Jan. 2 (UPI) — Chinese electric car maker BYD surpassed Tesla in annual sales in 2025.
BYD said it sold 2.26 million battery electric vehicles in 2025, a boost of 28% year over year, the company said in a statement Thursday. BYD’s total deliveries from BEVs and plug-in hybrids were about 4.6 million vehicles.
Tesla CEO Elon Musk once laughed at BYD cars in an interview on Bloomberg TV in 2011. He said, “I don’t think they have a great product,” CNBC reported Musk said.
In November, Tesla shareholders approved a new pay package for Musk.The firm said 75% of shareholders with voting rights backed Musk’s 10-year pay deal, which could net him $1 trillion over that time by boosting his stake in Tesla by more than 423 million shares.
Though shares dropped significantly in the first quarter of 2025, they are back on track with an all-time closing high of $489.88 last month, after Musk said it had been testing driverless vehicles in Austin, Texas.
A model poses for photographers during the Tokyo Auto Salon 2025 event at the Makuhari Messe convention center in Chiba, Japan, on January 10, 2025. Photo by Keizo Mori/UPI | License Photo
Decline in sales comes amid outrage of Elon Musk’s political forays, end in US electric vehicle tax breaks.
Published On 2 Jan 20262 Jan 2026
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Tesla has lost its place as the top global seller of electric vehicles to Chinese company BYD, capping a year defined by outrage over CEO Elon Musk’s political manoeuvring and the end of United States tax breaks for customers.
The company revealed on Friday that it had sold 1.64 million vehicles in 2025, compared with BYD’s 2.26 million vehicles. The sales represented a 9 percent decline for Tesla from a year earlier.
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Tesla, founded in 2003, had for years far outpaced traditional automakers in its development and sale of electric vehicles. However, the market has become increasingly crowded with competitors, with China’s electric vehicle market bounding ahead.
Musk’s embrace of US President Donald Trump in 2024 and subsequent spearheading of a controversial “government efficiency” panel (DOGE) behind widespread layoffs of federal workers has also proved polarising. The political foray prompted protests at Tesla facilities and slumps in sales.
The company’s fourth quarter sales totaled 418,227, falling short of the much-reduced 440,000 target that analysts recently polled by FactSet, an investment research firm, had expected.
Musk left DOGE in May, in what was largely viewed as an effort to reassure investors.
Tesla was also hard hit by the expiration of a $7,500 tax credit for electric vehicle purchases that was phased out by the Trump administration at the end of September. Trump’s opposition to electric vehicles has contributed to a strained relationship with Musk.
Despite the downward trends in sales, investors have generally remained optimistic about Tesla and Musk’s ambitious plans to make the company a leader in driverless robotaxi services and humanoid robots for homes.
Reflecting that optimism, Tesla stock finished 2025 up about 11 percent.
Tesla has also recently introduced two less expensive electric vehicle models, the Model Y and Model 3, meant to compete with cheaper Chinese models for sale in Europe and Asia.
Musk entered 2026 as the wealthiest person in the world.
It is widely believed that the public offering of his rocket company, SpaceX, set for later this year, could make the 54-year-old the world’s first trillionaire.
In November, Tesla’s directors awarded Musk a potentially historic pay package of nearly $1 trillion if ambitious performance targets were met.
Musk scored another huge win in December,when the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s ruling, awarding him a $55bn pay package that had been paused since 2018.
Conversely, Tesla is at risk of temporarily losing its licence to sell cars in California after a judge there ruled it had misled customers about the safety of its driverless taxis.
Taiwan’s Lai pledges to defend national sovereignty after Beijing holds live-fire drills around island.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has pledged to achieve the “reunification” of China and Taiwan, calling Beijing’s long-held goal “unstoppable.”
In a New Year’s address delivered a day after China’s military wrapped up war games around Taiwan, Xi on Wednesday invoked the “bond of blood and kinship” between Chinese people on each side of the Taiwan Strait.
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“The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable,” Xi said.
Xi also hailed the institution in 2025 of an annual “Taiwan Recovery Day”, marking the end of imperial Japan’s rule of the island at the end of World War II.
Xi’s speech came on the heels of two days of live-fire drills simulating a blockade of the island, in what officials called a “stern warning” against “separatist” and “external interference” forces.
The drills were the largest ever held around Taiwan in terms of geographical area.
The war games, codenamed “Justice Mission 2025”, came just days after the United States approved its largest-ever arms package to Taiwan, valued at $11.1bn.
China views self-governing Taiwan as part of its territory and has long pledged to bring the island under its control, using force if necessary.
Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party maintains that the island is a de facto independent country, though it has not formally declared independence.
In his New Year’s Day address on Thursday, Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te pledged to “firmly” uphold national sovereignty and boost the island’s defences.
“In the face of China’s escalating expansionist ambitions, the international community is closely watching whether the people of Taiwan have the determination to defend themselves,” Lai said.
While Taiwan elects its leaders and has its own military, passport and currency, the island is officially recognised by just 11 countries and Vatican City.
China insists that countries do not officially recognise Taipei in order to maintain diplomatic ties with Beijing.
Although the US does not officially recognise Taiwan, Washington is committed to helping the island to defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
While Washington is Taipei’s principal supplier of arms, the law does not stipulate any obligation to directly intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese blockade or invasion.
Opinion polls suggest a large majority of Taiwanese favour the status quo, with much smaller proportions supporting imminent moves towards formal independence or unification.
In his speech on Wednesday, Xi also hailed China’s innovation in industries including artificial intelligence and space.
“We sought to energise high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations,” he said.
“Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest-growing innovation capabilities.”
A passenger looks at an LED board showing delayed flights during the Chinese military live-fire drills around Taiwan, in Taipei, Taiwan, Tuesday. China is conducting live-fire drills in five designated maritime and airspace zones around Taiwan. Photo by Richie B. Tongo/EPA
Dec. 30 (UPI) — China continued its live-fire drill called “Justice Mission 2025,” on Tuesday creating a blockade around Taiwan and disrupting flights, but President Donald Trump said he’s not worried.
Reporters asked Trump about the drills Monday, and he said he has a “great relationship with President Xi [Jinping], and he hasn’t told me anything about it.”
“I certainly have seen it … I don’t believe he is going to be doing it,” Trump said. He didn’t elaborate on what he meant that Xi could do. “Nothing worries me.”
“They’ve been doing naval exercises for 20 years in that area,” he told reporters.
Trump is expected to make a formal visit to Beijing next year.
Though Taiwan is a self-governing democracy, China claims it is a Chinese province. China has been pushing for a “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. But it hasn’t ruled out taking the island nation by force.
On Friday, China sanctioned U.S. companies and their leadership after the United States announced an $11.1 billion arms deal with Taiwan on Dec. 18.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said it detected 130 Chinese military aircraft and 22 naval and coast guard vessels in the past 24 hours up to 6 a.m. Tuesday.
“China ignores the expectations of the international community for peace and persists in destroying regional stability with military threat, which is a blatant provocation to regional security and international order, and I would like to express my strongest condemnation,” President Lai Ching-te said Tuesday in a Facebook post.
