Eastern

The recent Ebola outbreak in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has resulted in a rising death toll, reaching 118 fatalities on Monday, May 18, which is a significant jump from the 80 deaths recorded just two days earlier. This outbreak is the 17th recorded Ebola virus epidemic in the DRC and has been described as a matter of international emergency by the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Patrick Muyaya, the DRC government spokesperson, announced that two additional health zones have been identified as impacted by the virus. These include Nyankunde in the Irumu territory of Ituri province. A suspected case has also emerged in Goma, the chief town of North Kivu.

The outbreak is now affecting multiple geographic areas, including Mongwalu, Rwampara, Bunia, Nyankunde in Ituri, as well as Butembo-Katwa and Goma in North Kivu. 

Butembo, a commercial town in North Kivu, was severely impacted during the Ebola Zaire strain outbreak from 2018 to 2020. Goma, which has been under the control of the M23 rebels since early 2025, serves as a significant regional transit hub on the border with Rwanda and Uganda.

The Bundibugyo Ebola strain, noted as the 17th epidemic in the DRC, was declared on May 15. Complete sequencing of the viral genome confirms that it is a genetically distinct variant from previous Bundibugyo outbreaks in 2007 and 2012, originating directly from an animal reserve, according to Jean-Jacques Muyembe, director of the DRC National Institute of Biomedical Research.

On May 17, after the WHO declared the epidemic an international public health emergency, the British organisation Oxfam also estimated that the global number of infections currently stands at 400.

Russia launched more than 1,400 drones and 56 missiles into Ukraine on Wednesday and Thursday.

Much of the onslaught was aimed at the capital Kyiv, days after Russia threatened to do so only if Ukraine attacked its Victory Day parade in Moscow’s Red Square on May 9. It is a major Russian holiday commemorating the end of the Second World War.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had proposed a ceasefire, beginning as early as May 5.

Moscow did not respond until May 7, and presented its peace proposal as a unilateral initiative, accompanied by threats to punish Kyiv if it did not respect its terms.

Moscow said Russian front line units would “launch a massive missile strike” on central Kyiv if attacked.

Forty-three Russian drones and a number of ballistic missiles were launched into Ukraine on May 9, and another 27 drones on May 10. It was not until May 11 that Ukraine had a day of peace.

Moscow justified these attacks as reciprocity for Ukrainian assaults. Kyiv accused Moscow of breaking its own ceasefire.

Once the ceasefire was over, on the night of May 11, Russia launched 216 drones and followed up with a massive strike involving 892 drones overnight on May 12 and during the day on May 13.

The night of May 13-14 was worse with 675 drones accompanied by 56 missiles.

Official Ukrainian reports recorded strikes in at least 20 locations in the capital, including a nine-storey apartment building where 12 people were killed in the collapse.

“These are ordinary residential buildings, a school, a veterinary clinic, and other purely civilian infrastructure,” wrote Zelenskyy on his Telegram messaging channel. “These are definitely not the actions of those who believe that the war is coming to an end.”

Throughout the week, Ukraine said it shot down 92 percent of the 1,930 drones launched, close to Zelenskyy’s 95 percent kill target, with 41 out of 57 missiles downed.

Russia’s army slows down

Russia’s onslaught of came as its armies in eastern Ukraine slowed down.

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, estimated they had advanced by an average of 2.9 sq km (1.1 sq miles) in the first four months of 2026, compared with 9.76 sq km (3.76 sq miles) a day in the first third of 2025 and 14.9 sq km (5.8 sq miles) a day between October 2024 and March 2025.

Two weeks into May, that daily average had already dropped to 2.63 sq km (1 sq mile), suggesting Russia’s advance is slowing almost daily.

The ISW recently estimated that Ukraine made net territorial gains of 116 sq km (45 sq miles) in April – its first such advance since a September 2023 counteroffensive.

Some of that success is attributed to Ukraine’s successful use of drones behind the front lines.

On May 8, the Azov Corps of Ukraine’s National Guard announced it had “returned to Mariupol”, four years almost to the day since it surrendered control of the city to Russian forces.

