Caracas

WASHINGTON — President Biden is considering a ban on imports of Russian oil while weighing actions that would boost energy production by autocracies in the hopes of mitigating the effects on American consumers and global energy markets, U.S. officials said.

“What the president is most focused on is ensuring we are continuing to take steps to deliver punishing economic consequences on [Russian President Vladimir] Putin while taking all action necessary to limit the impact to prices at the gas pump,” White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said Monday.

Until now, the economic strangulation of Russia by the West over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has avoided its robust energy sector, with administration officials suggesting that such a move could weaken the global economy.

But as Russia increases its unrelenting bombardment of Ukrainian cities, political pressure on the West has grown to do more to put pressure on Putin to stop the onslaught. U.S. officials said the Biden administration is considering easing restrictions on imports of oil from Venezuela to alleviate the void left by Russian oil bans, a politically problematic step.

It has also sought to convince Saudi Arabia, which has been under fire from U.S. and European officials over its human rights record, to boost oil production.

Biden spoke Monday for more than an hour with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, although the official White House readout of the conversation did not explicitly state that they discussed a ban on Russian energy.

According to the White House, “the leaders affirmed their determination to continue raising the costs on Russia for its unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. They also underscored their commitment to continue providing security, economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.”

Psaki said administration officials were also discussing whether the U.S. would send military aircraft to Poland should its leaders provide Soviet-era bombers to support Ukraine, but noted that the White House was not “preventing or blocking or discouraging” officials in Warsaw. “They are a sovereign country. They make their own decisions, but it is not as easy as just moving planes around,” she said.

The U.S. has been reluctant to get ahead of European allies in responding to Putin’s aggression. And while an oil embargo from Washington would have some effect, doing so in concert with Europe would deliver a far greater impact. Europe imports 4 million barrels of Russian oil a day, compared with 700,000 barrels imported daily by the U.S.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said Sunday during an interview with CNN that the administration was indeed exploring the “prospect” of an energy ban “in a coordinated way” with allies, although he did not rule out the possibility that Washington could act on its own to bar Russian oil.

The administration may not have much of a choice. Members of both political parties have introduced bills in both houses of Congress to block such imports.

“We may have to pay more at the pump because of this attack and our bipartisan response, but it is worth it to ensure that Putin pays the price for his paranoid adventurism and his attack on a peaceful democracy,” Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-Carmel Valley), who has co-sponsored a bill to ban Russian oil, said in a statement.

Rep. Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana), who supports the measure, said a Russian oil ban may only have limited success if the U.S. cannot persuade other countries to join the effort.

“I don’t believe Europe and some of the other countries are ready to say no to Russian energy, so that’s the challenge right now,” Correa said in an interview. “Not only does Russia have nukes, but also people have to buy their energy from the Russians.”

Congress is weighing an oil ban as it pushes to pass a measure to send Ukraine billions of dollars in emergency assistance. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) on Monday called for passage of a $12-billion aid package this week, saying it “will provide both humanitarian and military assistance for Ukraine: funding for refugees, medical supplies, emergency food supplies, as well as funding to support weapons transfers into Ukraine, and help for our eastern flank NATO allies.”

In a letter to House Democrats on Sunday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) said Congress intended to pass $10 billion in emergency aid for Ukraine as part of a larger government funding measure. The House is also exploring legislation that would “further isolate” Russia from the world economy, Pelosi said.

Banning Russian oil imports would probably lead to higher prices at the pump in the U.S. and globally. Gas is averaging $4 a gallon nationwide, up from $2.77 a year ago, according to AAA. The average price of gas in California during that same period has risen from $3.75 to $5.34.

In a clear signal of how seriously the Biden administration is considering a Russian oil ban, U.S. officials traveled over the weekend to Caracas, Venezuela, for talks about potentially easing sanctions imposed on the South American nation by the Trump administration in 2019. President Trump took that step after declaring President Nicolas Maduro’s election victory a sham and recognizing another politician, Juan Guaido, as the country’s rightful leader, a position Biden has affirmed.

Those measures built upon similar sanctions imposed by President Obama, signaling the long history of trouble Washington has had with Caracas and its socialist leaders.

The Venezuela economy is reeling, despite sitting on some of the world’s largest oil reserves, and Maduro is likely eager to be free of the sanctions. However, his economy and many of his government agencies are deeply intertwined with Russian assets and advisors. Any lenience by the White House toward Maduro, even if it’s driven by a desire to crack down on Putin, could undercut Biden’s messaging about the existential threat that autocracies present to democracies.

Psaki on Monday batted away questions about a potential rapprochement with Caracas, telling reporters that any easing of sanctions was “leaping several stages ahead” of where talks currently stand.