Lai also said the drills were disrupting trade and air traffic.
“China’s military provocations along the First Island Chain severely disrupt global maritime trade, air traffic and regional peace. #Taiwan continues to act responsibly, neither escalating tensions nor yielding to threats – we will steadfastly defend our freedom against coercion,” he said on X.
Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo said the drills disregarded international norms and “clearly aim to achieve cognitive warfare and deplete Taiwan’s combat capabilities … and to create division and conflict within Taiwanese society,” The Guardian reported.
This exercise is the sixth of its kind since 2022, though it’s the largest. In 2022, the drills were in retaliation for then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi‘s visit. But this is the first time since then that China has created “maritime exclusion zones.” Planes and boats were not allowed to pass during the drills.
China has held two-day military drills – Justice Mission 2025 – around Taiwan, marking the sixth round of large-scale war games since 2022, when then-Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited the island.
The exercise included 10 hours of live fire drills on Tuesday as Chinese forces practised encircling Taiwan and blockading its major ports.
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What happened during the Justice Mission 2025?
The war games began on Monday in the waters and airspace to the north, southwest, southeast and east of Taiwan’s main island, according to China’s Eastern Theatre Command spokesperson Shi Yi.
The exercises saw China deploy its naval destroyers, frigates, fighter planes, bombers, drones, and long-range missiles to simulate seizing control of Taiwan’s airspace, blockading its ports, and striking critical infrastructure, “mobile ground targets” and maritime targets, Shi said.
The exercises also simulated a blockade of Taiwan and its main ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung.
Tuesday’s live-fire drills were held in five zones around Taiwan between 8am and 6pm local time (00:00 GMT and 10:00 GMT), according to the Eastern Theatre Command. Chinese forces fired long-range rockets into the waters around the island, according to a video released by the military on social media.
Taiwan’s coastguard said seven rockets were fired into two drill zones around the main island.
Ground forces take part in long-range live-fire drills targeting waters north of Taiwan, from an undisclosed location in this screenshot from a video released by the Eastern Theatre Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army on December 30, 2025 [Handout/Eastern Theatre Command via Reuters]
Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence said it had tracked 130 air sorties by Chinese aircraft, 14 naval ships and eight “official ships” between 6am on Monday and 6am on Tuesday.
Ninety of the air sorties crossed into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ), an area of land and sea monitored by Taipei, during the 24 hours, in the second-largest incursion of its kind since 2022.
How were the exercises different from last time?
Justice Mission 2025 was the largest war game since 2022 in terms of the area covered, according to Jaime Ocon, a research fellow at Taiwan Security Monitor.
“These zones are very, very big, especially the southern and southeast zones around Taiwan, which actually breached territorial waters,” he told Al Jazeera, referring to the region within 12 nautical miles (22km) of Taiwan’s coast. “That’s a big escalation from previous exercises.”
They also focused explicitly on blockading Taiwan, unlike past iterations, sending a strong message to Taipei and its unofficial allies, particularly the US and Japan.
“This is a clear demonstration of China’s capability to conduct A2/AD – anti-access aerial denial – making sure that Taiwan can be cut off from the world and that other actors like Japan, the Philippines, or the United States cannot directly intervene,” Ocon said.
A blockade would impact not only the delivery of weapons systems but also critical imports, such as natural gas and coal, that Taiwan relies on to meet nearly all its energy needs. It would also disrupt vital global shipping routes through the Taiwan Strait.
Alexander Huang, director-general of Taiwan’s Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, told Al Jazeera the drills were similar to those held after Pelosi’s visit in August 2022.
“For this drill, it actually interfered with international civil aviation routes and also maritime shipping routes. In previous drills, they tried to avoid that, but this time they actually disrupted the air and maritime traffic,” he said.
The drills also put pressure on Taiwan’s maritime and transport links to Kinmen and Matsu islands, which are closer to the Chinese mainland.
Why did China stage the exercises now?
China has a history of holding military exercises to express its anger with Taiwan and its allies, but large-scale exercises have become more frequent since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit.
Beijing claims Taiwan as a province and has accused the US of interfering in its internal affairs by continuing to sell weapons to Taipei and supporting its “separatist” government led by President William Lai Ching-te.
Washington does not officially recognise Taiwan, whose formal name is the Republic of China, but it has pledged to help Taipei defend itself under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Six Assurances.
The Justice Mission 2025 came just days after Washington approved a record-breaking $11.1bn arms sale to Taiwan.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Monday that the drills were a “punitive and deterrent action against separatist forces who seek ‘Taiwan independence’ through military build-up, and a necessary move to safeguard China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Beijing sanctioned 30 US firms and individuals over the arms sale.
Experts also say the exercises were linked to a separate but related diplomatic row between China and Japan.
Beijing was angered in November by remarks from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi that an attack on Taiwan would be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Such a scenario would legally permit Japan to exercise its “right of collective self-defence” and deploy its military, she said.
Several flights were cancelled at the Taipei airport during China’s latest military drills around Taiwan, December 30, 2025 [Ann Wang/Reuters]
How is Taiwan responding to the drills?
Taiwan cancelled more than 80 domestic flights on Tuesday and warned that more than 300 international flights could be delayed due to flight rerouting during the live-fire drills.
Taiwan’s Defence Ministry said the coastguard monitored the exercises near the outlying islands and that an undisclosed number of naval vessels had also been deployed nearby. Taipei also monitored all incursions into its ADIZ, including the Taiwan Strait, sections of coastal China, and waters around Taiwan.
In a statement on Tuesday, Defence Minister Wellington Koo said, “[Beijing’s] highly provocative actions severely undermine regional peace and stability [and] also pose a significant security risk and disruption to transport ships, trade activities, and flight routes.”
Koo described the exercises as a form of “cognitive warfare” that aimed to “deplete Taiwan’s combat capabilities through a combination of military and non-military means, and to create division and conflict within Taiwanese society through a strategy of sowing discord”.
How did the US respond to the drills?
US President Donald Trump has so far remained quiet about the military drills, telling reporters on Monday that he was “not worried”.
“I have a great relationship with President Xi, and he hasn’t told me anything about it,” Trump said when asked about the exercises during a news conference, according to Reuters. “I don’t believe he’s going to be doing it,” he added, seemingly referring to the prospect of actual military action targeting Taiwan.
William Yang, a senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that Trump might avoid saying much about the Justice Mission 2025 exercises as he hopes to meet President Xi Jinping in April to discuss a US-China trade deal. “It’s a diplomatic strategy to make sure the US response is not going to immediately upset the temporary trade truce between the US and China,” Yang said.
“I think it’s quite consistent with how he personally and his administration have been handling the issue of Taiwan by trying to de-prioritise making public statements,” he said.
Pictures of the drones sitting dockside at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai first began circulating online late last week. The presence of the super-sized Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan in drydock nearby still raises the possibility of plans for trials aboard that ship, which features a single electromagnetic catapult, as was discussed in TWZ‘s initial reporting here. A medium-sized cargo ship loaded with containerized vertical launchers, as well as sensors and close-in defense systems, which emerged last week, has also been moored at this yard recently.
