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As the United States-Israeli war on Iran enters its fourth week, the conflict seems to have escalated beyond President Donald Trump’s control.

The Iranian government has been able to endure the killings of its top political and military leaders and has launched retaliatory attacks on Israel and Gulf countries despite weeks of air strikes.

Tehran has also been able to impose a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies pass, sending oil prices soaring. Analysts said the conflict risks unleashing a global recession. And that has put pressure on Trump, prompting his administration to allow the sale of sanctioned Russian oil to try to ease the energy crisis and pressure allies to police the strait, so far unsuccessfully.

Trump’s response in how to deal with the situation has been anything but coherent.

On Saturday, Trump upped the ante, issuing a threat to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants if Tehran does not reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours. This came a day after he said the US was “winding down” its military operations in Iran.

Analysts said Trump launched the war without a clear goal and misjudged how Tehran would respond. The conflict has expanded across the Middle East.

So is Trump looking to exit the war – or escalate it?

Trump’s mixed messaging on the Iran war

Here’s a brief look at the changing statements from Washington:

Is the war winding up or widening?

While one statement from Trump signalled that the US is considering “winding down” the war on Iran, another one indicated that the conflict would widen in the coming days.

On Saturday, Trump posted on his Truth Social platform that Washington was “very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts in the Middle East with respect to the Terrorist Regime of Iran”.

Trump listed the goals of the war as: completely degrading Iran’s missile capability, destroying its defence industrial base, eliminating the Iranian navy and air force, never allowing Iran to get even close to having nuclear weapons, protecting Middle Eastern allies, and guarding and policing the Strait of Hormuz.

Both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have claimed repeatedly in the past few days that Iranian military capabilities have been “completely destroyed” even as Tehran continues to retaliate against Israel and strike countries in the region.

US military officials said they have carried out heavy bombardments of Iran’s coast, including with bunker buster bombs, but still have not been able to limit Tehran’s capacity to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz.

On Saturday, Trump said the US “has blown Iran off of the map” and insisted that he has “met my own goals … and weeks ahead of schedule!” He also reiterated that Iran’s “leadership is gone, their navy and air force are dead, they have absolutely no defense, and they want to make a deal”.

Iranian leaders have consistently denied reaching out to the US with a ceasefire offer.

Just an hour later, Trump returned to his Truth Social platform with a warning for Iran.

“If Iran doesn’t FULLY OPEN, WITHOUT THREAT, the Strait of Hormuz, within 48 HOURS from this exact point in time, the United States of America will hit and obliterate their various POWER PLANTS, STARTING WITH THE BIGGEST ONE FIRST!” Trump wrote.

Iran has since responded by saying it will hit energy sites across the Middle East if its power facilities are targeted. It has already fired hundreds of missiles and drones on Gulf countries, targeting US assets as well as energy facilities.

Between Trump’s claims to be “winding down” operations and upping the ante later, his administration announced it is sending three more warships to the Middle East with about 2,500 additional Marines.

The US military said about 50,000 military personnel are already deployed for the war against Iran.

When will the war on Iran end?

That has been among the foremost questions posed to US officials, including Trump, since the war on Iran was launched on February 28.

The next day, Trump told the Daily Mail that “it will be four weeks or so. It’s always been about a four-week process.” A day later, Trump said at the White House: “We projected four to five weeks, but we have capability to go far longer than that.”

On March 8, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the CBS TV network’s 60 Minutes programme: “This is only just the beginning.” The next day, the US president told the same channel that he thinks “the war is very complete, pretty much.” And the US military operation was “way ahead of schedule”.

Then, on March 9, Trump said one could say the war is “both complete and just beginning”. Later the same day, the president said: “We’ve already won in many ways, but we haven’t won enough” and promised to go further and harsher against Iran.

On March 11, Trump said: “We don’t want to leave early, do we? We’ve got to finish the job.”

Why did US and Israel launch strikes on Iran?

Responses to this question are perhaps the most telling about US posturing in the war against Iran.

On March 2, Hegseth said the attacks were aimed at ending “47 long years” of war by “the expansionist and Islamist regime in Tehran” and were launched because Iran refused to negotiate with the US.

Hours later, Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, told reporters the US knew Israel was about to strike Iran, adding that the Trump administration believed the US needed to launch a pre-emptive strike before Iran’s retaliation potentially targeted US forces. “We went proactively in a defensive way to prevent them from inflicting higher damage,” he said.

This sparked a massive row in Washington with critics saying Israel had forced the US into war with Iran. Soon Trump rebutted his top diplomat, saying: “They [Iran] were going to attack. If we didn’t do it, they were going to attack first. … So if anything, I might have forced Israel’s hand.”

The next day, the White House press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, concluded that Trump just had a “good feeling” that Iran would strike so Washington attacked Tehran.

The launch of the war came as Washington and Tehran were scheduled to meet for another round of talks that were started late last year. Before the war, their Omani mediator said a deal was “within reach”.

