Diplomacy

In early August, a Pentagon official stood in front of reporters and conceded something the department almost never says out loud: the world’s best-funded military cannot out-produce a country under invasion. Travis Metz, deputy director of the Defense Innovation Unit, put a number on it. Ukraine will manufacture six to seven million small first-person-view attack drones this year — roughly 500,000 a month, built in garages, repurposed furniture factories and basements within range of Russian glide bombs. The Pentagon’s own flagship drone program, a $1.1 billion initiative branded Drone Dominance, will have ordered fewer than 200,000 drones, cumulatively, by February 2027. Metz’s response was not defensive. It was aspirational: “I see no reason why we shouldn’t… be the world champions of this as well.” The gap he was describing is not a technology gap. It is a speed gap, and speed is the one metric wartime industry cannot fake.

The instinct is to read this as a story about Ukrainian ingenuity, and it is one. But it is also the epilogue to a specific American failure. In 2023 the Pentagon launched Replicator, a program to field “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within 24 months to counter China. By its August 2025 deadline it had delivered “hundreds,” not thousands, after burning through roughly $1 billion — undone by drones that were unfinished at selection, software that could not command large numbers of different systems at once, and a Switchblade loitering munition priced above $100,000 a unit. Washington’s answer was not to slow down and fix the model; it was to bring in the Department of Government Efficiency to override procurement rules and reclassify small drones as disposable supplies rather than regulated weapons systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s own Shahed and decoy drone output is reportedly climbing toward several hundred, and by some Ukrainian estimates up to a thousand, units a day. The war that forced Ukraine to mass-produce cheap drones is the same war exposing how slowly America still moves.

Why the gap isn’t about money

Start with unit economics, because they explain most of the gap. A Ukrainian FPV drone can be built for as little as $300 to $500 — an airframe, a camera, a battery and a warhead, assembled by hand and flown once. The Pentagon’s comparable systems have historically cost orders of magnitude more, not because the components are better but because they were designed inside an acquisition culture built for exquisite, low-volume platforms like fighter jets, where every part is sourced, tested and certified over years. Layer onto that a July 2026 rule requiring a “wholly domestic” supply chain — no Chinese-made motors, no Chinese battery packs — and the honest tension becomes visible: the policy meant to make American drone production more secure is, in the near term, also what makes it slower and more expensive to scale. Metz’s own explanation was blunt: it is “much harder to get from zero to 200,000” than to expand an existing line. Ukraine skipped that problem by never centralizing production in the first place — thousands of small, dispersed workshops that are individually replaceable and collectively enormous.

The deeper obstacle is not money but structure. Replicator had no dedicated budget line, was bounced between the Defense Innovation Unit and a newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group under Special Operations Command, and repeatedly selected systems that existed as concepts rather than finished products, in a rush to hit an artificial 24-month deadline. Congress, by its own research service’s account, has struggled to get basic cost and capability data out of the program. This is what forced DOGE’s intervention: not a shortage of appropriated dollars, but a procurement system engineered for careful, low-volume exquisiteness trying to behave like a wartime factory floor, and failing at both.

The strongest objection to treating this as a straightforward American failure is that the comparison is not apples to apples. Ukraine’s FPVs are disposable, short-range and built for a static front line; American planners are chasing autonomy, jamming resistance and long-range swarm coordination for a Pacific theatre defined by vast distances rather than trench lines, and that ambition costs more and takes longer to get right. That is a fair distinction — but it does not rescue the record. Years and a billion dollars into that more ambitious bet, the Pentagon still lacks software able to command mixed fleets of different drones, while Ukrainian manufacturers are already fielding AI-assisted terminal guidance on sub-$500 airframes, refined through thousands of real combat sorties a month. The ambition gap did not produce a capability lead. It produced the same failure as the cost gap: exquisite requirements colliding with a timeline the requirements were never built to meet.

Which is why the Pentagon’s actual fix looks nothing like a bigger budget. Six Ukrainian manufacturers, including F-Drones and General Cherry, are now required to form joint ventures with American companies — near Toledo, Ohio, and in New Hampshire — as a condition of future Pentagon orders. Washington is not just buying drones. It is importing the production model, and with it the tacit admission that the expertise now runs the other way.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on whether the joint-venture model actually transplants Ukraine’s manufacturing tempo onto US soil, or just its branding.

Base case (roughly 50 percent probability). The Ohio and New Hampshire joint ventures scale gradually. By 2027–28, US-based output climbs into the low hundreds of thousands annually — a real improvement, but still an order of magnitude below Ukraine’s current pace, held back by the domestic-sourcing rule’s cost premium. The program becomes a credible proof of concept for a future Indo-Pacific contingency rather than a fix for any current shortfall, and “Drone Dominance” quietly redefines success downward to match what it can actually deliver.