Drones or drone mockups of catapult-capable low-observable combat drones, including one loaded on the back of a truck, seen recently at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai. Chinese InternetA picture also circulating online now of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan in drydock at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. The blast deflector behind the ship’s catapult is seen raised here. Pylons that could be part of a barrier system are also seen extending upward on opposite sides of the flight deck aft of the second island. Chinese internet
Though the drones are still under wraps in the new images, we do now have a better look at their overall design. This includes nose landing gear with bars that clearly show the design is intended for catapult launch. There is also a notable outline of a fairing under the nose, though no further details about that feature can be discerned at present.
A close-up look at one of the drone mockups at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. The catapult bar on the nose landing gear and the outline of the fairing under the nose are visible here. Chinese Internet
It is interesting to note that a mockup of a drone called the FH-97, shown at China’s Zhuhai Airshow in 2021, was depicted with an electro-optical sensor in a stealthy gold-plated windowed enclosure installed under its nose. The overall design of the FH-97, which is at least heavily inspired by the XQ-58A Valkyrie from U.S. drone maker Kratos, is similar in many other respects, at least in broad strokes, to what has now been seen at the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. The XQ-58 and FH-97 are both notably smaller designs. There are also similarities to two Chinese ‘loyal wingman’ type drone designs, commonly referred to presently as the Type C and Type E, which emerged around a huge military parade in Beijing back in September.
The FH-97 mockup displayed at that the 2021 Zhuhai Airshow. Chinese Internet
Well, back from work and back to this strange picture: 🤔 I start with my layman’s attempt to sort them a bit + adding the names according to Huitong’s CMA-Blog.
More interestingly, the new pictures from Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard show at least three eight-wheeled trucks that look designed to lock together seamlessly in a chain. Doing so also appears to form a continuous flat surface across the top. One of the drones is seen loaded at the rear of one of the trucks with its nose gear bar locked into what looks to be a catapult shuttle.
A broad view of the drone or drone mockups, as well as trucks, on the pier at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. Chinese internetA close-up look at the drone, or mockup thereof, on the truck, with its catapult bar looking to be locked into a shuttle-like fixture. Chinese internet
Besides the cabs in front, the sides of the trucks are largely open, showing elaborate electrical systems and large amounts of heavy exposed wiring. There is a cylindrical drum above each wheel, which could be part of an independent articulating suspension system capable of self-leveling. They might also serve another purpose, which we will come back to later on.
Another close-up view, this time of the truck at the front of the chain showing the various components that can be seen from the side. Chinese internet
A satellite image taken yesterday, which TWZ obtained from Planet Labs, shows what looks to be at least four of the trucks parked close together in a line along one of the piers at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. Despite the low resolution, a drone is plainly seen loaded on one of the trucks. Another one of the ‘loyal wingman’ drones is visible immediately behind the row of trucks, in line with what is seen in the pictures taken at ground level. Four more of the swept-wing drones are also visible further down the pier. A Wing Loong-type drone, similar to the Q-1/Q-9 Predator/Reaper series, is also present.
Altogether, there is the potential that these trucks could be part of a mobile ground-based electromagnetic catapult system. The cylinders and wiring seen on the trucks might be electromagnets and/or other supporting components. Any such system would also need to be self-leveling to help ensure a clean launch.
At the same time, they could still just be transporters, though the design looks far more elaborate than would be required for that purpose alone. The trucks could possibly be designed to serve both functions.
There is the additional question of why, if this is indeed a ground-based electromagnetic catapult system, it has been brought down to Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard at all. This is not the environment in which one would expect such a system to be employed, and there are no clear signs as of yet that it is there as part of a larger display.
Regardless, the basic idea of employing an aircraft carrier-type catapult launch system on land is not new. China itself, as well as the United States, has built steam and electromagnetic-powered catapults at land-based test sites for test, evaluation, and training purposes. The U.S. Marine Corps actually employed an ‘aircraft carrier on land’ with catapults and arresting gear, called the Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) system, operationally during the Vietnam War, which you can read more about here.
CE-2 TRACKLESS AIRCRAFT LAUNCHER 1966 MARINE CORPS SHORT AIRFIELD FOR TACTICAL SUPPORT FILM 81190
At least one company in China, Tiantao Technology, has been openly talking about plans for a ground-based electromagnetic catapult system made up of modular wheeled segments since at least August of this year. Renderings have shown 10-wheeled sections that do have some broad similarities to, but that also are distinctly different from the eight-wheeled trucks seen at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard. The eight-wheeled trucks, if they are part of a mobile electromagnetic catapult system, could also reflect an early developmental iteration.
A rendering of Tiantao-Technology’s modular mobile electromagnetic catapult system. Tiantao TechnologyAnother rendering showing one segment of Tiantao-Technology’s modular mobile electromagnetic catapult system. The aircraft depicted here is vaguely reminiscent of the Chinese J-36 heavy crewed tactical jet, which is exponentially larger than what the company has said it expects to be launchable from this system. Tiantao Technology
Tiantao Technology has also reportedly said the system will be capable of launching uncrewed aircraft weighing up to around 2.2 tons (two metric tons). This is lighter than the expected takeoff weights of ‘loyal wingman’ type drones China has shown to date, based on the known specifications of comparably-sized Western designs. For example, the stated maximum launch weight of the XQ-58 is three tons, according to Kratos. As another point of comparison, the Chinese GJ-11, a larger flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), a catapult-capable version of which is now in development, reportedly has a payload capacity of around two tons. China’s J-15 family of crewed carrier-based fighters, derived from the Su-33 Flanker, each weighs around 19 tons (17.5 metric tons) empty without any fuel or ordnance, as well.
It is possible that the modular design of Tiantao Technology’s ground-based catapult system could allow for configurations capable of launching heavier designs. A core benefit of electromagnetic catapults over steam-powered ones, in general, is their ability to be more fine-tuned in terms of the forces they exert on any aircraft during launch. The capabilities of a modular system would also be dependent on its exact configuration, including how long the catapult track is overall. Tiantao Technology has said the total length of its system could be scaled between roughly 65 and 196 feet (20 and 60 meters). What limitations there might be on simply adding more segments to increase launch capacity are unknown.
China’s aircraft carrier electromagnetic catapult is incredibly cool — the moment the catapult comes to an instant stop looks like a space jump straight out of a sci-fi movie. pic.twitter.com/VWdLOEzgzS
Tiantao Technology has also shown models and renderings of truck and trailer-mounted electromagnetic catapults for launching even smaller drones. How much progress it has made in the actual development of any of the systems to date is unclear. Other firms in China could very well be working along similar lines, too.
A rendering of another mobile electromagnetic catapult design concept from Tiantao-Technology, this one being a self-contained type on a 10-wheeled tactical truck. Tiantao TechnologyTiantao-Technology has also shown this trailer-based electromagnetic catapult concept. Tiantao Technology
All this being said, a ground-based electromagnetic catapult system capable of launching even two-ton drones still opens doors to new operational possibilities. This is a capability that could be especially valuable in expeditionary scenarios or other contexts in which access to traditional runways is limited. A mobile system would also offer a new way to push at least a certain tier of airpower closer to the front lines, and help keep it in close proximity where it could be more responsive, even as the dimensions of the battlefield evolve. Less transit time would translate to more on-station endurance even for smaller, shorter-range drones.
