ballistic

SEOUL, Aug. 11 (UPI) — North Korea fired a ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Wednesday, the militaries of Seoul and Tokyo said, its second such launch in less than a week as the United States and South Korea gear up to kick off their major summertime joint military drill.

The missile was fired from the Wonsan area on North Korea’s east coast at around 6 a.m., South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.

“The detected North Korean missile flew over 700 kilometers (435 miles), and South Korea and the U.S. are currently conducting a detailed analysis regarding its exact specifications,” the JCS said.

The military did not specify the type of missile involved, although the distance the projectile traveled falls within the range of short-range ballistic missiles.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities tracked and shared information on the launch from its initial stage, while Seoul also exchanged information related to the ballistic missile with Japan, the military added.

“Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, the military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various movements and maintaining the capability and readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocation,” the JCS said.

Japan’s Defense Ministry also detected the launch, saying the missile flew about 429 miles, reached a maximum altitude of roughly 56 miles and fell outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi condemned the launch at a press briefing, saying the North’s weapons tests “threaten the peace and security of our country, the region, and the international community.”

Koizumi said the launch violated relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and noted that Japan had lodged a strong protest with North Korea through diplomatic channels at its embassy in Beijing.

Hawaii-based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said it detected the launch and was consulting with regional allies and partners.

“Based on current assessments, this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” the command said in a statement.

The launch came days before the United States and South Korea are set to begin their annual summertime joint military drills. The 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise kicks off Monday and will focus on preparing for evolving threats from North Korea, military officials said earlier this week.

North Korea routinely denounces the allies’ joint exercises as rehearsals for an invasion and frequently responds with weapons tests. On Thursday, Pyongyang fired a short-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea.

The allies stressed that the joint exercise is defensive in nature.

“We’re up here today announcing Ulchi Freedom Shield to the entire world before it even starts,” U.S. Forces spokesman Col. Ryan Donald said at a press briefing Monday. “UFS is not a pretext, it’s not a provocation. It’s a transparent, longstanding defensive training event.”

Pyongyang conducts second weapons test in less than a week as Seoul, Washington gear up for annual military exercises.

North Korea has launched a ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan, according to Seoul and Tokyo, marking the second such test from Pyongyang in less than a week.

The launch on Wednesday came as South Korea and the United States announced plans to hold their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military drills starting on August 17.

“Our military detected at around 6:00 am [21:00 GMT Tuesday] a ballistic missile launched by North Korea from the Wonsan area towards the East Sea,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a message to reporters, referring to a body of water also known as the Sea of Japan.

South Korea’s military said the missile flew more than 700km (435 miles).

It said it has boosted its surveillance posture and that it was closely exchanging information on the launch with Washington and Tokyo.

Japan’s Defence Ministry said on social media that the suspected ballistic missile had “already fallen”, without providing further details.

“North Korea has never simply let a South Korea-US joint military exercise pass without a response,” Lim Eul-chul, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University, told the AFP news agency.

“This is a message that Pyongyang is closely watching the upcoming drills and could stage a provocation if it deems one necessary.”

US-South Korea drills

The Ulchi Freedom Shield training is to start on Monday and run for 11 days. Its scale will be similar to previous years, with 18,000 South Korean soldiers taking part, according to South Korea’s military.

North Korea has in previous years denounced the exercises as a rehearsal for invasion, and responded to the drills with weapons tests and harsh rhetoric. Seoul and Washington, however, have repeatedly said their training is defensive in nature.

On August 6, South Korea, the US and Japan detected the launch of a short-range ballistic missile from North Korea in what was Pyongyang’s first ballistic weapons testing activity since late June.

North Korea did not confirm the reported launch.

Pyongyang has ratcheted up its criticism of Tokyo’s defence policy, issuing statements at least seven times since July.

On Tuesday, North Korean state media condemned Japan’s latest defence white paper as a “re-invasion-minded” document, saying it “groundlessly described” Pyongyang as ⁠the greatest strategic challenge to “justify its reckless arms buildup”.

North Korea has also been accused of playing a more active role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday that Moscow had used a North Korean ballistic missile during an attack that killed seven workers at a Ukrainian steel plant in the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia.

Iran-backed Houthis have resumed attacks on Yemen’s al-Makha port in the Red Sea, striking Saudi weapons depots with missiles and drones. Yemen’s military says at least seven people were killed.

From recent satellite imagery, the Russian Navy now looks to be using nets to protect submarines from drone attacks at a highly strategic base on the country’s far eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. There are also signs that Russian forces have been taking new steps at a separate base along the Black Sea to shield submarines against uncrewed aerial threats. The appearance of the nets over the submarines at the base in Kamchatka point to how Russia’s concerns about drone threats have extended to critical facilities far removed from the battlefields of Ukraine.

TWZ obtained the imagery showing the netting in place over submarines at the Russian Navy’s base at Rybachiy from Vantor. Business insider was first to report on these images. Rybachiy is notably the homeport for the vast majority of Borei and Borei-A class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs, in service in Russia today. It is also home to various other guided missile and attack submarines assigned to the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet.

