Chinas

China’s Foreign Ministry said Trump initiated call with Xi Jinping and that communication was crucial for developing stable US-China relations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has “more or less agreed” to increase purchases of goods from the United States, President Donald Trump said, a day after a phone call between the two leaders was described by Beijing as “positive, friendly and constructive”.

Speaking to reporters on board Air Force One on Tuesday evening, Trump said he asked the Chinese leader during the call to accelerate purchases from the US.

“I think we will be pleasantly surprised by the actions of President Xi,” Trump said.

“I asked him, I’d like you to buy it a little faster. I’d like you to buy more. And he’s more or less agreed to do that,” he said.

Trump’s upbeat forecast on trade with China comes after Beijing announced last month that it would resume purchases of US soya beans and would halt expanded curbs on rare earths exports to the US amid detente in the tariff war with Washington.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that China had pledged to buy 12 million metric tonnes of soya beans from US farmers this year, but the Reuters news agency reports that the pace of Chinese purchases had been less than initially expected.

China has so far ordered nearly two million metric tonnes of US soya beans, according to data by the US Department of Agriculture, Reuters reports.

The call on Monday between Trump and Xi comes just weeks after the two leaders met in South Korea, where they agreed to a framework for a trade deal that has yet to be finalised.

“China and the United States once fought side by side against fascism and militarism, and should now work together to safeguard the outcomes of World War II,” Xi was quoted as telling Trump in the call, China’s official Xinhua news agency reports.

Xi also told Trump that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order”.

China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to unite the self-ruled, democratic island with the Chinese mainland.

The US has been traditionally opposed to China’s potential use of force to seize Taiwan and is obligated by a domestic law to provide sufficient military hardware to Taipei to deter any armed attack.

But Trump has maintained strategic ambiguity about whether he would commit US troops in case of a war in the Taiwan Strait, while his administration has urged Taiwan to increase its defence budget.

Trump made no mention of Xi’s comments on Taiwan in a later post on Truth Social, where he spoke of a “very good” call with the Chinese leader, which he said covered many topics, including Ukraine, Fentanyl and US farm products.

“Our relationship with China is extremely strong! This call was a follow up to our highly successful meeting in South Korea, three weeks ago. Since then, there has been significant progress on both sides in keeping our agreements current and accurate,” Trump said.

“Now we can set our sights on the big picture,” he said.

The US leader also said that he had accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing in April, and had invited Xi for a state visit to the US later in the year.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Tuesday that Washington had initiated the call between Trump and Xi, which spokesperson Mao Ning called “positive, friendly and constructive”.

Mao also said that “communication between the two heads of state on issues of common concern is crucial for the stable development of China-US relations”.

Additional reporting by Bonnie Liao.

We have gotten two new images of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s second ‘J-36’ heavy tactical jet airframe, which features significant changes over the first. The aircraft first emerged in late October. Along with new inlets and main landing gear, the addition of what appeared to be two-dimensional thrust vectoring across its bank of three engines was highly intriguing. Now we are seeing a rear aspect of this new exhaust configuration that further confirms our original analysis.

You can read our recent report on the new J-36 configuration here and our original deep dive on the J-36 here.

The new images show the J-36 from behind during landing and from directly below. The rear image is the star of the show here, as we can see what appears to be the jet’s three-pack of 2D thrust vectoring nozzles, similar to those found on the F-22. China has been developing this exhaust capability for some time now, but its addition on the J-36 is very interesting.

Generally speaking, thrust vectoring provides additional maneuverability throughout different areas of the flight envelope for a tactical jet, including, in many cases, in the post-stall regime. It also allows for better overall controllability and stability, the value of which is magnified on a highly unstable tailless fast jet design. It can also play a key role when operating at high altitudes, a performance goal that could be very beneficial to the J-36, as we discuss in our large analysis feature. At the same time, it adds weight and complexity to the aircraft, although this likely isn’t a major concern for a jet as large and complex as the J-36. It is also not as efficient as traditional conical exhausts when it comes to thrust output.

The first J-36, which emerged just 11 months ago, had recessed trough-like exhausts, vaguely similar to what was found on the YF-23. There is likely a low-observable (stealth) penalty from some rear aspects when trading the previous configuration for this new one.

The addition of thrust vectoring is a major design departure and clearly points to its advantages outweighing its costs. It also will raise the question, once again, about the intended role of this aircraft and how to define it. We went over this in great depth in our original analysis, but suffice it to say, keeping a certain level of maneuverability is likely seen as beneficial, but thrust vectoring provides other advantages beyond straight agility, as we discussed earlier.

All that being said, we still don’t know definitively if this second aircraft is purely evolutionary, depicting something that is truly a step closer to a final production configuration, or if it is experimental and we could see some of its features exchanged for those of the first model on future iterations.

It’s worth noting that the J-36’s smaller counterpart, the J-XDS, also features similar 2D thrust-vectoring capabilities. It’s additionally possible that the J-35, China’s medium stealth fighter, could one day ditch its serrated round exhausts and adopt 2D thrust vectoring, as well. We have seen such a configuration mocked up at Chinese arms expos.

With the one-year anniversary of the J-36 emerging from the shadows approaching, it’s remarkable just how much we have seen of it and how two prototype/demonstrator aircraft are now in known existence. It and the J-XDS, along with a flood of advanced uncrewed combat aircraft and naval aviation developments, mark 2025 as a truly remarkable year for Chinese military aviation, one that is clearly drawing concerns of potential adversaries.

Contact the author: [email protected]

One month before he opened this year’s United Nations climate summit, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva helped open a new mega-factory at the site of a former Ford car manufacturing plant.

The new plant, in Brazil’s Camacari, Bahia, is one of many being built around the world by China’s BYD, the world’s largest manufacturer of electric cars.

BYD’s presence is also being felt at the ongoing COP30 climate summit in Brazil’s Belem, where it is a cosponsor alongside GWM, another Chinese electric carmaker.

The sponsorship is just one of many ways that China’s investments in green technology are being felt at the UN’s top climate meeting, where the Chinese official delegation of 789 people is second only to Brazil’s 3,805.

It is a stark contrast to the United States, whose federal government has not sent an official delegation. California’s Governor Gavin Newsom has accused US President Donald Trump of “handing the future to China” and leaving states like California to pick up the slack, in a speech at the summit.

“ China is here. Only one country’s not here: United States of America,” Newsom said. Trump has called concerns over climate change a “hoax” and a “con job”.

But the UN Climate Change Conference COP30 is not the only event where the diverging paths that China and the US are taking on addressing the climate crisis are being felt.

Back in the US, and in neighbouring Canada, trade barriers aimed at punishing Chinese electric vehicles have made them far costlier than what the manufacturers want to sell them for.

These tariffs are a legacy of former US President Joe Biden’s administration, and place North America as an outlier at a time when Chinese EVs otherwise dominate the global market.

How dominant is China in EVs?

Joel Jaeger, a senior research associate with the World Resources Institute, told Al Jazeera that Chinese EVs have “really upended the car market” in recent years.

China has gone “from basically not a major player five years ago” to becoming “the number one exporter of cars globally in terms of the units”, says Jaeger.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China manufactured 12.4 million electric cars in 2024, more than 70 percent of the 17.3 million electric cars manufactured globally last year.

Of these, China exported about 1.25 million cars, representing 40 percent of global exports, while the remaining Chinese-made cars — the vast majority — were sold domestically.

This dominance has been built on the back of “subsidies that China’s put in place to develop its industry, which I think is a very strategic thing that China has done, both for its own economic growth as well as decarbonisation”, Jaeger said.

But on the streets of the US or Canada, Chinese EVs are still relatively rare.

Why are Chinese EVs less affordable in the US and Canada?

