ballistic

Multiple ballistic missiles fired from eastern Sinpo area in seventh such test this year.

North Korea has launched multiple ballistic missiles towards the sea off its eastern coast, according to South Korea and Japan.

The incident on Sunday marked North Korea’s seventh ⁠ballistic missile launch this year and its fourth in April.

The missiles were fired near the city of Sinpo on North Korea’s east coast at about 6:10am on Sunday (21:10 GMT, Saturday), South Korea’s military said in a statement. It added that South Korea had bolstered its surveillance posture and was closely exchanging information with the United States and Japan.

Japan’s ⁠government posted on social media that the ballistic missiles were believed to have fallen near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. No incursion into Japan’s exclusive economic zone was confirmed.

South Korea’s presidential office said it has held an emergency security meeting, according to media reports.

Such tests violate United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea’s missile programme. The diplomatically isolated country rejects the UN ban and says it infringes on its sovereign right to self-defence.

The launches come as China and the US prepare for a summit in mid-May, ⁠in which Chinese President ⁠Xi Jinping and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, are expected to discuss North Korea.

North Korea has made “very serious” advances in its ability to turn out nuclear weapons, with the probable addition of a new uranium enrichment facility, ‌International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi said on Wednesday.

Late last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said his country’s status as a nuclear-armed ‌state ‌was irreversible and that expanding a “self-defensive nuclear deterrent” was essential to national security.

One of the most striking visuals to emerge in the current conflict with Iran has been videos of ballistic missiles unleashing torrents of cluster munitions at very high altitudes over Israel. In doing so, the Iranians look to have found a worrisome way to consistently get around terminal-phase ballistic missile defenses, especially Israel’s David’s Sling.

The gap that the Iranians are leveraging with these cluster munition missile attacks goes beyond just bypassing terminal defenses. It, by extension, puts greater pressure on diminishing stocks of prized mid-course interceptors to try to defeat these incoming threats before they release their payloads. With all this in mind, what we are seeing with Iran’s attacks on Israel with ballistic missiles with cluster warheads could have even greater implications for future conflicts elsewhere, particularly in the Pacific region.

In some five weeks of fighting, Iran had launched more than 500 ballistic missiles at Israel, with at least 30 of those having carried cluster munition payloads (likely many more), according to the Times of Israel. Iran had fired ballistic missiles with cluster warheads in anger for the first time in attacks on Israel during last year’s 12 Day War.

Iran has developed multiple types of submunitions that can be dispersed via different ballistic missiles in its inventory during the terminal phases of their flight. Ballistic missiles typically fly along roughly parabolic trajectories to their targets. The arc is generally broken down into three main sections: the boost phase right after launch, the terminal phase as the missile comes back down at the end, and the mid-course phase in between. During the mid-course phase, the missiles leave the Earth’s atmosphere, with larger types spending more time in space in the middle of their flight. You can learn more about the complexities of intercepting a target in the mid-course phase in our past report here.

A typical Iranian cluster warhead reportedly contains between 20 and 30 submunitions. However, larger missiles, like members of the Khorramshahr family, are said to be able to carry up to 80. Reports also state that the cluster munitions can contain anywhere between four and 11 pounds of explosives. The damage they can cause is further magnified by the high speed with which they impact the ground.

“Iran has shown pictures in the past of triconic warheads [for ballistic missiles] equipped with at least four different sizes and types of bomblets,” Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, told TWZ. “So Iran calls these warheads ‘raining warheads,’ because these different bomblets will be showered on a wider geographic target set than if it was just the traditional unitary high explosive warhead. How many depends on what kind of configuration of bomblets they can actually choose to put in, but it can be easily a dozen-plus to two dozen to three dozen, depending on the size of the bomblets.”

