NEWS BRIEF China’s rare-earth magnet exports surged to 6,150 metric tons in November, the second-highest level on record and a 12% increase from October, following the U.S.-China agreement to streamline exports of the critical elements. The recovery comes after China restricted magnet exports in April during the trade war, bringing parts of the global supply […]
The Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2025 identified eight key tasks for China’s economic work in 2026. Several of these areas particularly interest me as a China expert. Among the most important tasks for China’s economic work in 2026 is promoting a policy of supporting service exports through various measures to boost household income, raise basic pensions, and remove restrictions in the consumer sector. What struck me most during the Central Economic Conference meetings in Beijing in December 2025 was its emphasis on China’s continued opening up. This will provide tremendous global growth opportunities by expanding trade and investment, especially in the technology and renewable energy sectors, deepening integration into global value chains, and increasing demand for resources. This will drive the global economy in conjunction with China and create new partnerships, focusing on “high-quality development” and “high-level opening up” as fundamental pillars for mutual benefit and to stimulate innovation within the Chinese economy.
– Main Tasks of the Beijing Economic Conference in December 2025
1) Providing a huge market and investment opportunities: By increasingly encouraging the opening of its doors to foreign companies, China will create diverse opportunities in various sectors such as technology, innovation, and services.
2) Making the Chinese economy an engine of global growth: The recovery and growth of the global economy depend heavily on China’s contribution, which accounts for a large share of the global economy.
3) Expanding free trade: China strongly supports free trade and the signing of regional agreements, reducing barriers and promoting trade exchanges.
4) Expanding the wheel of Chinese overseas investment: By significantly deepening the contribution of Chinese direct investment abroad to the economic development of other countries.
5) Promoting innovation-led development in China to accelerate the development of new growth engines in 2026: This will bring significant benefits to foreign consumers and investors. The meeting approved a package of policies aimed at strengthening the role of companies in innovation and implementing a new round of measures to develop high-quality key industrial chains, deepening and expanding fields such as artificial intelligence, which will bring more innovation opportunities to the world.
– Sectors in which China will expand in the future:
A) Innovation and Technology: China is a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and agricultural technology, driving global innovation.
B) Advanced Manufacturing: China’s rapid transition to high-quality development focuses on industrial upgrading and technological innovation, creating new products and services.
C) Promoting Globalization: China opposes protectionism and supports inclusive economic globalization, creating a more interconnected and integrated global economy.
D) Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind: The ultimate goal of China’s economic growth is to achieve common development and improve livelihoods for all, promoting win-win international cooperation.
– Areas of China’s contribution to global development and the global economy in 2026, through:
1) Product supply: As the “world’s factory,” with a focus on advanced technology.
2) Demand stimulation: China’s enormous demand for commodities, energy, and raw materials supports other economies.
3) Knowledge and technology transfer: Through investments and joint ventures.
4) Support for sustainable development: By focusing on clean energy and green sectors.
Accordingly, we understand that the main tasks for 2026, identified during the Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2026, are comprehensive and diverse. Chief among them is building a strong domestic market in China, reflecting a future strategic direction for the Chinese economy. This will promote sustainable development, support high-quality growth, foster innovation-led development, and uphold openness to the outside world. This means providing broader development opportunities for foreign investment and achieving growth that is synchronized with the development of the Chinese economy.
The Central Economic Conference meeting in Beijing in December 2025 proposed that “adhering to opening up to the outside world and promoting win-win cooperation in various fields” should be one of the main tasks of China’s economic work in the coming year. In 2025, China issued the “Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment in 2025,” and simultaneously, the 8th China International Import Expo 2025 was held in Shanghai. It was also agreed that the Hainan Free Trade Port would officially launch island-wide independent customs operations on December 18, 2025. This would bring numerous opportunities and momentum to support China’s continued opening up for global economic development.
The year 2026 marks the launch of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. The Central Economic Conference was held in Beijing in December 2025, a significant historical juncture as the 14th Five-Year Plan drew to a close and the 15th began. This held particular significance, as the world looked to China’s economic planning for the coming year for inspiration and opportunities. China’s continued opening up in 2025 represents a vital engine for the global economy, contributing approximately 30% to global growth.
– The opportunities and momentum generated by these policies are evident in the following areas:
1) Deepening Institutional Opening through the Hainan Free Trade Port
The launch of independent customs operations at Hainan Port on December 18, 2025, marked a milestone, transforming the port into a special customs zone governed by high-level international trade regulations. With China’s ambitious trade facilitation plan, the percentage of duty-free goods in Hainan has risen from 21% to 74%, attracting significant investment. The island has already attracted more than 1.2 million enterprises.
The “2025 Foreign Investment Stabilization Action Plan” aims to boost international investor confidence through practical measures, including opening new sectors by expanding pilot programs in telecommunications, healthcare, and education and supporting manufacturing and services by lifting restrictions on foreign investment across the entire manufacturing sector and encouraging investment in high-tech industries and green development. This has yielded numerous positive results for the Chinese economy, with China registering more than 49,000 new foreign-funded companies in the first half of 2025, representing a year-on-year increase of over 16%.
3) China International Import Expo (CIIE 2025)
The eighth edition of the expo in Shanghai solidified China’s position as a global launchpad for new products, achieving record-breaking figures. The expo saw record initial deals worth US$83 billion, a 4.5% increase over the previous year. With broad international participation, more than 4,500 companies from 138 countries participated, showcasing 461 new products and technologies.
