Battlefield

Sudan’s war is showing signs of a changing dynamic. Sudanese armed forces (SAF) have made a series of gains in North Kordofan state; the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is facing a new wave of defections; and army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is opening a political track while insisting the military campaign will continue.

Army advances are putting pressure on RSF supply lines; defections are raising questions about the force’s cohesion; and al-Burhan, who also heads the Transitional Sovereignty Council, is seeking to shape a political process from a position strengthened by developments on the battlefield.

But the wider battlefield remains contested. Together, the military pressure, defections and political outreach point to a potentially important shift: battlefield developments may be starting to affect the political balance.

What has the army gained?

The clearest recent gains have come in North Kordofan, a state in central Sudan that links the capital, Khartoum, with the country’s western regions.

In late July, the army announced that it had retaken Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh and Umm Sayala, along with other positions in the state. Al Jazeera reported that the advances also secured the national Exports Road, a key route linking Khartoum, through Omdurman, with el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.

The gains do not amount to control of the wider Kordofan region. But they have significance beyond the territory captured.

The army’s control of the Exports Road has strengthened its position in North Kordofan and added pressure on RSF supply lines. Al Jazeera reported on August 21 that the army was continuing efforts to cut those supply lines as fighting expanded across Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region.

What do the RSF defections mean?

The battlefield pressure has coincided with a marked increase in defections from the RSF.

On August 20, the army announced that about 318 people, including four officers, had joined its ranks, arriving in Northern state in about 50 combat vehicles before moving to Omdurman. Al Jazeera also reported separate groups from Kordofan and Khartoum, including 270 people, among them 21 field commanders, as well as 45 fighters and commanders from the Bara area who surrendered to the army.

The numbers alone do not tell the story. The timing does.

Al Jazeera’s August 21 analysis links the growing defections to several factors, including battlefield developments, internal problems within the RSF, social and tribal dynamics, and pressure created by the army’s advances and efforts to disrupt RSF supply lines. It also notes that the trend does not by itself mean the RSF is collapsing.

If the trend continues, it could become increasingly significant, particularly if more commanders and fighters conclude that the battlefield balance is shifting against the RSF.

For now, the more cautious conclusion is that battlefield pressure may be affecting the RSF’s cohesion without yet amounting to a broader breakdown of the organisation.

Why is al-Burhan opening a political track?

The SAF chief’s political initiative is unfolding alongside these military developments.

On August 15, he announced that the state would provide temporary immunity and legal, political and security guarantees to participants in a national dialogue managed by an independent national mechanism. Criminal proceedings against participants facing charges would be suspended during their involvement in the dialogue, without removing the rights of those who had filed complaints.

Al-Burhan said the initiative came from a group of Sudanese who had approached him with a proposal for dialogue. He said the group would independently manage the process and that the state would not determine its agenda or outcomes. He also said he had begun engaging with national forces that had supported the state and its institutions, with the aim of involving them in completing state institutions, including a legislative council.

But this is not a move away from the war.

Al-Burhan said he would not accept what he called a “peace without substance” that would bring RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, and his supporters to power. He also said the path to peace begins with the RSF leaving cities and being gathered in designated areas.

On August 21, Al Jazeera reported that al-Burhan said the fighting would continue until what he described as the rebellion was ended, while the army was working to cut RSF supply lines. He also rejected a truce that would allow the RSF to reorganise, while saying he remained open to a just peace and national dialogue that excluded the RSF.

Al-Burhan is therefore not choosing between war and politics. He is pursuing both, maintaining military pressure while opening a political process he says should preserve the state and its institutions.

What does Malik Agar’s position reveal?

Malik Agar, deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, has made the government’s position even clearer.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on August 22, Agar said the current option was military resolution unless serious conditions for negotiations emerged. He said the RSF would have to withdraw from cities and residential areas before negotiations could begin, stressing that the government remained open to initiatives that preserve Sudan’s unity and state institutions.

In a separate Al Jazeera interview published on August 23, Agar said the army would win but that the war would ultimately end through negotiations.

He argued that Sudan’s crisis was rooted in deeper problems, including the weakness of the state and the failure of political elites to manage the country’s ethnic, cultural, religious and geographic diversity.