The Iranian submunition installed in Iranian BM launched at Israel was seen TWICE in the past: In 2016 weapons exhibition and in a failed KHORRAMSHAHR missile test in Iran, 2023. pic.twitter.com/AxCYSDxs69

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) June 21, 2025

For the first time, a SUB-MUNITION from an Iranian BM was found in Israel. It is not yet clear on what type of missile it was installed. pic.twitter.com/HgwxCsE0FS

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) June 19, 2025

“Most importantly, in this conflict, the regime is using the Khoramshar ballistic missile, which is a threshold medium-range ballistic missile modified from an intermediate-range ballistic missile that can carry the heaviest reported warhead weight,” he added. “So, the regime is basically filling a large conical warhead with lots of bomblets and cluster munitions that basically fuse and disperse upon re-entry into the atmosphere, posing a real challenge, even for integrated air and missile defense systems like what the Israelis have, and causing quite a bit of damage and civilian harm.”

Both the shape of the fragment and the serial number pattern indicate it was part of a Khorramshahr reentry vehicle.

Would confirm the suspicion that some of the large submunition releases observed over Israel were linked to the use of the Khorramshahr. https://t.co/KP4Sp1Yy9P pic.twitter.com/B7SC1q6GNQ

— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) March 9, 2026

Khorramshah-4 is shorter than the previous versions as the missile engine is designed inside fuel tank.
The evolvement of different versions of Khorramshahr mostly deal with its re-entry vehicles which @inbarspace showed in this good picture. 3 pic.twitter.com/nm7kC6WfL2

— Mehdi H. (@mhmiranusa) November 3, 2024

Differentiating between missiles carrying cluster warheads and those with unitary ones is likely to be difficult, if not impossible, before any release of submarines occurs. This creates further challenges for defenders, as we will come back to later on.

In terms of dispersion, when Iran first fired cluster munition-laden ballistic missiles at Israel last year, authorities in the latter country said the weapons had released their payloads at an altitude of approximately 23,000 feet (seven kilometers). The submunitions were scattered across an area approximately 10 miles (16 kilometers) in diameter. This is in line with a report last month from CNN, where that outlet assessed two separate Iranian cluster missile attacks to have dropped submunitions across areas in Israel between roughly seven and eight miles (approximately 11 to 13 kilometers) long.

The IDF Home Front Command confirms that Iran launched at least one ballistic missile carrying a cluster bomb warhead at central Israel today.

The missile’s warhead split while descending, at around 7 kilometers altitude, spreading around 20 smaller munitions in a radius of… https://t.co/PF5RCpLfvH pic.twitter.com/2wyrH2JJM3

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) June 19, 2025

Israel’s Haaretz has also previously reported an instance where submunitions, apparently all from one missile, hit seven populated areas within a zone measuring nearly 17 miles (27 kilometers) across. This would point to a higher release altitude than the other cases.

A higher-altitude release earlier in the terminal phase of a missile’s flight inherently presents greater challenges for defenders trying to intercept the warhead before submunition release. Once the payload is dispersed, one larger target suddenly becomes dozens of smaller ones.

The David’s Sling system’s Stunner interceptors have a reported maximum engagement altitude of around nine miles (15 kilometers). However, various factors, especially the position of the launcher in relation to the target’s flight path, would impact the circumstances in which they would be able to reach the upper end of their envelope.

There are terminal missile defense systems with greater reach, such as the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the ship-launched Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), but their engagement envelopes still face positional constraints. THAAD would likely have the best chance as its interceptors can reach higher altitudes, in some circumstances, near the end of the transition from the mid-course to the terminal stage of flight.

As with Stunner, releases at very high altitudes would preclude intercept attempts by lower-tier terminal defenses like Patriot entirely.

All of this combines to creates a situation in which mid-course intercept attempts are critical for catching cluster munition-laden missiles before they release their payloads. However, inventories of relevant interceptors to defend targets in Israel have reportedly been dwindling after weeks of persistent Iranian ballistic missile attacks. Mid-course interceptors, like the U.S. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the Israeli Arrow 3, are precious munitions that have generally been stockpiled at lower levels, to begin with. They also take years to procure and cost many millions of dollars each.

Retired Army Col. David Shank echoed much of this when speaking to TWZ about the challenges and complexities of responding to Iranian long-range ballistic missiles with cluster munition payloads. Shank, who served as Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and as the 10th Army Air Missile Defense Commander in Europe, also highlighted that this threat would require the use of higher-end systems to attempt intercepts, either inside or outside of the Earth’s atmosphere, before any submunition payload is released.

