Bangladesh

After Pakistan announced their boycott of the forthcoming T20I World Cup match against India, the International Cricket Council (ICC) was quick to lament the position the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) had put fans in. “[Pakistan’s] decision is not in the interest of the global game or the welfare of fans worldwide,” the ICC said in a release, before going on to make special mention of “millions in Pakistan”, who will now have no India fixture to anticipate.

Through the course of this statement, and the one the previous week, justifying the ICC’s ultimatum to the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) – which eventually led to Bangladesh’s exit from the tournament – the ICC leaned on ideals of fairness and equality. The “integrity and sanctity” of the World Cup was invoked, as well as the “neutrality and fairness” of such an event.

Pakistan’s fans may clock, of course, that they had not attracted such concern before the Champions Trophy in 2025, when India had refused to play in Pakistan for what were, in truth, purely political reasons. As it happened, a semifinal and the final of that tournament were eventually moved away from Pakistan, India’s cricketing magnetism pulling the knockouts to Dubai, after the ICC had adopted a “hybrid” model wherein India played all its matches outside the “host” country.

This was a key moment setting cricket on its current trajectory. In return for India’s refusal to play in its home country, Pakistan insisted they would not travel to India for this year’s T20 World Cup – two of the most storied cricketing nations on the planet descending to reciprocal petulance. In the lead-up to this World Cup, Bangladesh was also drawn into the fray, the Indian Premier League (IPL) franchise’s jettisoning of Bangladesh bowler Mustafizur Rahman prompting Bangladesh to demand all its matches be played in Sri Lanka (India’s co-host for this tournament), and that demand, in turn, leading to it being thrown out entirely.

All claims that any of these boycotts are founded on security concerns are, in fact, bogus; security assessments ordered by the ICC had found India sufficiently equipped to handle Bangladesh’s visit, while Pakistan had hosted ICC-sanctioned international cricket involving multiple touring teams, and Pakistan had played an entire One Day International (ODI) World Cup in India as recently as 2023.

What is also clear, however, is that the ICC has now allowed its sport to become the medium through which South Asian states, currently as riven as they have been for decades, exchange geopolitical blows. What’s more, the ICC has begun to favour one set of geopolitical ambitions over others, India never so much as copping a censure for its refusal to play in Pakistan, while India’s men’s team’s refusal to shake hands with the Pakistan players in last year’s Asia Cup has now been adopted across the Board of Cricket in Control’s (BCCI’s) teams – the women’s and Under-19 (U19) sides following suit. To take the ICC at face value would also require believing that ICC Chair Jay Shah is conducting his business in complete separation from Amit Shah, who is India’s home minister.

It is India’s stupendous cricket economy that has chiefly brought about this imbalance. Since 2014, when a Big Three (India, Australia, England) takeover at the ICC diverted cricket to a hypercapitalist path, the game’s top administrators have been adamant that it is profits that must define cricket’s contours. Because India is the wellspring of much of the game’s finances, the ICC has organised for the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) to receive close to 40 percent of the ICC’s net earnings, while international men’s cricket largely surrenders a fifth of the calendar to the IPL. The sport’s high-octane driver of financial growth demands protection, or so the official line goes. If member boards fail to align with the BCCI agenda at the ICC, it has long been taken as read that the BCCI may threaten to cancel India’s next tour of that country, which in turn may shatter the smaller board’s revenues. The vote to issue that ultimatum to the BCB had run 14-2 against Bangladesh. A board must never forget at whose table it eats.

A cricket world that has spent 12 years lionising economic might cannot now be surprised that politics has now begun to overrun even the game’s financial imperatives. That monopolies tend to lead to appalling contractions in consumer choice has been a fundamental tenet of economics for generations. Hundreds of millions of Bangladesh fans are about to discover this over the next few weeks, as will the remainder of the cricketing world on February 15, when India and Pakistan were due to play. That profit-driven systems, which equate wealth with power, frequently lose the means to check the most powerful, is another longstanding principle in political economics.

The tournament’s competitive standards will also undoubtedly slip for Bangladesh’s absence. Bangladesh have a body of work in cricket that, respectfully, utterly dwarfs that of Scotland, who have replaced them. There are warnings here, too, for other cricketing economies. Although broadcast revenues from Bangladesh are a mere sliver of the mountains India presently generates, macroeconomic indicators from Bangladesh (a growing population, an improving gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) ranking) suggest that market is set to grow in future decades. If the ICC is willing to freeze a Full Member with Bangladesh’s potential, what will it do to more vulnerable boards – Sri Lanka, New Zealand, and the West Indies, for example?

The irony for many boards is that they have largely served the BCCI’s agenda at the ICC for a dozen years, helping extend its financial dominance. Since the Big Three first carved up governance and finances at the ICC in 2014, most smaller boards have been enthusiastic supporters of the BCCI’s programme, believing that only by appeasing India can they survive, which in itself is a tacit admission of a galling lack of ambition. And still, a dozen years of carrying this water has delivered them to no less bleak a position. In fact, several of the smaller Full Members have regressed..