Downside case. The DOGE-driven bypass of standard testing repeats Replicator’s failure mode at greater scale: units purchased without adequate vetting turn out unreliable in the field, a GAO or inspector-general report documents it, and Congress reimposes the very procurement safeguards that were just stripped away. Combined with a Chinese-component ban that keeps unit costs well above Ukrainian levels, US output stalls again, and the gap that Metz conceded in August widens rather than closes by the time it next matters.

Upside case. The joint-venture model works as intended — not just as a purchasing arrangement but as a transplant of Ukrainian manufacturing culture, its dispersed micro-factories, rapid iteration and tolerance for combat-tested imperfection, into the American industrial base. That model, proven on drones, becomes the template for how Washington arms the next partner already fighting a war, whether Taiwan or a Baltic state: not a slow pipeline of finished stockpiles shipped from the continental United States, but manufacturing capability transplanted onto the partner’s own soil, and now, in this instance, onto America’s.

The takeaway

So: what does the mismatch reveal? Not that Ukraine builds better drones — the Pentagon never disputed that its own designs, on paper, are more capable. It reveals that capability on paper is not the same as capability in time, and that the American defense-industrial base, even backed by an executive order, a billion-dollar program and a DOGE override of its own rules, still cannot mobilize at wartime tempo on its own. The fix Washington has actually reached for is not more money. It is outsourcing the missing ingredient — speed — to the one partner that has been forced to master it under fire. That is the real admission, and it may be the more durable one: the next time the United States arms a country fighting a live war, it may look less like supplying an ally and more like apprenticing to one.

Watch for: whether the Ohio and New Hampshire joint-venture lines are shipping US-assembled drones at anything close to Ukrainian unit costs by the next Gauntlet test cycle at Fort Carson. If the “wholly domestic” sourcing rule keeps American-made units several multiples more expensive than their Ukrainian counterparts, the joint ventures will have transferred the branding of Ukraine’s drone war without transferring its speed.

Yes. The US South Korea relationship has not broken down under Donald Trump, but it has become more transactional, cost focused and strategically uncertain. The latest decision to scale back joint military exercises highlights a broader evolution in which Washington increasingly expects Seoul to shoulder more of the alliance burden while seeking greater flexibility for US forces across the region.

From deterrence to deal making

Trump’s approach to South Korea has been shaped heavily by his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. His first term moved rapidly from threats of “fire and fury” to unprecedented summits with Kim, followed by the suspension or redesign of major US South Korean military exercises.

Although the Hanoi summit collapsed without a denuclearisation agreement, Trump has continued to emphasise his relationship with Kim. His latest instruction to reduce joint exercises therefore carries significance beyond cost savings. It signals that Washington may once again be willing to modify elements of its alliance posture in pursuit of diplomatic space with Pyongyang.

The strategic environment, however, is very different from 2018. North Korea has expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities and strengthened military cooperation with Russia. Reducing exercises therefore creates a more complicated calculation for Seoul: diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang may reduce tensions temporarily, but weaker military preparedness could also increase the risks associated with North Korea’s growing capabilities.

The alliance is becoming more transactional

The clearest transformation under Trump is arguably the growing emphasis on burden sharing.

Trump has repeatedly questioned the cost of maintaining roughly 28,500 US troops in South Korea and has pushed Seoul to contribute more to its own defence. The existing cost sharing agreement requires South Korea to contribute about 1.52 trillion won this year toward the upkeep of US forces.

For Washington, the argument is straightforward: South Korea is wealthy enough to assume a greater share of the financial and military burden. For Seoul, however, the US military presence remains central to deterring North Korea.

This creates a fundamental tension. The alliance is still strategically valuable to both sides, but Trump increasingly approaches it through a cost benefit framework rather than solely through traditional alliance commitments.

Defence cooperation is expanding even as exercises face pressure

The apparent contradiction is important. Trump is seeking to reduce certain military exercises while South Korea itself is increasing defence spending.

President Lee Jae Myung has pledged a larger security role and increased defence spending, while continuing to insist that Washington’s security commitment remains firm. Seoul has also sought greater strategic autonomy, including greater latitude over nuclear fuel technology and faster progress toward transferring wartime operational control.

This suggests that the alliance may be evolving rather than simply weakening.

South Korea appears to be preparing to assume greater responsibility for its own defence, while Washington wants the alliance to become more flexible and potentially address security challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula.

That latter objective is particularly sensitive for Seoul. The United States increasingly views its Asian alliances through the broader strategic competition with China, while South Korea remains primarily focused on the immediate threat from North Korea.

Trade has become inseparable from security

Under Trump, economic relations have also become an increasingly important component of the alliance.

Washington’s tariff pressure has pushed Seoul toward major investment commitments in the United States, including the $350 billion investment pledge associated with tariff relief. South Korean companies have already invested heavily in US semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles and shipbuilding.

But disagreements over how the investment should be structured have exposed the limits of Trump’s transactional approach. Seoul has warned that demands for large upfront cash commitments could place pressure on its economy.

The detention of hundreds of South Korean workers during an immigration raid at a Hyundai LG battery project in Georgia further demonstrated how economic and political tensions can spill directly into the strategic relationship.

