In the weeks since federal investigators announced that the devastating Palisades fire was caused by a reignition of a smaller blaze, top Los Angeles Fire Department officials have insisted that they did everything they could to put out the earlier fire.
But The Times has obtained records that call into question the agency’s statements about how thoroughly firefighters mopped up the Jan. 1 Lachman fire in the days before it reignited.
In an interview last month, then-Interim Fire Chief Ronnie Villanueva said that firefighters returned to the burn area on Jan. 3 — due to a report of smoke — and “cold-trailed” an additional time, meaning they used their hands to feel for heat and dug out hot spots.
“We went back over there again. We dug it all out again. We put ladders on it. We did everything that we could do — cold-trail again,” Villanueva told The Times on Oct. 8. “We did all of that.”
A dispatch log obtained by The Times, however, shows that firefighters arrived at the scene that day and quickly reported seeing no smoke. They then canceled the dispatch for another engine that was on the way, clearing the call within 34 minutes. The log does not mention cold trailing. It’s unclear if crews took any other actions during the call, because the LAFD has not answered questions about it.
The Times has made multiple requests for comment to LAFD spokesperson Capt. Erik Scott by email, text and in person, but the agency has refused to explain the discrepancy. Villanueva also did not respond to an emailed request for comment and an interview request.
The conflict between the LAFD’s statements and its own records is likely to intensify frustration and anger among Palisades fire victims over contradictory and incomplete information about what was done to protect their community. With the first anniversary approaching, gaps remain in what the LAFD has told the public about what it did to prepare for and respond to the fire, which killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes.
The LAFD’s after-action report on the Palisades fire makes only a cursory reference to the Lachman blaze. Missing from the 70-page document, released last month, are the report of smoke in the area on Jan. 3 and a battalion chief’s decision to pull firefighters out of the scene the day before, even though they warned him that there were signs of remaining hot spots.
The head of the board that oversees the LAFD has maintained that information about the firefighter warnings — or any examination of the Lachman fire — did not belong in the after-action report.
“The after-action review that was presented to the commission is exactly what we asked for,” Genethia Hudley Hayes, president of the Board of Fire Commissioners, said at the board’s meeting on Tuesday. She said the review was only supposed to cover the first 72 hours after the Palisades fire erupted.
“It is not an investigation,” she said. “It should not include things that the newspaper seems to feel like should be included.”
The after-action report detailed missteps in fire officials’ response to the Palisades fire, including major failures in deployment and communications, and made recommendations to prevent the issues from happening again.
Two former LAFD chief officers said the report also should have provided an examination of what might have gone wrong in the mop-up of the Lachman blaze, which investigators believe was deliberately set, as part of its “lessons learned” section.
“A good after-action report documents what happened before the incident,” said former LAFD Battalion Chief Rick Crawford, who retired from the agency last year and is now emergency and crisis management coordinator for the U.S. Capitol. “The after-action report should have gone back all the way to Dec. 31.”
Patrick Butler, a former assistant chief for the LAFD who has worked on several after-action teams, including for the federal government, agreed.
“If you limit an after-action to an artificial timeline, you’re not going to uncover everything you need to learn from,” said Butler, who is the Redondo Beach fire chief.
He noted that the reports shape training and operational improvements for the Fire Department.
“To exclude the Lachman fire from the report gives the appearance of a coverup of foundational facts,” Butler added. “It’s not a harmless oversight. The consequences can be significant and far-reaching.”
The Jan. 3 report of smoke at the Lachman burn area came in shortly before noon, according to a dispatch log of the incident. Firefighters from Fire Station 23 — one of two stations in the Palisades — arrived on the scene about 10 minutes after they were dispatched.
A couple minutes later, they reported “N/S,” or nothing showing, according to the log. A few minutes after that, they canceled the dispatch for an engine from Fire Station 69, the other Palisades station.
The last entry in the log was from 12:20 p.m., indicating that an L.A. County crew was working in the area.
The L.A. County Fire Department said in a statement that the crew was at the scene for less than 30 minutes conducting an “informal ‘lessons learned’ discussion of their actions from the night of the fire.”
“They did not gear up or perform any work while there and they did not see anything of note,” the statement said.
The L.A. County crew left the scene about 12:40 p.m.
The Times previously reported that firefighters were ordered to roll up their hoses and leave the burn area of the Lachman fire on Jan. 2, even though they had complained that the ground was still smoldering and rocks remained hot to the touch. The paper reviewed text messages among three firefighters and a third party, sent in the weeks and months after the fire, in which they discussed the handling of the blaze.
LAFD officials also opted not to use thermal imaging technology to detect lingering hot spots. Despite warnings of extreme winds leading up to Jan. 7, they failed to pre-deploy any engines or firefighters to the burn area — or anywhere in the Palisades.
At least one battalion chief assigned to the LAFD’s risk management section has known for months that crews had complained about hot spots after the Lachman fire. But the department kept that information hidden from the public.
At the Tuesday fire commission meeting, newly appointed Fire Chief Jaime Moore — in an apparent reference to The Times reporting — slammed what he called media efforts to “smear” firefighters who battled the worst fire in city history.
“Something that’s been very frustrating for me as fire chief, and through this process, is to watch my friends in the media smear our name and the work that our firefighters did to combat one of the most intense fires, the Palisades, the wind-driven monstrosity that it was,” Moore, a 30-year LAFD veteran, said on his second day on the job.
He added: “The audacity for people to make comments and say that there’s text messages out there that say that we did not put the fire out, that we did not extinguish the fire. Yet I have yet to see any of those text messages.”
Moore made those remarks despite having been tasked by Mayor Karen Bass with conducting an investigation into The Times report about the LAFD’s response to the Lachman fire.
Bass had requested that Villanueva investigate, saying that “a full understanding … is essential to an accurate accounting of what occurred during the January wildfires.”
Critics have said it would be improper for the LAFD to investigate itself and called for an independent review.