His position reflects the government’s broader calculation: maintain military pressure while leaving the door open to negotiations from a stronger position on the battlefield.

Can al-Burhan turn battlefield pressure into political leverage?

The army’s gains in North Kordofan have strengthened its position along a strategically important route. The growing defections from the RSF are raising questions about the force’s cohesion. At the same time, the RSF remains active on several fronts, and the wider battlefield remains contested.

That combination gives the recent developments significance beyond individual battles or defections. The changing military balance may now be beginning to shape the terms of Sudan’s next political phase.

For al-Burhan, the potential advantage is not simply territorial. If military pressure continues to produce defections and weaken RSF cohesion, it could give the SAF greater room to shape who participates in a political process and the conditions under which future negotiations take place.

For the RSF, the challenge is therefore not only to hold territory. It is to prevent battlefield pressure from becoming an internal crisis of cohesion.

That has not happened yet. Military setbacks do not automatically translate into political marginalisation.

The army’s recent gains are best understood not as evidence of a decisive victory, but as a shift in the conditions under which the next phase of the war may be fought, and eventually negotiated.

Can the RSF contain the defections and preserve its bargaining position, or will continued military pressure give al-Burhan greater leverage in Sudan’s next political phase?

BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 19 (UPI) — The Iran war may be over, but southern Lebanon is likely to remain a battlefield and a bargaining chip in regional negotiations, despite Lebanon’s inclusion in the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States — a provision Israel rejected to preserve its freedom of action against Hezbollah, analysts said.

Violence in southern Lebanon subsided after the United States and Iran announced a 14-point preliminary agreement to end hostilities, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and begin nuclear talks under a 60-day extended ceasefire.

The MOU was signed remotely on Wednesday by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, two days ahead of a formal signing ceremony scheduled to take place in Switzerland.

Rather than a cessation of hostilities, southern Lebanon witnessed a sharp escalation in fighting, with Israel intensifying its airstrikes and Hezbollah targeting Israeli forces seeking to seize the strategic Ali Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh district. Both sides traded accusations of violating the ceasefire established under the MOU.

The overnight exchange left 47 people dead, including women and children, and 97 others wounded in Israeli strikes on several areas of Lebanon, including Nabatiyeh and the eastern Bekaa Valley. Four Israeli soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel, were also killed by Hezbollah fire.

Israeli airstrikes continued beyond a new ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, brokered by the United States and Qatar with Iranian assistance, and set to take effect at 4 p.m. Friday.

It remains to be seen how long this new truce will last, as is the case with the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, given ambiguities in the MOU and differing interpretations of its clauses.

Israel, which rejected Trump’s “betrayal” and the agreement with Iran, is seeking to change the arrangement by force in order to preserve its freedom of action against Hezbollah threats in southern Lebanon. It also seeks to maintain control of a security zone in southern Lebanon and is not willing to withdraw its forces unless its northern region is secured and safe.

Riad Tabbarah, Lebanon’s former ambassador in Washington, said Israel believes it has the right, as it usually does, to modify the agreement on the ground after “accepting it on paper, so as not to annoy Trump.”

“This is exactly what they did last time, and what they do every time,” Tabbarah told UPI. “Today, they are doing the same.”

He was referring to the Nov. 27 ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and France to halt the war that began when Hezbollah opened a support front for Gaza on Oct. 8, 2023.

Despite the truce, Israel continued to carry out strikes against Hezbollah, which refrained from retaliation for 15 months as it sought to reorganize its ranks before resuming fighting on March 2 in support of Iran.

The March escalation increased the human and material toll in Lebanon after Israel applied what was described as a “scorched earth” policy to empty border areas of residents and render them uninhabitable.

More than 3,980 people have been killed and 12,001 injured in the past 109 days, with 1.2 million displaced under Israeli evacuation orders. Large areas were devastated, including the complete destruction of 70 villages and heavy damage to infrastructure.

It would be “pure imagination and illogical” to think that Israel would easily withdraw and relinquish the security zone it is building in southern Lebanon, intended to prevent anyone from crossing its border and carrying out kidnappings like Hamas did from Gaza on Oct. 7, 2023, according to Tabbarah.