Sri Lanka Cricket, for instance, has in recent years been among the BCCI’s most loyal allies. But it has now been a dozen years since any of their senior teams made the semifinal of a global tournament. Their Test cricket survives, but barely – the schedule is increasingly thin. Sri Lanka men only have six Tests on their slate in 2026, having had as few as four Tests to play last year. Cricket West Indies, meanwhile, has not seen a major resurgence on the field either, their men’s T20 fortunes having subsided since 2016, while both their men’s and women’s ODI teams have failed to qualify for the most recent World Cups. Zimbabwe Cricket is in no less challenging a footing now than it was two decades ago.

New Zealand and South Africa have held their own on the field, especially in women’s cricket and in the Test format. But to get here, Cricket South Africa (CSA), in particular, has had to be publicly chastened by the BCCI – in 2013, when India shortened a tour there because the BCCI resented the appointment of a CEO it didn’t like. More recently, South Africa’s top T20 league has also failed to feature Pakistan players, because each of the SA20’s franchise owners has a base in India. Excluding sportspeople based on the circumstances of their birth cuts hard against the ethos of post-Apartheid sport in South Africa. And yet even this national ambition has been subjugated by Indian political interests. Smaller boards have become so reliant on funds flowing from India that India increasingly chooses the terms of their cricketing survival.

Now, a World Cup is about to begin with Bangladesh having learned the harshest lesson of all. The BCB had been among the first of the smaller boards to sign away power to the Big Three during the first takeover in 2014. In 2026, the BCB now finds itself deeply out of favour for non-cricketing reasons.

India is inarguably the greatest cricketing superpower there ever has been. Even in the days of the Imperial Cricket Conference (the ICC’s predecessor), Australia and England could perhaps be relied on to check each other’s most predatory instincts. Such checks do not hold when one board is the sun, and the remainder are merely planets in its orbit. Perhaps the lesson for CA and the ECB – the BCCI’s most eager collaborators – is that the time may be coming when India has decided they are past their use-by date too. Why shouldn’t the BCCI freeze them out eventually? Would India not merely be doing what all superpowers tend to do, which is to leverage its stupendous power until all others either conform or are cast off? And why should the BCCI’s ambitions fall short of gobbling up even those established markets?

Cricket is now making clear its allegiances, and despite the ICC’s rhetoric, its commitments are no longer to neutrality and competitive equilibrium which are such vital rudiments of any sport. Other boards have allowed India’s will to prevail to such an extent that its motives now need not be merely economic; they can be nakedly political. And cricket is being eaten alive in this dark intersection between money and politics.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

An array of political parties and alliances will be vying for seats in the Bangladesh Parliament on February 12 in the country’s first election since the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024. About 127 million registered voters are eligible to cast votes to elect 350 members of the Jatiya Sangsad, the country’s parliament.

The South Asian country has been in the hands of a caretaker government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus since August 2024, when a student-led uprising ended Hasina’s long rule. Hasina ordered troops to crack down on protesters, killing 1,400 people. She has since been sentenced to death by a special tribunal in Bangladesh for the brutal crackdown, but remains in exile in India, and her Awami League party has been banned from political activity.

Besides the election on February 12, Bangladesh will also hold a referendum on the July National Charter 2025 – a document drafted following the student protests, setting the foundation for future governance of the country.

The two biggest groups competing for parliamentary seats across the country’s 300 constituencies are the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is leading a coalition of 10 parties, and Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB), which heads an 11-party alliance, including the National Citizen Party, a group formed by students who led the anti-Hasina movement in 2024. The Awami League, which dominated Bangladeshi politics for decades, has been barred from fielding candidates.

Besides the two main blocs, the Islami Andolan Bangladesh, which broke away from the JIB-led alliance, and the Jatiya Party, a longtime ally of Hasina’s Awami League, are contesting independently.

Here is a look at the main political parties and their leaders vying for parliament seats this year, and the key players influencing the election.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party

Led by Tarique Rahman, the son of the late former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, the BNP is seen as one of the main contenders in the upcoming elections.

The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, Tarique’s father and one of the leading military figures of the country’s independence war against Pakistan in 1971, on the principles of Bangladeshi nationalism. According to the BNP website, this is an “ideology that recognises the right of Bangladeshis from all walks of life, irrespective of their ethnicity, gender or race”.

As a centre-right political party, the BNP has been a popular political force in the country for decades and has traditionally exchanged power with the Awami League.

For four decades after Ziaur Rahman’s assassination in 1981, his wife and Tarique’s father, Khaleda Zia, led the party. Khaleda served as the country’s first female prime minister from 1991 to 1996 and again from 2001 to 2006. In that period, Jamaat was an ally of the BNP as they together fought against Hasina’s Awami League.

After Hasina came back to power in 2009 – she had also ruled between 1996 and 2001 –  the BNP faced the wrath of her government over corruption charges, and Khaleda was put under house arrest in 2018 in two related cases. She was acquitted of all charges after Hasina’s departure in 2024.

