Diplomacy

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has entered its fifth year, with military operations continuing alongside intermittent diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement. The United States and European allies remain Ukraine’s principal supporters, providing military, financial, and political backing.

At the recent G7 summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy met U.S. President Donald Trump and other Western leaders to discuss the war and prospects for peace negotiations. Following those discussions, Trump expressed optimism that a peace deal could eventually be reached.

What Happened?

Senior Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said European leaders likely influenced Trump’s views on the Ukraine war during the G7 summit.

Ushakov suggested Trump had been given misleading information about developments on the battlefield and rejected claims that Ukraine’s recent drone operations had significantly improved Kyiv’s military position.

The Kremlin official also said Moscow still expects visits from Trump’s envoys, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, although no timetable has been announced.

Key Statements

Kremlin Position

• European leaders are exerting an “unhelpful influence” on Trump regarding Ukraine.
• Russia believes Trump may have received inaccurate assessments of the battlefield situation.
• Moscow maintains that Ukraine’s military position has not improved as claimed by Kyiv and its allies.

Trump’s Position

• Trump said after meeting Zelenskiy that Russia should make peace with Ukraine.
• He described discussions at the G7 as constructive.
• Trump has continued to signal interest in facilitating a negotiated settlement.

Why It Matters

The comments offer insight into how Moscow views Trump’s evolving position on the war and the role of European leaders in shaping Western policy.

Russia appears keen to preserve direct communication channels with Trump while simultaneously pushing back against narratives advanced by Ukraine and its European supporters. The remarks also suggest the Kremlin remains attentive to potential diplomatic openings involving the United States despite ongoing military operations.

The episode highlights the growing importance of diplomacy and messaging as all sides attempt to influence future peace discussions.

Stakeholders

• Donald Trump
• Volodymyr Zelenskiy
• Vladimir Putin
• Yuri Ushakov
• European G7 leaders
• U.S. diplomatic envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner
• Russian and Ukrainian armed forces

What’s Next?

• Potential visits by Trump’s envoys to Moscow for further discussions.
• Continued efforts by Ukraine and European allies to secure stronger U.S. backing.
• Russian attempts to influence Washington’s understanding of battlefield developments.
• Further diplomatic contacts aimed at exploring conditions for a possible peace framework.
• Monitoring whether Trump’s public optimism translates into concrete negotiations.

Analysis

The Kremlin’s comments reveal an important strategic calculation: Moscow wants to criticize European influence on Trump without alienating Trump himself.

By describing Trump as a strong leader who ultimately forms his own views, the Kremlin is attempting to preserve a working relationship with the U.S. president while casting doubt on information coming from Kyiv and European capitals. This messaging suggests Russia still sees value in engaging directly with Trump and may believe he could play a decisive role in future negotiations.

The remarks also reflect a broader battle over perceptions of the war. Ukraine and its allies have highlighted successful long range drone strikes and attacks on Russian infrastructure as evidence that Kyiv retains leverage. Russia, meanwhile, seeks to project confidence and reject suggestions that its strategic position has weakened.

Looking ahead, the key question is whether the apparent diplomatic momentum emerging from recent meetings can produce substantive negotiations. Both Moscow and Kyiv continue to believe they have leverage, making compromises difficult. As a result, public statements from leaders and advisers are increasingly becoming part of a larger effort to shape the diplomatic environment before any formal peace talks begin.

With information from Reuters.

The preliminary memorandum represents the first formal framework outlining how Washington and Tehran intend to move from military confrontation toward diplomacy.

While many details remain unpublished, statements from U.S., Iranian and Pakistani officials provide a broad outline of the deal’s structure.

Rather than resolving every dispute immediately, the agreement establishes a phased process aimed at reducing tensions first and addressing more difficult issues later.

The approach reflects the reality that both sides were able to reach consensus on ending hostilities more easily than on the underlying disputes that fueled the conflict.

Phase One: Ending the Fighting

The first stage focuses on immediate de-escalation.

According to mediator Pakistan, both sides have agreed to permanently halt military operations across all fronts.

The formal memorandum is expected to be signed in Switzerland, after which implementation would begin.

The objective of this phase is straightforward: stop active hostilities, reduce the risk of escalation, and create space for broader negotiations.

This represents the most immediate achievement of the agreement and is likely the reason markets reacted positively.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the agreement’s most significant economic provision.

The waterway serves as one of the world’s most important energy transit routes and has been at the center of global concerns throughout the conflict.

Both sides indicate that commercial shipping will resume following the signing of the memorandum.

The restoration of maritime traffic could:

• Increase global oil supply.
• Reduce shipping disruptions.
• Ease pressure on energy prices.
• Lower inflation risks for major economies.

However, questions remain over how the route will be governed.

Iran has suggested it will coordinate management of traffic with Oman, potentially giving Tehran a more formal role in overseeing one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

That issue could become a future source of diplomatic friction.

The Nuclear Issue Has Been Deferred

The most controversial subject in the negotiations remains unresolved.

Rather than settling the nuclear dispute immediately, both sides appear to have agreed to address it during a 60-day negotiation period.

According to Iranian officials, Tehran would freeze nuclear activities during that time by halting additional enrichment and refraining from expanding facilities.

The long-term future of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains unclear.

Washington continues to emphasize inspections and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful and seeks recognition of its right to maintain civilian nuclear activities.

These competing positions are likely to dominate the next phase of talks.

Sanctions Relief Could Shape the Success of the Deal

Economic issues may ultimately prove as difficult as nuclear negotiations.

Iran expects meaningful sanctions relief as part of any final settlement.

Iranian officials have spoken about:

• Temporary waivers on oil sanctions.
• The release of frozen assets.
• Financial support mechanisms.
• A pathway toward lifting U.S. and international sanctions.

The Trump administration has signaled a more cautious approach.

Washington has indicated that sanctions relief will depend on Iranian compliance and future negotiations rather than automatic implementation.

This difference highlights one of the central tensions in the agreement: each side expects benefits on different timelines.

Lebanon Remains a Flashpoint

The agreement’s treatment of Lebanon illustrates how regional conflicts have become intertwined.

Iran views a ceasefire in Lebanon as a critical component of the broader settlement.

Lebanese political leaders have welcomed the inclusion of Lebanon in the framework.

Israel, however, has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by all aspects of the agreement and intends to maintain military positions in areas it views as strategically important.

This creates uncertainty about whether the Lebanon component can be implemented as envisioned.