Another general benefit of electromagnetic catapults over steam-powered types is the shorter reset time, which, by extension, increases sortie generation rates. How Tiantao Technology envisions drones being loaded on its ground-based system is unclear. It is possible that a truck preloaded with a drone could drive up, lock into the rear of the track, launch, and then detach to make way for the next one, offering additional benefits when it comes to operational tempo. Being able to break the launch system into multiple parts and disperse it when not in use would create targeting challenges for enemies and help increase survivability, as well.
These kinds of operational scenarios are driving the pursuit of aircraft, especially uncrewed types, with reduced runway requirements or entirely runway-independent designs by many armed forces globally. This includes the U.S. military. A ground-based electromagnetic catapult is just one way of approaching this operational need. There are runway-independent drones already on the market today that are launched with the help of expendable rocket motors or pneumatic catapults. However, these methods impose their own limitations, especially when it comes to launch weight and payload capacity. Rocket-assisted takeoffs come along with the additional risks associated with using that kind of propellant, as well as the stresses that are imparted on the aircraft being launched. The rockets are also consumed on launch, requiring a steady supply of them at any operating location. Kratos has notably demonstrated a special launch trolley for its primarily rocket-launched XQ-58 that allows for traditional runway takeoffs. The company is also developing a version of that design with built-in landing gear, to offer increased flexibility.
An XQ-58 seen being launched via a rocket-assisted method. USAF
In the context of what may now be in development in China, there is the additional question about how drones might be recovered after launch from a ground-based electromagnetic catapult. Tiantao Technology does not appear to have elaborated yet on this part of the expected concept of operations for its system. The aforementioned concept that General Atomics put forward paired an electromagnetic catapult with a separate arrested landing system, also based on technology developed for the U.S. Navy’s Ford class aircraft carriers. As noted, the Vietnam War-era SATS system also included arresting gear. The U.S. military and other armed forces globally already employ deployable arresting gear, especially to enable crewed tactical jet operations from far-flung locations with shorter runways. Drones could recover at tertiary bases, or be designed to land via parachute or some other runway-independent method, as well. The system could also be used to launch long-range one-way attack drones that would not be designed for recovery at all.
A US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet lands at West Field on the island of Tianian with the help of an M-31 expeditionary arresting gear system during an exercise. USMC
There is also a question of power and other logistical requirements. However, a ground-based electromagnetic catapult system that is not required to support all of the different types in a full carrier air wing, especially larger crewed aircraft, would inherently require far less capability.
It is also worth noting that a modular electromagnetic catapult system might be usable on ships that do not have this capability built into their design. As mentioned, the drones and trucks seen at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard were spotted near a cargo ship loaded with various containerized weapons and other systems. A drone launch capability of some kind would be a logical addition to a vessel with that configuration. At the same time, whether or not any catapult system made up of multiple segmented components would be stable enough for use on a ship rocking back and forth at sea is unclear.
A look at the cargo ship that recently emerged in China loaded with containerized weapons and other systems. Chinese internet
As a general note, major new military capabilities often emerge in China during the time between Christmas and New Year’s. This is also something that happens with the clear acquiescence of authorities in Beijing if they are not outright announced through official channels. Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard is an obvious area of interest for observers, and Chinese authorities do not appear to have taken any special steps to conceal the recent appearance of the drone mockups or the trucks.
More details about the trucks, and their exact function, as well as the drones, may now begin to emerge.
An Ethnic minority worker operates machinery at Aksu Huafu textile limited company in Aksu, western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region during a government organized trip for foreign journalists, Aksu, China, 20 April 2021 (issued 30 April 2021). File Photo by WU HONG/EPA
Dec. 28 (Asia Today) — Hanyang University business professor Lee Woong-hee said South Korean companies face structural disadvantages versus fast-rising Chinese rivals, citing China’s lack of inheritance and gift taxes and fewer work stoppages tied to strikes.
In a column, Lee said many in South Korea view China as a socialist system with low economic freedom, but argued Beijing has increasingly tolerated business autonomy since its “reform and opening-up” era. He pointed to China’s 2004 constitutional recognition of private property rights as an example of what he described as a bold shift, even though the state retains land ownership.
Lee argued China has absorbed Western institutions such as private property rights and joint-stock companies into its system, rebranding them as “new socialism,” and said Chinese scholars have promoted theoretical justifications for that approach.
Lee said China holds advantages that South Korean firms do not, starting with taxation. He wrote that China does not currently levy inheritance, estate or gift taxes, unlike South Korea, where high inheritance and gift tax burdens can pressure founders to sell companies rather than pass them on to heirs.
He also said China faces fewer production disruptions from strikes. Lee noted China removed the right to strike from its 1982 constitution and allows only the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as a legal union structure, limiting independent organizing.
While acknowledging an increase in labor disputes, Lee cited reports estimating 1,509 labor incidents in 2024 and argued they remained relatively small-scale and dispersed, with authorities preventing wider escalation.
Beyond taxes and labor, Lee said China benefits from deeper pools of engineering talent and stronger industrial support. He also argued South Korea’s industrial electricity rates are significantly higher than China’s, and said Beijing offers broad policy backing for strategic industries.
Lee wrote that China’s startup momentum appears stronger, citing surveys suggesting higher startup rates among Chinese graduates and pointing to global rankings that placed Beijing among leading startup cities. He said China ranks second globally in the number of unicorn companies after the United States.
Lee concluded that China’s older socialist traits appear to be fading and that its entrepreneurial culture is reasserting itself, arguing it may only be a matter of time before China becomes more business-friendly than South Korea.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
An image has emerged that appears to show, for the first time, one of China’s growing series of low-observable combat drones aboard the country’s super-sized Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan. The development is in line with previous predictions that this vessel will be capable of supporting high-end aerial drone operations as well as traditional amphibious assaults.
As it seems, for the first time a mock-up of one of the CCA UCAVs shown in September was seen on the deck of the PLANS-51 „Sichuan“ … Looks like a navalised variant of the Type-C. pic.twitter.com/Bs1Gxfiq9R
The image in question began to circulate recently online and shows the rear portion of the drone on the deck of the Sichuan, partly obscured by one of the vessel’s twin island superstructures. The characteristic twin, outward-canted tailfins of the drone suggest that this is a navalized version of the design that has been informally dubbed Type C by Chinese aerospace observers. It is part of a collection of aircraft that are considered to be broad Chinese equivalents of the U.S. Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).
Well, back from work and back to this strange picture: 🤔 I start with my layman’s attempt to sort them a bit + adding the names according to Huitong’s CMA-Blog.
While the image appears to be genuine, it should be considered at least possible that the drone in question is a mockup. China makes considerable use of aircraft mockups, on land and at sea, to assist with the development and subsequent service introduction of aircraft carriers and assault ships.
