democracy

The impact the Rodríguez administration could have on the Venezuelan oil industry, even under the new Hydrocarbons Law, would be unsustainable and limited in scope. Structural weakness surrounding the Delcy government and the National Assembly’s lack of legitimacy, commitment to the rule of law, and popular support will restrain the reach of her reforms. Nevertheless, the law will test the willingness of the private sector to run both upstream and downstream operations. These measures could deliver a limited economic boost, that despite American supervision, will be weaponized politically by window-dressing the regime’s legitimacy and stalling further political and economic reforms. It’s precisely this flawed political and legal foundation that undermines the sustainability of the economic gains that the new law could provide.

For Venezuela and PDVSA to reclaim relevance in the international oil market what is required are not incremental improvements but a comprehensive overhaul of the industry, the company, and the constitutional framework that ties them together. The reforms must prioritize transparency, accountability, and insulating the industry and PDVSA from political pressures under strong political coverage that provides long term stability. These measures are something an interim administration, independent of who is in charge, will be unable to provide. Only then would international companies and capitals commit to the long term projects needed.

Once the country finds its political footing under a popularly elected and legitimate government can longlasting and durable reform take place. At this point multiple options may surface. There could be a scenario where we see PDVSA take a back seat while the country creates a competitive fiscal system prioritizing royalty collections while up and downstream operations are run by private enterprises. Remaining PDVSA assets and JV operations would be divested gradually as production capacity is recovered in the hands of private enterprises. However, revitalizing PDVSA as a competitive oil company should remain as a national strategic objective. Venezuelans would greatly benefit from building a company able to compete in and outside of the Venezuelan market.

However, the only way to relaunch PDVSA as a relevant actor in the international market is by allowing it to enter the 21st century oil dynamics and embracing a partial privatization via a minority share offering in international equity markets. Beyond the much needed capital that would be raised in the initial and consequent secondary offerings, plus the potential to tap debt markets along the way, going public will create an additional moat and isolate the company some steps from further political interference. A publicly traded PDVSA would not only need to answer to the government but to energy analysts, independent shareholders, and international compliance and regulatory frameworks alike. It will be the pressure generated by the external scrutiny that will enable PDVSA to be scaled up back into international relevance. Given the precarious financial and operational standing of the holding, a partial privatization is not feasible on day one or two of a political transition and economic recovery phase. But it is a question that will become relevant once the objective becomes long sustainable growth.

PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning.

The privatization of PDVSA has been a taboo for Venezuelan society despite serious attempts in late 1990s to execute such an operation. However, the devastation that the industry suffered under chavista mismanagement provides a clean slate opportunity to relaunch PDVSA and the oil industry under a modern governance framework. For too long the Venezuelan oil industry has been treated as the cash cow of whoever seats in Miraflores. Historically, this led to the centralization of political and economic power which hindered the development of democratic institutions and left the nation at the will of the administration’s oil revenue distribution policy. Taking control of PDVSA not only meant controlling the oil industry but the state itself. Reforms should aim to break the petro-state monopoly over oil revenue and to make PDVSA part of a dynamic national industry where other participants are allowed to play.

There are multiple precedents to back this move. Lessons from the partial privatizations of Chinese SINOPEC and Norwegian Statoil from the early 2000s could be drawn to prove that these operations are possible under different political systems. A PDVSA offering would be exceptionally complex, but in order to even start considering it there are three basic fundamentals that need to align.

First, the move would need overwhelming support from civil society to sustain the necessary political will. While that looks like a concrete goal in María Corina Machado’s energy proposals, the possibility seems remote under an interim Delcy government that still needs to appease other factions within the ruling coalition. In addition, chavismo’s current leader has not adhered to international transparency standards following her 2020 appointment as acting Minister of Economy and Finance—a role that earned her the title of Venezuela’s economic vice president before taking control of the national oil industry. Her tenure overlapped with the loss of an estimated $21 billion in oil payments, a scandal that ultimately led to the arrest and scapegoating of former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami.

Second, Petróleos de Venezuela needs a robust rule-of-law framework that can deliver credible guarantees to investors The current interim president is unlikely to provide such assurances, given the deep mistrust surrounding Venezuela’s public institutions—many of which she does not fully control. As Juan Guillermo Blanco points out, her posture may swing from alignment with Washington on this occasion to an anti-imperialist rupture if the circumstances allow it.

