Chinas

We now have the first known commercial satellite imagery of the two Chinese sixth-generation stealth fighter designs that emerged nearly a year ago. The aircraft, which are commonly referred to now as the J-36 and the J-XDS, have been spotted in separate images not at their home airfields where they were built, but at a secretive airbase with a massive runway situated near the Lop Nur nuclear test site in northwestern China.

The J-36, readily identifiable by its large modified delta planform and ‘splinter’ camouflage paint scheme, is seen outside the main hangar at the facility’s central apron in an archived satellite image taken on August 27, which The War Zone obtained from Planet Labs. The J-XDS is seen in another Planet Labs image of the airfield taken on September 13. Previously, the J-36 and J-XDS have only been definitively spotted flying in and out of the main airfields associated with their respective manufacturers, Chengdu and Shenyang. Readers can find TWZ‘s very in-depth initial analysis on the J-36 and the J-XDS here.

This particular base near Lop Nur, which has been linked to work on reusable space planes, is also now undergoing a major expansion. It notably already has a runway over 16,400 feet long, or more than 3 miles in total length, making it one of the longest anywhere in the world.

The August 27 satellite image offers new details about the J-36’s size, showing it to have a wingspan of approximately 65 feet and an overall length of some 62 feet. It has already been clear that the three-engined J-36, two distinctly different prototypes of which have now emerged, is a very large tactical aircraft. For comparison, members of the extended Soviet-designed Flanker fighter family, like China’s J-16s, have wingspans of around 48 feet. Flankers are already well known for their large size relative to other fourth-generation fighter designs. As another point of comparison, the variable geometry F-111’s fully extended wingspan was 63 feet.

The September 13 image shows the J-XDS to have a wingspan of around 50 feet and be slightly shorter than the J-36. It’s worth noting that the shadow and image resolution make this estimate more challenging, and readers are advised to take it as such. It has been previously established that the twin-engined J-XDS, also sometimes referred to as the J-50, with its “lambda” wing planform, is smaller and slimmer than the J-36. That being said, it is still firmly in the heavy fighter class.

As mentioned, the remote base near Lop Nur is in the process of being expanded in a major way, overall. The work only started in earnest in the past six months or so, and significant progress has already been made. This includes the enlargement of the main apron, with a single new hangar also having been built at the northeastern end. Three smaller hangars, all joined together and that look to be typical of ones for fighter-sized aircraft, have been constructed at the opposite end, as well.

In addition, a host of other new buildings are seen under construction to the immediate southeast, pointing to plans to expand the scope and scale of work being done at the facility. The series of satellite images below gives a sense of the sheer magnitude of work that has been done just since May of this year.

There had already been a pronounced expansion of the infrastructure at the base in the early 2020s, including the construction of the large main hangar and associated apron. As noted, at that time, the facility seemed largely tied to Chinese military space development efforts. TWZ‘s first report on the airfield came in 2020 after a reusable space plane appeared to have landed there. Last year, we reported on it again after satellite imagery emerged showing a still-mysterious object sitting at one end of the runway.

It seems clear now that the facility has taken on a larger and still growing role in China’s broader advanced aerospace development ecosystem. Comparisons have already been drawn in the past to the U.S. military’s top-secret flight test center at Groom Lake in Nevada, better known as Area 51.

The airfield near Lop Nur is even more remote than China’s existing sprawling test airbase near Malan in Xinjiang province, which also seems to be almost exclusively focused, in terms of aerospace development tasks, on uncrewed aircraft. It also appears to host aircraft detachments for more general training and testing.

The construction of new hangars and other infrastructure at the base in question can only further help with the concealment of assets and other activity there from prying eyes, including in space. That being said, the site is regularly imaged, including by commercial satellites, which clearly did not deter the Chinese from parking the J-36 and J-XDS outside in broad daylight.

Regardless, the appearance of the J-36 and J-XDS at the remote base around the same time is also telling of the facility’s new mission to support the development of advanced air combat technologies. It is further indicative of the state of China’s rapidly evolving sixth-generation fighter programs that they have operated out of this place, possibly alongside each other.

All of this reflects a broader ramping up in China of the development and testing of next-generation tactical air combat platforms, as well as key supporting aircraft. This includes a host of advanced drones intended to perform a variety of missions. Some of these designs are very large, while others are smaller and more in the vein of ‘loyal wingman,’ or what is now often called a Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). For example, the satellite image below, from Planet Labs’ archive of shots taken of Malan, shows what is likely a fighter-sized CCA-type uncrewed aircraft.

These Chinese military aviation trends extend into the naval domain, as well. This past weekend, images emerged online that offer the first look at a navalized version of the GJ-11 Sharp Sword stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), intended for operations from aircraft carriers and big deck amphibious assault ships, with its arrestor hook deployed. This drone is sometimes also referred to as the GJ-21.

Even with major construction still underway, the secretive and remote base near Lop Nur is already becoming busier, and has now given us the first commercial satellite imagery showing the J-36 and J-XDS. The facility expansion is likely to see it support future advanced tactical aircraft developments, playing a bigger part in these endeavors going forward.

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The draft proposals for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan were approved during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2025. The final plan is expected to be adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026.

   China’s Five-Year Plans have been key strengths of China’s medium- to long-term economic and social development framework since the 1950s. Specifically, it has demonstrated strategic foresight, coordinated planning, and consistent implementation. The key strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan are its focus on high-quality development, particularly by achieving stringent climate targets such as peaking carbon emissions before 2030, while relying on strict monitoring mechanisms and advanced technologies. The plan also promotes innovation and digital transformation, focuses on integrated economic and military development, and leverages investment in research and development.

•  The strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, compared to previous five-year plans, are:

1)       Focus on quality development:

Compared to previous plans that focused on quantitative growth, the 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on quality, innovation, and sustainability rather than simply increasing productivity.

2) Integrated economic and military development:

The new plan systematically integrates scientific and technological innovations across the military and civilian sectors, enhancing national capabilities in a comprehensive manner.

3) Shifting towards a green economy:

The plan features new mechanisms for monitoring and managing carbon emissions, representing a significant shift from previous plans that were less focused on environmental issues.

4)       Investment in Research and Development:

The plan continues to boost investment in research, development, and innovation, a core strength that has enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements.

5) Balanced Development:

The plan seeks to achieve balanced development by supporting resource-rich regions, helping to reduce development gaps between different regions.

6) Investment Opportunities:

The plan opens new horizons for investors in areas such as carbon trading, offsets, and carbon asset management services, boosting national economic development.

Based on our understanding of the previous analysis, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) includes goals for economic and social development, focusing on technological self-reliance, high-quality development, and a real economy. The plan aims to be a crucial link towards achieving socialist modernization by 2035.

All eyes are on Beijing as the Communist Party of China (CPC) convenes to outline the next five years. These meetings take place amidst heightened trade tensions with Washington and mounting domestic challenges. This fourth plenary session of the CPC Central Committee, known as the “Fourth Plenum,” is a pivotal political event in the country, shaping future policies. The four-day closed-door meeting aims to finalize China’s new Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, an economic and political roadmap outlining the priorities of the world’s second-largest economy for the coming years. Approximately 370 members of the Central Committee, led by “Xi Jinping,” are participating in the meeting, with expectations of changes in some leadership positions, although details of these changes may not be revealed for several days or weeks. The full details of the plan are expected to be announced during the annual session of the National People’s Congress in March 2026.  Perhaps the most important things for the Chinese leadership at the moment are stability, legitimacy, and continued support. Therefore, it is crucial that they demonstrate their ability to improve the quality of life, as this is the cornerstone of their legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

 Many objectives of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) have come to fruition. The assessment of the key economic and social development achievements under the 14th Five-Year Plan, according to my view, is very positive, especially since they have global impacts in many aspects, such as economic growth, new quality productive forces, high-level opening-up, green transition, technological innovation, international cooperation, cultural and academic exchange, etc.

  As China’s 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025) draws to a close, the country has achieved a number of notable accomplishments, including fostering a resilient economy and making tangible strides in technology, manufacturing, economic reform, sustainability, and innovation. The country’s strategic plan has supported the country’s high-quality development, contributing to national progress across various sectors in China. China’s five-year plans are strategic guidance documents that chart the country’s development path over five years and form the overall framework for national planning. China will continue its 15th five-year plan in its opening-up and reform process to achieve more balanced and comprehensive development.

 China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will cover the period from 2026 to 2030. Planning began in December 2023. The plan aims to achieve General Secretary Xi Jinping’s goal of doubling the size of the economy between 2020 and 2035. The recommendations of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlined several actionable plans and programs for the national economic and social development of the People’s Republic of China. These plans focus on innovation-driven growth, low-carbon development, and urban-rural integration while deepening social inclusion and addressing the problem of population aging.

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing from October 20 to 23, 2025. A total of 168 members and 147 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the plenary session. Members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and responsible comrades from relevant departments attended as observers. Some comrades from grassroots units and a number of experts and scholars who were delegates to the 20th CPC National Congress also attended as observers. The plenary session was presided over by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and “Xi Jinping”, General Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered an important speech. The plenary session heard and discussed a work report delivered by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPC, commissioned by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and approved, after consideration, the “Proposals of the CPC Central Committee on Compiling the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development.” President Xi Jinping made explanations to the plenary session on the draft of the “Proposals.”