“We talk endo/exo-atmospheric. We’re talking THAAD capability, [and] SM-6/SM-3-capable systems,” Shank explained. “And so we’re really talking upper-tier in order to defeat that type of target once it is launched.”

The video below shows THAAD interceptors being fired at incoming Iranian threats in the course of the current conflict.

“Obviously, the goal is to kill it before they even launch it through a variety of means to do that,” he continued. “But if you can’t do that, and there is some type of air launch. And the next step is that upper-tier capability, coupled with other domains.”

In terms of other domains, “let’s just talk space real quick,” he added. “Sensing that launch and detecting it and then passing that information over a network, ultimately to what we’re talking about now,” systems like THAAD and ships armed with SM-3s and SM-6s that are “capable of defeating that threat with endo- and exo-atmosphere capabilities I mentioned.”

Shank underscored the importance of trying to intercept ballistic missiles with cluster warheads at as high altitudes as possible before they can release their payloads.

“Once it hits that point where bomblets are released, so a mechanism within the platform that releases the bomblets, instead of now having one aerial threat, now you obviously have many,” he said. “So, very difficult now to engage multiple aerial threats at one time.”

Shank told us that watching videos of submunitions being dispersed from Iranian ballistic missiles reminded him of past modeling and simulation of such attacks he observed during his time in the Army.

“I’ve seen modeling and simulation, when I was still in uniform years ago, of how we would fight against those types of early-release munitions,” he said. “They had different names then, but it’s very similar to what we’re seeing now in real time.”

That modeling and simulation “would show that overmatch” and that “need to defeat that capability before it does disperse those early-release munitions or those bomblets,” he added.

The retired Army air defense officer noted that the ballistic missile threat ecosystem in the Middle East, in general, is made more complicated by the relatively short distances those weapons travel from launch points in Iran to their targets.

“In the scenario that’s playing out real time, potentially, if they’re launched out of southwestern Iran at the GCCs [Gulf Cooperation Council states on the Arabian Peninsula] – they’re the closest – so minutes, two, three, four minutes,” said Shank.

The time to react is further compressed when facing missiles carrying scatterable payloads. “You’re down to a minute or two.”

Attempts can still be made to intercept submunitions after they are released. At the same time, in addition to the challenge of trying to prioritize and engage dozens of smaller targets, intercept attempts against individual submunitions also impose different costs on the defender. These are targets that are likely to be cheap even compared to lower-cost interceptors. Trying to shoot them down with something like Patriot would create an even more lopsided exchange ratio. Also their singular destructive power is far less than a unitary payload.

“What’s the cost curve look like?” Shank said, speaking generally about how expensive this proposition could become.

“I talk cost curve a lot, [but] you got to recognize the boots and the people that are on the ground on the other end of that, and other national assets and capabilities,” Shank noted. “What is a Soldier’s life worth? … What is an E-3 AWACS aircraft that is high-demand, low-density – what value do you put on something like that, or even a Patriot radar?”

Overall, Iran’s use of ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads highlights a “very big challenge in front of us, and so when I say in front of us, obviously in front of the warfighters. It’s a lot,” Shank said, highlighting the broader ramifications. “From an operator perspective, you have to discern which target is which, which one should be the priority to defeat first, how many of those bomblets are possibly going to impact dirt and not be a threat, and which ones will be the threat. You’ve got to discern [that] fairly quickly, and then pass on those engagement authorities to the shooters.”

As noted earlier, it is likely that defenders would be challenged to differentiate between missiles carrying submunitions and those with unitary payloads until a release occurs. This can only make it more difficult to prioritize intercept attempts against missiles with cluster munition warheads, especially in the mid-course phase of flight, when it would be most ideal. This could then contribute to a further wearing down of stocks of critical mid-course interceptors.

Shank stressed that this is not an entirely new problem set for the U.S. military, citing the aforementioned modeling and simulations.