4) The Strategic Direction of the Chinese Economy for 2026 and Beyond
The Central Economic Work Conference, held in Beijing in December 2025, affirmed that the main task for the coming year, 2026, is to ensure a strong start to the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) while achieving mutually beneficial cooperation. This will be accomplished by China focusing on aligning its domestic regulations with high-level international economic and trade standards in areas such as government procurement, e-commerce, and finance. This should coincide with achieving sustainable growth in the Chinese economy, especially given the International Monetary Fund’s upward revision of its growth forecast for China to 5% for 2025, which underscores the resilience of the Chinese economy in the face of global shocks.
Accordingly, we understand the extent of China’s aspirations to achieve new developmental and economic leaps during 2026, with numerous promising future opportunities available to China. It possesses the capacity to simultaneously improve the quality and scale of development, achieve a strong launch for its 15-year plan, and offer more ambitious investment and development opportunities to the world.
First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo (L) poses with Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu during their strategic dialogue in Beijing on Thursday. South Korea called for China to play a role in resuming dialogue with North Korea. Photo courtesy of South Korea Foreign Ministry
South Korea on Thursday called on China to play a role in fostering conditions to resume dialogue with North Korea, with China reaffirming its commitment to ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul’s foreign ministry said.
First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo made the call when he met with Ma Zhaoxu, China’s executive vice foreign minister, during the bilateral strategic dialogue in Beijing, the ministry said in a release.
The talks came as South Korea seeks to stably manage its ties with China, its largest trade partner and key economic benefactor of North Korea, amid the strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and Seoul’s drive to mend ties with Pyongyang.
“Vice Minister Park explained the government’s policy direction for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and asked for China’s role in fostering conditions to resume dialogue with North Korea,” the ministry said in a release.
Ma reaffirmed that China will “continue its constructive role in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,” according to the ministry.
They also agreed to work together to enhance “political and friendly” mutual trust, continuing the positive momentum in bilateral relations to further develop their ties.
It marked the first such talks since the launch of the Lee Jae Myung government in June.
The two sides exchanged opinions on issues of mutual concern, including China’s steel structures built in the overlapping sea zone in the Yellow Sea. The steel towers have raised speculation that China has installed them to lay territorial claims to the area, as was done in the South China Sea.
Noting that bilateral relations have recovered with the recent summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju, they agreed to implement follow-up steps in a substantive manner, through robust exchanges both at the government and private sector levels.
They also discussed ways to revitalize cultural exchanges between the two countries in a way that will “narrow the emotional distance between their peoples,” the ministry said.
Although China has never officially confirmed it, it has restricted the inflow of Korean cultural content and exchanges between relevant industries, including K-pop concerts and Korean films.
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Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The latest Chinese military aircraft to appear in flight test is a tactical transport aircraft, known, unofficially for now, as the Y-30. Not perhaps as headline-grabbing as China’s string of new crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft designs, the transport is nonetheless highly significant, reflecting the People’s Liberation Army’s growing ambitions to be able to conduct out-of-area operations, including from unprepared airfields.
A product of the Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation, the Y-30 (the alternative Y-15 designation has also been proposed) is expected to be a partial replacement for the same company’s Y-9 four-turboprop transport. Video and photos of the new aircraft began to circulate on social media for the first time today. The aircraft is reportedly flying from the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation (XAC) airfield in the city of Xi’an in central China, with XAC having been absorbed by Shaanxi.
One of the first images of the so-called Y-30. via Chinese internet
While a new Chinese medium/heavy airlifter had been anticipated for some time, there was speculation that it would be powered by a pair of turbofan engines: The result would have been something like a scaled-down Y-20, with a shorter fuselage and a new wing, somewhat similar in concept to the Kawasaki C-2. In the event, the so-called Y-30 is powered by four turboprops, meaning it looks much more like the Airbus A400M, although it would appear to be in a different class to the European transport.
Other features in common with the A400M include the wide fuselage, offering useful internal volume, especially compared to the Y-9, a rear loading ramp, and heavy-duty landing gear, which should make it suitable for operating out of short, poorly prepared landing strips. Like the Airbus transport, the Y-30 has a T-tail empennage, but its high-lift wing is not swept. The wingtips of the Chinese design additionally feature winglets, which improve fuel efficiency by reducing drag and increasing lift. There is a suggestion that the aircraft might also have asymmetric fuselage-side sponsons, a feature of the C-17 that you can read about here; on the other hand, this may just be a feature of the AI-enhanced version of one of the images.
via Chinese internetAn AI-enhanced view of the Y-30 (apparently based on the image above) shows off the distinctive winglets and other details, but should be considered as provisional only. via Chinese internet via Chinese internet
The Y-30 is reportedly powered by either WJ-10 or WJ-16 turboprops, which are said to develop 6,800 horsepower or 5,140 horsepower each, respectively. While the A400M’s engines drive distinctive eight-bladed ‘scimitar’ propellers, the Y-30, at least at this stage, has more conventional six-bladed props.
Both the WJ-10 and WJ-16 are notably less powerful than the 11,000-horsepower Europrop TP400-D6 engines used in the A400M, suggesting an aircraft that is smaller overall and with a more limited load capacity, closer to the C-130J Hercules. This would make sense, since the A400M, as you can read about here, was designed as a gap-filler between the C-130 at the smaller end of the transport segment, and the larger C-17 Globemaster III at the other end.