According to Jaeger, “prohibitive” tariffs mean that Chinese EVs are almost impossible to buy in the US and Canada.

“In the last year, the US and Canada both put on basically completely prohibitive tariffs on EVs [of] over 100 percent in both places,” he added.

Notably, the steep import taxes on Chinese EVs in the US were introduced under Biden, a Democrat, who championed renewable energy, in contrast to Trump, who has pledged to fight it and “drill, baby, drill” for oil.

A month after the US introduced 100 percent tariffs on Chinese EVs in September 2024, Canada brought in identical tariffs of its own.

It means that a car that a Chinese EV manufacturer might be selling at $30,000 actually costs at least $60,000 in the US or Canada. This makes it hard for even cheaper Chinese models to compete with the higher-end US electric models, which on average retail for approximately $55,000.

These tariffs, along with other US policies, have meant that Chinese manufacturers have yet to set up shop in the US.

In Canada, Addisu Lashitew, an associate professor of business at McMaster University, told Al Jazeera that the steep tariffs conflict with targets set to transition fully to electric cars by 2035, but are also complicated due to Canada’s close trading ties with the US.

“The problem is that one, we are going through a very complex trade talk with the US now,” said Lashitew. “And two, our supply chain has also [been] very much integrated. Many of the American manufacturers are here, and Canadian firms are mainly suppliers.”

But while it is almost impossible to buy a cheap Chinese electric car in the US, Jaeger says this does not mean that North America is completely missing out on importing new Chinese technology.

“The US, for example, imports a lot of batteries from China. It’s actually the second-biggest importer of lithium-ion batteries behind Germany in the world, from China. So, they’re using them in US-made EVs,” he said.

Where can you buy cheap Chinese electric cars?

In contrast with the US and Canada, said Jaeger, many other countries have been more open to China’s EV market.

“You see different reactions from different countries, depending on their relationship with China, but mostly depending upon their domestic auto manufacturing presence,” he said.

Lashitew told Al Jazeera that Chinese exporters, including BYD as well as some smaller firms, are “targeting many emerging and developing countries”.

“Ironically, we’re in a situation where in the transportation sector, the energy transition is happening much faster in the Global South than in North America, at least.”

Chinese electric cars have also continued to sell well in many European countries, says Jaeger, despite those countries also imposing some tariffs, though lower than the US and Canada, “for what they see as unfair competitive practices in China”.

Still, while BYD has built factories in Japan, Hungary and India, as well as Brazil, its biggest presence remains in China, where the company was founded in Shenzhen in 1995. A majority of the 4.27 million electric cars that BYD sold in 2024 were bought by Chinese consumers. BYD also has a manufacturing presence in Lancaster, California, where it builds electric buses and batteries, but not cars.

In China, the local market has grown in part due to incentives from the government, which also saw electric cars as part of its strategy to bring down air pollution in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

Customers in China have benefitted from the government’s approach, including through access to new technology. For example, a new battery, which BYD announced in March with the promise of charging for 400km (about 250 miles) of travel in just five minutes, is first being made available for preorder to customers in China only.

How expensive are EVs?

They used to be costlier than cars that run on petrol or diesel. But according to the IEA, the cost of owning an electric car over the vehicle’s entire lifetime is now less than fossil fuel-powered cars, due to the reduced costs of fuel and maintenance.

Buying an electric car is still often more expensive, though.

That is where China’s subsidies to manufacturers help. The IEA has found that prices for electric cars in China are similar to petrol and diesel cars, with half of all electric cars being sold for less than $30,000 and a wide range of lower-priced models available.

By contrast, in the US and Europe, “the range [of available EVs] was skewed towards higher-end models with higher prices”, according to the IEA.

Under Biden, the US tried to boost its domestic electric vehicle industry, while also trying to get the sector to reduce dependence on China.

Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) introduced incentives for US manufacturers that did not use any Chinese parts. The IRA also introduced subsidies for consumers who bought EVs, though these have largely been overturned by Trump’s Big Beautiful Bill, which became law in July.

Nevertheless, even with the Biden-era incentives, only one in 10 cars sold in the US in 2024 was electric, while more than half of all new cars sold last year in China were electric.

Not just cars

While electric cars grab most headlines on sustainable transport, people are also increasingly turning to electric bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, buses and even trains in many parts of the world.

Even in the US, says Jaeger, there has been a significant growth in the number of electric scooters and two-wheelers imported from China.

According to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), the US imported $1.5bn worth of electric two-wheelers from China in the 12 months up to September 2025, an increase of $275m — or more than 20 percent — from the previous year. Experts say that is because scooters are cheaper than cars, and because US tariffs on Chinese electric scooters are also lower than on electric cars.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the government has said it will ban petrol-powered motorbikes in the centre of its capital, Hanoi, from July next year, as part of a plan to tackle local air pollution.

According to the IEA, some 40 percent of bus sales are now electric in European countries, including Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway.

There have also been increases in electric bus sales in Central and South America. In Mexico, for example, “close to 18 percent of all bus sales were electric in 2024, up from just above 1 percent in 2023”, according to the IEA.

Still, the US continues to struggle here, too. Electric bus sales declined in 2024, according to the IEA, after the leading electric bus manufacturer went bankrupt and a second company stopped manufacturing in the US market after suffering sustained financial losses.

Images show that a large tiltrotor drone called the R6000, being developed by United Aircraft in China, has now entered flight testing. The design notably features swiveling rotors that are extremely similar to the ones found on Bell’s V-280 Valor. United Aircraft says it is working on uncrewed and crewed versions of the R6000, primarily for civilian applications, but that also have clear military potential.

Imagery of what is said to be the first tethered hover test of the R6000 first began circulating on social media yesterday, but when exactly the milestone was reached is unknown. Just over a year ago, a picture emerged showing the first completed prototype at the Wuhu United Aircraft Production Workshop in the Wuhu Aviation Industrial Park in China’s eastern Anhui province. United Aircraft unveiled the design, also referred to as the UR6000 and Zhang Ying (or Steel Shadow), at the 2024 Singapore Airshow.

The images of the hover test show various parts of the aircraft stripped down, as well as it lashed to the ground at four points. Tethered hover testing is a common element of initial flight envelope expansion for vertical takeoff and landing designs, especially larger uncrewed ones. Doing so to start offers an additional margin of safety.

The tilting rotor assemblies are notably exposed, but also blurred out in the newly emerged imagery. As mentioned, the design of the R6000’s swiveling rotors looks to be heavily inspired by, if not copied directly from the V-280. The U.S. Army’s future MV-75A tiltrotor, also known as the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA), is a derivative of the V-280. When Bell first showed the V-280 demonstrator, it also blurred out parts of the rotor assemblies.

Bell has also shown renderings of other tiltrotor concepts in recent years with somewhat similarly configured rotors and nacelles, where only a portion actually pivots up and down. This is distinct from most other tiltrotor concepts, including the U.S. V-22 Osprey, with nacelles that rotate as a complete unit, or even have fully articulating wings.

The rotor and nacelle arrangement seen on the V-280 and now the R6000 is said to offer benefits in terms of reduced complexity and increased reliability, as well as a boost in general performance. Tiltrotor designs are famously complicated, and the V-22’s checkered record is a testament to the challenges this can present. At the same time, tiltrotors offer similar point-to-point flexibility to traditional helicopters, but with the range and speed of a fixed-wing turboprop.

United Aircraft’s website does provide dimensions and other specifications for the R6000, putting it at just under 39 feet long and with a total width (including the wings and rotors) of around 57 feet. The expected maximum takeoff weight is near 13,450 pounds, and it is designed to be able to cruise at just under 297 knots. A maximum range of around 2,485 miles and a mission radius (with an unspecified load) of 932 miles are also projected.