The so-called Type C is a subsonic CCA or “loyal wingman”-type drone. Its key features include a swept lambda wing planform, the aforementioned canted tail fins, an internal stores bay, and a single jet engine fed by a dorsal intake. Overall, in terms of configuration, it has some similarities with the U.S.-made XQ-58A Valkyrie, but it is much larger. According to unconfirmed reports, it is said to be optimized for air-to-ground missions, although intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare would also be likely roles. The Type C is one of at least four new CCA-type drones that were publicly unveiled at the parade celebrating 80 years since the defeat of Japan in World War II, held in Beijing on September 3, 2025.
The so-called Type C drone on display at the Beijing parade marking 80 years since the defeat of Japan in World War II, on September 3, 2025. (Photo by GREG BAKER/AFP via Getty Images) PEDRO PARDO
It would make a good deal of sense for the drone to now be evaluated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) onboard the Sichuan. As you can read about here, the first of the Type 076 assault ship left port for its first sea trials last month.
The Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan prepares to leave Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard for its first sea trials. Government of the People’s Republic of China Government of the People’s Republic of China
Thanks to its electromagnetically-powered catapult, the 44,000-ton Type 076 is unlike any other big deck amphibious warship in terms of the kind of air wing that it can accommodate, which is expected to be dominated by uncrewed types.
Previously, Type 076’s air wing was expected to include naval versions of the GJ-11 stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), sometimes known as the GJ-21. This theory was supported by apparent GJ-11 mockups that appeared at a test and/or training site right on Changxing Island in Shanghai, very close to where the Type 076 was being built. This may well still be the case, but it now looks like a navalized Type C drone will at least supplement it.
As it seems, for the first time clear images of a GJ-21 in flight are posted and this one – based on the still installed pitots – has its tail hook down. pic.twitter.com/5h1nVZHzIe
The navalized GJ-11 is expected to operate primarily from China’s true aircraft carriers, including the catapult-equipped Fujian, which was commissioned last month. This carrier is expected to be followed by six more by 2035, according to a Pentagon report, which would provide the PLAN with a total of nine. Recent imagery indicates that China is now progressing with work on its fourth flattop, which is expected to introduce nuclear propulsion.
Returning to the Sichuan, in addition to drones, the warship will accommodate various helicopters, and very likely also a crewed tiltrotor aircraft, which is now in flight testing.
While we don’t yet know whether the Type C has been launched from the Sichuan, there have already been signs of preparations for flight trials. Shortly before the vessel left port for the first time, full markings had been painted on its flight deck, as part of its final fitting out.
Furthermore, as seen in the social media post below, evidence emerged at the end of October showing what looked to be a red-colored catapult test ‘truck’ on Sichuan’s deck. This, in turn, pointed to the start of testing of the ship’s lone catapult.
Again, as we have discussed before, as well as the catapult, the layout of the Type 076 design is heavily focused on sustained flight operations. These features include its unusually wide flight deck and the ship’s two islands. As such, fixed-wing drones can be launched by the catapult at the bow end and recovered via some form of arresting gear.
“The potential value to the PLAN of having a fleet of very large deck amphibious assault ships that are highly capable of large-scale drone operations as well as traditional amphibious assaults is clear. These ships could be used to launch and recover UCAVs like the GJ-11 and other types of drones to perform a host of missions from maritime strike to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). They could be used to provide additional ‘mass’ in support of the operations of larger carrier strike groups and help to free the air wings of flattops like Fujian up for tasks they might be better suited for. In addition, they could provide a lower tier of naval aviation support that could be employed independently.”
Chinese PLA Navy’s First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” Conducts First Sea Trial
It remains to be seen if the PLAN’s current ambitions include introducing the navalized Type C as part of the regular air wing for the Type 076, or whether it is currently being used as part of an evaluation that may lead to a different type of uncrewed aircraft going aboard the warship. By the same token, we don’t yet know if China currently plans to acquire more Type 076s, or if this design is also initially intended more to prove out the concept of super-sized assault ships.
For now, however, the appearance of the Type C, or a mockup thereof, aboard the Sichuan, underscores China’s broader goal of deploying a host of different uncrewed types aboard aviation-capable warships of various kinds.
Results of the Korea Federation of SMEs’ “2026 SME Export Outlook Survey.” Graphic by Asia Today and translated by UPI
Dec. 21 (Asia Today) — Nearly half of South Korea’s small and medium-sized exporters expect their overseas shipments to decline next year, with many citing intensifying low-price competition from China as their biggest challenge, a survey released Sunday found.
The Korea Federation of SMEs said its “2026 SME Export Outlook Survey” polled 1,300 exporting SMEs from Dec. 1-12.
In the survey, 68.6% of respondents said they expect exports to increase in 2026 compared with this year, while 31.4% forecast a decrease, the federation said.
Among firms expecting export growth, cosmetics exporters (86.4%) and medical and biotech exporters (86.1%) were the most optimistic, the federation said. The most common reason for expecting export growth, in multiple responses, was improved product competitiveness through new product launches and quality improvements (47.1%), followed by diversification of export markets (29.8%) and improved price competitiveness due to exchange rate appreciation (21.6%).
Among SMEs forecasting weaker exports, 49.3% cited intensifying low-price competition from China as their main export challenge, followed by greater exchange rate volatility (44.6%), sharp increases in raw material prices (37.0%) and uncertainty over U.S. and European Union tariff policies (35.0%), the federation said.
Planned responses to weaker export performance included diversifying export markets (28.2%), improving quality or launching new products (23.0%) and reducing production costs such as labor and raw materials (21.8%), according to the survey.
Despite tariff concerns, the United States ranked first among markets SMEs most want to enter or expand into, at 21.0% when combining first-, second- and third-priority choices, the federation said. Europe followed at 15.2%, with Japan and China tied at 10.6%.
For government priorities to strengthen export competitiveness, respondents most frequently called for expanding support for an export voucher program (53.5%), followed by building a system to counter China’s low-cost offensive (35.8%) and strengthening diplomacy to respond to U.S. and EU tariffs (35.1%), the federation said. Other priorities included expanding support for participation in overseas exhibitions, including in emerging markets (31.5%) and supporting overseas certification and regulatory compliance (27.2%).
Chu Moon-gap, head of the federation’s economic policy division, said it was significant that SMEs are projecting export growth by improving competitiveness despite external headwinds such as tighter export regulations by various countries. He added that companies’ ability to reduce total costs, including production and logistics costs, tariffs and lead times, will be key to export competitiveness and said the government should prepare cost-reduction support measures to help SMEs respond to China’s low-cost competition.
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The Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2025 identified eight key tasks for China’s economic work in 2026. Several of these areas particularly interest me as a China expert. Among the most important tasks for China’s economic work in 2026 is promoting a policy of supporting service exports through various measures to boost household income, raise basic pensions, and remove restrictions in the consumer sector. What struck me most during the Central Economic Conference meetings in Beijing in December 2025 was its emphasis on China’s continued opening up. This will provide tremendous global growth opportunities by expanding trade and investment, especially in the technology and renewable energy sectors, deepening integration into global value chains, and increasing demand for resources. This will drive the global economy in conjunction with China and create new partnerships, focusing on “high-quality development” and “high-level opening up” as fundamental pillars for mutual benefit and to stimulate innovation within the Chinese economy.