With China already building the Y-20 as a broad equivalent to the C-17, the Y-30 is likely intended to be more of an equivalent to the C-130/Y-9, probably slightly larger than the Hercules, rather than being a ‘mid-market’ transport like the A400M.
Unconfirmed accounts suggest the Y-30 will have a payload capacity of around 30 metric tonnes (around 66,000 pounds), which compares with around 145,000 pounds for the Y-20, 82,000 pounds for the A400M, 55,000 pounds for the Y-9, and 47,000 pounds for the C-130J-30.
A rear three-quarter view of the Y-30. via Chinese internet
In keeping with its test status, the Y-30 seen in the imagery available so far features a long air-data boom on the nose. This boom is used to obtain data on air pressure, temperature, and airflow direction, etc., vital for flight-testing. There is no sign of an aerial refueling probe, although this may well be added in the future, as was the case with certain variants of the Y-9.
In fact, the Y-30 first appeared in model form at the Zhuhai Airshow, back in 2014, after which the project went quiet.
A model of the Y-30 displayed at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2014. via Chinese internet
Currently, according to Western estimates, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates around 24 Y-9s in a transport role, together with 80 of the older Y-8 four-turboprop transports.
The PLAAF is rapidly introducing the Y-20, which is expected to eventually replace the roughly 26 Soviet-designed Il-76 Candid transports that remain in use. Indeed, by now, Y-20 numbers already eclipse those of the hard-worked Il-76.
A PLAAF Il-76 prepares to fly out from Perth International Airport, Australia, to assist with the international search effort trying to locate missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 in 2014. Photo by Greg Wood – Pool/Getty Images
Meanwhile, should the Y-30 prove successful, it will presumably supplant the Y-9 and allow the retirement of the aging Y-8 fleet.
While the Y-20 offers truly strategic range to support PLA operations (and humanitarian missions) around the globe, a modern turboprop-powered transport like the Y-30 would be especially well-suited to operations from more dispersed and even austere bases. For example, the new airlifter could fly troops and equipment in and out of China’s island outposts, as well as conduct airdropping as part of any future effort to retake Taiwan; it would also be of notable value during a conflict involving India.
A Y-20 transport aircraft flies at the Changchun Air Show 2025 in Changchun, Jilin province of China. Photo by Yue Shuhua/VCG via Getty ImagesA Y-9 transport at Airshow China 2021 in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China. Photo by Yue Shuhua/VCG via Getty Images
As well as its core transport role, it might be expected that the Y-30 could eventually be adapted for special missions, as has been the case with the Y-8 and Y-9. Between them, dozens of electronic warfare, maritime patrol, and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft have been produced for the PLA on these airframes, in numerous different sub-variants. On the other hand, with the Y-9 now well-proven as a special missions platform, it could be the case that continued production of this type will fulfill these niche roles, while the Y-30 production run is dedicated to transports.
It is worth noting that the PLAAF’s ability to conduct airborne assault operations is a relatively recent addition to its core missions. It was only in the 1990s that the Airborne Corps was transformed into a division, and its overall strength was boosted. At the same time, the first Il-76 transports were delivered, but for a long time these remained the extent of the PLAAF’s rapid-reaction transport force. Paratroopers operating as part of a combined-arms force are also a relatively new addition and part of the PLA’s wider modernization.
A file photo shows members of the PLAAF special airborne operation troops during a drill in 2015. Xinhua/Huang Hui
In terms of airlift capacity, the Y-20 has more recently spearheaded this continued transformation, and the Y-30 looks set to continue the process.
Like other Chinese designs, the Y-30 also has the major advantage of being immune to the tight export restrictions that typically apply to Western designs in the same class. Beijing would be likely to grant export licenses for the transport to countries that might be prohibited from buying a Western design, something that was the case with the Y-9, exported to Myanmar and Namibia, for example. Meanwhile, other markets could also provide an opportunity for the Y-30, as China becomes a more relevant competitor to the West across the military aviation segment.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
We have got what could be our first look at China’s CH-7 stealthy flying-wing drone in flight. While it’s no longer the biggest Chinese drone of this configuration, it’s still of impressive size and, as we have noted in the past, appears to be tailored for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR), as well as possibly a secondary strike role.
One of the first officially sanctioned images showing the CH-7 in the air. via Chinese internet
Video and stills released by Chinese state media today show the drone, for the first time, being prepared for flight, taking off, and landing. The video includes air-to-air footage of the CH-7 and, overall, the suggestion is that Beijing is making a notable effort to promote the progress of this program, especially in contrast to other, far more secretive flying wing drone programs.
It’s also notable that the CH-7 appears to have made its first flight from Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province, which also saw the recent maiden flight of the Jiutian heavyweight jet-powered ‘mothership drone,’ which you can read more about here. The Pucheng facility is operated by the China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE), underscoring its growing importance as a drone ‘center of excellence.’
The CH-7 over Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 seen in the new imagery retains the yellow-colored coat of primer that was seen in video and stills of the drone on the ground, released by Chinese state media earlier this year. Yellow primer is frequently seen on Chinese aircraft during their test phase. The drone also has air data probes on the leading edges of the wing and nose, again consistent with it being a prototype or perhaps a pre-production machine. Overall, the CH-7 has a ‘cranked-kite’ planform, of the kind that we have seen on various other Chinese drones. There are also various measures to reduce the radar and infrared signature, including a slot-like low-observable platypus engine exhaust, with the nozzle fully concealed from most angles of view, and serrated edges on doors and panels.