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will be held from October 20 to 23, 2025, to discuss proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for China’s Economic and Social Development. China has achieved significant achievements during the 14th Five-Year Plan, both domestically and internationally. In the new plan, it will continue its pursuit of high-quality development and strengthen international cooperation to achieve a more prosperous shared future.

The 14th Five-Year Plan focuses on achieving high-quality development, encompassing key areas such as scientific and technological innovation, the green economy, improving living standards, and balanced regional development. China’s achievements during this period were not limited to domestic matters but rather extended their impact to the entire world.

  This year, 2025, marks the conclusion of the implementation of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Chinese authorities recently reviewed the most significant achievements made during this period, a development that received widespread attention from the international community. China’s achievements in innovation during the 14th Five-Year Plan represent a global model of scientific and technological self-reliance. Not only did it increase spending on research and development, but it also succeeded in transforming knowledge into a sustainable, productive, and economic force. This reflects a strategic vision that has made China a leader in the fields of artificial intelligence, clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and modern communications. Giant Chinese companies, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Xiaomi, and BYD, have become symbols of this transformation. They have not only succeeded in building global brands but also established integrated innovation systems that blend scientific research with practical application.

 China’s five-year plans have always been an effective tool for driving progress across all sectors. According to my analysis as an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is described as “diverse, innovative, and open.” I expect China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan to continue prioritizing technological innovation, artificial intelligence, social welfare, scientific research, the digital economy, and carbon reduction. China’s development model is unique, with its sole goal of ensuring the prosperity of the Chinese people, under the motto “from the people, for the people.” Taking effective measures and prioritizing the protection and improvement of citizens’ livelihoods have been key factors behind China’s rapid development. This Chinese development model has become an inspiring example by transforming human capital into an engine of growth.

  Based on the previous analysis, perhaps what most caught my attention during China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is the significant Chinese focus on the innovation sector at the forefront. Over the past five years, the country’s total investment in research and development (R&D) has reached record levels. By 2024, China’s R&D spending will have increased by about 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, since the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission.

Marilyn Hubalde recalls the fear of local residents in Batanes, Philippines, when they first heard military helicopters during joint exercises with U. S. troops in April 2023. Hubalde’s helper even hid in the woods, thinking war had begun. The military drills, part of increased U. S.-Philippines cooperation, involve airlifting anti-ship missile launchers to the islands, marking a significant shift for the once-peaceful province.

Situated near Taiwan, Batanes is now seen as a frontline region in the competition between the U. S. and China for influence in Asia. The province is close to the Bashi Channel, an important shipping route between the Philippines and Taiwan, which connects the South China Sea to the Western Pacific. The recent exercises highlighted how both countries plan to use ground-based missiles to prevent Chinese naval access in potential conflicts.

Experts emphasize that denying Chinese control of the Bashi Channel is crucial, as it could decide the outcome of any conflict. Retired military officials state that controlling the northern Philippines is essential for any Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which China claims as its territory. President Xi Jinping has stated that China may use force to assert control over Taiwan, a position Taiwan’s government rejects, insisting that its future is for its people to determine.

China’s foreign ministry has warned the Philippines against involving external forces and escalating tensions in the South China Sea, calling Taiwan an internal issue that should not involve outside interference. The Pentagon and Taiwan’s defense ministry did not provide comments on these developments.

Using the ‘First Island Chain’

American military deployments in Batanes are part of a broader Pentagon strategy focused on using the Philippines’ geographic position to deter or counter Chinese military actions towards Taiwan and other areas in the South China Sea. The Philippines, consisting of over 7,600 islands and vital maritime chokepoints, is essential to the “First Island Chain,” which comprises territories controlled by U. S. allies, forming a barrier against China’s expanding navy. Rear Admiral Roy Trinidad of the Philippine Navy stated that the archipelago serves as a crucial gateway between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

The U. S. aims to ensure this gateway remains secure, despite uncertainties about American security commitments under President Donald Trump. Efforts have intensified since President Joe Biden took office to strengthen defense collaboration with the Philippines. Recent reports indicate an evolving and permanent U. S. military presence in the country, characterized by joint exercises and ongoing training, reversing an earlier period after the U. S. left its military base at Subic Bay in 1992.

In a meeting between Philippine Armed Forces chief General Romeo Brawner and U. S. Indo-Pacific Command head Admiral Samuel Paparo, the two sides agreed to more than 500 joint engagements for 2026, covering various military activities. U. S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth highlighted a focus on enhancing capabilities to counter Chinese aggression in the First Island Chain, noting that training activities with the Philippines are increasing in scale and duration.

The cooperation under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is vital for containing Chinese forces, especially in a potential conflict scenario. Marcos has stated that should war arise over Taiwan, the Philippines would be inevitably involved, while also emphasizing the desire to avoid conflict. The Philippine defense ministry expressed confidence in the commitments made by the Trump administration.

China’s recent military movements demonstrate the importance of the Bashi Channel for its Pacific strategies. The region has seen enhanced Chinese naval activity, including exercises near Japan, which highlight its ambitions. In response to Chinese “gray-zone” warfare aimed at the Philippines, which involves intimidation tactics against Philippine vessels, the military has reported unauthorized incursions by Chinese ships into Philippine waters. The defense ministry asserts that these actions challenge international law and reflect China’s desire to reshape the global order. China’s foreign ministry did not provide responses regarding these tactics.

War Jitters in Batanes

Communities near key military passages in the archipelago feel vulnerable due to preparations for conflict. In Batanes, residents, like Hubalde, rushed to buy essential supplies like rice, oil, sugar, and milk when military exercises began. The islands heavily depend on regular shipments from the mainland for food, fuel, and medical supplies.

Provincial Governor Ronald “Jun” Aguto Jr. said that the community has adapted to the military presence, which initially caused alarm and panic buying. Aguto is now focused on updating the provincial contingency plan to prepare for a potential influx of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) from Taiwan during a conflict. There are around 200,000 Filipinos living in Taiwan. He mentioned that Batanes could be used as a launch pad for bringing these workers home, but the islands can support only 20,000 people, requiring a plan to transfer them to the mainland for better sustainability.

The military is developing a rescue plan, according to Commodore Edward Ike De Sagon, the retiring Philippine Navy commander for Northern Luzon. He emphasized that the military is preparing for various scenarios, including handling large numbers of returning workers and possible refugees from Taiwan. The Philippine military has noted Batanes’ strategic location as a potential logistical hub for evacuations and humanitarian responses.

Concerns about being caught in conflict have intensified, especially if China were to attack Taiwan, with fears that Batanes could be targeted. Past military exercises have indicated preparations for potential fighting in the region. Retired politician Florencio Abad urged Manila authorities to reassure the local population regarding plans for managing the impact of conflict, expressing fears about survival in such a scenario. He highlighted the lack of clear communication from the government about evacuating workers from Taiwan or plans for potential refugees. The Philippine defense ministry stated that it is working on contingency and repatriation plans but did not provide details.

Missiles ‘Designed to Close a Strait’

Locals are concerned about potential conflict as the U. S. and the Philippines conduct annual military drills named Balikatan, which includes the deployment of U. S. Marines and new missile systems. The U. S. brought the NMESIS ground-based anti-ship missile launcher to Batanes, capable of launching the Naval Strike Missile with a range over 300 kilometers. This missile can target hostile warships in the Bashi Channel, providing “sea denial capability,” which is crucial for controlling access to this strait.

In late May, more drills occurred with the NMESIS system moved secretly into position for simulated strikes while U. S. and Philippine marines practiced key area operations. Not long after the NMESIS was deployed, China’s aircraft carrier Shandong entered the Western Pacific through the Bashi Channel for military exercises, spotlighting the strategic importance of this maritime route. China also deployed its other carrier, the Liaoning, similarly entering from the Miyako Strait, as both aimed to enhance their naval capabilities. Japan’s military anticipates that in a conflict, it would prevent Chinese access through certain straits, making the Bashi Channel vital for China.

The Philippine military described China’s naval activities as part of aggressive and illegal regional tactics. Meanwhile, the U. S. Army deployed Typhon launchers in Luzon, armed with powerful anti-ship missiles, which can hit targets deep into China, even as Manila expressed a willingness for further deployments despite Chinese objections.

China condemned the U. S. and Philippines’ military exercises and deployment of offensive weapons as destabilizing. The Philippine military clarified that these missile systems are for training and deterrence, not aimed specifically at any country, and operational security prevents them from confirming the locations of such systems. The military maintained that the presence of these missiles during exercises was temporary and not intended to close any maritime routes like the Bashi Channel.

If China doesn’t like it, ‘we’re doing it right’

Senior Philippine defense officials believe that China’s negative reaction indicates it sees the new anti-ship missiles as a significant threat. Retired Admiral Ong noted that disapproval from China means the Philippines is on the right track. The Philippine military recently acquired BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles from India, intended to give ground forces the ability to strike Chinese vessels and land targets while staying hidden. This approach helps avoid the vulnerability of fixed military bases to Chinese attacks.

Joint military exercises with the U. S., Japan, and Australia are being conducted to prepare for potential blockades in key maritime routes in the Philippines, such as the Mindoro Strait and the Balabac Strait. The Marcos administration has also allowed the U. S. access to four new military sites in northern Luzon, expanding military cooperation.

U. S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed America’s defense commitments to the Philippines shortly after President Trump took office and exempted funds for Philippine security force modernization from an overseas aid freeze. Despite increased military activity, Batanes Governor Aguto believes China is unlikely to attack, as it would escalate into a larger conflict.