– Main Tasks of the Beijing Economic Conference in December 2025
1) Providing a huge market and investment opportunities: By increasingly encouraging the opening of its doors to foreign companies, China will create diverse opportunities in various sectors such as technology, innovation, and services.
2) Making the Chinese economy an engine of global growth: The recovery and growth of the global economy depend heavily on China’s contribution, which accounts for a large share of the global economy.
3) Expanding free trade: China strongly supports free trade and the signing of regional agreements, reducing barriers and promoting trade exchanges.
4) Expanding the wheel of Chinese overseas investment: By significantly deepening the contribution of Chinese direct investment abroad to the economic development of other countries.
5) Promoting innovation-led development in China to accelerate the development of new growth engines in 2026: This will bring significant benefits to foreign consumers and investors. The meeting approved a package of policies aimed at strengthening the role of companies in innovation and implementing a new round of measures to develop high-quality key industrial chains, deepening and expanding fields such as artificial intelligence, which will bring more innovation opportunities to the world.
– Sectors in which China will expand in the future:
A) Innovation and Technology: China is a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and agricultural technology, driving global innovation.
B) Advanced Manufacturing: China’s rapid transition to high-quality development focuses on industrial upgrading and technological innovation, creating new products and services.
C) Promoting Globalization: China opposes protectionism and supports inclusive economic globalization, creating a more interconnected and integrated global economy.
D) Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind: The ultimate goal of China’s economic growth is to achieve common development and improve livelihoods for all, promoting win-win international cooperation.
– Areas of China’s contribution to global development and the global economy in 2026, through:
1) Product supply: As the “world’s factory,” with a focus on advanced technology.
2) Demand stimulation: China’s enormous demand for commodities, energy, and raw materials supports other economies.
3) Knowledge and technology transfer: Through investments and joint ventures.
4) Support for sustainable development: By focusing on clean energy and green sectors.
Accordingly, we understand that the main tasks for 2026, identified during the Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2026, are comprehensive and diverse. Chief among them is building a strong domestic market in China, reflecting a future strategic direction for the Chinese economy. This will promote sustainable development, support high-quality growth, foster innovation-led development, and uphold openness to the outside world. This means providing broader development opportunities for foreign investment and achieving growth that is synchronized with the development of the Chinese economy.
The Central Economic Conference meeting in Beijing in December 2025 proposed that “adhering to opening up to the outside world and promoting win-win cooperation in various fields” should be one of the main tasks of China’s economic work in the coming year. In 2025, China issued the “Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment in 2025,” and simultaneously, the 8th China International Import Expo 2025 was held in Shanghai. It was also agreed that the Hainan Free Trade Port would officially launch island-wide independent customs operations on December 18, 2025. This would bring numerous opportunities and momentum to support China’s continued opening up for global economic development.
The year 2026 marks the launch of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. The Central Economic Conference was held in Beijing in December 2025, a significant historical juncture as the 14th Five-Year Plan drew to a close and the 15th began. This held particular significance, as the world looked to China’s economic planning for the coming year for inspiration and opportunities. China’s continued opening up in 2025 represents a vital engine for the global economy, contributing approximately 30% to global growth.
– The opportunities and momentum generated by these policies are evident in the following areas:
1) Deepening Institutional Opening through the Hainan Free Trade Port
The launch of independent customs operations at Hainan Port on December 18, 2025, marked a milestone, transforming the port into a special customs zone governed by high-level international trade regulations. With China’s ambitious trade facilitation plan, the percentage of duty-free goods in Hainan has risen from 21% to 74%, attracting significant investment. The island has already attracted more than 1.2 million enterprises.
The “2025 Foreign Investment Stabilization Action Plan” aims to boost international investor confidence through practical measures, including opening new sectors by expanding pilot programs in telecommunications, healthcare, and education and supporting manufacturing and services by lifting restrictions on foreign investment across the entire manufacturing sector and encouraging investment in high-tech industries and green development. This has yielded numerous positive results for the Chinese economy, with China registering more than 49,000 new foreign-funded companies in the first half of 2025, representing a year-on-year increase of over 16%.
3) China International Import Expo (CIIE 2025)
The eighth edition of the expo in Shanghai solidified China’s position as a global launchpad for new products, achieving record-breaking figures. The expo saw record initial deals worth US$83 billion, a 4.5% increase over the previous year. With broad international participation, more than 4,500 companies from 138 countries participated, showcasing 461 new products and technologies.
4) The Strategic Direction of the Chinese Economy for 2026 and Beyond
The Central Economic Work Conference, held in Beijing in December 2025, affirmed that the main task for the coming year, 2026, is to ensure a strong start to the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) while achieving mutually beneficial cooperation. This will be accomplished by China focusing on aligning its domestic regulations with high-level international economic and trade standards in areas such as government procurement, e-commerce, and finance. This should coincide with achieving sustainable growth in the Chinese economy, especially given the International Monetary Fund’s upward revision of its growth forecast for China to 5% for 2025, which underscores the resilience of the Chinese economy in the face of global shocks.
Accordingly, we understand the extent of China’s aspirations to achieve new developmental and economic leaps during 2026, with numerous promising future opportunities available to China. It possesses the capacity to simultaneously improve the quality and scale of development, achieve a strong launch for its 15-year plan, and offer more ambitious investment and development opportunities to the world.
First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo (L) poses with Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu during their strategic dialogue in Beijing on Thursday. South Korea called for China to play a role in resuming dialogue with North Korea. Photo courtesy of South Korea Foreign Ministry
South Korea on Thursday called on China to play a role in fostering conditions to resume dialogue with North Korea, with China reaffirming its commitment to ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul’s foreign ministry said.
First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo made the call when he met with Ma Zhaoxu, China’s executive vice foreign minister, during the bilateral strategic dialogue in Beijing, the ministry said in a release.
The talks came as South Korea seeks to stably manage its ties with China, its largest trade partner and key economic benefactor of North Korea, amid the strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and Seoul’s drive to mend ties with Pyongyang.
“Vice Minister Park explained the government’s policy direction for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and asked for China’s role in fostering conditions to resume dialogue with North Korea,” the ministry said in a release.
Ma reaffirmed that China will “continue its constructive role in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,” according to the ministry.
They also agreed to work together to enhance “political and friendly” mutual trust, continuing the positive momentum in bilateral relations to further develop their ties.
It marked the first such talks since the launch of the Lee Jae Myung government in June.
The two sides exchanged opinions on issues of mutual concern, including China’s steel structures built in the overlapping sea zone in the Yellow Sea. The steel towers have raised speculation that China has installed them to lay territorial claims to the area, as was done in the South China Sea.
Noting that bilateral relations have recovered with the recent summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju, they agreed to implement follow-up steps in a substantive manner, through robust exchanges both at the government and private sector levels.