The result is an alliance in which security guarantees, trade concessions, investment and troop costs increasingly form one interconnected negotiation.

The deeper problem is strategic uncertainty

The central challenge for Seoul is not simply whether Trump wants fewer exercises. It is whether Washington’s definition of the alliance is changing.

For decades, the US South Korea alliance rested on a relatively clear bargain: Washington provided extended deterrence and military forces, while Seoul contributed financially and militarily to maintaining the security architecture.

Trump’s approach introduces more conditionality into that bargain.

If military exercises can be reduced because they are considered too expensive or diplomatically inconvenient, Seoul has to consider how predictable the US commitment remains. At the same time, Washington expects South Korea to spend more, invest more and potentially assume greater responsibility.

This could ultimately produce a stronger South Korean military, but it could also create greater uncertainty about the role of the United States.

What this means for China and the Indo Pacific

The evolution of the alliance also has implications far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Washington wants greater flexibility for US forces stationed in South Korea to respond to regional contingencies, particularly those involving China. Seoul, however, has historically been reluctant to become directly involved in a confrontation over Taiwan.

That creates a structural divergence in strategic priorities.

For Washington, South Korea is increasingly part of a broader Indo Pacific security network. For Seoul, the primary purpose of the alliance remains deterrence against North Korea.

Trump’s transactional approach therefore forces South Korea to navigate between two competing imperatives: maintaining the American security umbrella while avoiding excessive strategic dependence on Washington’s wider confrontation with Beijing.

The alliance has changed, but it has not collapsed

Trump has not dismantled the US South Korea alliance. Instead, he is redefining its terms.

Military exercises are being reconsidered, defence burden sharing remains contentious, trade and investment have become bargaining instruments, and Washington increasingly expects Seoul to assume greater responsibility for regional security.

For South Korea, this creates both a risk and an opportunity. Greater defence spending and military autonomy could make Seoul less dependent on American forces. But if Washington simultaneously reduces visible commitments while demanding greater financial and strategic contributions, Seoul could find itself paying more for an alliance that feels less predictable.

The most important question, therefore, is not whether Trump is weakening the alliance. It is whether he is transforming it from a traditional security partnership into a transactional strategic bargain.

If that transformation continues, the US South Korea alliance could survive Trump, but it may emerge fundamentally different from the alliance Washington and Seoul built over the past seven decades.

With information from Reuters.

Vietnam’s sovereign AI relies heavily on open-weight models developed in the United States. However, as Washington and Beijing are moving to restrict access to these technologies, Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy offers little protection to its AI ambitions.

In mid-July, Vietnam approved its National Digital Transformation Strategy for 2026-2030 under Decision 1266/QD-TTg, and the National Data Strategy under Decision 1308/QD-TTg. Both strategies aim for national digital sovereignty, domestic self-reliance and state-level data governance on the assumption that artificial intelligence (AI) models would remain a public good. Within days, the United States (U.S.) and China signalled their readiness to restrict access to those models.

Made in America

Vietnam’s current AI systems are modified versions of foreign tech. On the ground, Viettel, the state military telecom giant spearheading Vietnam’s AI goals, announced its VT-Super-120B-A12B Vietnamese language model had matched the accuracy of major global models of similar size. It was built by adapting Nemotron, Nvidia’s freely downloadable model family, to Vietnamese data. Viettel’s earlier model was also built on Meta’s Llama 3, trained with Nvidia tooling, and run on a cluster of 22 DGX B200 supercomputers at its Hoa Lac centre.

Moreover, VNG’s GreenNode subsidiary introduced GreenMind-Medium-14B-R1, the first open-source Vietnamese reasoning model built to run on Nvidia’s software and a single Nvidia H100 graphics chip. Meanwhile, FPT Corporation committed $200 million to build its AI factory powered by Nvidia hardware.

At the state level, Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology met with senior executives from Qualcomm in Hanoi on July 17. Deputy Minister of Science and Technology Hoang Minh and Qualcomm’s Executive Vice President Durga Malladi discussed expanding cooperation in AI semiconductors, research and development, and workforce training.

While Vietnam has made its bets on the U.S. for its AI ambitions, other Southeast Asian countries are leaning towards China. Indonesia’s Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison partnered with AIonOS on DeepSeek-powered services, and Malaysia’s Communications Ministry launched a sovereign full-stack AI ecosystem running on Huawei hardware.

Outside Two Blocs

AI governance is dividing into two blocs. One bloc is the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, which coordinates trusted supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals and AI infrastructure with 24 signatories. Singapore, the Philippines, India, Japan and South Korea are among them. The Philippines converted membership into commitments by agreeing in April 2026 to a 4,000-acre economic security zone in the Luzon economic corridor designated as the initiative’s first AI-native industrial hub.

The other is the Chinese-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, signed into existence in Shanghai on July 16 by 29 governments. The membership also includes Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela and most of Central Asia, alongside Vietnam’s neighbours Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

Membership in either bloc could offer access to supply chains, technical assistance and software distribution during a diplomatic crisis.

