Russia Claims Oreshnik Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Now “On Combat Duty” In Belarus
Belarus has announced the deployment on its territory of Russia’s still-shadowy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile. The development comes soon after the appearance of satellite imagery that suggests that Moscow is likely stationing the nuclear-capable missiles in Belarus. However, there remain questions about the status of the Oreshnik, as well as its overall capabilities.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense today released a video that it says shows the deployment of the Oreshnik system on its territory. The footage shows a flag-raising ceremony involving Russian troops in Belarus as well as a column of vehicles moving out into a firing position in the field, where they are then covered in camouflage netting.
It’s notable that the vehicles shown appear to all be associated with support roles, rather than being transporter-erector launchers (TEL) for the missile itself. It could be the case that the TELs (and missiles) have yet to arrive in Belarus, or that they were deliberately omitted from the footage. It may also be that the missiles themselves are based elsewhere.
A senior officer is seen telling troops that the systems have officially been placed on combat duty and talks about the missile crews’ regular training and reconnaissance drills.
The location of the missile systems and the date of the video were not disclosed.
The release of the video follows Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s announcement earlier this month that the Oreshnik would be deployed in his country, part of his extensive military support for his staunch ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Only last week, evidence emerged pointing to the likely stationing of the Oreshnik at a former airbase near Krichev (also known as Krichev-6) in eastern Belarus, around 190 miles east of the capital of Minsk, and 300 miles southwest of Moscow.
After assessing available satellite imagery, researchers Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, in California, and Decker Eveleth of the CNA research and analysis organization in Virginia, said they were “90 percent certain” that mobile Oreshnik launchers would be stationed there, if they weren’t already.
Lewis and Eveleth highlighted a hurried construction project that began at the site between August 4-12, which was consistent with a Russian strategic missile base. By November of this year, key evidence included a “military-grade rail transfer point” surrounded by a security fence, from where TELs and other components could be unloaded. There were also signs of a concrete pad being constructed at the end of the former runway, “consistent with a camouflaged launch point.”
According to Lewis and Eveleth, the site near Krichev is large enough to accommodate three launchers. Previously, Lukashenko said up to 10 Oreshniks would be based in Belarus, suggesting that more might yet be fielded at other locations.
The researchers’ assessment “broadly aligns with U.S. intelligence findings,” Reuters reported, citing a person familiar with the matter who spoke to the news agency on the condition of anonymity.
After a December 2024 meeting with Lukashenko, Putin had made clear his plan to station Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, but the exact location had not previously been reported. The Russian leader had said the deployment would occur in the second half of 2025.
As for the Oreshnik (Russian for hazel tree) system itself, U.S. officials have said this is an intermediate-range design derived from the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The new missile first emerged in public after it was used in an unprecedented attack on Ukraine in November 2024. Ukrainian authorities said that the missile that was fired at them carried six warheads, each containing six more sub-payloads, but that these contained no explosives.
Otherwise, details about the Oreshnik remain limited. After its use against Ukraine, Putin described it as a “medium-range missile system” and “a ballistic missile equipped with non-nuclear hypersonic technology” capable of reaching a peak speed of Mach 10. “The kinetic impact is powerful, like a meteorite falling,” the Russian president also said.
Overall, Russian claims of hypersonic performance for the Oreshnik are questionable. There is no evidence of true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, for example, but larger ballistic missiles, even ones with traditional designs, do reach hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal stage of their flight.
Western estimates suggest the missile has a range of up to 3,400 miles.
While positioning the Oreshnik marginally farther west does extend its reach further into Europe, the difference is less significant, bearing in mind its already considerable maximum range is enough to hit every NATO capital city in Europe from within Russian territory. With that in mind, stationing these missiles in Belarus does little to practically enhance Moscow’s ability to deliver these kinds of weapons across Europe.
In fact, the missile’s likely minimum range, forward deploying the Oreshnik to Belarus might actually limit the ability to employ it against certain targets, such as those in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine’s capital Kyiv lies less than 60 miles from the border with Belarus.
Another option might be to use a very high lofted trajectory that would allow the missile to hit targets at shorter ranges, but there would still be a limit to what could be achieved in this way. At the same time, we don’t know for sure what kinds of trajectories the Oreshnik can actually be fired on.
Regardless, the deployment does carry important political and strategic signals. It means that Belarusian and Russian affairs are even more deeply intertwined, with the former firmly and openly under the protection of the latter’s nuclear deterrent umbrella. Russia had already begun deploying nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory in cooperation with that country’s armed forces in 2023.
Placing these missiles (and air-dropped nuclear bombs) in Belarus is indicative of the Kremlin’s new nuclear strategy, which includes basing these kinds of weapons outside its territory for the first time since the Cold War.
The apparent deployment also comes only weeks before the expiration of the 2010 New START pact, the last U.S.-Russia treaty that puts limits on the deployments of strategic nuclear weapons by these two powers.
For NATO, it’s very much arguable whether Russia’s placing of the Oreshnik in neighboring Belarus, rather than on Russian territory, will really be seen as a more direct threat.
“The military implications of this missile being in Belarus are not all that different from the missile being in Russia — the technical support site is already very close to the Russian border,” Eveleth wrote on X last week.
For Belarus, the situation is different. For a country in the international wilderness, the deployment does underscore Russia’s guarantee of providing Belarus with (nuclear) protection.
Russia’s revised nuclear stance also relies increasingly on these kinds of weapons to deter NATO members from supplying Kyiv with weapons that can strike deep inside Russia, although it’s questionable whether placing the Oreshnik in Belarus will have a significant, if any, effect in this regard.
More generally, the deployment of the Oreshnik has to be seen as part of Moscow’s response to U.S. plans to send its own intermediate-range strike capabilities to Germany, and potentially elsewhere in Europe, in the coming years. This includes planned “episodic deployments” of the U.S. Army’s Typhon ground-based missile system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and multi-purpose SM-6 missiles, as well as that service’s still-in-development Dark Eagle hypersonic missile. The U.S. Navy has also demonstrated its ability to deploy containerized launchers related to Typhon, which can be employed in a ground-based mode and also fire Tomahawks and SM-6s, to sites in Europe.
While these U.S. long-range strike systems are all conventionally armed, it’s worth recalling that the Oreshnik, too, can be utilized in a non-nuclear version, as demonstrated in Ukraine. The missile, therefore, presents a longer-range strategic-level threat that can be employed without crossing the nuclear threshold.
The potential value of a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which some countries may be looking at fielding if they haven’t already, is something that we discussed in detail in this previous story.
Provided that the Oreshnik is indeed now deployed on Belarusian territory, we still don’t know how many missiles might be involved, or what kinds of warheads they might carry. While we may learn more in due course, for now, the missile’s greatest significance is in the political domain.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