The issue could quickly become one of the first tests of the agreement’s durability.

Why This Matters

The memorandum matters because it shifts the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The agreement addresses several immediate concerns:

• Rising energy prices.
• Shipping disruptions.
• Escalating regional instability.
• Growing economic uncertainty.

At the same time, it leaves the most difficult questions unresolved.

This means the framework should be viewed as the beginning of a diplomatic process rather than its conclusion.

Its success will depend on whether negotiators can transform temporary understandings into binding commitments.

Key Stakeholders

• United States
• Iran
• Pakistan (mediator)
• Israel
• Lebanon
• Oman
• European powers
• Gulf Arab states
• International energy markets
• Global shipping industry
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear inspectors

What to Watch Next

• Formal signing of the memorandum in Switzerland.
• Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
• Progress during the 60-day negotiation period.
• Discussions on Iran’s nuclear program.
• Decisions regarding sanctions relief.
• Reactions from Congress and international partners.
• Israeli actions in Lebanon and other contested areas.

The memorandum creates a framework for de-escalation, but its long-term success remains uncertain.

If implemented effectively, the agreement could stabilize energy markets, reduce regional tensions, and create momentum for broader diplomatic engagement.

However, many of the issues that triggered the conflict remain unresolved.

Nuclear enrichment, sanctions, regional security arrangements, and competing strategic interests are all likely to generate difficult negotiations.

The coming 60 days will therefore be more important than the announcement itself.

They will determine whether the framework becomes a durable peace process or merely a temporary pause in a conflict whose underlying disputes remain intact.

Analysis

The structure of the agreement reveals a pragmatic calculation by both Washington and Tehran.

Rather than attempting to solve every dispute at once, negotiators prioritized issues where agreement was achievable: ending active hostilities, reopening shipping routes, and creating a mechanism for future talks.

This approach reflects the political realities facing both governments.

For President Trump, reducing energy prices and ending a costly conflict addresses growing domestic pressure. For Iran, halting military operations while preserving room to negotiate on sanctions and nuclear issues offers a path to economic relief without immediate capitulation.

Yet the framework’s greatest strength may also be its greatest weakness.

By postponing the hardest questions, the agreement creates momentum for diplomacy but also leaves significant room for disagreement later. Nuclear enrichment, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements are not peripheral issues—they are the core disputes that drove the conflict.

As a result, the memorandum should be viewed less as a peace treaty and more as a diplomatic bridge. It lowers immediate risks and creates opportunities for negotiation, but it does not yet resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran.

Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or a temporary truce will depend on what happens after the signatures are placed on the document. The real negotiations are only beginning.

With information from Reuters.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

With its recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Delhi, the Quad has again shown it remains active, defying widespread rumours of collapse.

While the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers highlighted their countries’ strong relations with India and the Quad’s central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture, Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India was the most noteworthy aspect, as he repeatedly emphasized the significance of Indo-US relations.

Speculations about the Quad’s potential dissolution, reminiscent of developments in the 2000s, were fuelled by the postponement of the leaders’ summit, President Trump’s apparent lack of interest, and a more conciliatory approach toward China. Even so, the meeting reaffirmed the US’s ongoing engagement in the region and its support for the Quad.

The Quad’s momentum currently faces its principal challenge not from India’s or the US’s relations with Australia and Japan, but from a complicated Indo-US relationship.

Two factors show why India-US relations are central to the Quad’s minilateral framework.

Over the past year, India has faced unprecedented criticism from the US administration, particularly from President Trump, who has been critical of India on trade and security fronts. Issues such as tariff disputes, H-1B visa restrictions affecting Indian professionals, deepening US relations with the Pakistan Army, and increased US involvement in Bangladesh and Nepal have contributed to growing distrust about the US’s willingness to cooperate with India and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to several contentious statements by President Trump directed at India, Rubio’s visit served as a diplomatic effort to restore bilateral relations. His repeated emphasis on India’s role as a strategic partner signalled a commitment to improving ties. While a single visit cannot resolve all tensions from the past year, it reassures India and reduces the risk of further deterioration.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting became feasible only after India and the US undertook concerted efforts to revive bilateral relations. Notable examples include India’s invitation to the US to attend the AI Impact Summit in February 2026, ongoing trade agreement negotiations, and the US decision to invite India to the Pax Silica initiative. The meeting occurred only after a certain level of normalization had been achieved. Even so, a leaders’ summit is unlikely unless President Trump and Prime Minister Modi demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing India-US relations.

Second, without proactive American engagement, Japan, Australia, and India may develop their own trilateral regional strategies, perhaps with some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. However, the impact of such an alternative would be limited and localized. Japan could take a greater role in sustaining and rebuilding regional economic frameworks, replicating the Trans-Pacific Partnership experiment. Still, due to constitutional and capacity constraints, Tokyo is unlikely to replace Washington as the region’s primary security guarantor soon.

Although the Quad’s resilience is maintained by the agency and commitment of Australia, India, and Japan rather than by exclusive US leadership, strong US involvement in the Indo-Pacific security mechanism will remain a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

China’s persistent assertive behaviour remains the central factor. It continues to employ coercive tactics and expand its influence in regions critical to the US and its partners, so the original motivations for revitalizing the Quad remain relevant. Although the US approach to China is evolving, the fundamental dynamics of US-China relations remain unchanged. In the long term, Washington will require frameworks such as the Quad to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the erosion of its strategic influence. Consequently, the Quad is likely to remain central to regional strategy, with India as a key partner.

The US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s statement that the US is not going to make the same mistakes with India that it made with China 20 years ago must not guide Indo-US relations. The US needs India as much as India needs the US, and unlike China, India-US relations rest on shared values – democracy, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, and a common vision of maintaining a rules-based liberal international order. Both countries require mutually beneficial cooperation to advance their strategic objectives. Other Quad members and Indo-Pacific stakeholders also depend on collaboration between Washington and New Delhi to maintain strategic equilibrium and preserve the bloc’s cohesion.

The US regards India as a responsible stakeholder and a regional counterweight to China, especially after the limited outcomes of President Trump’s recent visit to China. Conversely, India depends on the US for advanced technology, strategic investments, and long-term defense needs. This mutual dependence makes both countries indispensable to each other, and significant short-term trade diversification is unlikely. Even if achieved, it would likely harm both parties.

The US must strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Quad and its member states to develop an effective regional strategy. Closer strategic coordination among Quad partners, particularly with India, is essential to this effort.