“It helped drive discussions on increased [force] structure, increased requirements. It helped recognize, in this scenario [including missiles with cluster munition warheads], adversarial capabilities with regards to munitions,” he explained. “The results, or the findings, personally, were somewhat laughable.”

“We would run a scenario, not necessarily the Middle East, but we’d run a general scenario, and the outcomes would be, well, we need 48 Patriot battalions, as an example. And then that’s a hypothetical number, but it was a very large number,” Shank said. “And, so, when you think through this, at the time, I think the U.S. Army had 14 Patriot battalions. And this was a 2030-2035 scenario, which we’re a lot closer to today, and we have 16 Patriot battalions. And so even if you factored in – which we were not during that modeling and simulation period, or exercise – but even if you factored in our allies and partners, I’m not sure we have 48 Patriot battalions on planet earth.”

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

TWZ has written on several occasions in the past about the strains on the U.S. Army’s Patriot force, which is inadequate to meet current demands. This is reflective of broader air and missile defense capacity limitations across the U.S. military, despite efforts in recent years to change that paradigm. This has been highlighted again in the course of the current conflict with Iran, and would be an even bigger issue should a high-end fight, such as one in the Pacific against China, erupt.

As an aside to all this, Shank pointed to the importance of so-called “left-of-launch” operations to neutralize threats before they are even launched.

“Within the U.S. Army, we had four ‘pillars’ within integrated air and missile defense. It’s attack operations. It’s active air defense, passive air defense, and command and control,” he noted. “And so the attack operations piece is that left of launch piece. And I would also tie today some of our offensive cyber capabilities as part of attack operations.”

“Again, if we can prevent an adversary from launching or from getting to the launch pad,” he added. “So, whether it’s a supply chain disruption, whether it’s a special operations force with eyes on a target forward on a battlefield, or what we possess now [with] some of our surface-to-surface precision munitions, that can influence and defeat those capabilities before they launch.”

In recent years, the Army and other elements of the U.S. military have also pointed to the value of a similar breadth of left-of-launch activities for disrupting and defeating drone attacks, as you can read more about here.

It should be stressed here that, at least from what has been observed so far, Iran has been using ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads primarily as terror weapons against population centers in Israel. The high-altitude releases have certainly helped those weapons get around terminal defenses like David’s Sling, but have also limited their ability to focus their effects on specific points on the ground. For vengeance attacks that also wear down the supply of mid-course interceptors, this is likely deemed adequate, and even less accurate cluster attacks still put military target under threat.

However, Iran’s demonstration of how this tactic can strain on an opponent’s layered defenses does have serious implications beyond the current conflict and the Middle East. Independent reports have previously highlighted the vulnerability of key U.S. air bases, especially in the Pacific, to attacks by cluster munition-laden ballistic missiles. Aircraft parked in the open and thin-skinned fuel storage sites are at particular risk from such strikes. This ties into a separate and increasingly heated debate about the value of investing in new hardened infrastructure, which TWZ continues to follow closely.

Those assessments are based on lower-altitude releases where submissions can be more focused on particular target areas. However, high-altitude releases could still be focused, at least to a general degree, on saturating very large area targets, including sprawling established air bases. As an example, the two main runways at the U.S. Air Force’s highly strategic Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, are roughly two miles long. They have taxiways and numerous open parking aprons attached to them. There are many other sprawling facilities on the island, too.

For an adversary like China, a barrage of missiles designed to scatter submunitions across larger areas could be relevant in striking a target like Andersen, or anything similarly large. Those weapons could also be used to help overwhelm defenses, eat up valuable interceptors, and otherwise sow chaos as part of layered strikes that also include more precise missiles, as well as drones. Even dispersing submunitions at lower altitudes to achieve better accuracy, but still relatively high within a system like Patriot’s interception envelope, would give a much smaller window to destroy the missile than compared to a traditional unitary warhead. In a future high-end fight in the Pacific, Chinese forces could also choose to employ this capability to attack large population centers, especially in Japan and elsewhere in the First Island Chain, similar to Iran’s attacks against Israel now.