Before the City Council confirmed his appointment as chief, Moore also had called for an outside organization to conduct the inquiry, describing the reports of the firefighters’ warnings on Jan. 2 as alarming.
On Tuesday, he said he would review the LAFD’s response to the Lachman fire.
“I will do as Mayor [Karen] Bass asked, and I will look into the Lachman fire, and we will look at how that was handled, and we will learn from it, and we’ll be better from it,” he said.
A Bass spokesperson said Wednesday that the mayor “has made clear to Chief Moore” that the investigation into the Lachman fire should be conducted by an independent entity.
The LAFD has not responded to a question about who will conduct the probe.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Ukraine announced it launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles at military targets in Russia. The attack appears to be the first use of these U.S.-made weapons into Russia under the Trump administration. It also points to the strong possibility that another batch of the prized missiles have been supplied to Ukraine, which is noteworthy in itself due to the limited U.S. stocks of the weapons, and/or that the White House has approved the type’s use once again.
“This is a significant development that underscores Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to its sovereignty,” the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff said of the attack. “Despite the ongoing pressure of Russian offensive actions, Ukrainians remain resilient, demonstrating determination and consistent resolve in defending their homeland.”
ATACMS launch from a HIMARS vehicle. (U.S. Army) (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Cecil Elliott II)
“The use of long-range strike capabilities, including systems such as ATACMS, will continue,” the Armed Forces General Staff added.
Ukrainian officials provided no details about the ATACMS targets or how many were launched. Newer variants of these missiles can reach to nearly 200 miles, with first generation models having just over half the range.
Ukrainian and Russian mibloggers suggested that Ukraine attacked locations in Russia’s Voronezh region, among them the Pogonovo training area, located roughly 105 miles from the border. However, there is no independent verification of that.
Ukrainian milbloggers claim that the Pogonovo training ground in Russia’s Voronezh region was attacked by ATACMS. (Google Earth)
Ukrainian Armed Forces now unleashing new capabilities.
General Staff of Ukraine: “The Armed Forces of Ukraine have successfully employed ATACMS tactical missile systems to carry out a precision strike against military targets on the territory of Russia. This is a significant… pic.twitter.com/Ugee9cFULc
Cluster warheads packed with submunitions would be an ideal weapon to fire at a location where troops might be concentrated in the open. Ukraine used cluster munitions-equipped ATACMS to hit a Russian training ground in the occupied Luhansk region in May 2024 to devastating effect. That strike was also captured on video, which you can see below.
Seems like 🇺🇦did another ATACMS strike near Kuban, Luhansk.
Though Kyiv claimed it will continue using ATACMS, just how many it has left is a mystery. Considering the long stretch between known uses, it likely ran dry for an extended period of time until the U.S. supplied more. The Trump administration could have also blocked the use of the weapons, especially into Russian territory, until now, although we cannot confirm this at this time.
Ukraine still has a number of U.S.-made Army High Mobility Rocket System (HIMARS) and M270 MLRS launchers that fire ATACMs. However, the last of these munitions authorized to be sent to Ukraine by former President Joe Biden arrived in the spring, The Wall Street Journal reported in August. The publication noted that “Kyiv has a small supply left, according to U.S. officials.”
Meanwhile, in March, The Associated Press reported Ukraine ran out of ATACMs. A U.S. official told the wire service at the time that “Ukraine was given fewer than 40 of those missiles overall and that Ukraine ran out of them in late January.”
We cannot confirm that number, but we do know they were not furnished by the many hundreds or anything approaching that number. The U.S. inventory is thought to be the low thousands.
Senior U.S. defense leaders, including the previous Pentagon chief, Lloyd Austin, “had made it clear that only a limited number of the ATACMs would be delivered and that the U.S. and NATO allies considered other weapons to be more valuable in the fight,” according to the AP.
ATACMS being launched by an M270 MLRS. (US Army)
As we previously reported, the first tranche of about 20 early generation, shorter-range ATACMS variants arrived in Ukraine in October 2023 and were apparently mostly used during attacks on Russian-held airfields the same month. Ukraine has used the limited number of these prized weapons it has received with major results. Longer-range variants, which were not introduced into the war until the Spring of 2024, were first used in a wave of attacks on air bases and air defense installations across the Crimean peninsula, according to the Kyiv Post.
A major reason for the limited number of ATACMS given to Ukraine is that U.S. officials have expressed concern about their own stockpiles. However, in December 2023, the U.S. Army began receiving the first tranches of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles. The Army, which sees PrSMs as the ATACMS successor, said in September 2023 that the advent of these weapons could reduce some of the readiness risks associated with giving Ukraine ATACMS. It is quite possible that PrSM deliveries had freed-up more ATACMS rounds for Ukraine, and, given the chill between the White House and the Kremlin, these weapons would work both as a tactical tool and a strategic message.
This is especially the case as discussions continue regarding the U.S. supplying even more advanced and longer-range weaponry to Ukraine. While Trump has seemed to sour on giving Ukraine Tomahawk cruise missiles, more ATACMS, which have far shorter range and do not set a new precedent, would be a likely alternative.
A PrSM missile is fired from an M142 HIMARS launcher during a test. (DOD) A PrSM missile is fired from an M142 HIMARS launcher during a test. DOD
After meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said his American counterpart was open to lifting restrictions on Kyiv’s use of American-made long-range weapons to strike inside Russia, according to The Wall Street Journal. Trump didn’t make any commitments to do so, the newspaper reported.
A month earlier, the Journal wrote that the Pentagon had for months “been blocking Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles to strike inside Russia.”
“A high-level Defense Department approval procedure, which hasn’t been announced, has prevented Ukraine from firing ATACMS missiles against targets in Russia since late spring,” the Journal added. “On at least one occasion, Ukraine sought to use ATACMS against a target on Russian territory but was rejected.”
The last recorded case of a Ukrainian ATACMS strike inside Russia was on January 14 as part of a massive attack also using U.K.-made Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles and long-range drones. That took place in the waning days of the Joe Biden administration, which also took a circuitous route in giving Ukraine ATACMS and then allowing them to strike inside Russia. The following graphic, produced as Biden was debating allowing Ukraine to hit Russia with ATACMS, gave a sense of what kinds of targets could be reached.
Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images Anadolu
The first such attack took place almost exactly a year ago. On Nov. 19, 2024, a munitions storage facility near the town of Karachev in the Bryansk region of western Russia was hit by ATACMS. The target was around 70 miles from the Ukrainian border, well within range of these missiles.
There are many questions unanswered about Ukraine’s claimed ATACMS strike today. We have reached out to the White House, Pentagon and State Department to see if we can get some answers about the last time Ukraine was given these weapons and the last time they were used in Russia. We will update this story if they give us any useful details.
While ATACMS did have major lasting battlefield effects, it never proved to be a game-changer based on the tiny quantities provided. But they are another long-range weapon that has existed in Ukraine’s arsenal that packs a punch far heavier than the long-range drones Kyiv has been using across Russia. With Ukraine’s introduction of home-made cruise missiles, this equation is changing, but still, ATACMS are survivable and hit very hard when equipped with a unitary warhead and its cluster warheads can blanket large areas with explosions and shrapnel.
If the strike occurred as stated today, it points to a shift in the Trump administration’s policy when it comes to long-range strikes with U.S. weapons into Russia and it could also indicate the ATACMS supplies are flowing once again.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Russia has said that it conducted a long-awaited test of its mysterious Burevestnik (also known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile last week, claiming that it flew for 8,700 miles. The missile, which is nuclear-powered, is said to have remained in the air for around 15 hours. For the time being, we don’t know if those statements are factually accurate, and details about how the missile actually works remain very scarce. However, the claimed test has led to boasts about the missile’s performance from Russian President Vladimir Putin, while his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, called upon Putin to end the war in Ukraine “instead of testing missiles.”
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, told Putin yesterday that a successful test of the Burevestnik was carried out on October 21. Gerasimov said that the 15-hour flight “is not the [maximum] limit” for the missile. Regardless, if true, this would appear to be the first long-endurance test of the missile.
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov during a meeting earlier this month in Saint Petersburg. Photo by Mikhail METZEL / POOL / AFP MIKHAIL METZEL
In response to Gerasimov’s remarks, Putin commented: “I remember vividly when we announced that we were developing such a weapon, even highly qualified specialists told me that, yes, it was a good and worthy goal, but unrealizable in the near future. This was the opinion of specialists, I repeat, highly qualified. And now the decisive tests have been completed.”
People are asking what’s the purpose of Burevestnik and why develop a system that is very much useless as a weapon. The answer has always been right there, in the 1 March 2018 address. Russian president has always wanted to say these words. The rest doesn’t matter really. pic.twitter.com/0Q7JUGBqo3
Of all these weapons, the Burevestnik has long been among the most intriguing.
As TWZ described when it was first announced, the basic concept of a nuclear-powered cruise missile is by no means new.
After all, in the 1960s, the U.S. Air Force explored a similar idea with its Supersonic Low Altitude Missile, or SLAM. This weapon employed a nuclear-powered ramjet along with conventional rocket boosters to kickstart the system. Once at the appropriate speed, the engine would blow air over the reactor, which could have enough fuel to operate for weeks or months on end, and then force it out of an exhaust nozzle to produce thrust.
The Tory II-C nuclear ramjet engine that was tested in 1964 and which helped inform the abortive Supersonic Low Altitude Missile, or SLAM, program. Public Domain
A missile of this kind has extreme endurance, not limited by conventional fuel onboard as all other air-breathing missiles are, can be wildly unpredictable and tough to defend against.
While we don’t know what kind of nuclear propulsion the Burevestnik uses, provided this kind of technology can be made reliable, the implications are significant.
Of the latest test, Gerasimov said: “The technical characteristics of the Burevestnik generally allow it to be used with guaranteed accuracy against highly protected targets at any distance.” He added that: “vertical and horizontal maneuvers were completed,” something that would allow the missile to “bypass anti-missile and air defense systems.”
As we have surmised before, an operational Burevestnik would likely cruise at high subsonic speed on a circuitous route at extremely low altitude, helping it to avoid surface-based early warning systems and missile defense interceptors.
Using a two-way datalink, it should be possible to adapt the Burevestnik’s course in flight to further confuse an opponent or actively counter any attempts to intercept the missile.
The American SLAM concept involved a payload of multiple nuclear warheads that could be dropped on different targets along the way, but again, the warhead of the Russian missile remains mysterious. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, claimed that the latest test involved a warhead. If true, it would almost certainly involve a mock warhead, without the nuclear material, which would serve to test fuzing and detonation, for example.
Congratulations to all Russia’s friends on the successful test of the unlimited-range Burevestnik (Storm petrel) cruise missile with a nuclear engine and warhead ⚡️😃
Nevertheless, a technically perfected Burevestnik remains a somewhat questionable goal given previous problems with the program. At the same time, there remains the very real issue of safety and environmental hazards. We will dive deeper into both these factors later.
Returning to last week’s test, Gerasimov didn’t say where it took place, but it’s widely assumed to have been in Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago in northern Russia, situated in the Arctic Ocean, and used for many previous weapons tests.
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) orders issued for October 21 showed a large area around Novaya Zemlya closed off, corresponding to a Russian missile test or live-fire exercise.
Over on the other site, David was covering the lead up to the apparently successful Burevestnik test. Sadly, its almost all ship tracking because this late in the year, you don’t get many satellite images that far north. pic.twitter.com/k04x9u6whp
Meanwhile, several Russian vessels that are known to be used in missile tests were noted in positions along the coast of the Arctic archipelago, both on the Barents Sea and Kara Sea sides. Probable support aircraft belonging to Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, and the Russian Aerospace Forces were also seen at Rogachevo airfield on Novaya Zemlya.