Shifting to global best practices

PDVSA cannot move forward without the goodwill of the market. Francisco Monaldi has repeatedly stated that the main risks of Venezuelan oil are above ground. Beyond the politics, sanctions, and the legal framework, PDVSA needs to get its house in order to regain market credibility. For starters, the holding needs to address its debt issue—estimated at $34.5b—through an agreement where debtholders walk away feeling it was a fair deal. Without serious debt restructuring, a share offering roadshow would be impossible.

The company must also cut all non-essential ventures, subsidies, and social project funding from the nucleus. From PDVAL supermarkets to F1 teams, PDVSA bankrolled it all during chavismo. Despite how bizarre the outflows party got, these types of splurges and subsidies have been ingrained in the Venezuelan mindset and will be hard to get rid of. Such measures would represent a comprehensive detachment from century-old beliefs in the magical powers of the Venezuelan petro-state.

Furthermore, PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning. In addition, investors and banking partners must be able to track every dollar. Auditable records are not only essential for building reliable financial projections but also necessary for protecting stakeholders from anticorruption liability. This underscores the need for a new framework of transparent, efficient contract allocation and fully auditable accounting trails, ensuring that financial statements can withstand market scrutiny and compliance verification.

Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market.

Figures such as the “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) or joint ventures that currently dominate private investments in the industry are compatible with this model as PDVSA should seek alliances in cases where it makes financial sense to do so. However, the secrecy under which these ventures have been working on needs to end.

Finally, PDVSA will need to bring in an independent leadership team and board with enough protection to isolate operational and financial decision-making from politics. Venezuela would be represented in the board as the majority shareholder, but would be restrained from running the day-to-day business operations and resource allocation. Studies that examine initial offerings of National Oil Companies (NOC) suggest that a substantial amount of the efficiency gains are delivered before an IPO is launched, as the company restructures itself to be introduced into the public market. PDVSA has a long way to go before we can consider this scenario. Nevertheless, aiming toward partial privatization would provide a blueprint for rebuilding PDVSA as an operationally, financially, and commercially viable company.

A share offering should consider a dual listing that includes the Caracas Stock Exchange, which is also in need of an extreme makeover (that’s part of a different discussion, however). The overhaul needed is not only about getting barrels out of the ground, but about including the company in the wider economy and making it subject to the highest managerial and corporate governance standards. Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market. Ultimately, this would constrain the government’s ability to overreach into the private sector.

Whichever path is chosen for the future of PDVSA and the Venezuelan oil industry, it should be preceded by an inclusive debate that considers implications beyond the industry itself and sets the country on a sustainable growth path. This debate must happen in public, in conditions of full political and economic freedom, free from coercion by either internal or external powers. It should be the opposite of what occurred prior to the swift approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law, when secrecy prevailed and the legislative body responsible for drafting the statute showed no significant deliberation.

The one-sided vote in the illegitimate 2025 National Assembly should not overshadow the legislature’s failure to comply with its own parliamentary rules during the bill’s passage, as purported opposition lawmakers reportedly received a copy of the draft only hours before the first debate. That episode underscores why the legal and constitutional reforms needed to break the petro-state and refound PDVSA can only follow the renewal of all institutions, including a truly multiparty, independent congress.

The end goal is simple, yet history-changing: to dismantle Miraflores’ total control and discretion over oil-industry revenues.

Welcome to Black History Month, 2026 style.

President Trump posted a video Thursday to his social media site that contains animated images depicting former President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama as apes.

The White House took down the post Friday, and after first calling it nothing more than a meme, they dubbed it a mistake by a staffer. Sure.

But while the justifiable outrage over this overt racism spins itself into a brief media circus (because we all know something else will come along is about three minutes), let’s look a bit deeper into why this video is more than an affront to everything America stands for, or should stand for, anyway.

It’s no accident that the images of the Obamas are embedded deep inside a video about voter fraud conspiracies from the 2020 election (which are untrue, if I need to say it again). This video is an escalation in the assault that is likely to come on voting rights and voting access in the midterms.

“Absolutely, there’s a connection to the vote,” Melina Abdullah told me Friday. She’s a professor at Cal State Los Angeles and co-founder of Black Lives Matter-LA.

“This is about more than just about the Obamas,” added Brian Levin, a professor Emeritus at California State University, San Bernardino, and founder of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism. “It’s about people that are (perceived as) undermining our elections and our democracy.”

I caught Levin the day after he turned in a chapter about authoritarianism for a new book, which happens to look at how discrimination and the imposition of social hierarchies ties in with power.

Let me summarize. Vulnerable groups are smashed down as dangerous and not fit to be full citizens, so a smaller group of elites can justify power by any means to protect society from these lowly and nasty influences.

Let me make that messaging even simpler: Black and brown people are bad and shouldn’t be allowed to participate in democracy because they don’t deserve the right.

How does that play out at the ballot box?

All that talk about voter identification and election integrity is really about stopping people from voting — people who legally have the right to vote. Those who are least likely to be able to obtain proof of citizenship — which might require a passport, or birth certificate along with the money and know-how to get such documents — are often Black or brown people. They are often also poor, or poorer, and therefore have less time and money to put into obtaining documents, and also live in urban areas where they share polling places.

Is it such a stretch to imagine some kind of federal oversight at those types of polling places, turning away — or simply intimidating away — legal voters who have long made up a strong block of the Democratic base?

Let’s hope that never happens. But the current undermining of the legitimacy of Black and brown voters is, said both Levin and Abdullah, systemic and concerning.

Trump’s latest video is “part of a floodgate of bigotry and conspiracy that relates to elections and immigrants and Black people and it’s important to condemn the manner in which these puzzle pieces are put together to label African Americans and immigrants as a threat to democracy with respect to the vote,” Levin said.

The premise of the video in question is that Democrats have engaged in a complicated and decades-long scheme to steal elections. It’s presented as a documentary, and the images of the Obamas have been weirdly inserted as almost a subliminal flash near the end.

If you’ve missed the white supremacist postings that have now become commonplace on official government communications such as those from the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security, let me assure you that Levin is right and this primate video is indeed part of a “firehose” of white nationalist rhetoric coming not just from Trump but from the federal government as a whole.

The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, for example, has turned its focus toward punishing diversity, equity and inclusion. Just this week, another federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, began a probe against Nike for allegedly discriminating against white people in hiring.

“It has been not even a dog whistling, but a Xeroxing of the exact kind of terms that that I’ve been looking at on white supremacists and neo Nazi websites for decades,” Levin said.

It’s not my place or intent to warn Black people about racism, because that would be ludicrous and insulting, but I’ll warn the rest of us because in the end, authoritarianism targets everyone. This video is a clear statement that Trump’s vision of America is one in which every non-white group, every vulnerable group really, is a second class citizen.

“He’s enabling an entire group of people who want to take this country back to a time when rampant violent white supremacy was enabled in the law,” Abdullah said. “What they mean is recapturing an old school, oppressive racism that is pre-1965 pre-Voting Rights Act.”

That message, Levin said, has “a resonance with a decent part of his base,” and when fed ceaselessly into the system, can have violent outcomes.

Levin uses the example of when Trump tweeted during the protests over the killing of George Floyd, “When the looting starts, the shooting starts,” a phrase with a violent and racist history.

Levin said Black people have always been the primary targets of hate crimes in the United States, but after that tweet, it was some of the “worst days” for violence aimed by race.

“When a high transmitter, like a president, circulates imagery with regard to prejudice, it creates these stereotypes and conspiracy theories, which then are the groundwork for further conspiracy theories and aggression,” he added.

Abdullah said she worries that even if the voter crackdown isn’t officially sanctioned, those empowered conspiracy theorists will take action anyway.

“So the people who are so-called ‘monitoring,’ self-appointed monitors … this is who’s going to be pulling people out of voter lines, and so this is what he’s whipping up intentionally,” she said.

Keep your eye on the ball, folks, because the far-right Republicans running the show are laser-focused on it. The midterm elections have to go their way for them to remain in power.

The easiest way to ensure that outcome is to only allow voters who see things their way.