digital

A regulatory package as a long-term political strategy

The European Union’s recent digital laws are often described as a regulatory package. The AI Act, the Data Act, and the emerging Data Union Strategy form a wide experiment in using transparency as infrastructure for the digital economy.

The underlying idea is that digital markets cannot be governed well if users, businesses, regulators, and affected individuals cannot understand how systems work, who controls data, where risks arise, and who is responsible for intervention. Therefore, transparency is becoming a condition for accountability, market access, innovation, and long-term trust that falls under what appears as a long-term strategy to regain data sovereignty.

The EU’s policy bet

The EU regulatory approach is founded on the premise that greater transparency can enhance the governability of complex digital systems. However, the mere disclosure of information does not result directly in a greater understanding of the data available; a company can disclose large amounts of technical material while leaving users no better able to assess risk, compare alternatives, or challenge decisions.

Accordingly, the success of the EU’s transparency framework should not be measured by the sheer volume of regulatory obligations it imposes. Rather, its effectiveness depends on whether those obligations generate information that is genuinely useful in practice. The relevant benchmarks are whether disclosures are meaningful, accessible, timely, and comparable, thereby enabling users and regulators to make informed decisions.

The AI Act’s goal to make AI legible

The AI Act shows the EU’s approach most clearly. Its stated purpose is to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote human-centric and trustworthy AI, protect health, safety, and fundamental rights, and support innovation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).

In policy terms, the AI Act tries to make AI systems legible. It assumes that AI risks should not be addressed only after harm occurs. They should be identified, documented, and managed before systems are placed on the market or deployed in sensitive settings.

This is why transparency is linked to risk. High-risk systems face more demanding documentation, monitoring, and information obligations. Lower-risk systems face lighter duties. The European Commission describes the AI Act as the first comprehensive legal framework on AI, designed to address AI risks while fostering trustworthy AI in Europe (European Commission, “Regulatory framework for AI”).

The policy logic is fundamentally pragmatic. Effective regulatory oversight depends on access to adequate information. Likewise, deployers require sufficient information to make informed decisions regarding whether and under what conditions to implement AI systems. Individuals affected by AI-assisted decisions must also have access to relevant information in order to understand how such decisions have been made and, where appropriate, to question or challenge them.

The Data Act attempts to rebalance informational power.

The Data Act uses transparency for a different purpose. Where the AI Act focuses on risk and trust, the Data Act focuses on access, fairness, and economic value. Its objective is to create harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data (Regulation (EU) 2023/2854).

The challenge is that data generated by connected products and digital services is often controlled by a small number of firms. Users may generate valuable data through their use of products but still lack practical access to it. Businesses may need data to innovate, repair products, or offer competing services but face legal, technical, or contractual barriers.

The Commission presents the Data Act as a way to address the challenges and opportunities created by data in the EU, with emphasis on fair access, user rights, and personal data protection (European Commission, “Data Act”).

In this context, transparency functions as a mechanism for redistributing information. Where users are unaware of what data is generated, how it can be accessed, or the conditions under which it may be shared, formally recognized rights of access are unlikely to translate into meaningful practical control. Effective data rights therefore depend not only on their legal recognition but also on the transparency necessary to enable individuals to exercise them.

The Data Union Strategy: From Control to Usable Data

The Data Union Strategy shows the broader direction of EU policy. The Commission frames it around increasing the availability of data for AI development, simplifying EU data rules and strengthening Europe’s position on international data flows (European Commission, “European Data Union Strategy”).

This is significant because it seems that the European Union seeks to pursue two complementary goals simultaneously. On the one hand, it aims to protect fundamental rights and mitigate the risks associated with digital technologies. On the other, it seeks to facilitate greater access to data in order to foster innovation, support the development of artificial intelligence, and enhance European competitiveness. In this way, transparency serves as the connecting principle between these objectives. In fact, by increasing the visibility of how data is collected, processed, and shared, it is intended to strengthen trust in data flows while making them more accessible and capable of supporting innovation.

Why meaningfulness matters most

Meaningfulness is the anchor test. Transparency is useful only if it reveals something that can change decisions or enable scrutiny.

In the AI context, this means information about a system’s purpose, limitations, performance, and risk profile must be specific enough to support procurement, oversight, and challenge. In the data context, it means users must receive information that helps them understand what data exists and how it can be used.

Generic compliance language is not enough. A disclosure that says a system is “risk managed” or that data is “available upon request” may be formally correct but still unhelpful. The real question is whether the information helps someone act.

Information must arrive before decisions are locked in.

Transparency is most useful when it arrives early enough to affect decisions. AI information matters most before procurement and deployment. Data-access information matters most before users become dependent on a particular product, service, or cloud provider.

Post-event transparency can still support audit and enforcement. But it is weaker as a prevention tool. A regime that informs users only after they have lost practical freedom of choice will have limited effect.

Accordingly, comparability occupies a central role in the European Union’s internal market strategy. If transparency is intended to promote competition, facilitate public procurement, and strengthen trust in cross-border digital markets, disclosures must be presented in a manner that enables users, businesses, and regulators to meaningfully compare systems, services, and contractual arrangements.

This objective is particularly relevant in the context of AI procurement, connected product ecosystems, and cloud switching, where informed comparisons are essential to reducing information asymmetries and preventing vendor lock-in. Nevertheless, pursuing comparability inevitably involves trade-offs. While standardized disclosure frameworks can improve the accessibility and consistency of information, they may also obscure sector-specific risks and contextual nuances. Consequently, a uniform template may enhance market discipline and regulatory oversight while simultaneously limiting a more nuanced understanding of the particular risks associated with individual technologies or markets.

The risk of regulatory complexity

The EU’s approach is ambitious, but it is also complex. The AI Act does not operate alone. It sits alongside the GDPR, the Data Act, the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Cyber Resilience Act, and sector-specific rules.