There have also been flights by a U.S. Air Force WC-135 Constant Phoenix “nuke sniffer” aircraft in the region, which some observers suggested could have been related to a Burevestnik. After a flight by this aircraft around the Barents Sea on August 5, the Air Force told TWZ that this was “to conduct routine background collection … to ensure signatory nations are adhering to established United Nations treaties.” The Air Force spokesperson added that the deployment of the WC-135 to the United Kingdom was planned and scheduled months in advance.
Background collection is something that could be conducted in anticipation of a Burevestnik test in the future. This data will be used to compare that from a collection mission following a test. At the same time, the wider region hosts other Russian nuclear assets, which would also be of interest for such flights, which are fairly regular in occurrence.
Finally, the test site at Pankovo, north of Rogachevo, on Yuzhny Island in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, has seen considerable activity starting this summer. Pankovo hosts what is understood to be the main launch site for the Burevestnik, with two rail-type launchers under a retractable covering.
A view of the test site at Pankovo, with a missile launcher in the raised position. via X
Update on the Burevestnik launch site. Launchers and covers for the first Burevestnik company are being installed. The presence of lightning rods suggest that assets will be on the pad for long periods of time. pic.twitter.com/UvhryhIJVd
On 21 October 2025 Russia conducted “the key test” of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile (also referred to as SSC-X-9 Skyfall). The test is reported to be successful. The missile travelled 14,000 km in a 15-hour flight (Image: Pan’kovo test site). Links follow 1/ pic.twitter.com/OVuCCjPiDO
Provided that last week’s test was conducted from Pankovo, making use of the area signaled by the NOTAM, then the missile must have flown in a racetrack or zigzag pattern around the Arctic archipelago. Less likely would be a longer route flown across the north of Russia.
A map showing Russia’s Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. The specific location of the Pankovo test site is also marked. Google Earth
Whatever the case, Norway, the closest NATO country to the test area, said it hadn’t detected any spikes in radiation at any of its monitoring posts.
“We have not measured anything abnormal at our measuring stations in Norway,” a spokesperson for the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) told the Barents Observer. However, there is still time for such a reading to be made.
“If there has been a radioactive release in connection with Russia’s testing of the cruise missile, it will take a long time to travel to Norway, and it will take time before it can be registered at our measuring stations,” the DSA spokesperson added.
Previous tests of the Burevestnik have not been without incident.
When he announced the missile in 2018, Putin suggested that tests of the propulsion system had occurred the previous year, but there was no indication of whether this had been in flight or on the ground and under what conditions.
A grainy screengrab, released in 2018, that may show the nuclear-powered cruise missile during a test flight. via Channel One Russia
Soon after Putin’s 2018 announcement, the Norwegian-based environmental group Bellona suggested that a radiation spike in the Arctic that same winter was caused by the missile’s open-air-cooled reactor core.
Later in 2018, a U.S. intelligence report described the loss at sea of a Russian nuclear-powered missile during a 2017 test. The report added that Russia was expected to embark on a search and recovery mission to try to lift the missile’s wreckage from the seabed.
The Russian Ministry of Defense released the video below in 2018, saying that it showed an earlier Burevestnik test launch, as well as examples of the missiles themselves.
More dramatically, in 2019, an explosion occurred aboard a barge in the White Sea, outside Nenoksa, killing five Rosatom scientists. It also led to a radiation spike in the Russian city of Severodvinsk, as you can read more about here. The explosion has been blamed on a reactor from a Burevestnik recovered from the sea, likely the one that was lost in 2017.
While the details of these accidents remain murky, they point to a significant problem in using nuclear propulsion for a missile or any other vehicle flying in the atmosphere.
It should be recalled that, in the case of SLAM, the nuclear ramjet had no shielding to contain dangerous radiation, a requirement driven by the need for the powerplant to be small enough to fit inside the missile. The SLAM’s exhaust plume also contained unspent fissile material that would have contaminated any area, enemy-controlled or not, that it passed over on its way to the target.
While the Burevestnik has already been likened to a ‘tiny flying Chernobyl’ by some observers, it’s important to remember that we still don’t know how it functions.
Nevertheless, provided it does indeed use nuclear propulsion, as claimed, there exists the risk of accidents.
“The testing [of the Burevestnik] carries a risk of accidents and local radioactive emissions,” Norway’s Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in a threat assessment report published last year.
This is especially the case during an unarmed test, when the missile necessarily has to come down to the surface, impacting either land or water. Here, especially, there remain a lot of questions about how the missile is tested.
A screencap from an official Russian Ministry of Defense video that purports to show a Burevestnik test round. Russian Ministry of Defensescreencap
It’s possible that the missile came down in waters around Novaya Zemlya, in either the Barents Sea or the Kara Sea. According to the Barents Observerand other sources, there are several ships in this area, on both sides of the Matochkin Strait, which might be involved in a recovery operation.
These ships include Rosatom’s special-purpose vessel Rossita, on the eastern coast of the Kola Peninsula. This vessel was noted making port calls in Novaya Zemlya after previous presumed Burevestnik tests. The Rossita is equipped to transport spent nuclear fuel and other hazardous radioactive material.
Perhaps, if Norway subsequently detects a radioactive spike in this area, we might learn more about where the missile ended its flight.
In the meantime, Putin took the opportunity to push claims about the missile’s game-changing nature.
“We need to determine the possible uses and begin preparing the infrastructure for deploying this weapon in our armed forces,” Putin said yesterday. This is especially relevant considering that the New START treaty with the United States, which puts a limit on strategic nuclear warheads and launchers, expires next year. Gerasimov’s announcement of the long-distance test also came one day before Russia began its annual Grom strategic nuclear maneuvers.
When asked for his reaction to the claims of the Burevestnik test, President Donald Trump stated that the U.S. Navy has a nuclear submarine “right off their shores,” meaning that there is no immediate requirement for a missile with the kind of range that the Russian cruise missile should possess.
At the same time, Trump noted that Russia is “not playing games with us. We’re not playing games with them either.” As for Putin’s comments on the missile test, Trump said: “I don’t think it’s an appropriate thing for Putin to be saying,” reminding the Russian leader that the priority was to bring an end to the war in Ukraine.
