Colombia

Presidential candidate Ivan Cepeda accepted the victory of his opponent Abelardo de la Espriella.

Bogota, Colombia – Colombian presidential candidate Ivan Cepeda officially conceded defeat to hard-right populist Abelardo de la Espriella this morning following a tight run-off race.

While Cepeda had recognised the legitimacy of the preliminary results on Sunday, which gave de la Espriella a less than 1 percent lead, he said he would wait for the final, legally binding vote count, known as the scrutiny, before accepting defeat.

“I have decided to accept the result of this process, which indicates that Abelardo de la Espriella is the new president of the Republic,” said Cepeda in a livestreamed address on Wednesday.

While the voting verification process has not been fully completed, the National Registry, which oversees the elections, said yesterday that Sunday’s preliminary vote count was “99.997 percent” accurate after revision by judges at the municipal level. The vote must now be verified at the departmental and national levels.

There had been doubts among the Cepeda camp about the legitimacy of the vote process, with President Gustavo Petro – who was closely involved in the leftist candidate’s campaign – openly alleging fraud and foreign interference before and after the election.

“Electoral manipulation has been proven; I cannot say for certain that what has been uncovered guarantees an electoral victory [for Cepeda], but it is a fact,” wrote Petro on Monday.

For months, the president has warned about vulnerabilities in vote-counting software and clashed with the National Registry.

The president’s mistrust is largely based on the 2022 legislative election, in which his Historic Pact coalition recouped roughly half a million votes following the scrutinised vote count.

The recent memory of that vote led Petro and many Cepedistas (supporters of Cepeda) to believe that the roughly 250,000-vote margin between Cepeda and de la Espriella on Sunday could be overturned.

But the National Registry recorded high accuracy in both the preliminary count for March’s legislative election and the first round of the presidential race on May 31.

Petro also said that Washington’s interference in the election undermined the final result because President Donald Trump had endorsed Abelardo, breaking with tradition.

“President Donald Trump’s direct intervention nullifies the elections in Colombia,” wrote Petro in an X post yesterday.

But Cepeda’s concession appears to put distance between him and the president, who founded the Historic Pact movement.

“This suggests some sort of schism between Petro and Cepeda. While Petro’s term is sunsetting, Cepeda will likely become the leader of the opposition,” said Sergio Guzman, director of political risk consultancy Colombia Risk Analysis.

Cepeda, who is now expected to lead the Historic Pact party in the Senate, struck a conciliatory tone in his speech this morning: “I am doing this as an act of democratic responsibility, to contribute to harmony, peace and dialogue among Colombians.”

For a quarter century, Venezuelan politics has revolved around a single divide: chavismo versus anti-chavismo. Entire political careers were built around that struggle, as parties rose and fell according to their ability to interpret it. Leaders were judged less by what they proposed than by how effectively and fervently they opposed the regime. 

No one has embodied that tradition more successfully than María Corina Machado. Her achievement was not simply electoral. She transformed anti-chavismo from a coalition of parties and personalities into something closer to a political identity.

That transformation helped make Machado the dominant figure in Venezuelan politics since 2024. It may also explain why the beast showing its fangs at the other side of the Western border deserves to be taken seriously by the opposition. 

Political movements rarely remain the property of the people who built them. Over time, people begin to invest parts of themselves in them. They become attached not only to leaders, but to their own idea of what those leaders represent. Their loyalties gradually shift from individuals to identities, at that point, succession becomes possible.

The curse of the trailblazer

Colombia’s recent election offers an intriguing illustration of how this process can unfold. At first glance, Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory looked like a victory for the Colombian Right. It may turn out to have been something more interesting.

De la Espriella did not defeat Uribismo. If anything, he inherited it. Many of his voters still admire Álvaro Uribe and some probably voted for him repeatedly. What changed was not their opinion of Uribe, but their sense of who now spoke most convincingly for the political tradition he created.

The Tiger did not campaign against Uribe’s legacy. He campaigned as its most uncompromising heir, as he described himself “más uribista que doña Lina” (Uribe ‘s wife). His appeal rested on a simple proposition: Uribe had been right all along, but those who claimed to represent his legacy lacked either the conviction or the will to carry it through to its logical conclusion. This is a very different kind of political challenge. It does not seek to replace a movement. It seeks to inherit it.

De la Espriella’s voters didn’t change their opinion of Uribe, but their sense of who now spoke most convincingly for the political tradition he created.

That possibility should sound familiar to Venezuelans.

The question is not whether Machado is losing support. By any reasonable measure she remains the dominant figure in the Venezuelan opposition. The more interesting question is whether anti-chavismo, having become an identity in its own right, could one day develop ambitions, expectations and frustrations that exceed her ability to contain them.

The strange thing about political victories is that they rarely belong entirely to those who achieve them. Over time, successful leaders create constituencies, expectations and myths that acquire a life of their own. What begins as a political movement gradually becomes a political identity, and once identities take root they stop asking permission from the people who created them.

The comparison that comes most readily to mind is Winston Churchill. The British prime minister lost the first election after the Second World War, in one of the great paradoxes of democratic politics. The standard explanation is that Britons decided the war had been won and wanted someone better suited to building the peace.

Bukele, Trump and Milei often feature more prominently in the imagination of many Venezuelans than the leaders who shaped domestic opposition politics before Machado.

The Venezuelan case may eventually present the opposite problem. Machado’s future challenger, once one emerges, is unlikely to argue that the struggle against chavismo has ended. If anything, the argument would be the reverse: not that Machado was wrong, but that she stopped too soon.

If such a figure were ever to emerge in Venezuela, it would likely appear first as a sentiment rather than as a politician.

A nameless threat

One can already glimpse fragments of that sentiment across the Venezuelan diaspora, in Miami, Houston or Madrid among voters who remain deeply committed to the opposition but increasingly impatient with the pace of events, and Machado’s approach to Trump’s plan. Many admire Machado, some even revere her. Yet admiration and impatience are not mutually exclusive sentiments.

A decade ago, one of the most common criticisms of Machado was that she was too confrontational. Today, some of her critics seem to believe she has not been enough of a hardliner. The shift may appear subtle. It is anything but that.

What unites these constituencies is not necessarily ideology. Many disagree on policy, strategy and even on the nature of a future Venezuelan transition. What they seem to share is a growing impatience with the political habits that defined the opposition during the previous two decades. Their political reference points are increasingly international. Bukele, Trump and Milei often feature more prominently in their imagination than the leaders who shaped Venezuelan opposition politics before Machado.

The result is a political vocabulary that would have sounded unfamiliar not long ago. Arguments about negotiations and elections increasingly coexist with arguments about strength, authenticity, betrayal and whether the opposition has shown sufficient willingness to exercise power rather than merely seek it.

The Tiger represents a possibility: that the greatest challenge facing anti-chavismo in the years ahead may not come from its enemies, but from the unresolved question of what victory should look like.