Israel’s balancing act that allowed it to reap America’s unconditional and, often, blind support, while slowly benefiting from China’s growing economic influence and political prestige, is already floundering.

Thanks to the heated cold war between the US and Chinese economic superpowers, the Israeli strategy of playing both sides is unlikely to pay dividends in the long run.

Soon enough, Tel Aviv might find itself having to make a stark choice between Washington and Beijing.  When US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Israel on May 13, two items topped his agenda: Israel’s imminent illegal annexation of Palestinian land and the growing Israeli-Chinese economic ties.

Pompeo communicated his country’s stand on both issues, reflecting Washington’s long-standing policies regarding Palestine and China. In the case of Palestine, as with the rest of the Middle East, Washington seems to adhere to Tel Aviv’s agenda, often to the letter.  China is a different story.

READ: China rejects Israel’s planned annexation of West Bank

Two significant historical examples come to mind: one, is Israel’s attempt to sell China Israeli-made Phalcon airborne radar system, which relied heavily on American technology in the 1990s; a similar event transpired in 2005, this time concerning Israel’s Harpy anti-radar missile. On both occasions, Israel succumbed to American pressure and canceled both deals.

For the Chinese, Israel matters for two different reasons. One, Israel is a strategic stop in China’s Belt and Road initiative, China’s most significant economic project to date, ultimately aimed at turning Beijing into a center of global trade and financial activities. Two, China is hoping to fight the US on its own political turf in the Middle East – partly in response to the American ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, which was initiated by the Barack Obama administration.

But the world – in terms of political and economic balances of power – after the coronavirus pandemic is likely to prove a different one when compared with previous years. China’s rise has been in the making for many years and the US political retreat and declining global outreach has been quite evident for some time. The isolationist policies of the Donald Trump Administration, coupled with Washington’s many China-related tantrums in recent years, are all indicators of the vastly changing political realities of a once-unipolar world.

“I will not miss the opportunity to annex the West Bank”- Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

A few years ago, Beijing had the time, patience, and resources to play a long-drawn geopolitical game in order for it to challenge the US’s global influence, whether in South America, Africa, or Israel.

The visit by China’s Vice President, Wang Qishan, to Israel in 2018, to “boost business ties”, was part of this Chinese strategy. That visit followed the signing, one year earlier, of the China-Israel Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. As of 2018, China-Israel trade has jumped to $14 billion and has grown exponentially ever since.

China would have been happy to carry on with that strategy for many years to come. Israel, too, would have played along, considering the lucrative financial returns from its China partnership.

READ: Israel ties to China may risk our ability to work with Tel Aviv

Indeed, despite Washington’s warnings against and, at times, explicit demands on Israel to refrain from giving Chinese companies access to fifth-generation infrastructure (5G) projects in the country, Israel labored to make China feel welcomed.

However, the global response to the coronavirus pandemic is likely to change this, as it has already accelerated the cold war between the US and China, pushing the latter to adopt a more aggressive form of diplomacy and pour massive sums into other countries’ economies to help them in their desperate fight against the COVID-19 disease.

The Chinese strategy is predicated on two main pillars: fortifying existing ties and solidarity with China’s allies or potential allies anywhere in the world, while pushing back against China’s foes, especially those who are participating in Washington’s anti-Beijing campaign.

The latter phenomenon is known as ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’. The ‘wolf warriors’ are Chinese diplomats who have, for months, pushed back with unprecedented ferocity against what they perceive to be US and Western propaganda.

READ: China’s ambassador to Israel found dead in Tel Aviv home

“We never pick a fight or bully others,” China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, told reporters in Beijing on May 24, while explaining China’s novel approach to diplomacy. “We will push back against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honor and dignity, and we will refute all groundless slander with facts,” the top Chinese official said firmly.

China’s new aggressive diplomacy, especially if it continues to define the country’s approach to foreign policy in the coming years, is unlikely to permit Israel to maintain its balancing act for much longer.

China’s ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, who was entrusted with implementing Beijing’s soft-diplomacy with Tel Aviv, died in his home only a few days following Pompeo’s visit to the country. Although Wei’s death was not – at least publicly – perceived to be the result of foul play, his absence, especially in the age of coronavirus and ‘wolf warriors’, might signal a shift in China’s approach to its economic and political interests in Israel.

On May 26, under American pressure, the Israeli Finance Ministry denied China a massive $1.5 billion desalination plant contract, awarding it to an Israeli company, instead.

This is the first time that the US has used its political and economic sway over Israel to curb Chinese influence in the country. China must be anxiously watching events unfold,   to see if US pressure on Israel will continue to undermine Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Deal of the century, embassy relocation, and the Golan Heights – Israel surely can’t believe their luck? – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

The world’s quickly shifting balance of power and the US-Chinese unmistakable fight for dominance is likely to, eventually, force countries like Israel to make a choice, of wholly joining the American or the Chinese sphere of influence. It is all reminiscent of the American-Soviet Cold War, where much of the globe was divided into zones of influence operated by proxy from Washington or Moscow.

Balancing acts in politics only work if all parties are willing to play or, at least, tolerate the game. While this form of politics suited Israel’s interests in the past and was played, quite successfully for years by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s balancing act is, possibly, over.

Between Washington’s precise demands to Israel to keep Beijing at bay, and the latter’s aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, Israel is facing a stark choice: remaining loyal to a fading superpower or diving into the uncharted waters of an emerging one.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

It’s always spectacular to see a big shot getting caught. Especially when he’s made a long career at the top of an European democracy under a mask of respectability. And, oh so suddenly, it turns out he’s made a fortune dealing with a Latin American dictatorship.

The sequence was— as people love to say today—worth of a Netflix series. 

Hours before getting on another flight to Caracas, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero decided to stay in Madrid once he knew he had just become the first former prime minister in the history of Spain’s 50-year-old democracy to be indicted for a crime. For those who turn on the phone in the morning across the Atlantic, when it is noon in Spain, the news of the indictment came as one bundle with the footage of Zapatero’s office being raided by an anti-corruption investigative unit of Spain’s National Police Corps, known as UDEF.

Zapatero was indicted by Audiencia National (an equivalent of the Supreme Court) for selling his influence to get a financial relief kit for an airline, Plus Ultra, the smallest of four Spanish carriers that received assistance from Madrid as a result of the demand-side shock during the pandemic. This company, with a fleet of seven aircrafts, was also the youngest of the lot, and had the particular feature of having inaugurated routes to Caracas in the annus horribilis of 2017, a time when international operators were withdrawing from the country en masse. As Armando.Info investigative reporter Roberto Deniz would reveal in December 2018, Plus Ultra’s majority stakeholders were from Venezuela.