The US and Israeli assertion that Tehran was on the verge of making a nuclear bomb has not been backed up by the United Nations nuclear watchdog. Last week, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard also told Congress that Iran was not in a position to make an atomic bomb.

Some analysts said the Trump administration was convinced to go to war by Netanyahu, who has been seeking US military intervention in Iran for decades. They said Trump was buoyed by a swift US military operation in Venezuela and did not think through Iran’s strengths before going into the war. In January, the US military abducted President Nicolas Maduro in a military operation in Caracas that took two and a half hours.

What does the conflicting messaging mean for US strategy?

Analysts said the moving goalposts in the Iran war show the policy limits of the current Trump administration as well as its strategy, to some extent, of keeping off-ramps available.

Zeidon Alkinani, a Middle East analyst at the Arab Perspectives Institute, told Al Jazeera that in the earlier days of the hostilities, there appeared to be clearer targets and limited objectives.

“There now seems to be a more chaotic reaction,” he said. He described the attacks as increasingly reciprocal, suggesting strikes on oil or energy facilities could prompt further escalation.

Last week, Iran attacked energy facilities in Qatar and caused “significant damage”, knocking out  17 percent of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity. Qatar produces 20 percent of global LNG supplies. Iran said the attack was in retaliation for Israeli attacks on a gas plant.

Paolo von Schirach, president of the Global Policy Institute, told Al Jazeera that Trump changes his mind “very quickly” and it is hard to predict what his next step could be in the war on Iran.

The analyst said it was unclear to him what “tools” Trump has to end the war.

“We look at his message saying the war is winding down. OK, good. Things are quiet. Maybe there is an off-ramp somehow. But now he says that if the Iranians don’t open the Strait of Hormuz, then we [the US] are going to unleash hell and what have you,” von Schirach noted.

“It is not quite clear to me what he wants and what the tools are to accomplish this.”

Von Schirach added that it would be difficult to predict whether the US could force Iran into submission, given its size and population. Using as a reference Iraq, where 150,000 American soldiers were deployed during the Second Gulf War, the analyst predicted that the US might need as many as half a million soldiers if Trump “wants to take over Iran”.

Venezuela’s National Assembly has passed an amnesty law amid the political, economic, and social shifts the country has been experiencing following the removal of Nicolás Maduro by the United States. On February 5, the first debate on the amnesty bill took place, and after two weeks of consultations it was unanimously approved on February 19. Although the law includes significant changes compared to the version approved in the first stage, it still contains gaps that make it impossible to speak of genuine reconciliation.

Throughout the entire process, the ruling party’s narrative has been that chavismo “forgives” those who committed crimes, rather than acknowledging that the judicial system acted in a biased, arbitrary manner and contrary to the law. This is important to underscore because amnesty laws arise as special justice mechanisms through which the State recognizes its partial use of the justice system, especially in political contexts.

This newly approved amnesty law cannot be perceived as a sign of reconciliation. On the contrary, it seems to be a mechanism that allows the Rodríguez siblings to manage the release of prisoners without recognizing the State’s responsibility for more than two decades of political persecution. At the same time, however, we must view the consultation processes—promoted from within the structures of chavista power—as spaces where sectors of civil society and civic organizations raised their voices and, in one way or another, managed to be “heard” and “taken into account” to some extent.

To “forgive” prisoners, the presidency already has the authority to decree pardons under Article 236 of the Venezuelan Constitution. If the Executive Power is already able to order releases, what function does this law actually serve?

The answer to that question reveals the structural insufficiency of the law that was passed. It establishes no mechanisms for reparation and continues to exclude hundreds of individuals who have been persecuted. At its core, the law does not correct injustice. It merely attempts to cloak in legality the discretionary manner in which power has exercised persecution. It follows the same logic that has been used for years with pardons (the last of which came on Christmas 2025, days before the US military intervention) which are presented as gestures meant to project a “goodwill” image of the State while avoiding any acknowledgment of the harm caused.

Changes and silences

From the outset, we expected an imperfect law that would at least have room for improvement. In that regard, the law introduced important changes compared to the draft approved in the first debate, such as providing legal representation for those abroad. It also revised the list of excluded crimes, narrowing it to the crime of corruption (previously referred to as “crimes against public assets”), incorporated the possibility of appeals against court decisions on amnesty, and ordered notification to foreign bodies to lift international alerts or arrest warrants. It can even be said that it broadened the scope of acts eligible for amnesty. However, it also made significant omissions.

The statute could be amended to create a commission entirely independent from State bodies, composed of representatives of civil society, relatives of victims, and experts capable of making binding decisions.

The law must include all persecuted individuals. There can be no distinctions or exclusions, because persecution itself made no such distinctions. For this reason, any meaningful improvement of the current law must begin by eliminating the exclusion set out in Article 9 concerning “persons who are or may be prosecuted or convicted for promoting, instigating, requesting, invoking, favoring, facilitating, financing, or participating in armed or forceful actions against the people, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of States, corporations, or foreign individuals.” If the crime of rebellion is generally defined as an uprising against authority, then it is a political act like any of the other amnestiable offenses.