However, it is unclear whether the specifications apply to the uncrewed or crewed version of the design, or both. The specifications do describe a design, broadly speaking, in the same category as the crewed AW609 tiltrotor being developed by Leonardo in Italy, and in a class below the V-22.

United Aircraft has been presenting the R6000’s crewed and uncrewed variations as ideal for moving commercial cargo and as VIP transports, among other non-military roles. A design like this could be well-suited for aeromedical evacuation, especially if it features a pressurized main cabin, and aerial firefighting tasks, as well.

As TWZ discussed in earlier reporting on the R6000, the design also has clear military potential. A tiltrotor design, crewed or uncrewed, that can fly at approaching 300 knots and with a combat radius nearing 1,000 miles would offer a new way to support People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces at far-flung locations that have limited access via conventional airstrips. For years now, Chinese aviation companies have been pushing ahead with the development of a growing number of fixed-wing logistics drones, which are dependent on at least some form of runway. The PLA has a particularly significant requirement to move cargo and personnel around a constellation of island outposts in the South China Sea. Militarized versions of the R6000 could also support day-to-day operations in other parts of the Pacific, as well as remote locales within China, especially near disputed border areas.

R6000s could also support a variety of PLA expeditionary operational scenarios, including regional ones like an intervention against Taiwan, or missions further from the country’s shores. The design’s payload capacity would open the door to configurations capable of missions beyond logistics, including surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, signal relay, or even potentially kinetic strike. Tiltotors like the R6000 would also be especially well-suited to operations from the PLA Navy’s growing fleets of big-deck amphibious assault ships. This includes the Sichuan, so far the only example of the super-sized Type 076 design, which just completed its first three-day sea trial.

The R6000 is also just one of several tiltrotor designs, crewed and uncrewed, not in development in China. Just today, a picture said to show another, smaller uncrewed design from United Aircraft emerged online, details about which are currently scant. Pictures showing flight testing of another crewed tiltrotor design, possibly being developed by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), also appeared on social media earlier this year. There are some broad parallels here to recent tiltrotor developments in the United States, which go beyond Bell’s aforementioned V-280 and the V-22.

If nothing else, the start of R6000 flight testing is another example of the continued push by Chinese companies to enter the tiltrotor market space with designs that could be attractive for various military and non-military roles.

Contact the author: [email protected]

China’s first super-sized Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, has left port for its first sea trials. The Type 076 is unlike any other big deck amphibious warship design globally, featuring an electromagnetically-powered catapult to support an air wing expected to include naval versions of the GJ-11 stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV).

Sichuan, which has now also been assigned the hull number 51, left Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai on its maiden voyage earlier today. The ship, which is currently the only one of its type, has been under construction in that yard since at least 2023. A ceremony marking its launch was held on December 27, 2024, and it was actually floated for the first time in its basin sometime afterward.

“This sea trial will mainly test and verify the reliability and stability of the power, electrical, and other systems,” according to a release from China’s Ministry of National Defense. Since its launch, the ship “has successfully completed mooring tests and equipment installation and debugging, and has met the technical conditions for sea trials.”

There had already been signs in recent weeks of significant new progress on the final fitting out of Sichuan, including the painting of full markings on its flight deck.

Another image, seen in the social media post below, had emerged at the end of last month showing what is very likely a red-colored catapult test ‘truck’ on Sichuan‘s deck. This, in turn, had pointed to the start of testing of the ship’s lone catapult.

Shipbuilders and navies around the world, including China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the U.S. Navy, have long used weighted trucks to test catapults on aircraft carriers as part of their construction or following maintenance. 

The video below shows testing of the catapults on the U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford using weighted trucks.

Overall, Sichuan represents a particularly notable development for the PLAN. Chinese officials have said the Type 076 displaces more than 40,000 metric tons (44,000 U.S. tons). TWZ has previously assessed that the ship is around 864 feet long and that it is some 141 feet wide (or 263 and nearly 43 meters, respectively). China’s previous Type 075 amphibious assault ships, of which there are now four in service, have a stated displacement of between 32,000 and 36,000 metric tons (35,000 to 40,000 U.S. tons) with a full load, and are just over 761 feet long and nearly 121 feet wide. Sichuan is also notably wider than other big deck amphibious warfare ships in service globally, including the U.S. Navy’s America class.

Sichuan‘s unusually wide flight deck is absolutely core to the design. Along with the ship’s two islands, this has long made clear the ship is heavily focused sustained flight operations. This will include fixed-wing types launched via the catapult at the bow end and recovered via some form of arresting gear.

There have been growing signs for years now that a navalized variant of the GJ-11 UCAV, also sometimes referred to as the GJ-21, will be an especially significant part of Sichuan‘s future air wing. Most recently, around the beginning of this month, pictures emerged showing a version of the drone with an arresting hook very prominently deployed. Last year, apparent GJ-11 mockups had also appeared at a test and/or training site right on Changxing Island in Shanghai, very close to where the Type 076 was being built.

As it seems, for the first time clear images of a GJ-21 in flight are posted and this one – based on the still installed pitots – has its tail hook down. pic.twitter.com/5h1nVZHzIe

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 1, 2025

Just this week, Chinese authorities announced that the land-based version of the GJ-11, now officially named the Mysterious Dragon, had entered operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Any future naval versions of the drone could also find their way onto other big deck ships in the PLAN’s inventory, including its first catapult-equipped aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which was commissioned last week.

Sichuan‘s air wing will not be limited to variations of the GJ-11 design, and is expected to include a host of other current and future crewed and uncrewed types. Various helicopters, as well as an as-yet unnamed crewed tiltrotor aircraft under development in China, which is now in flight testing, could be part of that mix.

The Type 076 design also has a well deck at the stern to support traditional amphibious assault operations.

As TWZ previously wrote about the overall significance of the Sichuan:

“The potential value to the PLAN of having a fleet of very large deck amphibious assault ships that are highly capable of large-scale drone operations as well as traditional amphibious assaults is clear. These ships could be used to launch and recover UCAVs like the GJ-11 and other types of drones to perform a host of missions from maritime strike to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). They could be used to provide additional ‘mass’ in support of the operations of larger carrier strike groups and help to free the air wings of flattops like Fujian up for tasks they might be better suited for. In addition, they could provide a lower tier of naval aviation support that could be employed independently.”

…

“Simply having more naval aviation capacity overall would give the PLAN added flexibility for various operations closer to the mainland, including a potential military intervention against Taiwan or defending its expansive and largely unrecognized territorial claims in places like the South China Sea. Type 076s could also help project naval and air power further from China’s shores, something that has also been a driving factor behind the country’s broader carrier ambitions.”

…

“The Type 076 could help provide support during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Big deck amphibious warfare ships, in general, provide their operators with immensely valuable platforms for projecting both hard and soft power.”

Sichuan is reflective of a larger effort by the PLAN to significantly expand its capabilities and operational capacity, including for projecting power well beyond China’s shores and any regional contingencies. A dramatic expansion in the naval aviation realm has been a particular centerpiece of this modernization push, which traces all the way back to the 1990s. This is all further underscored by the increasingly strong evidence that China’s next supercarrier will be a nuclear-powered design.

Whether the PLAN’s current ambitions include plans to acquire more Type 076s is unclear. Putting to sea now is certainly another major step in the process of getting Sichuan into actual operational service.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Recent imagery indicates that China is progressing with work on a new aircraft carrier, its fourth, which is expected by many sources to introduce nuclear propulsion. A new detail that is now visible of the makings of the ship’s hull structure would appear to directly support this. The development comes just a week after the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first domestically produced carrier, the Fujian. Meanwhile, there are increasing reports that Beijing may also still be working on at least one more conventionally powered carrier, too.