Images of Rybachiy from Vantor taken on August 4, seen at the top of this story and below, show several different types of submarines fully covered by nets. What is visible in the imagery is broadly consistent with netting that Russian forces have employed in and around Ukraine as a countermeasure against kamikaze drone attacks against assets on the ground and in the water. Similar netting has also observed in use by other armed forces elsewhere globally.

Russian forces at Rybachiy look to have started using these nets back in May based on additional imagery from Vantor. The imagery from May and August show crane barges being used to help erect the nets around submarines at their moorings.

As an aside, floating booms are also seen strung around the piers at Rybachiy. This is something else that is now commonplace at naval bases across Russia, and can help provide an additional barrier to certain threats on or near the surface, particularly explosive-laden kamikaze drone boats.

On Tuesday, the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom also published additional imagery from Vantor of the Russian Navy’s base in Novorossiysk along the Black Sea taken back on June 13. The images show several Kilo class attack submarines partially submerged in port. Three of the boats also appear to have anti-drone armor screens installed over their conning towers. A cursory review of additional satellite imagery in Planet Labs’ archive suggests screens were a relatively new additional at that time.

“The Russian Black Sea Fleet has equipped three of its four Kilo class submarines with counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] cages covering the vessels’ conning towers. This was applied as a preventive measure in response to Ukraine’s increased ability to strike targets further from the front line,” according to an accompanying assessment from British authorities earlier this week. “Analysis of commercial satellite imagery dated 13 June 2026 identified that three of the submarines had loosened their moorings and had submerged within the basin. Whilst the majority of the hull was below the surface, their conning towers remained above the waterline, explaining the need for the counter-UAS cage.”

“The fourth submarine, which had not been fitted with a counter-UAS cage, had slipped its mooring lines, manoeuvred away from nearby surface vessels and submerged within the harbour, its conning tower visible above the waterline,” the British government’s assessment continued. “The lack of a counter-UAS cage likely signifies this vessel has been de-prioritised compared to the other three.”

TWZ has also now obtained the June 13 image of Novorossiysk directly from Vantor, as well as another one taken on June 17, which shows the submarines surfaced and at their moorings as usual. This, in turn raises questions about whether or not the boats were submerged in response an attack or indications that one might be imminent. There could be another explanation for why the submarines were temporarily submerged in port, including a force protection readiness exercise in preparation for such an incident.

Growing threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems, as well as uncrewed surface vessels (USV), have already had a marked impact on the establishment of new defensive capabilities and force protection postures at Russian naval and other facilities. This is especially true of sites in more immediate proximity to Ukraine.

Back in 2024, satellite imagery of Novorossiysk notably showed that forces there had painted a silhouette of a submarine and built an actual mock conning tower on a pier at the base. This reflected a broader trend at the time to implement countermeasures against Ukrainian munitions with autonomous image-matching targeting capabilities.

Also in 2024, what looked to be additional overhead protection against drone attacks appeared on the Delta-IV class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Tula at the Russian Navy’s base in Gadzhiyevo in the country’s far northern Murmansk region. What was seen fitted to Tula at that time very rudimentary compared to what has now been seen erected over submarines at Novorossiysk and Rybachiy, which offers far greater and more elaborate coverage . More extensive counter-drone screens have also now appeared on other types of Russian naval vessels.

Ukrainian forces only continue to expand the area, both at sea and on land, that they can hold at risk with uncrewed systems, as well as more traditional missiles. As it stands now, Ukraine uses its ever more diverse arsenal of long-range kamikaze drones and cruise missiles to strike targets across whole swaths of Western Russia, including around the capital Moscow, on a near daily basis.

Footage of a Ukrainian FP-2 attack drone slamming into a Russian Wildberries distribution center in Yekaterinburg this morning.

The Russian distribution center, hit by multiple Ukrainian drones, is now ablaze. pic.twitter.com/W2r9t6f9q1

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 7, 2026

Ukrainian kamikaze USVs also regularly prowl the Black Sea. Submarines at Novorossiysk, as well as bases on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, have been the wide array of targets struck. There sas another daytime USV attack just yesterday on the Russian-occupied port of Yalta in Crimea. It’s also worth noting here that Ukraine has developed USVs capable of launching kamikaze UAS, combining those two capabilities and creating additional threat vectors Russia’s force have to contend with. In addition, Ukraine now has the ability to hit even moving targets using long-range drones equipped with miniaturized satellite communications terminals. This leaves even ships not sitting static in port very much at risk, which Ukraine has highlighted in recent months as it goes after Russia’s logistics ships in the Sea of Azov, a campaign that is only accelerating and spreading.

As noted, the appearance of the nets at Rybachiy, which sits thousands of miles from Ukraine, speaks to how much further the threat of drone attacks has expanded. This goes beyond long-range strikes, as well. Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb attacks on Russian airbases last year highlighted the dangers posed by near-field attacks launched from deep inside hostile territory closer to their actual targets. Bases in Russia’s far eastern regions were among those targeted in the clandestine operation. Ukrainian forces have also launched attacks on Russian-linked ships in the Mediterranean Sea.