Since Hasina’s ousting in 2024, the BNP has risen again as a political frontrunner. A December survey by the United States-based International Republican Institute indicated the BNP had the support of 33 percent of respondents. That was also the only month when the BNP — seeking to position itself as a liberal force ahead of the elections — broke its alliance with Jamaat. Polls show Jamaat just marginally behind the BNP in popular support.

Tarique, 60, had been living in London, United Kingdom, since he fled Bangladesh in 2008 over what he called politically motivated persecution. He arrived in Dhaka on December 25, 2025 to take over the BNP leadership ahead of his mother Khaleda’s death on December 30.

“We will build a Bangladesh that a mother dreams of,” he said in December after returning to the country and calling on citizens from the hills and plains – Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Christians – to join him in creating a secure and inclusive nation.

In election rallies, he has pledged to improve the country’s infrastructure, among other promises.

“If elected, the healthcare system will be improved, a flyover will be constructed in Sherpur, permanent embankments will be built in the river erosion areas of Dhunat, and the youth will be made self-reliant through the establishment of IT education institutions,” he said.

According to Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, lecturer in global studies and governance at the Independent University, Bangladesh, since Rahman’s return, the BNP has become more organised.

“The party has basically revived with a newfound spirit in both its central and grassroots-level leadership,” he said.

“Typical objections against BNP and affiliated party activists, like [allegations of] extortion … have also significantly declined. Top leaders of the central committee have also been comparatively cautious to avoid any statement that might create popular outrage. Significantly, the people are flocking in thousands to hear from Rahman at his electoral rally, even late at midnight,” he said.

Rejwan added that it is widely believed that Rahman is the only man who can currently unite Bangladesh with an “inclusive vision”, unlike his Jamaat rivals, who have failed to address any clear stance or acknowledge what are seen by many as their restrictive policies towards women and religious minorities.

Jamaat-e-Islami

The party was founded in 1941 by Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi during British rule in India.

In 1971, during Bangladesh’s war of independence, Jamaat supported staying with Pakistan, and was banned after the country won its freedom.

But in 1979, four years after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had fought for Bangladesh’s independence and is seen by many as the country’s founding father, BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, who was the country’s president at the time, lifted the ban. Ziaur Rahman was also assassinated in 1981.

Over the next two decades, Jamaat developed into a significant political force. It supported the BNP-led coalition in 1991 and 2001.

But while Hasina was in power from 2009 until she was toppled in student-led protests in 2024 and fled to India, five top Jamaat leaders were executed, while others were jailed for crimes committed during the independence war of 1971. The party was barred in 2013 from running in elections.

In June 2025, the country’s Supreme Court restored the party’s registration, paving the way for its participation in elections.

While Jamaat no longer has an alliance with the BNP, its current leader, 67-year-old Shafiqur Rahman, has also focused on reorganising the party into a strong contender in the election.

Speaking at an election rally in Jamalpur city on Sunday, Shafiqur Rahman said the upcoming election “will be a turning point”.

“It is an election to end the cries of the families of martyrs. It is an election to bury the rotten politics of the past,” he said, according to The Daily Star newspaper.

But his party’s resurgence has also prompted debate over whether Bangladesh is prepared to be led by an Islamist force, which some fear could seek to enforce Islamic law or try to restrict women’s rights and freedoms.

However, Jamaat has rejected such fears and has told reporters it is focusing on expanding its electoral power. Last December, the party announced an alliance with the National Citizen Party, founded by 2024 leaders of the student-led uprising, and with the Liberal Democratic Party, led by 1971 war hero Oli Ahmad.

For the first time in its history, Jamaat is also fielding a Hindu candidate, Krishna Nandi, from Khulna, in a bid to attract non-Muslim voters.

The International Republican Institute survey suggested the Jamaat-led alliance at number two, with 29 percent, closely behind the BNP.

According to Independent University’s Rejwan, Jamaat has an appeal across Bangladesh’s social classes.

“Its student wing has literally outperformed any other political rivals in the university union elections. We are also seeing the Jamaat-affiliated women’s wing reaching out door-to-door in both rural and urban areas to expand their women’s base of voters. Moreover, since the fall of Hasina, we are seeing pro-Jamaat active and retired elites from security forces, university academics, and civil services constantly pushing the pro-Jamaat narratives within their respective capacities,” he said.

“Jamaat’s upper hand and pragmatic postures are now being extended to its allies, like NCP, which is explicitly reaping all the benefits of its senior partner in the alliance,” he added.

National Citizens Party (NCP)

The NCP, one of Jamaat’s allies, was formed in February 2025 by students who led the mass protests in July 2024 over government job quotas, which ultimately toppled Hasina’s government.

Seeking to stand for the 2026 elections, the leaders told a rally in February 2025 that they had formed the party “to uphold the spirit of the July movement among students”.

Led by Nahid Islam, 27, the stated ideals of the NCP are to ensure “governance without corruption” and to unite the country. The party says it aims to uphold freedom of the press, increase women’s representation in parliament and improve Bangladesh’s relations with neighbouring countries, such as India.

