China

The US Senate approved its strongest move against Russia under Trump, advancing sanctions that could impose tariffs on major buyers including India and China.

“Our main goal is to empower robots’ brains.”

China has launched its first robot school, where a number of humanoid robots are trained before transitioning into the workforce.

Humanoid robots are no longer a laboratory experiment; they are a growing market. Morgan Stanley estimates it could hit $5 trillion by 2050, with more than a billion humanoids in use worldwide.

However, much of the global robot supply chain runs through China. It produces robot components at a scale and a price its competitors struggle to match.

The United States has banned imports of foreign-made humanoid robots, citing national security. It has also blocked power inverters used in data centres and solar energy systems. The move is seen as part of a broader effort to protect US industry and limit China’s technological rise.

Min Aung Hlaing stressed that his government was focused on ending the civil war and restoring peace.

The head of Myanmar’s military-backed government has met Thailand’s prime minister in Bangkok as he seeks to boost his government’s legitimacy more than five years after seizing power.

President Min Aung Hlaing arrived in Thailand’s capital on Thursday, on his first official visit to the country since taking power in a coup in 2021.

Myanmar remains in the midst of a bloody civil war triggered by the coup, which has killed more than 100,000 people, according to monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

During a meeting with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, Min Aung Hlaing stressed that Myanmar’s military-backed government was focused on ending the civil war and restoring peace to the resource-rich country.

“Myanmar has now reestablished itself on the path to democracy and is moving toward a better future,” Min Aung Hlaing said. “As the new government, we have now begun working on national stability, peace, and national reconciliation.”

Min Aung Hlaing is pushing for Myanmar to be readmitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from which his government was barred after failing to implement a peace plan agreed with member states in 2021.

Thailand is one of Myanmar’s top foreign investors and has called for a “calibrated re-engagement approach” with its neighbour, with which it shares a 2,400km (1500-mile) border.

Following the meeting, the two leaders delivered speeches at the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum.

Anutin said Thailand and Myanmar are ready to “step into the new chapter of economic cooperation that is built upon mutual trust and benefit for the people of the two countries”.

Min Aung Hlaing told attendees they could “invest with confidence” in Myanmar’s energy, agriculture, manufacturing, healthcare, technology and other sectors.

The visit has drawn criticism from activist groups such as Justice For Myanmar, which stated that the trip lends “false legitimacy” to Min Aung Hlaing and the ruling generals.

About a dozen demonstrators gathered outside the United Nations regional headquarters in Bangkok to oppose the visit. Some protesters could be seen holding placards denouncing him as a “criminal” who was not welcome in Thailand.

Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as president of Myanmar in April following an election that UN experts dismissed as a “sham”.

Western governments have shunned and sanctioned Min Aung Hlaing and his associates for overthrowing Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. Subsequent serious rights violations followed a deadly military crackdown on protests, which subsequently triggered a nationwide armed resistance movement and a bloody civil war.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who was overthrown in 2021 and remains under house arrest, was allowed to meet a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Monday.

Suu Kyi’s son Kim Aris welcomed the development but cautioned that he has not yet received independent confirmation of his mother’s condition or wellbeing.

Critics say the visit was a government stunt as it tries to rehabilitate its image.

Aug. 6 (UPI) — China has issued retaliatory sanctions against seven U.S. companies and organizations it accused of aiding U.S. punitive measures targeting Beijing, the latest tit-for-tat move between the world’s two largest economic powers, issued weeks before Chinese leader Xi Jinping‘s September visit to Washington.

Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce issued the sanctions in separate orders Wednesday, effectively imposing a China-wide ban on commercial and institutional dealings with the seven entities.

Applied DNA Sciences Inc. Stratum Reservoir LLC, Altana Technologies Inc., Responsible Business Alliance, Verite Group Inc, and Human Rights in China were blacklisted for assisting and supporting “the United States’ illegal sanctions concerning Xinjiang,” the ministry said in a statement.

Compliance Testing LLC was hit for assisting and supporting U.S. Federal Communications Commission actions “harming China’s sovereignty, security and development interests,” the ministry said in a second statement.

China imposed the ban against the five U.S. companies and one nongovernmental organization less than a week after the United States added 43 companies to its Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List, effectively banning the import of their products on thee presumption they were made using the forced labor of Uyghurs in northwestern Xinjiang region.

The U.S. State Department declared China’s treatment of its Uyghur Muslim minority group a genocide in 2021, alleging that Beijing has arbitrarily imprisoned at least 1 million of them. China has been credibly accused of subjecting Uyghurs to forced sterilization, forced labor and forced detention, as well as imposing draconian restrictions on their freedom of religion, expression and movement. Several other governments, as well as legal and civil independent bodies, have also accused China of genocide.

China vehemently rejects the accusations, claiming the camps are for eduction and training.

A Commerce Ministry spokesperson said Wednesday that “China is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposes” the sanctioning of the 43 companies.

The statement announcing the retaliatory measures said the U.S. move seriously violated international law, the basic norms governing international relations and an infringed upon its sovereignty, security and development interests.

It was unclear exactly how the five companies and one nongovernmental organization were involved, but China’s ministry said “their conduct is egregious.”

Human Rights in China, an NGO founded in 1989, condemned being sanctioned by China, calling it “a blatant act of retaliation against entities working to ensure that international trade and commerce are not tainted by forced labor and other serious human rights abuses.”

“It is another attempt by the Chinese government to intimidate and silence organizations that advocate for universal human rights and corporate accountability,” it said in a statement.

“While we were surprised to find HRIC included alongside organizations we were previously unfamiliar with, we regard this designation as a badge of honor.”

The ministry blacklisted Compliance Testing after the FCC on July 28 banned foreign-made humanoid robots and power inverters, a move that some said specifically targeted China. It also came amid reports that the Trump administration was drafting a ban on Chinese data center components.

Compliance Testing’s alleged involvement was not clear, but China’s Commerce Ministry alleged that it was involved in the FCC’s measures “seriously infringing upon the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of Chinese companies.”

In response to reports concerning the drafting of the new Chinese electronics ban, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said, “China opposes the U.S. overstretching the concept of national security and abusing state power to go after Chinese businesses.”

“Protectionism will not make the U.S. more competitive. The U.S. move seriously disrupts normal trade and economic exchanges between Chinese and U.S. businesses and consumers or anyone else for that matter,” he said in a statement. “China will continue firmly protecting our businesses’ legitimate and lawful rights and interests.”

The countermeasures come weeks before Xi is expected to visit Washington on Sept. 24 for talks with Trump on artificial intelligence, technological competition and global economic relations.

As a wave of cheap Chinese imports has flooded the EU in recent years, Brussels is now facing a new challenge: new import routes passing through Morocco and Turkey, the EU’s neighbouring countries, where Beijing can leverage tariff-free trade agreements with the bloc.

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By investing heavily in those countries, China is seeking to circumvent the EU’s trade barriers, including the extra duties imposed by the EU on products such as electric vehicles, and channel its industrial overcapacity into the European market.

European policymakers are now bracing for a surge in low-cost Chinese goods entering duty-free through these gateway countries, thanks to an association agreement that liberalises trade with Morocco and a customs union linking Turkey to the EU.

The European Commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance a trade relationship that has left the EU with a €1 billion deficit. However, it is not guaranteed to reach concrete results by October — the deadline set by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.

Brussels has already made clear it is prepared to deploy new unilateral trade defence measures. But Beijing is becoming increasingly adept at getting around the EU’s traditional trade tools, particularly trade defence tariffs.

Its circumvention strategy is now to go through Morocco and Turkey, which are becoming the new front line in the EU’s trade battle with China.

Billions in investments

Over the last four years, these investments have reached a record $6 billion in Morocco and $2 billion in Turkey, according to Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.

Cairo is also attracting Chinese money, with $6 billion invested in 2025 alone. But Chinese products made in Egypt are mainly exported to the US and Gulf countries.

In Morocco, Beijing has been investing in an entire electric vehicles (EV) manufacturing ecosystem. “There is a genuine long-term trend that began after COVID-19. We are seeing Chinese companies setting up operations in the country to manufacture high-value-added goods,” Armand Meyer, an expert at Rhodium Group, told Euronews.

Chinese battery producer Gotion is settling in the country, along with BTR, Tinci and Huayou, which produce battery materials, APG, an automotive brake manufacturer, and Sentury Tire, a tyre maker. All will soon have factories in Morocco.

The EU, which hit Chinese EVs with anti-subsidy duties in 2024, is concerned about China’s move into neighbouring countries.

In Turkey, part of the investment targets the local market, while Chinese export plans also threaten European producers. China’s EV giant BYD was granted preferential access to the Turkish market to build a factory, although the project has been suspended for now.

“The idea was to build a mega-factory in exchange for an exemption from Turkish import duties, as Turkey imposes tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles,” Meyer said. Chinese home appliance maker Haier is also investing in the country, as is Astronergy, which manufactures solar panels.

China’s manufacturing push in those countries spans multiple sectors, exploiting trade agreements with the EU that cover a wide range of products.

“The free trade agreements with Morocco and Turkey cover almost all goods. So it’s complicated to counter the Chinese export strategy,” Thomas Grjebine, an economist at the French Centre for Research and Expertise on the World Economy, told Euronews.

Grjebine added that China has understood these countries can serve as “a staging ground”, with investments rising year after year.

“Investments in these gateway countries account for about a quarter of China’s total investment in Europe and the Maghreb,” he said.

Reducing Morocco and Turkey’s access to the EU market

However, in March, the Commission proposed a landmark bill called the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) which aims to protect the EU market from foreign competitors — provoking anger from China.

The IAA creates a European preference for access to public procurement and EU public funding schemes, ruling out non-EU countries under certain conditions. China was targeted in particular, leading to threats of retaliation from Beijing.

All foreign countries are now lobbying EU lawmakers, who are discussing the bill, to be considered trusted partners, allowing their products to qualify as “Made in Europe”.

Industries with parts of their value chains outside the EU are also urging MEPs to include those countries. Euronews has learnt that ACEA, for instance, which represents European carmakers in Brussels, has been lobbying EU lawmakers to include Morocco, where many European manufacturers have production plants.

Paradoxically, if Morocco and Turkey — where European carmakers are also established — were considered trusted partners whose products could be labelled “Made in Europe”, it would also serve Beijing’s interests — despite fierce competition with the EU in the automotive sector — as China is building factories there.

“The Chinese know full well that a number of companies have located part of their value chain in those countries and are lobbying hard to ensure that Morocco and Turkey are not excluded from what is considered ‘Made in Europe’,” French socialist MEP Pierre Jouvet told Euronews.

“This is part of Beijing’s investment and tariff circumvention strategy,” he said.

The MEP is campaigning to exclude Morocco and Turkey from the scope of the IAA unless both countries open their public procurement markets to EU companies.

That position is backed by French liberal MEP Christophe Grudler and German Green MEP Anna Cavazzini, who, along with Jouvet, are expected to present a report on the issue to fellow MEPs in September.

EU trade defence instruments lack effectiveness

Without such a bill, the EU’s trade defence instruments remain modest compared with the scale of the coming wave of cheap Chinese products manufactured in those neighbouring countries.

The EU can only tackle Chinese dumping — where a product is sold below its normal value — on a product-by-product basis, as well as tariff circumvention when parts of the goods come from China and have only been assembled in Morocco or Turkey. The Commission usually assesses the value added generated in those countries before deciding whether to sanction Chinese companies with duties.

“For years, it was mostly a matter of transhipment through these countries, with Chinese exporters simply changing the certificate of origin, but defending the EU market has now become far more challenging,” Laurent Ruessmann, partner at law firm RB Legal, told Euronews.

Ruessmann has represented European glass fibre producers — whose products are used as reinforcement materials — in their fight against cheap Chinese imports. Eventually, glass fibre from China and from Chinese companies located in Egypt was hit with EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties in 2020.

But the Commission then had to open new cases involving glass fibre fabrics — used in wind turbine blades — imported from Morocco and Turkey. In 2022, it found that they were made using Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties imposed in 2020, a textbook case of tariff circumvention.

More recently, in 2025, the Commission also slapped countervailing duties on aluminium road wheels made in Morocco after concluding China had unfairly subsidised them.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Chinese companies receive up to eight times more subsidies than Western firms.

With recent investments in Morocco and Turkey, the EU executive is facing a new challenge: Chinese companies are setting up factories abroad, generating more added value in those countries than in China.

“In those cases, the Commission can no longer rely on anti-circumvention rules and has to launch a fresh investigation. The challenge is that it is much more difficult to prove dumping or unfair subsidies, making it far harder to impose duties high enough to protect the European market,” Victor Crochet of law firm Nishimura & Asahi told Euronews.

Looking at recent judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union, however, the lawyer believes EU judges will progressively allow the Commission to be “more aggressive” towards Chinese operations located in the EU’s neighbouring countries.

“The Commission will have to come up with new instruments. It will try to push the boundaries of the concept of circumvention to keep pace with the times, even when the raw materials no longer come from China,” Crochet said.

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military think tanks are closely monitoring the movements of the current Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, and tracking the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. PLA websites are officially monitoring the activities and movements of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, particularly the important air event for China: the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), especially as the Egyptian Air Force and Ministry of Defense prepare to launch the second edition of the exhibition (EIAS 2026) at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026.

As an Egyptian expert specializing primarily in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can deconstruct, analyze, and evaluate the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles regarding the role and actions of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and its minister, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, as follows:

– First: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers are closely monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in hosting the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition.

This event is considered regionally significant for China, serving as a platform to connect defense and space organizations in Africa and the Middle East. This edition has garnered considerable international and Chinese interest, particularly from leading figures in the Chinese arms and defense industries, who are showcasing their latest aircraft and drones.  China’s interest in the inaugural El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in 2024 was marked by significant historical participation: the Chinese Air Force performed spectacular air displays, their first official air show outside of China. This first-ever air show featured Chinese aircraft performing unique aerobatic maneuvers in the skies above El Alamein, a first for China. Furthermore, the exhibition served to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian military cooperation. China’s interest in the Egyptian air show reflected the strength of bilateral military relations and the two countries’ desire to bolster their aviation and defense sectors. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers focused on evaluating and analyzing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s activities in hosting the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. The Egyptian Air Force also announced the launch of the second edition of the exhibition, aiming to explore avenues for joint military cooperation and advanced military technologies between Egypt and China.

–             Second: The Role of the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security in Monitoring the Activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to Secure Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Projects and Protect Chinese Strategic Interests

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the Counter-Espionage and Infiltration Bureau) is concerned with the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in securing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects and protecting China’s growing strategic interests in the region from foreign intelligence penetrations. The dimensions of Chinese security and intelligence interest are focused on protecting vital waterways, particularly securing navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which are essential maritime arteries for China’s Maritime and Military Silk Road. Furthermore, the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security seeks to secure major Chinese investments through intelligence oversight of joint Chinese logistical and economic projects, such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the TEDA projects. With close monitoring by Chinese intelligence circles, specifically the role of the Chinese Ninth Bureau in countering external threats, the activities of rival intelligence agencies targeting Chinese military technologies or economic presence in North Africa are being tracked and neutralized.

Therefore, think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been paying close attention to the Egyptian defense minister’s foreign trips aimed at strengthening Egyptian military partnerships with countries around the world. This is of profound significance and military importance to China and the PLA, given its connection to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the military cover for trade. Beijing relies on developing military coordination with Cairo and advanced arms deals, such as air defense systems, to ensure a stable regional environment that protects its long-term investments. This is achieved through a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, transforming their cooperation from traditional trade to security and defense integration, thus guaranteeing the safe flow of global trade through Egypt. Therefore, the Chinese military has shown keen interest in tracking the movements of Egyptian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher around the world, particularly his important official visit to Turkey in July 2026 and his meeting with the Turkish Defense Minister to sign a letter of intent for defense cooperation and the expansion of joint exercises. This is in addition to his on-site monitoring of the development and training of personnel at the Military Academy and other educational institutions affiliated with the Armed Forces, which intelligence and military circles in Beijing are keen to monitor closely.

– Third: The interest of Chinese military platforms and websites in covering news and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense through official and semi-official military and news portals affiliated with the Chinese government that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs

In this context, several Chinese military platforms and websites specialize exclusively in covering news about the Egyptian Ministry of Defense or Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher individually. However, his strategic movements are also followed through official and semi-official Chinese government military and news outlets that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs. The most prominent of these Chinese websites and platforms include the China People’s Liberation Army Online (cn/China.81 Military Online). This is the official website of the Chinese armed forces, focusing on official meetings and joint cooperation. Also included is the website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, which is known as mod.gov.cn. This covers military diplomacy and protocols between Egypt and China. Additionally, there is (Xinhua Military). This is the official news arm that translates and publishes extensive reports on the restructuring of military leadership and the strategic moves of the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Ashraf Salem Zaher. And the Guancha Platform, which is militarily known as Guancha.cn. This is a leading Chinese analytical website that focuses on international military and geopolitical affairs. It analyzes Egyptian arms deals and military cooperation with regional and international powers, particularly China. Chinese media coverage of news from the Egyptian army and the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in Egypt demonstrates broad strategic interest through Chinese military platforms such as the People’s Liberation Army Online (China Military Online) and the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. This coverage focuses on joint military cooperation, modern Egyptian military technologies, and potential areas of military cooperation between Egypt and China during the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. This is especially significant given the participation of major Chinese military companies in the second edition of the exhibition, companies operating in the fields of defense, armaments, space technology, and commercial aviation. Therefore, specialized Chinese military platforms and agencies highlight displays of modern aircraft and drones, trends in military technological development in Egypt, and areas of mutual military benefit between Egypt and China.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles, represented by the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and all the aforementioned Chinese military sites, are monitoring all Egyptian military and field movements and activities. This includes, most notably, the movements of Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production (who assumed his position in February 2026). His recent intensive activities and initiatives aimed at enhancing combat readiness and strengthening Egyptian-international military cooperation, particularly with China and the People’s Liberation Army, are of particular interest. Among the most prominent movements and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which have been the focus of analysis and evaluation by Chinese military circles, are the Egyptian defense minister’s field and diplomatic activities, including his official visit to Turkey in July 2026 at the head of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to discuss joint defense cooperation with the Turkish side. In addition to the interest, analysis, and evaluation by Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles of the significance of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters and their analysis of its connection to maintaining the security and stability of Chinese investments and opening new footholds and ports, especially in the Horn of Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese logistical interests, relevant circles in Beijing are also monitoring the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss regional conditions and security in Africa, linking this to Chinese interests from a Chinese perspective.

– Fourth: The interest of intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing in the recent Egyptian military activity in Africa and the significance of inviting and receiving African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters, from a precise geopolitical perspective as a strategic pillar serving vital Chinese interests

Intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing view Egypt’s recent military activity in Africa as a strategic pillar directly serving vital Chinese interests. Beijing analyzes the invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense headquarters, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, from a precise geopolitical perspective that links regional security to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This analysis considers the connection between Egyptian activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa and Chinese logistics efforts to secure vital maritime routes for China’s interests. Beijing believes that strengthening Egyptian military influence in the sensitive Horn of Africa region acts as a safeguard for maritime traffic in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, the main artery of China’s Maritime Silk Road, in addition to its importance for protecting China’s ports. Here, Chinese defense circles welcome any efforts to stabilize the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, thus protecting Beijing’s logistics base in Djibouti and opening up prospects for securing new Chinese ports and investments. These investments depend on the stability that Cairo, as a regional power center, can contribute to establishing.

– Fifth: Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt to promote calm and stability in the Great Lakes and Nile Basin region, which is crucial to Chinese logistical interests.

Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt is that relevant circles in Beijing followed with great interest the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guy Kabombo Mwadiyamvita, to discuss regional security conditions. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles analyze this in order to secure Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, given that China has massive investments worth billions of dollars in the minerals and cobalt sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing believes that security and stability in Congo, which Egypt supports through African Union institutions and bilateral cooperation, protects vital supply chains for Chinese technology industries from the risks posed by rebel groups. Furthermore, the Chinese Ninth Bureau and Chinese think tanks and military intelligence affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that strategic coordination in the Nile Basin region is essential for China’s interests and investments. Beijing considers the Egyptian-Congolese consensus to enhance calm and stability in the Great Lakes region and the Nile Basin, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflicts that could threaten construction and infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese companies in those countries.

– Sixth: Chinese military circles are closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to secure the Chinese Maritime and Military Silk Road.

In addition to closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with the leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Chinese military circles are following the security situation and developments in the armed forces’ modernization plans, given the particular importance of these matters to China in safeguarding its interests. Chinese military and strategic circles are keen to follow these meetings due to Egypt’s pivotal role in the stability of the Middle East and its crucial importance to China’s economic interests and investments in the Maritime and Military Silk Road. The dimensions of Chinese interest in President al-Sisi’s role lie in his coordination with the Egyptian military establishment to protect Chinese investments and secure major infrastructure projects and the Chinese economic zone northwest of the Suez Canal. This strengthens the Chinese military partnership with Egypt, paving the way for further defense cooperation agreements, increased military partnership and joint exercises, and the diversification of Chinese arms sources for Cairo. This serves to maintain China’s regional security and to monitor the security situation and its impact on global trade and maritime navigation routes.

– Seventh: Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises and the Badr 2026 tactical project.

Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises. They pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile-firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. Chinese officials also observe the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions. Furthermore, Chinese circles evaluate the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s Badr 2026 tactical project, especially the main phase of the Badr tactical exercise, which involved live ammunition and was conducted by (units of the Egyptian Third Field Army). This evaluation assesses the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital waterways and axes of importance to China. Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises, and they pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. With the Chinese interest in the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions, Chinese circles are also evaluating the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s tactical project (Badr 2026), particularly the main phase of the Badr tactical project, which involved live-fire exercises conducted by units of the Egyptian Third Field Army. This evaluation aims to assess the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital corridors and axes of importance to China. Chinese military circles and analysts are closely following the training and educational activities of the Egyptian Armed Forces, specifically the Badr 2026 tactical project with live ammunition conducted by the Egyptian Third Field Army, night air defense firing exercises, and the scientific activities of the Military Technical College. This is all part of assessing the Egyptian army’s readiness to protect vital axes. Furthermore, relevant circles in Beijing are keen to conduct further monitoring and evaluation of Egyptian military field training activities within the framework of the Badr 2026 tactical project to accurately assess the main phase with live ammunition conducted by units of the Third Field Army in support of the Air Force and to penetrate defenses.  With the interest of Chinese military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army in the (nighttime missile firing) exercises in Egypt, they observed the efficiency and capabilities of the Egyptian air defense forces in operating effectively at night under cover of defense and in the presence of Egyptian military leaders.

With the Chinese military circles monitoring the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Military Academy and the graduation ceremonies of new classes of students from the Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies and understanding and studying the impact of these events on China through the desire of Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles to develop military curricula in Egypt and Africa. This reflects the Chinese interest in Egyptian military education and scientific research and the Egyptian Military Science Day through the monitoring of the activities of the Egyptian Military Technical College’s Science Day and engineering competitions, and following the conclusion of the scientific and engineering competitions and linking them to the technological development of the combat capabilities of Egyptian military academies and institutions, and understanding what is lacking in these activities in order to fill it in the future through military educational partnerships with Egypt and its Ministry of Defense.

With close monitoring by Chinese defense and security circles of the joint Golden Eagle exercises between Egypt and Turkey, given their importance to China’s military and maritime Silk Road and to protecting Chinese interests in maintaining the security of the region and its vital waterways necessary for global supply chains. The focus and attention of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have also been on Egypt. The With You initiative is primarily an Egyptian military initiative concerned with coordinating the Martyrs’ Recognition Fund of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to disburse the first phase of the presidential initiative to care for the children of martyrs and wounded veterans. Chinese circles are interested in this Egyptian presidential initiative to understand its implementation mechanism, in coordination with the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Solidarity, and in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt and Misr Life Insurance Company. China is seeking to understand the Egyptian system and its operational and implementation mechanisms regarding all presidential initiatives.

– Eighth: Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt, understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy, in order to assess Egyptian military and elite human resources and build an accurate Chinese database to understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt.

Furthermore, Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt and understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy in order to share their expertise with the Egyptian military. They are also monitoring announcements of new admissions to the Military Academy and graduates of technological colleges to understand the total number of individuals with military backgrounds in Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to transfer its expertise in military education curricula and leadership and elite training to Egypt and its military academies. An analytical reading of China’s monitoring of the Egyptian military education system reveals profound strategic dimensions that extend beyond mere routine observation for the Chinese. This Chinese interest in the Egyptian military education system can be broken down as Beijing’s focus on monitoring Egyptian military and elite human resources. By monitoring the admission requirements and announcements for the Egyptian Military Academy and Egyptian military technology colleges, Beijing aims to build a precise database and understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt. This contributes to anticipating the future leadership structure of the Egyptian state and helps Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles assess the combat and administrative efficiency of Egyptian military elites. Here, the Chinese side seeks to analyze the preparation and qualification curricula for students in Egyptian military academies to determine the development of Egyptian training doctrine and its adaptation to modern warfare and smart systems. This facilitates the evaluation of the most prominent military partner in the Middle East and Africa region. This can be considered a gateway for transferring Chinese military-diplomatic expertise to Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to introduce its leadership and elite training methodologies. This is part of China’s persistent effort to enhance its strategic influence (soft power) in Egypt and build long-term ideological and tactical alignment between the Egyptian and Chinese militaries through sharing its advanced military doctrine.

    Accordingly, we understand the extent of Beijing’s interest in the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense within its strategy to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This includes securing vital economic interests and maritime routes for China, such as the Suez Canal, and developing mutual military and arms cooperation with Cairo. This stems from China’s keenness to coordinate with Cairo, given its central position in global trade and regional security. This helps diversify Chinese military partnerships with the Egyptian military establishment and its Ministry of Defense, as Beijing presents itself as a reliable strategic military alternative in the Middle East.

A sweeping package of new Russian sanctions has cleared its first hurdle in the United States Congress, and, if passed, could trigger huge tariffs for countries such as India and China which continue to buy oil from Moscow.

The bill, which was advanced in the US Senate this week, has been named for the late Lindsey Graham, whose funeral was attended by world leaders including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier in the week.

Here’s what we know:

What happened in the Senate?

The “Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026” was advanced overwhelmingly by the Senate this week in a vote of 86 to 12, meaning it can now proceed to the House of Representatives for further deliberation.

Named for the late Senator Graham, a staunch Ukraine supporter who died unexpectedly this month, the bill moved forward with the support of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was in Washington to attend Graham’s funeral and watched the proceedings from the gallery.

“It was an honour to be present as the votes were counted – 86 senators supported the bill,” he wrote on X afterwards. “This is the first step towards implementing Lindsey [Graham]’s plans, and certainly a step towards peace. It is important that this tool works.”

After clearing the Senate, there will be a delay before the bill can move forward to the House, which is now in summer recess.

On Wednesday this week, US President Donald Trump ordered lawmakers to amend the bill to include tariffs covering Iran as well. This will likely delay the bill further if it deters Democrats from supporting it, analysts said.

David Smith, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s US Studies Centre, told Al Jazeera: “One of the things they’re worried about is how the tariff power in relation to Iran is going to be expanded. They’re going to be ok with tariff powers on Russia but they’re worried about tariff power on countries buying Iranian oil, which means China. I think there are going to be a lot of Democrats that are going to say these powers should be limited to sanctions and not tariffs.”

Without the Iran addition, he said he would have expected the bill to pass once the House resumes given strong Democratic support for Ukraine.

“Democrats have been genuinely worried about the Trump administration abandoning Ukraine. Something like this, which is ramping the pressure up on Russia so much, I just think there will be a large critical mass of Democrats who will vote for this,” he said.

What’s in the bill?

The bill makes use of sanctions and tariffs to target Russia and cut off the economic pipeline that has kept the Ukraine war going.

Major provisions include new sanctions on Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as on more than 20 top officials and companies which work with the Russian defence industry. It also targets Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and the network it uses to evade international sanctions on its energy exports.

The bill gives the president authority to impose sanctions by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Under it, he would be able to apply tariffs of up to 100 percent on exports to the US from the top five purchasers of Russian energy, military equipment or countries facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Tariffs of up to 500 percent can also be applied to Russian imports directly into the US. The US imported $3.8bn in goods from Russia in 2025.

Which countries are likely to be targeted?

China, India and Türkiye are potential targets of the bill, as they are among the largest buyers of Russian energy, according to data compiled by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).

China has historically responded to Trump’s tariffs with tariffs of its own on US exports. Even Pay, a director at the Beijing-based consultancy Trivium China, told Al Jazeera that the US may wait to impose tariffs as Trump is due to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping later this year.

Trump would still welcome the option, she said, after the Supreme Court struck down many of his tariffs in February.

“If passed and signed into law [which is still a big if at this point], the legislation would give Trump something he’s wanted for a while, namely, the legislature’s permission to impose high tariffs on China, alongside the small handful of other countries that import Russian oil,” Pay told Al Jazeera.

India is in a tricky position as its attempts to diversify away from Russian energy were disrupted by the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Maia Nikoladze, a deputy director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Due to the disruptions, it has also applied for and received US sanction waivers to continue buying Russian oil in the interim, Nikoladze wrote in a report this week, and it is expected to do the same in the future.

“India will face a trade-off between maintaining energy security and managing the risk of US tariffs, potentially prompting it to again seek waivers and exemptions,” Nikoladze said.

What do critics say about the bill?

Critics like Senator Maggie Hassan say the bill gives Trump too much power to impose tariffs while also potentially harming both the US taxpayer and allied countries.

Turkiye, for example, buys Russian energy but it is also a US ally and NATO member, while “major non-NATO ally” Brazil and “major security cooperation partner” Singapore both buy Russian oil products, according to CREA.

In a post on X, Hassan wrote that while she supports sanctioning Russia, she does “not think tariffs, which are paid for by American businesses and consumers, will help Ukraine win”.

The bill is also opposed by lobby groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce, which also says the true cost will be passed on to US businesses and consumers, as with past tariffs.

While many of Trump’s tariffs have already been struck down by the Supreme Court, the Russia tariffs could have more staying power because they would be imposed on a stronger legal basis, according to Smith.

That’s because it is new legislation which has been crafted using the powers of the IEEPA.

“Previously what Trump has done is to go back to old pieces of legislation and invoke from those his power to use tariffs in ways they haven’t been used before and in ways courts have subsequently found less lawful, whereas this looks like new legislation that is going to lawfully expand his tariff authority,” he told Al Jazeera.

AI Training Technique Sparks New Tech Rivalry

Model distillation, a widely used artificial intelligence training technique, has emerged as a new point of tension in the growing technology competition between the United States and China. While the method has long been accepted within AI research, concerns have intensified over whether proprietary AI capabilities can be replicated without the consent of their developers.

Leading U.S. AI companies and policymakers argue that some Chinese firms are using distillation to extract valuable capabilities from closed-source AI models, raising questions about intellectual property, technological leadership and AI security.

What Is Model Distillation?

Model distillation is a process that transfers selected capabilities from a large, powerful AI model—known as the “teacher”—to a smaller “student” model.

Instead of copying the original model’s architecture or internal parameters, the student learns by analyzing the teacher’s outputs, such as answers, computer code or generated text. The result is a lighter, more efficient model capable of performing many of the same tasks while requiring significantly fewer computing resources.

Why Is Distillation Important?

Training frontier AI models demands enormous investments in advanced chips, computing power and massive datasets.

Distillation makes AI more affordable by enabling smaller models to deliver strong performance on less expensive hardware. These compact systems can be deployed across smartphones, factories, vehicles, enterprise software and private networks, expanding AI adoption without the infrastructure costs associated with frontier models.

The technique has therefore become an important tool for both commercial AI development and national technology strategies.

Why Are Reasoning Traces Valuable?

Recent advances in AI have increased the importance of “reasoning traces”—the intermediate steps an AI model follows before producing a final answer.

Rather than simply learning correct outputs, smaller models can learn how complex problems are solved, improving their reasoning abilities.

Researchers compare this to studying detailed worked solutions instead of only reading the final answers to mathematical problems. As reasoning traces become more sophisticated, they are increasingly viewed as valuable intellectual property because they reveal how advanced AI systems approach difficult tasks.

Who Uses Model Distillation?

Distillation is widely used across the global AI industry and is not inherently controversial.

American researchers and technology companies have employed the technique in projects such as Stanford University’s Alpaca model and Microsoft’s Orca research. Chinese researchers have likewise used outputs from advanced AI systems to develop Chinese-language instruction models.

The key distinction lies between open-weight models, whose underlying parameters are publicly accessible, and closed-source models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Anthropic’s Claude, which are only accessible through proprietary platforms and APIs.

Why Has It Become a US-China Flashpoint?

The dispute centres not on distillation itself but on whether proprietary AI outputs are being systematically harvested without authorization.

U.S. AI companies argue there is a clear difference between legitimate academic research and large-scale extraction of outputs designed to replicate commercially valuable capabilities from closed-source systems.

Anthropic has accused several Chinese AI companies, including DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax, of attempting to extract capabilities from its Claude models, particularly in software engineering and advanced reasoning. OpenAI has also reported detecting attempts by Chinese actors to use its systems for distillation-related purposes.

Chinese companies have not publicly accused U.S. firms of conducting similar activities involving closed-source models.

Why It Matters

The debate over model distillation reflects a broader shift in global AI competition from hardware and semiconductors to the protection of advanced algorithms and proprietary knowledge.

As AI becomes central to economic growth, military capabilities and technological leadership, governments and companies are increasingly treating model outputs, reasoning methods and training techniques as strategic assets. The controversy over distillation is therefore likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping future AI regulation, international competition and the evolving U.S.-China technology rivalry.

Analysis: AI Distillation Signals the Next Phase of the US China Technology War

The controversy surrounding model distillation marks a turning point in the global artificial intelligence race. The competition between the United States and China is no longer driven solely by access to advanced semiconductors or computing power. Instead, it is increasingly centered on protecting the knowledge embedded within frontier AI models. As reasoning capabilities become the most valuable component of modern AI, companies and governments are beginning to treat model outputs as strategic assets rather than simply products or services.

For years, Washington’s strategy focused on restricting China’s access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, hoping to slow Beijing’s AI progress by limiting computational resources. Model distillation challenges that strategy because it enables developers to build highly capable systems without replicating the enormous costs of training frontier models from scratch. If smaller models can absorb sophisticated reasoning from larger ones, technological leadership becomes harder to preserve through hardware controls alone.

This development is also forcing a rethinking of AI intellectual property. Unlike traditional software, where source code defines ownership, modern AI derives much of its value from learned behavior and reasoning patterns. The legal and ethical boundaries surrounding whether outputs generated by proprietary models can be used to train competing systems remain largely undefined. As governments struggle to regulate these practices, AI firms are likely to tighten access to their models, limit reasoning transparency and strengthen technical safeguards against unauthorized capability extraction.

The geopolitical implications are equally significant. AI has become a core element of economic competitiveness, military modernization and national security. Any method that accelerates another country’s ability to close the technological gap will inevitably attract government attention. The United States increasingly views the protection of advanced AI capabilities as part of its broader strategy to maintain technological leadership, while China sees affordable AI development as essential to reducing dependence on foreign technology and overcoming export restrictions.

Ultimately, the debate over model distillation illustrates that the next phase of the AI race will not be determined solely by who builds the most powerful model, but by who can best control, protect and commercialize advanced intelligence. As AI becomes a strategic national asset, disputes over knowledge transfer, model security and intellectual property are likely to become as consequential as the earlier battles over semiconductor supply chains.

With information from Reuters.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters is facing backlash after telling a Chinese-born MP to ‘go back to your own country’ during a parliamentary debate. The remarks drew criticism at home, while China urged New Zealand politicians not to invoke Beijing in domestic disputes.

China’s top leaders pledged on Thursday to support the country’s slowing economy by accelerating spending on already-approved infrastructure projects instead of rolling out large-scale stimulus measures. The decision came after recent economic data showed second-quarter growth slowed to 4.3%, the weakest pace in more than three years and below the government’s annual target range of 4.5% to 5.0%.

The commitment followed a meeting of the Communist Party’s Politburo, where policymakers acknowledged mounting economic challenges but signaled confidence that existing fiscal resources would be sufficient to stabilize growth through the remainder of the year.

Infrastructure Spending Takes Center Stage

Rather than introducing fresh stimulus packages, Beijing plans to speed up implementation of projects that have already been budgeted. Analysts said the government still has significant fiscal room because infrastructure spending and bond issuance progressed more slowly than planned during the first half of the year.

Economists expect much of the spending to focus on China’s “six networks” initiative, covering investments in water systems, logistics infrastructure, underground pipelines, electricity grids, telecommunications and computing power centers. State media has previously indicated that roughly $1 trillion has been allocated for these projects.

Analysts viewed the Politburo’s statement as confirmation that Beijing intends to support growth without significantly expanding its fiscal deficit.

Concerns Over Overcapacity Remain

Chinese leaders continue to avoid aggressive stimulus partly because they remain focused on tackling industrial overcapacity and encouraging local governments to maintain fiscal discipline.

The Politburo reiterated its commitment to addressing what it described as “involution competition”—a term referring to intense price wars among manufacturers competing for market share at the expense of profitability. While many economists argue that excess industrial capacity is driving these price wars, Beijing continues to reject claims that overcapacity is a structural problem.

Weak Consumer Demand Continues to Weigh on Growth

Although manufacturing exports and advances in artificial intelligence have supported parts of the economy, domestic consumption remains weak.

China’s prolonged property downturn, sluggish wage growth and a challenging labor market have reduced household confidence. Millions of workers have shifted into lower-paying gig economy jobs with limited social protections, encouraging higher savings rather than consumer spending.

This imbalance has increased China’s reliance on exports to sustain growth, raising concerns among trading partners that Chinese manufacturers are flooding global markets while domestic demand remains subdued.

Employment Support Remains a Priority

The Politburo pledged to strengthen domestic demand by expanding employment support, particularly for flexible workers and those in newer forms of employment. However, officials did not announce specific policies aimed at boosting household incomes.

Economists noted that while Beijing continues to emphasize consumption, its strategy remains focused on improving the supply of goods and services rather than directly increasing consumer purchasing power through large-scale income support or cash stimulus.

Outlook

The latest policy signals suggest Beijing is seeking to balance economic stability with long-term structural reforms. Rather than relying on broad stimulus, China’s leadership is betting that faster implementation of existing infrastructure investments and targeted employment measures will be enough to keep the economy on track while avoiding a surge in debt and further industrial overcapacity.

With information from Reuters.

Published on
30/07/2026 – 12:57 GMT+2

The European Commission is considering opening an investigation into imports of certain construction materials from several Balkan countries over suspicions that they were made using low-cost Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties, according to people familiar with the matter.

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The probe will focus on so-called open mesh fabrics, including thermal insulation systems.

The case comes as the European Commission continues to step up pressure on low-cost Chinese imports, which are contributing to the EU’s record-high €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. The commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance trade ties, with hopes of securing tangible results by October.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič expected to travel to China in October.

At the same time, the Commission has warned that it would deploy its trade defence instruments before the deadline to counter low-cost Chinese imports, arguing that China uses unfair practices to gain access to the EU market – including strategies to circumvent EU tariffs.

Open mesh fabrics are often manufactured with Chinese glass fibre, which the Commission has accused Chinese producers of selling at unfairly low prices on the EU market, causing injury to European manufacturers. The EU has targeted glass fibre with additional duties several times in recent years, including imports from Egypt that are produced by Chinese companies.

But Chinese producers are suspected of circumventing those anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties by relying on local manufacturers in several Balkan countries to assemble open mesh fabrics using low-cost Chinese glass fibre.

The overcapacity problem

The EU produces around 1 million tonnes of melted glass annually from installations operating in eight countries, among them Germany, France and Italy.

But according to Glass Fibre Europe, which represents the glass fibre industry in Brussels, Chinese glass fibre overcapacity exceeds 100 percent of total EU market demand, raising the risk of further harm to European producers unless the EU strengthens its trade defence measures.

Over the past year, the number of cases involving alleged Chinese unfair trade practices across several industrial sectors has increased, and the Commission has been criticised for the length of its investigations.

At a summit in mid-June, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate to review and update its trade defence instruments.

But the EU’s current trade regulation toolbox remains limited, with Commission only able to address unfair trade practices on a product-by-product basis. Additional safeguard measures – including tariffs and quotas – are also under consideration, Euronews has learned, to protect the European chemicals sector from intense Chinese competition.

The Commission was contacted for comment but did not reply.

On July 10, almost exactly a year after the Pentagon announced it was becoming the largest shareholder in MP Materials, the International Energy Agency put a number on what that deal was designed to prevent: $6.5 trillion in global downstream production now sits exposed to China’s rare-earth export curbs — restrictions currently suspended under an October 2025 truce that lapses again around October 2026. In the year between those two dates, Washington did not simply subsidize its way out of dependency on Chinese processing. It bought in: $400 million for 15 percent of MP Materials, a decade-long price floor for neodymium-praseodymium set nearly double the market rate, and a ten-year promise to buy everything a new Texas magnet plant produces. The Pentagon is now, functionally, a mining shareholder. The interesting question is not whether that has worked — MP’s private financing round attracted $1 billion from J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs within weeks — but what it costs to win a state-capitalist contest by becoming a state capitalist.

The stakes are structural, not cyclical. China controls roughly 70 percent of the world’s rare-earth and critical-mineral refining capacity, a chokepoint built over three decades while Western producers treated minerals as ordinary commodities rather than strategic assets. Beijing’s October 2025 tariff-war truce with Washington postponed, rather than cancelled, an expanded licensing regime that already cut U.S. yttrium imports from 333 tonnes to 17 tonnes in eight months — a squeeze aerospace manufacturers say could force production pauses. Washington’s answer has three parts: Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private stockpile signed by executive order on February 2, 2026, covering all 60 minerals on the USGS critical list; a fast-growing portfolio of direct government equity stakes in miners and processors; and a parallel push to sign allied-supply agreements with eight partners, including Australia, Japan, the UK and the UAE. Europe, meanwhile, is running a different playbook: a €3 billion RESourceEU plan, a joint-purchasing platform, and a stockpiling pilot — procurement and coordination, not ownership.

The MP Materials deal is the template, and its mechanics matter more than its headline. The Department of Defense’s July 2025 investment made it MP’s largest shareholder, attached a $150 million loan for expanding the Mountain Pass mine, and guaranteed a $110-per-kilogram floor price for NdPr oxide — a level industry analysts put at nearly double the prevailing market price — alongside a ten-year offtake covering the full output of a planned magnet facility in Fort Worth. Private capital followed the government’s signal almost immediately, which is precisely the point: Washington concluded that a guarantee was worth more to investors than a grant. That logic has since scaled. The administration has taken a $670 million stake in magnet producer Vulcan Elements, a 10 percent, $35.6 million position in Trilogy Metals, converted a renegotiated Energy Department loan into equity in Lithium Americas, and expanded the official critical-minerals list to include copper and metallurgical coal. Total direct equity commitments now exceed $1 billion, on top of Project Vault’s $12 billion stockpile.

The backlash has been immediate and specific, and it is worth taking seriously rather than waving off as sour grapes. Rival producers argue the price floor lets MP “undercut commercial bids, using federal subsidies to shield its margins,” while former White House and Pentagon officials warn the arrangement could “distort global NdPr pricing, crowd out innovation, and deter private investment in alternative supply chains” — in effect, recreating the very state-directed monopoly the policy exists to counter. That is the strongest objection, and it does not fully land: a government willing to take equity risk, rather than hand out grants, at least has an incentive to see the investment succeed and can in principle profit from the upside, which is the argument the Treasury and National Energy Dominance Council make for why this is smarter policy than Cold War-style stockpiling alone. But the objection identifies a real cost even if it doesn’t defeat the policy: an above-market, government-guaranteed price for one company makes every unsubsidized competitor in the same commodity harder to finance, which narrows rather than widens the eventual supplier base — the opposite of the diversification the strategy claims to deliver.

There is a second problem the price-floor logic obscures: capital committed is not the same as metal produced. The Center for Strategic and International Studies frames this as the difference between “distance” — how much progress has been announced — and “displacement” — how far supply chains have actually moved from their starting point. Japan’s experience with Lynas Rare Earths is the sobering comparison: fifteen years and $250 million of patient, low-drama investment before Lynas achieved the first commercial dysprosium production outside China, in 2025. Washington’s approach substitutes speed and scale for that patience, which may be the correct trade given the urgency, but it means the MP deal’s real test has not yet arrived — it arrives when the Fort Worth facility is supposed to reach full commercial output, not when Wall Street decides to match the Pentagon’s bet.

None of this is happening in a China-versus-America vacuum, either. The Democratic Republic of Congo has extended its cobalt export suspension specifically to tighten leverage over Chinese refiners, and Indonesia has repeatedly resisted pressure to loosen nickel export quotas, forcing processing onshore on its own terms. Producer states, not only the two superpowers, are now treating minerals as instruments of strategic leverage rather than commodities to be sold at whatever price clears the market. That reframes the whole contest: this is not simply Washington racing to catch Beijing, but a broader shift in which every government that sits on a mineral deposit is deciding whether to sell it or wield it.

Which is where Europe’s exposure becomes concrete. RESourceEU gives Brussels coordination and buying power, but no board seats and no offtake priority — and Chatham House’s own assessment is blunt that the UK and EU “cannot match the scale of what the US is attempting” and risk being “left behind” without equity of their own. That matters because Washington’s price floors do not stay domestic: a guaranteed $110/kg for MP’s output resets the benchmark every other buyer, including European manufacturers, has to price against, while offtake agreements tied to U.S. defense production can put European buyers behind the queue when supply tightens. The diversification Europe wants — away from dependence on Beijing — is real, but the replacement supply chain now runs increasingly through companies Washington part-owns and whose output is pre-committed to American industry first. Substituting one chokepoint for another is not the same as building a market.

What Happens Next

Base case (our estimate: roughly 55 percent probability). Washington’s equity-and-price-floor model extends to more minerals — copper and metallurgical coal are already on the list — and more companies, Project Vault’s stockpile builds through 2026–27, and the October 2025 China truce holds past its lapse date. Europe continues a purchasing-only strategy, remaining a price-taker on a benchmark increasingly set in Washington rather than Shanghai. This depends on Congress and private markets continuing to treat government equity as a credible signal rather than a fiscal liability, and on China preferring managed leverage over an open rupture.

Downside case. China allows the truce to lapse on schedule around October 2026 and resumes full licensing enforcement — already quietly restarting, according to recent customs-audit reports — before Vault-funded and MP-style projects reach meaningful output. Aerospace and defense manufacturers, already forced to ration yttrium and dysprosium at a fraction of pre-2025 volumes, face renewed production pauses in the exact window (2026–2028) when domestic capacity is still years from scale, exposing the gap between announced investment and actual tonnage.

Upside case. Government stakes prove to be a bridge rather than a permanent structure: MP, Vulcan Elements and Lithium Americas hit production targets on schedule, price floors become unnecessary as Japan’s Lynas eventually showed is possible after fifteen years of patient investment, and the eight-nation allied-supply framework matures into a genuinely plural, competitively priced market that Europe can buy into on equal terms rather than through Washington’s balance sheet.

The Pentagon’s bet on MP Materials shows that the fastest way to out-compete a state-directed rival was to become one — and by the only metric available so far, capital raised, that gamble is working. But capital raised is not resilience, and every mineral now being withheld or weaponized elsewhere, from Congolese cobalt to Indonesian nickel, shows the world’s supply chains are being redrawn along political lines everywhere, not simply rerouted away from Beijing.

Watch whether China lets its rare-earth export truce lapse on schedule around October 2026, and whether MP Materials’ Fort Worth magnet plant is producing at commercial scale when it does. If the truce holds and the plant delivers, Washington’s ownership model will keep expanding. If either fails, the U.S. will have discovered it bought a shareholding in a company, not a supply chain immune to the country it was built to out-manoeuvre.

Evidence has emerged indicating that China’s YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile is now also being fielded aboard the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers. These warships are far more numerous than the Type 055 ‘super destroyers,’ from which the missile was previously seen being fired, as we reported at the time. The new development suggests that the PLAN intends to distribute the weapon across a much broader portion of its surface fleet rather than reserving it exclusively for its largest combatants.

A new video apparently originating from the PLAN shows the launch of a YJ-20 from the cold-launch vertical launch system (VLS) on the foredeck of an unidentified Type 052D destroyer, known in the West as the Luyang III class. After being ejected from the launcher, the missile’s solid rocket motor ignites before it accelerates rapidly away. No target engagement is shown.

Typically, the Type 052D’s VLS would be loaded with variants of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile, YJ-18 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile, and CY-5 anti-submarine missile.

The 7,500-ton Type 052D has 64 VLS cells, 32 forward and 32 aft. It’s unclear whether each of these is able to accommodate the big YJ-20 missile.

This compares to the Type 055’s 112-cell VLS system, which makes it the PLAN’s premier surface strike platform. However, only 10 of these ships are currently in operational service, with additional vessels still under construction. By contrast, approximately 35 Type 052D destroyers have entered PLAN service, with production continuing.

Putting the YJ-20 on the Type 052Ds would significantly expand the number of Chinese warships capable of launching hypersonic anti-ship strikes, further strengthening Beijing’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture across the western Pacific. On the other hand, it remains possible — although less likely — that the launch depicted is some kind of trial or experimental effort that might not lead to large-scale fielding on these hulls.

The new video follows the release of official Chinese military footage showing what the PLAN described as a “finalization test” of the YJ-20 launched from the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi, late last year. That video appeared to confirm the missile’s integration with China’s largest surface combatant, a warship design that you can read more about here.

That test from the Wuxi provided the first official acknowledgement of the ship-launched YJ-20. The missile itself had previously been unveiled publicly during China’s military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II, although speculation surrounding the weapon stretches back several years before that.

A missile first observed during what appeared to be a Type 055 launch in 2022 was widely referred to as the YJ-21. Subsequent official Chinese designations now strongly suggest that weapon was actually the YJ-20, or an earlier developmental version of it.

The YJ-20 is understood to be a hypersonic anti-ship weapon employing either an aero-ballistic flight profile or potentially a boost-glide vehicle: different Chinese sources have described both concepts at various times. In either case, the missile is optimized for extremely high terminal speed combined with unpredictable maneuvering designed to defeat modern naval air defenses.

Unlike a traditional ballistic missile that follows a predictable parabolic arc, an aero-ballistic missile can execute quasi-ballistic maneuvers — including skip-glide or ‘porpoising’ trajectories — as it descends toward its target. These abrupt changes in altitude and direction make interception significantly more challenging.

Chinese state media have also described the missile as employing a conical boost-glide vehicle, which would use a rocket booster to accelerate to high altitude before gliding toward its target while conducting sustained maneuvering throughout the terminal phase.

Although many details remain murky, it is generally considered that the missile achieves speeds well above Mach 6 during cruise and may approach Mach 9 during its terminal attack. Estimated range is generally assessed at more than 620 miles.

Guidance is believed to combine satellite navigation and mid-course updates before transitioning to an active radar and/or infrared seeker during the final approach.

Weapons with these characteristics are particularly well suited to engaging high-value naval targets including aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, cruisers, and other major surface combatants. The missile likely also possesses a secondary land-attack capability against fixed targets.

With their combination of extreme speed and maneuverability, hypersonic weapons can dramatically compress an opponent’s decision-making timeline while reducing opportunities for interception, making them especially valuable against time-sensitive targets. They also require very high-end interceptors, if they can be intercepted at all.

The apparent expansion of the missile to the Type 052D is arguably an even more significant milestone than the Type 055 test itself.

For China, fielding the YJ-20 aboard both the Type 055 and the much more numerous Type 052D dramatically increases the number of PLAN hulls capable of conducting long-range hypersonic anti-ship attacks. Such a move represents another step in expanding the reach of its layered A2/AD strategy. Rather than concentrating hypersonic capability in a small number of flagship destroyers, the PLAN appears to be distributing it across a much larger force capable of operating throughout the First Island Chain and increasingly beyond it.

Clearly, a larger force of PLAN destroyers armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles would complicate U.S. and allied naval operations across the western Pacific by increasing the number of launch platforms capable of threatening high-value warships from long stand-off ranges.

At the same time, it is unclear if the YJ-20 has formally entered full operational service. However, official test footage, public appearances during military parades, and, above all, launches from two separate destroyer classes all point toward the missile transitioning from a developmental program to a broader capability.

The development underscores two major issues for the U.S. military as it gears up to face the prospect of a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, the PLAN is growing at an alarming rate, and Chinese shipyards are churning out increasingly capable warship designs, not to mention submarines and other naval weapons.

The latest annual Pentagon report to Congress on China’s military, released at the end of 2025, stated that “China has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and continued to advance the development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past year.”

With that in mind, the case study of the YJ-20 further underscores the fact that China is investing heavily in the development of hypersonic missiles and is now apparently scaling that capability across a larger proportion of its surface fleet, something that will have a significant effect on the regional naval balance.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

July 28 (Asia Today) — China’s successful stock market debut of its largest DRAM manufacturer has fueled expectations that the company could challenge the three global leaders in memory chips, though Chinese media acknowledged that a significant technological gap remains.

ChangXin Memory Technologies, commonly known as CXMT, became the most valuable company in China’s domestic A-share market after its shares surged 465.82% during their first day of trading on Shanghai’s technology-focused STAR Market on Monday.

The shares closed at 49 yuan ($7.24), compared with an initial public offering price of 8.66 yuan ($1.28).

The closing price gave CXMT a market capitalization of about 3.28 trillion yuan ($484.5 billion), surpassing the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, previously the country’s most valuable domestically listed company.

The shares lost some momentum Tuesday, closing at 47 yuan ($6.94). CXMT’s market value declined to about 3.14 trillion yuan ($463.8 billion), but it remained the largest company in the A-share market.

The listing followed Asia’s largest initial public offering of 2026. CXMT raised about $8.6 billion, nearly twice the amount initially sought, reflecting strong investor demand for Chinese semiconductor companies.

State media celebrates semiconductor advance

Chinese state-affiliated media described the listing as a milestone in Beijing’s drive for technological self-sufficiency.

The Global Times said the market response demonstrated growing investor confidence in China’s semiconductor industry as the country accelerates efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

The Chinese-language Global Times described memory chips as the “rice of the digital age” and said CXMT had broken the longstanding foreign dominance of large-scale DRAM production.

It said the company had built its design and manufacturing capabilities from virtually nothing over approximately a decade.

CXMT was founded in 2016 and produces DRAM chips used in smartphones, personal computers, tablets and servers. It is widely regarded as the world’s fourth-largest DRAM manufacturer after Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron Technology.

China’s state media said the funds raised through the listing would be used to upgrade memory wafer production lines, expand DRAM research and development and pursue next-generation memory technologies.

Chinese analysts expressed hope that the investment could eventually weaken the dominance of Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron in the global DRAM market.

CXMT’s progress has already heightened investor concern over increasing Chinese competition. Its market debut contributed to declines in several global semiconductor stocks, including shares of South Korean memory manufacturers.

Technology gap remains

Despite the celebratory tone, Chinese media cautioned that CXMT continues to trail South Korean and U.S. memory manufacturers in advanced production processes.

The company is estimated to remain two to three years behind leading foreign manufacturers in some advanced technologies and faces restrictions on access to sophisticated overseas chipmaking equipment.

CXMT’s roughly 8% share of the global DRAM market also remains well below the combined position of Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron.

The memory chip industry is highly cyclical, meaning the current surge in prices and demand associated with artificial intelligence may not continue indefinitely.

Rapid capacity expansion by CXMT and other manufacturers could also increase supplies and place downward pressure on global memory prices.

Chinese state media urged investors and the semiconductor industry not to allow the listing’s success to create excessive confidence.

The debut nevertheless represents a major symbolic and financial achievement for Beijing’s semiconductor strategy. CXMT now has access to substantial capital that could accelerate research, manufacturing expansion and efforts to compete in higher-end memory products.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260728010010446

Taipei, Taiwan – China’s coastguard and civilian fleet are expanding their presence in the waters east of Taiwan, raising fears that Beijing may be rehearsing a containment strategy that would cut off the self-ruled island from outside trade and assistance.

Through June and July, China’s Maritime Safety Administration and coastguard staged multiple patrols and “special maritime law enforcement operations”, according to official government announcements.

While China regularly patrols the Taiwan Strait – the waterway with an average width of about 180km (112 miles) separating coastal China from the main island of Taiwan – this marks the first time the patrols have moved east of Taiwan in such quick succession, according to analysts.

K Tristan Tang, a nonresident fellow at the United States-based National Bureau of Asian Research, said the shift carries both strategic and symbolic weight for Taiwan.

“Beijing is signalling that it wants to extend its claimed administrative jurisdiction to Taiwan’s eastern waters, effectively surrounding Taiwan rather than only eroding Taiwan’s space in the strait,” Tang told Al Jazeera.

“Law enforcement operations” have included patrolling the area and requesting information from commercial vessels about their origin and destination, according to Taipei.

The shift east has also occurred amid a greater uptick in Chinese maritime activity around Taiwan and its outlying islands. Taiwan reported 55 sightings of Chinese coastguard and research vessel activity in June, up from 30 sightings in May.

These sightings included Chinese activity near the uninhabited Taiwan-controlled Dongsha Islands, also known as the Pratas Islands, in the South China Sea.

Beijing has said the operations are a response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to set their maritime boundaries, which infringe on “territorial sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests”, according to Chinese state media.

Some of the waters around southern Japan and the northern Philippines overlap with Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coastline.

On July 4, China’s coastguard announced that law enforcement activities to the east of Taiwan would continue to “firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”.

China claims Taiwan as a province – which means it also views Taiwan’s EEZ as under its jurisdiction. It also claims large swaths of the nearby South China Sea and East China Sea, some of which are disputed by Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously told reporters that its activities near Taiwan are “legitimate actions to exercise China’s jurisdiction, safeguard regional stability and uphold order at sea in accordance with the law”.

The Chinese embassy in Washington, DC did not immediately respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

‘Grey zone’ tactics

Ray Powell, founder and director of Sea Light, a maritime transparency project based at Stanford University, said he views the uptick in patrols as part of China’s “boa constrictor strategy that intends to squeeze Taiwan one coil at a time”.

China has pledged to annex Taiwan by peace or by force, and it employs a variety of pressure tactics, from cutting off access to international spaces such as the World Health Organization, drone and fighter jet incursions, to alleged cyberattacks, according to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau.

Known as “grey zone” tactics, these manoeuvres are designed to strain Taiwan’s limited resources and damage morale in order to convince its 23 million people that annexation is inevitable, according to Taiwanese officials.

Security analysts like Powell have warned that “law enforcement” activities could quickly escalate into a blockade or quarantine. Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure as an island that imports nearly all its energy supplies.

“One day we could look back at this and say this was in some ways the start of the quarantine,” he told Al Jazeera.

“Today it’s radio challenges; what is the next stage after that? When do we start to see them stop and inspect ships or reroute them? It’s not a very big step to start squeezing Taiwan on things it needs, like LNG,” Powell said.

China has already signalled that a blockade could be on the table in the future. Since 2022, Beijing has regularly staged large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a simulated blockade of the island during its last round of exercises in December.

While coastguard activity is more low-profile than a naval patrol, Chauluen Lin, an expert in asymmetric warfare at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told Al Jazeera the fleet could be considered a “second navy”.

China’s coastguard is not a civilian police force, as it falls under the jurisdiction of the Central Military Commission as a division of the People’s Armed Police.

China’s coastguard patrols have been unusual enough to elicit a rare joint response from the United Kingdom, Germany and France, who said in late June that the “actions threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping”.

“We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” the statement said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that Washington disagrees with the expanded patrols and that they undermine regional stability.

A distracted US

William Yang, the Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera that Beijing may be taking advantage of a US distracted by the war in Iran and a president who appears ambivalent towards Taiwan.

Although the US does not recognise Taiwan as a country, it has pledged to help the island defend itself. Much of this assistance has come in the form of weapons sales, training and intelligence sharing.

US President Donald Trump also cast doubt on these commitments when he said US weapons sales could be a “negotiating chip” with China following a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May.

“The external environment has fundamentally changed in the Indo-Pacific region, at least from their perspective, with Washington very focused and tangled up in the Middle East,” Yang said.

“At the same time, the US has no bandwidth to really look at or respond to such an expansion of Chinese maritime operations in these sensitive waters,” he added.

July 27 (UPI) — Brazil and China agreed Monday to speed up negotiations on a trade agreement between Mercosur and China as both countries seek to strengthen economic ties after new U.S. tariffs hit Brazilian exports.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke by telephone for more than an hour just days after the United States confirmed a 25% tariff on Brazilian exports.

Lula said on X that the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation in strategic and high-technology sectors, including artificial intelligence, satellites, critical minerals processing and fertilizer trade.

In the post, Lula highlighted the “positive results” of bilateral trade and the recent short-term visa waiver, saying the measures “will increase tourist flows and business opportunities.”

He also emphasized the need to expand cooperation in other sectors and advance negotiations on a trade agreement between Mercosur, the South American trade bloc, and China.

“I stressed that our government remains committed to diversifying markets,” Lula wrote.

The two leaders also discussed global conflicts and their impact on people’s lives, as well as global food and energy security, identifying them as key international challenges.

“While discussing the crisis in the Middle East, we agreed that restrictions on freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have harmful effects on the global economy,” Lula said.

According to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, Xi rejected what he described as external interference in Brazil’s electoral process and expressed China’s willingness to support Lula’s government.

Xi said that under new global circumstances and challenges, China and Brazil, as leading members of the Global South, should uphold historical justice and the progress of civilization while playing a greater role in reforming and improving the global governance system and defending international fairness and justice.

According to Xi, China “highly values Brazil’s international standing and significant influence, supports the country in safeguarding its sovereignty and independence, opposes foreign interference and will contribute to maintaining regional and global peace and stability.”

Lula also said both leaders criticized the inability of the United Nations Security Council to respond effectively to current international crises and reaffirmed Brazil’s and China’s commitment to multilateralism. They agreed to maintain close coordination on international issues through forums, including the United Nations and the BRICS group.

The conversation comes as Lula has intensified his efforts to diversify Brazil’s trade relationships. In an article published Sunday in The Washington Post, he described the new U.S. tariffs on Brazilian goods as a “strategic mistake” and said Brazil would pursue alternative markets to expand investment and economic partnerships.

Published on
27/07/2026 – 9:03 GMT+2

CXMT’s shares surged 472% in their market debut and were trading up 462% by early afternoon in Asia, making it the most valuable company listed on a mainland Chinese exchange, with a market capitalisation of about 3.3 trillion yuan (approximately €415 billion). Even so, its market capitalisation remains below that of South Korean and US memory chipmakers Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix and Micron Technology.

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CXMT is among a growing number of chipmakers that have benefited enormously from the artificial intelligence boom. The company has also prospered as China pushes for greater self-sufficiency in advanced technologies while grappling with restricted access to cutting-edge chipmaking equipment under US-led export controls.

The company raised at least $8.6 billion (approximately €7.3 billion) in the offering, which was priced at 8.66 yuan (about €1.10) a share, in its listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s Nasdaq-like STAR Market, also known as the Science and Technology Innovation Board.

It was mainland China’s second-largest initial public offering after Agricultural Bank of China’s 2010 dual listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong, which raised $22.1 billion (approximately €18.8 billion).

Founded in 2016 in the eastern city of Hefei, CXMT is one of the world’s largest makers of DRAM, or “dynamic random access” memory chips, a kind of semiconductor used in everything from AI servers to autos and consumer electronics like smartphones and personal computers.

“CXMT plays a critical role in China’s AI push, particularly in the face of US export controls,” Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and an expert in China’s technology policies, said. US restrictions have also barred China from importing powerful HBM, or high-bandwidth memory chips – a type of DRAM chip.

The company’s revenue surged to 50.8 billion yuan (approximately €6.4 billion) in the first three months of 2026, up more than 700% year on year as booming demand driven by the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence fuelled growth.

Soaring use of AI has led to a global memory chip shortage, driving up prices for some computers and smartphones. One big question, Chan said, is whether CXMT could help with the broader shortage.

CXMT is seen as China’s best shot at developing its own cutting-edge HBM chips to power Chinese AI models, Chan said. But it also faces many challenges, including supply chain bottlenecks in scaling up manufacturing capacity, since its access to the world’s most best chipmaking tools is highly restricted, forcing it to depend on Chinese equipment makers.

According to Counterpoint Research, a technology research firm, CXMT was the world’s fourth biggest DRAM memory chipmaker in 2025 by shipments, taking up roughly 8% of the global market. Samsung Electronics accounted for 36%, SK Hynix 29% and Micron about 24%.

In the first three months of this year CXMT accounted for approximately 9% of global shipments. By 2028, its market share is forecast by Counterpoint Research to reach about 11%. But the research firm estimated CXMT will likely need at least a 15% global market share to be competitive in the long term.

“Trade restrictions on tools are remaining as the key challenge for CXMT,” MS Hwang, a research director at Counterpoint who specialises in memory semiconductors, said. Some US lawmakers have also recently called for President Donald Trump’s administration to block American companies from buying CXMT’s memory chips over national and economic security concerns.

CXMT, among many other Chinese companies, has been designated by the Pentagon as having links to the Chinese military. Beijing has rejected such designations in most cases.

CXMT’s public share offering followed South Korean chipmaker SK Hynix’s $26.5 billion (approximately €22.5 billion) Nasdaq listing earlier this month.

Additional sources • AP