Trump responded to Putin’s threats and the recent Burevestnik missile test by reminding that the US has a nuclear submarine “right off their coast.”
He said there’s no need to fire missiles 8,000 miles when such assets are already in place, and called on Putin to end a war that… pic.twitter.com/kRIlFdMzQZ
Still, the prospect of the Burevestnik entering service is a concerning one for adversaries of Russia. The missile can be launched preemptively and approach its target from any vector long after launch. For example, it could be launched from the Arctic, stay aloft for many hours, and then attack the United States from the south. Once launched, its flight path is entirely unpredictable, and it could exploit holes in defenses and weaker spots in early warning capabilities. It provides another reason why space-based tracking layers, including those that can spot low-flying aircraft, are currently very much on trend.
It is also worth noting that the latest Burevestnik test comes at a time when the U.S. Golden Dome initiative is taking shape, and the Russian missile reinforces the case for such a system. At the same time, it also underlines the reason why Russia wants weapons like this, so that it can better bypass existing strategic air defense systems.
The latest developments leave no doubt that the Burevestnik is a prestige program for Russia, even if many questions still surround it, and the nature of the latest test.
LAFD records show no sign of ‘cold trailing’ again at Lachman fire, as interim chief had claimed
In the weeks since federal investigators announced that the devastating Palisades fire was caused by a reignition of a smaller blaze, top Los Angeles Fire Department officials have insisted that they did everything they could to put out the earlier fire.
But The Times has obtained records that call into question the agency’s statements about how thoroughly firefighters mopped up the Jan. 1 Lachman fire in the days before it reignited.
In an interview last month, then-Interim Fire Chief Ronnie Villanueva said that firefighters returned to the burn area on Jan. 3 — due to a report of smoke — and “cold-trailed” an additional time, meaning they used their hands to feel for heat and dug out hot spots.
“We went back over there again. We dug it all out again. We put ladders on it. We did everything that we could do — cold-trail again,” Villanueva told The Times on Oct. 8. “We did all of that.”
A dispatch log obtained by The Times, however, shows that firefighters arrived at the scene that day and quickly reported seeing no smoke. They then canceled the dispatch for another engine that was on the way, clearing the call within 34 minutes. The log does not mention cold trailing. It’s unclear if crews took any other actions during the call, because the LAFD has not answered questions about it.
The Times has made multiple requests for comment to LAFD spokesperson Capt. Erik Scott by email, text and in person, but the agency has refused to explain the discrepancy. Villanueva also did not respond to an emailed request for comment and an interview request.
The conflict between the LAFD’s statements and its own records is likely to intensify frustration and anger among Palisades fire victims over contradictory and incomplete information about what was done to protect their community. With the first anniversary approaching, gaps remain in what the LAFD has told the public about what it did to prepare for and respond to the fire, which killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes.
The LAFD’s after-action report on the Palisades fire makes only a cursory reference to the Lachman blaze. Missing from the 70-page document, released last month, are the report of smoke in the area on Jan. 3 and a battalion chief’s decision to pull firefighters out of the scene the day before, even though they warned him that there were signs of remaining hot spots.
The head of the board that oversees the LAFD has maintained that information about the firefighter warnings — or any examination of the Lachman fire — did not belong in the after-action report.
“The after-action review that was presented to the commission is exactly what we asked for,” Genethia Hudley Hayes, president of the Board of Fire Commissioners, said at the board’s meeting on Tuesday. She said the review was only supposed to cover the first 72 hours after the Palisades fire erupted.
“It is not an investigation,” she said. “It should not include things that the newspaper seems to feel like should be included.”
The after-action report detailed missteps in fire officials’ response to the Palisades fire, including major failures in deployment and communications, and made recommendations to prevent the issues from happening again.
Two former LAFD chief officers said the report also should have provided an examination of what might have gone wrong in the mop-up of the Lachman blaze, which investigators believe was deliberately set, as part of its “lessons learned” section.
“A good after-action report documents what happened before the incident,” said former LAFD Battalion Chief Rick Crawford, who retired from the agency last year and is now emergency and crisis management coordinator for the U.S. Capitol. “The after-action report should have gone back all the way to Dec. 31.”
Patrick Butler, a former assistant chief for the LAFD who has worked on several after-action teams, including for the federal government, agreed.
“If you limit an after-action to an artificial timeline, you’re not going to uncover everything you need to learn from,” said Butler, who is the Redondo Beach fire chief.
He noted that the reports shape training and operational improvements for the Fire Department.
“To exclude the Lachman fire from the report gives the appearance of a coverup of foundational facts,” Butler added. “It’s not a harmless oversight. The consequences can be significant and far-reaching.”
The Jan. 3 report of smoke at the Lachman burn area came in shortly before noon, according to a dispatch log of the incident. Firefighters from Fire Station 23 — one of two stations in the Palisades — arrived on the scene about 10 minutes after they were dispatched.
A couple minutes later, they reported “N/S,” or nothing showing, according to the log. A few minutes after that, they canceled the dispatch for an engine from Fire Station 69, the other Palisades station.
The last entry in the log was from 12:20 p.m., indicating that an L.A. County crew was working in the area.
The L.A. County Fire Department said in a statement that the crew was at the scene for less than 30 minutes conducting an “informal ‘lessons learned’ discussion of their actions from the night of the fire.”
“They did not gear up or perform any work while there and they did not see anything of note,” the statement said.
The L.A. County crew left the scene about 12:40 p.m.
The Times previously reported that firefighters were ordered to roll up their hoses and leave the burn area of the Lachman fire on Jan. 2, even though they had complained that the ground was still smoldering and rocks remained hot to the touch. The paper reviewed text messages among three firefighters and a third party, sent in the weeks and months after the fire, in which they discussed the handling of the blaze.
LAFD officials also opted not to use thermal imaging technology to detect lingering hot spots. Despite warnings of extreme winds leading up to Jan. 7, they failed to pre-deploy any engines or firefighters to the burn area — or anywhere in the Palisades.