But lacking adequate funds to run by itself in an election, the party has allied with Jamaat. However, the move has been received poorly by some in Bangladesh. It also triggered some resignations by some NCP members over ideological differences.

According to local media reports, those members submitted a memorandum stating that Jamaat’s controversial political history and historical views against Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 were contrary to the NCP’s values.

In an interview with ABC News last month, Nahid Islam defended the decision to unite with Jamaat and said, “When we are forming an electoral alliance, we are not abandoning our own political beliefs. It’s just a strategic alliance.”

“It’s unfortunate to see the leader of the political party that arguably claims to own and lead the 2024 mass uprising and depose Hasina, now become a junior partner to a major political party,” Rejwan said.

“As a result, we see defections of many top leaders of NCP, and astonishingly, by allying, it was only able to bargain for 30 seats for its own candidate. To sum up, Nahid has sold his political autonomy and image of an exclusive figure by de facto becoming subservient to Jamaat,” he added.

Who are the other key players in the election?

Besides the main political parties, Muhammad Yunus, who currently leads the interim government, and General Waker-Uz-Zaman, the army chief, are also influential figures in this election.

Yunus, who was selected to run the government after Hasina’s ousting, is facilitating the election in his capacity as the country’s chief adviser.

But while political parties are campaigning for the election, Yunus is focusing on the referendum on the July Charter, which will take place on the same day.

After Hasina’s ousting, Yunus formed the Constitution Reform Commission (CRC) in 2025, seeking to amend the governance of the country. The commission proposed an anticorruption mechanism, electoral reforms and new rules the police must follow, among other issues. The July Charter is the culmination of the CRC’s work and takes its name from the protests which dismantled Hasina’s government in July 2024. Bangladeshis will vote to approve or reject it in the referendum.

Last month, Yunus expressed confidence in the results of the referendum and told the media he expected people and political parties to agree to the charter. But some critics have said holding the referendum and establishing the charter is not constitutional.

General Zaman is also a key player in the election.

Following the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding leader and then-president, the country entered a period marked by coups, countercoups and military rule, which reshaped the state.

Currently, the army is not vying for electoral power, but its focus will be on ensuring public order and security during the election, in light of political violence that has spread in the country since the upheaval of 2024.

The military also plays a role with respect to backing the political party in power or deciding how to govern the country during a political crisis.

In September 2024, after the protests against Hasina, Zaman told the Reuters news agency that he would back Yunus’s interim government “come what may”, while also floating a timeline for elections within 18 months, placing him central to the political debate.

A successful election will require goodwill from both Yunus and the army chief, according to Rejwan.

“Executives under the leadership of Yunus are critical to ensure the nationwide voting, while the Chief of Army Staff Waker’s forces, which would be deployed throughout the country, are indispensable to maintain public order and prevent the proliferation of political instability, violence and chaos,” he said.

Does Hasina have any power at all?

Hasina, who is currently in exile in India, has denounced the upcoming elections since her party, the Awami League, has not been allowed to take part. However, those who voted for her in the past must now choose how to vote this time.

In a message sent to the media last month, Hasina stated that “a government born of exclusion cannot unite a divided nation”.

“Each time political participation is denied to a significant portion of the population, it deepens resentment, delegitimises institutions and creates the conditions for future instability,” the former leader warned in an email to The Associated Press news agency.

Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it was “surprised and shocked” that Hasina had been allowed to make a public address in India. Her speeches and statements are banned from the media in Bangladesh.

“Allowing the event to take place in the Indian capital and letting mass murderer Hasina openly deliver her hate speech … constitute a clear affront to the people and the Government of Bangladesh,” the ministry said in a statement.

Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia by a tribunal in Bangladesh last November, and Dhaka has called on New Delhi to extradite her.

But she remains in India, and Rejwan says she will be a key political instigator of unrest as the elections approach.

“If Hasina were a negligible figure, then the interim government wouldn’t have banned all of her speeches and statements from being aired on television or printed in newspapers … the interim government would also not have reacted so firmly against India for allowing her to speak,” he noted.

“This means Hasina is a factor that the interim government implicitly believes has an influence over the Awami League populace, who are yet undecided on whom to cast their vote for, given that AL is banned from the polls,” he said.

“The reality is that AL has its own clear political ideology and a base of loyal cadres, many of whom have declined to change their allegiance despite living a harsh clandestine life in Bangladesh or abroad,” he added.

Authorities say that steps are being taken to contain the virus and that risk of a global spread of the virus remains low.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has said that a patient in Bangladesh died after contracting the Nipah virus, adding that it believes the risk of the disease spreading internationally still remains low.

The WHO said on Friday that a patient died after being admitted to hospital on January 28, where a team collected throat swabs and blood samples. Infection with the virus was laboratory-confirmed the following day.

“On 3 February 2026, the International Health Regulations National Focal Point (IHR NFP) for Bangladesh notified WHO of one confirmed case of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in Rajshahi Division,” the international health organisation said in a statement.

The announcement comes about a week after two cases were confirmed in West Bengal state in eastern India, as authorities work to contain the deadly virus that they say remains largely under control.