A European Parliament study notes that the AI Act interacts with other digital laws, including the GDPR, Data Act, and Cyber Resilience Act, and that this interplay creates significant regulatory complexity (European Parliament, “Interplay between the AI Act and the EU digital legislative framework”).

Secondary analysis makes a similar point. CEPS has argued that the AI Act may overlap with several horizontal and sector-specific rules, creating possible gaps, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty (CEPS, “The AI Act and emerging EU digital acquis”).

Competitiveness and the SME problem

The burden of complexity is not shared equally. Large technology firms are better able to absorb compliance costs, hire specialists, and shape standards. Smaller firms may struggle.

Bruegel has warned that EU AI regulation risks imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller firms and may contribute to market concentration if compliance demands are not properly balanced (Bruegel, “The right balance: how to fix European Union artificial intelligence regulation”). This is a key policy tension. The EU wants trustworthy digital markets, but it also wants innovation and technological sovereignty. Transparency can support both goals, but only if it is designed in a way that smaller firms can use and implement.

From disclosure to governance

The EU’s digital strategy should be judged by a practical standard. The question is not whether Europe has created the world’s most elaborate digital rulebook. The question is whether that rulebook produces usable knowledge, enables timely intervention, supports meaningful comparison and redistributes informational power.

If it does, transparency may become genuine governance infrastructure. If it does not, the EU risks building a sophisticated compliance architecture that documents the digital economy without effectively governing it.

The European Central Bank (ECB) took the digital euro project into its next operational stage on Tuesday by naming 36 payment service providers to help test the future currency in a large-scale pilot programme beginning in the second half of 2027.

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According to the ECB, the participants were selected from more than 50 applicants across the euro area and will work alongside the ECB and 19 of the euro area’s national central banks, excluding Bulgaria and Malta, during a 12-month testing exercise.

The pilot is intended to assess the digital euro’s technical infrastructure, operational processes and user experience, allowing person-to-person and person-to-business payments to be tested in both online and offline environments, before any decision is taken on issuing the currency.

The announcement moves the digital euro closer to practical testing with consumers, merchants and payment providers, making it one of the project’s most significant milestones since the ECB launched its preparation phase in late 2023.

The selected providers include traditional banks, digital banks and payment companies, with several of Europe’s largest financial institutions among those taking part, including Deutsche Bank, UniCredit, Revolut, Adyen and Stripe.

ECB Executive Board member Piero Cipollone said the level of interest demonstrated that the payments industry was ready to help shape the project’s next phase.

“The strong market interest in the pilot shows the private sector’s readiness to engage actively and quickly advance with the digital euro project to strengthen the European payments landscape,” Cipollone stated.

“We look forward to deeper engagement as we work with and learn alongside European payment service providers in developing a secure, efficient and inclusive digital euro,” Cipollone concluded.

Legislative approval remains the decisive milestone

The pilot comes as negotiations continue between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on legislation that would establish the legal basis for a digital euro.

The ECB has consistently maintained that it cannot issue the currency unless the legislation is adopted by EU lawmakers.

Current planning foresees formal approval in 2027, followed by completion of the pilot and a possible public launch in 2029, although those timelines remain dependent on the legislative process.

The digital euro would be available free of charge to consumers through supervised payment providers and the ECB has repeatedly sought to counter concerns that it could lead to the disappearance of physical money or weaken privacy protections.

In the current plan for the launch, the digital euro would not pay interest and holdings would likely be capped to avoid significant outflows from commercial bank deposits.

Speaking to Euronews exclusively last week, ECB President Christine Lagarde welcomed the European Parliament’s decision to begin negotiations on the legislation and reiterated that the digital is intended to complement, rather than replace, cash.

“Cash and the digital euro will both be legal tender, which means that nowhere in Europe can someone say, ‘Sorry, I’m not taking your banknotes’,” Lagarde told The Europe Conversation with Maria Tadeo, reaffirming that cash would remain a permanent feature of Europe’s monetary system.

The digital euro is also designed to reduce Europe’s dependence on international payment providers and strengthen the bloc’s strategic autonomy in payments.

Lagarde also told Euronews that the project is about reinforcing Europe’s economic sovereignty as much as modernising payments, pointing to the bloc’s continued reliance on foreign-owned payment networks.

“We depend predominantly on US, but also sometimes Chinese, networks to organise payments. We need to have a European solution because we want to be sovereign at home,” Lagarde stated.

Netflix is going bite-sized. In a pivot toward the short-form content dominating TikTok and YouTube, the streaming giant announced it will start hosting three- to 20-minute videos from top digital publishers right on its homepage starting Aug. 3.

The streamer said U.S. customers will see “fan-favorite videos” from brands run by digital publishers, including BuzzFeed Studios, Condé Nast, Hearst Magazines, PMX (a subdivision of Penske Media), People Inc. and Tastemade. The videos will cover a variety of topics, including gardening tips, travel and celebrity profiles.

The rollout comes as Netflix competes for audience time from YouTube and social media platforms such as TikTok that have viral videos that can occupy users for hours. By bringing series such as BuzzFeed Celeb’s “30 Questions,” on which celebrities provide answers, or Vanity Fair’s “Lie Detector,” on which celebrities are hooked up to polygraph machines, Netflix users can learn more information about the people they already watch on the streamer, but in shorter videos.

“Members don’t just want to watch a show or film and move on. They want to keep exploring the stories and personalities they love long after the final credits roll,” said John Derderian, a Netflix vice president overseeing the initiative. “These partnerships help us deepen fandom and create more ways for members to carry those stories with them throughout their day.”

Netflix said it will offer licensed archival and ongoing series, including Harper’s Bazaar’s “Burning Questions,” Billboard’s “24 Hrs With” and People’s “My Life in Pictures” that provide an inside look at celebrities.

The videos from digital publishers will also be available to Netflix customers in Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand on Aug. 3.

The Los Gatos, Calif., streamer over time has been expanding its library of content, adding games, live programming such as boxing matches and football games, alongside movies and TV shows.