They also discussed ways to revitalize cultural exchanges between the two countries in a way that will “narrow the emotional distance between their peoples,” the ministry said.
Although China has never officially confirmed it, it has restricted the inflow of Korean cultural content and exchanges between relevant industries, including K-pop concerts and Korean films.
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Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The latest Chinese military aircraft to appear in flight test is a tactical transport aircraft, known, unofficially for now, as the Y-30. Not perhaps as headline-grabbing as China’s string of new crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft designs, the transport is nonetheless highly significant, reflecting the People’s Liberation Army’s growing ambitions to be able to conduct out-of-area operations, including from unprepared airfields.
A product of the Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation, the Y-30 (the alternative Y-15 designation has also been proposed) is expected to be a partial replacement for the same company’s Y-9 four-turboprop transport. Video and photos of the new aircraft began to circulate on social media for the first time today. The aircraft is reportedly flying from the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation (XAC) airfield in the city of Xi’an in central China, with XAC having been absorbed by Shaanxi.
One of the first images of the so-called Y-30. via Chinese internet
While a new Chinese medium/heavy airlifter had been anticipated for some time, there was speculation that it would be powered by a pair of turbofan engines: The result would have been something like a scaled-down Y-20, with a shorter fuselage and a new wing, somewhat similar in concept to the Kawasaki C-2. In the event, the so-called Y-30 is powered by four turboprops, meaning it looks much more like the Airbus A400M, although it would appear to be in a different class to the European transport.
Other features in common with the A400M include the wide fuselage, offering useful internal volume, especially compared to the Y-9, a rear loading ramp, and heavy-duty landing gear, which should make it suitable for operating out of short, poorly prepared landing strips. Like the Airbus transport, the Y-30 has a T-tail empennage, but its high-lift wing is not swept. The wingtips of the Chinese design additionally feature winglets, which improve fuel efficiency by reducing drag and increasing lift. There is a suggestion that the aircraft might also have asymmetric fuselage-side sponsons, a feature of the C-17 that you can read about here; on the other hand, this may just be a feature of the AI-enhanced version of one of the images.
via Chinese internetAn AI-enhanced view of the Y-30 (apparently based on the image above) shows off the distinctive winglets and other details, but should be considered as provisional only. via Chinese internet via Chinese internet
The Y-30 is reportedly powered by either WJ-10 or WJ-16 turboprops, which are said to develop 6,800 horsepower or 5,140 horsepower each, respectively. While the A400M’s engines drive distinctive eight-bladed ‘scimitar’ propellers, the Y-30, at least at this stage, has more conventional six-bladed props.
Both the WJ-10 and WJ-16 are notably less powerful than the 11,000-horsepower Europrop TP400-D6 engines used in the A400M, suggesting an aircraft that is smaller overall and with a more limited load capacity, closer to the C-130J Hercules. This would make sense, since the A400M, as you can read about here, was designed as a gap-filler between the C-130 at the smaller end of the transport segment, and the larger C-17 Globemaster III at the other end.
With China already building the Y-20 as a broad equivalent to the C-17, the Y-30 is likely intended to be more of an equivalent to the C-130/Y-9, probably slightly larger than the Hercules, rather than being a ‘mid-market’ transport like the A400M.
Unconfirmed accounts suggest the Y-30 will have a payload capacity of around 30 metric tonnes (around 66,000 pounds), which compares with around 145,000 pounds for the Y-20, 82,000 pounds for the A400M, 55,000 pounds for the Y-9, and 47,000 pounds for the C-130J-30.
A rear three-quarter view of the Y-30. via Chinese internet
In keeping with its test status, the Y-30 seen in the imagery available so far features a long air-data boom on the nose. This boom is used to obtain data on air pressure, temperature, and airflow direction, etc., vital for flight-testing. There is no sign of an aerial refueling probe, although this may well be added in the future, as was the case with certain variants of the Y-9.
In fact, the Y-30 first appeared in model form at the Zhuhai Airshow, back in 2014, after which the project went quiet.
A model of the Y-30 displayed at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2014. via Chinese internet
Currently, according to Western estimates, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates around 24 Y-9s in a transport role, together with 80 of the older Y-8 four-turboprop transports.
The PLAAF is rapidly introducing the Y-20, which is expected to eventually replace the roughly 26 Soviet-designed Il-76 Candid transports that remain in use. Indeed, by now, Y-20 numbers already eclipse those of the hard-worked Il-76.
A PLAAF Il-76 prepares to fly out from Perth International Airport, Australia, to assist with the international search effort trying to locate missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 in 2014. Photo by Greg Wood – Pool/Getty Images
Meanwhile, should the Y-30 prove successful, it will presumably supplant the Y-9 and allow the retirement of the aging Y-8 fleet.
While the Y-20 offers truly strategic range to support PLA operations (and humanitarian missions) around the globe, a modern turboprop-powered transport like the Y-30 would be especially well-suited to operations from more dispersed and even austere bases. For example, the new airlifter could fly troops and equipment in and out of China’s island outposts, as well as conduct airdropping as part of any future effort to retake Taiwan; it would also be of notable value during a conflict involving India.
A Y-20 transport aircraft flies at the Changchun Air Show 2025 in Changchun, Jilin province of China. Photo by Yue Shuhua/VCG via Getty ImagesA Y-9 transport at Airshow China 2021 in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China. Photo by Yue Shuhua/VCG via Getty Images
As well as its core transport role, it might be expected that the Y-30 could eventually be adapted for special missions, as has been the case with the Y-8 and Y-9. Between them, dozens of electronic warfare, maritime patrol, and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft have been produced for the PLA on these airframes, in numerous different sub-variants. On the other hand, with the Y-9 now well-proven as a special missions platform, it could be the case that continued production of this type will fulfill these niche roles, while the Y-30 production run is dedicated to transports.
It is worth noting that the PLAAF’s ability to conduct airborne assault operations is a relatively recent addition to its core missions. It was only in the 1990s that the Airborne Corps was transformed into a division, and its overall strength was boosted. At the same time, the first Il-76 transports were delivered, but for a long time these remained the extent of the PLAAF’s rapid-reaction transport force. Paratroopers operating as part of a combined-arms force are also a relatively new addition and part of the PLA’s wider modernization.
A file photo shows members of the PLAAF special airborne operation troops during a drill in 2015. Xinhua/Huang Hui
In terms of airlift capacity, the Y-20 has more recently spearheaded this continued transformation, and the Y-30 looks set to continue the process.
Like other Chinese designs, the Y-30 also has the major advantage of being immune to the tight export restrictions that typically apply to Western designs in the same class. Beijing would be likely to grant export licenses for the transport to countries that might be prohibited from buying a Western design, something that was the case with the Y-9, exported to Myanmar and Namibia, for example. Meanwhile, other markets could also provide an opportunity for the Y-30, as China becomes a more relevant competitor to the West across the military aviation segment.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
We have got what could be our first look at China’s CH-7 stealthy flying-wing drone in flight. While it’s no longer the biggest Chinese drone of this configuration, it’s still of impressive size and, as we have noted in the past, appears to be tailored for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR), as well as possibly a secondary strike role.