However, local residents, like store owner Marilyn Hubalde, are preparing for possible disruptions to their supply chains. They are considering the need to grow their own food should conflict arise, emphasizing the importance of self-sufficiency in uncertain times.

With information from Reuters

Relations nosedived in 2018 after Canada arrested a senior Huawei executive and have remained rocky ever since.

The leaders of China and Canada have taken a step towards mending the long-fractured ties between their countries with a meeting in South Korea during the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney met on Friday and called for improving ties in a pragmatic and constructive manner, according to both sides.

“The leaders agreed that their meeting marked a turning point in the bilateral relationship,” a Canadian statement said.

Xi was quoted as saying that relations are showing signs of recovery, thanks to the joint efforts of both sides.

“We are willing to work together with Canada to take this meeting as an opportunity to promote the return of bilateral relations to a healthy, stable and sustainable track as soon as possible,” Xi said, according to an official report distributed by China’s state media.

Carney, who became prime minister in March, accepted an invitation from Xi to visit China, the Canadian statement said, without specifying any date.

Carney also later told reporters he was “very pleased” with the outcome.

“We now have a turning point in the relationship, a turning point that creates opportunities for Canadian families, for Canadian businesses and Canadian workers, and also creates a path to address current issues,” he said.

“The meeting signals a change in tone and an openness to relations at the highest levels, but this is not a return to strategic partnership,” said Vina Nadjibulla, vice president of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. “Canada needs to proceed with caution because there’s nothing to suggest the Chinese Communist Party’s actions have changed since the prime minister named China as a foreign security threat.”

She said Carney should keep talking with Chinese leaders but stay mindful of China’s threats to Canada’s security interests, including its efforts to play a greater role in Arctic affairs.

Shaky relations

Relations took a nosedive in late 2018 after Canadian authorities arrested a senior executive of Chinese tech giant Huawei as part of its extradition agreement with the United States. China then arrested two Canadian citizens and charged them with espionage.

Ties did not improve much even after the 2021 release of the two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, and the Chinese executive, Meng Wanzhou, who is the daughter of Huawei’s founder.

More recently, relations have been shaken by Canada’s decision to levy a 100 percent tariff on electric vehicles (EVs) from China in 2024 and a 25 percent tariff on steel and aluminium. China retaliated with its own steep tariffs on canola, seafood and pork, and has offered to remove some of those import taxes if Canada drops the EV tariff.

Canada made the move last in tandem with the US.

The Canadian statement said that both leaders directed their officials to move quickly to resolve trade issues and irritants and discussed solutions for specific products such as EVs, canola and seafood.

Xi called for expanding “pragmatic” cooperation in areas such as the economy, trade and energy. Both Canada and China have been hit by tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.

The attempt at rapprochement comes as Carney looks to diversify Canada’s trade away from the US and as Trump says he plans to raise tariffs on imports of Canadian goods by an extra 10 percent. Canada’s free trade agreement with the US is up for review.

Earlier on Friday, Carney told a business event that the world of rules-based liberalised trade and investment had passed, adding that Canada aimed to double its non-US exports over the next decade.

Nadjibulla said China should not be viewed as the solution to Canada’s issues with the US, however.

“We should not diversify away from the US and go deeper into China,” she said. “Canada’s overdependence on both the US and China has been shown to be a vulnerability we cannot afford.”

Beijing is positioning itself as the defender of free trade as Washington’s tariff hikes disrupt the global economy and Trump skips the economic summit.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for efforts to promote economic globalisation and multilateralism at an annual economic regional forum pointedly snubbed by United States President Donald Trump.

Xi took centre stage at the two-day Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that began Friday in the South Korean city of Gyeongju, as Trump left the country a day earlier after reaching deals meant to ease the escalating trade war with China.

“The more turbulent the times, the more we must work together,” Xi said during the opening session. “The world is undergoing a period of rapid change, with the international situation becoming increasingly complex and volatile.”

The Chinese leader positioned his country as the defender of free trade systems that observers say are being threatened by Trump’s tariff hikes and “America first” policy.

Xi called for maintaining supply chain stability, as opposed to US efforts to decouple its supply chains from China, and expressed hopes to work with other countries to expand cooperation in green industries and clean energy.

Chinese exports of solar panels, electric vehicles and other green tech have been criticised for creating oversupplies and undercutting the domestic industries of countries it exports to.

The US president left the country before the summit, after reaching several deals with Xi meant to ease their escalating trade war. Trump described his meeting with Xi on Thursday as a roaring success, saying Beijing had agreed to allow the export of rare earth elements and to start buying US soya beans in exchange for slashing tariffs.

The US president’s decision to skip APEC, a forum that represents nearly 40 percent of the world’s population and more than half of global goods trade, fits in with his well-known disdain for big, multi-nation forums that have been traditionally used to address huge global problems, with his preference for grand spectacle one-on-one meetings that generate blanket media coverage.

Al Jazeera’s Jack Barton, reporting from Gyeongju, said Xi was “filling the vacuum left by Trump”.

While on his first visit to South Korea in 11 years, Xi is scheduled to meet South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi separately on Friday. Xi and Lee are scheduled to discuss denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula on Saturday.

Barton said the meeting with Japan’s Takaichi would be “setting the diplomatic tone for the foreseeable future”. The Japanese prime minister is described by Chinese media as a far-right nationalist who has visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.

The site, dedicated to 2.5 million Japanese who died in wars beginning in the 19th century, is a political lightning rod in East Asia. Among those honoured are World War II leaders convicted as “Class A” war criminals, some of whom committed their atrocities under the Imperial Japan flag in China in the 20th century.

“South Korea and China share some of these historical issues with Japan,” Barton said. “They came out essentially saying, we’re going to put legacy issues on one side and diplomacy on another, so there is scope for a positive outcome.”

Xi also met Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on Friday to discuss trade. “We’re expecting perhaps the biggest substantial economic deal to come out of that meeting,” Barton said.

Leaders and other representatives from 21 Asian and Pacific Rim economies are attending the APEC meeting to discuss how to promote economic cooperation and tackle shared challenges.

The APEC region faces an array of issues, including strategic competition between the US and China, supply chain vulnerabilities, ageing populations and the effect of AI on jobs.

South Korean officials said they have been communicating with other countries to prod all 21 members to adopt a joint statement at the end of the summit, so as not to repeat the failure to issue one in 2018 in Papua New Guinea due to US-China discord over trade.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said last week that issuing a joint statement strongly endorsing free trade would be unlikely because of differing positions among APEC members.

Al Jazeera’s Barton said the result might be a “watered-down version”.

“The question really is, can APEC survive this age of US-China rivalry?” he added.

Kyiv, Ukraine – Both Russia and Ukraine depend on Chinese-made components for drones, jamming systems and the fibre optic cable attached to the drones to make them immune to jamming.

If Beijing wanted to end the Russia-Ukraine war, it could do so promptly and singlehandedly by banning the imports, according to one of the pioneers of drone warfare in Ukraine.

“Almost each component is made in China,” Andrey Pronin, who runs a drone school in Kyiv, told Al Jazeera. “China could cut off their side – or ours.”

Beijing supplies Moscow with four-fifths of drones, electronic chips and other dual-purpose goods that end up on the front line, keeping the Russian war machine rolling, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

Ukraine is trying to wean off its reliance on Chinese drones amid Beijing’s restriction of exports, but they still account for a staggering 97 percent of components, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank in Washington, DC.

United States President Donald Trump hopes that Thursday’s summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping can change that.

“I’d like China to help us out with Russia,” Trump said on October 24, two days after cancelling his talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and slapping sanctions on two Russian oil companies.

Trump is scheduled to meet with Xi in South Korea’s Seoul on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Their last meeting was held in 2019, in Japan’s Osaka.

Zelenskyy hopes meeting will ‘help us all’

Beijing, which has claimed it is officially neutral regarding the war, denies direct involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But it plays a role as Moscow’s main political and economic backer.

As Beijing seeks to “return” Taiwan to its fold, Moscow is understood by observers to be sharing with the Chinese military information on the use of drones, the vulnerabilities of Western-supplied weaponry and the management of airborne troops.

Meanwhile, amid mounting Western sanctions, Beijing is buying discounted oil, gas and raw materials, paying Moscow tens of billions of dollars a year.

That is the weak spot Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wants Trump to target in talks with Xi.

If Trump manages to “find an understanding with China about the reduction of Russian energy exports”, he said on Monday, “I think it’ll help us all.”

But Trump’s latest Russia sanctions slapped on state-owned oil giant Rosneft and the private Lukoil company could inadvertently strengthen Beijing.

Both companies will be forced to sell their foreign subsidiaries and diminish their role in international projects – namely, in ex-Soviet Central Asia and several African nations, where their place may be taken by Chinese companies.

According to Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Kyiv-based Penta think tank, Xi’s role in ending the war is pivotal.

“Without the financial support, without the economic cooperation with China, Russia can’t continue the war,” he said. “China is Russia’s main economic resource.

“Had [Beijing] wanted to end this war, it would have achieved it very fast,” he added. “China’s harsh position in closed-door, non-public talks with Putin would be enough.”

However, Beijing has “no inclination or interest in making a gift to Trump”, said Fesenko.

During his first presidency, ties with Beijing spiralled as the White House sought to curb China’s growing global clout and its access to Western technologies.