On a hot Tuesday afternoon in Yola, Adamawa State, in northeastern Nigeria, 32-year-old Fidelis Mbai walked to a point-of-sale (POS) stand to withdraw ₦35,000. The POS operator, Abu Sani, collected his Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card and inserted it into a POS terminal. Fidelis entered his Personal Identification Number (PIN). Within seconds, he received a debit alert. The money had left Fidelis’ account, but Abu’s terminal showed that the transaction had not been completed successfully.

The two men stared at their screens. One had seen ₦35,000 withdrawn from his account; the other had received nothing. For nearly 30 minutes, they kept refreshing their mobile bank apps. “I was angry because the money had left my account immediately,” Fidelis said. “As far as I was concerned, the transaction was successful.”

Abu understood the frustration, but he had a problem of his own. “The customer was debited, but I didn’t receive the money,” he said. “If I gave him cash and the transaction eventually failed completely, the loss would be mine.”

Eventually, Fidelis left without cash. His money would later be reversed. But for several hours, ₦35,000 simply disappeared into Nigeria’s digital payment infrastructure. 

This experience has become familiar to many Nigerian residents. As digital payments increasingly replace cash, it is ordinary citizens, not institutions, who bear the cost of failed transactions. The consequences often extend beyond the value of the failed transaction itself. Delayed payments can prevent traders from restocking goods, force customers to borrow money while waiting for reversals, disrupt access to healthcare, transport, or other essential services, and erode trust in digital financial systems. For small businesses and low-income households that depend on immediate access to funds, even a short delay can translate into lost income, missed opportunities, and significant financial stress.

Nigeria’s digital payment revolution

Nigeria’s digital payment ecosystem has expanded rapidly over the past decade. According to data from the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS) – which operates the core infrastructure that processes and settles electronic payments and fund transfers between banks, discount houses, and card companies in Nigeria, and is jointly owned by the Central Bank of Nigeria and all licensed banks – the value of instant digital payments reached ₦1.07 quadrillion in 2024, up from ₦600.36 trillion in 2023. The data also showed that Nigerians conducted 1.38 billion POS transactions worth ₦18.32 trillion during the same period. 

These numbers reflect one of the most successful examples of digital public infrastructure (DPI) in Africa. At its core, DPI refers to the digital rails that allow citizens to identify themselves, make payments, and access services. In Nigeria, these rails include bank transfer systems, mobile money platforms, POS networks, identity systems such as BVN and NIN, and shared payment infrastructure.

Together, these systems enable millions of transactions every day. For most users, the process appears simple: send money, receive money, and move on. But when something goes wrong, the burden often shifts away from the infrastructure and onto the people who rely on it.

While there is no official national estimate of the total amount Nigerians lose annually to failed digital payment transactions, the scale is substantial. During the 2023 cashless transition, industry reports indicated that as many as 40 per cent of failed e-payment complaints remained unresolved for extended periods, with affected transactions running into millions of naira. 

Given that Nigerians processed over ₦1.07 quadrillion in instant payments in 2024 alone, experts say that even a failure rate of less than one per cent could leave billions of naira temporarily trapped in failed, delayed, or disputed transactions each year.

The last mile bankers of Nigeria

Every morning, Abu begins work with a few simple calculations. How much cash does he have? How much electronic value is in his account? And how much of that money is trapped in pending transactions?

“Almost every week, we experience failed transactions,” he said. “Sometimes two or three times. During network problems, it can happen many times in one day.”

Officially, Abu’s role is to provide financial services. Unofficially, he has become something else: a lender, a mediator, and a shock absorber. He is one of an estimated 1,600 POS operators per square kilometre in Nigeria, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As banks have reduced their physical footprint in some communities, these agents have become the last-mile providers of financial services, connecting millions of Nigerian residents to the formal financial system.

One afternoon, a regular customer named Musa Ibrahim arrived to withdraw ₦50,000. The debit alert arrived immediately, but Abu’s account was not credited. Musa needed the money urgently for a hospital bill, and Abu had to choose between trusting the system and trusting the customer. “I knew him very well,” Abu said. “So I gave him the money from my own cash.”

The confirmation took two days to arrive. For 48 hours, Abu had effectively given Musa an interest-free loan. Nobody paid him for the risk. Nobody compensated him for the anxiety. Yet this informal lending happens every day across Nigeria. Thousands of POS operators use their own money to bridge gaps created by delayed transactions. 

At Jimeta Modern Market in Yola, 38-year-old Aisha Mohammed sells food items. More than half of her customers now pay by bank transfer. Like many traders, she has adapted to Nigeria’s cash-light economy, but that adaptation comes at a cost. Several months ago, a customer purchased a bag of rice worth ₦80,000. He presented a transfer receipt. The money did not arrive. 

“The customer looked genuine,” Aisha said. “He showed me everything on his phone.”

She released the goods. The payment did not arrive until the following day. That night, she barely slept. “You start asking yourself whether you have been scammed,” she said.

Delayed transactions create a dilemma for traders like Aisha. If they reject digital payments, they risk losing customers; if they accept them, they risk losing money. Many solve the problem through selective trust. “If I know the customer, I may release the goods,” she explained. “If I don’t know them, I wait until I see the money myself.”

This has created a parallel trust economy operating beneath Nigeria’s digital economy. In theory, transactions are guaranteed by technology; in practice, they are often guaranteed by relationships.

Dr Ibrahim Sule, a financial inclusion expert at the Adamawa State Ministry of Finance described it as a hidden feature of Nigeria’s digital economy. “It shows that people are finding ways to compensate for weaknesses in the system. Personal trust often fills the gaps where technology falls short,” he said. 

Borrowing money while waiting 

For Ibrahim Yusuf, a resident of Damilu, a community in Jimeta, the consequences were far more serious. In October 2025, he transferred ₦43,000 to a shop owner as payment for foodstuffs he had purchased. The money left his account instantly, but the shop owner never received it.

