Dilemma

The US-China G-2 concept is both normatively exclusionary and strategically constraining. The inherent limits of a G-2 framework—hierarchy, power structure, and systematic constraints—make it a non-starter in a multipolar reality. Here, I completely agree; the concept of a G2 is unworkable and constitutes a strategic exclusion of many international actors in a multipolar world order characterized by a complex distribution of power and multiple centers of decision-making. The Structural and Political Constraints, represented in:

· Unacceptable Hierarchy: This framework attempts to impose a bipolarity that ignores the rise of major regional and international powers such as the European Union, India, and Russia.

· Lack of Methodological Flexibility: This framework fails to accommodate global issues that transcend borders and require broad collective cooperation, not just bilateral understandings.

· Conflicting Interests: The current strategic and geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing makes it impossible to manage the international system through joint governance. The structural conflict of interests between Washington and Beijing renders joint management of the international system impossible, amidst a fierce struggle for technological leadership, economic dominance, and the reshaping of national security rules. This manifests itself in:

– First: The Roots of the Strategic Conflict

A) The Challenge to Hegemony: China seeks to reshape international rules and challenge absolute American supremacy.

B) The American Shift: Washington adopts a strategy of confrontation and containment to reduce Chinese influence and supply chains.

– Second: Arenas of International Conflict

A) Technology and Trade: The chip war, tariffs, and control over advanced technology.

B) Regional Sovereignty: The escalating competition in the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue.

Trump’s China policy has shifted from confrontation to accommodation. If we wonder how true that is, to claim that Donald Trump’s policy toward China has completely shifted from confrontation to accommodation is inaccurate. It is merely a superficial shift toward de-escalation and managing disputes through deals, while the underlying geopolitical and structural competition remains intense.

– Manifestations of De-escalation and Deals (Tactical Accommodation)

· Diplomatic Summits: A state visit to Beijing in mid-May 2026 and frequent summits with President Xi Jinping to reduce escalating tensions.

· Trade Settlements: Temporarily reducing some reciprocal tariffs and concluding major deals, such as Boeing aircraft orders and easing chip restrictions for major companies.

· Regional Crisis Management: Seeking cautious coordination or neutralizing China’s role in some global energy and shipping crises.

– Constants of Conflict and Confrontation (Ongoing Competition)

· Technological Restrictions and Economic Structure: The complex core of the conflict over intellectual property and control of advanced technology remains unresolved.

· Legal and Institutional Pressures: Reciprocal restrictions and legislation continue, with China activating its blocking statute to counter extraterritorial US sanctions.

· The Taiwan file and military strategy: Divergent major strategic interests and military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

China wants to be seen on par with Washington. The Chinese gave Trump everything he wanted but nothing of substance. Taiwan was off the table at the Beijing May 2026 meet. Here, political assessments of the Beijing summit held in May 2016 vary. Some believe China successfully established itself as a rival to Washington, while others consider the results to have ranged from symbolic gains to continued ambiguity regarding issues such as Taiwan and trade deals. The summit’s dimensions and outstanding issues can be summarized as follows:

· International parity: Beijing sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of competing with and managing the power struggle with the United States.

· Taiwan’s position: Taiwan was naturally absent from the direct bilateral talks between the two leaders, amidst strong Chinese warnings to Washington about the dangers of arms sales to the island.

· Mutual gains: Opinions differed regarding the extent of concessions. Analysts believe the Trump administration did not secure any decisive, substantive commitments on certain regional issues in exchange for a temporary easing of trade tensions.

Beijing has sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of rivaling and managing the struggle for influence with the United States. It aims to establish itself as a major power on par with Washington through a variety of economic, technological, and military tools, skillfully managed through a policy of gradual retaliation and the management of international competition. This is achieved through:

– First: Economic and Technological Tools

• Rare Earth Minerals: Controlling the production of raw materials vital to advanced technologies and imposing export restrictions on them.

• Trade War: Reciprocal and gradual retaliation against US tariffs to mitigate the effects of economic pressure.

• Supply Chains: Leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance global trade routes.

– Second: Geopolitical and Diplomatic Presence

• Multipolarity: Supporting a new international order that limits unilateral US hegemony.

• Partnerships and Alliances: Expanding diplomatic and economic influence in vital regions such as Africa and Latin America.

There were some raised questions related to whether US-China friendship is bad for India and whether their infighting is bad for India too. Here, I partially agree with this view, as the interaction between Washington and Beijing presents both gains and risks for India. The conflict grants New Delhi strategic room for maneuver and security alignment with the US, but sharp conflicts or a sudden rapprochement between the two giants could exert economic and political pressure on India’s interests.

– First: Risks of US-China Conflict and Friendship for India

· Bilateral Accords Between Washington and Beijing: If the two powers reach trade agreements or strategic stability without India’s involvement, it could diminish New Delhi’s importance as a crucial ally for containing China.