Interestingly, the attachment points previously seen on the upper surfaces of the rear of the drone have been removed in the new official imagery. It seems these were used to mount vertical tail surfaces.
Unofficial imagery, captured from an observer on the ground, suggests that the CH-7 was initially flight-tested with outward-canted tailfins, presumably to ensure stability during initial sorties, or otherwise to test an alternative aerodynamic configuration.
While the identity of this drone has not been confirmed, it appears to be the CH-7, with the outward-canted tailfins fitted. via Chinese internet
Compared to the previous imagery, we now also get to see some other details of the CH-7, including a distinctive small teardrop-shaped fairing mounted below the fuselage. This enclosure is very likely an air-to-ground datalink used for line-of-sight control of the drone and is a common feature on larger drones, including the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. This very unstealthy feature would be removed for most operational uses once the aircraft has entered service.
via Chinese internet
We now have a much better look at the series of antennas that runs in a line along the spine, flanked by two air scoops. There are also two prominent blade aerials, above and below the fuselage. Below the fuselage, immediately behind the nose landing gear, there appears to be a large radio frequency sensor aperture, and there could also be space for conformal arrays under the inner wings.
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
As we presumed, the previous prominent gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps, where the wing meets the blended body section, were a temporary configuration and have now been filled.
The latest configuration of the CH-7, with the attachment points for tailfins deleted and with the gaps removed inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese internetvia Chinese internetThis view of the CH-7 prototype on the runway reveals the previous gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese Internet
The CH-7 was previously assumed to have an internal payload bay. That is not immediately obvious in the new imagery, but there is a suggestion of a notably long and slender bay immediately inboard of the main landing gear on the right-hand side, presumably with a similar bay on the left-hand side, too. If these are indeed for weapons, then they would be able to accommodate smaller stores only. This could point to a secondary strike role, but that seems somewhat less than likely at this point.
An underside view of the drone reveals only limited evidence of internal stores bays. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 has already gone through several different iterations since it was first revealed, as a full-scale mockup in 2018, with the design being progressively adapted. Earlier changes included a less sharply swept wing compared to at least one early model, as well as an apparent growth in overall size.
The CH-7 (or Caihong-7, meaning Rainbow-7) has been developed by the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), specifically by its 11th Research Institute. A high-altitude, long-endurance drone, it is generally understood to be optimized for penetrating into or very near hostile airspace. It achieves this through a combination of a low-observable (stealth) design and flying at high altitudes, leading it to operate for extended periods of time without being successfully engaged.
via Chinese internet
Published specifications for the CH-7 include a length of 10 meters (33 feet), a maximum takeoff weight of 10,000 kilograms (22,000 pounds), a maximum speed of 926 km/h (575 mph), and an endurance of up to 15 hours. Bearing in mind the various design changes, these figures should be considered very much as provisional.
Earlier this year, Chinese state-owned media reported that the CH-7 had completed testing and was scheduled to complete development in 2024. This would imply it had also completed the flight-test program by this date, which remains possible, and the new imagery may actually date back a year or so.
via Chinese internet
Regardless of the timeline, the CH-7 is a fascinating program.
It represents one part of China’s accelerated efforts to develop low-observable, long-endurance drones, and there is a general expectation that, once in service, it will be used for both ISR and as a UCAV. Official statements from Beijing claim that, as well as bringing back critical intelligence, the CH-7 should also be able to strike strategic targets.
When it was unveiled, the CH-7 was described as a high-altitude, long-endurance stealth combat drone. Its chief designer, Shi Wen, said the aircraft would be able to “fly long hours, scout, and strike the target when necessary.”
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
It should be noted, however, that the latest imagery doesn’t provide definitive evidence of an extensive internal payload capacity, which might throw some doubt on the strike role, at least as a primary mission.
Even if the CH-7 ends up being exclusively an ISR platform, it remains highly relevant within China’s growing portfolio of stealthy drones, especially since it is apparently tailored to penetrate into or very near hostile airspace at high altitudes. Flying ISR missions with this profile would be especially relevant for China in a naval context, with the drone potentially roaming far out into the Pacific, monitoring the movements of enemy ships and providing targeting data for ground-based long-range missiles, for example, as well as anti-ship missiles launched from warships and bombers. Other theaters of operation in which a drone of this kind would be valuable include around the islands of the South China Sea and along the border with India.
A rear three-quarter view of the CH-7. via Chinese internet
Furthermore, it seems that the CH-7 will be offered for export. This hypothesis might also be supported by the unusually open nature of the imagery that’s been released of the drone so far.
If the CH-7 were to be offered for foreign customers, it would come with advanced capabilities that no other country is currently pitching on the arms market. It would also come without the various restrictions that limit the sale of high-end U.S. and other Western defense products.
A still from an official video showing what is purported to be a control center used for the CH-7 testing. via Chinese internet
Not only is the United States not currently able to offer for export a stealthy long-endurance surveillance drone or UCAV, but it’s also possible that no uncrewed platform of this class is even under development in that country — the still-mysterious RQ-180 may have fit in this category, but its current status is unknown. The stark contrast between the U.S. and Chinese approaches to very stealthy uncrewed aircraft for independent strike missions is something that we have addressed before in this feature of ours.
At this point, we should remember that we don’t know exactly how far the development of the CH-7 has progressed and when it might end up being ready for service with China, let alone with export customers. It remains possible that they might have to wait for a downgraded or otherwise sanitized version of the drone.