An outbreak of the Nipah virus in India’s West Bengal has heightened concerns in China and several Southeast Asian nations, prompting tighter health screening operations at airports, though the WHO said it does not recommend any travel or trade restrictions based on current information.

“WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV to be low at the national, the regional and global level,” an assessment reads.

“The risk of international disease spread is considered low,” it said.

The WHO said that the patient in Bangladesh, described as a female between the ages of 40 and 50 residing in the Naogaon district, first began experiencing fever and neurological symptoms on January 21. The patient reported no travel history but had recently consumed raw date palm sap.

An additional 35 contact persons have been tested for the virus, with no further cases yet detected.

About 348 Nipah virus cases have been reported in Bangladesh since 2001, about half of which occurred among people with a confirmed history of drinking raw palm sap.

Outbreaks tend to occur on a seasonal basis from the months of December through April, which the WHO says corresponds with the harvest and consumption of date palm sap.

There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for the infection, and the fatality rate is reported to be high, between 40 percent and 75 percent, among people infected with the virus, according to reports.

In a statement last week, WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus called Nipah a “rare but serious disease” that authorities are working to counter.

“Authorities have increased disease surveillance and testing, implemented prevention and control measures in health care settings, and are keeping the public informed about how to protect themselves,” Ghebreyesus said.

‘There should be no politics in sport,’ Sharif said while referencing to the recent India-Bangladesh cricket crisis.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has confirmed the decision to boycott the ICC Men’s Twenty20 World Cup match by Pakistan against India, saying the move is a show of solidarity with Bangladesh.

“We have taken this stand after careful deliberation and [decided that] on this matter, we must stand with Bangladesh and support them,” Sharif told his cabinet on Wednesday.

On Sunday, the Pakistani government announced that its men’s cricket team will not take the field in the match against archrivals India on February 15, without stating the reason behind the decision at the time.

However, it was largely believed to be a mark of protest against Bangladesh’s ouster from the tournament for refusing to travel to India for their T20 World Cup fixtures.

Sharif’s statement, made in a televised address, rubber-stamped the motive and confirmed the boycott.

“We have taken a very clear stand that we will not play the match against India,” Sharif told the government officials. “Pakistan believes that this is sport, not politics, and there should be no politics in sport.”

While Sharif did not elaborate on his statement, it points towards the ongoing cricket crisis surrounding the tournament, which began after a Bangladeshi player was expelled from the Indian Premier League on the directives of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) last month.

Mustafizur Rahman’s removal was linked to political tensions between Bangladesh and India, as confirmed by BCCI Secretary Devajit Saikia, and led to a chain of events, including the boycott by Pakistan.

India and Pakistan are placed in the same group and were scheduled to meet in a marquee clash in Sri Lanka, which is cohosting the tournament along with India.

Following Pakistan’s announcement, the International Cricket Council (ICC) said in a statement that “selective participation undermines the spirit and sanctity of the competitions”.

“While the ICC respects the roles of governments in matters of national policy, this decision is not in the interest of the global game or the welfare of fans worldwide, including millions in Pakistan,” it said, adding that it awaited official communication from the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB).

“The ICC hopes that the PCB will consider the significant and long-term implications for cricket in its own country as this is likely to impact the global cricket ecosystem, which it is itself a member and beneficiary of.”

While the boycott by Pakistan could see them forfeit two points, it remains unclear if the PCB will be hit by further sanctions or bans.

The T20 World Cup begins on Saturday.

What ranks as a safety concern in cricket? As the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup gets under way, Samantha Johnson looks at how the IPL exclusion of one Bangladeshi player led to an entire country exiting the tournament, and whether there are signs of a double standard.

Bangladesh cricket lost their place at T20 World Cup after refusal to play in India, but shooting team heads to New Delhi.

Bangladesh ‌has approved its shooting team’s tour to New Delhi for ‍next month’s Asian ‍Shooting Championships, days after the cricket team’s refusal to play in India due to safety concerns cost them a place at the Twenty20 World Cup.

Bangladesh have been replaced by Scotland in ⁠the T20 World Cup, which runs from February 7 to March 8, ​after they insisted they would not tour India, highlighting security ‍concerns following soured political relations between the neighbours.

The International Cricket Council (ICC), citing independent security assessment reports, dismissed Bangladesh’s demands to play their World Cup matches in Sri Lanka, the tournament ‍cohosts, ⁠instead, arguing the late change in schedule was “not feasible”.

However, media reports in Bangladesh said a three-member contingent comprising shooter Robiul Islam, his coach Sharmin Akhter and jury member Saima Feroze had received approval from the Ministry of Youth and Sports to compete in New Delhi.

The National Rifle Association of India (NRAI) secretary-general, Pawan Singh, confirmed the shooting team’s participation in India.

“Bangladesh’s participation was confirmed a month ‌ago. Our applications for clearances for all nations have been in process for almost three months,” Singh told the Reuters news agency.

“We have to follow ISSF norms as a ‌sport and comply with the IOC (International Olympic Committee) charter, and as NRAI, we have always received support ‌from the government,” he said, referring to the International Shooting Sport Federation.