Imagery of the new carrier, commonly referred to as the Type 004, shows the vessel taking shape at Dalian shipyard in China’s Liaoning province. Visible now is what looks to be a reactor containment structure, which would be a key indicator of its propulsion system. Certainly, the structure is broadly similar to that which is found in U.S. nuclear-powered supercarriers, and there is a general consensus that what we can see here is related to the future installation of a nuclear reactor. However, there remains the possibility that this could be some other test ship or potentially a test module. It could also be a case of this feature looking like it exists for one purpose, but it ends up being for another, although that seems less unlikely.

Renderings related to the Type 004 design that have emerged in the past have shown similarities to the U.S. Navy’s Ford class, as well as France’s future New Generation Aircraft Carrier, both of which are nuclear-powered.

In its latest assessment of Chinese military power, the Pentagon doesn’t explicitly mention a nuclear-powered carrier, but does note that China’s “next generation of carriers” will be characterized by “greater endurance,” which “will increase the striking power of a potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond the PRC’s immediate periphery.”

In March of this year, Yuan Huazhi, political commissar for the PLAN, confirmed that construction of a fourth carrier had begun, but declined to answer whether it would be nuclear-powered.

Almost exactly a year ago, evidence emerged that China had constructed a land-based prototype nuclear reactor suitable for a large surface warship. The so-called Dragon Might project is located at a mountain site outside the city of Leshan, in Sichuan province.

The shift to nuclear power for China’s fourth carrier is hugely significant.

Nuclear propulsion will give the Type 004 effectively unlimited range. It will also help meet the power-generation requirements of ever-improving sensors and other mission systems. A nuclear-powered supercarrier would go a long way toward closing the technical gap with the U.S. Navy, and would see China join France as the only other nation operating a nuclear-powered flattop.

Previous satellite imagery confirmed that construction work on the carrier was underway in Dalian before May 2024, when a module, a section of the flight deck, first appeared in satellite imagery.

Apparently evident in the module were trenches for catapult tracks, suggesting that the Type 004 will have two waist catapults, in addition to the two bow catapults. This would match the arrangement of the Nimitz and Ford classes and would add an extra catapult compared with China’s third carrier, the Type 003 Fujian, which has a single catapult in the waist position.

In other respects, too, the Type 004 is expected to be an overall more advanced design than Liaoning and Shandong, which are by now well established with the PLAN fleet, as well as the Fujian.

Like Fujian — and in contrast to the two previous carriers — the Type 004 will be equipped to launch aircraft via catapults. The earlier Shandong and the Liaoning are both short takeoff but arrested recovery, or STOBAR, types with prominent ‘ski jump’ takeoff ramps. Catapults offer numerous advantages, especially when it comes to launching aircraft at higher gross weights, which translates to larger fuel and ordnance loads. They can also generally accommodate a wider array of aircraft types, too. This includes larger and slower designs, like the KJ-600 carrier-based airborne early warning and control aircraft, as well as smaller ones, such as drones.

Like the Fujian, the Type 004 will presumably be equipped with an advanced electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), a type of equipment otherwise only in use with the U.S. Navy.

As well as the aforementioned KJ-600, the Type 004’s air wing will likely include the J-35 stealth fighter, supported by advanced developments of the J-15 multirole fighter, including an electronic warfare variant. The carrier is also likely to embark various drones, such as navalized versions of the GJ-11 uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), plus helicopters.

Intriguingly, however, China is reportedly also working in parallel on another new carrier, this one being conventionally powered.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that, in addition to the Type 004 at Dalian, China is poised to start working on a conventionally powered carrier at Jiangnan in Shanghai. This location would make sense inasmuch as this was the yard that built the Fujian. If these reports are correct, the finished product would likely be an improved Type 003 design.

Via Chaos314159/SDF:

“The latest Sentinel satellite imagery suggests that Jiangnan is cleaning a platform outside the dock, raising questions about whether this indicates the start of construction on the so-called Type 003A aircraft carrier.”

Does anyone know more? 🤨🤔 pic.twitter.com/sCSduadhM0

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 11, 2025

Considering China’s huge shipbuilding capacity, it might well make sense to pursue two distinct new-generation carrier designs. An improved Type 003 — which some observers have begun to dub Type 003A — would offer the advantages of a proven design and lower costs, while the more ambitious Type 004 would be more expensive and higher risk.

The model below depicts a follow-on conventionally powered carrier, with the pennant number CV-19, but the source is unknown, and it may or may not be official. Notably, however, the island superstructure has major similarities with that seen on the large-scale, land-based aircraft carrier test facility in Wuhan.

There’s also an argument that China doesn’t necessarily need nuclear-powered carriers for many of its missions. While a nuclear-powered carrier would be a huge advantage for sustained blue-water operations across the globe, for contingencies closer to home, such as in the Taiwan Strait, and even in the disputed South China Sea, a force of conventionally powered flattops is still highly relevant. Conventionally powered carriers have the added advantage that they can be built more quickly and fielded in greater numbers given a set budget, although they are more dependent on a steady supply train, which can be vulnerable in a time of conflict. For its part, even a nuclear-powered carrier still requires a steady supply of other supplies, including fuel for its air wing and for its escorts.

At the same time, it should be noted that China is also working to introduce a number of very large big-deck amphibious assault ships, referred to as the Type 076. Each will feature at least one electromagnetic catapult that is expected to be primarily used to launch drones, as you can read more about here. Again, these would appear to be tailor-made for missions directed against Taiwan, as well as for power projection in the South China Sea.

Continued construction work on what is increasingly likely to be a nuclear-powered carrier, and the possibility of another type of conventional flattop in the works, highlight China’s high ambitions as a naval power and the resources they are willing to invest to achieve their maritime vision. While these developments are significant, it should also be recalled that, for the time being, the PLAN’s fleet of three conventionally powered carriers is still vastly outmatched by the U.S. Navy’s 11 active nuclear-powered supercarriers. Nevertheless, the gap is growing smaller at what seems like an increasing pace.

Contact the author: [email protected]

China’s AI models are quickly gaining traction in Silicon Valley, becoming integral to the operations of American companies and earning the praise of a growing list of tech leaders.

Their rapid ascent has highlighted the competitive edge that Chinese developers such as Alibaba, Z.ai, Moonshot, and MiniMax have been able to gain by offering so-called “open” language models at much lower costs than their rivals in the United States.

The trend has also cast a critical glare on the US’s efforts to stunt China’s tech sector with export controls on advanced chips, which have not stopped Chinese developers from approaching the capabilities of Silicon Valley’s tech giants.

Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky generated headlines in October when he revealed that the short-term rental platform had opted for Alibaba’s Qwen over OpenAI’s ChatGPT, praising the Chinese model as “fast and cheap”.

Social Capital CEO Chamath Palihapitiya revealed the same month that his company had migrated much of its work to Moonshot’s Kimi K2 as it was “way more performant” and “a ton cheaper” than models from OpenAI and Anthropic.

Programmers on social media also recently highlighted evidence that two popular US-developed coding assistants, Composer and Windsurf, were built on Chinese models.

The assistants’ developers, Cursor and Cognition AI, have not publicly confirmed their use of Chinese technology and did not respond to requests for comment, though Z.ai has said the speculation aligns with its “internal findings.”

Nathan Lambert, a machine learning researcher who founded the Atom Project, an initiative to promote open models in the US, said such public examples were the “tip of the iceberg”.

“Chinese open models have become a de facto standard among startups in the US,” Lambert told Al Jazeera.

“I’ve personally heard of many other high-profile cases, where the most valued and hyped American AI startups are starting training models on the likes of Qwen, Kimi, GLM or DeepSeek,” Lambert said, adding that many US firms have been reluctant to publicly disclose their use of Chinese technology.