Nevertheless, the CH-7 program remains very much one to watch. Provided it fulfills its promise, it could provide China with a multirole low-observable drone family that could also be offered for export. For now, the CH-7 stands as more evidence of the huge strides that China is making in terms of drone technology, and the particular focus being placed on stealthy uncrewed aircraft.
The global green transition has long been seen as a critical path to addressing climate change and reshaping economies. Yet, since 2020, this vision has faced a growing backlash. Rising energy prices, inflation, and the mounting financial strain on the middle class have made green policies increasingly unpopular in many developed nations. In the U.S., for instance, under the Trump administration, the green transition has been delayed under the pretext of inflation and job security. In Europe, despite some countries’ continued commitment to green initiatives, conservative political forces have begun to push back, casting doubt on the future of the green agenda. Even frameworks like Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) policies, once seen as a driving force for the green transition, are now under attack for “greenwashing”, further undermining their credibility.
What was once an ambitious, unified global vision for a greener future is now splintering into a series of competing political agendas. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, China’s green transition has shown a distinctive sense of continuity.
Unlike many Western nations, China’s green transition is not just about international agreements or ideological alignment. It is driven by deep, internal imperatives to address chronic pollution, improve public health, and upgrade its industrial base. The need for cleaner air and a more sustainable economy is not just a policy choice for China but an urgent requirement for the country’s reality.
This internal drive gives China a unique position to lead the charge in creating a “non-politicized global green coalition”, focused not on ideological divides, but on pragmatic, shared solutions.
With the U.S. scaling back its green subsidies and Europe facing political fragmentation, a leadership vacuum is emerging in global climate governance. In countries like France, Italy, and the Netherlands, right-wing forces are calling for delays to energy taxes and carbon-reduction targets, seeing the green agenda as an economic burden. Meanwhile, in the Nordic countries, while policies remain green, their influence is limited by their small size and capacity to drive global change.
This creates an opportunity for China to step in.
If China can embrace a pragmatic and non-politicized approach, it can work to rebuild cross-regional cooperation on green policies and lay the foundation for a new global green alliance. Such a coalition, focusing on technology, green finance, and shared standards, could bring together countries from East Asia, the Middle East, and emerging economies in Africa and Southeast Asia.
China’s green transition is driven by urgent domestic needs. In 2024, official statistics indicate that the proportion of days with good air quality in China reached 87.2 percent last year, up 1.7 percentage points from the previous year, though pollution remains a problem to be tackled. As China strives to reduce healthcare burdens and improve the quality of life for its citizens, its green transition becomes a necessity, not just a global strategy.
Unlike countries that frame their green policies in ideological terms, China’s approach is rooted in a concrete need for environmental and public health improvement. This focus on sustainabilitypositions China as a potential leader in advocating for non-ideological global cooperation on climate issues.
Indeed, China has already made significant strides in “green diplomacy”. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has increasingly focused on green development, with projects in clean energy, sustainable transportation, and ecological conservation now spread across over 100 countries. China’s leadership in renewable energy production, from photovoltaic modules to electric vehicles, gives it a competitive advantage in driving the green agenda forward. China is already the world’s largest producer of clean energy technology, with production capacities for solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries outpacing any other country.
But China’s green transition is not just about technology. The country is also emerging as a leader in green finance. China accounts for 60% of Asia’s green finance, which is roughly $200 billion. Its ability to offer affordable, high-quality green technologies to developing nations, combined with its leadership in green finance, makes it well-positioned to spearhead a new global green coalition.
While China has significant advantages, there are still challenges ahead. Some countries may perceive China-led green initiatives as another form of geopolitical influence. Western nations still control many critical certification systems and intellectual property related to green technologies, which could limit its ability to fully shape the global green agenda. Additionally, the long investment cycles and uncertain returns of green projects could stretch China’s financial resources.
To mitigate these risks, China could focus on building trust through joint projects with other nations and involving Western capital as investors or observers. Focusing on less politically sensitive areas, such as energy storage, carbon trading, and climate education, would also help to avoid ideological conflicts and build a more inclusive global green network.
The global green transition is not just an economic challenge. It is an opportunity to redefine international governance based on shared survival pressures. If China can lead the way with a focus on non-ideological cooperation and pragmatic action, it can help the world move beyond the current political fragmentation and build a greener, more sustainable future for all.
China has successfully achieved economic development in recent years by shifting towards a model that relies on stimulating domestic demand. This not only ensures economic stability but also addresses crucial considerations related to China’s national security and international competitiveness. China has indeed succeeded in this by focusing on four key factors that are the main determinants of its remarkable economic growth: economic reform policies, the government’s commitment to Chinese-style reform, the government’s dedication to integrating into the global economy, and industrial upgrading and technological innovation. The Chinese government has also unveiled measures to boost service consumption and pledged to open up more sectors, such as the internet, culture, and the promotion of hosting international sporting events, in an effort to bolster the Chinese economy and connect it globally.
China’s Fifteenth Five-Year Plan further spurred this shift from high-speed growth to high-quality growth, placing science and technology at the forefront of national priorities. Over the past five years, China has strengthened its comprehensive opening-up policy, implementing practical measures to improve the business environment and fostering continued cooperation with all countries, especially developing nations of the Global South, through its Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative has become a model for a new type of international cooperation and has been recognized as such by international organizations, including the United Nations. During this same period, China has also made concerted efforts to improve the ecological environment and fulfill its international commitments through its “green economy” policy. This policy emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to environmentally friendly economic projects worldwide, particularly in African, developing, and Globally Southern countries. China is rapidly advancing a cleaner and greener economy, with strong commitments to environmental protection, clean energy, ecological protection, and the development of green industries.