СБУ показала унікальні кадри спецоперації «Павутина», у результаті якої уражено 41 військовий літак стратегічної авіації рф

➡️ https://t.co/OSxqEsI9CD pic.twitter.com/aGSZNEsoX3

— СБ України (@ServiceSsu) June 4, 2025

The russian terrorist state no longer has the ability to produce Tu-95s or any kind of strategic bomber. This is a tremendous victory for Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/SVeQE78v0h

— Michael MacKay (@mhmck) June 1, 2025

It also worth mentioning here that just this week, a small quadcopter drone equipped with explosive payload was discovered at next to Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at an airport in Germany. CNN reported today that U.S. authorities have now assessed that uncrewed aerial system to have belonged to a Russian intelligence service. This follows year now of concerning drone incursions over military bases and other critical infrastructure across Western Europe.

Just this week, the US assessed that an explosive-laden drone discovered at an airport in Germany overnight on Wednesday belonged to a Russian intelligence service, a US defense official in Europe told CNN — https://t.co/axn5uQRTiG

— Haley Britzky (@halbritz) August 7, 2026

Uncrewed aerial threats large and small are not at all limited to the context of the conflict in Ukraine and spillover from it into Europe, either. Drones have been a major factor in the conflict this year with Iran, as well as in other crises in and around the Middle East in recent years.

With the barrier to entry so low, drone threats are only becoming more commonplace globally as they proliferate to increasingly more capable degrees even among smaller nation state armed forces and non-state actors. For the U.S. government, counter-drone defenses for military installations and other critical infrastructure within the homeland, as to protect forces abroad, has become a major priority. Still, American authorities continue to lag in many respects in responding to the serious dangers that very present already.

Altogether, the expansion of counter-drone defenses around submarines at the Russian Navy’s bases at Rybachiy and Novorossiysk reflect very immediate threats emanating from Ukraine, but are also a sign of larger trends globally. Similar force protection measures could well continue to emerge elsewhere, and not just in Russia.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Ukraine’s military intelligence says North Korea is preparing to deploy a missile unit to western Russia, which would mark another major expansion of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. The report comes as Kyiv warns its dwindling ballistic missile defenses are costing civilian lives.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment will involve approximately 90 North Korean personnel stationed in Russia’s Voronezh region — which borders Ukraine — alongside the Russian military’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade. Ukrainian intelligence assesses the unit could ultimately field six launchers and as many as 120 KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), although the final composition is expected to be determined during senior-level talks next month.

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment has not been independently verified.

If confirmed, the deployment would represent a further deepening of North Korean support for Russia, after supplying Russia with ammunition, smaller numbers of ballistic missiles, and troops.

The Ukrainian Air Force today said Russia launched another major overnight strike combining drones with ballistic missiles. Preliminary figures showed Ukrainian air defenses shot down 98 of the 115 drones launched, but failed to intercept a single ballistic missile. As well as the inherent difficulty of intercepting these threats, this statistic also points to the exhaustion of its Patriot interceptor stockpiles.

The attack killed at least 17 people and injured dozens more after strikes hit multiple locations across Kyiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky directly linked the casualties to continued shortages of advanced air-defense systems.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelensky wrote on social media. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Ukraine has spent months urging Western partners to provide additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, which remain among the few systems capable of defeating ballistic missile threats such as Russia’s Iskander and North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24. While Ukrainian forces routinely claim to intercept the majority of incoming drones and many cruise missiles, ballistic missiles continue to present one of the most difficult threats to defend against.

Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Washington might grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically before later appearing to back away from the proposal, saying the technology was “a hard thing to give away.”

According to Ukraine’s military administration, seven sites across Kyiv were struck during the latest attack, which began shortly after midnight. Zelensky said the primary targets included civilian industrial facilities, among them a brewing company and warehouses storing construction materials.

“Partners who are not yet ready to play a more active role in supplying interceptors can help by implementing new sanctions. A significant share of Russia’s ballistic missile production is still not under sanctions,” Zelensky wrote on X. “Even now. New steps are needed — from the G7, the European Union, and everyone who supports the protection of life. Thank you to those who are willing to help in this way.”

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said rescue operations continued throughout the day.

“There may still be people under the rubble,” he said.

Emergency crews rescued two survivors from a destroyed warehouse near the city center. Klitschko said 24 people were injured, including an ambulance driver, while four remained in critical condition. The strikes also ignited multiple fires at warehouses and industrial sites, while Ukrainian authorities reported an ammonia leak triggered by one of the impacts.

The latest attack coincides with what Ukrainian intelligence says was Russia’s first use of North Korean ballistic missiles since August 2025.

Cherniak told Reuters that Pyongyang recently delivered another batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia, along with additional personnel. He said Russia ultimately expects to receive 120 North Korean ballistic missiles and six launchers.

According to Ukrainian authorities, one of the newly delivered North Korean missiles struck the central Ukrainian village of Radushne last week, flattening a residential home and killing at least five members of the same family.