One of the first officially sanctioned images showing the CH-7 in the air. via Chinese internet
Video and stills released by Chinese state media today show the drone, for the first time, being prepared for flight, taking off, and landing. The video includes air-to-air footage of the CH-7 and, overall, the suggestion is that Beijing is making a notable effort to promote the progress of this program, especially in contrast to other, far more secretive flying wing drone programs.
It’s also notable that the CH-7 appears to have made its first flight from Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province, which also saw the recent maiden flight of the Jiutian heavyweight jet-powered ‘mothership drone,’ which you can read more about here. The Pucheng facility is operated by the China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE), underscoring its growing importance as a drone ‘center of excellence.’
The CH-7 over Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 seen in the new imagery retains the yellow-colored coat of primer that was seen in video and stills of the drone on the ground, released by Chinese state media earlier this year. Yellow primer is frequently seen on Chinese aircraft during their test phase. The drone also has air data probes on the leading edges of the wing and nose, again consistent with it being a prototype or perhaps a pre-production machine. Overall, the CH-7 has a ‘cranked-kite’ planform, of the kind that we have seen on various other Chinese drones. There are also various measures to reduce the radar and infrared signature, including a slot-like low-observable platypus engine exhaust, with the nozzle fully concealed from most angles of view, and serrated edges on doors and panels.
Interestingly, the attachment points previously seen on the upper surfaces of the rear of the drone have been removed in the new official imagery. It seems these were used to mount vertical tail surfaces.
Unofficial imagery, captured from an observer on the ground, suggests that the CH-7 was initially flight-tested with outward-canted tailfins, presumably to ensure stability during initial sorties, or otherwise to test an alternative aerodynamic configuration.
While the identity of this drone has not been confirmed, it appears to be the CH-7, with the outward-canted tailfins fitted. via Chinese internet
Compared to the previous imagery, we now also get to see some other details of the CH-7, including a distinctive small teardrop-shaped fairing mounted below the fuselage. This enclosure is very likely an air-to-ground datalink used for line-of-sight control of the drone and is a common feature on larger drones, including the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. This very unstealthy feature would be removed for most operational uses once the aircraft has entered service.
via Chinese internet
We now have a much better look at the series of antennas that runs in a line along the spine, flanked by two air scoops. There are also two prominent blade aerials, above and below the fuselage. Below the fuselage, immediately behind the nose landing gear, there appears to be a large radio frequency sensor aperture, and there could also be space for conformal arrays under the inner wings.
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
As we presumed, the previous prominent gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps, where the wing meets the blended body section, were a temporary configuration and have now been filled.
The latest configuration of the CH-7, with the attachment points for tailfins deleted and with the gaps removed inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese internetvia Chinese internetThis view of the CH-7 prototype on the runway reveals the previous gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese Internet
The CH-7 was previously assumed to have an internal payload bay. That is not immediately obvious in the new imagery, but there is a suggestion of a notably long and slender bay immediately inboard of the main landing gear on the right-hand side, presumably with a similar bay on the left-hand side, too. If these are indeed for weapons, then they would be able to accommodate smaller stores only. This could point to a secondary strike role, but that seems somewhat less than likely at this point.
An underside view of the drone reveals only limited evidence of internal stores bays. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 has already gone through several different iterations since it was first revealed, as a full-scale mockup in 2018, with the design being progressively adapted. Earlier changes included a less sharply swept wing compared to at least one early model, as well as an apparent growth in overall size.
The CH-7 (or Caihong-7, meaning Rainbow-7) has been developed by the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), specifically by its 11th Research Institute. A high-altitude, long-endurance drone, it is generally understood to be optimized for penetrating into or very near hostile airspace. It achieves this through a combination of a low-observable (stealth) design and flying at high altitudes, leading it to operate for extended periods of time without being successfully engaged.
via Chinese internet
Published specifications for the CH-7 include a length of 10 meters (33 feet), a maximum takeoff weight of 10,000 kilograms (22,000 pounds), a maximum speed of 926 km/h (575 mph), and an endurance of up to 15 hours. Bearing in mind the various design changes, these figures should be considered very much as provisional.
Earlier this year, Chinese state-owned media reported that the CH-7 had completed testing and was scheduled to complete development in 2024. This would imply it had also completed the flight-test program by this date, which remains possible, and the new imagery may actually date back a year or so.
via Chinese internet
Regardless of the timeline, the CH-7 is a fascinating program.
It represents one part of China’s accelerated efforts to develop low-observable, long-endurance drones, and there is a general expectation that, once in service, it will be used for both ISR and as a UCAV. Official statements from Beijing claim that, as well as bringing back critical intelligence, the CH-7 should also be able to strike strategic targets.
When it was unveiled, the CH-7 was described as a high-altitude, long-endurance stealth combat drone. Its chief designer, Shi Wen, said the aircraft would be able to “fly long hours, scout, and strike the target when necessary.”
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
It should be noted, however, that the latest imagery doesn’t provide definitive evidence of an extensive internal payload capacity, which might throw some doubt on the strike role, at least as a primary mission.
Even if the CH-7 ends up being exclusively an ISR platform, it remains highly relevant within China’s growing portfolio of stealthy drones, especially since it is apparently tailored to penetrate into or very near hostile airspace at high altitudes. Flying ISR missions with this profile would be especially relevant for China in a naval context, with the drone potentially roaming far out into the Pacific, monitoring the movements of enemy ships and providing targeting data for ground-based long-range missiles, for example, as well as anti-ship missiles launched from warships and bombers. Other theaters of operation in which a drone of this kind would be valuable include around the islands of the South China Sea and along the border with India.
A rear three-quarter view of the CH-7. via Chinese internet
Furthermore, it seems that the CH-7 will be offered for export. This hypothesis might also be supported by the unusually open nature of the imagery that’s been released of the drone so far.
If the CH-7 were to be offered for foreign customers, it would come with advanced capabilities that no other country is currently pitching on the arms market. It would also come without the various restrictions that limit the sale of high-end U.S. and other Western defense products.
A still from an official video showing what is purported to be a control center used for the CH-7 testing. via Chinese internet
Not only is the United States not currently able to offer for export a stealthy long-endurance surveillance drone or UCAV, but it’s also possible that no uncrewed platform of this class is even under development in that country — the still-mysterious RQ-180 may have fit in this category, but its current status is unknown. The stark contrast between the U.S. and Chinese approaches to very stealthy uncrewed aircraft for independent strike missions is something that we have addressed before in this feature of ours.
At this point, we should remember that we don’t know exactly how far the development of the CH-7 has progressed and when it might end up being ready for service with China, let alone with export customers. It remains possible that they might have to wait for a downgraded or otherwise sanitized version of the drone.
Nevertheless, the CH-7 program remains very much one to watch. Provided it fulfills its promise, it could provide China with a multirole low-observable drone family that could also be offered for export. For now, the CH-7 stands as more evidence of the huge strides that China is making in terms of drone technology, and the particular focus being placed on stealthy uncrewed aircraft.