One day passed, then two, three, four, five, and six. During that period, Ibrahim had no extra money with him. “The money was meant for foodstuffs, but I couldn’t leave the market with what I bought because the shop owner didn’t receive an alert,” Ibrahim said.

By the third day, Ibrahim borrowed ₦20,000 from a friend. The irony was difficult to ignore. His own money existed somewhere inside the banking system, yet he needed someone else’s money to survive. “It wasn’t even the financial loss that hurt the most,” he said. “It was the uncertainty. Nobody could tell me exactly where the money was.”

His experience illustrates a hidden cost rarely captured in transaction statistics. When payments fail, people do not simply lose access to money. They lose opportunities, business deals collapse, and relationships become strained.

The financial system eventually restores the funds. But it rarely restores the time, trust, or opportunities lost along the way.

How the money moves

While a bank transfer feels like a simple process for customers, financial experts say that transactions often travel through multiple systems. According to Hakeem Abdulkareem, a tech expert at NIBSS, “When you initiate a transfer on your bank app or through your bank, your bank first authenticates the transaction and verifies the beneficiary’s account details. The payment instruction is then routed through the NIBSS Instant Payment (NIP) platform to the receiving bank, which validates the request before crediting the beneficiary’s account. For the transfer to succeed, each of these systems – the sending institution, the NIP switch, and the receiving institution – must exchange information correctly and in real time,” he explained. “Each stage must communicate properly for the transaction to be completed.”

Any disruption along that chain can create problems. Not every failed transfer originates from NIBSS. Payment experts note that delays can occur at the sending bank, the receiving bank, a fintech platform, telecommunications networks, or the central payment switch. One way to determine where a transaction stalled is through the unique ‘Session ID’ generated for every transfer, which allows institutions to trace the payment through the system.

“Delays often occur when there are network issues, system outages, or communication problems between institutions involved in the transaction,” Hakeem added, noting that NIBSS continues to work with banks and fintech companies to improve transaction monitoring, automate reconciliation processes, and strengthen the resilience of the NIBSS Instant Payment (NIP) platform as transaction volumes continue to grow.

In the first quarter of 2025, electronic payment transactions reached ₦284.99 trillion, a 17.7 percent increase from ₦234.49 trillion recorded during the same period in 2024. POS transactions alone rose to ₦10.45 trillion during the same period, more than double the ₦3.62 trillion recorded in the first quarter of 2024. 

While these figures highlight growth, Hakeem noted that “as transaction volumes increase, maintaining system efficiency becomes even more important.” 

The institutions behind Nigeria’s digital payment system agree on one point: public confidence depends on reliability. As transaction volumes continue to grow, banks, fintech companies, and regulators say they are investing in infrastructure, monitoring systems, and consumer protection to reduce delays and strengthen trust.

Adi Dansanda, Customer Protection Officer at the Central Bank of Nigeria, Yola branch, told HumAngle that “Consumer confidence is critical to the success of Nigeria’s digital payment ecosystem. We continue to work with financial institutions and payment service providers to strengthen compliance, improve service quality, and ensure that customer complaints are resolved within established timelines.”

Despite these commitments, the experiences of everyday Nigerian residents suggest that the gap between policy and practice remains significant. For them, confidence is built every time a transfer arrives on time, every time a complaint is resolved quickly, and every time money moves when it is needed most.

Lessons from elsewhere

Building a reliable real-time payment system is not unique to Nigeria. Countries with some of the world’s most advanced digital payment platforms have also experienced outages and technical failures as transaction volumes increased.

In India, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), which processes more than 18 billion transactions each month, experienced several nationwide outages in 2025. An investigation by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) traced one of the largest disruptions to excessive transaction-status requests from participating banks that overwhelmed the system. In response, the regulator tightened technical protocols, limited repeated status checks, and strengthened monitoring to reduce the risk of similar failures.

Brazil’s Pix platform has also experienced periodic service disruptions linked to participating financial institutions and network issues. Rather than eliminating failures entirely, authorities have continued to improve interoperability, operational resilience, and incident response as usage has expanded.

Nigeria has already built one of Africa’s largest real-time payment systems through the NIBSS Instant Payment platform. Experts who spoke to HumAngle say the lesson from other countries is not that payment systems can avoid failures altogether, but that maintaining public trust depends on continuously strengthening infrastructure, improving coordination among participants, and responding quickly and transparently to disruptions.

This report is produced under the DPI Africa Journalism Fellowship Programme of the Media Foundation for West Africa and Co-Develop.

June 26 (UPI) — President Donald Trump on Friday threatened to impose a 100% tariff on any country that enacts a digital services tax against a U.S. company.

The new tariff would be applied to all goods shipped into the United States and be levied on top of any other tariff already in effect for that country, Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

At least a dozen nations have digital services taxes, which are meant to limit the influence of large technology companies — especially large U.S. companies such as Apple, Amazon and Meta — and are being considered by several European countries, CNBC and Politico reported.

Canada last year rescinded a digital services tax hours before it was set to go into effect in order to restart trade negotiations with the United States, which Trump held back on until the tax was canceled.

“Please let this statement serve to represent that any Country that imposes such a Tax will immediately be met with a 100% TARIFF on any and all Goods sent to the United States of America,” Trump said in the post.

“This TARIFF will supersede Trade Deals made with the Country, whether implemented, signed, or not,” Trump said. “Additionally, the 100% TARIFF will be immediately imposed, if they proceed.”

Canada’s tax was to be levied against online marketplace and advertising services companies, as well as social media companies, but Trump called it a “direct and blatant attack” on the United States and canceled talks on the tax was rescinded.

A record 10 African teams are competing at the 2026 World Cup. But 60 years ago, not one African nation played in the 1966 World Cup. Al Jazeera’s Samantha Johnson looks at the 1966 boycott that helped reshape the tournament for generations to come.

Jadon John keeps a diary in which he records reference numbers for government-mandated registrations. Based in Jimeta, a commercial district in Adamawa State, northeastern Nigeria, one page of Jadon’s diary contains his voter registration details and another lists his Bank Verification Number (BVN). The 34-year-old has also noted down his National Identification Number (NIN), records for Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) registration, and information for his driver’s licence renewal. 