In the strike on Radushne, for the first time in a while, the Russians used a North Korean missile, according to preliminary data. Of course, more examinations will follow, and everything will be verified, but as of now – it is a North Korean ballistic missile. The alliance… pic.twitter.com/UtTTNGwBUb

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) July 30, 2026

Clearly, any increase in Russia’s ballistic missile inventory poses a serious challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defenses. The situation is likely to become more difficult heading into the coming winter, when Russia normally steps up its strikes against Ukraine’s electrical grid.

The KN-23, known in North Korea as the Hwasong-11A, is a traditional SRBM that can reach out to around 800 kilometers (497 miles) and has a 500-kilogram (1,102-pound) class unitary high-explosive warhead. It offers greater range than Russia’s 9M723 Iskander SRBM, which carries a similarly sized warhead but has a range of 500 kilometers (311 miles). This weapon has also been fired from adapted railcars, a concept you can read more about here.

As for the KN-24, or Hwasong-11B, this has a range of approximately 410 kilometers (255 miles), making it more of a battlefield support SRBM, but still sufficient for Russia to strike many targets within Ukraine. It is often considered a North Korean analog of the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

However, the North Korean SRBMs are considered less accurate than their Russian-made counterparts and have been associated with strikes causing significant civilian casualties.

According to a report from Ukrainian state prosecutors, around half of the KN-23s that had been launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 not only deviated from their trajectory but also exploded in midair.

An investigation by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) into the wreckage of a KN-23/KN-24 missile used by Russia in Ukraine found that the missile contained more than 290 foreign-made electronic components, with approximately 75 percent linked to U.S. companies, 16 percent to European firms, and the remainder to Asian manufacturers. This suggests that North Korea continues to obtain critical Western technology despite longstanding international sanctions and points to continued limitations in Pyongyang’s high-technology production capabilities.

🚨 🇺🇦🇷🇺🇰🇵 Analysis of the debris from one of the North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine found it was constructed with more than 290 non-domestic electronic components. Many of them were produced by US companies in the last 3 years.

This analysis was conducted… pic.twitter.com/YHwwAZG0Wo

— Colby Badhwar (@ColbyBadhwar) February 20, 2024

North Korea first began supplying KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia in late 2023. Cherniak said Pyongyang delivered approximately 150 ballistic missiles between late 2023 and August 2025. Ukraine also says North Korea has supplied millions of much-needed artillery projectiles and deployed around 14,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk region under the countries’ 2024 mutual defense agreement.

Cherniak said roughly 9,500 North Korean troops remain in Kursk but are not currently engaged in combat operations against Ukraine. Zelensky said last month that Russia is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops and is preparing facilities in the Voronezh region to receive them.

Overall, North Korean-supplied missiles make up only a very small fraction of the weapons used in Russian strikes on Ukraine, but there has long been concern about the direction the burgeoning military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang could take. There have been particular concerns that Russian expertise in the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons — as well as other weapons and technologies — could be provided to North Korea.

North Korea: Kim Jong-un shows unseen nuclear weapons to Russia’s defence minister

The reported new deployment comes as Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on ballistic missiles to exploit one of Ukraine’s most significant military vulnerabilities. With few signs that Russia has been able to further ramp up production of its own Iskander missiles, an increased supply of North Korean ballistic missiles would take advantage of a gap in Ukrainian air defenses and further threaten its cities, energy infrastructure, and other targets. The bigger concern is not simply another shipment of missiles, but the prospect of Russia tapping into an expanding North Korean production base financed by Moscow, allowing it to sustain high-volume ballistic missile attacks for far longer than it otherwise could.

Ukraine’s ability to defeat ballistic missiles of any origin has become increasingly constrained by the availability of interceptor missiles. Patriot remains the primary system capable of reliably engaging Iskander, KN-23, and KN-24 ballistic missiles, but the U.S.-made interceptors are expensive, produced in relatively modest numbers, and are also needed to meet U.S. and allied needs around the world. European-supplied SAMP/T batteries also provide a limited anti-ballistic capability, but have been provided in only limited numbers so far.

Global demand for Patriot interceptors has surged amid conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, straining U.S. and allied inventories and production capacity. Those constraints have become significant enough that Congress has questioned whether the Pentagon can sustain higher transfer rates to Ukraine even as Kyiv presses for more interceptors. Meanwhile, although the United States continues discussing licensed Patriot production with Ukraine, any domestic manufacturing effort would take many months—if not years—to produce missiles in meaningful numbers, leaving Kyiv dependent on allied deliveries for the foreseeable future.

Whether or not the reported North Korean missile unit deployment materializes, the operational trend is becoming increasingly clear. Russia is continuing to expand the scale and complexity of its long-range strike campaigns, pairing mass drone attacks with growing numbers of ballistic missiles specifically intended to exploit one of Ukraine’s most difficult defensive challenges. As Kyiv’s leadership continues to press for additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, the consequences of those shortages are becoming increasingly evident with every large-scale strike.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

China’s ballistic missile arsenal has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past two decades. Once centered on a relatively small force of nuclear missiles designed primarily for deterrence, which we discussed in the first part of this series, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) now fields the world’s largest — and one of the most diverse — conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic missile forces. Among its increasingly advanced regional ballistic missiles are several types that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, further complicating crisis stability.