While it is not possible to precisely quantify the usage of different AI models, industry data points to the rising popularity of Chinese offerings.

Chinese AI tools, including MiniMax’s M2, Z.ai’s GLM 4.6 and DeepSeek’s V3.2, took up seven spots among the 20 models with the most usage last week, according to data from OpenRouter, a platform that connects developers with AI models.

Among the top 10 models used for programming, four were developed by Chinese firms, according to OpenRouter.

In the open model space, China’s clear lead is evident, with cumulative downloads surpassing 540 million as of October, according to an Atom Project analysis of data from hosting platform Hugging Face.

Rui Ma, the founder of Tech Buzz China, said Chinese models are particularly attractive to fledgling startups, while “high-resource organisations” have gravitated towards premium US models.

“These are typically cost-conscious early-stage companies that experiment widely, and many of them will not survive,” Ma told Al Jazeera.

Unlike leading US platforms such as ChatGPT, China’s open-weight large language models make their trained parameters – called weights – publicly available.

While open-weight models do not generate licensing or subscription fees, running them at enterprise scale requires large amounts of computing power, which creators can offer to users at a cost.

Developers such as Beijing-based Z.ai and Hangzhou-based DeepSeek have reported using older-generation chips that are not subject to US export controls, in relatively small quantities, dramatically reducing training and hardware costs compared with their Silicon Valley rivals.

“The success of these Chinese models demonstrates the failure of export controls to limit China,” Toby Walsh, an expert in AI at the University of New South Wales, told Al Jazeera.

“Indeed, they’ve actually encouraged Chinese companies to be more resourceful and build better models that are smaller and are trained on and run on older generation hardware. Necessity is the mother of invention.”

With lower input costs, Chinese firms have been able to offer their services far more cheaply than their US peers.

In an analysis published by AllianceBernstein in February, DeepSeek’s pricing for its models at the time was estimated to be up to 40 times cheaper than OpenAI’s, for instance.

“I do think China’s AI progress has been underestimated, partly because the signal is fragmented,” Greg Slabaugh, a professor who studies AI at Queen Mary University of London, told Al Jazeera.

“Much of the uptake of Chinese models is in China. China’s scale in AI publications and patents has long been visible; the emergence of open-weight models simply makes that capability more globally consumable.”

Some industry analysts have likened China’s approach to AI to the strategy undertaken by Chinese firms in other industries, such as solar panels, that flooded markets with cheap goods.

“This is the solar panel playbook running on software,” Poe Zhao, a Beijing-based tech analyst, wrote last week in his Substack newsletter, Hello China Tech.

But while Chinese AI models have made inroads with their low cost, US tech giants are in a strong position to dominate the high-end market and highly regulated sectors where considerations such as national security are paramount, according to analysts.

Ma, the Tech Buzz China founder, said the development of AI could end up following a similar trajectory to the Android and iPhone platforms, the former of which has about three times as many users worldwide.

“Over the longer term – likely faster than what we saw in the mobile era – it’s entirely possible that AI adoption might follow similar economic dynamics. There are simply more users in the world who prioritise affordability than those who choose premium options,” Ma said.

“But that doesn’t mean the greatest margins or market capitalisation will exist at the low end; value may still concentrate where differentiation, performance and trust command a premium.”

“In Fortune 500 and regulated sectors, widespread adoption is probably not imminent,” said Slabaugh, the Queen Mary University of London professor, referring to the uptake of Chinese models.

“If there is a ‘rude awakening’, it may come on the pricing and flexibility front rather than from a sudden displacement of US models.”

A month after the emergence of satellite imagery that showed GJ-11 stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAV) in at least a semi-operational state, China has released the first air-to-air video of the drone — and, as far as we know, the first official imagery of any kind showing the real aircraft. China also revealed that the official People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) name for the GJ-11 is Mysterious Dragon, alternatively translated as Fantasy Dragon. This appears to have superseded the Sharp Sword name that was previously applied, and which likely referred to prototype and pre-production aircraft.

The development comes a little over a year after TWZ reported in detail on growing evidence of the GJ-11 moving ever closer to operational status.

The GJ-11 entered development more than a decade ago and is widely assessed to be designed to perform both penetrating air-to-surface strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. It may well also be expected to take on other roles, including air-to-air combat and electronic warfare. UCAVs of this size have long endurance, much longer than crewed tactical jet counterparts, while still carrying a relevant payload.

The air-to-air footage and other clips of the GJ-11 appear toward the end of a nearly 30-minute video released by the PLAAF to commemorate the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army. The video notably includes the GJ-11 flying in formation with a J-20 stealth fighter and a J-16D electronic attack aircraft. One sequence also shows, apparently for the first time, a J-20 launching a medium-range air-to-air missile, likely a PL-15, fired from its internal weapons bay.

Showing the drone aloft with these two crewed combat is notable and not just as they represent two of the most modern and capable designs in the PLAAF inventory. In particular, both the J-16 and (two-seat versions of) the J-20 have been considered as likely ‘airborne drone controllers’ for types like the GJ-11.

China certainly has a great interest in having drones work alongside crewed platforms, as well as to operate cooperatively, and potentially do so with a high degree of autonomy. As TWZ has highlighted for several years now, the two-seat variant of the J-20 would be an ideal candidate as an airborne drone controller.

Un passage dans un reportage de CCTV-7 montre la possible collaboration entre un J-20 biplace et des #drones GJ-11 à faible observabilité.

La représentativité est à confirmer. pic.twitter.com/9Xy8Q8KQOO

— East Pendulum (@HenriKenhmann) October 12, 2022

Some observers have taken the footage as confirmation that the GJ-11 is now in operational service with the PLAAF. While the video alone is not enough to determine that the drone is in operational use, especially not in any truly meaningful way, it’s another sign that this milestone is fast approaching, if it hasn’t already been attained.

Last month, we reported on satellite imagery showing three GJ-11s at Shigatse Air Base, in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, where they were present from August 6 through September 5. The appearance of the UCAVs at this very active dual-use military-civilian airport was a strong indicator that they were now in operational test, at least, if not operational service. In particular, the base is in a strategic position along China’s southwestern flank with India, close to some of the border areas that have seen sometimes violent skirmishes between the two nations.

A prototype of the GJ-11 was first flown in 2013, in a much less stealthy form. The design was then considerably refined, and a mockup of the new-look version appeared at a parade in Beijing in 2019. It now featured major improvements in terms of low observability, including a completely redesigned rear aspect with a stealthier exhaust.

Prior to being spotted at Shigatse, and now in the PLAAF video, the GJ-11 was primarily known through its appearances at various test facilities. Such locations have included the enormous and secretive base at Malan in Xinjiang province, where examples of the UCAV have been regularly seen flying for more than a year now. Mockups have also been included in parades and have been spotted at Chinese naval test and training facilities.

China clearly has aspirations to operate the drone, or a version of it, from aircraft carriers and big deck amphibious assault ships, and the continued work on a naval variant or derivative capable of doing this has led to a string of unofficial designations, including GJ-11H, GJ-11J, and GJ-21.

Via ACuriousPLAFan/SDF: 😮

Supposedly not a recent image, but still the carrier mock-up and test facility at Wuhan has gained some new aircraft: Visible now are clearly mock-ups of J-15, J-35, KJ-600 and a GJ-11H on the flight deck.

(Image via @伏尔戈星图 from Weibo) pic.twitter.com/UL6uk81zh4

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) December 19, 2023

More recently, a navalized version of the drone appeared in flight, with its arrester hook lowered, as seen in the imagery below.