At least one battalion chief assigned to the LAFD’s risk management section has known for months that crews had complained about hot spots after the Lachman fire. But the department kept that information hidden from the public.
At the Tuesday fire commission meeting, newly appointed Fire Chief Jaime Moore — in an apparent reference to The Times reporting — slammed what he called media efforts to “smear” firefighters who battled the worst fire in city history.
“Something that’s been very frustrating for me as fire chief, and through this process, is to watch my friends in the media smear our name and the work that our firefighters did to combat one of the most intense fires, the Palisades, the wind-driven monstrosity that it was,” Moore, a 30-year LAFD veteran, said on his second day on the job.
He added: “The audacity for people to make comments and say that there’s text messages out there that say that we did not put the fire out, that we did not extinguish the fire. Yet I have yet to see any of those text messages.”
Moore made those remarks despite having been tasked by Mayor Karen Bass with conducting an investigation into The Times report about the LAFD’s response to the Lachman fire.
Bass had requested that Villanueva investigate, saying that “a full understanding … is essential to an accurate accounting of what occurred during the January wildfires.”
Critics have said it would be improper for the LAFD to investigate itself and called for an independent review.
Before the City Council confirmed his appointment as chief, Moore also had called for an outside organization to conduct the inquiry, describing the reports of the firefighters’ warnings on Jan. 2 as alarming.
On Tuesday, he said he would review the LAFD’s response to the Lachman fire.
“I will do as Mayor [Karen] Bass asked, and I will look into the Lachman fire, and we will look at how that was handled, and we will learn from it, and we’ll be better from it,” he said.
A Bass spokesperson said Wednesday that the mayor “has made clear to Chief Moore” that the investigation into the Lachman fire should be conducted by an independent entity.
The LAFD has not responded to a question about who will conduct the probe.
Source link
Ukraine’s Claimed ATACMS Strike In Russia Signals Major Shift In U.S. Policy
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Ukraine announced it launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles at military targets in Russia. The attack appears to be the first use of these U.S.-made weapons into Russia under the Trump administration. It also points to the strong possibility that another batch of the prized missiles have been supplied to Ukraine, which is noteworthy in itself due to the limited U.S. stocks of the weapons, and/or that the White House has approved the type’s use once again.
“This is a significant development that underscores Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to its sovereignty,” the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff said of the attack. “Despite the ongoing pressure of Russian offensive actions, Ukrainians remain resilient, demonstrating determination and consistent resolve in defending their homeland.”
“The use of long-range strike capabilities, including systems such as ATACMS, will continue,” the Armed Forces General Staff added.
Ukrainian officials provided no details about the ATACMS targets or how many were launched. Newer variants of these missiles can reach to nearly 200 miles, with first generation models having just over half the range.
Ukrainian and Russian mibloggers suggested that Ukraine attacked locations in Russia’s Voronezh region, among them the Pogonovo training area, located roughly 105 miles from the border. However, there is no independent verification of that.
The following video, first published by the Supernova+ Telegram channel, purports to show one of the ATACMS being shot down.
Cluster warheads packed with submunitions would be an ideal weapon to fire at a location where troops might be concentrated in the open. Ukraine used cluster munitions-equipped ATACMS to hit a Russian training ground in the occupied Luhansk region in May 2024 to devastating effect. That strike was also captured on video, which you can see below.
Though Kyiv claimed it will continue using ATACMS, just how many it has left is a mystery. Considering the long stretch between known uses, it likely ran dry for an extended period of time until the U.S. supplied more. The Trump administration could have also blocked the use of the weapons, especially into Russian territory, until now, although we cannot confirm this at this time.
Ukraine still has a number of U.S.-made Army High Mobility Rocket System (HIMARS) and M270 MLRS launchers that fire ATACMs. However, the last of these munitions authorized to be sent to Ukraine by former President Joe Biden arrived in the spring, The Wall Street Journal reported in August. The publication noted that “Kyiv has a small supply left, according to U.S. officials.”
Meanwhile, in March, The Associated Press reported Ukraine ran out of ATACMs. A U.S. official told the wire service at the time that “Ukraine was given fewer than 40 of those missiles overall and that Ukraine ran out of them in late January.”
We cannot confirm that number, but we do know they were not furnished by the many hundreds or anything approaching that number. The U.S. inventory is thought to be the low thousands.
Senior U.S. defense leaders, including the previous Pentagon chief, Lloyd Austin, “had made it clear that only a limited number of the ATACMs would be delivered and that the U.S. and NATO allies considered other weapons to be more valuable in the fight,” according to the AP.
As we previously reported, the first tranche of about 20 early generation, shorter-range ATACMS variants arrived in Ukraine in October 2023 and were apparently mostly used during attacks on Russian-held airfields the same month. Ukraine has used the limited number of these prized weapons it has received with major results. Longer-range variants, which were not introduced into the war until the Spring of 2024, were first used in a wave of attacks on air bases and air defense installations across the Crimean peninsula, according to the Kyiv Post.
A major reason for the limited number of ATACMS given to Ukraine is that U.S. officials have expressed concern about their own stockpiles. However, in December 2023, the U.S. Army began receiving the first tranches of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles. The Army, which sees PrSMs as the ATACMS successor, said in September 2023 that the advent of these weapons could reduce some of the readiness risks associated with giving Ukraine ATACMS. It is quite possible that PrSM deliveries had freed-up more ATACMS rounds for Ukraine, and, given the chill between the White House and the Kremlin, these weapons would work both as a tactical tool and a strategic message.
This is especially the case as discussions continue regarding the U.S. supplying even more advanced and longer-range weaponry to Ukraine. While Trump has seemed to sour on giving Ukraine Tomahawk cruise missiles, more ATACMS, which have far shorter range and do not set a new precedent, would be a likely alternative.
After meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said his American counterpart was open to lifting restrictions on Kyiv’s use of American-made long-range weapons to strike inside Russia, according to The Wall Street Journal. Trump didn’t make any commitments to do so, the newspaper reported.