China and the US have introduced tariffs on mutual exports as Beijing threatened to cut off the trade in critical minerals, and Washington promised to curb the transfer of technologies. The Russia-Ukraine war is unlikely to dominate the summit, as Trump and Xi have bigger fish to fry as their nations now face a trade war.

‘Freezing the war’

At the same time, Beijing has been boosting its economic clout in Eastern Europe, Moscow’s former stomping ground, investing heavily in new infrastructure.

“The escalation of the war, its spread to Europe, is something that contradicts China’s interests,” Fesenko said.

However, Washington and Beijing may want to keep the war simmering or frozen without letting Moscow or Kyiv win a decisive victory, argued Kyiv-based analyst Igar Tyshkevych.

Washington is not going to benefit from Russia’s “overwhelming victory” as the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek the role of a “third global leader”, he said.

But neither Beijing or Washington could benefit from Russia’s full defeat, as China is concerned by destabilisation near its northern and northwestern borders.

“Washington is active about freezing the war,” Tyshkevych said. “I won’t be surprised if Beijing will be active in the same direction.”

If frozen, there are fears that the war could reignite when Russia recovers economically and accumulates enough resources.

To avoid that, Kyiv would look to building new or strengthening existing partnerships, especially with the European Union and its individual members, as well as countries such as Turkiye and Pakistan that both have cordial ties with Beijing.

And Putin still has plenty of incentives to offer to Trump.

There is a reported proposal to create infrastructure for the Arctic sea route that will shorten the delivery of goods from Asia to Europe by weeks.

Moscow also considered a joint project to sell Russian natural gas to Europe, develop oil and gas fields in Russia’s Far East, and supply rare earths that are crucial for US tech giants.

In a post-war environment, Putin may also propose Russia’s expertise in processing spent nuclear fuel from US power stations – and come up with nuclear security deals, including non-proliferation.

Non-proliferation “is the only field where Russia is ‘equal’ to the United States,” Tyshkevych said.

A second prototype of China’s very heavy J-36 ‘fighter’ has emerged with major refinements. These alterations, compared to the first J-36 airframe, point to the program very much being iterative in its process. They also add to the evidence of what we already posited, that the first J-36 aircraft was not a highly mature, near-production-representative design, as some had repeatedly claimed. You can read our very in-depth initial analysis on the J-36 here.

Images of this second example of the J-36 emerged today on social media, showing the aircraft flying through Chinese skies from multiple angles. The images were likely taken near Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s major plant in its namesake city, where initial flight testing of the first aircraft publicly emerged on December 26, 2024.

The new images show the same overall modified delta design we have become accustomed to, but with some major features changed in readily visible areas.

Exhaust

The first J-36 had exhausts that were recessed from the trailing edge atop the aircraft, an arrangement loosely similar to what was found on the Northrop YF-23. This is a noted low-observable (stealth) design cue and made sense for a big three-engined jet that optimized stealth, speed, and efficiency over raw maneuverability. Now we are seeing what appears to be three angular exhaust nozzles that look very similar to the two-dimensional thrust vectoring exhaust nozzles on the Lockheed F-22 Raptor — a design trait and capability that is also present on China’s new J-XDS heavy tailless stealth fighter.

The exhaust changes have major implications. First off, if indeed this is two-dimensional (2-D) thrust vectoring, why is it needed for what appears to be a very heavy multi-role tactical jet that is less fighter than regional bomber? It could be that a higher degree of fighter-like performance is desired, pointing to that mission set being prioritized. It could also be to solve certain stability and maneuverability issues during certain phases of flight. Tailless designs are inherently extremely unstable. Thrust vectoring can help with this and maximize potential performance throughout the flight envelope, including at very high altitudes.

It’s also possible that just a lower thrust vectoring ‘flap’ is being employed here and not a full 2-D exhaust system. This seems less likely, but it is possible, and could provide some degree of extra control without such a heavy redesign of the upper empennage.

The new, more heavily serrated design likely has an impact on the jet’s low-observable qualities, at least from the rear aspect. In order to pull off full 2-D thrust vectoring, the aircraft’s rear upper rear fuselage design would also have to be significantly remodeled, with the engine nacelles being pushed back to the trailing edge. The full extent of the changes to the upper end of the J-36 are unclear, but this was not a case of just slapping a thrust vectoring nozzle on there, as the original exhausts were deeply recessed forward of the trailing edge. Again, it looks like Chengdu designers traded some signature control for performance here.

Weight is also an issue, as thrust vectoring nozzles add complexity and mass, but for such a larger and heavy jet as it is, the impact is likely minimal.

Inlets

The original J-36 aircraft’s F-22-like caret lower inlets have been significantly revised. In our original analysis, we discussed how it was interesting that the dorsal intake uses divertless supersonic intake (DSI), which China is now accustomed to using on its aircraft, but the two lower intakes were a trapezoidal caret-like design. This has changed in the new iteration of the jet, with what appear to be DSI intakes taking the place of the original ones. The lower lips of these intakes also sweep forward, which is another trademark for this kind of design, and is especially pronounced on low-observable ones.

Landing Gear

The J-36’s tandem two-wheeled main landing gear — which provided a stark indication of how heavy the aircraft was — has been totally redesigned, with a twin-wheel side-by-side truck arrangement taking its place. While this may necessitate a deeper main gear well for stowage when retracted, it requires less area and smaller main gear doors, among other advantages. This is a relatively dramatic and surprising refinement, to say the least.

Other Takeaways

Another small tweak appears to be a less elaborate air data probe jutting out from the second J-36’s nose, although this could be an artifact of the high compression of the images. There are certain to be other outward tweaks to the J-36’s original design that we cannot see in these limited-resolution images taken in poor lighting. We can expect some refinements in shaping, especially where the intakes blend with the fuselage and other areas, although we cannot confirm this at this time. This is all in addition to what’s on the top of the new aircraft, which we haven’t seen at all at the time of writing.

Overall, these major changes a year after we first saw the design, point to an aircraft still very much in the stages of flight test demonstration/development and possibly to an accelerated iterative design scheme used to rush the aircraft into a production-like state. This new aircraft could also be an alternative configuration, not an evolutionary one, but that seems less likely at this time.

As we have repeatedly stated, the progress China is making when it comes to advanced combat aircraft is absolutely stunning. And yes, these aircraft are far more than their outward appearance and would need to rely on superior sensor and communications technology, low-observable material science, total force integration, and of course, operator and integrated training, in order to win the day. But taken at face value, China’s rapid progress with so many diverse platforms in such a short time is remarkable.

That being said, there are some that declare everything they see as late in development and near ready for production, regardless of the evidence. This is usually framed against an inflammatory U.S.-China competition narrative. Seeing this new iteration of the J-36 should underline just how fast China is working to refine the design, and it’s likely this was well in the works when the first example took flight. Still, claims that the J-36 was very far along in its development and even production representative when it first flew should now be put to rest.

Contact the author: [email protected]

WASHINGTON — President Trump faces the most important international meeting of his second term so far on Thursday: face-to-face negotiations with Xi Jinping, who has made China a formidable economic and military challenger to the United States.

The two presidents face a vast agenda during their meeting in Seoul, beginning with the two countries’ escalating trade war over tariffs and high-tech exports. The list also includes U.S. demands for a Chinese crackdown on fentanyl, China’s aid to Russia in its war with Ukraine, the future of Taiwan and China’s growing nuclear arsenal.

Trump has already promised, characteristically, that the meeting will be a major success.

“It’s going to be fantastic for both countries, and it’s going to be fantastic for the entire world,” he said last week.

But it isn’t yet clear that the summit’s concrete results will measure up to that high standard.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Sunday that the two sides have agreed to a “framework” under which China would delay implementing tight controls on rare earth elements, minerals crucial for the production of high-tech products from smartphones and electric vehicles to military aircraft and missiles. He said China has also agreed to resume buying soybeans from U.S. farmers and to crack down on fentanyl components.

In return, Bessent said, the United States will back down from its stinging tariffs on Chinese goods.

Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador in Beijing under then-President Biden, said that kind of deal would amount to “an uneasy trade truce rather than a comprehensive trade deal.”

“That may be the best we can expect,” he said in an interview Monday. Still, he added, “it will be a positive step to stabilize world markets and allow the continuation of U.S.-China trade for the time being.”

But U.S. and Chinese officials have been close-mouthed on what, if anything, has been agreed on regarding Xi’s other big trade demand: easier U.S. restrictions on high-tech exports to China, especially advanced semiconductor chips used for artificial intelligence.

Burns said the two superpowers’ technology competition is “the most sensitive … in terms of where this relationship will head, which country will emerge more powerful.”

Giving China easy access to advanced semiconductors “would only help [the Chinese army] in its competition with the U.S. military for power in the Indo-Pacific,” he warned.

Other former officials and China hawks outside the administration have said, even more pointedly, that they worry that Trump may be too willing to trade long-term technology assets for short-term trade deals.

In August, Trump eased export controls to allow Nvidia, the world leader in AI chips, to sell more semiconductors to China — in an unusual deal under which the U.S. company would pay 15% of its revenue from the sales to the U.S. Treasury.

Matthew Pottinger, Trump’s top China advisor in his first term, protested in a recent podcast interview that the deal risked trading a strategic technology advantage “for $20 billion and Nvidia’s bottom line.”

Underlying the controversy over technology, some China watchers warn, is a basic mismatch between the two presidents: Trump is focused almost entirely on trade and commercial deals, while Xi is focused on displacing the United States as the biggest economic and military power in Asia.