The development of precision-guided submunitions capable of being released via ballistic missile would further change the equation. In 2024, the Guangdong Aerodynamic Research Academy (GARA) in China notably put forward a tangential concept for a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle carrying different kinds of scatterable payloads, including miniature missiles and drones. Ballistic missiles often also reach hypersonic speeds, generally defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal phase of flight, and any submunitions they release have to be able to withstand similar stresses.

There is no doubt that China, in particular, has been keenly watching the outcomes of Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, as well as other countries in the region. Israel’s integrated air and missile defense network has long been touted as the best in the world. The Gulf Arab states have also spent billions of dollars over the past decade or so to bolster their capabilities and overall capacity in the past decade or so with this exact scenario top of mind. The U.S. military’s higher-end ballistic missile defense posture in the Pacific remains relatively limited, and focused largely on very particular regions, despite years now of efforts to dramatically expand that architecture.

Iran’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks has been significantly degraded over the past five weeks, but it has been able to keep up a persistent tempo regardless. China has a broader array of far more capable ballistic missiles, as well as other stand-off strike weapons, that it would bring to bear en masse in any future high-end fight in the Pacific.

Other countries, such as Russia or North Korea, could look to capitalize on what Iran has demonstrated with its cluster munition missile attack, as well. There has been a burst in the development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, in general, including to non-state actors, globally, in recent years.

If anything, application of these tactics by Iran help make the case for the Trump administration’s highly ambitious and expensive Golden Dome missile defense network, which will put a much higher-focus on mid-course intercept. This includes stationing interceptors in space.

Overall, while Iran has been using high-altitude releases of submunitions from ballistic missiles to help ensure it can continue executing succes attacks on Israel, it is a tactic that could have significant implications in other contexts in conflicts well beyond the Middle East.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

The U.S. military has been using M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to strike Iranian ships as part of Operation Epic Fury. Since the current conflict erupted, the only munitions those launchers have been seen firing are Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles. PrSM has made its combat debut against Iran, and the newly disclosed operational details raise the question of whether an anti-ship version has been fielded.

Over the first 10 days of Operation Epic Fury, American forces destroyed 50 Iranian naval vessels “using a combination of artillery, fighters, bombers, and sea-launched missiles,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine said at a press conference at the Pentagon this morning. U.S. officials have consistently stressed that the neutralization of Iran’s naval capabilities is a core objective of the ongoing campaign against Iran.

TWZ subsequently reached out for further clarification about what Caine was referring to here when he said “artillery” and for any additional information about the use of those assets against the Iranian Navy. A U.S. official told TWZ that HIMARS were used against Iranian Navy ships, but would not comment on what type of munitions they had fired or which ships were attacked that way.

However, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has released several videos and pictures showing HIMARS operating in support of Operation Epic Fury. As noted, that imagery has only shown them firing ATACMS and PrSM ballistic missiles. CENTCOM has also now explicitly touted the first-ever combat use of PrSM in the current conflict. U.S. officials have yet to confirm where specifically ATACMS or PrSM missiles are being fired from.

Imagery also began circulating on social media yesterday that is said to show an empty ATACMS ammunition ‘pod’ in Kuwait discovered by locals in the midst of ongoing operations against Iran. Wheeled HIMARS launchers, as well as tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), fire ATACMS, PrSM, and 227mm guided artillery from pods with standardized dimensions. ATACMS are loaded one to a pod, while pods for PrSM contain two missiles.

A video also emerged online this past weekend showing two HIMARS being employed from a beach in Bahrain. When the footage was captured is unknown. What munitions they see are also unclear.

No evidence has emerged so far that HIMARS are being used to fire 227mm guided artillery rockets, which come six to a pod, in support of Operation Epic Fury. Even new extended-range variants of these rockets can only fly out to around 93 miles (150 kilometers) away, severely limiting the areas in and around Iran they could reach from available launch points in the region, to begin with. For example, the shortest distance between Bahrain and Iranian soil across the Persian Gulf is around 120 miles. The longest ranged variants of ATACMS can hit targets out to around 186 miles (300 kilometers), with PrSM’s maximum range at least 310 miles (500 kilometers).