A month earlier, the Journal wrote that the Pentagon had for months “been blocking Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles to strike inside Russia.”
“A high-level Defense Department approval procedure, which hasn’t been announced, has prevented Ukraine from firing ATACMS missiles against targets in Russia since late spring,” the Journal added. “On at least one occasion, Ukraine sought to use ATACMS against a target on Russian territory but was rejected.”
The last recorded case of a Ukrainian ATACMS strike inside Russia was on January 14 as part of a massive attack also using U.K.-made Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles and long-range drones. That took place in the waning days of the Joe Biden administration, which also took a circuitous route in giving Ukraine ATACMS and then allowing them to strike inside Russia. The following graphic, produced as Biden was debating allowing Ukraine to hit Russia with ATACMS, gave a sense of what kinds of targets could be reached.
The first such attack took place almost exactly a year ago. On Nov. 19, 2024, a munitions storage facility near the town of Karachev in the Bryansk region of western Russia was hit by ATACMS. The target was around 70 miles from the Ukrainian border, well within range of these missiles.
There are many questions unanswered about Ukraine’s claimed ATACMS strike today. We have reached out to the White House, Pentagon and State Department to see if we can get some answers about the last time Ukraine was given these weapons and the last time they were used in Russia. We will update this story if they give us any useful details.
While ATACMS did have major lasting battlefield effects, it never proved to be a game-changer based on the tiny quantities provided. But they are another long-range weapon that has existed in Ukraine’s arsenal that packs a punch far heavier than the long-range drones Kyiv has been using across Russia. With Ukraine’s introduction of home-made cruise missiles, this equation is changing, but still, ATACMS are survivable and hit very hard when equipped with a unitary warhead and its cluster warheads can blanket large areas with explosions and shrapnel.
If the strike occurred as stated today, it points to a shift in the Trump administration’s policy when it comes to long-range strikes with U.S. weapons into Russia and it could also indicate the ATACMS supplies are flowing once again.
Contact the author: [email protected]
Source link
Skyfall Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Long-Range Test Claimed By Russia
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Russia has said that it conducted a long-awaited test of its mysterious Burevestnik (also known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile last week, claiming that it flew for 8,700 miles. The missile, which is nuclear-powered, is said to have remained in the air for around 15 hours. For the time being, we don’t know if those statements are factually accurate, and details about how the missile actually works remain very scarce. However, the claimed test has led to boasts about the missile’s performance from Russian President Vladimir Putin, while his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, called upon Putin to end the war in Ukraine “instead of testing missiles.”
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, told Putin yesterday that a successful test of the Burevestnik was carried out on October 21. Gerasimov said that the 15-hour flight “is not the [maximum] limit” for the missile. Regardless, if true, this would appear to be the first long-endurance test of the missile.
In response to Gerasimov’s remarks, Putin commented: “I remember vividly when we announced that we were developing such a weapon, even highly qualified specialists told me that, yes, it was a good and worthy goal, but unrealizable in the near future. This was the opinion of specialists, I repeat, highly qualified. And now the decisive tests have been completed.”
The Russian president was referring to the revelation of the Burevestnik’s existence back in 2018. It was one of six ‘super weapons’ that also included hypersonic weapons and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed torpedo.
Of all these weapons, the Burevestnik has long been among the most intriguing.
As TWZ described when it was first announced, the basic concept of a nuclear-powered cruise missile is by no means new.
After all, in the 1960s, the U.S. Air Force explored a similar idea with its Supersonic Low Altitude Missile, or SLAM. This weapon employed a nuclear-powered ramjet along with conventional rocket boosters to kickstart the system. Once at the appropriate speed, the engine would blow air over the reactor, which could have enough fuel to operate for weeks or months on end, and then force it out of an exhaust nozzle to produce thrust.
A missile of this kind has extreme endurance, not limited by conventional fuel onboard as all other air-breathing missiles are, can be wildly unpredictable and tough to defend against.
While we don’t know what kind of nuclear propulsion the Burevestnik uses, provided this kind of technology can be made reliable, the implications are significant.
Of the latest test, Gerasimov said: “The technical characteristics of the Burevestnik generally allow it to be used with guaranteed accuracy against highly protected targets at any distance.” He added that: “vertical and horizontal maneuvers were completed,” something that would allow the missile to “bypass anti-missile and air defense systems.”
As we have surmised before, an operational Burevestnik would likely cruise at high subsonic speed on a circuitous route at extremely low altitude, helping it to avoid surface-based early warning systems and missile defense interceptors.
Using a two-way datalink, it should be possible to adapt the Burevestnik’s course in flight to further confuse an opponent or actively counter any attempts to intercept the missile.
The American SLAM concept involved a payload of multiple nuclear warheads that could be dropped on different targets along the way, but again, the warhead of the Russian missile remains mysterious. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, claimed that the latest test involved a warhead. If true, it would almost certainly involve a mock warhead, without the nuclear material, which would serve to test fuzing and detonation, for example.
Nevertheless, a technically perfected Burevestnik remains a somewhat questionable goal given previous problems with the program. At the same time, there remains the very real issue of safety and environmental hazards. We will dive deeper into both these factors later.
Returning to last week’s test, Gerasimov didn’t say where it took place, but it’s widely assumed to have been in Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago in northern Russia, situated in the Arctic Ocean, and used for many previous weapons tests.
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) orders issued for October 21 showed a large area around Novaya Zemlya closed off, corresponding to a Russian missile test or live-fire exercise.
Meanwhile, several Russian vessels that are known to be used in missile tests were noted in positions along the coast of the Arctic archipelago, both on the Barents Sea and Kara Sea sides. Probable support aircraft belonging to Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, and the Russian Aerospace Forces were also seen at Rogachevo airfield on Novaya Zemlya.