“I don’t think the administration has a strategy toward China,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “It has a trade strategy, not a China strategy.”

“The administration does not seem to be focused on competition with China,” said Jonathan Czin, a former CIA analyst now at Washington’s Brookings Institution. “It’s focused on deal making. … It’s tactics without strategy.”

“We’ve fallen into a kind of trade and technology myopia,” he added. “We’re not talking about issues like China’s coercion [of smaller countries] in the South China Sea. … China doesn’t want to have that bigger, broader conversation.”

It isn’t clear that Trump and Xi will have either the time or inclination to talk in detail about anything other than trade.

And even on the front-burner economic issues, this week’s ceasefire is unlikely to produce a permanent peace.

“As with all such agreements, the devil will be in the details,” Burns, the former ambassador, said. “The two countries will remain fierce trade rivals. Expect friction ahead and further trade duels well into 2026.”

“Buckle up,” Czin said. “There are likely more sudden moves from Beijing ahead.”

In the long run, Trump’s legacy in U.S.-China relations will rest not only on trade deals but on the larger competition for economic and military power in the Pacific Rim. No matter how this week’s meetings go, those challenges still lie ahead.

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE — President Trump headed for Asia for the first time this term, a trip where he’s expected to work on investment deals and peace efforts before meeting face-to-face with Chinese President Xi Jinping to try to de-escalate a trade war.

“We have a lot to talk about with President Xi, and he has a lot to talk about with us,” Trump told reporters Friday night as he left the White House. “I think we’ll have a good meeting.”

The president was taking a long-haul flight that has him arriving in Malaysia on Sunday morning, the first stop of a three-country visit.

His trip comes as the U.S. government shutdown drags on. Many federal workers are set to miss their first full paycheck next week, there are flight disruptions as already-squeezed air traffic controllers work without pay, and states are confronting the possibility that federal food aid could dry up. As Republicans reject Democratic demands to maintain healthcare subsidies for many Americans, there’s no sign of a break in the impasse.

Some Democrats criticized the president for traveling abroad during the standoff.

“America is shut down and the President is skipping town,” Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer of New York said.

Trump’s first stop is at a regional summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital. He attended the annual Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations summit only once during his first term, but this year it comes as Malaysia and the U.S. have been working to address a military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia.

On Sunday, he’s scheduled to meet with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, followed by a joint signing ceremony with the prime ministers of Thailand and Cambodia.

Trump threatened earlier this year to withhold trade deals with the countries if they didn’t stop fighting, and his administration has since been working with Malaysia to nail down an expanded ceasefire.

The president credited Ibrahim with working to resolve the conflict.

“I told the leader of Malaysia, who is a very good man, I think I owe you a trip,” he told reporters aboard Air Force One.

Trump on Sunday may also have a significant meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who wants to see the U.S. cut a 40% tariff on Brazilian imports. Trump has justified the tariffs by citing Brazil’s criminal prosecution of his ally, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup.

Beyond trade, Lula on Friday also criticized the U.S. campaign of military strikes off the South American coast in the name of fighting drug trafficking. He said he planned to raise concerns with Trump at a meeting on Sunday in Malaysia. The White House has not yet confirmed the meeting is set to take place.

Stops in Japan and South Korea

From there, Trump heads to Japan and South Korea, where he’s expected to make progress on talks for at least $900 billion in investments for U.S. factories and other projects that those countries committed to in return for easing Trump’s planned tariff rates down to 15% from 25%.

The trip to Tokyo comes a week after Japan elected its first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. Trump is set to meet with Takaichi, who is a protege of late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Trump was close to Abe, who was assassinated after leaving office.

Trump said Takaichi’s relationship with Abe was “a good sign” and “I look forward to meeting her.”

While there, Trump is expected to be hosted by Japanese Emperor Naruhito and meet with U.S. troops who are stationed in Japan, according to a senior U.S. official who was not authorized to speak publicly and spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity about the planned trip.

In South Korea, Trump is expected to hold a highly anticipated meeting with China’s Xi on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

The APEC summit is set to be held in Gyeongju, and the Trump-Xi meeting is expected to take place in the city of Busan, according to the U.S. official.

The meeting follows months of volatile moves in a trade war between China and the U.S. that have rattled the global economy.

Trump was infuriated this month after Beijing imposed new export controls on rare earths used in technology and threatened to hike retaliatory tariffs to sky-high levels. He has said he wants China to buy U.S. soybeans. But this week Trump was optimistic, predicting he would reach a “fantastic deal” with Xi.

The U.S. president also said he might ask Xi about freeing Jimmy Lai, a Hong Kong pro-democracy newspaper founder, saying that “it’ll be on my list.”

The only meeting that could possibly eclipse the Xi summit would be an impromptu reunion with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Speculation has been rife since South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told lawmakers this month it was possible that Trump could again meet with Kim in the demilitarized zone, as he did during his first term in 2019.

But such a meeting is not on the president’s schedule for this trip, according to the U.S. official.

Trump suggested it was hard to reach the North Korean leader.

“They have a lot of nuclear weapons, but not a lot of telephone service,” he said.

Price and Schiefelbein write for the Associated Press. Price reported from Washington and Schiefelbein from aboard Air Force One. AP writer Darlene Superville in Washington contributed to this report.

The probe comes as the US government seeks additional leverage against Beijing amid escalating trade tensions.

The United States has launched an investigation into whether China is out of compliance with a 2020 trade deal they struck together, as trade tensions ratchet up between the world’s two largest economies.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer announced the investigation on Friday, as President Donald Trump travels to Asia to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. China denies that it has failed to abide by the deal.

“China has scrupulously fulfilled its obligations in the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement,” a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington said in a social media post.

The probe into unfair trade practices could grant President Trump greater authority to impose more tariffs on China, which he has hit with massive trade duties during his second term in office.

“The administration seems to be looking for new sources of leverage to use against Beijing, while adding another pressure point to get China to buy more US soybeans as well as other goods,” Wendy Cutler, a former US trade negotiator who is now vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told The Associated Press news agency.

The “Phase One” deal came at the end of Trump’s first term in office in 2020, when the US imposed a series of tariffs on China in the name of bringing greater “balance” to their commercial exchange.

In that agreement, Beijing agreed to buy more US agricultural and manufacturing goods.

A Federal Register notice (PDF) from the Office of the US Trade Representative alleges that China has not followed up on that promise or others related to intellectual property protections, forced technology transfers or financial services.

September, for instance, marked the first month since 2018 that China imported no soya beans from US farmers.

“The initiation of this investigation underscores the Trump Administration’s resolve to hold China to its Phase One Agreement commitments, protect American farmers, ranchers, workers, and innovators, and establish a more reciprocal trade relationship with China for the benefit of the American people,” Greer said in a statement.

A new round of US-China trade talks is set to take place on Saturday, and discussions will focus on China’s restrictions on the export of rare earth metals, essential for many US tech products.

For decades, China powered spectacular growth through exports, infrastructure and cheap credit. But that old model is running out of steam, even as it hits a record trade surplus with the world this year.

The property sector is drowning in debt, confidence is fading, and consumers are holding back. Now, Beijing faces its toughest test yet: how to keep the world’s second-largest economy growing without relying much on the engines that once drove it.

A new five-year plan promises “high-quality growth” built on technology and self-reliance. But trade tensions with the United States could make the climb even steeper.

The recent agreement between the United States and Australia to invest $3 billion in critical minerals and rare earths projects represents a significant step in the Western effort to reduce dependency on China for strategically vital resources.
While the deal has been heralded by Washington as a turning point in global supply diversification, a closer examination suggests that China’s entrenched dominance in rare earth mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing will remain largely unchallenged in the foreseeable future.

This analysis situates the agreement within the broader geopolitical and economic context of resource security, outlines its potential and limitations, and assesses its implications for the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Rare Earths and Strategic Dependence

Rare earth elements (REEs) are indispensable for modern technology spanning clean energy, defence systems, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. Despite their name, REEs are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust; their scarcity lies in the technically complex, costly, and environmentally damaging refining process.

Over the past three decades, China has systematically consolidated control over this value chain, developing low-cost refining and magnet production capabilities that now underpin 90% of global processing capacity, 69% of mining, and 98% of magnet manufacturing (Goldman Sachs, 2024).

This dominance has translated into a form of strategic leverage. Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to weaponize resource supply chains, most recently through export curbs on gallium, graphite, and rare earth magnets, heightening Western concerns about supply security and industrial resilience.

The United States and its allies, including Japan, Australia, and the European Union, have consequently prioritized critical mineral diversification as a matter of both economic sovereignty and national security.

Key Issues:

Technological Dependence:
Western economies lack refining and magnet manufacturing infrastructure comparable to China’s mature ecosystem, which benefits from decades of state investment and technological standardization.

Environmental and Regulatory Constraints:
High environmental standards, community opposition, and lengthy approval timelines in the U.S. and Australia increase project costs and delay production, deterring private investment.

Market Distortion by State Subsidies:
Chinese producers benefit from state-backed financing, subsidized energy, and vertically integrated industrial networks that suppress global prices, making it difficult for Western firms to compete without government intervention.

Investor and Consumer Behavior:
Global manufacturers continue to prioritize low-cost Chinese supply, perpetuating dependency despite policy rhetoric about diversification.

Geopolitical Fragmentation:
Efforts to “de-risk” supply chains are hindered by divergent national strategies among Western allies, with varying levels of commitment to resource security versus environmental and economic priorities.