The Corps filmed drone strikes on Russian diesel tankers, army trucks and other logistics 160 km (99 miles) behind the front line along the T-0509 highway, which feeds the Russian war effort in the Donetsk region.

“The strike depth will increase,” said the Azov Corps.

Their strikes are part of a broader Ukrainian campaign to hit Russian logistics at middle ranges of about 120-150 km (75-90 miles) from the front line as announced by Zelenskyy at the end of April.

“This primarily involves military logistics, enemy warehouses and headquarters, air defence systems and other components,” he said, adding that Ukraine had increased its strikes at this depth five-fold during the past year.

“We’re already carrying out about five thousand successful strikes at a depth of 20 plus km (12 miles) every month,” said Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov this week.

Also this week, a Russian military reporter said Ukrainian Hornet drones were targeting Russian logistics on roads closer to the frontlines.

“Although the front line is more than 35 km away from the M-30, it is currently paralysed due to enemy [First Person View drone] surveillance,” wrote the Russian reporter.

“In 2014-2015 the front line was closer, but the M-30 was safer,” he added. “This is because many people think that if the front line moves away from large cities and logistics routes they become safer, but for some reason no one takes into account that the range of enemy drones, even FPV surveillance, increases more rapidly relative to the movement of the front line.”

Russia’s declining performance is not due to lack of effort.

“The enemy has intensified offensive actions along almost the entire front and is regrouping its troops,” said Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskii on May 8. “The most tense area is currently the Pokrovsk direction, where the Russian aggressor has concentrated about 106,000 personnel,” he said.

Since March, Ukraine has increased strikes against Russian oil infrastructure as many as 1,700 km (1,056 miles) inside Russia, in an effort to starve its war machine of diesel and export revenue.

Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, said the Ukraine Security Service (SBU) hit the Yaroslavl oil refinery and Perm oil pumping station on May 8 – Perm sends oil in four directions across Russia to refineries and export terminals.

Russian media reports said the fire from a previous strike on the pumping station was not put out until May 11.

The SBU also said it hit the Perm refinery that day.

During the week, Ukrainian forces struck drone bases and a radar research centre in Rostov-on-Don, the Bryansk chemical plant, an explosives warehouse in Nizhny Novgorod and other targets.

Fedorov on Monday thanked Germany for investing $1bn in Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities, when his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, visited Kyiv.

“Overall, Ukraine’s positions right now – on the front line, in our long-range sanctions, and in our joint results with partners – are the strongest they have been in years,” said Zelenskyy.

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

The killings mark the fourth US deadly strike in the past four days on vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean.

The US military has killed four more people in its fourth deadly attack on vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean over the past four days.

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) announced the attack in a social media post on Tuesday, alongside a video that showed a stationary boat with outboard engines being hit by a missile and exploding into a huge ball of flames.

SOUTHCOM, which is responsible for US military operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, claimed that the four people killed were “narco-terrorists”, but provided no evidence to support its claims.

Justification for the lethal attack, according to SOUTHCOM, was due to intelligence – details of which were not provided – that confirmed that “the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the eastern Pacific and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations”.

The latest killing of people on board vessels in international waters in the eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean brings the overall death toll to at least 175 since early September, when US President Donald Trump ordered the attacks to stop what the White House claims are Latin American cartels transporting drugs to the US.

Tuesday’s killings came after two people were killed in a US strike on Monday, and five people were killed in two separate strikes on Saturday, also in the eastern Pacific.

The Associated Press news agency reported that the US coastguard has suspended a search for one survivor from the two attacks reported on Saturday.

International legal experts and rights groups say the US military campaign amounts to “extrajudicial killings” in international waters and that the attacks have targeted civilian fishing boats.

Legal experts have said that if some vessels were involved in drug trafficking, those on board should face the law, rather than deadly attacks.

Critics have also questioned the effectiveness of the US military operation in part because the fentanyl behind many fatal overdoses in the US, which Trump has used to justify his campaign, is typically trafficked to the US over land from Mexico, where it is produced with chemicals imported from China and India.