None of this means that a Venezuelan Bukele is waiting in the wings, nor does it suggest that Machado’s position is immediately threatened. As things stand, the opposite appears true. But political identities rarely remain frozen in time. They absorb new influences, adapt to new frustrations and develop new aspirations. The question is whether anti-chavismo is beginning to do the same.

Perhaps someone like Abelardo The Tiger never comes. Perhaps Machado successfully leads Venezuela through a transition and remains the uncontested leader of the movement she helped build. That remains the most likely outcome.

But history suggests that political movements rarely remain suspended in a single moment forever. The forces that transformed Machado into the dominant figure of Venezuelan opposition politics, frustration, perseverance, impatience, conviction and a refusal to accept the permanence of chavismo, are not forces she alone controls.

That is why The Tiger matters. The point is not whether it materializes as a candidate, a faction or a movement. The point is that it represents a possibility: that the greatest challenge facing anti-chavismo in the years ahead may not come from its enemies, but from the unresolved question of what victory should look like.

For 25 years, Venezuelan politics revolved around how to confront chavismo. María Corina Machado provided the most compelling answer that question has yet produced. The shadow crouched in the woods is the possibility that a different question is beginning to emerge.

And predators have a peculiar habit. They tend to show up before people eventually give them a name.

Colombia’s outgoing leftist president, Gustavo Petro, has alleged electoral fraud after preliminary results from a presidential run-off saw his handpicked candidate lose by a small margin.

In a barrage of posts on the social media site X on Monday, Petro alleged that the opposition bought votes and Israel and the United States interfered to help opposition far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella win.

Petro has refused to recognise the results and has called for an investigation by the judiciary.

The president, who was barred by the constitution from running for a second term, was Colombia’s first leftist president, putting him at odds with the US.

His administration is praised for reforms that boosted social spending, raised the minimum wage and redistributed land to poorer families. Petro also cut ties with Israel over Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and distanced himself from US President Donald Trump’s administration.

However, critics said his refusal to accept the election results risks inflaming political tensions – and violence. Here’s what we know:

What are the election results?

The first round of the presidential election was held on May 31. Neither of the two leading candidates – Abelardo de la Espriella of the right-wing Defenders of the Homeland movement and Senator Ivan Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact – secured at least 50 percent of the vote, leading to a run-off on Sunday.

De la Espriella narrowly won with 49.66 percent over Cepeda’s 48.7 percent, according to preliminary results released on Monday by the National Registry, which manages vote numbers.

The razor-thin difference amounts to less than 1 percent of the vote and represents one of Colombia’s closest elections.

Trump-backed de la Espriella, 47, is to take office on August 7. The criminal lawyer is a multimillionaire who campaigned on tougher security and anti-leftist policies. He also has US citizenship.

De la Espriella’s win is part of a recent trend of Latin American countries electing far-right, populist leaders who are pro-Trump. Argentina’s Javier Milei, Honduras’s Nasry “Tito” Asfura, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Costa Rica’s Laura Fernandez Delgado all have close ties to the Trump administration.

Why is Petro alleging fraud?

Petro took to X to denounce in a series of posts what he said was voter fraud committed with the help of Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Petro said there was evidence of manipulation of Form E-14, the official, handwritten tally of sheets filled out by poll workers at each voting station.

The form is a physical record of the vote count and is meant to prevent electoral fraud. It is filled out by hand, and digital scans are also uploaded to the National Registry’s portal for public auditing. If found to have errors, parties may request a recount.

Petro alleged that foreign actors accessed the National Registry’s website and rewrote voting data on some E-14 forms.

“Today we have evidence of a change in IP addresses of several servers of the national registry,” he posted.

“This means that the software was compromised and others wrote data for polling stations and voting posts. The only entity in the world capable of doing that is the state of Israel,” Petro added without providing evidence of Israel’s alleged involvement.

Petro said his party had requested a “technical audit” of the voting software before the elections and asked authorities to retrieve the digital footprints of all digitally transmitted documents to avoid modification. He claimed those requests were ignored.

The outgoing president shared videos of what he alleged captured the “premeditated” modification of E-14 forms. He also claimed the manipulation was done “from the offices of the Bautista brothers”.

Who are the Bautista brothers?

Petro was referring to Thomas Greg & Sons, an influential private logistics and security printing firm that runs Colombia’s electoral infrastructure. Until recently, it also printed Colombian passports.

It is run by brothers Fernando and Camilo Bautista Palacio. The duo was convicted of bank fraud in the US in the 1980s.

Thomas Greg & Sons, which was founded by their father, Gregorio, has been contracted by the National Registry for more than a decade to manage election logistics, preliminary vote counting and vote-tallying software.

Petro in April accused the Bautista brothers of negotiating a deal with de la Espriella that would see them secure the presidency for the far-right candidate in return for clinching passport printing contracts once more.

At the time, de la Espriella refuted the claims, and his lawyers threatened Petro with a lawsuit.

What are authorities saying?

Attorney General Gregorio Eljach has dismissed the allegations and told reporters there is “no evidence of fraud” with more than 99 percent of the votes counted.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has so far not responded directly to Petro.

Is de la Espriella linked with Israel?

Yes, de la Espriella has consistently voiced support for Israel and campaigned in Colombia’s Jewish community, making pro-Israel promises and saying his government would “defend Judeo-Christian principles”.

He pledged to reverse Petro’s 2024 decision to cut ties with Israel and has promised to relocate the Colombian embassy to Jerusalem.

Netanyahu congratulated de la Espriella on Monday, saying: “I look forward to working with you to strengthen the bond between Israel and Colombia.”

How has the US reacted?

In his posts, Petro also blamed Trump for interfering in the elections by publicly endorsing a candidate and thus swaying voters.

Trump endorsed de la Espriella on his Truth Social platform weeks before the run-off.

Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also congratulated de la Espriella on his preliminary win, and Trump took credit for the far-right candidate’s victory.

“He was in 10th place. I endorsed him, and he won the election. He called me last night and thanked me for the endorsement,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Monday.

Rubio wrote on X: “The Trump administration looks forward to working closely with your incoming administration to advance regional security cooperation, end illegal immigration to the United States, and strengthen our economic ties.”

Petro has invited Trump to make a statement on the electoral fraud allegations.

“I formally invite President Donald Trump to speak,” Petro wrote, adding that the US president bears responsibility for “having supported a candidate and not the freedom of the Colombian people”.

What is the US-Colombian relationship like?

Although both countries have close trade ties, diplomatic relations have often been strained over drug trafficking policies and relations with Israel, among other issues.

But relations essentially collapsed under the Trump and Petro administrations.

Petro in January last year refused to allow US migrant deportation planes to land in his country and said on X that the US “cannot treat Colombian migrants like criminals”.

In October, the US sanctioned Petro, his family and key officials in his government based on unproven allegations of involvement in the drug trade.