However, Vietnam belongs to neither group because of its long-standing bamboo diplomacy, a policy of balancing relations between Washington and Beijing without taking sides. This leaves Hanoi in an awkward position. Vietnam depends heavily on American technology, but enjoys none of the guarantees or protections of one.

Weaponising Access

Export controls on chips work because processors are physical goods, subject to customs enforcement. On May 31, the Bureau of Industry and Security extended licensing requirements to any China-parented buyer worldwide, closing loopholes in Singapore and Malaysia.

AI models do not behave the same way. Access to a closed system can be revoked instantly by flipping an application programming interface (API) key. For example, on June 12, Anthropic suspended access to its Fable and Mythos models to comply with U.S. Commerce Department export controls, restoring access only on July 1 after those controls were lifted. Such events largely explain why governments prefer AI models they can host locally.

In contrast, an open-weight model, once downloaded, cannot be recalled by any foreign regulator. Instead, global superpowers exert control by forcing major tech companies and code-sharing platforms to block downloads from specific regions or countries. They can also pressure developers to restrict future model updates to dodge penalties from Washington or Beijing.

This fight over AI access is now an open battle. On July 16, Chinese startup Moonshot AI unveiled Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter model that independent evaluators say matches top American models at a fraction of their operating cost. On July 21, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signalled that Washington could sanction Chinese tech firms, citing American-model watermarks found inside Chinese ones. Days later, China’s Ministry of Commerce called the investigations groundless, threatened countermeasures, and began consulting Alibaba, ByteDance and Z.ai on export controls covering model weights, training data and chip designs.

Why It Matters

For years, nations have built digital capacity cheaply and quickly by customising open-weight AI models. Kimi K3 seemed to promise that era would continue. Instead, the geopolitical fallout exposed the fragility of relying on superpower goodwill.

For Vietnam, the real threat is getting left behind. Washington or Beijing cannot delete the AI models already sitting on Vietnamese servers. What they can block is future releases. If both superpowers restrict open-weight models, Vietnam’s AI ecosystem gets stuck using today’s tools while the rest of the world moves forward. A national tech stack built on frozen updates decays one generation at a time. States that have not localised model weights face an even harsher reality. Their access relies on live connections and downloads that can vanish overnight with a new policy.

At its core, this is a problem of time. Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy relies on having time to adapt. Trade deals and defence agreements move slowly, giving Hanoi room to bend without breaking. AI access, however, moves instantly as access disappears with a revoked key or a blocked download link.

Diplomatically, Vietnam tries to stay neutral at all costs. However, its technology does not try to do so. All of its major AI models are built on American weights, run on American chips, and improve when American companies release new ones. Vietnam acts as if it can delay picking a side, but with every new AI update or blocked release, the cost of delay becomes more expensive. In the past, diplomatic pressure moved slowly through international summits. Today, that pressure speeds up with every new model release.

Dhaka Seeks a New Start

Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told India’s envoy on Monday that the two countries needed to create a “conducive environment” to strengthen bilateral ties, as Dhaka continues to press New Delhi over the politically sensitive issue of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India.

Rahman’s remarks highlight his six-month-old government’s efforts to stabilise relations with its largest neighbour while seeking progress on issues that have remained major sources of tension since Hasina was ousted in August 2024.

While Rahman has sought closer relations with India since taking office, Monday’s comments were his first to explicitly stress the need to improve the broader environment for bilateral engagement.

Hasina’s Extradition Remains a Key Dispute

Rahman made the remarks during his first meeting with India’s new High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi.

Rahman “emphasized the need to create a conducive environment to further advance the bilateral relations between the two countries”, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement following the meeting.

Bangladesh also urged India to expedite Hasina’s extradition.

Hasina, who has remained in India since the collapse of her government, is facing legal proceedings in Bangladesh and was sentenced to death in November.

Hasina’s Return Raises Fresh Tensions

The extradition request came days after Hasina interacted with the media for the first time since fleeing Bangladesh.

During an online audio conference, she reiterated that she would return to Bangladesh in December, drawing renewed attention to her continued presence and political activities in India.

Bangladesh’s foreign ministry strongly criticised the event, saying that India’s decision to allow Hasina to participate was deeply hurtful and that Bangladesh was outraged.

India has said it is examining Bangladesh’s extradition request in accordance with its legal and judicial procedures.

India Signals Willingness to Engage

In a post on X, the Indian High Commission said Trivedi reiterated India’s commitment to working with Bangladesh in a “positive, constructive and forward-looking manner”.

The exchange reflects the delicate balancing act facing both governments as they attempt to preserve bilateral ties while disagreements over Hasina’s future continue to complicate relations.

Can the Relationship Move Beyond Hasina?

For Dhaka, securing Hasina’s extradition remains a politically sensitive issue, while for New Delhi, any decision on the request carries broader implications for its relationship with Bangladesh and the country’s evolving political landscape.