Ranging from short-range systems optimized for a Taiwan contingency to intermediate-range weapons capable of striking Guam and threatening U.S. naval forces deep into the Western Pacific, these regional missiles have become the backbone of Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The land-based examples are road-mobile, solid-fueled, and increasingly precise. Some are fitted with hypersonic or maneuvering warheads to further complicate the work of an adversary’s air defenses. As of last year, the Pentagon assessed that China fielded 600 missiles in the ‘boosted hypersonic’ category, which includes systems carrying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) as well as air-launched ballistic missiles, also covered in this article.

This guide examines China’s principal short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, how they evolved, and the roles they are expected to play in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) refers to a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), typically intended for battlefield or nearby regional targets; a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) covers ranges of 1,000-3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles) and is designed to strike targets across a broader region; and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418 miles), enabling it to reach distant regional targets.

This article also discusses multiple missiles that carry either a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). These weapon types can potentially be adapted to hit moving vessels. A MaRV follows a roughly ballistic path to its impact point, maneuvering to improve terminal accuracy and defeat missile defenses. If paired with a seeker, among other alterations, they can potentially be used to strike ships. Meanwhile, unlike a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle, an HGV is designed to be boosted to high speed and released before proceeding along a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path to its target. It remains maneuverable throughout much of its flight, allowing it to change course and vary its altitude. That combination of sustained hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight profile makes it far more difficult to successfully engage, while also reducing the time air defenses have to defend against it — provided they even have weapons that can successfully do so.

Short-range ballistic missiles

The PLARF fields multiple variants of the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 SRBM families. Among their most important roles is to hold Taiwan and the southern reaches of the Japanese archipelago at risk. Ongoing modernization efforts to improve accuracy, survivability, and operational flexibility underscore the continued importance of these systems, particularly for a cross-Strait campaign. Just as significant is their sheer quantity, which would enable sustained strikes against the many military and infrastructure targets that would need to be engaged in a major conflict.

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)

The origins of the DF-11 can be traced back to 1985, and work on a new single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile. The initial requirement called for a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range, matching that of the widely used Soviet Scud-B, using a similar road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, development trailed the DF-15, culminating in a successful flight test in mid-1990.

The DF-11 entered PLARF service in 1992, but work on an improved version reportedly began almost immediately. Development of the DF-11A started as early as 1993 and focused primarily on extending the missile’s reach to approximately 600 kilometers (373 miles), effectively doubling the range of the original design. Following its maiden flight in 1997, the program was publicly acknowledged the following year, and the DF-11A formally entered Chinese service in 1999.

China also developed a specialized bunker-busting variant known as the DF-11AZT, reportedly entering service in 2013. Believed to use the DF-11A airframe, the missile replaces the standard high-explosive payload with a penetrator warhead optimized for attacking hardened and fortified targets. Images of the system surfaced in Chinese media in 2016, followed by the release of footage showing a 2013 test launch the following year.

Although rumors have periodically claimed the DF-11 family can carry a nuclear warhead, the available evidence does not support that assessment. Today, it appears that only one brigade still operates the system.

DF-15 (CSS-6)

China began developing a new generation of conventionally armed, mobile SRBMs during the 1980s, mainly with export customers in mind. The DF-15 has evolved through several iterations, although publicly available information on the missile family remains fragmented and, in some cases, contradictory. The first major upgrade, the DF-15A, reportedly entered service in 1996 and has occasionally been described as being capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, the only PLARF brigade still believed to operate the variant is consistently identified in open-source assessments as a conventional missile unit. Estimates of its maximum range are equally inconsistent, with figures ranging from the original 600 kilometers (373 miles) to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles).

A more substantial redesign followed with the DF-15B (CSS-6 Mod 3), which reportedly entered operational service around 2006 before making its public debut during China’s military parade in 2009. The most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a MaRV warhead.

Around 2013, another variant, the DF-15C (CSS-6 Mod 2), reportedly entered service. Based on the shape of its warhead, the missile is widely believed to be optimized for attacks against hardened and deeply buried targets, much like the previous DF-11AZT.

The DF-15 remains in service with only a small number of PLARF brigades and appears to be steadily giving way to the newer, longer-ranged, and more capable DF-16.

In 2022, the PLARF fired multiple DF-15s into the waters around Taiwan during live-fire drills following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This reflects the fact that missiles in this category remain central to any contingency involving the island.

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Another conventionally armed mobile SRBM, the DF-16 has steadily replaced the DF-15. Although it made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade, the missile is widely believed to have entered PLARF service several years earlier, around 2011 or 2012. Nevertheless, Much about the DF-16 remains unclear.

The DF-16 closely resembles the older DF-15, but lacks the prominent aerodynamic fins found on its predecessor. This suggests the missile relies on a more advanced guidance and flight-control system capable of maintaining stability without the need for large external control surfaces. There is also some uncertainty about its range: this could potentially surpass 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), a threshold that would place it in the MRBM category.