Recognition, inclusion, and non-discrimination must be the minimum standards for any amnesty that seeks to be considered a step forward in the pursuit of justice.

Lacking external oversight

In transitional justice contexts, international frameworks are clear in their assessment of amnesties: they cannot be left in the hands of the very institutions that participated in the persecution. The approved law establishes that verification of amnestiable cases falls to the courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, whose highest-level official stated in November 2024 that there were no political prisoners in Venezuela (nor minors unjustly imprisoned), only individuals who committed crimes and were prosecuted in accordance with the law. This underscores a problem as obvious as it is serious: this amnesty law cannot, on its own, correct the very bodies responsible for human rights violations.

The final text incorporates an advisory body to monitor the law’s implementation, one of the recommendations made by experts who engaged with the Interior Policy Commission. This body takes the form of a Special Commission of the National Assembly composed of figures directly linked to the State’s control and coercive apparatus, including Nicolás Maduro Guerra and Iris Varela, the former Minister of Prisons.

To ensure impartiality and credibility, oversight of the law’s implementation should fall to an independent body. Given that Venezuela lacks a genuine separation of powers, the statute could be amended to create a commission entirely independent from State institutions, composed of representatives of civil society, victims’ families, and experts in human rights and transitional justice, with powers to review case files, request information, and make binding decisions. In other words, technical specialists must be able to effectively oversee the application of the law.

Memory and non-repetition

If we aspire for the amnesty law to contribute to Venezuela’s reconciliation process, it cannot be limited to releasing individuals. The law must repair the harm caused and guarantee that persecution will not occur again.

Article 14 maintains the elimination of records and criminal histories of beneficiaries. This provision, far from promoting reconciliation, may erase evidence necessary to reconstruct patterns of persecution. Preserving documentation is a cornerstone of transitional justice. An amnesty that erases archives risks becoming a mechanism of impunity. Thus, while cases must indeed be extinguished, the files should be preserved and made available so that the Commission responsible for verifying the amnesty can confirm that victims have been repaired.

The discussion is no longer about whether persecution occurred, but about how it will be repaired and what independent mechanisms are needed to review each case.

Moreover, the law does not prescribe any mechanism for reparation. But all of this depends on the State recognizing its victims, restoring their rights, providing both symbolic and material reparations, and adopting institutional reforms that serve as safeguards to prevent the justice system from once again being used in a partisan manner.

One element removed from the draft approved in the first debate was the extinction of administrative actions. While this may seem minor, in the Venezuelan context it is vital. Amnesty should not apply only to criminal cases. In Venezuela, administrative mechanisms—such as political bans on opposition figures—have been used arbitrarily and constantly

Without these elements, the amnesty risks becoming a clean slate rather than a commitment to truth, justice, and non-repetition.

Political signals

The US has not issued a statement on the approved law. Representatives of the Trump administration, including the president himself, have primarily insisted on the release of political prisoners and the safe return of those in exile. We will see whether there is a statement (which, in my view, will come and will amount to a “green light”) and whether this law fits within the steps announced by Washington to evaluate the conduct of those in charge of the Venezuelan government.

After the law was approved in the chamber, lawmakers immediately presented it to the Executive. Delcy Rodríguez signed it publicly and, in her speech, called for speed in evaluating cases that do not fall under the law. That call can take several paths: issuing final convictions, granting pardons, or decreeing dismissals. The difference among the three is enormous. The first would mean completely forgetting those who are not amnestiable and keeping them imprisoned; the second would amount to a simple pardon, without acknowledging injustice; and the third would be an admission that there is insufficient evidence to proceed.

Jorge Rodríguez’s statements are also important to note: he publicly acknowledged the unjust application of the Anti-Hate Law and the possibility of reforming it. He also recognized that there are more than 11,000 cases linked to political persecution. That acknowledgment, although it did not come with an admission of responsibility, dismantles the narrative that these are “isolated” incidents or that the amnesty concerns only “individual cases.” Whether this is a gesture of “democratization” or simply the result of international oversight now conditioning the government, admitting the magnitude of persecution creates a crack in the official discourse. A crack that civil society and the opposition must seize.

When we speak of reconciliation and pacification in Venezuela, we mean that it’s the State that must cease to be a violent actor. Today, with an insufficient amnesty law in place, we cannot speak of such reconciliation. But considering these signals, the discussion is no longer about whether persecution occurred, but about how it will be repaired and what independent mechanisms are needed to review each case.

Venezuela needs real reconciliation. And such reconciliation is only possible if the State acknowledges that it systematically used the justice system to persecute those who think differently. The approved law is insufficient, but it may yield partial results. That is why it is important for civil society to be present at every public forum to demand truth, reparation, and review of case files. The more contradictions those interventions induce among powerful factions, the greater the pressure to make decisions that would not be made voluntarily. This amnesty law does not resolve persecution, but it does create a space for persistence, oversight, and civil society coordination that can push for real change. As the transition advances and the political landscape shifts, the amnesty law can be adjusted, expanded, and corrected. Its enactment is not an endpoint. It is a starting point that can evolve.