Rahman’s call for a “conducive environment” suggests that Dhaka is seeking to prevent the dispute from overwhelming wider bilateral relations.

For India and Bangladesh, cooperation on broader areas of mutual interest will increasingly depend on whether the two sides can manage the Hasina issue without allowing it to become a permanent obstacle to engagement.

With information from Reuters.

A chapbook by Henry Opeyemi 

Publisher: Felis Catus Press

“The purpose of literature is to turn blood into ink.”

T.S. Eliot

Henry Opeyemi is an oracle, and this chapbook is a miracle of sorts; it is a prayer of consolation, a hymn, a psalm, a song that gives birth to awakening after awakening, enlightenment after enlightenment. It starts with conscientising and ends by raising a phoenix-like awareness of boyhood and its challenges on the African continent. Where Rumi, Khalil Gibran, Weldon Kees, Mzi Mahola, and Ken Saro-Wiwa walked, where Rethabile Masilo walks, now Henry Opeyemi walks alongside these giants. There was Derek Walcott, Langston Hughes, those constellations feeding galaxies, and now there is Henry Opeyemi.

Perhaps all poets have an innate sense of clairvoyance. They can recognise the pains of the land, the masculine and feminine pains of the vessel of an African body, the psychological torment, the mental despair, the stigmatized struggle, the social alienation, the estrangement from the land of our ancestors, and the unbearable loneliness that every waking moment a poet experiences, lives with, suffers from, and the devastation of the internal landscape of the wounded children of Africa. Yes, yes, yes. Henry Opeyemi has turned blood into ink, and the veins are enriched with shelter.

These poems, each one “peeling itself into joy” (from the poem, Wanderers on pg.5).

This manuscript cleanses like the sea. Writing is a spiritual act, a spiritual dance. It is meditative and comes with instructions. It is sacred. When the hand of God moves through the pen, the poet must obey, and Henry Opeyemi has obeyed. The title of this chapbook speaks about black vulnerability, black stigma, the rallying cry of injustice and inequality, systemic racism, the undertow of the vision of poverty-stricken, disenfranchised and marginalised Africa. Henry Opeyemi writes about miracles in the same breath that he confronts suicide ideation, and when he writes, as he does in his dedication, “of the land of his youth”, he is addressing the social ills of the day, he is speaking to every man, woman, youth and child on the African continent. 

The dedication is a searing polemic, a testimony to a time that came before, and that sadly, heartwrenchingly still exists. The bittersweet river of the sands of time through the hourglass, the tapestry of exile, the memory of the silent witness, the memory of the historian and recorder and poet, the novel dispensation that we are living and co-existing in with the pains of a wandering soul, and history, have not erased anything. We, as African poets, living on the African continent beset with problems of despair and conflict, a continent ravaged by “hungry bowls” as the poet writes, we are the angry souls, the grief, heartbreak and emptiness of our rages.

There is beauty in the poetic sense and sensibility of Henry Opeyemi, and a sense of isolation. Every poet from this continent writes about what we have faced, endured, survived (colonialism, liberation, independence, civil war), and the terrible price we have had to pay, the debts of love of our mothers, the considerable debts of love of the maternal figures in our lives. There is the moral distress, the psychiatric distress, and cry of the poet, the language of moral decay in these verses, and the injury, the sickness, the mental tension, the utter mental turmoil and devastation, and the moral distress of the decay of the mind, of the psychological framework, of the alienation, the social ineptitude and isolation, the rejection from the church, from the community, from society who has labeled the citizens and inhabitants of African descent as interlopers, from the immediate and maternal and paternal family of the individual, of the poet.

Henry Opeyemi is the poetic version of Moses Molelekwa, and in his verses abound “genes and spirits”, ancestral kingdoms and bloodlines.

Every African writer, every African novelist and African poet who lives on the continent and finds themselves elsewhere in the world, writes about stigma, whether they acknowledge this consciously or subconsciously. It is written on the blueprint of our consciousness. Henry Opeyemi (remember this name) writes about the wounded child, the boy, the youth’s fractured sense of self and the youth’s spoiled identity, marginalised identity, wanting to seek validation and approval from the powers that be, from the same gender parent, from adult supervision, from their contemporaries, from leaders, from mentors. Every poet is a wanderer, a directionless nomad, a seeker, a believer if he has found the certainty of faith, of religious instructions and meditative practices. When I write, I write as an African, who lives on the African continent first and foremost; secondly, I write as a woman.

On these pages, a particular tenderness is personified in the writing. The wound is sacred and as omnipresent as the omega, and the grief our mothers have carried is a sacred kind of grief that their cells carried when they were in the womb of the maternal grandmother. The mother-figure is the portal, the origin of humanity. It is where the tension and spark of history coincide with the psychological repair, release and repair of life. 