Eight years later, Zapatero is being prosecuted over allegations of political influence peddling related to the €53 million bailout of Plus Ultra. He also faces charges of criminal conspiracy, document forgery and money laundering. The judge handling the case describes Zapatero as the head of “a stable and hierarchical influence‑peddling structure” meant to “obtain financial benefits as an intermediary, exerting influence over public bodies on behalf of third parties, mainly Plus Ultra.” At least six other individuals are under investigation, including Plus Ultra’s chairman, its CEO, and Alicante-based businessman Julio Martínez Martínez.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts.

This latter will be a key character in this story: Martínez Martínez is not only being accused of acting as Zapatero’s frontman in a number of entities that received payments linked to the Plus Ultra (et al) scheme. His own personal records, such as notebook annotations UDEF just made public, suggest he was fully aware of Zapatero’s business and political dealings with the Maduro regime. That evidence seems to point at both opaque trade deals (over Venezuelan light crude, gold, fuel, asphalt, which were the subject of US sanctions until recently) Martínez and Zapatero may have promoted, and knowledge about a number of high-profile political prisoners released this year. The son-in-law of Edmundo González, security expert Rocío San Miguel and opposition moderate Enrique Márquez (who has publicly praised Zapatero) appear mentioned. Martínez´s notes also provide previously undisclosed details about the contents of a constitutional reform Maduro toyed with, but never brought about after stealing the presidential vote in 2024.

All of this adds to the investigations about shady business in the pandemic that involved Spanish businessman Víctor de Aldama, former Transport Minister and PSOE Organization Secretary José Luis Ábalos, and his close advisor Koldo García. The trio famously met Delcy Rodríguez in the tarmac of the Madrid international airport, for a purported conversation over the sale of Venezuelan gold lingots, despite her being the subject of EU sanctions and therefore unable to step on European soil. These three Spaniards (with Ábalos and Koldo being amongst the closest collaborators of Pedro Sánchez in his primary campaign and early government) are the main actors in a series of corruption scandals that have been getting closer to the Spanish head of government, a darling of the International Left whose reputation has been boosted by a knack for antagonizing Donald Trump. But the former aides of Perro Sanxe have been arrested without bail and indicted (and will soon face a sentencing hearing). His brother is facing trial. His wife has also been indicted and is on the verge of facing trial. And now it looks like his political mentor will also face a lengthy process before Spanish justice.

Just after the Zapatero news broke in Spain, predictable reactions began to come across the political spectrum: bloodthirst at the Right, accusations of conspiracy at the Left. Then, the judge made public the 88-page file, fed with a probe that began in 2024, and the ambiance turned in a second. Many allies of the graft-plagued socialist government admitted that the accusations are solid, the evidence overwhelming, and the outlook quite bleak for Zapatero. The conspiracy theory that this was lawfare against the Sánchez government faded away. Spain’s paper of record, El País, traditionally aligned with Zapatero’s party PSOE, wrote a stern op-ed saying that the Sánchez government was forced to investigate this properly to prevent the “enemies of democracy” in the Far Right from charging against the democratic system. “Full cooperation with the judiciary, full respect for the presumption of innocence, and all my support for President Zapatero,” Sánchez said today. 

As you may have noticed, authorities have released more evidence this week. Spanish media ranging from the State-owned, left-leaning broadcaster RTVE to the investigative El Confidencial are carving out a map of the Zapatero network of sociedades mercantiles. While not all of these companies are under investigation, together they received an estimated €2.6 million between 2020 and 2025 from Chinese capital and entities under investigation.

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms (under not-at-all pretentious names like Inteligencia Prospectiva and Análisis Relevante) meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts. Money that looks, in many cases, like kickbacks. For instance, Whathefav, a social media agency owned by his two daughters, got a payment of half a million euros for creating a website and a promotional video for Inteligencia Prospectiva SL, which is owned by Guillemo and Domingo Amaro Chacón. These two are Spanish-Venezuelan citizens who happen to be the sons of a businessman involved in a case of insurance fraud with PDVSA. Inteligencia Prospectiva reported losses, but was paying juicy bills to other businesses of the same network, like Whathefav.

UDEF  also cites evidence of conversations between Domingo Amaro Chacón and Julio Martínez Martínez, from 2021 to 2024, discussing a deal with Minerven (coded as “comercialización de amarillo”), nickel reserves in Venezuela, a major tourism development project on La Tortuga Island, and what seems like efforts to promote the opening of the UAE embassy in Caracas (coded as “the desert guys”). All of this may have something to do with UDEF’s suggestion (reviewed here by The Objective) alleging that the Plus Ultra case might be linked to a money-laundering operation involving proceeds from the Venezuelan CLAP food-box scheme, as well as the shipment of 5-8 tons of gold from Caracas to Dubai.

Yes, it’s a lot. And we’re not even getting into other grim details, like reports that Whathefav received a €100,000 payment from the company behind VenApp, which you’ll remember as the mobile app Maduro promoted in the past two years to encourage chavistas to snitch on dissidents.

“I told you so…”

Until that day, Zapatero was able to sell to the Spanish people that he had been in Venezuela not just as a negotiator helping take people out of jail, but as a peacemaker trying to prevent the country from falling into a civil war. Apparently through his good heart and blue eyes.

Suddenly, Spain has discovered that a former president, adored among socialists for his term’s achievements like the disbandment of terrorist group ETA, who left Moncloa Palace with no scandals on his shoulders, and who kept enough prestige to back the rise of Sánchez, is an international operator that used his connections and knowledge to make at least 2.6 million euros in ways that spill way beyond the disputable boundaries of legal lobbying.

Once again, Venezuelans raised their eyes to the sky and whispered with resignation. That “yes, moron, we have known this for years” feeling we are so familiar with. 

This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

For Venezuelan media, and we dare to say a great deal of the public, Zapatero has been known for years as a loyal operator of the chavista regime who works at the expense of the people to help Maduro, and now the Rodríguez siblings, to preserve power. In doing so, he has kept the boardgame tilted against the opposition. The statesmanship that many Spaniards attribute to Zapatero has served only to defend Maduro’s interests during several negotiation rounds with international presence, and to corner the opposition into disadvantageous arrangements by presenting himself as an arbiter when, in fact, he’s no more than an able messenger of Miraflores. Former political prisoners like Lorent Saleh have recalled how Zapatero pressured their families to keep quiet about torture and abuse endured in prison. All that work, of course, has been handsomely rewarded.

