Constitutional

The real winner in Poland’s constitutional battle is Putin | Opinions

Poland’s two main political camps are locked in an escalating fight for control of the Constitutional Tribunal, each claiming to defend the rule of law. In the process, they are undermining the legitimacy of the Polish state in the eyes of its own citizens, playing directly into Putin’s playbook.

The roots of the dispute go back more than a decade. In 2015, the outgoing centre-right Civic Platform-controlled parliament attempted to appoint judges to the Constitutional Tribunal for vacancies that should have been left to the incoming parliament. The newly elected conservative Law and Justice government used this controversy to intensify its efforts to pack the Tribunal with party nominees rather than independent judges.

Now back in power, Civic Platform is trying to bring new judges into the Constitutional Tribunal. But President Karol Nawrocki and the Tribunal’s leadership, both aligned with Law and Justice, have blocked several of the newly appointed judges from taking office. Last month, one of the newly elected judges ordered the suspension of the Tribunal’s president and deputy, and police were deployed to the building. Nawrocki denounced the move as a forcible takeover, while Prime Minister Donald Tusk defended it as an effort to restore the rule of law.

Moscow has already seized on the confrontation to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Poland’s institutions. On November 3, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev described the intervention as a “coup”.

A decade ago, it was the conservative Law and Justice government that sought to pack the Constitutional Tribunal with party nominees, disregarding legal constraints. Today, it is the coalition of the centre-right Civic Platform and the liberal Left that is acting unlawfully. We see the main parties becoming mirror images of one another. Conservative Law and Justice is calling on its supporters to take to the streets to defend the rule of law, a slogan previously used by the liberal opposition when Law and Justice was in power. Now it is the liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk who is playing the strongman, with police carrying shields and wearing helmets deployed around the Constitutional Tribunal during the operation. He presents himself as an effective leader who gets things done, with little regard for legal subtleties and doubts raised even by some liberal-leaning experts. Against this backdrop, a photograph of Tusk reading an issue of the philosophical journal Kronos devoted to Carl Schmitt has recently circulated widely on social media. Schmitt, a theorist of decisionism, famously declared, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”

Law and Justice’s efforts to politicise the Constitutional Tribunal pushed middle-aged supporters of the liberals in big cities onto the streets a decade ago. It seems, however, unlikely that Poles will again take to the streets in their millions to support either political bloc. The public is tired of the tug-of-war between politicians, not only because both main blocs demonstrate considerable hypocrisy when invoking the rule of law over force, but also because the fight does not speak to people’s chief everyday concerns: the cost of living and the safety of a country with an aggressive neighbour waging a hot war on its border and a hybrid and cognitive war inside the country.

What has changed drastically compared to the protests that took place a decade ago, when the main forces occupied mirror-image positions, is the geopolitical context: Russia’s full-scale war in neighbouring Ukraine, alongside its hybrid and information warfare aimed at weakening Poland’s position on the global stage.

In the worst-case scenario, this struggle over the legitimacy of state institutions could extend to elections. A precedent can be found in Romania, where, on December 6, 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election following intelligence reports of alleged foreign interference, social media manipulation and campaign financing irregularities, and ordered the electoral process to be repeated.

What we might see in other Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland if the situation deteriorates, is, on the one hand, the liberal establishment adopting measures that override electoral outcomes, such as courts annulling elections in response to genuine foreign interference through social media campaigns. On the other hand, the opposition could become increasingly anti-establishment, effectively delegitimising the institutions of the state. The problem will be aggravated by the fact that foreign interference may be real rather than invented by the establishment.

These two opposing forces are squeezing the middle ground on which democracy depends: on one side, social media platforms controlled by foreign superpowers algorithmically manipulating the emotions of the populus and fuelling distrust in the state; on the other, the decisionism of an establishment governing in a state of exception through politically subordinated courts. Both leave less space for thoughtful civic self-determination.

A large part of the commentariat in Poland, however, still sees this dynamic as another round in the familiar two-party struggle between Civic Platform’s EU-oriented liberals and Law and Justice conservatives backed by the US. Beyond this rivalry, Russia- and China-inspired, supposedly anti-establishment radical influencers and parties, both anti-European and anti-American, seek to portray the state as a foreign occupation. The wilder the theories delegitimising the state become, the more pretexts the ruling establishment will have to delegitimise the opposition.

The danger is no longer simply that one political bloc might gain control of the Constitutional Tribunal at the expense of another. It is that, as both sides continue to undermine the legitimacy of state institutions, growing numbers of Poles may cease to see those institutions as their own. What is being weakened is not just the authority of a particular government, but the bond between citizens and the state itself.

No one could be happier about this kind of self-reinforcing dynamic, which weakens Poland’s position, than Putin.