All of these are national digital identifiers that Nigerians require for most official documentation. For him, these entries feel like variations of the same repetitive process. 

“It has been stressful from the beginning,” he said, sitting outside a phone repair shop near the Jimeta Modern Market in Adamawa. “I first registered for my voter’s card, then later did BVN at the bank, and after that, I spent almost two days trying to get my NIN. Every place asked for almost the same information and biometric capture.”

The queues were always long, he said, and sometimes the network would fail after hours of waiting. His experience has become a normal routine for many people in Nigeria, a country that has devoted years to developing digital identity systems aimed at modernising governance, enhancing financial inclusion, and minimising fraud. 

Experts have described the government’s efforts as Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), which encompasses the collective digital frameworks that facilitate effective online interactions between governments and citizens. Despite the government’s investments in identity infrastructure, many citizens experience cycles of repeated registrations, record mismatches, and fragmented databases. At the heart of the problem is a simple contradiction: Nigeria now has multiple powerful identity systems, but they do not fully connect with one another.

One person, many registrations

Jadon, for instance, says he struggles to remember how many times he has submitted his fingerprints for similar digital identity registrations. “Every agency takes my fingerprints, passport photo, phone number, and address again, as if I have never registered anywhere before,” he complained, especially about how repetitive and tedious these processes can be.

Nigeria has multiple agencies managing different biometric databases for identity verification, banking security, voting, and driver licensing. The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) manages the NIN database to build Nigeria’s foundational identity system. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced the BVN in 2014 to secure the banking sector and combat fraud. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) maintains its own voter register for elections, while the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) operates another biometric database for driver licensing. Each system has its own valid purpose, but when combined, they frequently function in isolation. Experts say this lack of coordination can sometimes lead to significant problems.

Jadon said that on many occasions, he has suffered service disruptions due to identity mismatches. His bank account was once restricted because his NIN details did not exactly match the BVN record. One system had his middle name fully written, while another used only initials. A similar incident occurred in 2020, when his SIM was blocked amid the government’s NIN-SIM linkage policy.

“When my SIM was blocked because of the NIN-SIM linkage issue, I lost customers because people could not reach me,” he recalled. “I could not receive calls, bank alerts, or access mobile banking for days simply because my records did not match properly across the systems.”

As with the NIN-SIM linkage policy, people also face difficulties linking their BVN to their NIN records. The BVN was introduced in 2014, when Nigeria’s national identity system was not yet fully developed for seamless nationwide interoperability. Abubakar Nuhu Buba, the Deputy Manager of the Currency Operations and Branch Management Department at the CBN in Yola, said the BVN emerged during a period when Nigerian banks urgently needed stronger identity verification systems.

“The original goal of the BVN system was to address the absence of a unique identifier across the Nigerian banking industry,” Abubakar noted. “The banking industry faced an urgent security crisis that the national identity system was not yet equipped to handle.”

The CBN official revealed that the current BVN-NIN integration presents a complex dual effect on financial inclusion. While it builds a more secure foundation for credit and digital banking, he said, it also creates significant friction that risks pushing vulnerable rural populations back into the informal sector. That friction is often felt most sharply in rural communities where internet access is weak, enrolment centres are scarce, and transport costs are high.

The unified identity dream

Nunaya David, a senior enrolment officer with NIMC in Adamawa, said the NIN is intended to serve as Nigeria’s official foundational identity number. Its primary goal is to establish a unique identity for every Nigerian and legal resident, serving as a central reference point across various platforms and services.

“The long-term goal is one person, one identity across all sectors,” he noted.

In theory, that would mean a citizen registers biometrics once, and authorised institutions securely verify identity digitally, rather than repeatedly capturing fingerprints and photographs. But in practice, the systems continue to function as separate databases.

Nigeria’s broader digital interoperability efforts are also coordinated by the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), which has developed frameworks to improve secure data exchange and interoperability across government institutions. Through initiatives such as the Nigerian e-Government Interoperability Framework (Ne-GIF) and the Nigeria Data Exchange framework, NITDA seeks to enable Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) to securely share and verify data across platforms rather than operate disconnected databases. The agency has repeatedly stressed that interoperability is essential to achieving Nigeria’s “One Citizen, One Identity” vision.

“The main reason citizens still repeat biometric registration is that most agencies still maintain independent databases and legal mandates,” Nunaya said. He identified several challenges affecting Nigeria’s digital identity systems, including varying database architectures, inconsistent data formats, outdated legacy infrastructure, network disruptions, and issues regarding data ownership.

“Many citizens have different names, dates of birth, or phone numbers across BVN, voter registration, passport, and NIN records,” he added, noting that minor spelling differences can prevent systems from recognising the same person.

Registration for a voter’s card through the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) also presents similar interoperability challenges. INEC officials in Yola told HumAngle that their biometric registration process serves a different purpose from the NIN database. Grace Akpan, an electoral officer in the state, said the electoral body is mandated to conduct its own biometric registration because the voter register is legally separate from the NIN and BVN databases. The commission also captures biometrics specifically for the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) used during elections.

“INEC currently does not use NIN as a mandatory verification requirement during voter registration,” Grace said.

Citizens can still register to vote without a NIN because the law allows other forms of identification, including passports, birth certificates, and driver’s licences. The official said that while discussions on collaboration exist between INEC and NIMC, real-time nationwide interoperability has not yet been achieved.

It is the same challenge of duplicated effort for Nigeria’s road safety administration. Samuel Danladi, an Assistant Corps Commander of the FRSC in Adamawa, said biometrics are collected during driver’s licence registration to prevent fraud and maintain unique driver records. Although most applicants already possess NIN or BVN records, the FRSC still performs separate biometric capture.

“Nigeria’s identity systems were developed independently by different agencies with separate mandates,” Danladi argued. “Systems are not fully interoperable, biometric standards differ, and agencies lack full real-time access to one another’s databases.”