We saw his shadow in the humiliation of president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, in the Spanish ambassador’s house in Caracas, during his last hours in Venezuela in August 2024. Edmundo was pressured by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez to sign a self-incriminating letter as a condition for being allowed to leave for Spain. After that, the Rodríguez siblings and Zapatero have actively endorsed each other: one of the Spaniard’s last visits to Caracas saw him declaring next to Jorge and other National Assembly lawmakers as a key international sponsor of the 2026 amnesty law, which Delcy recently discontinued. One of those lawmakers, fake opposition politician Timoteo Zambrano, is another close friend and ally of Zapatero. The latter’s influence looks so significant that Delcy just appointed Zambrano as the Venezuelan ambassador in Madrid.

Bad for Delcy, good for María Corina

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government. It will all depend on what prosecutors can find and prove, but it’s fair to say that a wave of scandals and a thickening of corruption dossiers of this kind could make any democratic government in the world collapse (though with Sánchez, in the end, we’re talking about a man Spanish voters know for surviving all kinds of reputational crises). 

The Spanish government was among the first to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as head of state. As early as January, its top diplomat said he would request that the EU lifts sanctions on Delcy. Just a few weeks ago, the same official confirmed that Caracas would resume talks with the IMF. The Spanish Foreign Ministry used to be run by Josep Borrell, a socialist from the non-Zapaterista faction (the more moderate, Felipista wing) of the ruling PSOE, who has become a vocal critic of both the Maduro dictatorship and Zapatero. But Madrid’s latest efforts to normalize relations with Delcy haven’t gone unnoticed, perhaps encouraged by the Trump administration, and also by Maria Corina Machado’s close ties with the Spanish Right.

With such accusations against a key enabler of this bilateral relationship, the image of normalcy (and common sense) both Sánchez and Delcy are trying to project should take a hit. This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

We should note this is not a problem where Delcy can turn to the Trump administration for help. Not only because Trump despises Sánchez, but because Homeland Security reportedly gave leads to Spain’s National Police in the Plus Ultra case, in cooperation through the American embassy in Madrid.

A big winner in this case is María Corina Machado, who recently held a massive rally in Madrid’s main square that few Spanish politicians could have matched. Machado was lambasted by Foreign Minister José Luis Albares for refusing to meet Sánchez or other leftwing leaders during her Madrid visit. Throughout her trip, when asked by journalists about this decision, Machado did not name Sánchez but thanked the Spanish government for receiving Venezuelan migrants over the years, while also stressing her utmost respect for Spanish institutions. It is false that Machado only met with the right-wing opposition: she appeared publicly with former PM Felipe González, a historic figure of Spanish social democracy and a key leader of the country’s famous Transition.

Machado may now be feeling some relief about how the whole Spanish saga is unfolding (both Zapatero and Machado have acknowledged they have never spoken to each other).

In another era, she might have summed it up with one of her classic phrases: se los dije.

Israeli attacks on Lebanon have killed at least 3,111 people since March 2, with 9,432 injured, according to Lebanese Health Ministry.

During his first year, U. S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive negotiating style led to some gains with other countries, but when it comes to Iran, this approach seems to be failing. Instead of softening his stance, Trump has shown increasing frustration over the ongoing crisis, which has lasted for 11 weeks, and his tough tactics might hinder efforts to end the conflict that is impacting the global economy.

Analysts believe that one key issue is the Iranian leaders’ need to maintain their image at home, complicating any negotiations. Despite the U. S. and Israeli strikes weakening Iran’s military, Iran still controls the important Strait of Hormuz, allowing it to exert significant influence. Trump’s strategy has been marked by extreme demands and mixed messages, which may not lead to a quick resolution. His desire to frame any outcome as a U. S. victory, while expecting total defeat for Iran, poses further challenges, as no government, including Iran’s, can afford to be seen as surrendering.

The deadlock with Iran happens as Trump faces domestic pressures, including rising gasoline prices and low approval ratings due to an unpopular war ahead of the midterm elections. White House spokesperson Olivia Wales defended Trump’s tactics, claiming that he is a skilled negotiator and suggesting that Iran is becoming more desperate for a resolution.

In a notable threat, Trump warned on social media of destroying Iran’s civilization if a deal is not reached. He later backed down but has repeated his threats to damaging Iranian infrastructure. Trump’s harsh language towards Iranian leaders has continued, and while he claims Iran is on the verge of collapse, the Iranian response has been to portray their endurance as a victory.

Inside the White House, there has been no effort to moderate Trump’s messaging. Polls show his core supporters remain behind him, but some former allies now criticize his extreme threats and the ongoing conflict.

Some of Trump’s strongest statements on his Truth Social platform have come at crucial moments, like when he announced a blockade of Iran’s ports, which led to Iranian retaliation and threatened a fragile ceasefire. He recently rejected a peace proposal from Iran, calling it a “piece of garbage. ” Analysts like Dennis Ross said Trump’s lack of consistency in messaging undermines his intentions. During a visit to Beijing, Trump avoided harsh comments on Iran, focusing instead on relations with China, an ally of Iran.

Some experts believe it would be beneficial for Trump to lower his rhetoric if he truly wants to resolve the conflict. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Saeed Khatibzadeh, criticized Trump for talking too much. Trump claims that his unpredictability is a negotiation tactic, which has sometimes worked in trade discussions. However, in situations like the military actions in Venezuela and the Gaza ceasefire talks, his pressure tactics had positive outcomes.

Despite his desire to seem dangerous in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, analysts say this strategy is unlikely to succeed, given the entrenched nature of Iran’s leadership and their pride. Trump’s threats may have strengthened Iran’s current hardline rulers, who trust him even less after U. S. attacks during negotiations. Nate Swanson, a former State Department official, noted that the expectation of Iran capitulating under pressure is a misconception.

Barbara Leaf pointed out that Trump’s approach has been based on a misunderstanding of Iran’s resilience. Some experts warn that his tactics could backfire, making Iran more determined to develop nuclear capabilities for self-protection. There is a mismatch in timelines, as Trump prefers quick deals while Iran often prolongs negotiations. Academic Abdulkhaleq Abdullah suggested that Iran’s inflexibility is a bigger issue than Trump’s statements. Trita Parsi argued that Iranian leaders might see Trump’s unpredictable behavior as a sign of desperation, leading them to wait him out.