The poet serves grief, heartbreak, their loneliness on a silver platter to humanity, like a beacon, an anchor, a lighthouse in the storm, like the being of light, like daybreak, like an oyster it is consumed, eaten, studied, investigated, and it is this noble endeavour, the practice of writing poetry about grief, heartbreak, and loneliness, that serves us, our collective humanity, exile and history, that is a remainder of colonialism that will last the test of time, that will serve as proof of evidence that we existed, that we were here, that this was our collective emotional pain on the face of the African continent.

The grief of Africa is, unfortunately, not bloodless. Even her tears are, in fact, tears of blood, of war, of strife, of conflict, of genocide. Poetry is our only method of self-defence. It is the survival, coping and defence mechanism of the novelist, the journalist, the filmmaker, the editor, most of all, the poet. It always has been since the onset of slavery and colonialism and independence. Henry Opeyemi does what poets have done before and after colonialism, he discusses emancipation, personal freedom, personal growth, missionary education, liberation, self-improvement, his youth, his Africa, he addresses the ritual of bone, blood, bowl, the question of God and religion, yes, how immortal religion defies and defines us, guides and interrogates us, he mentions the roles of Big Pharma, and the use of pharmaceuticals in society, are they of help or hindrance? He speaks about the mother-figure, the abandonment of Eve, the resurrection of Lady Macbeth on these pages. The mosque becomes an education, the mind of the young intellectual like a feverish young tree, eager for verdant-green growth, branches like limbs, eager to be acknowledged in a garden of other poets, all vying for attention and literary prizes, or, or, humility, imaginative grace, which is, to all intents and purposes more powerful than attention and literary prizes. 

Creative writing, the practice of writing poetry, is an intellectual pursuit. It is the cultural endeavour of the modern-day philosopher, and all poets are wanderers for an eternity of time.

Sidenote: Henry Opeyemi, welcome to the African Renaissance. May you mentor other poets, you, young poet, young leader, young intellectual. Africa is in good hands. Be, go forth, onwards and upwards; be as all princes from this continent who write poetry; be King of the World. Take the empire back. Build your own empires of gold from the dust of the colonial masters, from the powers that be.

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has entered its fifth year, with military operations continuing alongside intermittent diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement. The United States and European allies remain Ukraine’s principal supporters, providing military, financial, and political backing.

At the recent G7 summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy met U.S. President Donald Trump and other Western leaders to discuss the war and prospects for peace negotiations. Following those discussions, Trump expressed optimism that a peace deal could eventually be reached.

What Happened?

Senior Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said European leaders likely influenced Trump’s views on the Ukraine war during the G7 summit.

Ushakov suggested Trump had been given misleading information about developments on the battlefield and rejected claims that Ukraine’s recent drone operations had significantly improved Kyiv’s military position.

The Kremlin official also said Moscow still expects visits from Trump’s envoys, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, although no timetable has been announced.

Key Statements

Kremlin Position

• European leaders are exerting an “unhelpful influence” on Trump regarding Ukraine.
• Russia believes Trump may have received inaccurate assessments of the battlefield situation.
• Moscow maintains that Ukraine’s military position has not improved as claimed by Kyiv and its allies.

Trump’s Position

• Trump said after meeting Zelenskiy that Russia should make peace with Ukraine.
• He described discussions at the G7 as constructive.
• Trump has continued to signal interest in facilitating a negotiated settlement.

Why It Matters

The comments offer insight into how Moscow views Trump’s evolving position on the war and the role of European leaders in shaping Western policy.

Russia appears keen to preserve direct communication channels with Trump while simultaneously pushing back against narratives advanced by Ukraine and its European supporters. The remarks also suggest the Kremlin remains attentive to potential diplomatic openings involving the United States despite ongoing military operations.

The episode highlights the growing importance of diplomacy and messaging as all sides attempt to influence future peace discussions.

Stakeholders

• Donald Trump
• Volodymyr Zelenskiy
• Vladimir Putin
• Yuri Ushakov
• European G7 leaders
• U.S. diplomatic envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner
• Russian and Ukrainian armed forces

What’s Next?

• Potential visits by Trump’s envoys to Moscow for further discussions.
• Continued efforts by Ukraine and European allies to secure stronger U.S. backing.
• Russian attempts to influence Washington’s understanding of battlefield developments.
• Further diplomatic contacts aimed at exploring conditions for a possible peace framework.
• Monitoring whether Trump’s public optimism translates into concrete negotiations.

Analysis

The Kremlin’s comments reveal an important strategic calculation: Moscow wants to criticize European influence on Trump without alienating Trump himself.

By describing Trump as a strong leader who ultimately forms his own views, the Kremlin is attempting to preserve a working relationship with the U.S. president while casting doubt on information coming from Kyiv and European capitals. This messaging suggests Russia still sees value in engaging directly with Trump and may believe he could play a decisive role in future negotiations.

The remarks also reflect a broader battle over perceptions of the war. Ukraine and its allies have highlighted successful long range drone strikes and attacks on Russian infrastructure as evidence that Kyiv retains leverage. Russia, meanwhile, seeks to project confidence and reject suggestions that its strategic position has weakened.