China’s economic development has achieved remarkable success in recent years through a long-term plan focused on economic reforms. This plan involved transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, adopting a policy of openness to foreign investment, establishing special economic zones to attract foreign investment, and investing heavily in infrastructure development, particularly in transportation, energy, communications, information technology, and artificial intelligence. China has also become the world’s largest exporter of advanced technology, with the Chinese government allocating approximately 2.6% of its GDP to research and development across various economic sectors. Furthermore, China boasts the world’s fastest-growing consumer market and is the second-largest importer of goods. China’s industrial output is double that of the United States. The Chinese government has addressed poverty through development, guided by market principles, economic restructuring, the utilization of domestic resources, peaceful production development, and the strengthening of self-reliance and development capabilities. It has employed various methods and approaches to reduce poverty through self-reliance and hard work, building infrastructure in agriculture, industry, roads, and irrigation, providing the necessary funds for development and training, and allocating all necessary resources for technological advancements in each sector. Simultaneously, efforts have been made to protect the environment by conserving soil and water, promoting ecological construction, and implementing the sustainable development strategy set by the central government. China has not only eradicated poverty but has also raised the standard of living in all areas, enabling it to compete with developed nations in many fields.
One of the most prominent strengths of the Chinese economy in recent years is its success in achieving high levels in education and scientific research. China spends 2.5% of its GDP on research and development. The number of people employed in research and development sectors is approximately 1,687 per million inhabitants, enabling China to remain a leading exporter of high-tech goods globally. This has been achieved while the Chinese government has encouraged the formation of rural and private enterprises, liberalized foreign trade and investment, eased state control over certain prices, and invested in industrial production and workforce education.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
China’s heavyweight jet-powered Jiutian drone, said to have a maximum takeoff weight of around 17.6 tons (16 metric tons), has flown. A key mission for the design is expected to be acting as a mothership for swarms of smaller uncrewed aerial systems, as TWZ has explored in the past. It has also been shown previously armed with various air-to-surface and air-to-air munitions, and could perform a variety of other missions, including airborne signal relay and logistics.
The Jiutian’s manufacturer, the state-run Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), announced the drone’s first flight, which took place earlier today in Pucheng County in China’s central Shaanxi Province. The drone was first shown publicly at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, and it has also been referred to as the SS-UAV. What the “SS” stands for in that acronym remains unclear. The name Jiutian (also sometimes written Jiu Tian), or “The Ninth Heaven,” refers to the highest level of the heavens in traditional Chinese mythology, but is also commonly translated simply as “High Sky.”
A view of the Jiutian drone on the ground before taking off for its first flight. capture via Chinese internet/X
Jiutian is some 53.6 feet (16.35 meters) long and has a wingspan of around 82 feet (25 meters), per AVIC. In addition to its maximum takeoff weight, the company says it has a maximum payload capacity of nearly 13,228 pounds (6,000 kilograms), a ferry range of approximately 4,349.5 miles (7,000 kilometers), and can stay aloft for up to 12 hours. The drone’s stated maximum operational ceiling is 49,212.5 feet (15,000 meters), and it can fly at speeds up to 378 knots and as low as 108 knots.
In terms of its general configuration, Jiutian has a high-mounted wing with a very minimal sweep and small winglets at the tips, as well as an H-shaped tail. It has a single jet engine mounted in a nacelle on top of the rear fuselage. Its tricycle landing gear includes main units that retract into sponsons under the wings. As TWZ has noted in the past, these features together give the drone the outward appearance of something of a mashup of the A-10 Warthog and OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft. There is also a resemblance to rugged De Havilland aircraft, with its landing gear looking especially tough, which could point to being able to operate out of rougher fields.
A top-down look at the Jiutian offering a good general view of the design. Chinese internet via X
Jiutian is notably large compared to many other armed uncrewed aircraft designs currently on the market globally. For instance, the jet-powered Wing Loong-10 drone (also known as the WZ-10) in Chinese service now, produced by AVIC’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG) subsidiary, has a maximum takeoff weight of around 3.5 tons (3,200 kilograms). CAIG’s Wing Loong 3 pusher-propeller-driven armed drone, the largest member of that design family to date, has a maximum takeoff weight of around six tons. As another point of comparison, the stated maximum takeoff weight of newer extended-range versions of the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, which are also notably smaller overall, is just under six tons.
AVIC has described the Jiutian as a “general purpose” design capable of performing a wide range of missions, and its modular payload section has drawn particular attention since it was first unveiled. At the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, that section had a Chinese phrase printed on the side reading “ascension of the beehive mission module,” according to a machine translation. It also said “Isomerism Hive Module” in English, which appeared to be a mistranslation. A term typically used in chemistry, isomerism refers to the potential existence of isomers, which are molecules or ions with identical molecular formula, but that differ in the physical and chemical arrangements of their atoms. AVIC subsequently confirmed that the intent was to communicate a drone swarm launch capability, according to Chinese state media.