The U.S.-Australia Critical Minerals Pact

On October 20, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a joint U.S.-Australia agreement committing $3 billion to the exploration, mining, and processing of critical minerals.
The pact includes provisions for a price floor a mechanism designed to ensure profitability for Western miners operating in markets distorted by Chinese state subsidies and environmental cost advantages.

According to the White House, U.S. investments will “unlock deposits worth over $53 billion” in Australian reserves. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) has issued seven Letters of Interest totaling $2.2 billion to Australian mining firms, including Arafura Rare Earths, developer of the Nolans project in Western Australia.

While these measures indicate a serious financial commitment, they also highlight the industrial asymmetry between emerging Western projects and China’s mature, vertically integrated supply chains.

Economic Feasibility and Industry Timelines

Industry experts have expressed caution regarding the feasibility of rapid supply diversification.
Barrenjoey analyst Dan Morgan noted that the “time frame for various projects to be ready even by 2027 would be heroic,” reflecting the inherent capital intensity and regulatory delays in rare earth development.

Similarly, Dylan Kelly of Terra Capital observed that the current pricing of NdPr oxide the most traded rare earth compound “does not reflect a market dynamic that can sustain a significant fall in prices,” implying that a price floor mechanism may be essential for commercial viability.

Such perspectives underline the structural constraint that industrial policy cannot compress geological and technological timelines. New rare earth projects require multi-year investments in exploration, environmental clearance, and processing technology transfer.

Strategic and Geopolitical Dimensions

The U.S.-Australia pact is emblematic of a broader strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific, wherein critical minerals are increasingly framed not merely as commodities but as strategic enablers of power projection.
For Washington, the deal aligns with its economic security agenda to “de-risk” supply chains and reduce China’s capacity to use resource dependencies as geopolitical tools.

For Canberra, it represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic burden. Australia possesses abundant mineral reserves but faces pressure to align its export policies with U.S. strategic interests, potentially straining its trade relations with China still its largest trading partner.

At a deeper level, the agreement signals the emergence of a critical minerals bloc, mirroring patterns seen in energy geopolitics. Yet, the absence of comparable refining infrastructure, skilled labor pools, and environmental cost advantages continues to limit Western competitiveness.

Market Reactions and Corporate Beneficiaries

The deal has already produced identifiable commercial winners.
Arafura Rare Earths and Syrah Resources have reported increased investor interest following the announcement, reflecting market confidence in Western government-backed financing.
Arafura’s CFO, Peter Sherrington, emphasized that the U.S.-Australia initiative “de-risks raising money from an equity perspective,” while its CEO projected full project funding by early 2026.

However, as Syrah CEO Shaun Verner noted, unless global consumers “cure their addiction to lowest-cost supply from China,” even well-financed Western projects will struggle to secure stable demand. This underscores a behavioral dimension of market dependency, wherein private-sector procurement patterns perpetuate Chinese dominance despite political rhetoric of diversification.

Implications for Global Resource Governance

In the short term, the U.S.-Australia agreement is unlikely to materially alter the global rare earth landscape.
China’s entrenched advantages in scale, technology, and regulatory flexibility will ensure continued dominance through the decade.
Nevertheless, the pact marks an important symbolic and structural step toward building alternative supply chains, particularly if accompanied by coordinated policies on processing technology, environmental standards, and market access.

In the medium to long term, such agreements could catalyze a Western-led industrial ecosystem, reducing strategic vulnerability and fostering innovation in cleaner extraction methods. However, success will depend on sustained political will, technological breakthroughs, and a willingness to absorb short-term economic inefficiencies for long-term security gains.

Analysis: Strategic Patience Over Political Rhetoric

The U.S.-Australia rare earths pact represents a strategically coherent but operationally constrained response to China’s resource hegemony. It reflects the increasing securitization of economic policy in an era of great-power competition.

Yet, as this analysis indicates, the pathway to rare earth independence will be long, capital-intensive, and geopolitically fraught.
While the agreement sends a strong signal of Western resolve, the transformation of intent into industrial capability will take years, not electoral cycles.

Until then, China’s dominance will persist not simply because of its mineral reserves, but due to its unparalleled integration of industrial policy, technological expertise, and geopolitical strategy.

With information from Reuters.

We are getting what could be our first look at China’s very large stealth ‘cranked kite’ flying-wing drone, unofficially dubbed the GJ-X, in flight. TWZ broke the news on the existence of this aircraft in September after it appeared in satellite imagery at China’s sprawling test airbase near Malan in Xinjiang province. We estimated then that the aircraft’s wingspan was roughly 42 meters (137 feet), which puts it in a very rare class for a stealthy uncrewed aircraft. Since our report, there have been persistent claims that the aircraft’s wingspan is larger than that of a B-21, but that is very unlikely to be the case. It’s still a gigantic stealthy flying wing drone, but it is not China’s largest, by a significant margin.

The short clip above shows what appears to be the same aircraft, or one with a very similar design, in flight. Building on that caveat, it is possible that the aircraft depicted is a different one than what was seen in the satellite image at Malan, with both aircraft sharing a similar ‘cranked kite’ planform. China has at least one other drone in development that shares a similar planform, although it’s possible that both aircraft are related developmentally.

It’s worth noting that we see ‘split rudders’ in the image as outboard control surfaces, which are common on flying wing concepts and found on the B-2. We also see a small hump that looks off center above the jet’s empenage. This is likely to be the top of the recessed engine exhaust pointing to a twin-engine design.

The most interesting detail from the short video clip is the aircraft’s underside coating. It appears to have a counter-shaded paint job that is intended to make it harder to properly identify the aircraft’s shape at altitude, with the dark design taking on a more traditional fuselage and wing shape. It’s possible this could also be a coating installation process byproduct, but the shape being so clearly like a conventional aircraft configuration points to camouflage. This technique has been used for many years to visually break up an aircraft’s shape and/or misidentify its orientation.

The purpose of this aircraft is perhaps the most contentious aspect of its existence. Some Chinese military watchers state it’s a very large unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) with kinetic operations as its focus. Others claim it is straight-up an unmanned stealth bomber. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance role, taking on a similar task as America’s rumored clandestine ‘RQ-180’ high-altitude, long-endurance stealth drone, is maybe the most overlooked and probable possibility. But having a multi-role aircraft that can take on various tasks, from kinetic attacks to reconnaissance, would also be highly advantageous. We just don’t know conclusively at this time what China’s intent is for the design.

The GJ-X is just one of a dizzying array of stealth combat aircraft developments over the last year, starting off with the simultaneous first flights (or at least publicly witnessed and disseminated first flights) of the so-called J-36 very heavy stealth tactical jet and the heavy J-XDS fighter, both advanced tailless designs. A steady stream of other unmanned tactical aircraft of a similar generation have been spotted or unveiled, as well. The speed at which China is now moving when it comes to advanced combat aircraft development is truly stunning, and this is just what we are allowed to see, and maybe some leaks. Much more is underway in the shadows.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Satellite imagery shows several GJ-11 Sharp Sword stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAV) were deployed to a very active dual-use military-civilian airport in western China for weeks between August and September. This would be in line with an operational test and might point to the GJ-11 having reached a semi-operational state. The Sharp Sword is a prime example of China’s heavy investment in flying-wing uncrewed aircraft, which stands in ever more stark contrast to the U.S. military’s eschewing of such designs, at least publicly.

Imagery in Planet Labs’ online archive database shows three GJ-11s at Shigatse Air Base, also known as Shigatse Peace Airport, in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, from August 6 through September 5. The Sharp Sword has been in development for more than a decade and is understood to be designed to at least perform penetrating air-to-surface strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. It also has the potential for use in air-to-air combat as an electronic warfare platform.

At least two of the drones seen in the images of Shigatse have overall gray paint schemes, as is commonly seen on other Chinese crewed and uncrewed military aircraft. At least one additional example is seen with a red/brown colored protective covering of some kind. A Planet Labs image of Shigatse taken on September 10, seen below, shows Flanker-type fighters with similar covers.

Though its location is remote, Shigatse occupies a strategic position along China’s southwestern flank with India. It is situated just around 90 miles northeast of the boundary with India’s Sikkim state, which is one of a number of border areas between the two countries that have seen sometimes violent skirmishes. In the past five years or so, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been steadily working to expand its ability to project airpower from multiple bases in the Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions, as you can read more about here.

Shigatse’s main runway is one of the longest in the world, stretching approximately 16,404 feet (5,000 meters) in length. An additional 9,840-foot (3,000-meter) auxiliary runway, with seven large aircraft parking spots attached to it, was also completed at the facility back in 2017. An expanded apron for military aircraft was also subsequently constructed at the eastern end of the base. Work to further enlarge that apron, and to build what looks to be at least five hangars and other supporting infrastructure adjacent to it, has been underway for around a year now.

In line with all this, Shigatse has a significant and active PLA presence. In terms of crewed aircraft, there is a continuous fighter presence at the base, which has included Flanker-type and J-10s over the years. Satellite imagery shows that other fixed-wing military aircraft, including airborne early warning and control planes, as well as helicopters, operate from there, as well.

Shigatse is also a very well-established hub for drone operations, with various types, including members of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) Rainbow family, having been continuously based there for years now. Shigatse was notably the first known operating location for the high-flying WZ-7 Soaring Dragon reconnaissance drone. WZ-7s, which also have a constant presence at the facility, are used to collect intelligence along the border with India.