What could stop the frustrated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from sabotaging Trump’s efforts to finalize a lasting peace deal with Iran and continuing his military campaign in Lebanon?

The tension between Trump and his administration on one side, and Netanyahu and his government officials on the other, over the Iran deal “is growing, and we need to wait and see how it will develop,” said Lebanese former foreign minister Fares Boueiz.

As for Iran, Boueiz noted that as long as it believes it is benefiting from the deal with Trump, it “won’t do anything to jeopardize the understanding.”

“It is clear that the U.S.-Iran war is over, with no winner and no loser and no complete victory for anyone,” he told UPI. “The next 60 days will determine whether a final agreement is reached and whether Netanyahu will be able to obstruct it.”

The fear that Lebanon remains an open battlefield and a bargaining chip has grown, despite Iran’s pledge to Hezbollah that it will not proceed with the MOU talks if Israel fails to observe a full ceasefire in Lebanon and withdraw from the southern region.

Lebanese retired Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Chehaitli argued that the war in south Lebanon was “an Iran-Israel war sponsored by the U.S.”

“Now that Iran has reconciled with the U.S., signed an agreement, and is negotiating, the battle is over for them,” Chehaitli said in an interview with UPI. “This means that Lebanon should work toward a solution with Hezbollah and engage in serious negotiations to secure Israel’s withdrawal and end any illegitimate armed presence.”

Lebanon, which opted for U.S.-mediated direct talks with Israel to end the war despite Hezbollah’s objections, is preparing for another round of diplomatic talks with Israel scheduled to take place in Washington next week.

While Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem has set new terms for the talks, saying they should be limited to “mutual security,” Israel is insisting on disarming the Iran-backed group and keeping it away from its borders.

Hezbollah has also been pushing to drop the Lebanon-Israel direct negotiations in favor of the U.S.-Iran track.

“Hezbollah can say whatever it wants, but Lebanon should negotiate on its own,” Chehaitli said, adding that the militant group “is concerned about the day after, seeking security guarantees or immunity.”

Lebanon has no option but to negotiate its way out of the war, but the process will be long, and southern Lebanon will remain under Israeli fire and a bargaining chip in Iran’s hands until a final deal with Washington is reached, according to some analysts.

Tabbarah argued that Israel did not go through all this war only to back down, while Iran seeks a high price in return for Hezbollah and its other regional armed proxies.

“I don’t think Iran will go to war again. It will find a formula to save face for its armed militias,” he said, adding that the U.S., on its part, will have to restrain Israel and force Netanyahu to accept a full ceasefire in Lebanon.

He explained that a decision by Trump to stop U.S. military assistance to Israel, or “anything of the sort,” would be a serious step.

Tabbarah, however, warned that the solution “is not for tomorrow unless Israel drops its dream of establishing Greater Israel.”

Since Israel launched its latest war on Gaza, Palestinian activist Mohammad Hannoun has been a figurehead in demonstrations across Italy.

Wrapped in a keffiyeh and waving the national flag, as head of the Palestinian Association in Italy he delivered impassioned speeches condemning the Italian government’s military cooperation with Israel and demanding an end to the genocide in Gaza.

The 63-year-old Jordanian national, who lives in the port city of Genoa and is an architect by profession, was arrested in December, under the accusation of having raised around 7 million euros ($8.1m) through his non-profit Association of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (ABSPP) that allegedly ended up in Hamas’s coffers.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni expressed “appreciation and satisfaction” when the so-called “Operation Domino” led to the arrest of nine people, including Hannoun, described by investigators as the “head of the Italian cell of the Hamas organisation”.

But Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation last month demanded a “comprehensive re-evaluation” of the evidence, describing it as too “generic”, according to the ruling seen by Al Jazeera.

The material presented in court consisted of Israeli intelligence sent to Italian authorities, as well as open-source online information whose provenance and reliability had not been established.

Hannoun’s case is not an isolated one.

Last month, Amin Abu Rashid, a Dutch national of Palestinian origin, was acquitted in the Netherlands by the Rotterdam District Court of financing Hamas, after a years-long legal battle landed him in jail for a year. Similarly, the evidence had relied on Israeli government reports and unverified newspaper articles.