If any healing is possible, it will not come from the existing political forces.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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America is heading for two years of constitutional brinkmanship | Donald Trump

To understand the coming collision between President Donald Trump and a Democratic Congress, one must first discard the textbook formulas of US governance. The United States is about to witness a political experiment for which there is no modern precedent: a purely transactional populist, entirely unmoored from traditional ideological orthodoxy, forced to share power with a legislative branch unified in partisan hostility.

The conventional wisdom predicts immediate, paralysing gridlock. That is a misreading of the terrain. Trump does not view politics through the lens of conservative dogma or constitutional restraint; he views it through the lens of the deal. Consequently, his governance will not be characterised by passive stagnation, but by an aggressive, volatile mix of transactional bipartisanship and raw executive unilateralism.

Domestically, the ideological lines will blur. For decades, the Republican Party was defined by its commitment to limited government and free markets. Trump has spent a decade dismantling that consensus. Confronted with a Democratic House of Representatives and a Democratic Senate, he will feel no tribal loyalty to standard conservative policy. Instead, expect him to seek out areas of populist overlap.

When it comes to massive infrastructure spending, protectionist trade policy and aggressive state intervention to protect domestic manufacturing, Trump is often closer to the Democratic centre-left than to the ghost of former President Ronald Reagan. He will dare the opposition majorities to vote against legislation that pours millions of dollars into their districts or levies tariffs that protect their blue-collar constituents. It will be an unholy, ad hoc alliance — issue-by-issue, fleeting, and transactional — designed to deliver the optics of victory for both a populist president and a vulnerable congressional majority.

Where such transactions fail, however, the venue will shift from the legislative chamber to the administrative state controlled by the executive. Trump will not accept the traditional boundaries of a divided government. If necessary, he will govern by decree. Executive orders, emergency declarations and expansive interpretations of federal statutes will be deployed to bypass a stubborn Capitol Hill. The administration will dare the Democratic leadership to tie up the government in the federal courts, turning the slow wheels of the judiciary into a political weapon.

Yet, the true test of this fragile constitutional architecture will not occur on the domestic stage. It will happen abroad, specifically in the volatile expanses of the Middle East, where the executive branch enjoys its greatest constitutional latitude.

The immediate flashpoint is Iran. The Trump doctrine rests on a foundation of maximum economic pressure backed by highly unpredictable, asymmetric tactical deterrence. It is a posture designed to keep adversaries off balance. But a Democratic Congress, historically wedded to the framework of multilateral diplomacy and deeply wary of congressionally unauthorised foreign entanglements, will view this unpredictability not as a strategic asset but as an existential danger.

The US is likely headed for a historic constitutional showdown over the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Democratic majorities will also aggressively use the power of the purse to place statutory fences around the commander-in-chief, attempting to defund military manoeuvres or explicitly prohibit unilateral escalations against Tehran. Trump will treat these attempts at legislative constraints with open contempt. Asserting an absolute, almost unrestrained reading of the Constitution’s Article II executive authority, the president will argue that modern geopolitical threats require executive agility, not governance by congressional committee. When the rockets fly, the president will act unilaterally, leaving Congress to meaningless academic debates.

Hanging over this entire drama is the ultimate constitutional weapon: the threat of impeachment by Congress. In a Washington where both the House and the Senate are controlled by the president’s opponents, oversight will cease to be an instrument of governance and become an engine of partisan political destruction.

Democratic congressional committee chairs will launch a relentless, multifront campaign of subpoenas and investigations. Every member of Trump’s cabinet will live in a permanent state of interrogation; every foreign policy decision will be audited for high crimes and misdemeanours. The House will almost certainly draft articles of impeachment, not as an extraordinary remedy for rare misconduct, but as a routine penalty for political nonconformity.

Yet, this strategy carries severe risks for the opposition. Trump does not fear institutional warfare; he thrives on it. He will transform the spectacle of congressional investigations into the theatre of public grievance. To his base, a hostile Congress will be framed not as a coequal branch of government performing its constitutional duty, but as an illegitimate, obstructionist cabal subverting the will of the forgotten American voter.

Because the structural math of the Senate requires a two-thirds majority for removal of the president, actual eviction from the Oval Office remains a statistical fantasy. Impeachment will therefore achieve not displacement, but a permanent state of institutional friction.

What the US is about to enter is not two years of legislative inactivity, but a phase of perpetual brinkmanship. It will be an era in which governance occurs only in the narrow, volatile intervals between constitutional crises. The US system was built to withstand institutional tension, but it also requires a basic reverence for institutional boundaries to function. With a transactional populist president in the White House and an adversarial army on Capitol Hill, those boundaries will be tested as never before. The architecture will hold, but the foundation will shake.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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Poland’s president joins protest amid constitutional crisis at top court | Protests

Poland’s president has cut short a trip to Senegal, joining protesters facing off with police outside the country’s Constitutional Court. The stand-off follows moves by the government to remove the court’s president and vice-president, sparking accusations of a coup in the court.

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