Looking ahead, the key question is whether the apparent diplomatic momentum emerging from recent meetings can produce substantive negotiations. Both Moscow and Kyiv continue to believe they have leverage, making compromises difficult. As a result, public statements from leaders and advisers are increasingly becoming part of a larger effort to shape the diplomatic environment before any formal peace talks begin.

With information from Reuters.

The preliminary memorandum represents the first formal framework outlining how Washington and Tehran intend to move from military confrontation toward diplomacy.

While many details remain unpublished, statements from U.S., Iranian and Pakistani officials provide a broad outline of the deal’s structure.

Rather than resolving every dispute immediately, the agreement establishes a phased process aimed at reducing tensions first and addressing more difficult issues later.

The approach reflects the reality that both sides were able to reach consensus on ending hostilities more easily than on the underlying disputes that fueled the conflict.

Phase One: Ending the Fighting

The first stage focuses on immediate de-escalation.

According to mediator Pakistan, both sides have agreed to permanently halt military operations across all fronts.

The formal memorandum is expected to be signed in Switzerland, after which implementation would begin.

The objective of this phase is straightforward: stop active hostilities, reduce the risk of escalation, and create space for broader negotiations.

This represents the most immediate achievement of the agreement and is likely the reason markets reacted positively.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the agreement’s most significant economic provision.

The waterway serves as one of the world’s most important energy transit routes and has been at the center of global concerns throughout the conflict.

Both sides indicate that commercial shipping will resume following the signing of the memorandum.

The restoration of maritime traffic could:

• Increase global oil supply.
• Reduce shipping disruptions.
• Ease pressure on energy prices.
• Lower inflation risks for major economies.

However, questions remain over how the route will be governed.

Iran has suggested it will coordinate management of traffic with Oman, potentially giving Tehran a more formal role in overseeing one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

That issue could become a future source of diplomatic friction.

The Nuclear Issue Has Been Deferred

The most controversial subject in the negotiations remains unresolved.

Rather than settling the nuclear dispute immediately, both sides appear to have agreed to address it during a 60-day negotiation period.

According to Iranian officials, Tehran would freeze nuclear activities during that time by halting additional enrichment and refraining from expanding facilities.

The long-term future of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains unclear.

Washington continues to emphasize inspections and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful and seeks recognition of its right to maintain civilian nuclear activities.

These competing positions are likely to dominate the next phase of talks.

Sanctions Relief Could Shape the Success of the Deal

Economic issues may ultimately prove as difficult as nuclear negotiations.

Iran expects meaningful sanctions relief as part of any final settlement.

Iranian officials have spoken about:

• Temporary waivers on oil sanctions.
• The release of frozen assets.
• Financial support mechanisms.
• A pathway toward lifting U.S. and international sanctions.

The Trump administration has signaled a more cautious approach.

Washington has indicated that sanctions relief will depend on Iranian compliance and future negotiations rather than automatic implementation.

This difference highlights one of the central tensions in the agreement: each side expects benefits on different timelines.

Lebanon Remains a Flashpoint

The agreement’s treatment of Lebanon illustrates how regional conflicts have become intertwined.

Iran views a ceasefire in Lebanon as a critical component of the broader settlement.

Lebanese political leaders have welcomed the inclusion of Lebanon in the framework.

Israel, however, has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by all aspects of the agreement and intends to maintain military positions in areas it views as strategically important.

This creates uncertainty about whether the Lebanon component can be implemented as envisioned.

The issue could quickly become one of the first tests of the agreement’s durability.

Why This Matters

The memorandum matters because it shifts the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The agreement addresses several immediate concerns:

• Rising energy prices.
• Shipping disruptions.
• Escalating regional instability.
• Growing economic uncertainty.

At the same time, it leaves the most difficult questions unresolved.

This means the framework should be viewed as the beginning of a diplomatic process rather than its conclusion.

Its success will depend on whether negotiators can transform temporary understandings into binding commitments.

Key Stakeholders

• United States
• Iran
• Pakistan (mediator)
• Israel
• Lebanon
• Oman
• European powers
• Gulf Arab states
• International energy markets
• Global shipping industry
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear inspectors

What to Watch Next

• Formal signing of the memorandum in Switzerland.
• Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
• Progress during the 60-day negotiation period.
• Discussions on Iran’s nuclear program.
• Decisions regarding sanctions relief.
• Reactions from Congress and international partners.
• Israeli actions in Lebanon and other contested areas.

The memorandum creates a framework for de-escalation, but its long-term success remains uncertain.

If implemented effectively, the agreement could stabilize energy markets, reduce regional tensions, and create momentum for broader diplomatic engagement.

However, many of the issues that triggered the conflict remain unresolved.

Nuclear enrichment, sanctions, regional security arrangements, and competing strategic interests are all likely to generate difficult negotiations.

The coming 60 days will therefore be more important than the announcement itself.

They will determine whether the framework becomes a durable peace process or merely a temporary pause in a conflict whose underlying disputes remain intact.