Stills from a video showing a test of a DF-16 with a submunitions warhead:

DF-16 from mid 2010s, with a submunition warhead.

Employment of submunition warheads against land based targets is well established, but for the PLA, their use for large and medium naval targets from AShBMs are more interesting especially from a mission kill pov. pic.twitter.com/m6S4QFAgDS

— Rick Joe (@RickJoe_PLA) March 8, 2026

A version equipped with what appears to be a MaRV, commonly identified as the DF-16A (CSS-11 Mod 2), was spotted in footage of a Chinese military exercise released in early 2017, indicating it was already operational by that point. Chinese state media later revealed another DF-16 warhead configuration in 2018, widely interpreted as evidence of a further variant, the DF-16B (CSS-11 Mod 3?). Despite the emergence of multiple versions, open-source reporting consistently indicates that the DF-16 family is intended exclusively for conventional strike missions.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in modernizing both the quality and quantity of its medium-range ballistic missile forces. Today, it fields a diverse mix of MRBMs, backed up by long-range land-attack cruise missiles, capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions across the Indo-Pacific. All of these MRBMs are road-mobile, carried on wheeled TELs, and powered by solid-fuel rocket motors, allowing them to disperse rapidly, launch with minimal preparation, and complicate efforts to destroy them either before or after firing.

DF-17 (CSS-22)

One of the PLARF’s most significant recent additions is the DF-17, the world’s first operational ballistic missile designed from the outset to deliver an HGV. Publicly unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in 2019, the system is estimated to have entered service shortly beforehand.

With an estimated range of 1,800-2,200 kilometers (1,118-1,367 miles), the DF-17 can reach targets across Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Japan, as well as U.S. military facilities throughout the First Island Chain. Traveling at speeds reportedly approaching Mach 10, the DF-17 could cover its maximum range in roughly a dozen minutes, representing a far more difficult target for existing air and missile defense systems.

The PLARF would likely employ the DF-17 during the opening stages of a conflict to neutralize high-value assets, including integrated air and missile defense sites, long-range radars, command-and-control nodes, and other time-sensitive targets, thereby improving the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by less advanced missile systems.

Although Beijing maintains that the DF-17 is conventionally armed, Chinese media and senior U.S. military officials have suggested the missile may also possess a nuclear capability. If confirmed, it would join several other PLARF missile systems believed to be dual-capable, further complicating an adversary’s ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear strikes during a crisis, and potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Reports have also periodically pointed to the development of an anti-ship variant, which would further expand the DF-17’s role within China’s growing long-range precision strike arsenal.

DF-21

The origins of the DF-21 can be traced back to the late 1970s, when China began working in earnest on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Following successful tests of a large-diameter solid rocket motor in 1978, development of the road-mobile DF-21 accelerated (as did work on a larger solid-fueled missile that would eventually evolve into the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and its submarine-launched counterpart, the JL-2, both described in the first part of this feature).

The DF-21 completed its maiden successful test in 1985 and rapidly entered operational service with the PLA. The original DF-21 carried a single nuclear warhead and formed the backbone of China’s first generation of solid-fuel strategic missile forces. Its range is estimated at more than 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles).

Even before the original DF-21 entered widespread service, work had begun on an improved version. Approved in 1986, the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) focused on reducing structural weight while increasing propellant capacity, extending the missile’s range and improving overall performance. Flight testing began in 1991, and by the mid-1990s the PLA had begun replacing the original DF-21 with the upgraded variant.

The DF-21 subsequently evolved from a purely nuclear deterrent into a remarkably versatile missile family. Around 2004, the PLA fielded the DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4), widely believed to be the first conventionally armed member of the series. Designed for precision land attack, the missile introduced an entirely new mission for the DF-21 but also highlighted a growing escalation risk. The DF-21C appears to have been retired, with surviving units reportedly having transitioned to newer missile systems.

Public information on a supposed DF-21B remains sparse. The designation may have referred to an intermediate development fitted with a MaRV before that technology matured into the much better-known DF-21D.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

It was the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) that really brought the missile family into the spotlight, as one of China’s most closely watched strategic weapons. Public attention surged in 2010 after a senior U.S. Navy officer stated that the missile had reached initial operational capability. Equipped with a MaRV and designed specifically to attack moving warships, the conventionally armed DF-21D became the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and quickly earned the nickname “carrier killer” (since applied to several other weapon systems). Western sources attribute the DF-21D with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).

The concept reflected Beijing’s broader A2/AD strategy, which seeks to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk and complicate U.S. military intervention inside the First Island Chain. U.S. defense reports had been tracking the program since the mid-2000s, and subsequent reports indicate the DF-21D has been tested against both land-based carrier mockups and actual targets at sea, underscoring China’s continued investment in long-range precision strike capabilities.

While both the DF-21C and DF-21D are conventionally armed, there is also a more modern nuclear-armed addition to the family. First reported in 2016, information about this missile is scarce. Some sources refer to this variant as the DF-21E, though this designation has not been seen in an authoritative context in China, and the Western reporting name CSS-5 Mod 6 has meanwhile been applied.