Singh added that the Bangladesh contingent ⁠did not request any extra security measures.

“The Bangladesh team has come to our tournaments many times, so they know our strict protocols well. Maybe that’s why they are confident and ‌have not made any special requests.”

The Asian Shooting Confederation, which is organising the event, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The continental ‍rifle and pistol shooting championship will be held in New Delhi from February 2 to 14.

Ousted premier says the exclusion of her Awami League party “deepens resentment” on Muhammad Yunus’s interim government.

Bangladesh’s toppled leader Sheikh Hasina has denounced her country’s election next month after her party was barred from participating in the polls, raising fears of wider political division and possible unrest.

In a message published by The Associated Press news agency on Thursday, Hasina said “a government born of exclusion cannot unite a divided nation.”

Hasina, who was sentenced to death in absentia for her crackdown on a student uprising in 2024 that killed hundreds of people and led to the fall of her 15-year government, has been sharpening her critique of the interim government of Nobel Peace winner Muhammad Yunus in recent days, as the election that will shape the nation’s next chapter looms.

“Each time political participation is denied to a significant portion of the population, it deepens resentment, delegitimises institutions and creates the conditions for future instability,” the former leader, who is living in exile in India, warned in her email to the AP.

She also claimed that the current Bangladesh government deliberately disenfranchised millions of her supporters by excluding her party – the former governing Awami League – from the election.

More than 127 million people in Bangladesh are eligible to vote in the February 12 election, widely seen as the country’s most consequential in decades and the first since Hasina’s removal from power after the mass uprising.

Yunus’s government is overseeing the process, with voters also weighing a proposed constitutional referendum on sweeping political reforms.

Campaigning started last week, with rallies in the capital, Dhaka, and elsewhere.

Yunus returned to Bangladesh and took over three days after Hasina fled to India on August 5, 2024, following weeks of violent unrest.

He has promised a free and fair election, but critics question whether the process will meet democratic standards and whether it will be genuinely inclusive after the ban on Hasina’s Awami League.

There are also concerns over security and uncertainty surrounding the referendum, which could bring about major changes to the constitution.

Yunus’s office said in a statement to the AP that security forces will ensure an orderly election and will not allow anyone to influence the outcome through coercion or violence. International observers and human rights groups have been invited to monitor the process, the statement added.

Tarique Rahman, the son of former prime minister and Hasina rival, Khaleda Zia, returned to Bangladesh after his mother’s death in December.

Rahman, the acting chairman of Khaleda’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party, is a strong candidate to win the forthcoming election.

On Friday, Hasina made her first public speech since her ouster, telling a packed press club in Delhi that Bangladesh “will never experience free and fair elections” under Yunus’s watch.

Her remarks on Friday were broadcast online and streamed live to more than 100,000 of her supporters.

The statement was criticised by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which issued a statement saying it was “surprised” and “shocked” that India had allowed her to make a public address.

Bangladesh has been asking India to extradite Hasina, but New Delhi has yet to comment on the request.

India’s past support for Hasina has frayed relations between the South Asian neighbours since her overthrow.

In Dhaka’s political chatter, one word often keeps resurfacing when people debate who really holds the reins of the country: “Kochukhet”.

The neighbourhood that houses key military installations has, in recent public discussions, become shorthand for the cantonment’s influence over civilian matters, including politics.

Bangladesh is weeks away from a national election on February 12, the first since the 2024 uprising that ended then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s long rule and ushered in an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

The army is not vying for electoral power. But it has become central to the voting climate as the most visible guarantor of public order, with the police still weakened in morale and capacity after the upheaval of 2024, and with the country still reckoning with a “security apparatus” that watchdogs and official inquiries say was used to shape political outcomes under Hasina.

For nearly a year and a half now, soldiers have policed the streets of Bangladesh, operating under an order that grants them magisterial powers in support of law and order. On election duty, the deployment will scale up further: Officials have said as many as 100,000 troops are expected nationwide, and proposed changes to election rules would formally list the armed forces among the poll’s “law-enforcing agencies”.

Bangladesh, a nation of more than 170 million wedged between India and Myanmar, has repeatedly seen political transitions hijacked by coups, counter-coups and military rule, a past that still shapes how Bangladeshis read the present.  Analysts say that the army today is not positioned for an overt takeover, but it remains a decisive power centre: an institution embedded across the state, able to narrow civilian choices through its security role, intelligence networks and footprint inside government.

The military’s role now

Thomas Kean, the International Crisis Group’s senior consultant on Bangladesh and Myanmar, said the army has been “backstopping the interim government” not only politically but also “through day-to-day security amid police weakness”.

He said the institution is eager to see a transition to an elected government so the country returns to a firmer constitutional footing and so troops can “return to their barracks”.

“There are different factions and views within the army, but overall I would say that the army wants to see the election take place as smoothly as possible,” Kean told Al Jazeera.

Kean argued that if the army chief, General Waker-uz-Zaman, and the military “had wanted to take power, they could have done so when the political order collapsed on August 5”, the day Hasina fled to India amid a popular student-led revolt. But the military chose not to, he said, in part because it had learned from the fallout of past experiments with its direct political control.