Since December 2020, FRSC has made the NIN compulsory for driver’s licence applications and renewals, but citizens still submit fingerprints and photographs during the licensing process. “What exists now is mostly verification-based connectivity, not full data-sharing interoperability,” Danladi said.

The human cost 

For ordinary Nigerians, however, the consequences go beyond inconvenience. The burden often falls hardest on people who depend on daily income and cannot afford to spend days correcting identity records. Mercy Barka, a caterer in Yola, encountered an issue while attempting to transfer money to a supplier via her bank’s mobile app. The transaction repeatedly failed despite sufficient funds in her account.

When she visited her bank branch, she was told that her account name did not exactly match the name attached to her BVN records. One database contained her full middle name, while another used an abbreviated version. “The bank told me I needed to correct the information with NIMC first or obtain an affidavit before they could update the records,” she said.

What appeared to be a minor discrepancy eventually took five days to resolve. The resolution required Mercy to shuffle between the bank, a court registry, and the NIMC enrolment centre. “I spent money on transport, affidavit fees, and photocopies,” she said. “The amount I spent trying to correct the problem was painful because I was only trying to access my own money.”

Identity mismatches do not merely create administrative inconvenience; they can interrupt business activities, delay transactions, and impose additional costs on already strained incomes. “It affects everything,” Jadon said quietly. “I lose workdays anytime I have to visit these offices. I spend money on transport, passport photographs, and photocopies.”

Throughout Nigeria, individuals frequently undertake long journeys to resolve discrepancies in records between various databases. This can occur due to a missing middle name, an incorrect birth date, or issues with fingerprint synchronisation during verification. Sometimes, entire systems may just go offline.

“Sometimes one office tells you their server is down after waiting for long hours,” Jadon said. “Other times, they say your information does not match another system. You keep moving from one office to another, trying to correct problems you do not even understand.”

For Charles Anthony, a student who secured a scholarship under the Adamawa State Government, the frustration came during the renewal of his passport. Although immigration authorities already possessed biometric records linked to his previous passport, he was required to submit fresh fingerprints and another facial photograph during the renewal process.

“I thought renewal meant they would simply verify the information they already had,” Charles said. “Instead, it felt like starting the registration process from the beginning.”

The repeated capture was not unique to passport services. Charles noted that he had previously submitted similar biometric information during NIN registration, voter registration, and banking enrolment. “Sometimes it feels like the offices do not know that they are dealing with the same person,” he said.

The privacy question

Beyond the interoperability problem facing Nigeria’s digital identity systems, a growing concern over data protection has also emerged among citizens and digital governance experts. Different government agencies now hold enormous amounts of biometric and demographic information about citizens, including fingerprints, facial scans, phone numbers, home addresses, and financial records. Yet many Nigerians remain uncertain about how securely that information is managed.

“I worry about it sometimes,” Jadon said. “Different agencies already have my fingerprints, face, phone number, and personal details, but nobody explains clearly how the data is protected or who can access it.”

Data protection experts say the concern is legitimate. Vincent Olatunji,  the National Commissioner of the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC), believes that effective identity management requires “harmonised policies, secure technologies, and inclusive systems.” Vincent warned that identity systems must align closely with privacy and data protection frameworks to build public trust. He also said that disconnected databases can increase security vulnerabilities because agencies often duplicate sensitive information rather than securely verify identity through shared infrastructure. He noted that the risks include inconsistent records, unauthorised access, identity theft, and data breaches across multiple systems.

Mohammed Bello Buhari, a digital governance and democracy expert, noted that as Nigeria develops its Digital Public Infrastructure, the primary challenge is ensuring efficient information exchange across systems without repeatedly collecting the same personal data. Mohammed argued that the purpose of modern digital identity systems is not to create more databases but to enable trusted verification across institutions.

“The goal is not to collect more data about people, but to create trusted ways of verifying identity while minimising unnecessary data sharing,” he said, warning that when agencies continue collecting the same information independently, citizens are exposed to greater privacy and security risks because sensitive personal data is duplicated across multiple databases rather than verified through interoperable systems.

Alan Gelb, a senior fellow at the Centre for Global Development and a long-time researcher on identification systems, also argued that global digital identity systems create the greatest value when they are interoperable and trusted across sectors rather than operating as isolated databases. According to him, fragmented systems often increase costs for both governments and citizens while reducing the efficiency that digital identity programmes are meant to achieve.

The World Bank’s Identification for Development (ID4D) programme advocates that trusted digital identity systems should be accompanied by strong safeguards for privacy and data protection. The World Bank noted that digital identity reaches its full potential when combined with secure data-sharing frameworks that allow institutions to verify information without repeatedly collecting it from citizens.

For Jadon, however, those debates remain far from everyday reality. His concern is that several government agencies already possess the same fingerprints, photographs, and personal records, yet he is still asked to provide them.

Learning from other countries

Countries around the world have faced similar identity challenges, but several have moved further towards interoperability. In India, the Aadhaar system allows citizens to authenticate identity across banking, telecoms, and public services through a shared digital identity infrastructure. In Estonia, a European country in the Baltic region, the digital identity ecosystem enables citizens to access healthcare, taxes, voting, and banking through interoperable platforms connected by secure data-sharing systems. The ID4D programme also encourages countries to build interoperable identity ecosystems as part of Digital Public Infrastructure.  

As of early 2026, Nigeria had already issued more than 127 million NINs, according to figures released by NIMC, which shows the massive scale of the country’s digital identity expansion. Meanwhile, Nigeria aims to issue up to 180 million NINs by December 2026 and has begun upgrading its identity infrastructure under the NIMS 2.0 platform, which is supported by the World Bank. 

Despite the current frustrations, officials across agencies agree on one thing: the future lies in interoperability.

“The key reform needed in Nigeria’s identity system is establishing the NIN as the single foundational identity across government services,” Samuel of the FRSC said, calling for stronger interoperability standards, reduced repeated biometric capture, improved digital infrastructure, and stronger cybersecurity protections.