Complicating matters has been Venezuela’s decision to imprison six executives from the Citgo oil company for the last four years. Five are U.S. citizens and the sixth a U.S. permanent resident. They were convicted in show trials on trumped-up embezzlement charges and other crimes, according to their families and human rights activists.

Psaki said discussions about the release of the men and sanctions relief were taking place “in different channels,” and not tied together.

Republicans, who have seized on the potential energy crisis to call for stepping up domestic fossil fuel production, have already made clear that they will hit the White House hard should it look to offset any ban on Russian oil by looking to foreign suppliers.

Florida Sen. Marco Rubio criticized Biden in a tweet Sunday, saying: “Rather than produce more American oil, he wants to replace the oil we buy from one murderous dictator with oil from another murderous dictator.”

Caracas, January 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President, Delcy Rodríguez, welcomed the “lifting of restrictions on the country’s commercial airspace”, which had been in place since last November, following talks with the US government.

Speaking at a rally on Thursday, Rodríguez said she received a phone call from US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio to address the issue as part of a “working agenda” between the two countries that includes the resumption of diplomatic relations.

“Let all the airlines that need to come, come. Let all the investors that need to come, come”, Rodríguez said. She assumed office following the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, amid the January 3 US attacks.

Earlier in the day, Trump ordered the reopening of “all Venezuelan airspace” to commercial flights, stating that US citizens would be able to travel safely and that Venezuelans wishing to return—either permanently or temporarily—would also be able to do so.

Trump ordered Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy and other officials, including military commanders, to ensure the reopening was “immediate.”

Trump went on to describe the exchange with his Venezuelan counterpart as “highly positive,” emphasizing that “relations have been very solid and very good.” He further sought to reassure international travelers by stressing that they would be safe while in Venezuelan territory.

Following the announcements, the US Federal Aviation Administration confirmed that it had removed four Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) in the Caribbean region, including one related to Venezuela. “They were issued as a precautionary measure and are no longer necessary”, the agency argued.

Likewise on Thursday, American Airlines announced its intention to resume daily direct flights between the United States and Venezuela, becoming the first US airline to take such a step.

The company, which began operations in Venezuela in 1987, stated that the resumption of the route would be subject to approval by both US and Venezuelan authorities, as well as the corresponding security assessments.

American Airlines Chief Commercial Officer Nat Pieper said the company was eager to offer its customers the opportunity to reunite with family members and to generate new business and trade opportunities with the United States.

Direct flights between the two countries were suspended in 2019, the same year diplomatic relations between Washington and Caracas were severed after the US recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president.

Last November, Trump declared that Venezuela’s airspace should be considered “completely closed.” A flurry of NOTAM warnings led international airlines to suspend their connections to the Caribbean country. Caracas withdrew licenses from several companies, including TAP, Iberia and Turkish Airlines.

On January 13, Panama’s Copa Airlines announced the resumption of flights to and from Caracas.

Embassy reopening in the works

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Wednesday during a Senate hearing that he expects the United States to reestablish a diplomatic presence in Venezuela in the near future. “We have a team there evaluating it, and I think we’ll be able to open a diplomatic presence soon,” he said.

Rubio argued that such a presence would allow Washington to “have real-time information and interact not only with government officials but also with members of civil society and the opposition.”

Laura Dogu has so far been appointed to lead the diplomatic mission from the Venezuela Affairs Unit in Bogotá, Colombia. According to CNN, the CIA is looking to establish a “foothold” in the South American country that may preced the formal arrival of US diplomats.

For her part, Rodríguez has defended her administration’s diplomatic engagement with the United States, while also urging Venezuelan political sectors to resolve their differences and internal conflicts without “orders from Washington.”

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Not even a month in since the Trump administration captured Nicolás Maduro and the left-wing, Bolivarian regime led by Delcy Rodríguez has been “extremely cooperative.” “Thus far,” the White House said, she has “met all of the demands and requests of the United States”— around favoring American oil companies and investment, stopping narco-trafficking, and severing subordinance to extra-hemispheric rivals.

“Thus far” being the operative word. While in the immediate aftermath she appears to have stabilized the regime while cooperating with Trump, over the medium to long-term, Rodríguez’s attempt to satisfy US demands will likely require her to modify the very structures and processes—i.e., the mechanisms—that have underpinned the regime’s internal cohesion and stability for over two decades. 

Delcy, indeed, is in a quagmire.