Asif Shahan, a political analyst and professor at Dhaka University, said the military was aware that a takeover would have also jeopardised key interests, including Bangladesh’s United Nations peacekeeping deployments, which carry both financial benefits and reputational weight for the armed forces. Bangladesh has for decades been one of the biggest suppliers to UN peacekeeping missions, and receives between $100m and $500m a year in payouts and equipment reimbursements for these services.

But Shahan argues that the military remains “an important political actor”. Today, he said, its influence is “less about overt intervention than the institutional weight it carries through the security and intelligence apparatus”.

He also pointed to what he called the army’s “corporate” footprint. That footprint spans involvement in major state infrastructure projects, the military’s own business conglomerate, and the presence of serving and retired officers across commercial and state bodies.

Shahan said the last Hasina government “gave them a share of the pie”, leaving “a kind of culture of corruption … ingrained”. He suggested that this could translate into informal pressure on whoever governs next to do the same, and anxieties inside the force over whether “the facilities and privileges” it has accumulated will shrink.

On the election itself, Shahan too said that the possibility of the army trying to gain overt control was “very low” unless there is such a major law and order breakdown that there is public demand for the army to step in as the “only source of stability”,

Others who track the military closely agreed. Rajib Hossain, a former army officer and author of the best-selling book Commando, said he “strongly believes” the army will avoid partisan involvement for its own sake. “The army will play a neutral role during this election,” he said. “What we’ve observed on the ground over the past year and a half, there is no record of the army acting in a partisan way.”

But, he added, pressure on the institution has been intense since 2024. “Internally, there’s an understanding that if the army fails to act neutrally, it could lose even the public credibility it still has,” he said.

Mustafa Kamal Rusho, a retired brigadier general at the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies, also told Al Jazeera that the military does not have “any clear intent” to influence politics, though “it still remains a critical power base”.

That leverage was clearest during the 2024 uprising, Rusho said, when Bangladesh’s political crisis reached a point that many Bangladeshis and international watchdogs viewed the military’s posture as decisive. “If the military did not take the stand that it took, then there would have been more bloodshed,” he said.

With protests escalating, the military refused to fully enforce Hasina’s curfew orders and decided troops would not fire on civilians. It enabled Hasina to flee to India on an air force plane, and the army chief then announced an interim government would be formed.

In an Al Jazeera documentary on the uprising last year, Waker-uz-Zaman, who is related to Hasina and was appointed less than two months before her collapse, also stressed that his forces would not turn their guns on civilians. “We don’t shoot at civilians. It’s not in our culture … So we did not intervene,” he said.

In the same interview, he added: “We believe that the military should not engage in politics … It’s not our cup of tea.”

When the military ruled

That hasn’t always been the military’s position.

After the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding leader and then-president, by a group of military officers, the country entered a period marked by coups, counter-coups and military rule upheavals that reshaped the state and produced political forces that still dominate elections.

One of them was the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), founded by army general-turned-ruler Ziaur Rahman, who emerged as the country’s most powerful figure in the late 1970s before moving into civilian politics. Rahman was assassinated in 1981 in a failed coup attempt by another group of military officers. The BNP remains a key contender in the February 12 vote, now led by Rahman’s son, Tarique Rahman, who has returned to front-line politics after a long exile.

In 1982, then army chief Hussain Muhammad Ershad seized power and ruled for much of the 1980s. Writer and political historian Mohiuddin Ahmed has described Ershad’s takeover as coming only months after he publicly argued that “the army should be brought in to help run the country”.

Eventually, a pro-democracy movement led by Zia’s wife, Khaleda Zia, and Hasina, also Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, forced him from office. The BNP won a landmark election, and in 1991, Khaleda became the country’s first female prime minister.

Since then, Rusho said, the military’s influence “became more indirect”, though Bangladesh still saw an abortive May 1996 showdown when the then army chief, Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim, defied presidential orders, and troops loyal to him moved towards Dhaka. Nasim was arrested and removed from office.

A decade later, in 2007, the military in effect “fully backed” a caretaker government that was formed to replace Khaleda’s second administration, which had ruled between 2001 and 2006. That caretaker government was installed in January 2007 after a breakdown in the election process and escalating political violence. The International Crisis Group described the caretaker administration as “headed by technocrats but controlled by the military”, while then-army chief Moeen U Ahmed argued the political climate “was deteriorating very rapidly” and that the military’s intervention had “quickly ended” street violence.

It was only after 2009, when Hasina came back to power – her Awami League had first ruled between 1996 and 2001 – that the military became “subordinate to the civilian regime”, Rusho said.

Blurred lines

But even though the military today insists that it does not want power, it has often drifted into the political terrain.

A major moment arrived just weeks after Hasina’s ouster, in September 2024, when General Zaman told the Reuters news agency he would back Yunus’s interim government “come what may”, while also floating a timeline for elections within 18 months. The interview, which critics described as something unprecedented for a serving army chief, placed the military close to the country’s central political debate.