In January this year, the US military abducted leftist Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from his Caracas home after the Trump administration accused him of “narcoterrorism”.

Footage shows Colombian outsider Abelardo de la Espriella in an armoured vehicle next to his vice-presidential candidate, Jose Manuel Restrepo, celebrating a narrow lead in the preliminary election results.

WASHINGTON — Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella has vowed to crush criminal groups and slash government programs. He promises to bomb “narco-terrorist” camps and build sprawling mega prisons if he wins Sunday’s runoff election.

De la Espriella’s views have earned him the vociferous backing of President Trump, who has broken with White House tradition by publicly seeking to tip the scales in foreign elections — particularly in Latin America.

After Trump gave his “complete and total endorsement” to De la Espriella, whom he referred to by his nickname, “El Tigre,” the candidate posted an AI-generated image of a bald eagle and a tiger, with American and Colombian flags waving side by side.

“You have paved the way for the people to defeat the entrenched powers that have long held sway,” he wrote to Trump. “In Colombia, we have now begun to follow the same path.”

De la Espriella, a political newcomer who built his campaign around gym workout videos and vows to “disembowel” the left, is part of a new wave of far-right, MAGA-aligned politicians in Latin America openly borrowing from Trump’s playbook, presenting themselves as outsiders who will trim the government, curtail immigration and militarize law enforcement.

In a region that remains plagued by high crime and inequality after a decades-long period of leftist domination known as the “Pink Tide,” the playbook appears working.

More Latin Americans now identify with the right than at any time over the last two decades, according to polling firm Latinobarómetro. A series of conservatives have won presidential elections in recent years, giving Trump a slate of willing partners as he seeks to expand U.S. power in the region, combat drug cartels and counter growing Chinese influence.

President Trump meets with El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, in the Oval Office of the White House on April 14, 2025.

(Brendan Smialowski / AFP via Getty Images)

Among Trump’s many allies are Argentina’s Javier Milei, a libertarian firebrand whose dramatic cuts to state services were a blueprint for Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency, known as DOGE; and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, a mano dura autocrat who housed U.S. deportees in his notorious prisons to assist Trump’s immigration crackdown.

Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa has welcomed U.S. Special Forces, who are attacking drug traffickers in his country, and Chile’s José Antonio Kast has pledged a border wall along his country’s frontier with Peru and Bolivia in his quest to “make Chile great again.”

Trump might soon gain another ideological bedfellow in Peru with the election of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of late autocrat Alberto Fujimori. With ballots still being counted, Fujimori was on track for a narrow victory

In a sea of nations led by conservatives, the left now retains power in just three key countries: Mexico, Colombia and Brazil.

It faces serious challenges in two of them.

Ahead of October’s presidential election in Brazil, incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist stalwart and one of the last vestiges of the Pink Tide, has been polling even with Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally convicted of convening a Jan. 6-style insurrection.

Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, right, with President Trump during a dinner at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Fla., on March 7, 2020.

(Alan Santos / Associated Press)

And then there’s Colombia, where De la Espriella, a criminal defense attorney, surged ahead in the first round of voting and this weekend faces off against Sen. Iván Cepeda, an ally of leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Petro drew Trump’s ire by denouncing the U.S. military campaign to oust leftist President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and a spate of lethal U.S. attacks on alleged drug boats.

Petro slammed Trump’s endorsement of De la Espriella, calling on Colombians to “vote freely and not allow ourselves to become either slaves or anyone’s colony.”

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum also accused Trump of electoral interference after the U.S. announced drug trafficking charges against several members of her ruling Morena party and The Times revealed that two more sitting governors are under investigation.

“Is it truly a legitimate interest to combat organized crime?” Sheinbaum asked of the U.S. investigations. “Or are we perhaps witnessing how sectors of the American far right … intend to influence the 2027 election in our country?”

President Trump meets with Argentine President Javier Milei during the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 23, 2025, in New York.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

The White House has declined to comment on Sheinbaum’s criticism. But Trump earlier this month warned Mexico that his administration is “focused on coming in by land” to deter drug trafficking.

“President Trump has been clear that Mexico must do more to combat the drug cartels running rampant in their country,” a White House official told The Times when asked whether Trump is planning a military operation there.

Trump, who publicly backed Kast and President Nasry Asfura of Honduras, as well as Milei’s political party ahead of Argentina’s midterm elections last fall, has openly mused that he should charge money for endorsement of leaders in foreign countries.

Guillaume Long, who served as foreign minister in Ecuador under leftist President Rafael Correa and who is now a fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, criticized Trump’s “unprecedented, unabashed interventionism in Latin American politics.”

“There are a number of taboos that have been broken,” he said.

Long added that Latin America is mirroring the United States in its political divisions. “I think we’re likely to see in the coming decades a very polarized politics,” he said. “And that doesn’t bode very well for political stability.”

Much of Trump’s activity in the region, including the deposing of Maduro, has been presented as part of a war on drug cartels, which the White House has formally declared terrorist organizations. Long described that rationale as a “pretext” for expanding U.S. political and economic influence in the region.

Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, are escorted by federal agents as they make their way to an armored car for a trip to a federal courthouse in Manhattan on Jan. 5.

(XNY/Star Max/GC Images)

He said he believed that focus on cartels had pushed some Latin American politicians to the right “because they think being security hawks will make them popular with the Trump administration.”

But James Bosworth, the founder of Hxagon, a company that provides political risk analysis in Latin America, said many leaders in the region have come to tough-on-crime policies on their own.

“I think that some of the hemisphere is willing to play along with it because the hemisphere has issues, including security issues, where the U.S. can be of assistance,” Bosworth said. “Many Latin Americans do want a greater military focus, so there’s certain alignment that’s occurred.”

Conversely, Mexican journalist Alex González Ormerod said he believes Trump has been influenced by Latin American leaders, including Bukele, who suspended civil liberties and began locking up alleged gang members en masse in 2021.

“I think there’s a lot of cross-pollination going on,” he said, crediting groups like the Conservative Political Action Conference, a gathering of right-wing activists and elected officials that has hosted events in Brazil and Argentina.

Many analysts cautioned that Latin America operates on a pendulum, swinging every few years between right and left.

“There’s a lot of evidence that voters are just unhappy and voting for the opposition, and then losing patience very quickly with whoever is in office,” said Benjamin Gedan, director of the Latin America Program at the Stimson Center.

Voters dissatisfied with the status quo so often vote out incumbents there is a phrase for it: voto castigo, or “the punishment vote.”

Ceballos reported from Washington and Linthicum from Mexico City.

As Colombia comes down from the ecstasy-filled high of its recent win in their 2026 World Cup opener, a sadder, and much darker reality is beginning to set. On June 21^st, 2026, Colombians will vote in a historic runoff election that will not only hurt Colombia but will have serious effects on the future of Venezuela. 