It should also be noted that there is no known operational variant of ATACMS capable of engaging moving targets, meaning that it would have to be used against stationary ships. This is very possible, as we’ve seen multiple examples of Iranian ships struck in port or while appearing to be at anchor offshore already.

The U.S. Army had pursued an anti-ship version of ATACMS in the past, which would have been capable of targeting vessels on the move. That effort looks to have been subsumed by the development of a ship-killing variant of PrSM featuring an additional seeker, also known as Increment 2.

There have been indications that the U.S. Army has already begun to field PrSMs that can hit ships on the move, though it is unclear if this represents the full planned Increment 2 capability. In 2024, the service announced it had successfully hit a moving vessel with an unspecified version of PrSM in a test exercise in the Pacific. In a report released in 2025, the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) disclosed that the Army had actually “shot two PrSM EOC [early operational capability] missiles at a maritime target in June 2024.” At that time, the service was only known to have reached early operational capability with the baseline version of PrSM, also known as Increment 1.

It is possible that the Army has begun to field Increment 2 PrSMs, at least on a limited level, as well. The Army announced that it had begun initial flight testing of the new seeker system in 2023. Whether or not Increment 1 missiles can be readily converted into Increment 2 versions is also unknown. Like ATACMS, PrSMs without a moving target capability could still be fired at ships that are stationary, as well.

Regardless, Operation Epic Fury looks to be the first known instance of the U.S. military using ballistic missiles to target ships, at anchor and/or on the move, in real combat.

In general, ballistic missiles are especially well-suited to long-range standoff strikes against time-sensitive and well-defended high-value targets based on the speed at which they fly. They also reach especially high velocity as they come down in the terminal phase of flight. This all, in turn, creates additional challenges for enemy defenders attempting to intercept them compared to other kinds of missiles, including some subsonic air-breathing cruise missiles, and compresses the overall time available to react in any way. That speed also gives ballistic missiles an inherent ability to burrow more deeply into hardened targets. This could be particularly valuable when engaging larger and better-armored warships.

The U.S. military has been playing catch-up for some time now when it comes to the development and fielding of anti-ship ballistic missiles, especially compared to the investments that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made in this arena. The use now of ballistic missiles against Iranian ships is, in turn, a sign of things to come in other future U.S. operations. PrSM is often discussed as a particularly important new capability in the context of any future high-end fight against China in the Pacific, just on account of its extended range compared to ATACMS. That extra reach would be valuable for engaging targets on land and at sea. TWZ previously highlighted how the use of PrSM in strikes on Iranian targets, in general, could also send signals to other American opponents well beyond the Middle East.

Interestingly, Iran has also spent considerable time and resources developing an array of shorter-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, capabilities that were then proliferated to its Houthi proxies in Yemen. The Houthis became the first in the world to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles in anger in 2023, as part of a campaign against commercial vessels and foreign warships in and around the Red Sea that ultimately stretched into 2025. So far, Iran does not look to have brought these capabilities to bear itself in the current conflict.

If nothing else, HIMARS has now been used in real combat to target enemy naval vessels, very likely with ballistic missiles. In doing so, experience is gained that could be very relevant beyond the current conflict with Iran.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

A submarine is among the Iranian naval vessels that U.S. forces have struck with Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles. ATACMS cannot hit moving targets, so the submarine would have had to have been stationary in port when struck. TWZ was first to report earlier this week that M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers firing ATACMS, as well as Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles, had been aiding in the destruction of Iran’s Navy as part of Operation Epic Fury. The conflict has also marked the first combat use of PrSM, which brings a major boost in range over ATACMS.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine put a particular spotlight on the contributions of field artillery units in current operations against Iran at a press conference at the Pentagon this morning.

“Today, I’m going to talk about our incredible artillery force, comprised of American soldiers and Marines who’ve been sinking ships, [and] destroying depots,” Caine said. “Our Army and Marine artillerymen are hitting sites that Iran relies on to project power beyond their borders and protect our deployed [forces].”