The CBN official also told HumAngle that Nigeria would soon achieve interoperable digital systems. “There are major plans to move towards a single, unified identity system by December 2026,” the official claimed. 

For citizens like Jadon, however, reforms cannot come soon enough. He says he is tired of standing in endless queues to repeatedly provide the same fingerprints. “If the government already has my information, why should I still start from the beginning every single time?” he asked.

This report is produced under the DPI Africa Journalism Fellowship Programme of the Media Foundation for West Africa and Co-Develop.

How does a football penalty become a story about survival? As Bosnia and Herzegovina prepare to face Canada in their 2026 World Cup opener, many eyes will be on Esmir Bajraktarevic. Born in the US, to a family affected by the Srebrenica genocide, his journey is about far more than just football.

Since the public launch of large-language models like ChatGPT and OpenAI in 2020, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is gaining ground across a variety of private and public areas,  the prospect of not only facilitating mundane tasks but also revolutionising labor markets, research, medicine and militaries.  

The gilded age of AI

But as the presence of AI is becoming an increasingly normalized part of everyday life, from summarizing texts, fact-checking a statement or composing an email, it is easy to overlook the more nefarious purposes of surveillance, discrimination and persecution for which AI can be used at the state level. This is an increasingly pertinent issue, with the surge of state-based AI surveillance—such as ’safe cities,’ facial recognition, and smart policing—since 2018, extending to at least 75 of the 175 countries with available data. While this trend is present on all continents, there are regional disparities in application, with AI surveillance present in almost 70% of the surveyed African states, over 50% of South East Asian states, and just under 40% of European countries use AI for surveillance. Thus, AI surveillance is not limited to authoritarian states; according to one report, 51% of liberal democracies use AI for surveillance purposes. How, then, is AI being used for surveillance in China, the Middle East, US, and Europe? 

China—a spearhead for surveillance

China dominates the AI surveillance sector, with companies like ZTE and Huawei present in over 63 countries, vastly outnumbering the US. This presence is especially noticeable in Africa and Asia, where the use of Chinese surveillance technology correlates closely with  participation in the cross-continental Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. In particular, China has been exporting its ‘safe city’ model, which has already been domestically implemented in cities like Beijing as part of its social credit system, to Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Thailand as well as European cities like Valenciennes, which in 2017 was gifted safe city technology by Huawei. This model connects an extensive network of facial recognition cameras and police body cameras into intelligent command centers using algorithms to predict crime.

Individual freedom versus national security

While states are justifying these measures by reference to crime reduction and national security, organisations are warning about the implications of AI surveillance for privacy, systemic discrimination civil rights and democratic freedoms as AI allows for cost efficient surveillance at an unprecedented spatial and temporal scale. For example, China has domestically implemented large scale AI surveillance encompassing over 600 million cameras, coupled with large language models for minority languages to sharpen its surveillance of the communication of its Tibetan, Uyghur, Korean, and Mongolian minorities. In the Xinjiang province, the Chinese state has created an Integrated Joint Operations Platform, which employs an extensive network of CCTV cameras, facial recognition devices, and or WiFi surveillance devices to suppress political dissent among the province’s Uyghur minority. Such Chinese technology has reportedly also been exported to Saudi Arabia and Iran for similar purposes of suppressing political dissent, and to enhance the precision of drone air strikes in Ukraine and the Middle East.

AI surveillance beyond autocracies

However, the West is not immune to these developments. The US government recently found itself in a legal dispute with AI company Anthropic after the company refused to allow the government to use its ground breaking AI model Claude for domestic surveillance without built-in restraints. The US government claimed that this jeopardised national security by preventing the state from identifying espionage. In addition, US President Trump has issued various executive orders to increase the adoption of AI by federal agencies over state regulations. Indeed, the US already uses surveillance technology deployed by Israel on the occupied West Bank, to stem migration on the Mexican border. Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) admitted in March 2026 that federal agencies are buying personal data from data brokers, including location data collected by private companies, in order to track citizens.

Europe: between security, migration and regulation

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) is exploring Automated Border Crossing technologies. The intelligent system iBorderCtrl is currently being piloted in Greece, Hungary and Latvia  applies AI lie detectors to immigrants, with immigrants found lying being automatically detained for further questioning. This system has been criticised by human rights activists and academics as a scientifically weak and potentially discriminatory practice. Thus, even though AI is more regulated in Europe than elsewhere in the world, with the EU AI Act of 2024 restricting large scale usage from sensitive areas through, the risk of questionable AI use in the name of national security remains salient.

Indeed, several member states are stretching the AI Act’s limitations on large-scale surveillance. For example, Luxembourg has since 2025 pursued plans of expanding its use of Trojan spyware from state security and terrorist threats to encompass a broader range of crimes, such as child exploitation, currency counterfeiting and human trafficking. Similarly, the government of Ireland is seeking to expand the powers of the police and Defense Forces to intercept conversations on encrypted platforms like WhatsApp, and iMessage, and other social media platforms. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic was forced to end its use of facial recognition at Prague Airport after six months as it was found to violate the EU AI Act. Likewise, Hungary authorized the police to use real-time facial recognition to identify participants in LGBTQ+ parades in April last year, in violation of the AI Act.

Digital emancipation or authoritarianism?

Thus, it appears that national and international regulation has been lagging behind the rapid tech innovation of recent years. As with any innovation, AI is a neutral tool—but it can be used in ways good or bad depending on the decisions of power-holders. Thus, the application of AI calls for increased scrutiny, accountability and implementation to safeguard the benefits and prospects of improvement it holds out from being hijacked by nefarious purposes undermining democracy and human rights.

A digital register of land ownership in the West Bank is seen as an escalation of Israel’s occupation.

Occupied East Jerusalem, Palestine – A controversial Israeli plan to digitally register property ownership in the occupied West Bank is a “dangerous colonial occupation step that represents a direct assault on the historical and legal rights of the Palestinian people to their land and property”, the Palestinian Land Authority has said.