Analysis

The structure of the agreement reveals a pragmatic calculation by both Washington and Tehran.

Rather than attempting to solve every dispute at once, negotiators prioritized issues where agreement was achievable: ending active hostilities, reopening shipping routes, and creating a mechanism for future talks.

This approach reflects the political realities facing both governments.

For President Trump, reducing energy prices and ending a costly conflict addresses growing domestic pressure. For Iran, halting military operations while preserving room to negotiate on sanctions and nuclear issues offers a path to economic relief without immediate capitulation.

Yet the framework’s greatest strength may also be its greatest weakness.

By postponing the hardest questions, the agreement creates momentum for diplomacy but also leaves significant room for disagreement later. Nuclear enrichment, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements are not peripheral issues—they are the core disputes that drove the conflict.

As a result, the memorandum should be viewed less as a peace treaty and more as a diplomatic bridge. It lowers immediate risks and creates opportunities for negotiation, but it does not yet resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran.

Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or a temporary truce will depend on what happens after the signatures are placed on the document. The real negotiations are only beginning.

With information from Reuters.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

With its recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Delhi, the Quad has again shown it remains active, defying widespread rumours of collapse.

While the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers highlighted their countries’ strong relations with India and the Quad’s central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture, Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India was the most noteworthy aspect, as he repeatedly emphasized the significance of Indo-US relations.

Speculations about the Quad’s potential dissolution, reminiscent of developments in the 2000s, were fuelled by the postponement of the leaders’ summit, President Trump’s apparent lack of interest, and a more conciliatory approach toward China. Even so, the meeting reaffirmed the US’s ongoing engagement in the region and its support for the Quad.

The Quad’s momentum currently faces its principal challenge not from India’s or the US’s relations with Australia and Japan, but from a complicated Indo-US relationship.

Two factors show why India-US relations are central to the Quad’s minilateral framework.

Over the past year, India has faced unprecedented criticism from the US administration, particularly from President Trump, who has been critical of India on trade and security fronts. Issues such as tariff disputes, H-1B visa restrictions affecting Indian professionals, deepening US relations with the Pakistan Army, and increased US involvement in Bangladesh and Nepal have contributed to growing distrust about the US’s willingness to cooperate with India and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to several contentious statements by President Trump directed at India, Rubio’s visit served as a diplomatic effort to restore bilateral relations. His repeated emphasis on India’s role as a strategic partner signalled a commitment to improving ties. While a single visit cannot resolve all tensions from the past year, it reassures India and reduces the risk of further deterioration.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting became feasible only after India and the US undertook concerted efforts to revive bilateral relations. Notable examples include India’s invitation to the US to attend the AI Impact Summit in February 2026, ongoing trade agreement negotiations, and the US decision to invite India to the Pax Silica initiative. The meeting occurred only after a certain level of normalization had been achieved. Even so, a leaders’ summit is unlikely unless President Trump and Prime Minister Modi demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing India-US relations.

Second, without proactive American engagement, Japan, Australia, and India may develop their own trilateral regional strategies, perhaps with some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. However, the impact of such an alternative would be limited and localized. Japan could take a greater role in sustaining and rebuilding regional economic frameworks, replicating the Trans-Pacific Partnership experiment. Still, due to constitutional and capacity constraints, Tokyo is unlikely to replace Washington as the region’s primary security guarantor soon.

Although the Quad’s resilience is maintained by the agency and commitment of Australia, India, and Japan rather than by exclusive US leadership, strong US involvement in the Indo-Pacific security mechanism will remain a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

China’s persistent assertive behaviour remains the central factor. It continues to employ coercive tactics and expand its influence in regions critical to the US and its partners, so the original motivations for revitalizing the Quad remain relevant. Although the US approach to China is evolving, the fundamental dynamics of US-China relations remain unchanged. In the long term, Washington will require frameworks such as the Quad to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the erosion of its strategic influence. Consequently, the Quad is likely to remain central to regional strategy, with India as a key partner.

The US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s statement that the US is not going to make the same mistakes with India that it made with China 20 years ago must not guide Indo-US relations. The US needs India as much as India needs the US, and unlike China, India-US relations rest on shared values – democracy, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, and a common vision of maintaining a rules-based liberal international order. Both countries require mutually beneficial cooperation to advance their strategic objectives. Other Quad members and Indo-Pacific stakeholders also depend on collaboration between Washington and New Delhi to maintain strategic equilibrium and preserve the bloc’s cohesion.

The US regards India as a responsible stakeholder and a regional counterweight to China, especially after the limited outcomes of President Trump’s recent visit to China. Conversely, India depends on the US for advanced technology, strategic investments, and long-term defense needs. This mutual dependence makes both countries indispensable to each other, and significant short-term trade diversification is unlikely. Even if achieved, it would likely harm both parties.

The US must strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Quad and its member states to develop an effective regional strategy. Closer strategic coordination among Quad partners, particularly with India, is essential to this effort.