There have also been flights by a U.S. Air Force WC-135 Constant Phoenix “nuke sniffer” aircraft in the region, which some observers suggested could have been related to a Burevestnik. After a flight by this aircraft around the Barents Sea on August 5, the Air Force told TWZ that this was “to conduct routine background collection … to ensure signatory nations are adhering to established United Nations treaties.” The Air Force spokesperson added that the deployment of the WC-135 to the United Kingdom was planned and scheduled months in advance.
Background collection is something that could be conducted in anticipation of a Burevestnik test in the future. This data will be used to compare that from a collection mission following a test. At the same time, the wider region hosts other Russian nuclear assets, which would also be of interest for such flights, which are fairly regular in occurrence.
Finally, the test site at Pankovo, north of Rogachevo, on Yuzhny Island in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, has seen considerable activity starting this summer. Pankovo hosts what is understood to be the main launch site for the Burevestnik, with two rail-type launchers under a retractable covering.
Provided that last week’s test was conducted from Pankovo, making use of the area signaled by the NOTAM, then the missile must have flown in a racetrack or zigzag pattern around the Arctic archipelago. Less likely would be a longer route flown across the north of Russia.
Whatever the case, Norway, the closest NATO country to the test area, said it hadn’t detected any spikes in radiation at any of its monitoring posts.
“We have not measured anything abnormal at our measuring stations in Norway,” a spokesperson for the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) told the Barents Observer. However, there is still time for such a reading to be made.
“If there has been a radioactive release in connection with Russia’s testing of the cruise missile, it will take a long time to travel to Norway, and it will take time before it can be registered at our measuring stations,” the DSA spokesperson added.
Previous tests of the Burevestnik have not been without incident.
When he announced the missile in 2018, Putin suggested that tests of the propulsion system had occurred the previous year, but there was no indication of whether this had been in flight or on the ground and under what conditions.
Soon after Putin’s 2018 announcement, the Norwegian-based environmental group Bellona suggested that a radiation spike in the Arctic that same winter was caused by the missile’s open-air-cooled reactor core.
Later in 2018, a U.S. intelligence report described the loss at sea of a Russian nuclear-powered missile during a 2017 test. The report added that Russia was expected to embark on a search and recovery mission to try to lift the missile’s wreckage from the seabed.
The Russian Ministry of Defense released the video below in 2018, saying that it showed an earlier Burevestnik test launch, as well as examples of the missiles themselves.
More dramatically, in 2019, an explosion occurred aboard a barge in the White Sea, outside Nenoksa, killing five Rosatom scientists. It also led to a radiation spike in the Russian city of Severodvinsk, as you can read more about here. The explosion has been blamed on a reactor from a Burevestnik recovered from the sea, likely the one that was lost in 2017.
While the details of these accidents remain murky, they point to a significant problem in using nuclear propulsion for a missile or any other vehicle flying in the atmosphere.
It should be recalled that, in the case of SLAM, the nuclear ramjet had no shielding to contain dangerous radiation, a requirement driven by the need for the powerplant to be small enough to fit inside the missile. The SLAM’s exhaust plume also contained unspent fissile material that would have contaminated any area, enemy-controlled or not, that it passed over on its way to the target.
While the Burevestnik has already been likened to a ‘tiny flying Chernobyl’ by some observers, it’s important to remember that we still don’t know how it functions.
Nevertheless, provided it does indeed use nuclear propulsion, as claimed, there exists the risk of accidents.
“The testing [of the Burevestnik] carries a risk of accidents and local radioactive emissions,” Norway’s Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in a threat assessment report published last year.
This is especially the case during an unarmed test, when the missile necessarily has to come down to the surface, impacting either land or water. Here, especially, there remain a lot of questions about how the missile is tested.
It’s possible that the missile came down in waters around Novaya Zemlya, in either the Barents Sea or the Kara Sea. According to the Barents Observer and other sources, there are several ships in this area, on both sides of the Matochkin Strait, which might be involved in a recovery operation.
These ships include Rosatom’s special-purpose vessel Rossita, on the eastern coast of the Kola Peninsula. This vessel was noted making port calls in Novaya Zemlya after previous presumed Burevestnik tests. The Rossita is equipped to transport spent nuclear fuel and other hazardous radioactive material.
Perhaps, if Norway subsequently detects a radioactive spike in this area, we might learn more about where the missile ended its flight.
In the meantime, Putin took the opportunity to push claims about the missile’s game-changing nature.
“We need to determine the possible uses and begin preparing the infrastructure for deploying this weapon in our armed forces,” Putin said yesterday. This is especially relevant considering that the New START treaty with the United States, which puts a limit on strategic nuclear warheads and launchers, expires next year. Gerasimov’s announcement of the long-distance test also came one day before Russia began its annual Grom strategic nuclear maneuvers.
When asked for his reaction to the claims of the Burevestnik test, President Donald Trump stated that the U.S. Navy has a nuclear submarine “right off their shores,” meaning that there is no immediate requirement for a missile with the kind of range that the Russian cruise missile should possess.
At the same time, Trump noted that Russia is “not playing games with us. We’re not playing games with them either.” As for Putin’s comments on the missile test, Trump said: “I don’t think it’s an appropriate thing for Putin to be saying,” reminding the Russian leader that the priority was to bring an end to the war in Ukraine.
Still, the prospect of the Burevestnik entering service is a concerning one for adversaries of Russia. The missile can be launched preemptively and approach its target from any vector long after launch. For example, it could be launched from the Arctic, stay aloft for many hours, and then attack the United States from the south. Once launched, its flight path is entirely unpredictable, and it could exploit holes in defenses and weaker spots in early warning capabilities. It provides another reason why space-based tracking layers, including those that can spot low-flying aircraft, are currently very much on trend.
It is also worth noting that the latest Burevestnik test comes at a time when the U.S. Golden Dome initiative is taking shape, and the Russian missile reinforces the case for such a system. At the same time, it also underlines the reason why Russia wants weapons like this, so that it can better bypass existing strategic air defense systems.
The latest developments leave no doubt that the Burevestnik is a prestige program for Russia, even if many questions still surround it, and the nature of the latest test.
Contact the author: [email protected]
Source link