· Economic and Trade Pressure: Global conflicts, tensions, and reciprocal tariffs affect the stability of markets and supply chains upon which India depends.

· Regional Military Escalation: Direct conflict increases the likelihood of India’s regional involvement due to its direct border disputes with China.

– Second: Opportunities and Gains for India from Competition

· Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: US-China competition is driving Washington and Western countries to deepen military and technological cooperation with India to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

· The strategy of multiple independence: India benefits from competition by implementing a policy of multiple alignment, protecting its decision-making independence without being completely dependent on any party.

The interaction between Washington and Beijing presents India with both opportunities and risks, most notably strategic room for maneuver, security cooperation with the US, and potential economic pressures. In terms of gains and risks, these can be assessed as follows:

– Strategic Gains

· Role for Maneuvering: New Delhi skillfully balances its relations between the two powers.

· Security Cooperation: Stronger cooperation with the US and the Quad countries to counter China’s influence.

· Economic Gains: Global companies are seeking to relocate their factories from China to India.

– Risks and Threats

· Military Escalation: A direct confrontation could force India to choose sides.

· Sudden Rapprochement: Any major deal between the US and China could marginalize India’s regional role.

· Economic Pressures: Markets and supply chains could be affected by any trade tensions between the two giants.

Beyond the US and China, India and others are building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific. Here, the fundamental error in the statement lies in describing India and other countries as building a G-2 alliance with the United States and China. The G-2 concept actually refers to a potential bipolar hegemony or joint management of the world solely by Washington and Beijing, while India and other regional powers are pursuing a strategy known as G-Minus Two to expand their options for independence. This can be understood through:

– Rejection of Bipolar Hegemony:

India adopts a policy of strategic independence and rejects any bipolar system or joint US-China hegemony that diminishes the role of emerging powers.

– The G-Minus Two Strategy:

New Delhi is working with partners such as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Indonesia to build a network of flexible partnerships that balance influence and protect regional interests.

Here, the statement of Beyond US and China, India, and others building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific, accurately describes the shift of major regional powers like India towards building a network of independent strategic partnerships, moving away from the bipolar hegemony of the US and China. This is achieved through:

– Concepts of International Alliances

• The G2 concept refers to a shared global management or potential bipolar hegemony confined exclusively to Washington and Beijing.

• The G-Minus Two concept: expresses the middle power strategy of expanding its economic and defense cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea to safeguard its strategic independence.

– Dimensions of the G-Minus Two strategy

• Diversifying partnerships: avoiding the trap of bipolar polarization between the two superpowers.

• Securing sea lanes and supply chains: building flexible regional blocs to enhance Asian stability.

China opposes the US and Western escalation against Iran and insists on condemning the US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear targets. China considers the US and Israeli military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter. While Beijing officially adheres to nuclear non-proliferation, it will hold the US directly responsible and will oppose the imposition of new international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. China will work to hold Washington accountable. Beijing believes that the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is the root cause of the current impasse in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry asserts that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions against Tehran will not resolve the crisis but will only exacerbate tensions. China views Tehran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT as an understandable reaction to the maximum pressure exerted upon it, but it consistently prefers diplomatic solutions and supports maintaining the international legal framework to prevent escalation.  The Chinese stance came after Iranian parliamentarians, including Ebrahim Rezaei, asserted that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the best response to the Trump administration’s escalation of economic warfare.

The main dimensions of the Chinese position regarding the Iranian threat to withdraw from the NPT are embodied in China’s rejection of pressure and sanctions against Iran. China maintains that the escalating US sanctions and policies against Tehran will not resolve the nuclear crisis but rather exacerbate it. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles have adopted a strategy of legal consideration versus feasibility. Experts and observers close to Chinese circles argue that Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate legal right for independent states, but Beijing implicitly suggests that such a move could trigger harsher international sanctions against Tehran. Therefore, Beijing is working to (obstruct UN sanctions against Iran). China, along with Russia, has expressed its readiness to block the activation of the snapback mechanism or any harsh international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council to protect its interests and regional stability, while adhering to a political settlement. Beijing is calling on all parties to return to the negotiating table and maintain regional and international stability, instead of taking radical and escalatory steps that violate international treaties.

In my analysis, China will insist on referring the Iranian issue to international forums, such as the Security Council, using its veto power to condemn and block any resolutions issued against Iran. Here, China is expected to cooperate with Russia to obstruct any Western or American Security Council resolutions aimed at condemning Iran or imposing new, harsh UN sanctions. China will maintain its commitment to dialogue by continuing to call for a return to the political negotiating table, while publicly acknowledging Tehran’s previous assurances that it is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons. Here, we must understand all the strategic parameters of China’s position regarding the escalation against Iran over its nuclear program through the lens of China’s opposition to nuclear armament. Despite China’s understanding of Iran’s motives and its right to peaceful energy, it categorically rejects Tehran’s move towards acquiring a nuclear military arsenal in order to preserve the stability of the international order and prevent a regional arms race. This is coupled with the desire of relevant circles in Beijing to safeguard their interests. Therefore, Beijing will strive to avoid sliding into a direct confrontation with the West and the United States while continuing to provide Iran with as much economic and diplomatic support as possible in order to alleviate Iran’s isolation.