The UK-based advocacy organisation CAGE International described Abu Rashid’s acquittal as a “direct rebuke of the use of Israeli intelligence as the basis for prosecuting Palestinian humanitarian organisers in Europe”.

Anas Mustapha, head of public advocacy at CAGE, told Al Jazeera that relying on Israeli evidence to prosecute Palestinians was tantamount to relying on Chinese information to try Hong Kong dissidents.

This practice constitutes a “major threat to the rule of law in Europe”, he said.

“Israeli intelligence is being laundered through European legal systems to suppress Palestinian civil society,” said Mustapha. “The aim is to disrupt and restrict activism and action against the state of Israel.”

‘Battlefield evidence’

Nicola Canestrini, who is among the lawyers representing the nine defendants including Hannoun, liaised with Abu Rashid’s representatives over the course of several months to challenge the use of so-called “battlefield evidence” in both Italian and Dutch courts.

The term refers to evidence collected by military forces during active hostilities or combat operations. Just like a standard crime scene, the collection of this type of evidence under European requirements must be presented with a chain of custody – the chronological documentation of the seizure, transfer, analysis, and storage of the materials.

In Hannoun’s case, the files alleging cooperation between the ABSPP and Hamas’s military wing were not accompanied by a chain of custody, but sent by an Israeli official “whose personal details remain confidential”, according to court documents.

The only indication of their provenance was the word “Avi”, which Canestrini said was later found to mean Israeli intelligence official Avi Abramson.

The evidence purportedly originated from hard drives found in Gaza’s hospitals as they were taken over by Israeli forces, namely in al-Shifa, al-Rantisi and Jabalia, as well as the Maghazi refugee camp and other locations across the Gaza Strip.

United Nations experts and organisations, including Human Rights Watch, have found that Israeli military actions in Gaza, including the forcible displacement of patients from those hospitals, amount to war crimes.

Canestrini and his legal team argued in court that unverifiable evidence collected by a state undergoing trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was inadmissible.

“There’s a short-circuit in the legal system that is very troublesome for the rule of law,” the lawyer told Al Jazeera. “We’re seeing a foreign state under investigation for war crimes and crimes against humanity bringing evidence forward, and Italian authorities copying and pasting it in their reports.”

Additionally, rather than file an arrest warrant through established international cooperation channels, Israel sent the documents through a “spontaneous information exchange”. That measure bypasses oversight mechanisms established by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the UN Military Evidence Guidelines.

“I believe this was done wilfully to avoid checks and balances that guarantee the respect of human rights,” the lawyer said.

Al Jazeera contacted Italian officials Riccardo Perisi, director of the Service for Combatting Extremism and External Terrorism, and District Attorney Marco Zocco, who declined to comment on Hannoun’s case due to ongoing legal proceedings. Avi Abramson, the Israeli intelligence official identified as the source of the evidence, did not respond to requests for comment.

Crackdown on dissent

Palestinian solidarity has been repressed across Europe since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, with protest bans, police violence and a wave of legal prosecution.

According to the European Legal Support Center (ELSC), an independent organisation offering legal assistance to organisations and individuals advocating for Palestine, European states have systematically deployed “counterterrorism” and “public order” measures against Palestine solidarity efforts.

ELSC found a pattern of repression to “demobilise opposition to the Israeli genocide against Palestinians” in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and France, “advanced through alliances between state actors, Zionist lobby groups, and arms manufacturers”.

In Italy, activities around Palestinian solidarity are increasingly “equated with terrorism,” Italo Di Sabato, the national coordinator of Osservatorio Repressione (Observatory on Repression), an Italian organisation focused on tracking state control and defending the right to protest, told Al Jazeera.

The observatory documented cases in which pro-Palestinian activists were targeted by lawsuits, searches and administrative sanctions. “The objective is stifling any real form of solidarity with the Palestinian people,” Di Sabato said.

He argued that accepting opaque evidence to be used against Hannoun would have created a dangerous legal precedent.

“Israel’s aim was to have a free zone where everything is permitted,” Di Sabato said. “The political meaning of the Supreme Court of Cassation’s ruling is that the rule of law cannot be suspended when we deal with Palestine.

“What today constitutes the basis for the repression of Palestinian activism could tomorrow be the basis for the repression of any form of dissent.”