With information from Reuters

Foreign ministers from the BRICS nations ended a two day meeting in New Delhi without issuing a joint statement, highlighting deep divisions within the bloc over the ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel.

The diplomatic gathering brought together representatives from an increasingly diverse and politically complex alliance that now includes both Iran and the United Arab Emirates, two regional rivals currently on opposite sides of the escalating Middle East crisis.

Because member states could not agree on language regarding the war, host country India released only a chair’s statement summarizing discussions rather than a unified declaration endorsed by all participants.

Iran Pushes for Stronger Condemnation

Iran reportedly sought a stronger collective position condemning the United States and Israel for military operations against it.

Tehran also accused the UAE, a close American partner in the Gulf region, of involvement in military activities linked to the conflict.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi stated that one BRICS member blocked sections of the proposed statement, although he did not directly name the UAE.

Araqchi attempted to soften tensions publicly by emphasizing that Iran did not view the UAE itself as a direct target in the conflict. He argued that Iranian strikes had focused only on American military facilities located on Emirati territory.

At the same time, he expressed hope that relations inside BRICS could improve before the leaders’ summit later this year.

India’s Carefully Balanced Position

India’s final chair statement revealed the difficulty of managing competing geopolitical interests within the expanded BRICS bloc.

The document acknowledged that member countries held different perspectives regarding the Middle East crisis. According to the statement, discussions included calls for diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, protection of civilian lives, and the importance of maintaining secure maritime trade routes.

However, the absence of a formal joint declaration demonstrated that BRICS members remain divided on critical geopolitical questions.

India’s approach reflected its broader diplomatic strategy of balancing relations with multiple global powers simultaneously. New Delhi maintains close ties with the United States and Gulf countries while also preserving strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and China.

Gaza and Palestine Also Cause Disagreement

Divisions were not limited to the Iran conflict.

The chair statement noted that BRICS ministers reaffirmed support for Palestinian self determination and described Gaza as an inseparable part of the occupied Palestinian territories.

The document also supported efforts to unify Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority and backed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

However, the statement acknowledged that one unnamed member state held reservations regarding aspects of the Gaza section as well.

This further illustrated the challenge of building unified foreign policy positions within a grouping that includes countries with vastly different regional interests and diplomatic alignments.

BRICS and the Global South Narrative

Despite internal disagreements, BRICS members emphasized the importance of cooperation among developing nations.

India’s statement described the Global South as an important force for positive international change during a period marked by rising geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, technological disruption, protectionism, and migration pressures.

The expanded BRICS bloc now includes:

• Brazil
• Russia
• India
• China
• South Africa
• Ethiopia
• Egypt
• Iran
• UAE

The expansion of the bloc has increased its global economic and political weight but has also introduced more ideological and strategic divisions.

The Economic Impact on India

The Middle East conflict has had serious economic implications for India.

As one of the world’s largest oil importers, India depends heavily on energy shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The disruption of maritime traffic in the region has increased energy costs and raised concerns about inflation and supply stability.

Indian personnel have reportedly been killed in incidents linked to the regional conflict, while an India flagged vessel was sunk during the recent escalation.

Against this backdrop, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the UAE and publicly condemned attacks targeting the Gulf nation.

Modi praised the UAE’s restraint and described attacks against it as unacceptable, signaling India’s effort to maintain strong ties with key Gulf partners despite its participation alongside Iran in BRICS.

Analysis

The failure of BRICS foreign ministers to produce a joint statement highlights the growing contradictions inside the expanded organization.

Originally conceived as an economic coalition of major emerging powers, BRICS increasingly aspires to become a broader geopolitical platform representing the Global South. However, the inclusion of regional rivals and states with conflicting strategic interests makes unified diplomacy increasingly difficult.

The Iran conflict exposed these tensions clearly. Iran sought solidarity against the United States and Israel, while Gulf states inside the bloc maintain close security relationships with Washington and face direct security threats from Tehran.

India’s cautious wording reflected the reality that BRICS currently functions more as a flexible diplomatic forum than a cohesive political alliance.

The episode also demonstrates a larger shift in global politics. As Western led institutions face criticism from many developing nations, alternative groupings like BRICS are gaining visibility. Yet these organizations must still overcome major internal disagreements if they hope to shape global governance effectively.

For India, the situation illustrates the complexity of its foreign policy position. New Delhi seeks leadership within the Global South while simultaneously maintaining relations with competing regional and global powers.

Ultimately, the Delhi meeting showed both the growing importance and the structural limitations of BRICS. The bloc may continue expanding economically and politically, but achieving consensus on major international crises will remain a significant challenge as geopolitical rivalries deepen across the world.

With information from Reuters.

The continued clashes and drone strikes reported by Ukraine despite a United States brokered ceasefire reveal the deep structural difficulties facing diplomatic efforts to end the Russia Ukraine war. Although both Moscow and Kyiv formally agreed to a temporary ceasefire between May 9 and May 11, reports of ongoing battlefield engagements, drone operations, and civilian casualties demonstrate how fragile and limited such agreements have become in the context of prolonged modern warfare.

The ceasefire emerged as part of a broader diplomatic push led by United States President Donald Trump to reduce hostilities and create momentum toward wider peace negotiations. However, within days both Russia and Ukraine accused each other of violations, exposing the absence of trust, verification mechanisms, and shared strategic objectives between the two sides.

The developments illustrate a broader reality increasingly visible in contemporary conflicts. Ceasefires no longer necessarily represent steps toward peace. Instead, they often function as temporary tactical pauses within wars that continue politically, militarily, and psychologically even during formal periods of de escalation.

The Structural Fragility of Modern Ceasefires

The Ukraine conflict demonstrates why ceasefires in modern interstate wars are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Unlike traditional wars where front lines were relatively static and centralized military command structures exercised greater control, contemporary conflicts involve decentralized operations, drone warfare, rapid communication systems, and continuous battlefield surveillance.

In such environments, even limited military activity can quickly trigger accusations of violations and retaliation. The reported drone attacks, artillery clashes, and combat engagements along the front line reflect how difficult it is to fully halt military operations across an extensive and heavily militarized battlefield.