Alas, that Delcy’s regime has remained stable is unsurprising. The Venezuelan regime has historically turned threatening crises—from mass protests, an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, and economic sanctions to a parallel government recognized by over 50 nations—into recurrent opportunities for consolidation. These survival mechanisms rely on loyalty coerced from civilians and engineered among military and political elites by weaponizing access to dwindling economic rents—from oil, as well as agriculture and minerals, illicit networks, and dependence on China, Russia, and Iran. The scale of this systemic pillaging is vast: since the Chávez era only, at least $300 billion have been diverted to fuel these survival mechanisms.

On the other hand, these are the mechanisms that the Trump administration expects to be overhauled or abolished. While these structures and processes were originally established by the regime, for the regime, the post-Maduro reality is that Rodríguez must now modify them with the US, for the US.

Rodríguez must also redirect scarce resources from pillaging into investments in ruined public infrastructure (especially roads, highways, freeways) and even in basic services like water or domestic gas.

Hence, Delcy’s quagmire. Reforming these mechanisms enough to satisfy the economic and security interests of a forceful (and eager) US administration risks, for regime elites, severing their access to rents that engineer their loyalty. Yet, mere superficial reforms risk Delcy’s fate with her new patron. Trump himself made it clear: “All political and military figures in Venezuela should understand what happened to Maduro can happen to them, and it will happen to them if they aren’t just, fair, even to their people.” 

Take for instance Trump’s demand that Venezuela grants privileged access to US oil companies and allows the US to have control over allocation from the financial proceedings. For Rodríguez to fully meet this, it will likely require much more than a mere reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. It necessitates the regulation, hiring, mobilization, and investment of resources to rebuild a decades-neglected, decimated national electricity grid, with 75% of Venezuelans suffering daily outages. Furthermore, Rodríguez must also redirect scarce resources from pillaging into investments in ruined public infrastructure (especially roads, highways, freeways) and even in basic services like water—to which only 36% of Venezuelans have daily access—or domestic gas, where over 70% receive it once every three months! And, on top of this, there is a Frankenstein-type financial system that has also presented opportunities for graft and provides all but predictability.

Washington’s expectation that scarce resources be directed toward restoring infrastructure and basic services while overhauling structural financial distortions to ensure US firms operate safely and profitably will strongly constrain Rodríguez’s ability to allow her inner circle to siphon these limited rents. Rodríguez will likely have to interfere with the very mechanisms of survival that have kept the elite unified: to satisfy Trump jeopardizes internal unity; to preserve internal unity risks facing the fate of Maduro.

During a recent visit to Caracas, CIA Director John Ratcliffe demanded Rodríguez to ensure Venezuela is no longer a “safe haven for America’s adversaries, especially narco-traffickers.” But this requires eliminating the shadow economies that have largely sustained the regime. As oil output collapsed by about 90%, it has been demonstrated that the regime has pivoted to illicit enterprises—along with the regime’s acquiescence to criminal groups in their territory. Illegal mining and drug trafficking, for instance, have reportedly accounted for over a quarter of Venezuela’s economy.

The Trump administration’s eagerness (or impatience) over reforms in Venezuela, plus its immense leverage and willingness to exercise it, may eventually make it realize the need for a swift and credible timeline for re-institutionalization and electoral reform.

Furthermore, China has become the regime’s primary economic patron, absorbing sanctioned crude. With the US interdicting shadow-fleet vessels in the Caribbean and demanding a severance of ties with Beijing, regime insiders—particularly the military, which controls critical pillars of domestic oil production and gasoline distribution—now face unprecedented structural strain. The security apparatus is similarly entangled with Russia, a partner that occupied key strategic voids left by the US and provided the military with hardware and gray market financial networks. These networks will not disappear overnight. Trump’s demand for a strong severance from illicit and foreign ties will likely be a turbulent process.

Complying too strongly with Trump will likely require Rodríguez to cut off many of the elites—and their related structures—that, by enriching the regime, have averted threatening crises for over 20 years. Complying too little with Trump to avoid overhauling internal-regime mechanisms, however, risks the ire of a Trump administration that has staked significant political capital on Venezuela’s transformation, especially in a critical election year.

Will the regime, as María Corina Machado suggested, “be forced to dismantle itself”? While not ensuring democratization, altering survival mechanisms to avoid the fate of Maduro could open junctures towards political liberalization. Conversely, prioritizing elite loyalty and existing mechanisms of enrichment over US expectations of reform and improvement risks unilateral dislodgment. While neither path guarantees democracy in the short term, the Trump administration’s eagerness (or impatience) over reforms in Venezuela, plus its immense leverage and willingness to exercise it, may eventually make it realize the need for a swifter and credible timeline for re-institutionalization and electoral reform.

Amidst this uncertainty, rather than a narrative of Delcy’s uncontested longevity, the politics of post-Maduro Venezuela suggests that the possibility of critical junctures favoring a transition toward democracy remains, today, more resonant than ever.