China supports Tehran diplomatically, emphasizing dialogue and rejecting the unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington. Despite the ongoing pressure, the likelihood of direct war remains low, as a major war of attrition is avoided. China’s position is characterized by its call for diplomatic solutions and dialogue based on mutual respect, its rejection of unilateral US economic sanctions against Iran, and its insistence that all parties address the root causes of the tension and resume the nuclear agreement. This is especially relevant given the Iranian threat to withdraw from the agreement, voiced by several members of the Iranian parliament who believe that remaining in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is pointless under continued US pressure.  Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing considered the Iranian parliamentary proposal a political response to the tightened US economic sanctions against Tehran. Chinese intelligence circles are well aware that an actual Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the approval of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Should this occur—a slim possibility according to Chinese strategic assessments—it would mean the potential outbreak of a full-scale war. Therefore, strategic assessments in Beijing suggest that the potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran will likely escalate into a protracted war of attrition rather than a full-scale military clash. According to Chinese analyses, both Washington and Tehran prefer economic pressure and the prospect of open negotiations to the option of open warfare. Hence, China seeks to curb any military escalation that could threaten energy security and regional stability.

Accordingly, China supports the continuation of the diplomatic and political track to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. It rejects pressures, escalatory policies, and economic sanctions against Tehran, while simultaneously calling for dialogue based on mutual respect and the preservation of regional stability, without supporting any sudden steps that could fuel the conflict. China’s general position stems from its rejection of sanctions. Beijing believes that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions does not resolve the nuclear issue. Therefore, China consistently calls for adherence to dialogue to resolve differences through peaceful political and diplomatic means and to resume negotiations. China also provides strategic support to Iran. In this regard, China stands with Iran in the face of Western and American pressure. China is working alongside Russia to submit draft resolutions to the UN Security Council to support de-escalation, extend the agreement’s framework, address threats of withdrawal, and avoid mutual escalation. China urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps or escalatory measures, such as triggering the snapback mechanism or mutual withdrawals from international agreements and treaties, which could lead to a loss of control.  Therefore, Beijing prefers to contain this crisis and the Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiating frameworks that preserve the basic structure of the non-proliferation regime, while holding the United States and European countries partly responsible due to Washington’s previous withdrawal from the same nuclear agreement that Tehran is now threatening to withdraw from.

Japan’s protest over Putin’s visit to the Kuril Islands is loud because its response is capped: Tokyo cannot meaningfully sanction the one Russian energy relationship — Sakhalin-2 LNG — it now depends on more than ever, after the Strait of Hormuz closure gutted its Gulf oil access and made that supply a load-bearing pillar of its energy security through at least December 2026.

On August 13th, Vladimir Putin toured a fish-processing plant on Iturup Island, the largest of the four southern Kuril Islands Japan calls its Northern Territories, with Sakhalin’s regional governor at his side. It was his first visit there in twenty-six years in power. He called the islands’ status “enshrined” as a permanent outcome of the Second World War and pointedly invoked the late Shinzo Abe, who spent years personally courting him toward a peace treaty that never materialised. Tokyo’s response was immediate: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the visit “absolutely unacceptable,” and her Foreign Ministry says an “additional sanctions package” is under consideration. What went unmentioned is that this same government told Washington, in writing, ten months earlier that a full ban on Russian LNG would be “difficult.” That contradiction, not the visit itself, is the story.

The dispute is old: the Soviet Union seized the four islands in the war’s final days, and the missing peace treaty has been Tokyo and Moscow’s unfinished business for eighty years. What is new is the energy math surrounding it. Sakhalin-2, the LNG project sitting directly across the strait from where Putin stood, supplied Japan roughly 3.6–3.9 million tonnes last year — about 9% of its total LNG imports, and enough to make Japan the project’s largest single buyer. The US Treasury sanctions waiver permitting those imports, along with the Gazprombank clearing that finances them, was just extended to December 18th, 2026, pushed back from an original June deadline. Washington’s stated reason was blunt: global supply is “constrained amid the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz.”