No matter the outcome, Colombia will be worse off, as both Iván Cepeda and Abelardo De la Espriella are a study on how a democracy can offer voters a choice between two particular brands of terrible.

The first-round of the election provides a clear insight into the current state of Colombian civil society. Like many presidential systems, Colombia structures its presidential elections in a two-round system.  If no candidate surpasses 50% of the vote in the first round, as happened on May 31st, a second runoff election is called between the first and second placed candidates. That runoff is this Sunday, June 21^st. Moderate and moderate right-wing candidates Sergio Fajardo and Paloma Valencia achieved historic electoral lows for centrists with 4% and 6% of the vote respectively, whilst the radical extremes of the political scale rejoiced in victory. 

The biggest surprise was undoubtedly Abelardo de la Espriella´s first round victory, with the self-anointed “Tiger” garnering 43.7% of the vote to first round favourite Iván Cepeda´s 40.9%. With a mere 600,000 votes separating the candidates and about 3 million votes being contested, both can win the election. 

Cepeda, who is President Gustavo Petro’s hand-picked heir, initially questioned the results alongside the controversial president, and only accepted them on June 7^th, a week after the election. With his institutional backing, that delay matters. All in all, Colombians ran to the extremes, which provided a clear data-backed picture of just how polarized Colombian civil society is.

Whoever gets sworn in Bogotá on August 7^th2026, will have more operational influence over Venezuelan affairs than any other head of state in the hemisphere, apart from Trump.

Regardless of the result in the June 21^st runoff, the Colombian elections will have a lasting effect on the future of Venezuela and could be the catalyst for very different answers to the question of the country´s political future. 

First and foremost, Colombia is the country that has received the largest number of Venezuelan migrants, with approximately 3 million Venezuelans calling the country home. Since January 2025, Colombia has been hosting the diaspora without US funding and support. Furthermore, part of the the 2,219 kilometre-long border between both countries is controlled by the Colombian Guerrilla ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), who lost key ally and facilitator Nicolás Maduro on January 3^rd and is currently massing on the Colombian side.

Bogotá’s diplomatic influence and posture is one of the few international players that can have significant effects on whether interim dictator Delcy Rodríguez will eventually push for elections in Venezuela. 

All in all, whoever gets sworn in Bogotá on August 7^th 2026, will have more operational influence over Venezuelan affairs than any other head of state in the hemisphere, apart from the self-proclaimed most popular man in Venezuela, Donald Trump.

Now, it’s time to get down to brass tacks, the who is who. Inside trash can number one we find Iván Cepeda. Cepeda’s personal arc is worryingly similar to that of the Rodríguez siblings in Venezuela. His father was a radical Left politician murdered by far Right paramilitary groups. That fuelled Cepeda’s deep hatred towards the Colombian political system and institutions. A career senator and politician, Cepeda is probably the smartest mind in Colombia’s hard Left. He is also an admirer of Hugo Chávez, and strong critic of former president and kingmaker Álvaro Úribe. Cepeda’s followers will frame him as a left-wing moderate, but he is not. He is Petro without the cocaine, prostitutes and charisma, running on continuing the Total Peace framework that has seen record numbers of cocaine production in the country, and bolstered the rearming of the ELN. His commitment to governmental continuity will no doubt hurt Colombia, starting with the fact that current policies have driven down Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia by 30% from a 2023 peak.

De la Espriella is a one-man band who won the first round through violent speeches, AI anthropomorphic videos of himself as a tiger, and evangelical networks.

Furthermore, his delay in recognizing the electoral results provides an interesting insight on how Cepeda could interact with institutions that he finds inconvenient. A man who questions clean elections certified by international observers has no business rewriting constitutions, a key pillar on his first-round electoral campaign, which he recently dropped in a pathetic attempt to attract centrists and moderates. Cepeda’s rhetoric and language is extremely divisive. He frames every political opponent as an oligarch, every private enterprise as an exploiter, every security operation as state violence whilst analysing the deep social gaps and concerns the country must navigate. Rather than seeking to solve them, Cepeda weaponizes them to further divide the Colombian population.

But Cepeda’s rottenness is not counterbalanced by a knight in shining armour, but by a different but equally foul-smelling individual. We find Abelardo “The Tiger” de la Espriella inside trash can number two. The part-time attorney, part-time rum maker, aspiring opera singer, fashionista with terrible taste is one of the most questionable figures in the Colombian public sphere. A criminal defence attorney, who became famous for being the lawyer and fixer for chavista allies like Alex Saab and paramilitary leaders, has found a new “passion project” in his expanding list of questionable side hustles: becoming the president of Colombia. De la Espriella comes in as a true outsider who has no congressional or political backing. He is a one-man band who won the first round through violent speeches, AI anthropomorphic videos of himself as a tiger, and evangelical networks.

Abelardo’s rhetoric only serves to perpetrate a never-ending cycle of violence. The anti-democratic claims that he will literally “gut leftists,” his active endorsements of states of exception and support for arbitrary concentrations of power within the presidency, his promise to open ten CECOT-style mega prisons, and his constant disregard and attacks against human rights are problematic. 

His “security agenda” is not offering any coherent security policy. On the contrary, he’s seeking to create a permission structure for state-sponsored political violence, dressed as law and order. His policy against the ELN of all-out war has no institutional backing, and risks triggering considerable escalation. Events like the April 25^th bombing can serve as a prelude of what an empowered ELN can look like. 

De la Espriella’s polarization is of a different flavour to Cepeda’s, but equally problematic. Instead of using social and class divides, the Tiger weaponizes the us-versus-them mentality along the lines of patriots and enemies. In a country with such a tragic and saddening history of political violence, that rhetoric has a body count attached to it.

Cepeda’s attitude will likely be lukewarm and soft on Venezuela, dragging his feet on any meaningful action such as Venezuelan migrants in Colombia or elections in our country.

At the end of the day, either candidate will face serious problems to govern, and will bring a myriad of conundrums for Colombia, but how do their stances translate into the Venezuelan question? On one hand, Iván Cepeda has constantly framed the operation to extract Nicolás Maduro as violation of sovereignty, a position which lacks any diplomatic nuance, and at the same time provides strong insights into how Cepeda will behave towards Venezuela and how much pressure he´ll exert on Venezuela to call for elections. The Total Peace Framework will provide the ELN with the political umbrella to consolidate in the border region, stacking an unpredictable situation on top of an already volatile powder-keg in Venezuela. Calling Cepeda a “friend” of Maduro or Delcy is not accurate, but he is the regime’s useful neighbour. His attitude will most likely be lukewarm and soft on Venezuela, dragging his feet on any meaningful action like his predecessor Gustavo Petro such as Venezuelan migrants in Colombia or elections in our country.