The Palestinian Jerusalem Governorate and the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CRRC) have urged Palestinians in the West Bank not to engage with any Israeli “entities, committees, platforms, or procedures” of lands and property.

Israel reportedly launched the online “Land Registry and Settlement of Rights” platform on which it plans to “update” property ownership in the occupied West Bank on Wednesday this week.

The Jerusalem Governorate and the CRRC have called on the international community, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and all international human rights and legal institutions to “take their urgent responsibilities to stop these illegal procedures and hold the occupying state accountable for its continuous violations against the Palestinian people, their land, and their resources”, they said.

Moayad Shaaban, head of the CRRC, which is part of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said the move reveals “the occupation’s transition from traditional policies of field control to digital and administrative colonial engineering aimed at imposing permanent legal realities on the occupied Palestinian territory”.

‘Annexation’ by land registry

In May 2025, the Israeli Security Cabinet launched a new, aggressive land settlement process throughout the West Bank, with the aim of “completing the legal and administrative annexation of the occupied territories through fully registering the lands under Israeli authority”, the Jerusalem Governorate said.

Then, in July 2025, Israel’s parliament approved a symbolic measure calling for the annexation of the occupied West Bank. The move was first tabled in 2024 by Israel’s far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who himself lives in an illegal Israeli settlement.

On February 15, 2026, the permanent acquisition and registration of approximately 58 percent of Area C – the part of the West Bank over which Israel exerts total control – began.

Under that decision, Palestinian land registration in the Israeli “Tabu” – the land registry extract – began for the first time since the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. It is a final measure that will be difficult to challenge in Israeli courts, the Israel Hayom newspaper reported in February.

With the onset of land settlement, the Israeli Land Registry unit will take over the regulation and registration of land ownership in Area C. It also has the power to issue sales permits and to collect fees. Israel aims to complete the full settlement of 15 percent of the West Bank by the end of 2030.

Some 700,000 Israeli settlers already live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as illegal settlement has expanded under the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Rights groups say settlement approvals, along with rising settler violence against Palestinian communities, have accelerated since Israel launched its genocidal war on Gaza on October 7, 2023.

Who actually gets to go to the World Cup? With US President Donald Trump’s strict immigration policies, some fans may never make it past the American border. Because while teams qualify on merit, passports don’t. Al Jazeera’s Samantha Johnson explains.

China currently boasts one of the lowest rates of homicide, violent crime, and gun and explosive incidents globally. The Chinese-style sense of security is a comprehensive system integrating advanced technology, community engagement, and continuous improvement in living standards. This has positioned China as one of the safest countries in the world, according to the 2025 Global Security Report, with 98.2% of Chinese citizens feeling safe by 2025, further solidifying its status as a globally stable destination. The pillars of this Chinese-style sense of security are built upon advanced digital technologies, relying on smart networks and modern surveillance systems such as facial recognition and artificial intelligence to enhance the security network within China.

The phrase “Chinese-style security” refers to China’s model for achieving social stability and reducing crime rates. This model is based primarily on three pillars: proactive prevention systems, where, rather than simply addressing crime after it occurs, China focuses on prevention and control through extensive security networks and a constant police presence in key areas; the continuation of the community mobilization system (the Fengqiao model), a historical concept (currently revived) that involves citizens and local committees in resolving community disputes before they escalate into crimes or legal cases, thus promoting the idea of ​​self-regulation and public cooperation with Chinese authorities; and the use of digitalization and artificial intelligence technologies, where China has heavily invested in smart city technologies and the Skynet system. Skynet utilizes millions of cameras equipped with facial recognition and big data analytics to predict suspicious activities and track wanted individuals with high precision. This combination aims to create a secure environment that supports economic growth within China, despite the occasional international debates it sparks regarding the balance between public security and individual privacy.

Data and reports confirm exceptional social stability in China, with citizens’ sense of security exceeding 98% for six consecutive years. This security is attributed to effective governance, advanced digital technologies, and a high standard of living, making China a safe destination for investment and a source of stability. Key features of Chinese governance and the sense of security include increased levels of trust and optimism, with the Chinese people ranking among the world’s highest in trust in the government and optimism about the future, according to trust index reports. A robust safety net exists, built on Chinese-style security through crime prevention systems, community mobilization, and enhanced digitalization. These systemic features, along with numerous other advantages, reflect the stability within China and the state’s ability to fulfill its commitments and provide a safe and stable social environment, earning international praise, particularly in light of global geopolitical conflicts. With the continuation of Chinese-style modernization, ongoing modernization has contributed to raising living standards, thus strengthening the sense of security within China.

Accordingly, the Chinese government and the authorities of the ruling Communist Party of China support several pillars and points that support this approach to enhance the sense of security within the country. Based on current developments, focusing on security as the foundation for development in China, the stability of the situation in China is seen as a key element in boosting investor confidence and building a safe and stable living environment for citizens, which contributes to economic growth. With the intensification of the Chinese-style modernization model, modernization in China is not limited to economic growth but also focuses on improving the quality of life, providing employment opportunities, and upgrading social services, which significantly raises living standards. With the stable sense of security, China, through well-considered social policies, has succeeded in maintaining a high level of social security, which enhances public trust in the government and contributes to long-term stability. This has resulted in continued international praise (amidst crises). At a time when several regions around the world are experiencing geopolitical conflicts, China’s stability stands out as a model attracting the attention and scrutiny of international observers, particularly due to the Chinese state’s ability to effectively manage its internal affairs compared to many systems worldwide, including American and Western ones. This strengthens China’s capacity to lead the developing Global South and strongly promote its model of Chinese governance.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how the development for security strategy can form a fundamental pillar within the Chinese governance system. Improving living standards contributes to consolidating social stability and public security within China. This analysis highlights a delicate equation in the contemporary Chinese landscape, where continuous development (Chinese-style modernization) is linked to social stability, creating a secure environment in a turbulent world.