The nature of the PLA’s activity at Shigatse strongly points at least to the GJ-11s having been sent there for some type of operational testing. Prior to this, Sharp Swords had been primarily spotted at test facilities, such as the sprawling and secretive base at Malan in Xinjiang province. The drones have been flying daily at Malan for more than a year now. Mockups have also been spotted at Chinese naval test and training facilities, as well as at parades.

Flying from Shigatse would offer a real-world opportunity to explore and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing the drones operationally, as well as just how they might fit into existing force structures. The base, which lies at an elevation of nearly 12,410 feet (3,782 meters), also offers an especially high-altitude testing location, as well as one that is in proximity to an area of active tension with India and that country’s air defense overlay.

Having multiple Sharp Swords at the facility would also allow for demonstrations of their ability to operate cooperatively, as well as alongside crewed platforms, and potentially do so with a high degree of autonomy. China’s J-20 stealth fighter is regularly presented as a likely aerial companion to the GJ-11. TWZ has been highlighting for years how the two-seat variant of the J-20 would be especially well suited to the airborne drone controller role.

Un passage dans un reportage de CCTV-7 montre la possible collaboration entre un J-20 biplace et des #drones GJ-11 à faible observabilité.

La représentativité est à confirmer. pic.twitter.com/9Xy8Q8KQOO

— East Pendulum (@HenriKenhmann) October 12, 2022

The GJ-11 has already been in development for more than a decade, with a prototype with a substantially less stealthy design having first flown in 2013. A mockup with a drastically refined low-observable (stealthy) configuration broke cover at a parade in Beijing in 2019. Continued work on Sharp Sword now also includes a naval variant or derivative capable of operating from aircraft carriers and big deck amphibious assault ships, which has been referred to unofficially at times as the GJ-11H, GJ-11J, or GJ-21. Just over a year ago, TWZ reported in detail on clear evidence that the development of the GJ-11, overall, was accelerating, pointing to the drone getting increasingly closer to an operational state, at least in its land-based form.

Via ACuriousPLAFan/SDF: 😮

Supposedly not a recent image, but still the carrier mock-up and test facility at Wuhan has gained some new aircraft: Visible now are clearly mock-ups of J-15, J-35, KJ-600 and a GJ-11H on the flight deck.

(Image via @伏尔戈星图 from Weibo) pic.twitter.com/UL6uk81zh4

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) December 19, 2023

As noted, the GJ-11 is just one example of the PLA’s larger pursuit of multiple types of stealthy flying-wing drones for use as UCAVs and in other roles, especially high-altitude, long-endurance ISR missions. Three previously unseen flying-wing designs have emerged in China just this year. This includes the appearance of two particularly large types at Malan, which TWZ was first to report on in both cases. We had assessed years ago that an explosion of investment in flying-wing drones in China was likely to come, and that academic institutions tied to the country’s weapons development ecosystem would play a key role. The Chinese aviation industry has also been surging ahead, in general, in the development of new advanced crewed and uncrewed designs.

Chinese flying-wing UCAV developments, in particular, reflect something of a trend globally, with Russia, India, Turkey, and France also publicly pursuing this kind of capability to varying degrees. The U.S. military is pointedly absent from this space, at least that we know, despite decades of development work that looked for a time to be on the cusp of yielding operational platforms before various programs were abandoned. You can read more about that history in extensive detail in this past TWZ feature.

When it comes to China’s GJ-11, the imagery of Shigatse from August and September offers new signs that these drones are getting close to at least a limited operational state, if they haven’t already reached that milestone.

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The US president’s announcement comes after China pledged to impose restrictions on the export of rare earth minerals.

United States President Donald Trump has suggested he may scrap a planned meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping this month over questions of technology and trade.

Trump and Xi had been expected to meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit at the end of this month, in an attempt to lower economic tensions.

But in a social media post on Friday, Trump criticised China over the new controls it announced on the export of rare earth metals. The US president also threatened China with the possibility of steep tariffs.

“I have not spoken to President Xi because there was no reason to do so. This was a real surprise, not only to me, but to all the Leaders of the Free World,” Trump said. “I was to meet President Xi in two weeks, at APEC, in South Korea, but now there seems to be no reason to do so.”

The relationship between Trump and his Chinese counterpart has been rocky, and both have imposed new measures aimed at countering each other in areas where they are competing for influence, such as technological development.

Rare earth metals are vital for such development, and China leads the world in refining the metals for use in devices like computers, smart phones and military weaponry.

On Thursday, China unveiled a suite of new restrictions on the exports of those products. Out of the 17 elements considered rare earth metals, China will now require export licences for 12 of them.

Technologies involved in the processing of the metals will also face new licensing requirements. Among the measures is also a special approval process for foreign companies shipping metallic elements abroad.

China described the new rules as necessary to protect its national security interests. But in his lengthy post to Truth Social, Trump slammed the country for seeking to corner the rare-earths industry.

“They are becoming very hostile, and sending letters to Countries throughout the World, that they want to impose Export Controls on each and every element of production having to do with Rare Earths, and virtually anything else they can think of, even if it’s not manufactured in China,” Trump wrote.

The Republican president warned he would counter with protectionist moves and seek to restrict China from accessing industries the US holds sway over.

“There is no way that China should be allowed to hold the World ‘captive,’ but that seems to have been their plan for quite some time, starting with the “Magnets” and, other Elements that they have quietly amassed into somewhat of a Monopoly position,” Trump said.

“But the U.S. has Monopoly positions also, much stronger and more far reaching than China’s. I have just not chosen to use them, there was never a reason for me to do so — UNTIL NOW!”

The Trump administration had previously imposed massive tariffs on China, one of the US’s largest trading partners.

But those tariffs were eventually eased after the two countries came to an agreement for a 90-day pause that is set to expire around November 9.

The US has previously taken aggressive steps aimed at hobbling China’s tech sector, which it views as a key competitor to its own.

“Our relationship with China over the past six months has been a very good one, thereby making this move on Trade an even more surprising one,” Trump said. “I have always felt that they’ve been lying in wait, and now, as usual, I have been proven right!”

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has demonstrated its ability to launch and recover aircraft from its first catapult-equipped aircraft carrier, the Fujian. Official imagery released by the PLAN today confirms that the new J-35 naval stealth fighters and KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft are carrying out carrier trials, something that had not been seen until now. Meanwhile, we’ve also got a much better view of the J-15T single-seat carrier-based fighter launching and recovering aboard Fujian, having previously seen it in position for a catapult launch with its afterburners engaged. The sudden appearance of video of all three aircraft operating from the ship for the first time is something of a stunning revelation, one of many that has come this year from China’s air power portfolio.

The undated videos and photos showing flight operations aboard Fujian reveal examples of all three aircraft being prepared for catapult launch, taking off, and then making arrested recoveries. The aircraft are also shown in flight, including in formation with a J-15D series electronic warfare aircraft, and Fujian is shown from above, with the J-35, KJ-600, and J-15T arranged on its deck.

Fujian has been conducting sea trials since May 2024, and there have been growing signs that fixed-wing flight operations were underway. In August of this year, official imagery showed J-15s on the deck of the carrier and flying at low level above it. At that stage, however, there were no clear indications that the J-15 had actually taken off from and/or landed on Fujian.

An earlier video is shown below of J-15 activity aboard Fujian, but without presenting any carrier takeoffs or recoveries:

First-ever official footage of flight operations aboard China’s newest, soon-to-be commissioned aircraft carrier, CNS Fujian (18)

On the eve of the PLA’s 98th anniversary, PRC media released video showcasing another major milestone: integration tests between the electromagnetic… pic.twitter.com/wIrU4hxFi6

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) July 31, 2025

While we don’t know how long these fixed-wing aircraft types have now been conducting flight operations aboard the carrier, revealing all three in action at once is something of a coup.

Of the three types, the J-15 family is a Chinese development of the Soviet-era Sukhoi Su-33 Flanker, with the T version being specifically developed for catapult launch. Earlier variants of the J-15, as well as the Su-33, were designed for use on short takeoff but assisted recovery (STOBAR) carriers with ‘ski jumps’ rather than catapults, like the PLAN’s first two flattops. The J-15T had previously been seen operating from these two earlier vessels, in which case it relies on the STOBAR mode. However, the addition of a catapult launch bar (and less visible additional structural modifications) means the T-model is very much optimized for Fujian, from which it will be able to launch at higher operating weights than in STOBAR mode.

The J-35 is the PLAN’s next-generation carrier fighter, a stealthy design that was intended to conduct catapult takeoff but assisted recovery (CATOBAR) operations from the outset. Developed from the land-based FC-31, there are also signs that the J-35, like the J-15T, might also eventually embark on the Liaoning and Shandong. Until now, however, it hadn’t been seen taking part in any kind of carrier operations, other than in the form of mock-ups.

As for the KJ-600, the size and performance of this aircraft mean that it’s only suitable for CATOBAR operations, restricting its use to Fujian and any follow-on carriers. At least three examples are seen on the deck of Fujian. This aircraft will fulfill the same role as the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye, and, although not a direct copy, it is extremely similar both in size and overall design.

Also seen in the new imagery is the Z-9 helicopter, a license-produced variant of the Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters) AS365 Dauphin. Z-9s are also part of the air wings found on China’s STOBAR carriers, including for use as plane guards while fixed-wing aircraft are launching and recovering, and the type has been seen on the deck of Fujian, too, in the past.