BEHIND THE VISIT

That closure is the piece most coverage of the Kuril visit leaves out. Since February 28th, when the US and Israel launched their air campaign against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively shut, with roughly 20,000 mariners and 2,000 ships stranded and Brent crude spiking to $126 a barrel at its peak. Around 90% of Japan’s crude oil and 11% of its LNG normally transit Hormuz. Tokyo has spent 2026 losing its largest energy artery to a war in the Gulf, which means Sakhalin-2 has quietly gone from “one Russian supplier among several” to one of the few pillars still standing under Japan’s winter power grid. Putin picked this year, not an arbitrary one, to make his sovereignty claim visible on the ground.

The waiver renewal is the tell. Washington and Tokyo did not merely tolerate the Sakhalin-2 exemption through the Ukraine-sanctions years — they actively rebuilt it in 2026, in the middle of the Hormuz crisis, explicitly carving out maritime transport, financial clearing, and joint-operations funding through the end of the year. Putin then chose that same window, with that same regional government’s leadership standing next to him, to plant a public flag on the neighbouring islands. He is not testing whether Japan objects. He knows it will. He is testing whether the general logic of sanctioning Russia survives contact with the specific, recently-renewed exemption that keeps Japanese lights on. Compare that to 2010, when Dmitry Medvedev made the first-ever Russian presidential visit to the same islands: Tokyo protested loudly, recalled its ambassador briefly, and moved on within weeks, because no comparable energy dependency was on the table at the time. The script is recognisable. The stakes underneath it are not.

Takaichi’s own words undercut her “absolutely unacceptable” framing before she said it. In October 2025, briefing President Trump on the LNG relationship, she told him directly that a total ban on Russian gas “would be difficult” — an unusually candid admission from a leader now weighing a fresh sanctions package over the same relationship’s home islands. A prime minister who has already told Washington, on the record, that cutting the energy tie is impractical cannot now credibly threaten it without the threat being understood, in Moscow as much as in Tokyo, as theatre. What remains available is a narrow band of symbolic measures — travel restrictions, asset freezes on individuals connected to the visit or the regional administration — that let Tokyo be seen to act without touching a single LNG cargo.

The standard objection is that Japan has options: JERA, its largest buyer, points to a 30–35 million tonne portfolio and spot-market access, and Tokyo Electric-linked utilities cite early-stage interest in the $44 billion Alaska LNG project as a long-term alternative. That is capability, not near-term relief. Japanese firms remain openly cautious about Alaska LNG’s cost and logistics, with no binding offtake timeline in sight, and the global spot market Japan would lean on is the same market already absorbing cargoes redirected from Hormuz-blocked routes — tighter, not looser, than in a normal year. Sanctioning the actual molecules, rather than a list of names, risks the electricity-price and blackout warnings Japanese officials themselves used to justify keeping the Sakhalin-2 waiver alive in the first place.

THE SCENARIOS

Base case (~55%): Japan announces a narrow, largely symbolic sanctions package — individual travel bans and targeted asset freezes tied to the Far East regional government — while explicitly leaving Sakhalin-2 supply and Gazprombank clearing untouched, repeating the 2010 script almost exactly. The December 18th waiver renewal proceeds quietly, folded into the broader Hormuz-driven energy calculus, and Moscow reads the episode as confirmation that its Pacific energy leverage over Japan is durable regardless of who occupies the Kremlin’s chair on any given August.

Downside case: domestic backlash — the same “hardened public sentiment” Takaichi herself warned the visit would produce — pushes her government into a genuine review of the Sakhalin-2 exemption as its December deadline approaches, right as Hormuz remains tight heading into winter and Asian spot LNG prices stay elevated from redirected Gulf cargoes. The result is Japan’s first real taste of sanctions-driven energy pain from the Ukraine-era regime, a burden that has so far landed almost entirely on European households rather than Japanese ones, arriving in the worst possible month of the heating season and forcing utilities into the kind of emergency rationing talk Tokyo has avoided since 2022.

Upside case: Tokyo treats the compounding shock — Hormuz plus the Kuril visit landing in the same year — as the forcing function it has lacked for three years, converting Minister Yoji Muto’s long-stated goal of “steadily reducing dependence” on Russian LNG into actual contracted volume rather than a talking point: accelerated Alaska LNG offtake commitments, expanded US Gulf Coast term deals, and a public timeline for winding down Sakhalin-2 purchases that uses the December waiver deadline as a hard exit ramp instead of an automatic renewal. Even here, the earliest realistic substitution volumes arrive on a multi-year timeline, not by next winter.

THE AFTERMATH

Putin’s flag on Iturup was never really a test of Japan’s territorial resolve — Tokyo’s position on the Northern Territories has not moved in eighty years and was never going to move now. It was a test of whether that resolve has any economic weight behind it at the one moment Japan’s alternatives are thinnest.

Watch for: what actually happens to the Sakhalin-2 waiver around December 18th, not the sanctions package announced this week. A quiet renewal, carved out exactly as before, will tell you Japan’s outrage and Japan’s energy security are now permanently on separate tracks — and that Moscow understands the gap between them better than Tokyo would like to admit.