A rendering shown on Chinese state television depicting the launch of a swarm of smaller uncrewed aerial systems from a Jiutian drone. CCTV capture
“China’s interest in swarming capabilities and the ability to launch them from various platforms, including high-altitude balloons, is not new. For military purposes, swarms have a number of inherent benefits, including the ability to rapidly fan out across a broad area to carry out various missions depending on how they are configured, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, and kinetic strike. Individual drones in a swarm can also be equipped with different payloads to give the entire grouping a multi-mission capability. Large numbers of uncrewed aerial systems operating closely together also present significant challenges for defenders who could easily find themselves overwhelmed or otherwise confused about how to best respond to the incoming threats.”
“The War Zone previously laid out a case for giving exactly this kind of drone swarm launch capability to reconfigured P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol planes, which you can read more about here. Drones launching other drones offers a way to push these capabilities further forward while reducing the risk to crewed platforms.”
Having a platform capable of delivering a swarm of drones within hundreds of miles of a particular area would offer huge advantages, especially for attacking ships at sea, island outposts, and other distributed or dispersed target sets. Even the most modern warships in service in the United States and elsewhere today notably lack any real ability to defend against a high-volume attack of this kind. This is something TWZ previously highlighted in a detailed case for arming U.S. Navy warships with their own swarms of drones to bolster their defensive and offensive capabilities, which you can find here.
As mentioned, Jiutian has been displayed in the past with four pylons under each wing loaded with various munitions, as well. This has included PL-12 radar-guided air-to-air missiles, TL-17 land-attack cruise missiles (an export variant of the KD-88), and precision-guided bombs.
Jiutian has a sensor turret under its nose of the kind typically fitted with a mix of electro-optical and infrared cameras. It could also contain a laser designator for employing munitions using that type of guidance.
The drone also has a dome on top of the nose in line with a beyond-line-of-sight communications array and a nose radome. The latter has pointed to at least provisions for the installation of a radar. That could be used to help spot and target aerial threats using weapons like the PL-12, as well as for other targeting purposes, and just to assist with navigation and provide additional situational awareness. Jiutian could use air-to-air weapons for self-defense or to actively hunt flying targets.
The modular payload section is large enough to serve a host of other potential purposes, as well. It could accommodate additional sensors, such as a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), as well as electronic warfare suites and communication arrays. Jiutian’s ability to fly high and for extended periods at relatively low speeds could make it a particularly ideal platform for more general surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as acting as an airborne communications node. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had already been expanding its fleet of high-altitude, long-endurance drones and increasingly employing them on routine surveillance and reconnaissance missions, over land or water, around its borders. Many of those existing designs can also carry air-to-surface munitions, but with nowhere near the same capacity as the Jiutian.
A Chinese WZ-7 drone seen flying over or around the East China Sea. This picture was taken from a Japanese aircraft sent to intercept it. Japanese Ministry of Defense
AVIC itself has highlighted how Jiutian’s internal space could be utilized for carrying cargo, and it could be a relevant addition for providing logistics support to far-flung locales. The PLA has pronounced needs in this regard with an ever-growing array of remote and austere operating locations, such as its highly strategic island outposts in the South China Sea and its bases spread across the Himalayan Plateau along its disputed border with India. As mentioned earlier, the Jiutian’s landing gear could point to its ability to perform any of its missions while forward-deployed at sites with more limited infrastructure to perform.
Uncrewed platforms could also offer cost benefits compared to traditional crewed cargo aircraft for conducting routine resupply operations to those areas, where the latter may not even be able to operate at all. At the same time, this all seems likely to be at most a secondary mission set for the Jiutian. AVIC and other Chinese aviation firms have already been developing a growing array of larger drones expressly designed primarily for logistics roles.
AVIC and the PLA have also been heavily touting Jiutian’s potential to perform various non-military missions. “Its modular payload system enables roles ranging from precise deliveries of heavy cargo to remote regions, to emergency communication and disaster relief, to geographic surveying and resource mapping,” according to a post today from the China Military Bugle account on X, an official mouthpiece for China’s armed forces.
A large unmanned aerial vehicle (#UAV), named “Jiutian,” completed its maiden flight on December 11, 2025, according to the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (#AVIC).
The domestically developed general-purpose drone, measuring 16.35 meters in length and 25 meters in… pic.twitter.com/LwUHyNaEp6
It’s worth pointing out that AVIC’s heavy focus on non-military missions for Jiutian underscores the significant overlap between the military and commercial ends of China’s aerospace industry, as well as the role that ostensibly civilian research institutions often play. This is something TWZ routinely highlights. These kinds of dual-purpose relationships are also prevalent in the country outside of the aviation realm.
When it comes to the Jiutian design, specifically, more insights into its capabilities and expected roles may now begin to emerge as the drone is now in flight testing.
China’s trade surplus – the difference between the value of goods it imports and exports – has hit $1 trillion for the first time, a significant yardstick in the country’s role as “factory of the world”, making everything from socks and curtains to electric cars.
For the first 11 months of this year, China’s exports rose to $3.4 trillion while its imports declined slightly to $2.3 trillion. That brought the country’s trade surplus to about $1 trillion, China’s General Administration of Customs said on Monday.
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Shipments overseas from China have boomed despite US President Donald Trump’s global trade war, largely consisting of sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs on most countries, which were launched earlier this year in a bid to reduce US trade deficits.
But China, which was initially hit with US tariffs of 145 percent before they were lowered to allow for trade talks, has emerged largely unscathed from the standoff by stepping up shipments to markets outside the US.
Following Trump’s 2024 election win, China began diversifying its export market away from the US in exchange for closer ties with Southeast Asia and the European Union. It also established new production hubs, outside of China, for low-tariff access.
Why does China have such a large trade surplus?
China’s exports returned to growth last month following an unexpected dip in October, rising to 5.9 percent more than one year earlier and far outpacing a 1.9 percent rise in imports, according to China’s General Administration of Customs.
China’s goods surplus for the first 11 months of 2025 was up 21.7 percent from the same period last year. Most of the surge was driven by strong growth in high-tech goods, which outpaced the increase in overall exports by 5.4 percent.
Auto exports, especially for electric vehicles, rallied as Chinese firms muscled in on Japanese and German market share. Total car shipments jumped by more than one million to approximately 6.5 million units this year, according to data from China-based consultancy Automobility.
And although China still trails US leaders like Nvidia in advanced chips, it is becoming dominant in the production of semiconductors (used in everything from electric cars to medical devices). Semiconductor exports rose by 24.7 percent over the period.
China’s technological advances have also boosted shipbuilding, where exports rose 26.8 percent compared with the same period in 2024.
So, given the hostile global trade backdrop, how has China achieved this?
Rerouting and diversifying
Though Washington has lowered tariffs on Chinese imports in recent months, they remain high. Average import duties on Chinese goods currently stand at 37 percent. For this reason, Chinese shipments to the US have dropped by 29 percent year-on-year to November.
Some Chinese companies have shifted their production facilities to Southeast Asia, Mexico and Africa, enabling them to bypass Trump’s tariffs on goods arriving directly from China. Despite this, overall trade between the two countries remains down.
In the first eight months of this year, for instance, the US imported roughly $23bn in goods from Indonesia, an increase of nearly one-third on the same period in 2024. It is widely understood that the rise is down to Chinese goods being redirected via Indonesia.
“The role of trade rerouting in offsetting the drag from US tariffs still appears to be increasing,” Zichun Huang, an economist at Capital Economics, wrote in a note to clients on Monday. Huang added that “exports to Vietnam, the top [Chinese] rerouting hub, continued to grow rapidly.”
As trade with the US has slackened, China has doubled down on developing ties with other major trading partners. That includes a 15 percent surge in Chinese shipments to the EU, compared with the year before, and an 8.2 percent rise in exports to countries in Southeast Asia.
Weaker currency
Another reason for China’s trading success is that its currency has been cheap, compared with others, in recent years. A lower renminbi makes exports relatively inexpensive to produce, and imports relatively expensive to consume.
China maintains a “managed float” of the renminbi – meaning the central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets to maintain its value against other currencies – with the aim of keeping the price stable.
For years, many economists have argued that China’s currency is undervalued. In their view, that gives exporters a competitive edge by boosting the appeal of cheap Chinese products at the expense of other countries, leading to large imbalances in trade.
Indeed, taking into account global inflationary dynamics, the real effective exchange rate – a measure of the competitiveness of Chinese goods – is actually at its weakest level since 2012.
How has China got here?
China’s eye-watering $1 trillion trade surplus – never before recorded in economic history – is the culmination of decades of industrial policies that have enabled China to emerge from a low-income agrarian society in the 1970s to become the world’s second-largest economy today.
China established itself as a dependable producer of low-cost manufactured goods, like T-shirts and shoes, in the 1980s. Since then, it has climbed the industrial ladder to higher-value goods, such as electric vehicles and solar panels.
By far its largest sector in terms of exports is electronics. China exported a total of more than $1 trillion-worth of electronic goods around the world in 2024. This follows the pattern of other industrialised countries by starting with simple, labour-intensive goods and then moving into more complex sectors. However, China has done so with unusual scale and speed to cement its dominance across numerous global supply chains.
It also dominates trade in rare-earth metals, which are crucial for the manufacture of a wide range of goods from smartphones to fighter jets.
Twelve of the 17 rare earth metals on the periodic table can be found in China, and it mines between 60 percent and 70 percent of the world’s rare-earth resources. It also carries out 90 percent of the processing of these metals for commercial use.
[Al Jazeera]
For historical context, China’s trade surplus in factory goods is larger as a share of its economy than the US ran in the years after World War II, when most other manufacturing nations were emerging from the ruins of war.
How are other countries responding to China’s expanding dominance?
Many are looking for ways to redress the balance.
French President Emmanuel Macron, who visited China last week, warned the EU may take “strong measures”, including imposing higher tariffs, should Beijing fail to address the imbalance.
The EU already imposes additional tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs), which range from 17 percent to 35.3 percent, for example, on top of its existing 10 percent import duty. Germany’s foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, arrived in China for a two-day trip on Monday this week, becoming the latest senior European official to visit for talks amid the country’s rapidly expanding goods trade with Europe.
Before his trip, Wadephul said he planned to raise the issue of tariffs with his Chinese counterparts, particularly those involving rare earths, in addition to concerns about industrial “overcapacities”, which he said are distorting global prices for industrial goods.
Will China’s exports continue to grow?
Despite efforts by the US and other wealthy countries to diversify away from China, few economists expect the country’s broad-based trade momentum to slow anytime soon.
Economists at Morgan Stanley predict China’s share of global goods exports will reach 16.5 percent by the end of the decade, up from 15 percent now, reflecting China’s ability to adapt quickly to shifting global demand.
More immediately, China’s strong trade performance means the annual growth target – set by Beijing to guide economic policy and to align regional governments – of about 5 percent is likely to be met.