Overall, testing Fujian’s abilities to launch and recover fixed-wing aircraft is a critical part of the path to operational service. However, it has added resonance since not only is the carrier fully homegrown, but so are the J-35 and KJ-600, the most important elements of its air wing, and they have not previously been to sea, at least in an operational capacity. The PLAN is therefore introducing to service a new carrier design and at least two new naval aircraft designs simultaneously, which is impressive by any measure.

Just as significant is the fact that Fujian is equipped with electromagnetically powered catapults, the testing of which first began in 2023 while the ship was still being fitted out.

In contrast to the U.S. Navy, which gathered decades of experience with steam-powered catapults, China opted for electromagnetic ones for its first CATOBAR carrier. It’s worth noting that the U.S. Navy’s USS Gerald R. Ford was the first carrier ever to get an aircraft into the air using what is also referred to as an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS). However, it has not launched an F-35C so far, making the J-35 the first stealth jet to achieve this feat. Based on earlier predictions, the F-35C may not do the same for some years.

As we have discussed in the past, electromagnetic catapults offer several advantages, not least the fact that they can be more finely tuned to very different aircraft types, including ones that are larger and slower (like the KJ-600), or which are smaller and lighter, such as smaller drones. EMALS are also less mechanically complex than their predecessors, providing lower reset times that can help boost sortie-generation rate. On the other hand, the technology behind the electromagnetic catapults on USS Gerald R. Ford proved to be hard to master, causing issues for years before the U.S. Navy said it was able to mitigate them.

While the latest imagery from Fujian’s trials focuses on traditionally crewed fixed-wing airpower, it’s very likely that this carrier, and other aviation-capable PLAN ships, will eventually operate advanced uncrewed platforms. In this case, the capabilities offered by EMALS are particularly relevant. The PLAN is known to be working on advanced uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAVs) and other types of drones that can be launched from carriers and big-deck amphibious warfare ships. Fujian will surely be no exception in this regard.

Videos provide a comparison of a STOBAR J-15 carrier launch and a CATOBAR J-15T launch from Fujian:

Whatever trials and tribulations the PLAN might have faced with its new homegrown carrier, its advanced electromagnetic catapults, and its new-look air wing, the Fujian project is indicative of a broader modernization drive within the service.

As well as increasingly advanced and powerful surface combatants and submarines, China is understood to be already working on its next CATOBAR carrier. Generally referred to as the Type 004, this may also be nuclear-powered.

The expanding PLAN carrier force also reflects growing strategic ambitions for the PLAN, as it pivots toward being able to take part in higher-end regional missions, such as intervention against Taiwan, as well as longer-range blue water operations in the Pacific and beyond.

For China, therefore, Fujian is much more than just a point of national and naval pride. With the carrier now expected to enter operational service by the end of this year, we will surely learn more about this landmark design for the PLAN, and the various aircraft that will serve aboard it.

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China is rolling out a new visa aimed at attracting foreign talent in the fields of science and technology.

The K visa comes into effect from Wednesday, following a proclamation last month by the State Council, China’s cabinet.

The visa has attracted particular attention in light of United States President Donald Trump’s tightening of the eligibility rules for the H-1B, which Silicon Valley heavily relies on to recruit skilled labour from overseas.

What is the goal of the K visa, and how does it work?

The Chinese government has cast the visa as part of its efforts to attract foreign talent to boost the country’s competitiveness in science and technology.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun on Tuesday said the visa’s purpose was to “promote exchanges and cooperation” between science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) talent from China and other countries.

The visa is the latest in a series of recent reforms intended to make China more attractive to foreigners, including streamlined visa processing and the introduction of a redesigned permanent residency card.

“From the 1980s to the 2010s, China used to lose talent to developed countries such as the United States,” Zhigang Tao, a professor of strategy and economics at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing, told Al Jazeera.

“Now the task is to keep local talent and also attract some global talent.”

Chinese officials have said the K visa, which will be open to graduates of recognised universities and young professionals engaged in STEM-related fields, will offer more flexible conditions than existing options.

The main advantage of the visa is that, unlike previous skilled migrant programmes, it does not require sponsorship by an employer.

However, many key details of the visa remain unclear, including duration of stay and unspecified requirements related to age, educational background and work experience.

Is the K visa likely to attract foreign talent?

Edward Hu, immigration director at consultancy Newland Chase in Shanghai, said there has been strong interest in the visa, with inquiries up more than 30 percent since August.

Hu said there has been particularly strong interest from prospective applicants in India, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the US.

“The K visa fills a gap in China’s talent system by lowering entry barriers for younger STEM talents – complementing the existing R visa, which targets top-tier experts,” Hu told Al Jazeera, referring to the visa as a “strategic move” to position China as a top destination for early-career STEM talent.

The R visa, introduced in 2013, is aimed at “high-level and professional” foreigners who are “urgently needed” by the state, and requires sponsorship by an “inviting organisation”.

Still, China’s drive to expand its talent pool with the K visa faces challenges.

While China has made moves to open to foreigners, the country is still far less internationalised than the US.

Unlike the US, China rarely grants citizenship to foreigners.

While Chinese permanent residency is more feasible to obtain, it is still only granted to a tiny fraction compared with the roughly one million non-US citizens who receive green cards each year.

Chinese work environments also present a language barrier for English-speaking applicants when compared with their Silicon Valley counterparts.

Michael Feller, chief strategist at Sydney-based business consultancy Geopolitical Strategy, said Chinese companies would need to offer English-language roles and “international-style” work schedules to compete with US firms.

“I can’t imagine many foreign graduates interested in the ‘9-9-6’ work-life balance that many Chinese firms are known for,” Feller told Al Jazeera, referring to the 72-hour workweek famously endorsed by Alibaba founder Jack Ma.

What does the K visa have to do with the H-1B?

While China’s drive to recruit talent has cast Trump’s crackdown on immigration in sharp relief, there is no direct link between the introduction of the K visa and his moves to rein in access to the H-1B.

Beijing officially unveiled its visa on August 7, weeks before Trump announced the introduction of a $100,000 fee on H-1B applications, sending shockwaves through the tech sector, especially in India, the source of about 70 percent of visa recipients.

However, many observers have suggested that the US’s inward turn could be to the benefit of other countries seeking to attract talent, including China.

“The K visa is incredible timing from China’s perspective,” Feller said.

“It’s unlikely that Beijing knew that Washington was about to hike the fees for its own H-1B visa category, but it certainly gives the K visa added impetus in the global war for talent.”

Hu of Newland Chase said he expected the shift in policy around the H-1B to “significantly boost” the appeal of the K visa, “positioning it as a timely alternative for affected talent”.

“The K visa offers a low-cost, sponsor-free pathway – aligning with the global surge in STEM talent demand and making China a more accessible option,” he said.

What could be a major leak out of China features by far the clearest pictures yet of Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s (SAC) J-XDS, also referred to unofficially as the J-50. This aircraft is a heavy sixth-generation stealth fighter design that features no tails, thrust vectoring, and a very sleek profile. It also has unique features, in particular its swiveling wingtip control surfaces. You can read our past analysis on this aircraft here and here.

While these images could very well be a fabrication, they appear to match very closely with other, less detailed views we have seen of this aircraft. As it sits now, we have to take them as unconfirmed, but there are no indications outright that they are not authentic. The only discrepancy we could find between these new images and past ones is the lack of an air data boom on the jet’s nose. But after further review of other lower-quality imagery of this aircraft from very recently, the boom appears to have been removed. This could also be a second airframe that is now in flight test that is not equipped with one, which is not uncommon for the early development phase of air combat aircraft. It’s also worth noting that we still do not know if these are technology demonstrators or more production representative designs. Considering the speed at which China is moving in terms of air combat systems development, it wouldn’t be surprising if the latter were true.

Up until recently, we have gotten mostly underside and silhouette views of this aircraft. Meanwhile, its super-heavy counterpart, commonly referred to as the J-36, which broke cover on the same days as the J-XDS back in December 2024, has been seen in much higher detail. One shot in particular of that aircraft was similar to this one, taken directly into the airfield where it is produced and based for flight testing.

These fresh images, if authentic, provide a new, detailed look at the sides of this exotic aircraft. Details that are very visible include its F-22-like 2D thrust vectoring exhausts, which include fine serrated edges around the exhaust housing, a common detail on stealth fighter aircraft.

Its very long diamond-shaped nose that features a deeply blended canopy is also very apparent in the images. The aircraft’s intakes are also seen in greater detail here, which are trapezoidal and feature a diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI) arrangement.

Based on these photos, assuming they are not fabricated, the aircraft is conclusively operated by a single pilot — a detail that has remained unclear until now. The electro-optical target system (EOTS) enclosure is also visible under the nose, as are the aircraft’s side bay-like features that still remain something of a mystery due to their small size. Small bulges in the profile of the aircraft’s spine are seen behind the cockpit. It is not clear what this would be for, but they do look like small auxiliary inlet doors that are open. If they were fixed bumps, they would likely house apertures for a distributed aperture system (DAS) or other sensor/communications aperture.

And, of course, the aircraft’s trademark swiveling wingtips, which would help to keep the inherently very unstable tailless aircraft pointed in the right direction, especially during slow flight and hard maneuvering, are seen deflected downward.

Overall, the images are quite remarkable and give us a better idea of what this aircraft actually looks like from a side view in good light. We’ll have to see if the photos end up proving to show the real McCoy, but for now they are a welcome revelation.

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