Furthermore, both Russia and Ukraine continue to pursue strategic objectives incompatible with lasting compromise. Russia seeks to consolidate territorial gains and maintain pressure on Ukrainian forces, while Ukraine aims to resist occupation and preserve sovereignty. Without broader political agreement regarding the war’s fundamental issues, temporary ceasefires remain highly vulnerable to collapse.

The result is a situation where ceasefires may reduce the intensity of conflict in some areas while violence continues in others, creating ambiguity regarding whether peace efforts are genuinely progressing.

Drone Warfare and the Transformation of the Battlefield

One of the most significant features of the current conflict is the central role of drones in sustaining military operations even during ceasefire periods. Ukraine’s military reported thousands of so called kamikaze drone deployments, while Russia simultaneously accused Ukraine of launching drone attacks into Russian territory.

Drone warfare fundamentally alters the nature of ceasefires because unmanned systems allow states to maintain pressure without large scale troop offensives. Drones can conduct reconnaissance, target infrastructure, disrupt logistics, and inflict psychological pressure while remaining below the threshold of full conventional escalation.

This creates a strategic grey zone where both sides can continue military activity while formally claiming commitment to ceasefire agreements. The low cost, flexibility, and deniability associated with drone operations make them especially attractive during periods of limited diplomatic engagement.

The widespread use of drones also reflects the broader transformation of modern warfare into a technologically driven conflict characterized by constant surveillance and persistent low intensity attacks. In this environment, the distinction between war and ceasefire becomes increasingly blurred.

The apparent breakdown of the ceasefire also highlights the growing limitations facing United States led diplomatic efforts. Although Washington remains deeply influential in shaping international negotiations surrounding the conflict, its ability to enforce compliance remains constrained.

Temporary ceasefires require more than political announcements. They depend on verification systems, mutual trust, enforcement mechanisms, and shared incentives for de escalation. None of these conditions currently exist at sufficient levels between Russia and Ukraine.

Moreover, both sides appear to view military pressure as essential to strengthening their negotiating positions. This creates a paradox where diplomacy and warfare occur simultaneously rather than sequentially. Ceasefires therefore become instruments for tactical adjustment rather than genuine pathways toward peace.

The involvement of the United States also introduces additional geopolitical dimensions. Russia continues to frame the conflict as part of a broader confrontation with Western influence, while Ukraine depends heavily on Western military and diplomatic support. These dynamics complicate efforts to establish neutral or mutually accepted mediation frameworks.

Humanitarian Consequences and Civilian Vulnerability

Despite diplomatic initiatives, civilians continue to bear the costs of ongoing violence. Reports of deaths and injuries across regions including Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv demonstrate how even limited ceasefire violations can produce severe humanitarian consequences.

Modern conflicts increasingly expose civilian populations to continuous insecurity because fighting extends beyond conventional front lines. Drone strikes, missile attacks, and artillery exchanges create environments where daily life remains unstable regardless of official diplomatic announcements.

This persistent insecurity also produces long term social and psychological effects. Populations living under repeated cycles of ceasefire and renewed violence may gradually lose confidence in diplomatic processes altogether. Such conditions weaken public trust in negotiations and reinforce perceptions that military outcomes remain more decisive than political agreements.

The humanitarian dimension therefore remains central to understanding the broader implications of the war. Beyond territorial disputes and geopolitical competition, the conflict continues to reshape civilian life, displacement patterns, and regional stability across Eastern Europe.

The Strategic Logic Behind Continued Fighting

The continuation of battlefield clashes despite the ceasefire reflects rational strategic calculations by both parties. Neither Russia nor Ukraine wishes to allow the other side opportunities to regroup, reinforce positions, or gain battlefield advantage during temporary pauses.

For Russia, maintaining pressure along advancing sectors preserves momentum and signals military resolve. For Ukraine, continued resistance demonstrates operational resilience and prevents normalization of Russian territorial control.

This strategic logic makes limited violations almost inevitable in prolonged wars where military outcomes remain uncertain. Ceasefires become fragile because both sides fear that restraint could weaken their broader position in future negotiations or battlefield developments.

The situation also reflects how wars of attrition generate incentives for constant pressure rather than stable pauses. Each side seeks to exhaust the opponent economically, militarily, and psychologically over time.

Analysis

The reported ceasefire violations in Ukraine demonstrate the growing difficulty of achieving meaningful de escalation in modern high intensity conflicts. Temporary agreements may reduce some forms of violence, but they rarely address the deeper strategic, political, and technological dynamics sustaining prolonged warfare.

The Ukraine conflict illustrates several important realities shaping contemporary international security. First, ceasefires without comprehensive political frameworks remain highly unstable. Second, drone warfare and decentralized military technologies blur the distinction between peace and conflict. Third, diplomatic efforts increasingly coexist with ongoing military operations rather than replacing them.

The events also reveal the limits of external mediation in wars where core strategic objectives remain fundamentally incompatible. As long as both Russia and Ukraine continue viewing military pressure as essential to their long term goals, ceasefires are likely to function more as tactical interruptions than genuine transitions toward peace.

Ultimately, the fragility of the current ceasefire reflects a broader transformation in warfare itself. Modern conflicts are no longer defined solely by formal declarations of war or peace, but by continuous cycles of negotiation, limited escalation, technological warfare, and strategic uncertainty.

With information from Reuters.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry on Thursday confirmed that the United States and Iran were in discussions – through Islamabad – to hold a second meeting between their negotiators to end their now nearly seven-week war, with a fragile ceasefire announced on April 8 days away from expiring.

But it added that no date had been set for that next round of negotiations, even as Islamabad stepped up a parallel diplomatic push to keep the process alive.

“Who will come, how big the delegation will be, who will stay, and who will go is for the parties to decide,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tahir Andrabi told reporters in Islamabad, referring to what upcoming talks might look like. “As a mediator, it’s important for us to keep the talks confidential. We had the details and information of the talks entrusted to us by the negotiating parties.” 

Speaking of the first round of talks on April 12 in Islamabad, which concluded without a deal, Andrabi said: “There was neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown.”

The spokesperson confirmed that nuclear issues remained among the key subjects under discussion, but declined to elaborate.

His comments came as Pakistan’s civil and military leadership is travelling across the region in what some observers have begun calling the “Islamabad Process”, reflecting the government’s attempt to frame negotiations as an ongoing diplomatic effort rather than a one-off engagement.

Parallel diplomatic tracks

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif arrived in Doha on Thursday, the second stop of a four-day regional tour that began with Jeddah on Wednesday, and will see him visiting Antalya next.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Asim Munir arrived in Tehran on Wednesday with a delegation that included Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi.