On the other hand, analysing Abelardo’s impact on Venezuela must begin with the fact that he was the leading defence attorney for Alex Saab between 2013 and 2018, the same years Saab ran Maduro’s sanction-busting operation. Although his divisive rhetoric claims forceful actions, his personal history and contacts in his rolodex prove that rather than full force, there is a clear entanglement with the chavista operation. De la Espriella also has no real plan for the domestic situation with refugees, and his ultra-nationalist stance could cause serious problems for foreign populations in Colombia. Furthermore, his full force campaign against the guerrillas can drive the ELN back over the Venezuelan border.

A small “silver lining” does exist. On one hand, Cepeda has stated that he will try to push for regularization mechanisms in Colombia. On the other, Abelardo’s ties to the International Right and Donald Trump can transform him into a key figure to push for a decisive presidential election and as a source of pressure on Delcy.

Colombia’s role as a key interlocutor with Venezuela is undeniably at risk regardless of who wins the presidency. Because the region and Venezuela needed a Colombian president that could be a genuine bridge between Washington and Caracas, between the Venezuelan diaspora and integration, between the ELN and disarmament, and for the ever-divided poles of the Colombian population. But rather, on June 21, the country was forced to choose between ideological blindness dressed in progressive language, and maximum pressure dressed over an obvious conflict of interest. Venezuela might again pay the price for someone else’s terrible choices.

The star winger scores a goal and sets up another, as Colombia make a winning return to the FIFA World Cup.

Colombia opened their World Cup Group K campaign with a 3-1 victory over Uzbekistan at the Estadio Azteca on Wednesday, as Daniel Munoz, Luis Diaz and Jaminton Campaz ⁠struck to overcome a spirited second-half response from the tournament debutants.

Uzbekistan were disciplined for long periods under their Italian coach Fabio Cannavaro, but Colombia’s greater quality stood out in front of a crowd of over 80,000 on a cool, rain-tinged evening in Mexico City.

Colombia, the Copa ⁠America runners-up, had early sights of goal through Jhon Arias and James Rodriguez, but Uzbekistan sat deep, scrapped gamely and waited for mistakes. Bekhruz Karimov almost profited when he burst forward, only for Jhon Lucumi to intervene before he could shoot.

Diaz had the clearest chance of the opening half when he struck the post, before Abdukodir Khusanov slid in after the winger ‌had knocked the ball past him, taking out both the Colombian player and a pitchside cameraman who required medical treatment.

Uzbekistan’s resistance finally cracked in the 40th minute. Diaz gathered the ball after an attack had broken down and clipped a fine pass into the path of Munoz, who guided home a neat finish for his third international goal.

The large Colombian contingent erupted, their yellow shirts making the Azteca look and sound almost like home. Chants of “Vamos Colombia”, adapted from a Club America-style chorus, rolled around the ground, while Uzbekistan’s small band ⁠of supporters answered with drums of their own.

Fayzullaev scores Uzbekistan’s maiden World Cup goal

Uzbekistan improved after the ⁠break and equalised on the hour with the country’s first World Cup goal.

Dostonbek Khamdamov fed Eldor Shomurodov, whose shot from the right side of the box was saved low by Camilo Vargas. The goalkeeper could not hold it, however, and Abbosbek Fayzullaev nodded in the rebound from ⁠close range.

However, Uzbekistan’s joy lasted only five minutes.

Gustavo Puerta released Diaz in the 65th minute, and the forward side-footed across goal to restore Colombia’s lead. The crowd ⁠responded with chants of “Lucho, Lucho”.

Uzbekistan kept pushing. Akmal Mozgovoy shot narrowly off ⁠target in stoppage time, Karimov hit the bar with an effort from distance, and Azizbek Amonov had a shot blocked after Otabek Shukurov’s pass.

But Colombia had the final word, Campaz scoring in the ninth minute of stoppage time to settle a contest in which Nestor Lorenzo’s side had 15 attempts to Uzbekistan’s nine, ‌and extended their strong recent group-stage record to seven wins in eight World Cup matches.

Colombia face DR Congo on Tuesday in Guadalajara, after Uzbekistan play Portugal on the same day in Houston.

The FIFA World Cup begins on June 11. You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary, and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

Winger Luis Diaz scores a goal and sets up another, as Colombia make a winning return to the FIFA World Cup after missing the last edition.

Colombia opened their World Cup Group K campaign with a 3-1 victory over Uzbekistan at the Estadio Azteca on Wednesday, as Daniel Munoz, Luis Diaz and Jaminton Campaz ⁠struck to overcome a spirited second-half response from the tournament debutants.

Uzbekistan were disciplined for long periods under their Italian coach Fabio Cannavaro, but Colombia’s greater quality stood out in front of a crowd of over 80,000 on a cool, rain-tinged evening in Mexico City.

Colombia, the Copa ⁠America runners-up, had early sights of goal through Jhon Arias and James Rodriguez, but Uzbekistan sat deep, scrapped gamely and waited for mistakes. Bekhruz Karimov almost profited when he burst forward, only for Jhon Lucumi to intervene before he could shoot.

Diaz had the clearest chance of the opening half when he struck the post, before Abdukodir Khusanov slid in after the winger ‌had knocked the ball past him, taking out both the Colombian player and a pitchside cameraman who required medical treatment.

Uzbekistan’s resistance finally cracked in the 40th minute. Diaz gathered the ball after an attack had broken down and clipped a fine pass into the path of Munoz, who guided home a neat finish for his third international goal.

The large Colombian contingent erupted, their yellow shirts making the Azteca look and sound almost like home. Chants of “Vamos Colombia”, adapted from a Club America-style chorus, rolled around the ground, while Uzbekistan’s small band ⁠of supporters answered with drums of their own.

Fayzullaev scores Uzbekistan’s maiden World Cup goal

Uzbekistan improved after the ⁠break and equalised on the hour with the country’s first World Cup goal.

Dostonbek Khamdamov fed Eldor Shomurodov, whose shot from the right side of the box was saved low by Camilo Vargas. The goalkeeper could not hold it, however, and Abbosbek Fayzullaev nodded in the rebound from ⁠close range.

However, Uzbekistan’s joy lasted only five minutes.

Gustavo Puerta released Diaz in the 65th minute, and the forward side-footed across goal to restore Colombia’s lead. The crowd ⁠responded with chants of “Lucho, Lucho”.

Uzbekistan kept pushing. Akmal Mozgovoy shot narrowly off ⁠target in stoppage time, Karimov hit the bar with an effort from distance, and Azizbek Amonov had a shot blocked after Otabek Shukurov’s pass.

But Colombia had the final word, Campaz scoring in the ninth minute of stoppage time to settle a contest in which Nestor Lorenzo’s side had 15 attempts to Uzbekistan’s nine, ‌and extended their strong recent group-stage record to seven wins in eight World Cup matches.

Colombia face DR Congo on Tuesday in Guadalajara, after Uzbekistan play Portugal on the same day in Houston.