Hossain, the former army officer and author, criticised the public nature of the intervention. “If he [Zaman] had discussed this after sitting with all the stakeholders … the interim [administration], political parties, protest leaders … and then gone to the media, that would be acceptable,” he said. “But here, he declared it unilaterally and blindsided the government from his position of power. He had no authority to do that.”

“You may say this is an extraordinary, transitional time and the military has a role to play,” Hossain added. “But then, why do we have an administration at all?”

Shahan, the Dhaka University professor, said Zaman “came very close” to crossing the line and explained it as a product of military institutional culture after August 5. “Military organisations … like to follow standing operating procedures, order, stability,” he said. But August 5, he added, was “a political rupture” that forced the army and the nation into uncertainty: about the interim government’s longevity, legitimacy and how it would deal with the military.

Those anxieties, Shahan said, likely pushed Zaman to speak. In principle, he said, it is reasonable for the army chief to say elections are needed for stability. But “when he set a specific timeline – within 18 months – that is beyond his role”, Shahan said. “It then appears as if he is dictating.”

Shahan added that the problem becomes sharper when that kind of specificity appears to respond to a party demand; he was referring to a time when only the Bangladesh Nationalist Party was repeatedly pushing for a vote timetable.

Eight months later, in May 2025, Zaman again weighed in, telling a high-level military gathering, according to local media reports, that his position had not changed and that the next national vote should be held by December 2025. After that, Faiz Ahmad Taiyeb, a special adviser to Yunus, wrote on Facebook that “the army can’t meddle in politics” and argued that the military chief had failed to maintain “jurisdictional correctness” by prescribing an election deadline.

Around the same period, rumours emerged suggesting that Yunus had considered resigning amid political discord.

The shadow Hasina left

Another reason that analysts say the military’s role is being debated so intensely now is because of Bangladesh’s recent wounds.

During Hasina’s 15-year rule, human rights organisations argued Bangladesh’s security apparatus was often used for political control. Human Rights Watch has described enforced disappearances as a “hallmark” of Hasina’s rule since 2009.

When the United States sanctioned the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in 2021 over allegations of extrajudicial killings, the US Department of the Treasury said, “These incidents target opposition party members, journalists, and human rights activists.” Critics argue that security institutions became central to governance, and questions about how that machinery was used are now part of the post-Hasina political settlement.

Hossain, the former officer, said the Hasina-era legacy still echoes inside the top brass. “If you look at the leadership, the general, five lieutenant generals, and some major generals and brigadier generals, a lot of them were part of Hasina’s apparatus,” he said, “aside from a handful of professional officers”.

A report by Bangladesh’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances says disappearances were used as a “tool for political repression” and that the practice “reached alarming levels during key political flashpoints”, including in the run-up to elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024. The commission said it verified 1,569 cases of enforced disappearance.

In cases where political affiliation could be confirmed, the Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing accounted for about 75 percent of victims, while the BNP and its affiliated groups accounted for about 22 percent. Among those “still missing or dead”, the BNP and its allies accounted for about 68 percent, while the Jamaat and its affiliates accounted for about 22 percent, the report said.

The commission also noted that the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the military-run intelligence agency, had been “accused of manipulating domestic politics and interfering in the 2014 parliamentary elections”, and argued that perceived alignment with the Awami League compromised its neutrality.

Several senior military officers, including 15 in service, are now facing trial in a civilian tribunal on charges of enforced disappearances, murders and custodial tortures.

The proceedings have become a delicate issue in civil-military relations, as cases against serving officers in civilian courts are rare in Bangladesh’s history.

Former army chief Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan wrote on Facebook that local media had reported disagreements over the “trial process” for officers accused of crimes against humanity and that those disagreements had created what he described as a “chasm” between the interim government and the army’s top leadership.

Hossain, the former officer, however, said he disagreed. “These trials are not defaming the army,” Hossain said. “Rather, they are a kind of redemption for the institution to recover from the stigma created by the crimes of some self-serving officers.”

He argued that accountability could motivate younger officers and reduce the risk of the military being politically exploited again. Rusho, the retired brigadier general, also argued that politicisation under Hasina was driven less by formal doctrine than by executive control over careers.

“Promotions, important postings, placements … they were influenced considerably by the executive branch,” he said. “When you influence postings, some people’s loyalty often gets diverted to political masters, [and] it affects … professionalism and capability.”

Kean of the International Crisis Group said the real test for Bangladesh now would be whether it can stop the security state from being reabsorbed into partisan politics.

“The military is going to remain a powerful institution in Bangladesh, with a level of influence in domestic politics,” he said. “One hopes that the lesson of the past 18 months is that the military is better to support civilian administrations rather than be in power directly – that it can be a stabilising force, and one that is ultimately committed to democracy and civilian leadership.”

But, he added, the onus to do that isn’t only on the generals. Civilian politicians, too, needed to resist the temptation to misuse the military. That alone, he suggested, would help Bangladesh keep the army in the barracks and politicians accountable to the people, not to men in khakis.