As it seems, for the first time clear images of a GJ-21 in flight are posted and this one – based on the still installed pitots – has its tail hook down. pic.twitter.com/5h1nVZHzIe

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 1, 2025

Whatever way the PLA intends to employ it, the GJ-11 further underscores just how seriously China is taking the development of flying-wing uncrewed aircraft, an area that is currently the beneficiary of heavy investment. As we have repeatedly discussed in the past, this approach is very much at odds with the U.S. military’s eschewing of such designs, with very little evidence of parallel activities, at least publicly. The puzzling case of America’s ‘missing’ UCAVs is something you can read more about in this past TWZ feature.

In the meantime, other countries are putting more resources into flying-wing UCAV programs, among them Russia, India, Turkey, and France.

Another Chinese stealthy flying-wing drone, the CH-7, has meanwhile been seen for the first time in the air, in unofficial footage captured from the ground. Compared to the drone when it was seen previously on the ground, the videos showing the drone in flight reveal that it has been fitted with additional outward-canted vertical tail surfaces. Attachment points for these tailfins appear to be present in previous imagery of the drone; likely, they are intended for testing purposes, as part of envelope expansion.

Besides the official unveiling of the GJ-11 also another flying wing UAV/UCAV – namely the CH-7 – was seen for the first time flying; however quite surprisingly with additional tails attached. pic.twitter.com/YCG04PCBdr

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 11, 2025

While the CH-7 remains generally mysterious, it is notably large and is another pointer toward China’s accelerated efforts to develop low-observable, long-endurance drones. The CH-7 appears likely to be tailored for ISR, but there have been claims that it will also undertake strike missions as a UCAV. Similar in configuration to the CH-7, but significantly larger, are two other flying-wing drones, both of which were spotted at Malan. In both cases, TWZ was first to report on these larger drones. 

Combined, the new videos of the GJ-11 and the CH-7 reflect something that TWZ has long predicted, namely that China has invested very heavily in flying-wing drones, for both land-based and naval applications. In the case of the GJ-11, in particular, its path toward becoming a feature of regular PLAAF operations should come as no surprise, and it seems certain that other Chinese flying-wing drones and UCAVs will follow the same path.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Apple has removed two popular gay dating apps in China in response to the government’s continued policing of LGBTQIA+ related online content.

According to a recent report from Wired, Blued and Finka disappeared from the company’s App Store in China after the country’s internet regulator issued an order.

“We follow the laws in the countries where we operate. Based on an order from the Cyberspace Administration of China, we have removed these two apps from the China storefront only,” an Apple spokesperson told the news outlet in an email statement.

The spokesperson went on to say that the two apps, owned by parent company BlueCity, had already dialled back availability before being completely removed.

“Earlier this year, the developer of Finka elected to remove the app from storefronts outside of China, and Blued was available only in China,” they added.

While Finka and Blued can no longer be downloaded from the App Store, users who already have the app can still access them.

Over the last few years, the LGBTQIA+ community in China has faced relentless censorship by the government.

In 2020, the country’s annual Pride celebration, Shanghai Pride, was unceremoniously shut down.

The following year, dozens of queer-related accounts on the popular messaging app WeChat were removed, and all their content was deleted.

In 2022, Grindr disappeared from China’s App Store a few days after the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) launched a month-long campaign to remove content it deemed problematic.

The Chinese government has also censored LGBTQIA+ content within other sectors of the entertainment sphere.

In 2021, CAC introduced a new policy banning any “effeminate” male characters, established queer relationships and characters with “no clear gender” in video games.

Films like Alien: Covenant, Bohemian Rhapsody and Together also faced censorship in China, with their LGBTQIA+ content either getting chopped or altered to fit a heterosexual narrative.

In 2018, Chinese broadcaster Mango TV cut Ireland’s performance from the Eurovision semi-finals due to the inclusion of two same-sex dancers.

Three years later, the country’s top three streaming platforms – iQiyi, Tencent Video and Alibaba’s Youku – took out a segment from the Friends reunion that celebrated the show’s LGBTQIA+ fans.

Lastly, in 2024, eagle-eyed viewers of Netflix’s hit series Arcane noticed that scenes depicting Vi and Caitlyn’s romance were either heavily censored or cut altogether.

China has ramped up its weapons development programs to a breathtaking degree, introducing waves of new missiles, ground combat systems, and vessels, as well as vastly expanding its nuclear triad. In just the past few months alone, China showed off gobs of new hardware, especially during its Victory Day parade in September. But above all else, Beijing’s developments in the air combat arena have been most stunning to observe. Autonomous combat drones, from relatively small to extremely large, and everything in between, to the emergence of tailless J-XDS and J-36 tactical jets, and ever sub-variations of them, as well as flying a stealth fighter from its new carrier, are among the revelations piling up at an increasing pace.

The status of these weapons programs and how many are real or merely meant to confuse and overwhelm foreign intelligence isn’t clear, but based on historic precedent, the notion that many are decoys isn’t supported. With so much development emerging publicly, and so much more going on clandestinely, along with other developments around an increasingly troubled globe, including from an active war in Ukraine, a critical question must be raised: Is the American intelligence apparatus able to deal with so much foreign technological change at one time?

Not since the height of the Cold War have so many military advancements and individual adversary weapons programs flooded the space. Does the U.S. intelligence community have the raw capacity to adequately deal with this now and sustain it for the foreseeable future?

With the Defense Intelligence Agency declining to comment and the CIA not responding to our queries, we reached out to a number of experts in the field to get their sense of how the U.S. intelligence community (USIC) is able to process and track this growing wave of weapons programs and provide adequate analysis for the White House, Pentagon and Congress. The responses we received vary quite dramatically. This is step one in trying to get a clear answer to this glaring question. We will be following up with more on the topic in the future.

The answers to our question from our experts have been lightly edited for clarity.

Timothy Heath, senior international defense researcher at RAND Corporation:

“China’s largest and growing inventory of modern weapons does pose a challenge to U.S. intelligence collection efforts. U.S. intelligence capabilities are quite sophisticated and can collect considerable data on systems once they are deployed. However, it is more useful to anticipate future weapons or programs in development and this is probably much more difficult for U.S. intelligence to accurately determine due to the secretive nature of Chinese weapons programs. Thus, U.S. intelligence is at some risk of being surprised by the emergence of new weapons systems.

Some types or programs are easier to monitor and predict than others. Warships, for example, are hard to hide and only built in a few locations. This makes it easier for U.S. intelligence to monitor. Missiles, directed energy, and hi-tech systems are smaller and easier to hide, which makes it harder for U.S. intelligence to collect.

Perhaps even more challenging than intelligence collection is the problem of how to counter the weapons. Chinese technology has improved considerably and many of their weapons and equipment systems lag only that of the United States. These are sophisticated and deadly systems and could pose a serious challenge to U.S. military forces on the battlefield. Developing counters to weapons such as hypersonic anti-ship missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and stealth aircraft all require enormous sums of money and new technology. Even still, it is unclear if the U.S. can effectively counter some of these new systems, which raise questions about the ability of U.S. military forces to survive and fight in a conflict near China’s coast.”

Brad Bowman, senior director at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Center on Military & Political Power:

“Beijing revealed a remarkable quantity of weapons in the parade back in September. It is vital that the United States Intelligence Community and the Pentagon understand the capabilities of the systems displayed, distinguishing between systems that are hyped versus those that represent real advancements in capability. That is easier said than done and takes time and serious expertise to accomplish accurately. The importance and difficulty of this task is another reason why we need a large, effective, and well-funded intelligence community to understand our adversaries, their intentions, and their military capabilities – so decision makers can make informed decisions on how to respond.

I am all for efficiency in government, but the effectiveness of our intelligence community is a higher priority than efficiency, particularly in this dangerous geo-strategic moment for Americans.

It is possible that Beijing is happy to inundate the U.S. intelligence community with an enormous quantity of systems and munitions to scrutinize. But a more prudent approach in Washington is to assume that Beijing actually means what it says and is sprinting to develop and field military capabilities that it hopes could conquer Taiwan and defeat the U.S. military in the Pacific.