The FIFA World Cup begins on June 11. You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary, and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

Colombia’s far-right, pro-Trump candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, is in the lead after Colombia’s first round of elections. If he wins the June 21 runoff against left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda, progressive policies could be reversed. Al Jazeera’s Hala Al Shami explains why US officials are invested in de la Espriella’s success and walks us through the stakes.

Less than two hours after polling stations closed on Sunday, it was clear that Colombia’s presidential race would be settled in a run-off between two finalists: hard-right political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda.

Though the overall result surprised few, de la Espriella’s strong showing upended pollsters’ predictions.

Cepeda, President Gustavo Petro’s chosen successor, had been expected to win the most votes, based on public opinion surveys.

But instead, de la Espriella came in first place, winning 43.74 percent of the vote. Cepeda trailed with 40.90 percent.

Supporters of de la Espriella, a criminal defence lawyer, held rapturous celebrations in the coastal city of Barranquilla, where the candidate has an office.

“Colombia won, and with more than 10 million votes, democracy won,” said Elsa Suarez, a de la Espriella voter living in Bogota.

The far-right candidate has modelled himself after politicians like Donald Trump in the United States and Javier Milei in Argentina, flamboyant media personalities who won the presidency despite having little to no political experience.

Like them, de la Espriella has pledged a return to “law and order”, as well as a pared-back national government and policies to support traditional family values.

Notably, he promises to use an “iron fist” to stamp out crime and build megaprisons to jail criminals, mimicking the policies of Salvadoran strongman Nayib Bukele.

Analysts say de la Espriella’s populist messaging resonated with voters in Colombia’s interior, where urban crime is a growing concern.

Electoral maps show de la Espriella besting Cepeda in 16 of the country’s 32 departments, primarily in the heart of Colombia and along the border with Venezuela.

“In more central areas and closer to the capitals, people prioritise security,” explained Laura Bonilla, the deputy director at the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (PARES), a Bogota-based research nonprofit.

By contrast, de la Espriella’s security messaging failed to sway voters along the coast and in border areas afflicted by rebel violence.

Bonilla argues that people in these regions instead place greater value on the socioeconomic issues that Cepeda represents, as the continuity candidate for Petro’s Historic Pact party.

“Over the past four years, they have received constant attention from the government,” said Bonilla, citing state development projects under the Petro administration.

A blow to the conservative establishment

De la Espriella’s success also highlights growing anti-establishment sentiment in Colombia, according to experts.

The lawyer, who has never run for public office before, comfortably beat his main rival on the right, Senator Paloma Valencia, who was backed by former President Alvaro Uribe, the figurehead of Colombian conservatism.

Initially, Sunday’s election was predicted to be a close race between Valencia and de la Espriella, both of whom lagged behind Cepeda in the polls.

But as Sunday’s ballots were tallied, Valencia flopped with less than 7 percent of the vote.

Miguel Silva, a Colombian political consultant, credited some of de la Espriella’s success to his campaign messaging.

De la Espriella, he explained, used his campaign to draw a distinction between the haves and the have-nots, those who have benefitted from the government and those who feel ignored.

“He [succeeded] by portraying himself and the people he represents as ‘Los Nunca’ and by portraying Paloma and her followers as ‘Los Siempre’,” Silva said, using the Spanish words for “The Nevers” and “The Always”.

Pollsters predicted the right would be divided in the first round, paving the way for Cepeda to win the most votes, but de la Espriella captured millions of votes from traditional conservatives, marking a shift in Colombia’s political landscape.

In Bogota, the only province in the country’s interior to vote for Cepeda, the left-wing candidate’s supporters were shocked by Sunday’s results.

“Everyone is a little surprised,” said Juan Camilo Rodriguez, who voted for Cepeda. “These results don’t match the polls.”

Petro himself had hammered his base to flood the polls, warning that the left’s chances of success could be hampered by electoral fraud.

The outgoing president rejected last night’s results, which were based on the “pre-conteo”, or preliminary count, a non-legally binding process.

Instead, Petro called on the public to wait for the official, scrutinised count, which will be released in the coming days.

Cepeda echoed the president’s scepticism in a speech on Sunday night. “Only once the vote-counting committees have fully, clearly, and thoroughly clarified this matter, will we comment on tonight’s results,” he told supporters.

But the candidate appeared to mellow his stance this morning, acknowledging that there was no evidence of irregularities in the vote. He trailed de la Espriella by more than 670,000 votes.

Experts warn that Cepeda is losing precious time by focusing on fraud allegations and should instead concentrate on swaying moderate voters.

“By crying fraud so early, it’s hard to bring more voters to the table,” said Silva.

A second round of voting, between Cepeda and de la Espriella, is scheduled for June 21.

Up for grabs are more than a million votes for centrist candidate Sergio Fajardo and 1.6 million for Paloma Valencia. While Valencia endorsed de la Espriella, her running mate, moderate politician Juan Daniel Oviedo, did not.

Miguel Jaramillo Lujan, a Colombian political strategist, said the final two candidates must tread carefully in the next three weeks to prevail.

“As the saying goes, whoever makes fewer mistakes will be the winner.”

Far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella will face left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda in the run-off for Colombia’s presidential election next month. Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo explains what this means for Colombians.

Colombia’s election heads to a June 21 runoff after a tight first round between Abelardo de la Espriella and Ivan Cepeda. The night was marked by mutual accusations, with Cepeda calling for verification of results and De la Espriella celebrating his lead.

Colombia’s presidential election is headed to a runoff on June 21. Far-right outsider, Abelardo de la Espriella, will face leftist senator, Ivan Cepeda. Professor Jorge Restrepo describes de la Espriella’s rise in the polls as a punishment vote against Colombia’s long-established political class.

Far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella will face left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda in the run-off for Colombia’s presidential election next month.

After polls closed on Sunday, the two candidates quickly surged ahead in the vote tally, extinguishing the hopes of right-wing Senator Paloma Valencia, a former frontrunner.

As of Sunday afternoon, with 99 percent of the votes tallied, de la Espriella took the lead, with 43 percent of the ballots cast in his favour.

Cepeda trailed him by more than 600,000 votes, earning 40 percent support.

Neither candidate breached the 50-percent threshold needed to avoid a head-to-head match-up on June 21. But the results are likely to buoy de la Espriella’s campaign going into the final round.

Cepeda had consistently topped public opinion polls in the final weeks before the vote. A May 24 poll from the National Consulting Centre (CNC) showed him with more than 33 percent support, ahead of de la Espriella’s 30.9 percent.

De la Espriella’s ‘outsider’ campaign

Questions about security were at the forefront of voters’ concerns going into Sunday’s election.

De la Espriella, a businessman and lawyer who has never held elected office, leaned heavily into fears of crime as he launched an outsider campaign, similar to the dark-horse bid of Argentinian President Javier Milei.

By contrast, Cepeda is a well-known quantity in Colombian politics. His father was a senator, too, before he was assassinated in 1994, in what was widely considered to be an act of political violence.