“In just the first 13 days of this operation, our artillery forces have made history. They fired the first Precision Strike Missiles ever used in combat, reaching deep into enemy territory,” the Chairman continued. He also said that soldiers from the Army’s 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, part of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were the ones to fire the first PrSMs against targets in Iran.

“They used Army ATACMS to sink multiple ships, including a submarine,” Caine added. “And they’ve done all of this with the precision and determination that comes from relentless training and trust in each other and in their weapon systems.”

“We’ve rendered the Iranian Navy combat ineffective,” but “continue to attack naval vessels,” Caine also said, speaking generally.

Caine did not name the Iranian submarine that was destroyed using ATACMS, nor did he say what class it was. TWZ has reached out for more information. There is no known operational version of ATACMS capable of hitting moving targets, so, as already noted, the missile would also have had to have been employed against a submarine in port or one that was otherwise stationary.

A review of satellite imagery in Planet Labs’ archive does show one of Iran’s three Russian-made Kilo class diesel-electric submarines sunk at Bandar Abbas as of March 4. The submarine had looked to be untouched in an earlier Planet Labs image taken on March 2 in the aftermath of a wave of strikes, as TWZ previously reported. Bandar Abbas is the Iranian Navy’s main base and occupies a particularly strategic position along the Strait of Hormuz.

In a video address on March 5, U.S. Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), had also said that “the most operational Iranian submarine … now has a hole in its side.” What submarine Cooper was referring to here remains unclear, but it may have been the Kilo class submarine struck at Bandar Abbas. At that time, his comments were also taken by many to be a reference to the IRIS Fateh, a domestically-produced diesel-electric coastal attack submarine that entered Iranian service in 2019. The fate of that boat remains unconfirmed.

On March 10, CENTCOM released the video seen below, showing strikes on various Iranian vessels at sea and in port, including what looks to be a Ghadir class diesel-electric midget submarine. That boat was struck by an AGM-114 Hellfire missile, a U.S. official told TWZ. How many Ghadir class submarines were in Iran’s inventory before the current conflict is not clear, but prior estimates had generally put the size of that fleet at between 16 and 20 hulls.

Regardless, it makes good sense that the U.S. military would focus on neutralizing Iran’s submarine force, and doing so in port if possible, as part of the larger objective of neutering the country’s naval capabilities. Finding, fixing, and engaging submerged submarines, even older and louder designs, can take significant time and effort, as you can read about in more detail in this past TWZ feature. Iranian submarines could have been used to discreetly lay mines, as well as to attempt attacks on friendly warships or commercial vessels. As it stands now, maritime traffic in and out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz has still ground to a virtual halt over concerns about mines and other remaining Iranian threats, which is already having global ramifications.

Chairman Caine’s comments today also reinforce the role that ATACMS and PrSM have been playing in the current conflict, in general. TWZ previously noted that this is a preview of what one would expect to see from U.S. forces in other future conflicts, especially when it comes to using ballistic missiles in the anti-ship role as part of a high-end fight with China in the Pacific. PrSM, which only began entering service in the past two years or so, offers significantly greater reach than ATACMS, allowing it to hold a much broader swath of territory at risk from any launch position.

Just yesterday, Lockheed Martin also announced the first test launch of a full-up Increment 2 PrSM, an anti-ship optimized version in development now. In that test, a HIMARS launcher fired the Increment 2 missile, which flew out to a range of around 217 and a half miles (350 kilometers), according to a company press release. The Increment 2 PrSM features an additional multi-mode seeker specifically designed to allow it to engage moving targets at sea. Lockheed Martin also released the rendering below as part of its announcement yesterday, which looks to show apertures for the seeker system around the nose.

Questions do remain about the anti-ship and/or moving target capabilities that might be found on baseline Increment 1 PrSMs. A pair of “early operational capability” PrSMs – a term generally understood to refer to Increment 1 missiles – were fired at what was described as a moving maritime target during a test in the Pacific back in 2024.

In the meantime, the older ATACMS, which PrSM is set to eventually replace, has now scored a hit against an enemy submarine, albeit one not on the move.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com