If Beijing is trying to portray more advanced military capabilities than it actually possesses, it would not be the first country to do so. Then again, we have also seen examples in which Americans were unwisely dismissive of adversary capabilities. We should neither exaggerate nor dismiss what we are seeing from China. We should try to understand the actual capabilities of each system, and then realize that those capabilities can change quickly.

When it comes to adversary parades and static displays, there is always more than one intended audience. Washington is no doubt on the short list of intended audiences, but Beijing is also sending messages to America’s partners, to the Chinese people, and to the PRC’s partners, including the other members of the axis of aggressors – Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Regardless, the split screen between a historic expansion in military capabilities in China and a government shutdown in America could not be more jarring and troubling.”

Zack Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies U.S. strategy in Asia, including alliance dynamics and U.S.-China competition:

“I think the United States is certainly concerned about some of the new systems shown by Beijing, but many experts have expected China to continue developing more advanced uncrewed systems and long-range missiles, so I wouldn’t say that those are huge surprises. 

The United States has a number of intelligence agencies with deep expertise on weapons systems, so although I’m sure they are busy watching these new developments, I doubt that they are overwhelmed. At the end of the day, we’re really only talking about a handful of truly new systems, so the magnitude of the challenge is probably workable, even if it does require a substantial amount of time and attention at DIA and elsewhere.

Christopher Miller, former acting defense secretary from November 2020 to January 2021 during the first Trump administration:

“I don’t think there was concern about the ability to track and analyze Chinese weapons programs. It was a pretty standard collection requirement. Now, how effective they were ……I don’t know how effective they were. I am out of the business now. 

The large number of programs was not a concern. It was a pretty standard collection requirement. The challenge was prioritization because of so many different constituencies pushing their ‘pet rocks.’  But that is simply part of the churn. It was never a crisis issue — just typical process. 

Questions about being adequately resourced was the standard pathology of the IC — ‘they NEVER have enough resources’; the political masters don’t understand the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)!! ‘Woe is us; etc.’  It was/is their SOP.”

Robert Peters, senior research fellow for strategic deterrence in the Allison Center for National Security:

“How overwhelming, or not, for the USIC are Chinese new weaponry like those seen so far in parade preps and programs, like the long-range bombers, UAVs etc? They are a problem, both the quantity and diversity of systems displayed, but we should not make the Chinese out to be 10 feet tall. It is unclear how many of these systems are real vs. how many are mockups. And even if they are all real, it is unclear how effective these systems are. 

As an example, the U.S. Air Force recently said that the Chinese ‘stealth bomber’ — which looks for all the world like a B-2 Stealth bomber— has no stealth characteristics at all, it simply looks like a stealth bomber.

Further, even if these systems are highly capable, it is unclear how or how well the PLA would employ them. The PLA has not fought in a kinetic conflict since 1979, so they have no real-world experience in combat operations. While they certainly exercise jointly, exercises are far different than battlefield effectiveness. So we should look at what the Chinese are producing with seriousness, but we should not be fatalistic about them. 

Is this affecting the USIC and the military’s ability to get a handle on this? The Chinese military buildup — particularly is numbers of fifth-generation fighters, naval surface combatants, missiles, and nuclear warheads — presents a real challenge for the United States, yes.

The quantity they are able to produce, coupled with their ability to focus their combat power on a specific theater close to home, is the challenge for us. Even if you believe that U.S. military capabilities are qualitatively superior to Chinese capabilities (which, I do believe), the U.S. is a global power. It has aircraft carrier strike groups operating in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and the Pacific. It has ground and air forces deployed on six continents. This is because the United States has global commitments. China is able to field an enormous quantity of combat power on the Western Pacific, focus it, and achieve results, even with a qualitatively inferior force, while the U.S. would be pulling forces from around the world during a contingency. 

It will require a significant amount of analysts to track and analyze these forces, but I think we have the manpower to make it happen.”

Once again, this is our first look into this unique facet of the growing military technology race between the U.S. and China. Stay tuned for follow-ups.

Contact the author: [email protected]

We now have the first known commercial satellite imagery of the two Chinese sixth-generation stealth fighter designs that emerged nearly a year ago. The aircraft, which are commonly referred to now as the J-36 and the J-XDS, have been spotted in separate images not at their home airfields where they were built, but at a secretive airbase with a massive runway situated near the Lop Nur nuclear test site in northwestern China.

The J-36, readily identifiable by its large modified delta planform and ‘splinter’ camouflage paint scheme, is seen outside the main hangar at the facility’s central apron in an archived satellite image taken on August 27, which The War Zone obtained from Planet Labs. The J-XDS is seen in another Planet Labs image of the airfield taken on September 13. Previously, the J-36 and J-XDS have only been definitively spotted flying in and out of the main airfields associated with their respective manufacturers, Chengdu and Shenyang. Readers can find TWZ‘s very in-depth initial analysis on the J-36 and the J-XDS here.

This particular base near Lop Nur, which has been linked to work on reusable space planes, is also now undergoing a major expansion. It notably already has a runway over 16,400 feet long, or more than 3 miles in total length, making it one of the longest anywhere in the world.

The August 27 satellite image offers new details about the J-36’s size, showing it to have a wingspan of approximately 65 feet and an overall length of some 62 feet. It has already been clear that the three-engined J-36, two distinctly different prototypes of which have now emerged, is a very large tactical aircraft. For comparison, members of the extended Soviet-designed Flanker fighter family, like China’s J-16s, have wingspans of around 48 feet. Flankers are already well known for their large size relative to other fourth-generation fighter designs. As another point of comparison, the variable geometry F-111’s fully extended wingspan was 63 feet.

The September 13 image shows the J-XDS to have a wingspan of around 50 feet and be slightly shorter than the J-36. It’s worth noting that the shadow and image resolution make this estimate more challenging, and readers are advised to take it as such. It has been previously established that the twin-engined J-XDS, also sometimes referred to as the J-50, with its “lambda” wing planform, is smaller and slimmer than the J-36. That being said, it is still firmly in the heavy fighter class.

As mentioned, the remote base near Lop Nur is in the process of being expanded in a major way, overall. The work only started in earnest in the past six months or so, and significant progress has already been made. This includes the enlargement of the main apron, with a single new hangar also having been built at the northeastern end. Three smaller hangars, all joined together and that look to be typical of ones for fighter-sized aircraft, have been constructed at the opposite end, as well.

In addition, a host of other new buildings are seen under construction to the immediate southeast, pointing to plans to expand the scope and scale of work being done at the facility. The series of satellite images below gives a sense of the sheer magnitude of work that has been done just since May of this year.

There had already been a pronounced expansion of the infrastructure at the base in the early 2020s, including the construction of the large main hangar and associated apron. As noted, at that time, the facility seemed largely tied to Chinese military space development efforts. TWZ‘s first report on the airfield came in 2020 after a reusable space plane appeared to have landed there. Last year, we reported on it again after satellite imagery emerged showing a still-mysterious object sitting at one end of the runway.

It seems clear now that the facility has taken on a larger and still growing role in China’s broader advanced aerospace development ecosystem. Comparisons have already been drawn in the past to the U.S. military’s top-secret flight test center at Groom Lake in Nevada, better known as Area 51.

The airfield near Lop Nur is even more remote than China’s existing sprawling test airbase near Malan in Xinjiang province, which also seems to be almost exclusively focused, in terms of aerospace development tasks, on uncrewed aircraft. It also appears to host aircraft detachments for more general training and testing.

The construction of new hangars and other infrastructure at the base in question can only further help with the concealment of assets and other activity there from prying eyes, including in space. That being said, the site is regularly imaged, including by commercial satellites, which clearly did not deter the Chinese from parking the J-36 and J-XDS outside in broad daylight.