Cepeda himself has served as a senator since 2014. Before that, he served in the Chamber of Deputies, representing the capital, Bogota.

During his political career, he became embroiled in a long-running legal dispute with former right-wing President Alvaro Uribe, whom he accused of complicity with right-wing paramilitaries.

Uribe initially sued Cepeda for defamation, but in a dramatic twist, Colombia’s Supreme Court dismissed the charge and instead investigated Uribe for witness tampering.

While Uribe was initially found guilty and sentenced to 12 years of house arrest, an appeals court ultimately struck down the verdict, citing procedural errors, including insufficient evidence.

Security a top concern

Central to the rift in Colombia’s politics is the country’s six-decade-long internal conflict.

Since 1964, criminal networks, government forces, left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries have all jockeyed against one another for power and territory.

Cepeda has been critical of right-wing efforts to solve the conflict through military might alone.

Instead, he has allied himself with Colombia’s outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, the first left-wing figure ever elected to the country’s highest office.

A former rebel fighter, Petro has championed a policy he calls “Total Peace”, which actively seeks negotiated solutions to the fighting.

While critics have questioned the efficacy of “Total Peace”, pointing to a recent uptick in violence, Cepeda has nevertheless pledged to carry it forward. He represents Petro’s left-wing Historic Pact party in this year’s election.

In an interview this month with CNN, Cepeda acknowledged the policy’s “immense challenges”, saying: “We cannot continue to develop conversations that do not yield clear results.”

But he rejected overly militaristic solutions, as well as the prospect of intervention by the United States. The US-led “war on drugs”, Cepeda said, has “failed spectacularly”.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has embraced the kind of hardline security platform commonly associated with El Salvador’s leader, Nayib Bukele.

His platform includes a pledge to crack down on crime and build 10 megaprisons in Colombia.

Nicknamed “The Tiger”, he founded the Defenders of the Homeland political party and is known to rally with the slogan, “Stand firm for the nation”.

“The only peace process I believe in is one imposed by the force of arms and the laws of the republic,” de la Espriella told The Associated Press news agency this month.

Like US President Donald Trump, de la Espriella has also threatened to launch a bombing campaign to disrupt drug-trafficking, killing suspects by downing planes and shooting boats.

But such campaigns have been widely denounced as a form of extrajudicial killing, effectively denying suspects the chance of defending themselves in a court of law.

Narrowing odds for Colombia’s left

More than 23.6 million Colombians voted in Sunday’s election, though there was a high number of blank or nullified ballots.

Early estimates, with 99 percent of ballots tallied, indicate that 245,342 voting sheets were null, and another 406,830 were left blank.

The second round is likely to be an uphill battle for Cepeda. Colombia’s right-wing is expected to consolidate behind de la Espriella in the second round.

In Sunday’s vote count, more than 10.3 million ballots were cast for de la Espriella, compared with roughly 9.7 million for Cepeda.

A victory for the right would continue a regional trend in Latin America. Last year alone, left-wing governments in Chile, Honduras and Bolivia were all replaced by right-wing presidential contenders.

De la Espriella signalled his optimism about the second round in a social media post as the results rolled in.

“We are going to defeat tyranny and absolutism,” de la Espriella wrote. “We have advanced to the run-off thanks to the more than 10 million Colombians who answered the roar. In 21 days, we will make history!”

Colombians headed to the polls to choose a new president in a high-stakes election that will determine whether the country continues the left-wing agenda launched by Gustavo Petro or shifts back to the political right.

Ten years after Colombia’s landmark peace agreement, former president Juan Manuel Santos assesses its legacy. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate discusses renewed violence, political divisions and what Colombia’s experience can teach a world facing growing conflict.

In Colombia’s volatile Catatumbo region, FARC dissidents say they returned to war after a historic peace deal failed to deliver security and social change.

Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo has exclusive access to the group as it fights rivals for control of territory and lucrative drug trafficking routes.

On Sunday, voters in the South American country of Colombia are facing a choice.

Four years ago, they elected the first left-wing president in the country’s modern history, Gustavo Petro. Now, they must decide whether to continue with Petro’s leftist push — or restore the political right to power.

Fourteen candidates will be on the ballot for the first round of voting in Colombia’s presidential election.  The packed field includes contenders from the left, right and centre, who are slated to face off over issues like security and the cost of living.

But Petro will not be among them: Presidents in Colombia are limited to a single four-year term.

The right wing is expected to have the advantage, particularly if the race proceeds to a second round. Petro is struggling with low poll numbers, and voters have expressed frustration with crime and violence, driven in part by the country’s six-decade-long internal conflict.

But leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda has surprised observers, consistently placing at the top of the polls ahead of the first round.

When is the election, who are the candidates, and which issues are top of mind for voters? We look at those questions and more in this brief explainer.

When is the election?

The first round of voting is set to take place on May 31, 2026.

Will there be a second round of voting?

A candidate would need to win more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round to avoid a run-off.

If no single candidate meets that threshold, a run-off will be held between the top two finishers on June 21.

Why is this election important?

In recent years, across Latin America, long-entrenched left-wing governments have met defeat at the ballot box.

Last year alone, right-wing candidates have been elected to replace left-wing presidents in Bolivia, Chile and Honduras.

But Colombia does not have a long history of left-wing presidents. Petro was the first. That makes this race one to watch, according to Gimena Sanchez, a Colombia expert at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a human rights nonprofit.

“This is the first election to be held after the first-ever leftist administration in Colombia’s 200-year history,” Sanchez explained.

Colombia now stands at a fork in the road. One of the dominant issues in the election is how to resolve the country’s internal conflict, which forced more than 235,619 individuals from their homes in 2025.

Another 87,069 people were caught up in mass displacement events due to the fighting, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Petro has embraced negotiation as a tool to end the conflict, which has seen government forces, criminal networks, left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries all battling one another.

But the political right has advocated a return to the more militarised approach backed by the United States, according to Sanchez.

“The leading candidates fall into two camps: continuity with the leftist government of Petro and an approach to security that focuses on negotiations with armed groups, and right-wing candidates who very much want to go back to a hardline security model that Colombia had in the past,” Sanchez said.

“You have polar opposite visions for the country.”

Who is the main candidate on the left?

Senator Ivan Cepeda has emerged as the primary candidate of the political left, running as the head of the governing coalition, known as Historic Pact.

Cepeda has largely pledged continuity with Petro’s platform, including social and economic policies meant to reduce inequality.

He has also embraced Petro’s “Total Peace” approach, which aims to resolve the country’s internal fighting by negotiating with armed groups and criminal networks, as opposed to solely relying on military force.

Confronting state-backed violence has become a hallmark of Cepeda’s life and career.

His father, who was also a senator, is believed to have been assassinated by a government-backed paramilitary. For years, Cepeda was also embroiled in a legal battle for accusing former President Alvaro Uribe of connections to right-wing paramilitaries.

Who are the main candidates on the right?

While Cepeda has become the standard-bearer for the left, the political right has had to contend with a more fractured field of candidates.

Running on the far right is Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer for the Defenders of the Homeland Party who has generated comparisons with Salvadoran President Salvador Bukele and Argentina’s Javier Milei.

Like those leaders, de la Espriella has offered a hardline vision for his country’s security. If elected, he says he would end negotiations with armed groups, bomb rebel camps, and resume the aerial fumigation of coca ⁠crops, which produce the raw material for cocaine.

Senator Paloma Valencia, a candidate with the Democratic Centre Party, is running as a more moderate alternative to de la Espriella. She too has promised a stricter approach to crime. Her platform involves expanding the police and armed forces, while cutting taxes and promoting pro-business policies in the economic realm.

Their election-season competition has become a source of acrimony for Valencia and de la Espriella, who have accused each other of paving the way for a leftist election victory.

“There is a more familiar, establishment right, represented by Valencia, and a far right in the form of de la Espriella, who pitches himself as an outsider,” said Sanchez.

Valencia, for her part, has criticised de la Espriella as two-faced, defending criminals in his legal practice but advocating for tighter security on the campaign trail.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has dismissed Valencia as a member of the country’s political establishment and chided her in a social media post, stating that the presidential election is “not for little games”.

What are the polls saying?

Polls generally show Cepeda ahead of his rivals, with de la Espriella in second place and Valencia in third.

A May 24 poll from the National Consulting Centre (CNC) and the publication Cambio suggested that Cepeda had drawn 33.4 percent of voter support, the most of any candidate.

But de la Espriella was on the upswing with 30.9 percent. Valencia, meanwhile, trailed with 12.6 percent.

The same surveys, however, suggest that Cepeda would struggle to win a run-off against either of the two right-wing candidates, with de la Espriella eking out about three points in a head-to-head contest, and Valencia coming within a percentage point of victory.

Undecided voters could play a key role in deciding the outcome, though. An analysis cited by the Spanish paper El Pais estimates that undecided voters could account for as much as 28 percent of the electorate.

Which issues are front and centre?

Concerns over crime, security and economic issues like unemployment and affordability have dominated the election.

In a poll from the firm Invamer, the highest proportion of voters — 37 percent — identified security as the top issue facing the country.

Basic needs and unemployment ranked second and third, with 17 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Eleven percent of voters, meanwhile, named corruption as a leading concern.

The threat of violence has lingered over the presidential campaign over the past year.

Two political staffers with de la Espriella’s campaign were killed by gunmen on motorbikes earlier this month. And in June 2025, presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot while leaving a campaign rally. The 39-year-old died two months later from his injuries.

Political violence is a serious concern in Colombia, and all of the frontrunners in the race travel with heavy security.

Venezuela is becoming increasingly important in Colombia’s presidential election, though not necessarily from a policy perspective. The three leading candidates are not offering radically new approaches toward Caracas. Instead, they broadly accept that Colombia will not shape Venezuela policy in a vacuum, but within a regional framework increasingly defined by Washington.

Even among the Colombian Right, the differences are narrower than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. Some candidates favor preserving parts of the thaw in relations initiated under Gustavo Petro, while others align themselves more openly with the Trump administration’s emerging three-phase approach toward Venezuela, combining pressure, negotiation, and eventual normalization while maintaining support for María Corina Machado and the democratic opposition.

The real competition is happening elsewhere.

As Bogotá increasingly adapts itself to strategic realities designed in Washington, Venezuela has become less a matter of concrete policy and more a source of symbolic legitimacy inside the Colombian Right. The question is no longer simply who has the best Venezuela strategy, but who is most closely aligned with the hemisphere’s most internationally legitimized anti-chavista figure.

Both Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella have sought proximity to Machado, likely recognizing her growing political value among Colombian-Venezuelan voters and sectors of the Colombian Right that increasingly view her as a hemispheric democratic symbol after July 28, 2024. Early in the electoral cycle, both candidates publicized meetings with Machado and members of her team, presenting themselves as politically aligned with the Venezuelan opposition’s struggle. Valencia recently traveled to Panama to meet Machado personally, while De la Espriella has repeatedly emphasized his relationship with anti-chavista circles to position himself as part of a broader regional conservative realignment.

Yet the two candidacies embody very different political instincts.

Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

Valencia represents a more traditional conservative internationalism tied to institutional anti-chavismo, democratic legitimacy, and Atlanticist conservatism. De la Espriella, meanwhile, has increasingly embraced a far more populist style of politics, openly presenting himself as a Colombian version of Nayib Bukele that promises to build ten CECOT-style mega prisons in Colombia.

That contradiction becomes particularly striking when placed alongside one of the defining professional relationships of De la Espriella’s career: his representation of Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era. Saab became one of the clearest symbols of late-stage chavismo’s corruption architecture, embodying the opaque financial networks, sanctions arbitrage, and humanitarian corruption that increasingly defined the Maduro era.

The irony of Saab’s former lawyer attempting to embody Colombia’s hardest anti-chavista and anti-corruption posture is difficult to ignore. But the contradiction also reveals something deeper about contemporary Latin American politics, where anti-establishment rhetoric and proximity to opaque power structures are no longer necessarily disqualifying contradictions.

The contradictions are perhaps most visible within parts of the Venezuelan opposition’s own media ecosystem. Some anti-chavista pundits spent years cultivating reputations as uncompromising anti-corruption crusaders, often accusing opposition figures of moral weakness, accommodationism, or hidden financial interests. Their enthusiastic support for Abelardo de la Espriella, despite his long professional relationship with Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era, suggests that ideological affinity and political aesthetics are increasingly overriding the moral rigidity that once characterized parts of anti-chavista discourse.

Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

At the same time, other sectors of Machado’s broader international coalition appear more naturally aligned with Valencia’s institutional conservatism. The result is an increasingly visible fragmentation within the anti-chavista ecosystem itself, one that reflects broader tensions inside the Latin American Right between institutional conservatism, populist maximalism, and Bukele-style punitive politics.

Washington has only reinforced those dynamics. As the US once again becomes the principal external actor shaping Venezuela’s political future, different Colombian candidates increasingly compete to position themselves as the preferred interlocutors of the emerging regional order. Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

In that sense, Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

And perhaps more importantly, it may also offer a glimpse into the future political terrain of a post-transition Venezuela itself. If chavismo eventually collapses or evolves into some form of negotiated transition, the country will not emerge into a region defined by liberal democratic consensus. It will emerge into a hemisphere shaped by Bukele, Milei, Trumpism, social media maximalism, and deep public exhaustion with traditional political elites.

The rise of figures like De la Espriella suggests that the post-chavista Right may not necessarily resemble the liberal democratic opposition that spent decades fighting chavismo. It may instead reflect a harsher, more punitive, and more performative political culture, one forged not despite the region’s prolonged crises, but because of them.