Munir was received at the airport with a warm hug from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who said he was “delighted” to welcome the field marshal and expressed gratitude for Pakistan’s “gracious hosting of dialogue”.

On Thursday, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led Tehran’s delegation at the Islamabad talks, also met Munir.

Reza Amiri Moghadam, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, said at an event in Islamabad that Tehran would not consider any venue other than Pakistan for talks with Washington.

“We will do talks in Pakistan and nowhere else, because we trust Pakistan,” he said.

Muhammad Faisal, a Pakistani security analyst and scholar at the University of Technology Sydney, said the parallel outreach reflected a deliberate division of labour.

“Pakistan’s strategy appears to be dual-tracked: PM Sharif is reassuring Gulf allies and attempting to build a broader support coalition, while CDF Munir is engaged in hard negotiations between the two sides to narrow gaps between Iran and the US, with an eye on extending the ceasefire and reaching a broader understanding,” he told Al Jazeera.

Reports that Munir might travel to Washington, DC after Tehran were denied by security officials, who called them “speculative”. Andrabi said he was not aware of any such development.

In Jeddah on Wednesday, Sharif met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and expressed “full solidarity and support” for the kingdom following regional escalation, according to Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry. The crown prince praised what Riyadh described as the “constructive role” played by both Sharif and Munir.

In Doha, Sharif met Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and discussed “the regional situation, particularly in the Gulf region”, underscoring “the importance of de-escalation, dialogue and close international coordination to ensure peace and stability”, the prime minister’s office said.

From Doha, Sharif heads to Antalya with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. They are expected to meet counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and potentially Egypt on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 17.

Regional security push

The Antalya meeting is part of a broader diplomatic effort. Turkiye is preparing to host talks on a regional security platform involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt, according to officials familiar with the discussions.

It would be the third such meeting in a month, following earlier rounds of talks in Riyadh and Islamabad.

The goal is to establish a platform for regular, structured cooperation on regional security issues, the officials said, stressing the discussions are distinct from current efforts to end the Iran war.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed that discussions were under way, but said no agreement had been finalised.

“This pact is necessary so that countries can be assured of one another,” he told the state-run Anadolu Agency on Monday.

Turkiye also reaffirmed support for the US-Iran peace process on Thursday.

“We will continue to provide the necessary support for the ongoing ceasefire to turn into a permanent truce and eventually lasting peace, without becoming more complex and difficult to manage,” the Defence Ministry said, adding that it expected “the parties will be constructive in the ongoing negotiation process”.

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said senior officials from the four countries had also met in Islamabad earlier this week to prepare recommendations for Antalya.

Ceasefire under strain

The two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 8, which halted attacks in Iran and the Gulf, is due to expire on April 22. While still holding, it is under increasing strain.

A US naval blockade on Iranian ports remains in place, with the US Central Command saying its forces had turned away nine ships as of Wednesday.

Kamran Yousuf, an Islamabad-based journalist and expert on diplomatic affairs, said he expected the ceasefire to be extended.

“I would be really surprised if the current ceasefire is not extended. There is little appetite on both sides to go back to war. There are enough signs on the ground that if there is no deal before the truce expires, the ceasefire will be extended,” he told Al Jazeera.

Faisal offered a more cautious assessment, warning that failure to secure a second round would shift Pakistan’s role.

“Pakistan’s mediation will not collapse immediately, but Islamabad’s role will change from mediator to crisis manager. If hostilities resume, Pakistan will focus again on brokering a ceasefire,” he said.

Despite uncertainty, signals from both Washington and Tehran have remained cautiously optimistic.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said further talks would “very likely” take place in Islamabad, adding, “We feel good about the prospects of a deal.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said multiple messages had been exchanged with Washington through Pakistan since April 12.

US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that talks could resume within two days and that Washington was “more inclined to go” to Pakistan.

Sticking points remain

The path to a second round remains complicated by unresolved disputes.

Iran has insisted that Lebanon be included in any agreement, arguing that ongoing Israeli strikes there, which have killed more than 2,000 people and displaced 1.2 million, cannot be separated from the wider conflict.

On April 14, the United States convened a trilateral meeting in Washington with the ambassadors of Israel and Lebanon, the first direct engagement between the two sides since 1993.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio mediated the talks, which both sides described as “productive”, but no ceasefire or follow-up meeting was agreed.

Washington has maintained that any Lebanon deal must remain separate from US-Iran negotiations, rejecting Tehran’s position. On Thursday, Israel said its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would speak on the phone with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun — but Beirut had not confirmed any plans for a telephone conversation. The two countries do not have formal diplomatic relations.

At Thursday’s briefing, Andrabi aligned Pakistan with Iran on this issue.

“Peace in Lebanon is essential for US-Iran peace talks,” he said, adding that “signs of improvement on the Israel-Lebanon front over the past two days are encouraging.”

Yousuf said a Lebanon ceasefire would send an important signal to Iran.

“Extending the ceasefire to Lebanon will be an important confidence-building measure, a signal from the US that it is serious about a second round. It will also give Tehran good reason to return to the table,” he said.

But he added that the deeper challenge remained Iran’s nuclear programme.

“The nuclear issue is at the heart of the real problem. The flurry of shuttle diplomacy initiated by Pakistan is aimed at bridging the gap between the two sides,” he said.

Grace Wermenbol, a former US national security official and senior visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund, said Washington’s approach to Lebanon would hinge on Trump’s willingness to pressure Israel.

“A clear pathway to a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon exists,” she told Al Jazeera. “The question is whether Trump will be willing to apply the pressure necessary on Israel to halt its military offensive and allow the Lebanese government to continue its military disarmament efforts. So far, and this is also true for the months preceding the latest escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, we have not seen this pressure materialise.”

The Strait of Hormuz remains another major obstacle.

The waterway, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil passes during peacetime, has effectively been blocked by Iran since early in the war, except for ships belonging to countries that have struck individual deals with Tehran.

Starting Monday, the US imposed its own naval blockade on the strait, to prevent any Iran-linked vessel from passing through.

“Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the primary issue in US-Iranian negotiations. Opening it is crucial to easing upward pressure on oil prices and instilling confidence in global markets,” Wermenbol said.

She added that Tehran appeared to be betting Washington would eventually back down.

“There is no easy military option here,” she said. “The only way to resolve this issue and remove the threat to maritime traffic will need to involve a diplomatic deal.”