Regardless, the appearance of the J-36 and J-XDS at the remote base around the same time is also telling of the facility’s new mission to support the development of advanced air combat technologies. It is further indicative of the state of China’s rapidly evolving sixth-generation fighter programs that they have operated out of this place, possibly alongside each other.

All of this reflects a broader ramping up in China of the development and testing of next-generation tactical air combat platforms, as well as key supporting aircraft. This includes a host of advanced drones intended to perform a variety of missions. Some of these designs are very large, while others are smaller and more in the vein of ‘loyal wingman,’ or what is now often called a Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). For example, the satellite image below, from Planet Labs’ archive of shots taken of Malan, shows what is likely a fighter-sized CCA-type uncrewed aircraft.

These Chinese military aviation trends extend into the naval domain, as well. This past weekend, images emerged online that offer the first look at a navalized version of the GJ-11 Sharp Sword stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), intended for operations from aircraft carriers and big deck amphibious assault ships, with its arrestor hook deployed. This drone is sometimes also referred to as the GJ-21.

Even with major construction still underway, the secretive and remote base near Lop Nur is already becoming busier, and has now given us the first commercial satellite imagery showing the J-36 and J-XDS. The facility expansion is likely to see it support future advanced tactical aircraft developments, playing a bigger part in these endeavors going forward.

Contact the author: [email protected]

The draft proposals for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan were approved during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2025. The final plan is expected to be adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026.

   China’s Five-Year Plans have been key strengths of China’s medium- to long-term economic and social development framework since the 1950s. Specifically, it has demonstrated strategic foresight, coordinated planning, and consistent implementation. The key strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan are its focus on high-quality development, particularly by achieving stringent climate targets such as peaking carbon emissions before 2030, while relying on strict monitoring mechanisms and advanced technologies. The plan also promotes innovation and digital transformation, focuses on integrated economic and military development, and leverages investment in research and development.

•  The strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, compared to previous five-year plans, are:

1)       Focus on quality development:

Compared to previous plans that focused on quantitative growth, the 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on quality, innovation, and sustainability rather than simply increasing productivity.

2) Integrated economic and military development:

The new plan systematically integrates scientific and technological innovations across the military and civilian sectors, enhancing national capabilities in a comprehensive manner.

3) Shifting towards a green economy:

The plan features new mechanisms for monitoring and managing carbon emissions, representing a significant shift from previous plans that were less focused on environmental issues.

4)       Investment in Research and Development:

The plan continues to boost investment in research, development, and innovation, a core strength that has enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements.

5) Balanced Development:

The plan seeks to achieve balanced development by supporting resource-rich regions, helping to reduce development gaps between different regions.

6) Investment Opportunities:

The plan opens new horizons for investors in areas such as carbon trading, offsets, and carbon asset management services, boosting national economic development.

Based on our understanding of the previous analysis, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) includes goals for economic and social development, focusing on technological self-reliance, high-quality development, and a real economy. The plan aims to be a crucial link towards achieving socialist modernization by 2035.

All eyes are on Beijing as the Communist Party of China (CPC) convenes to outline the next five years. These meetings take place amidst heightened trade tensions with Washington and mounting domestic challenges. This fourth plenary session of the CPC Central Committee, known as the “Fourth Plenum,” is a pivotal political event in the country, shaping future policies. The four-day closed-door meeting aims to finalize China’s new Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, an economic and political roadmap outlining the priorities of the world’s second-largest economy for the coming years. Approximately 370 members of the Central Committee, led by “Xi Jinping,” are participating in the meeting, with expectations of changes in some leadership positions, although details of these changes may not be revealed for several days or weeks. The full details of the plan are expected to be announced during the annual session of the National People’s Congress in March 2026.  Perhaps the most important things for the Chinese leadership at the moment are stability, legitimacy, and continued support. Therefore, it is crucial that they demonstrate their ability to improve the quality of life, as this is the cornerstone of their legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

 Many objectives of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) have come to fruition. The assessment of the key economic and social development achievements under the 14th Five-Year Plan, according to my view, is very positive, especially since they have global impacts in many aspects, such as economic growth, new quality productive forces, high-level opening-up, green transition, technological innovation, international cooperation, cultural and academic exchange, etc.

  As China’s 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025) draws to a close, the country has achieved a number of notable accomplishments, including fostering a resilient economy and making tangible strides in technology, manufacturing, economic reform, sustainability, and innovation. The country’s strategic plan has supported the country’s high-quality development, contributing to national progress across various sectors in China. China’s five-year plans are strategic guidance documents that chart the country’s development path over five years and form the overall framework for national planning. China will continue its 15th five-year plan in its opening-up and reform process to achieve more balanced and comprehensive development.

 China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will cover the period from 2026 to 2030. Planning began in December 2023. The plan aims to achieve General Secretary Xi Jinping’s goal of doubling the size of the economy between 2020 and 2035. The recommendations of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlined several actionable plans and programs for the national economic and social development of the People’s Republic of China. These plans focus on innovation-driven growth, low-carbon development, and urban-rural integration while deepening social inclusion and addressing the problem of population aging.

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing from October 20 to 23, 2025. A total of 168 members and 147 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the plenary session. Members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and responsible comrades from relevant departments attended as observers. Some comrades from grassroots units and a number of experts and scholars who were delegates to the 20th CPC National Congress also attended as observers. The plenary session was presided over by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and “Xi Jinping”, General Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered an important speech. The plenary session heard and discussed a work report delivered by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPC, commissioned by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and approved, after consideration, the “Proposals of the CPC Central Committee on Compiling the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development.” President Xi Jinping made explanations to the plenary session on the draft of the “Proposals.”

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will be held from October 20 to 23, 2025, to discuss proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for China’s Economic and Social Development. China has achieved significant achievements during the 14th Five-Year Plan, both domestically and internationally. In the new plan, it will continue its pursuit of high-quality development and strengthen international cooperation to achieve a more prosperous shared future.

The 14th Five-Year Plan focuses on achieving high-quality development, encompassing key areas such as scientific and technological innovation, the green economy, improving living standards, and balanced regional development. China’s achievements during this period were not limited to domestic matters but rather extended their impact to the entire world.

  This year, 2025, marks the conclusion of the implementation of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Chinese authorities recently reviewed the most significant achievements made during this period, a development that received widespread attention from the international community. China’s achievements in innovation during the 14th Five-Year Plan represent a global model of scientific and technological self-reliance. Not only did it increase spending on research and development, but it also succeeded in transforming knowledge into a sustainable, productive, and economic force. This reflects a strategic vision that has made China a leader in the fields of artificial intelligence, clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and modern communications. Giant Chinese companies, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Xiaomi, and BYD, have become symbols of this transformation. They have not only succeeded in building global brands but also established integrated innovation systems that blend scientific research with practical application.

 China’s five-year plans have always been an effective tool for driving progress across all sectors. According to my analysis as an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is described as “diverse, innovative, and open.” I expect China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan to continue prioritizing technological innovation, artificial intelligence, social welfare, scientific research, the digital economy, and carbon reduction. China’s development model is unique, with its sole goal of ensuring the prosperity of the Chinese people, under the motto “from the people, for the people.” Taking effective measures and prioritizing the protection and improvement of citizens’ livelihoods have been key factors behind China’s rapid development. This Chinese development model has become an inspiring example by transforming human capital into an engine of growth.

  Based on the previous analysis, perhaps what most caught my attention during China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is the significant Chinese focus on the innovation sector at the forefront. Over the past five years, the country’s total investment in research and development (R&D) has reached record levels. By 2024, China’s R&D spending will have increased by about 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, since the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission.