China

TAIPEI, Taiwan — A resolute Secretary of State Marco Rubio took to the White House lectern Tuesday and declared the United States, under President Trump’s leadership, had launched a bold new operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, based on the principle that international waterways must remain free.

An hour later, Trump walked it all back, ending the complex military endeavor after less than a day.

It was just the latest evidence to America’s allies that the word of the U.S. government is subject entirely to the president’s whims. And such is the worry fueling concerns in Taipei ahead of Trump’s state visit to China this week.

Privately, senior administration officials have assured Taiwanese leadership ahead of the trip that Trump has no intention of changing long-standing U.S. policy on the island, two sources familiar with the discussions said — a stance of “strategic ambiguity” that has avoided any declarative statements on Taiwanese independence since it was coined by Henry Kissinger 55 years ago.

A White House official was definitive that U.S. policy toward Taiwan “remains the same as the first Trump administration.”

“The U.S. One China policy, as our cross-strait policies are collectively known, is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan,” the official said. “There is no change to our policy with respect to Taiwan.”

But Chinese officials told The Times that their president, Xi Jinping, intends to raise the matter as a top priority, knowing that only one person — Trump himself — speaks for the administration today.

Whether Xi can leverage the intimacy of a private audience to shift Trump’s stance, potentially linking it to other U.S. objectives, is the source of significant concern here.

Taiwanese officials fear even the most subtle rhetorical change in policy from Trump could imperil a delicate status quo that has held, to its benefit, for decades. They have similarly sought assurances that the administration will follow through on a pending U.S. arms sale worth over $10 billion, which received approval from Taiwan’s legislature on Friday.

“The most serious scenario would be if President Trump were to make an impromptu statement, such as, ‘I oppose Taiwanese independence,’ particularly if he were to link this to trade, the Iran issue, or a summit agreement,” said Chienyu Shih, of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan. “This would constitute a rhetorical concession of substantial significance to Beijing.”

Rubio told reporters at his news conference Tuesday — with a similar confidence he expressed on the Iran file — that China understands Washington’s long-standing position on the island.

“I’m sure Taiwan will be a topic of conversation. It always is. The Chinese understand our position on that topic — we understand theirs,” Rubio said.

“I think both countries understand that it is in neither one of our interests to see anything destabilizing happen in that part of the world,” he added. “We don’t need any destabilizing events to occur with regards to Taiwan, or anywhere in the Indo-Pacific. And that’s to the mutual benefit of both the United States and the Chinese.”

Trump has suggested a willingness to shift U.S. policy on Taiwan before.

During his initial campaign for the presidency in 2016, Trump openly questioned the One China policy, drawing ire from Beijing for suggesting he might endorse Taiwanese independence. He accepted a call from Taiwan’s president after his victory and would later support significant arms sales to Taipei.

And yet, at a 2017 meeting with Xi, Trump vacillated, telling the Chinese leader he could “deal with” the Taiwan issue in “a matter of months,” according to the Wall Street Journal. The Chinese were reportedly so flabbergasted by the comment that they dismissed it as rhetorical flourish.

“There is concern that the conversation between the two leaders could veer into sensitive territory on the topic of Taiwan,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “but there are many in the administration who would still appreciate the importance of general continuity in U.S. policy.”

U.S. support for Taiwan’s democratic movement used to be a matter of principle. Today, Washington sees it as a matter of national security. Over 60% of semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, including 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. And it is viewed as the clasp of the first island chain guarding against Chinese maritime expansion.

A robust debate between Taiwan’s Cabinet and the opposition in parliament ended Friday not over whether to accept U.S. defense equipment, but over how much to spend. The Legislative Yuan approved $24 billion in purchases — including a defense package passed by Congress in December and the pending arms sale — falling short of Taipei’s $40-billion proposal.

Anticipation for the president’s state visit is high here in the capital city, where local news is filled with questions over the influence Trump’s war in Iran might have on his appetite for supporting Taiwan.

Chinese defense analysts have seen the war as a sign of U.S. weakness. But Taiwanese defense experts have taken away a different lesson: cheap equipment from a lesser military, such as dumb mines thrown in a strait, may just be enough to paralyze a superpower.

The latest U.S. National Security Strategy, released by the Trump administration in December, emphasized the importance of support for Taiwan and the status quo.

But the Taiwanese took note that the strategy also called for an end to forever wars in the Middle East, offering little preview of the president’s sudden strategic pivot on Iran in February, launching a war few saw coming.

What Trump chooses to say in China “might be difficult to predict,” said Jyh-Shyang Sheu, a scholar of Chinese politics and military capabilities based in Taiwan.

But “in Taipei, we are still focusing on the U.S. policy,” he added, “more focusing on what he does instead of what he says.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is in Beijing, seeking support on a deal with the US, while US President Trump will be in China next week, and Iran will be on the agenda.

Why is everyone turning to China? What role is Beijing playing in the US-Israel led war on Iran?

Los Angeles is a city rich with regional specificity when considering the cuisines of Asia. When someone asks for a restaurant recommendation for “Korean food” or “dumplings” or “Thai,” I encourage them to be more specific. Are you in the mood for xiao long bao, mandu, gyoza or momos? You want to know where to get barbecue in Koreatown? Those sizzling grills crowded with galbi, while dependably righteous, only scratch the surface of the breadth and depth of Korean cuisine in what is home to the largest Korean diaspora outside of Korea.

There are omakase experiences for every price point. Cramped izakayas. A restaurant where the sole speciality is lamb prepared in the style of the Uyghur people of China’s Xinjiang province. Pho parlors and banh mi shops with pâté-smeared baguettes. Sunny Taiwanese breakfast restaurants slinging steaming bowls of congee and tightly wrapped fantuan.

AAPI-owned restaurants act as the vital centers of countless communities around the city. The San Gabriel Valley, Westminster, Little Bangladesh, Koreatown and so many more. These are places that are both hubs for thriving immigrant communities and sought-after dining destinations.

Here’s a list of 20 AAPI-owned standouts from our most recent guide to the 101 Best Restaurants in the city. — Jenn Harris

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

Iran’s foreign minister meets his Chinese counterpart one week before President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is holding talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing amid tensions with the United States in the Strait of Hormuz.

Araghchi’s one-day trip on Wednesday comes a week before US President Donald Trump’s scheduled ⁠visit to Beijing for a summit with President Xi Jinping on May 14 and 15.

China’s official Xinhua news agency reported the meeting between Araghchi and Wang had begun, without providing further details.

Araghchi’s visit to Beijing marks the first time he has travelled to China, a close ally of Tehran, since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Araghchi had spoken with Wang by telephone at least three times following the start of the war.

Earlier in Washington, DC, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed hope that Beijing would reiterate to Tehran the need to release its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran effectively closed the strait, through which major oil and gas supplies passed, after the war began, sending prices of fuel and fertiliser skyrocketing and rattling the global economy.

Following a ceasefire in April, the US imposed its own blockade on Iranian ports in a bid to compel Tehran to agree to Washington’s terms in peace talks.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said two things will be front and centre on the agenda of Araghchi and Wang’s meeting – maintaining the ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

“We know that China has been very critical of the US’s naval blockade on Iranian ports, calling it dangerous. But increasingly, Beijing has also been critical of Iran’s decision to continually close that vital chokepoint,” Yu said.

Wang is expected to speak to Araghchi about what kind of support China can continue to offer Iran if it continues to close the strait.

“Iran will need Chinese backing, for example, at the United Nations, to continue to block any action that would put any additional sanctions on Iran because of its closure of the strait,” Yu said.

“Reportedly, the Iranian foreign minister is looking for clarity from Beijing as to what it will put on the table when Xi meets with Trump, and whether Beijing will be making any concessions to Washington that could make Tehran nervous.”

China, in return, “wants its own assurances that Iran won’t act in any escalatory way or any dramatic fashion in the lead up to that very important meeting”, she added.

Araghchi and Wang’s meeting came as Trump announced a pause on a US military operation to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

The effort, which began on Monday, ratcheted up tensions, with the US military claiming it sank several Iranian boats that attempted to interfere in the operation. The United Arab Emirates also reported coming under missile and drone attacks from Iran, with one assault sparking a fire at an oil refinery. Tehran denies the launching the attacks.

Trump said on Truth Social the pause was based “on the request of Pakistan and other Countries” and because “Great Progress has been made toward a Complete and Final Agreement with Representatives of Iran”.

Pakistan has been leading efforts for a peace deal between Iran and the US.

The two sides held direct talks in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, but the negotiations ended without an agreement. Key sticking points include US demands for Iran to halt all nuclear enrichment and Tehran’s wish to continue to exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz.

THE most beautiful museums in the world have been named but you will have to hop on a plane to visit any of them.

The 2026 list has been revealed Prix Versailles, with the architecture competition including everything from airports to train stations.

Yet the 2026 The World’s Most Beautiful Museums list only has one entry in Europe – and it wasn’t in the UK.

“Beyond welcoming their visitors, we hope these places will be sources of inspiration for all those who serve the common good of humanity.”

The only European winner was Lost Shtetl Museum in Šeduva, Lithuania.

Designed to look like a small town (being the Yiddish translation of Shtetl), the museum is based on the typical Lithuanian Jewish family.

NO KID-DING

Small UK museum ‘made for kids’ named best in Europe and it’s free to visit

PLAY ON

The huge new ‘world-class’ indoor attraction set to open in the UK

Tourists have raved about it, with one saying: “This museum is one of the best at least in Baltics, if not in Europe.”

Zayed National Museum in Abu Dhabi, which opened in December last year and cost £502million to build, also made the list.

The museum goes back 300,000 years of the Emirates, and is a tribute to the UAE’s first president Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

It was even designed by the UK architectural company Foster + Partners (behind London’s Gherkin) and has a collaboration with the British Museum to offer more than 500 artifacts.

America’s National Medal of Honor Museum in Texas was also named, which features recipients of the highest military awards.

In Uzbekistan, the Islamic Civilization Center made the list, which is home to a museum as well as libraries and science labs.

Having opened back in March 2026, it has also been awarded a Guinness World Record for being the world’s largest museum of Islamic civilization.

China had two entries on the most beautiful museum list – the Xuelei Fragrance Museum (the largest fragrance museum in the world) and Shenzhen’s Science and Technology Museum which opened last year.

And finally, Japan‘s MoN Takanawa: The Museum of Narratives, which opened in March 2026, was also praised.

Jérôme Gouadain, Secretary General of the Prix Versailles explained: “The World’s Most Beautiful Museums List for 2026 stands out for the quality of its architectural interpretations and staging, elevating the sites with extraordinary narrative power.

“Together, these museums provide a real illustration of how strength and talent can be revealed through harmony, sensitivity and sharing.”

Previous winners on the list include Grand Palais in Paris (2025) and Grand Egyptian Museum (2024).

Here is one of the UK’s newest museums that opened last year.

As well as the UK’s newest most popular museum.

May 5 (UPI) — An explosion at a fireworks factory in China’s Hunan Province has killed 26 people and injured dozens more, state media reported Tuesday, prompting Chinese President Xi Jinping to call for those responsible to be held accountable.

The blast occurred Monday afternoon at the Huasheng Fireworks Manufacturing and Display plant in the southern city of Liuyang, the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported. Authorities said 26 people were killed and 61 injured at a press conference Tuesday.

Five rescue teams totaling nearly 500 personnel were dispatched to the scene, while an area with a radius of nearly two miles was evacuated due to the risk of further explosions.

Rescuers set up firebreaks and sprayed water over the site to “prevent secondary accidents during the rescue,” Xinhua said.

Mayor Chen Bozhang of provincial capital Changsha told reporters Tuesday that search and rescue operations were largely complete, adding that real-time air and water monitoring showed no signs of environmental contamination.

The person in charge of the fireworks company has been taken into custody, Chen said.

Aerial footage from Chinese state broadcaster CCTV showed widespread damage, with smoldering factory buildings leveled across a wide area.

Xi on Tuesday ordered a prompt investigation into the accident and said “those responsible must be held accountable,” state media reported. He also called for stronger risk screening and hazard controls in key sectors, along with enhanced public safety management.

The blast follows other deadly fireworks-related accidents in China in recent years. Ahead of Lunar New Year celebrations in February, an explosion and fire at a fireworks store in Jiangsu Province killed eight, prompting officials to call for increased safety checks on pyrotechnics.

In 2019, another fireworks factory explosion in Liuyang killed 13 people. The city is the hub of China’s fireworks manufacturing industry, accounting for about 60% of the domestic market and roughly 70% of exports, according to state media.

May 3 (Asia Today) — Japan and Vietnam agreed to deepen cooperation across key economic security sectors, including energy, critical minerals, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and space, as Tokyo seeks to strengthen supply chains and reduce reliance on China.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met with Vietnam’s top leadership, including Communist Party General Secretary and President To Lam and Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, during her visit to Hanoi. After the meetings, she said both countries had designated economic security as a top priority in bilateral cooperation.

According to Vietnamese media and Reuters, the two countries agreed Saturday to elevate their comprehensive strategic partnership and signed six memorandums of understanding covering technology, climate response and information and communications.

Energy cooperation at the forefront

A key outcome was in energy. Vietnam said Japan will support crude oil supplies to the Nghi Son refinery through a $10 billion “Power Asia” initiative aimed at strengthening energy resilience in the region.

The program, introduced by Takaichi last month, is designed to help Southeast Asian countries affected by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz by supporting oil procurement, storage and supply chain resilience.

Japan’s Idemitsu Kosan has already decided to send about 4 million barrels of crude oil to Vietnam via routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The shipment, equivalent to about 10 days of refinery operations, followed a request from Vietnam earlier this year.

Strategic message on China

In a speech at Vietnam National University, Takaichi emphasized the risks of overdependence on a single country for critical supplies, a remark widely interpreted as targeting China.

“Overreliance on one country often stems from abnormally low prices,” she said, calling for a “level playing field” in global trade.

She also stressed that regional supply chains depend on secure and open sea lanes, referencing both the Strait of Hormuz and the South China Sea.

The speech reaffirmed Japan’s vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a framework originally proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and now updated for what Takaichi described as a more challenging global environment.

Expanding cooperation in critical minerals

The two countries also agreed to expand cooperation on critical minerals, as Japan seeks to diversify supply chains heavily dependent on China.

Vietnam holds significant reserves of rare earth elements and gallium but lacks refining capacity, leaving it reliant on Chinese processing. Strengthened cooperation could help Japan secure alternative supply sources.

Japan remains one of Vietnam’s largest economic partners, with bilateral trade exceeding $50 billion last year. It is also Vietnam’s largest provider of official development assistance.

Takaichi highlighted Vietnam’s growing role in global manufacturing, citing production of Apple AirPods and Nintendo Switch devices, as part of efforts to encourage renewed Japanese investment.

She is scheduled to travel to Australia next, where she will meet Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to mark the 50th anniversary of bilateral relations and upgrade ties to a “special strategic partnership.”

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260503010000231

May 2 (Asia Today) — China has begun tightening regulations on its fast-growing drone industry, prompting concerns that the government may be undermining one of its most competitive global sectors.

Recent reports from Chinese media outlets, including the New Beijing News, indicate that China holds a commanding position in the global drone market, with an estimated market share of at least 70%. Industry leader DJI dominates both domestic and international markets, facing limited competition even as Taiwan makes inroads in Europe.

Despite this strong position, new regulations took effect Thursday in Beijing, effectively designating much of the capital as a no-drone zone. Under the new municipal ordinance on unmanned aerial vehicle management, the transport, sale, rental and operation of drones within the city have been broadly restricted.

The measures have already led to store closures. DJI flagship outlets in areas such as the 798 Art District in Beijing’s Chaoyang district have shut down, in some cases under pressure from authorities.

Officials say the move reflects growing concerns over national security and public safety, as drones are increasingly viewed as potential threats in sensitive areas. Beijing has previously imposed temporary flight bans on low, slow and small aerial objects during major political events, a policy that now appears to be expanding into a more permanent framework.

Analysts say the Beijing regulations could serve as a model for broader nationwide controls. If expanded, such measures may significantly weaken China’s dominance in the global drone industry and could even erode its competitive edge.

Industry insiders have expressed concern that excessive regulation could harm a key growth sector, with some privately warning that China risks damaging its own technological leadership.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260502010000045

China currently boasts one of the lowest rates of homicide, violent crime, and gun and explosive incidents globally. The Chinese-style sense of security is a comprehensive system integrating advanced technology, community engagement, and continuous improvement in living standards. This has positioned China as one of the safest countries in the world, according to the 2025 Global Security Report, with 98.2% of Chinese citizens feeling safe by 2025, further solidifying its status as a globally stable destination. The pillars of this Chinese-style sense of security are built upon advanced digital technologies, relying on smart networks and modern surveillance systems such as facial recognition and artificial intelligence to enhance the security network within China.

The phrase “Chinese-style security” refers to China’s model for achieving social stability and reducing crime rates. This model is based primarily on three pillars: proactive prevention systems, where, rather than simply addressing crime after it occurs, China focuses on prevention and control through extensive security networks and a constant police presence in key areas; the continuation of the community mobilization system (the Fengqiao model), a historical concept (currently revived) that involves citizens and local committees in resolving community disputes before they escalate into crimes or legal cases, thus promoting the idea of ​​self-regulation and public cooperation with Chinese authorities; and the use of digitalization and artificial intelligence technologies, where China has heavily invested in smart city technologies and the Skynet system. Skynet utilizes millions of cameras equipped with facial recognition and big data analytics to predict suspicious activities and track wanted individuals with high precision. This combination aims to create a secure environment that supports economic growth within China, despite the occasional international debates it sparks regarding the balance between public security and individual privacy.

Data and reports confirm exceptional social stability in China, with citizens’ sense of security exceeding 98% for six consecutive years. This security is attributed to effective governance, advanced digital technologies, and a high standard of living, making China a safe destination for investment and a source of stability. Key features of Chinese governance and the sense of security include increased levels of trust and optimism, with the Chinese people ranking among the world’s highest in trust in the government and optimism about the future, according to trust index reports. A robust safety net exists, built on Chinese-style security through crime prevention systems, community mobilization, and enhanced digitalization. These systemic features, along with numerous other advantages, reflect the stability within China and the state’s ability to fulfill its commitments and provide a safe and stable social environment, earning international praise, particularly in light of global geopolitical conflicts. With the continuation of Chinese-style modernization, ongoing modernization has contributed to raising living standards, thus strengthening the sense of security within China.

Accordingly, the Chinese government and the authorities of the ruling Communist Party of China support several pillars and points that support this approach to enhance the sense of security within the country. Based on current developments, focusing on security as the foundation for development in China, the stability of the situation in China is seen as a key element in boosting investor confidence and building a safe and stable living environment for citizens, which contributes to economic growth. With the intensification of the Chinese-style modernization model, modernization in China is not limited to economic growth but also focuses on improving the quality of life, providing employment opportunities, and upgrading social services, which significantly raises living standards. With the stable sense of security, China, through well-considered social policies, has succeeded in maintaining a high level of social security, which enhances public trust in the government and contributes to long-term stability. This has resulted in continued international praise (amidst crises). At a time when several regions around the world are experiencing geopolitical conflicts, China’s stability stands out as a model attracting the attention and scrutiny of international observers, particularly due to the Chinese state’s ability to effectively manage its internal affairs compared to many systems worldwide, including American and Western ones. This strengthens China’s capacity to lead the developing Global South and strongly promote its model of Chinese governance.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how the development for security strategy can form a fundamental pillar within the Chinese governance system. Improving living standards contributes to consolidating social stability and public security within China. This analysis highlights a delicate equation in the contemporary Chinese landscape, where continuous development (Chinese-style modernization) is linked to social stability, creating a secure environment in a turbulent world.

Ministry of Commerce says sanctions against refineries accused of importing Iranian oil violate international law.

China has announced an injunction to block US sanctions placed on five Chinese refiners accused ‌of buying oil from Iran.

The sanctions announced by the United States Department of the Treasury late last month bar the companies from the US financial system and seek to penalise anyone doing business with the firms.

In a statement on Saturday, China’s Ministry of Commerce said the sanctions “improperly” restrict business between Chinese enterprises and third countries “in violation of international law and the basic norms governing international relations”.

The Commerce Ministry said it had issued a “prohibition order” stipulating that the sanctions “shall not be recognized, enforced, or complied with” to “safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests”.

“The Chinese government has consistently opposed unilateral sanctions that lack UN authorisation and basis in international law,” the ministry added.

It said the order blocked US measures against Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery and four other so-called “teapot” refineries: Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group, Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group, Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong ⁠Shengxing Chemical.

Announcing the sanctions on April 24, the US Treasury Department called Hengli “one of Tehran’s most valued customers”, saying it had generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the Iranian military through crude oil purchases.

The Trump administration imposed sanctions on the other four refineries named by the Chinese ministry, among other facilities, last year.

China gets more than half of its oil from the Middle East, much of it from Iran.

According to commodities data firm Kpler, China bought more than 80 percent of the oil Iran shipped in 2025.

China’s “teapot” refineries operate independently and are generally smaller than the facilities run by state-owned oil giants, such as Sinopec.

The facilities, which have been crucial to China’s efforts to secure its oil supplies, capitalise on heavily discounted crude sold by countries under sanctions, such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela.

Teapots account for a quarter of Chinese ⁠refinery capacity, operate with narrow and sometimes negative margins, and have been squeezed recently by tepid domestic demand.

US sanctions have created additional hurdles for refiners, including difficulties selling refined products under their correct place-of-origin markings.

We can analyze China’s current stance on the escalating Iranian conflict by understanding its true position. China does not desire a full-scale war that would destroy its oil interests, but it is not averse to the continuation of the neither-peace-nor-war situation that drains its adversaries, such as Washington. This positions China as a player that pushes for calm during critical times, while simultaneously providing Iran with the economic lifeline it needs. Here, China plays a dual and complex role in the Iranian conflict (the Iranian-American/Israeli conflict), balancing its strategic support for Tehran to safeguard its energy interests and undermine American influence with its pursuit of a ceasefire to avoid widespread economic chaos.

Based on current developments up to early May 2026 and statements by Iranian officials that war is a possibility, the regional and international landscape reveals a divide between actual military escalation and cautious diplomacy. The Chinese position and the likelihood of war can be analyzed based on several factors. China views the current conflict with Iran as a proxy war, prioritizing stability over stability. China considers Iran a strategic partner, and its stance is characterized by a delicate balance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for de-escalation and a complete ceasefire to prevent further escalation in the Middle East, while simultaneously condemning American escalation. China has stated that American and Israeli military operations against Iran violate its sovereignty and has expressed grave concern about the potential imposition of a blockade on Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz. While Beijing seeks to protect its investments and economic interests, China is deeply concerned about any disruption to oil and energy supplies, especially since a direct war would lead to imported inflation, negatively impacting its economy. Therefore, China’s current stance is characterized by a cautious, mediating role. China is attempting to play the part of a peace broker but is also wary of the potential damage a war could inflict on its relations with the United States, especially given the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

Regarding the likelihood of war (and the expected scenarios), despite the tense rhetoric, a full-scale, direct war between the United States and Iran remains a risky prospect for all parties. Current indicators suggest that a war is already underway (indirectly), particularly since the start of direct military operations (US/Israeli strikes) against Iran and its allies in February 2026. This indicates that a direct war remains a strong possibility. The option of blockade and proxies also remains a possibility. Chinese intelligence and military assessments suggest that Iran might prefer to carry out its threats through proxies in the region or by disrupting oil shipments in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than engaging in a direct war, to avoid a conventional military defeat. Despite Chinese diplomatic efforts to contain the situation, and despite the escalation, attempts are still underway, such as Pakistani mediation, to reach a ceasefire. This indicates a desire among the parties to keep the door open for political solutions.

As for my perspective on the proxy war between China and Iran against the United States and Israel, the current conflict is likely to continue as a proxy war of attrition, with limited and precise strikes, rather than a full-scale ground invasion. China will likely exert further pressure, continuing to push for diplomatic solutions because any large-scale war would threaten the stability of global energy supplies, on which it depends. It’s worth noting that the region is going through a critical moment and a dangerous phase of mutual deterrence. Iranian officials’ statements are as much messages of deterrence as they are an acknowledgment of the potential for escalation.

Regarding China’s role in the continuation of the war or its support for Iran (strategic and economic support), China considers the Iranian Strait of Hormuz and its purchases of Iranian oil as a vital economic lifeline. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil (approximately 80-90% of exports), providing Tehran with crucial funding to sustain its activities. China also seeks to help Iran circumvent US sanctions, assisting Iran in bypassing these sanctions through an unofficial oil fleet, thus keeping the Iranian economy afloat. Furthermore, there is a strategic Chinese-Iranian partnership opposed to the West and US sanctions against Tehran. China views Iran as a partner in undermining the US-led global order through organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, China is exploiting the current situation to its advantage. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security analyses suggest that the continuation of the Iranian war drains US resources and provides China with an opportunity to enhance its influence, absorbing the shock of the war and potentially emerging with strategic gains.

At the same time that China is playing a role in halting the Iranian war through mediation diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, with China acting as a hidden mediator to urge Tehran to cooperate and reach a ceasefire with the United States to protect its economic interests, despite China’s support for Iran, the war harms China by closing the Strait of Hormuz and threatening its energy security. This prompts Beijing to urge an end to the war and the reopening of waterways. Therefore, China is pursuing a policy of diplomatic pressure, consistently calling for restraint and believing that the best solution is an immediate ceasefire, according to statements by its permanent representative to the United Nations.

Accordingly, we conclude that a full-scale war is theoretically possible but practically unlikely as a final option due to the exorbitant cost to all parties. However, the continuation of retaliatory strikes and economic sanctions remains the most probable scenario at present.

The United Arab Emirates’ announcement of its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ alliance, effective May 1, 2026, represents a major strategic shift in the global energy market, with direct and significant implications for China, the world’s largest oil importer. The primary impact of this UAE withdrawal on China is the enhancement of Chinese energy security, as it will increase available supplies. The UAE will now be able to raise its production towards its target of 5 million barrels per day by 2027, without being bound by OPEC quotas. This expansion will provide China with a substantial and stable source of oil outside the constraints of production alliances. Furthermore, the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC will impact China’s diversification policy, as China relies on imports to cover approximately 70% of its oil needs. The UAE’s departure will grant Beijing greater flexibility in purchasing from the spot market at potentially more competitive prices.

This also has a significant impact on import costs (prices) through prolonged downward pressure. The UAE’s increased oil production (up to 680,000 barrels per day above previous levels) is expected to put downward pressure on global Brent crude prices in the medium term (12-24 months), thus reducing China’s energy import bill. This could lead to short-term volatility, as, despite the potential benefit, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (due to current regional tensions in April 2026) limits the immediate ability to capitalize on the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, since most of the UAE’s exports to China pass through this waterway.

China could benefit from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC by enhancing its capacity for financial and trade cooperation and expanding trade in local currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan. The UAE’s departure from OPEC could (facilitate the expansion of oil trade agreements) in rubles, rupees, and yuan, moving away from OPEC’s traditional dollar pricing. This aligns with China’s drive to internationalize the yuan. Such a move could boost joint investments, given China’s existing stakes in UAE oil concessions. With Abu Dhabi freed from restrictions, these Chinese investments could generate higher returns through increased production. Furthermore, China might leverage the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC to bolster the strategic and geopolitical value of weakening OPEC’s influence. This withdrawal diminishes OPEC’s ability to control global supply, which benefits major consuming nations like China by reducing the likelihood of price shocks resulting from collective production cuts.

In this context, Chinese discussions and analyses have intensified, examining the potential benefits for China from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC. Chinese experts are analyzing the likelihood and impact of such a move should it materialize, particularly given the UAE’s increasing production capacity and its desire for greater flexibility. If we assume the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is indeed the case, China stands to be the biggest beneficiary for the following reasons. First, it would break the dominance of the petrodollar. The departure of a player the size of the UAE from traditional OPEC constraints opens the door wide to bilateral agreements for pricing oil in digital yuan (or Chinese yuan), thus supporting Beijing’s strategy of internationalizing the yuan to reduce its dependence on the Western financial system (SWIFT). In addition to the increased Chinese-Emirati supply, since Chinese companies such as CNPC and CNOOC hold stakes in oil concessions in Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s release from OPEC production quotas means these companies can increase production and secure China’s growing energy needs at preferential prices and with favorable terms. This facilitates the revitalization of joint UAE-China investments, allowing for deeper Chinese capital flow into the UAE’s refining and petrochemical sector. The exchange of finished goods and crude oil within an economic cycle based on local currencies reduces conversion costs and the risks associated with dollar fluctuations. This supports China’s policy of moving towards BRICS+. As the UAE is a member of the BRICS group, any move away from traditional OPEC frameworks aligns with the group’s overall direction to create a parallel financial system that supports the ruble, rupee, and yuan. This scenario, if it were to occur, would transform the relationship from one of buyer and seller to a comprehensive strategic partnership, making energy the driving force behind the new financial system that China seeks to lead.

Accordingly, the UAE’s withdrawal represents a strategic gain for China in terms of increased supply and potential cost reductions, but maximizing the benefit remains contingent on the stability of shipping lanes in the Arabian Gulf.

The UNIFIL has faced a growing number of casualties as Israel continues air raids despite a ceasefire and Hezbollah has responded with rockets and drones.

China’s ambassador to the United Nations, Fu Cong, has said there is a need to re-examine the UN Security Council’s decision to terminate the mandate of the longstanding peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, which is due to end later this year.

Speaking to reporters on Friday at the UN headquarters in New York, Ambassador Fu expressed China’s deep concern about the situation in Lebanon as Beijing assumed the council’s rotating presidency for May.

He observed that a genuine ceasefire did not exist in Lebanon, describing the current state of conflict as merely a “lesser fire”.

“We do believe that we should revisit the decision, actually, to withdraw the UNIFIL,” Fu said, using the acronym for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

“I think at least the view of the overwhelming majority of the Security Council is that this is not the time to really, to withdraw the UNIFIL out of that part of the country,” Fu said.

China is waiting for a report from the UN secretariat, expected in June, “before we take our position”, he added.

Fu also said, “It is incumbent on Israel to stop this bombardment of Lebanon.”

Created to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli troops after the 1978 invasion, UNIFIL saw its mandate expanded after the 2006 war between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah and was responsible for a demilitarised buffer between the opposing sides.

However, the UNSC unanimously resolved last year to begin withdrawing the UNIFIL mission’s 10,800 international peacekeepers by December 2026.

According to Lebanese authorities, Israeli attacks on Lebanon since March 2 have killed 2,618 people and forced more than one million to flee their homes.

The UNIFIL mission has also faced a growing number of casualties. According to UN officials, at least six peacekeepers have been killed and many others injured since Israel began its attack on March 2.

The deaths include soldiers from various contributing nations, including Indonesia and France, who have been caught in shelling incidents and roadside attacks.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has condemned these incidents, noting that the UN’s “blue helmets” have come under fire while performing essential duties, such as clearing explosive ordnance and escorting logistics convoys.

China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong says maintaining the ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz are “urgent” priorities, warning the issue will be high on the agenda if it remains closed during President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing.

In an interview with Euronews, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič issued a firm warning that the European Union will not hesitate to defend its industries after Beijing signaled possible retaliation over new EU plans to bolster its industrial base.

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China this week up the pressure on Brussels, threatening countermeasures unless the EU softens core elements of its “Made in Europe” proposal—designed to tighten market access for foreign companies—and its Cybersecurity Act, which could ultimately restrict Chinese telecom firms’ presence across the bloc.

Asked about China’s reaction to what the EU describes as much-needed measures to reinforce its sovereignty and restore a level playing field, Šefčovič told Euronews the EU will “always” defend the interests of its companies.

“We will fight tooth and nail for every European job, for every European company, for every open sector, if we see they are treated unfairly,” said Šefčovič in comments to Euronews in an exclusive interview Friday.

Ballooning trade deficit in detriment to EU

Relations between Brussels and Beijing have deteriorated sharply over the past year, with China tightening export controls on rare earths vital to Europe’s clean-tech and defence industries, as well as restricting chips essential to the automotive sector, intensifying pressure on already fragile supply chains across the bloc.

In response, the EU has pushed for legislative proposals in the domain of cybersecurity and single market rules for companies, prompting a sharp reaction from China which has accused the EU of unfair practices. Earlier this week, Beijing said the EU should not underestimate China’s “firm resolve” to safeguard its interests.

Šefčovič rejected the suggestion that recent developments signal a looming trade war but stressed that the EU does not operate under pressure and expects to be treated with respect. “We never threaten our partners, and we certainly don’t do it through the media,” he said. “What we need is strategic patience and a great deal of courage.”

He said a “war” is often easy to start, but difficult to exit. A Chinese official told Euronews Beijing does not wish for a trade spat to escalate, but said China is serious about what it considers discriminatory practices. The EU disputes discrimination.

The EU’s trade chief pointed to a ballooning trade deficit between the two sides as a cause for concern. The bloc’s trade gap with China surged to €359.3 billion in 2025, a level Šefčovič called “simply unsustainable” that does not show signs of improvement.

He also said policymakers, the European parliament and economic actors in the EU have delivered “a very strong economic and political reaction” to tackle the trade deficit.

So far, Brussels has failed to secure meaningful commitments from Beijing to rebalance trade relations. At the same time, EU officials are growing increasingly concerned that Chinese exports—shut out of the US market by higher tariffs—are being redirected towards Europe. Brussels also points to China’s overcapacity as a source of concern.

The EU is now pressing Beijing to enter serious negotiations and deliver concrete results.

“I invited the Chinese foreign minister to visit Brussels because I think we need a very thorough assessment of the current situation,” Šefčovič told Euronews. “What I want is constructive engagement.”

Faced with a surge in low-cost Chinese imports, the EU is relying on trade defence instruments to counter what it sees as dumped and heavily subsidised goods, while also monitoring efforts by Chinese firms to bypass restrictions by shifting production outside China. Šefčovič made clear the EU will not be pushed into retreat from those issues.

“There are very strong industrial policies in China. You have the same in the US, in Canada, in Japan and in Korea. So, nobody should be surprised if the European Union responds in kind—especially when it comes to public money and public funds.”

April 29 (Asia Today) — China expressed opposition Wednesday to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” initiative, calling it an attempt to promote bloc confrontation.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian made the remarks at a regular briefing in response to reports that Takaichi may present a revised Indo-Pacific strategy during a visit to Vietnam this weekend.

“Exchanges between countries should not target a third party or harm the interests of a third party,” Lin said. “Japan uses the slogan of being ‘free and open,’ but in reality it is stirring up confrontation between camps and creating a small, exclusive group.”

Lin said such actions run counter to the shared desire of regional countries and the international community for peace, development and cooperation.

“They will be difficult to win support,” he said.

According to Japan’s Foreign Ministry, Takaichi is scheduled to visit Hanoi on Friday and meet with To Lam, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Le Minh Hung.

Diplomatic sources in Beijing said the talks are expected to focus on strengthening the two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership, including in economic security fields such as energy, critical minerals and science and technology.

Takaichi is also expected to deliver a speech outlining Japan’s foreign policy direction, including its Indo-Pacific strategy, around the time of the meetings.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260429010009593

The general in charge of keeping the United States Marine Corps sustained in a fight dismisses the notion that China poses a near-peer threat to the U.S. It’s far more serious and will make the currently paused conflict with Iran pale by comparison should the two superpowers come to blows, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the USMC Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics. 

“There is no threat that looms larger than the People’s Republic of China,” Sklenka said during the 2026 Modern Day Marine Expo in Washington, D.C.. “Don’t listen to this garbage about them being a near peer. They’re a peer because they rival us in nearly every single measure of national influence.”

As the “lead strategist” and former Deputy Commander of U.S. IndoPacom, Sklenka said he “got to be pretty familiar with how General Secretary Xi was thinking and what his intentions are.”

The Chinese leader’s “vision is to upend the international structure [and] supplant us as the global leaders. And in many ways, it’s been Xi’s thinking, his vision, that has helped my own thinking about the demands of modern warfare, particularly when waged in the Pacific and particularly waged against a peer adversary, something that’s new to all of us.”

Epic Fury offers some sobering lessons, Sklenka noted. While the U.S. is able to pour forces into theater via uncontested skies and largely uncontested seas, Iran was still able to inflict a great deal of pain on America and its allies during the fighting. It still is economically through an ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A fight with China would be far worse, Sklenka cautioned.

“We’re about two months into combat operations with Epic Fury. We’ve got service members who have tragically been wounded and killed by Iran. They’ve launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at our bases and our allies throughout the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan – reinforcing the point that the bases that we have, they’re no longer administrative garrison sanctuaries. We really need to start looking at our bases as war fighting formations, just as critical of a war fighting formation as our divisions, wings and [Marine Expeditionary Units] MEUs.”

We’ll talk more about that later in this story.

You can see damage to U.S. bases in the Middle East in the following satellite images.

Iran has “illustrated how a mid-tier power can hold a significantly superior force at risk” Sklenka suggested. “As a learning organization, we ask ourselves, ‘how do we carry every lesson from this fight forward, and how do we ensure that we’re equally prepared to dominate the conflict with China?’”

“Think about the complexities and complications that we’re [facing] with Iran, and then ask yourself, ‘how are we going to respond and act when we’re going up against a nation that’s number two in national GDP?’” he added. “The fact is that Iran doesn’t have anywhere near China’s economic might. They don’t have their industrial base. They certainly don’t have their military modernization trajectory.”

“Over the last 10 to 15 years, the Chinese manufacturing base has been out-producing us” Sklenka posited. “Xi is on a wartime footing. There’s no doubt about that. It’s underpinned by an industrial base that’s out producing the world in ships and steel, precious minerals and satellites, munitions.”

China’s “shipbuilding capacity is reported to be 230 times the capacity that the United States has,” the general continued. “They more than doubled their nuclear powered submarine construction, their arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles is undergoing a rapid expansion.”

First made-in-China aircraft carrier, the Shandong, enters service

“Their nuclear stockpile is the fastest growing in the world. They’re pursuing innovative, intelligentized warfare tactics,” Sklenka pointed out. “They’re using artificial intelligence, drone swarms, exploring the cognitive and innovative domains to achieve their dominance. They’re building a military design to dominate the Pacific, and I believe ultimately beyond the Pacific.”

China’s intent, Sklenka added, “is clear. They want to regain that self-identified moniker of the Middle Kingdom, and they want to resume what they believe is their rightful place in the world. They’re not interested in sharing that position with us or with anybody else. General Secretary Xi’s view is that it’s their time, and this is the context. I bring that all up for our transformation.”

“None of us in uniform today have ever had to operate in a world where a legitimate peer simultaneously contests us in every single domain,” said Sklenka. “We are talking terrestrially and non-terrestrially, kinetically and non-kinetically. We’re going to have to fight to get to that fight, and we’re going to have to embrace these challenges and not operate under the auspices of how we did in the 80s and 90s. History is proven, and our current operations are confirmed, that the society that can project and sustain power and sustain their forces most effectively, ultimately, they prevail.”

Looking to the future, Sklenka echoed warnings that TWZ has made for years about the vulnerability of U.S. military installations, both home and abroad. No increases in magazine depth, additional weapons systems or advancements with AI and other new technologies will ultimately matter “if you can’t get off the installation in the first place,” he stated. “The ability to mobilize and deploy is underpinned by the readiness of our installations. It’s a concept that we’re just now really starting to wrestle with.”

“Our bases, posts and stations…are the front lines of decisive terrain. And I’m not just talking about those in the first island chain. This isn’t just [Marine Corps Installations Pacific] MCIPAC. Our CONUS installations are subject to non-kinetic attacks. Non kinetic-attacks, they’re going to be just as debilitating and just as strategically consequential as any kinetic attack that’s going to be out there. And they’re going to carry an air of non-attrition that’s designed to both confuse decision makers and sow chaos during the most critical phases of the fight, the beginning, the first shots of that next war.”

That first salvo, Sklenka said, is most likely not going to be delivered by a missile or bomber.

“They’re likely not going to be fired in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait,” he explained. “They’re going to be a cyber attack against a power grid on our base, a disinformation campaign targeting military families or a drone swarm coming off one of our installations.”

The localized drone attack concern is exactly what TWZ has long predicted and became a reality last year in Russia and Iran. Last June, Ukraine launched Operation Spider Web, an audacious near-field attack on Russian air bases, destroying a large number of strategic bombers with remotely operated drones set up in trucks placed near those installations.

Spider Web was followed about two weeks later by an operation Israel carried out, using drones pre-positioned inside Iran to attack the Islamic Republic’s air defenses.

You can see video of one attack during Operation Spider Web below.

Published on 29/04/2026 – 19:52 GMT+2•Updated
19:57

China has called on EU member states to revise the bloc’s proposed “Made in Europe” legislation, according to Suo Peng, trade and economy minister at China’s mission in Brussels.

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The European Union is currently debating the draft, which was unveiled by the European Commission in March and aims to impose stricter conditions on foreign companies seeking access to EU public procurement and investment opportunities.

The proposal — widely interpreted as targeting Chinese firms — has already drawn a warning from Beijing. Earlier this week, China’s commerce ministry said it would consider retaliatory measures if the EU proceeds without significant changes.

“Chinese embassies in EU member states have conveyed China’s comments and suggestions to the governments of their hosting countries,” Peng told journalists in Brussels.

He added that if the EU “insists on this punishment and treats China’s enterprises in a discriminatory manner,” Beijing would be forced to respond with countermeasures.

Public procurement rules and investment limits

The so-called Industrial Accelerator Act would, if adopted by EU governments and the European Parliament, prioritise European-made products in public procurement in sectors considered strategic, including automotive, green technologies, and energy-intensive industries such as aluminium and steel.

It would also place conditions on foreign direct investment exceeding €100 million in areas such as batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels and critical raw materials.

Companies from countries with more than 40% global market share in a given sector could be required to form joint ventures with European partners and transfer technology. At least half of jobs in such projects would also need to go to EU workers.

China has criticised the measures as discriminatory, with Peng accusing the EU of double standards on technology transfer rules. He pointed to a 2018 joint statement with the United States and Japan opposing forced technology transfers.

Divisions within the EU

EU member states remain split over the proposal. France is pushing for stricter local content requirements, while Germany and others are calling for a broader approach that includes cooperation with like-minded partners.

Some countries have also warned that the rules could increase costs and limit access to innovation.

The proposal includes a reciprocity principle in public procurement, meaning the EU would only open its market to countries that grant similar access to European firms.

China, which does not currently have such an agreement with the EU, says it is open to a bilateral deal on government procurement. Peng urged Brussels to respond “as soon as possible”.

Otherwise, he warned, the plan “will seriously damage the actual interests of Chinese and European companies.”

China has detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships after a Supreme Court ruling on the Panama Canal, US officials say.

Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States have released a joint statement in support of Panama, while criticising Chinese economic retaliation, after a Hong Kong-based conglomerate lost a legal dispute over the management of ports on the Panama Canal.

Panama’s Supreme Court in late January annulled contracts that had allowed a subsidiary of Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison to administer the Balboa and Cristobal port terminals on the Panama Canal after deeming the decades-old agreements unconstitutional.

In their joint statement on Tuesday, the six countries claimed that following the court ruling, China has retaliated against Panama with “targeted economic pressure” on Panamanian-flagged ships.

China detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships in March, according to the US Federal Maritime Commission, a number “far exceeding historical norms”.

“These actions – following the decision of Panama’s independent Supreme Court regarding the Balboa and Cristobal terminals – are a blatant attempt to politicise maritime trade and infringe on the sovereignty of the nations of our hemisphere,” the signatories said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said separately on X that Washington was “deeply concerned” by China’s economic pressure on Panama.

“We stand in solidarity with Panama. Any attempts to undermine Panama’s sovereignty are a threat to us all,” he said.

China has previously accused the US of “bullying” and trying to smear its reputation in Latin America, while it described the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling as “absurd” and “shameful”.

US Federal Maritime Commission head Laura DiBella said last month that Beijing’s detention of Panamanian ships had repercussions for both Panama and the US.

“These intensified inspections were carried out under informal directives and appear intended to punish Panama after the transfer of Hutchison’s port assets,” DiBella said.

“Given that Panama‑flagged ships carry a meaningful share of US containerised trade, these actions could result in significant commercial and strategic consequences to US shipping,” she said.

‘States know how vulnerable shipping is’

Panama’s decision to invalidate the contracts held by CK Hutchison’s subsidiary Panama Ports Company was made at a time of heightened media attention around the Panama Canal amid threats by US President Donald Trump to seize the strategic waterway.

Trump had made the approximately 80km (49-mile) waterway a focus of his second administration, alleging in his inaugural address in January 2025 that China was “operating” the canal and pledging that the US would “take back” control.

US officials allege that, in addition to targeting Panama and its interests, China has also retaliated against shipping giants Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), whose subsidiaries were granted 18-month contracts to administer the Balboa and Cristobal terminals after CK Hutchison was removed.

Representatives of Maersk and MSC were both summoned by China’s Ministry of Transport for “high-level discussions”, the Federal Maritime Commission said in March, while Chinese shipping giant COSCO has suspended operations at the Balboa terminal.

CK Hutchison, through its Panama Ports Company subsidiary, is separately pursuing international arbitration against the government of Panama and seeking more than $2bn in damages.

David Smith, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s US Studies Centre, said that the Panama Canal dispute and China’s retaliation were the latest example of how shipping has become a political target, from Latin America to the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea in the Middle East.

“We have taken for granted that the world runs on container ships just freely sailing around the world,” he told Al Jazeera.

“What we’re seeing now is that states know how vulnerable shipping is. They know they can cut shipping lanes off if necessary. It should not surprise us from now on if ships and shipping in general become pawns in international politics.”

On China, the mood at the European Commission has shifted in recent months.

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China hawks are gaining ground inside both the Commission’s powerful Directorate-General for Trade and in the cabinet of President Ursula von der Leyen, Euronews has learned, with drastic new measures being considered to counter what is seen as unfair competition.

The 27 EU commissioners are set to debate on their China strategy on 29 May, with one official saying, “It will be about acknowledging there is a problem and that something needs to be done.”

Tensions flared Monday after China’s Ministry of Commerce threatened retaliation against the EU over its Made in Europe legislation, which sets strict conditions on foreign direct investment.

An EU official told Euronews the Chinese were “playing games,” adding that the Commission’s priority remains engagement with Beijing through multiple channels set up in recent months.

However, Commission services are already working on new measures to address China’s economic threats, sources have confirmed. “We don’t see any move from the Chinese despite all the issues we have flagged with them, so there’s a reflection on whether we should do more,” one said.

Another source said the release of Germany’s trade deficit figures before Christmas marked a turning point for the Commission.

Data published last autumn by Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) showed a record €87 billion German trade deficit with China — a wake-up call in Berlin, long focused on securing market access in China ahead of protecting domestic manufacturing.

China has since surged up the agenda for German industry, for the Bundestag — which has set up a dedicated committee — and for the Commission, whose German president has Berlin’s ear.

The EU has long grappled with cheap Chinese imports threatening its industry. Pressure intensified last year after the US slapped steep tariffs on Chinese goods, effectively shutting its market and pushing Beijing to reroute overcapacity in sectors like steel and chemicals toward Europe.

A recent report by the French High Commission for Strategy and Planning, a French government advisory body, warned that “the production cost gaps, as assessed by industry players [across Europe], have now reached levels incompatible with sustainable competition, averaging between 30% and 40%, and exceeding 60% in certain segments (industrial robotics, mechanical components).”

Under these conditions, how can the EU defend its market?

The bloc’s leverage is mainly limited to its 450 million-strong consumer base. Still, one source said it is “increasingly becoming mainstream” inside the Commission to warn Beijing that the EU market could close without rebalancing.

But the trade-offs are stark.

Chinese electric vehicles — hit with EU tariffs in October 2024 — highlight the dilemma. China depended equally on the US and EU markets for almost all its exports before Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025. “It cannot easily diversify its EVs as it will not sell in Africa, nor in southeast Asia, where there’s no infrastructure,” another source said.

At the same time, Europe remains reliant on China imports in many of the same sectors where China depends on Europe. “Are we to close our market to lithium batteries from China? We cannot do this overnight,” the same source said. The same applies to solar panels, laptops and medical devices.

Commission explores anti-coercion tool

The EU has trade defence tools — including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties — but they can take at least 18 months to deploy after a complaint is filed. Two sources said the Commission is working on new instruments, but by the time they bite, the damage may already be done.

A fourth source described an overcapacity instrument as still “premature.”

However, Commission services are also mulling the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which allows the EU to deploy a wide range of measures — from tariffs to restrictions on public procurement or intellectual property — in response to economic pressure from third countries.

The tool, sometimes described as a “trade bazooka”, has never been used since its creation in 2023, but resurfaced after China weaponised rare earth exports in October 2025 during its trade standoff with the US by imposing strict export controls.

Exports resumed after Washington and Beijing agreed on a one-year truce, which also covers Europe. But that deal expires in October 2026, leaving uncertainty hanging over the EU.

Brussels wants the anti-coercion tool ready if needed.

Tensions could rise further after Beijing’s threats over the Industrial Accelerator Act — the Made in Europe legislation now debated by member states and MEPs — or over pressure linked to the Cybersecurity Act, which could phase out Chinese telecom operators from the EU market.

Securing member states’ backing

However, a qualified majority of EU countries is needed to activate the ACI, and member states remain split.

“It requires a political support higher than for the traditional anti-dumping or anti-subsidies duties which can only be rejected by a reversed majority of EU countries,” a source said.

Despite the wake-up call, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz struck a softer tone in March, floating a long-term trade deal with Beijing.

But in Brussels, that idea is off the table.

“There are a number of concerns and real challenges that the European Union has consistently expressed to China that we need to see them meaningfully address before we can even talk about any future agreements or anything like that,” the Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson, Olof Gill, said.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez — who has visited China four times in three years and secured major Chinese investment — backs closer ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever urged a tougher line in an 18 March letter to von der Leyen.

“We have arrived at a point of no return in which we need to make difficult choices in the short term towards China to protect our industries, economies and the well-being of our citizens in the long term,” he wrote.

France, long a proponent of a hard line on China, shares that view.