For years, the medium-range DF-21 formed the backbone of China’s regional ballistic missile force, with different variants providing conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear strike capabilities. That role is increasingly being assumed by the longer-ranged DF-26 IRBM, which significantly expands the PLARF’s reach by bringing Guam, and its concentration of critical U.S. military facilities, within range. The in-development DF-27 looks set to push that range even further, blurring the boundary between an IRBM and an ICBM.

DF-26 (CSS-18)

Increasingly the centerpiece of the PLARF’s regional strike force is the DF-26, which appears to be a substantially enlarged and more capable evolution of the DF-21. Development is believed to have begun before 2010, with the first images emerging from Chinese sources around 2012 before U.S. intelligence publicly acknowledged the missile’s existence in 2014. Mounted on a highly mobile six-axle TEL, the two-stage, solid-fueled DF-26 made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade and entered operational service the following year.

The DF-26 combines significantly greater range with exceptional mission flexibility. Unlike many earlier PLARF missiles, it is believed to be genuinely dual-capable, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads that can reportedly be exchanged relatively quickly depending on operational requirements.

In addition to land-attack missions, China has also fielded an anti-ship variant, equipped with a MaRV, and effectively extending the DF-21D’s “carrier killer” concept many hundreds of miles farther out to sea.

The DF-26 is thought to have a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Just as significant as the DF-26’s capabilities is the pace at which it has been fielded. The missile has become one of the fastest-growing elements of the PLARF’s inventory, reflecting Beijing’s increasing emphasis on longer-range conventional strike options. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China possessed more than 200 DF-26 launchers by 2020, a figure that had grown to around 250 just two years later. Combined with its ability to strike targets as far away as Guam while performing both conventional and nuclear missions, the DF-26 is poised to remain one of the PLARF’s most important regional strike weapons for the foreseeable future.

DF-27 (CSS-X-24)

A next-generation system, the DF-27, represents the PLARF’s continued modernization. The Pentagon’s 2023 assessment described the DF-27 as still being under development, but a tranche of leaked U.S. intelligence documents earlier that year suggested at least a limited number had already entered service. If accurate, the DF-27 would represent another significant leap in China’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The Pentagon has stated that the missile could have a range of 5,000-8,000 kilometers (3,107-4,971 miles), pushing into the intercontinental-range category. Even at the lower end of this assessment, it could strike targets far beyond the Second Island Chain, including parts of Alaska and Australia, depending on launch location. At the higher end, it would be sufficient to reach Hawaii and potentially parts of the U.S. West Coast from some launch locations.

One missile I was hoping to see in yesterday’s PLA parade was the DF-27—a new long-range hypersonic missile that’s been discussed in the annual DoD China Military Power Report for the last few years.

However, it was missing from the parade…or was it??? pic.twitter.com/GPIGwkMgUG

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) September 3, 2025

Available reports indicate the missile is designed to carry an HGV and will likely be fielded in both land-attack and anti-ship variants. That combination could substantially expand the PLARF’s ability to threaten high-value targets across the Western Pacific, extending the reach of China’s A2/AD network farther into areas where U.S. carrier strike groups have traditionally operated under reduced threat.

The missile’s payload remains undisclosed, but given the PLARF’s growing inventory of dual-capable ballistic missiles, it would not be surprising if the DF-27 were ultimately able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Air-launched ballistic missiles

Falling into an interesting category is the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). The ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a comeback, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. China is among them, and the best-known of these weapons, the JL-1, is today considered to constitute the airborne arm of the Chinese nuclear triad.

JL-1

The JL-1 ALBM can be launched by the modernized H-6N missile carrier aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These aircraft feature a modified fuselage that allows for the external carriage of these large weapons, as well as an in-flight refueling probe, extending their range.

The JL-1 ALBM is assumed to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. This missile is reported to be an adapted, air-launched version of the DF-21 MRBM and similarly equipped with a MaRV. The possible relationship with the DF-21, and the DF-21D specifically, has prompted previous speculation about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as being able to hit land targets.

China released first in-flight footage of an H-6N bomber carrying the JL-1 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, escorted by two J-20 stealth fighters.

JL-1: Nuclear-capable ALBM, ~8,000 km range, hypersonic reentry, also usable for anti-ship/land-attack. pic.twitter.com/e9uokWFnvz

— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 4, 2026

China has said the JL-1 (presumably coupled with the H-6N) has a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers (4,971 miles), although this is very much unconfirmed.

The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities refers to the H-6N as a “nuclear weapons-capable bomber,” and that its JL-1 ALBM is a “highly precise theater weapon that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” However, it may also have the option of a conventional warhead.

Imagery has also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the Chinese ALBM concept, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered HGV on top. As with the JL-1, this weapon could also be anti-ship capable.

KD-21

Finally, the H-6K variant can carry the smaller KD-21 ALBM on its center-wing pylons. This designation indicates an anti-ship missile, but it may well have the capability to strike ground targets, too.

In terms of its appearance, the weapon is very similar to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy), a missile that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors and which has been employed in the war in Ukraine, apparently with only mixed success. Like the Kinzhal, which is an air-launched development of the Iskander SRBM, the KD-21 may be derived from a land-based weapon. In particular, the Chinese missile bears a close resemblance to the CM-401 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon offered for export. The truck- or ship-launched CM-401 is also capable of hitting static land targets and is said to have a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6 and a range of up to 290 kilometers (180 miles).

Missile numbers

Estimating the size of the PLARF’s missile arsenal remains challenging, and, understandably, publicly available figures differ depending on whether they refer to launchers or missiles.

Recent Pentagon assessments estimate the PLARF operates roughly 200 SRBM launchers backed by around 1,000 missiles, approximately 300 MRBM launchers with some 1,300 missiles, and another 300 IRBM launchers fielding roughly 550 DF-26-class missiles.

While the number of Chinese SRBM launchers used for the DF-15 and DF-16 missiles, both of which are conventionally armed, has remained static in recent years according to Western estimates, Beijing has prioritized the development and deployment of land-based MRBMs and IRBMs, such as the dual-capable DF-21 and DF-26. From 2018 to 2019, for example, the Pentagon noted that the number of Chinese IRBM launchers and missiles had at least roughly tripled from roughly 30 to 80. In its 2020 report, the Pentagon noted that the PLARF had further increased this number to approximately 200 launchers.

These figures are informed estimates, and they vary noticeably across successive Pentagon reports as intelligence assessments evolve. Even so, they underscore the extraordinary scale of China’s regional strike force and, perhaps more importantly, its substantial magazine depth. This would allow the PLARF to conduct repeated waves of missile strikes in a high-intensity campaign. Current conflicts, especially between Iran and the United States/Israel, as well as in Ukraine, have shown just how critical these weapons are, and underscore that they can be a deterrent just by existing in huge numbers. The cost of air defense is also very high for the one being targeted. These lessons learned will likely accelerate China’s acquisition of more missiles and improved designs.

Taken together, the missile families detailed here illustrate how dramatically the PLARF has evolved from a relatively small strategic force into one of the world’s most capable missile services. Older systems such as the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21 continue to provide valuable magazine depth, while newer designs including the DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and emerging DF-27 emphasize greater range, improved accuracy, enhanced survivability, and increased operational flexibility.

Just as importantly, Beijing has increasingly blurred the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence by fielding a growing number of dual-capable missile systems, complicating an adversary’s ability to determine China’s intentions during a crisis.

Coupled with expanding production, continued technological refinement, and the proliferation of hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, the PLARF’s regional missile arsenal has become a central pillar of China’s military modernization and one of the most consequential strike forces in the Indo-Pacific. Any future conflict involving Taiwan, the First Island Chain, or U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is certain to feature these missiles prominently from its opening hours.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Returning from the US, Zelenskyy says Ukrainians’ safety depends on allies’ willingness to provide anti-missile defences.

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko says some non-residential sites in the city caught fire as Russia struck the Ukrainian capital with ballistic missiles.

Multiple explosions were heard in the city at 1:18am on Thursday (22:18 GMT Wednesday), according to Kyiv Independent reporters on the ground. Klitschko instructed people to seek shelter.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had warned on Wednesday that a massive Russian attack on Ukraine was likely and the safety of Ukrainians depended on the willingness of allies to provide anti-missile defences.

He was returning from the United States, where he said President Donald Trump had agreed to give Ukraine licences to make Patriot missiles.

Zelenskyy also repeated his request to Ukraine’s allies to supply Kyiv with the missiles its air defence system lacks in an X post.

In early July, Trump had expressed his intention to allow Ukraine to make the surface-to-air missiles at a time when Russia had stepped up its ballistic missile strikes.

Only US Patriot systems are capable of shooting down Russian missiles, but Ukraine is short of PAC-3 interceptor missiles.

This shortage has worsened since the war on Iran launched by the US and Israel in February.

In Washington, DC, Zelenskyy held what he called a “good meeting” with Trump, as he underscored Russian President Vladimir Putin’s loss of initiative on the war front due to heavy losses.

Zelenskyy spent just over an hour with Trump at the White House, in talks that came as Kyiv and Moscow intensified long-range strikes, as US-led diplomatic efforts to end the war stalled.

After the meeting, Trump posted photos to social media with a note that said: “Many things were discussed. The meeting went very well!”

Relations between Zelenskyy and Trump have warmed since the start of the US president’s second term, with Trump suggesting earlier this month that Ukrainian strikes inside Russia “could help” end the war.

July 8 (UPI) — NATO countries in Europe, plus Canada, agreed Wednesday to jointly spend $50 billion over the coming decade on developing new ground-based “deep precision strike capabilities,” including an advanced missile with a 1,250 mile range to defend the continent and beyond.

Launched by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the project brings together Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Greece, Czechia, Slovakia, Turkey and Canada, Downing Street said in a news release.

The initiative was, Britain said, proof that allies were taking action to strengthen Europe’s ability to defend by “radically boosting NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities” and ensuring a “more European NATO.”

“We must step up to deliver a stronger, more European NATO. The U.K.is already working with partners to develop exquisite capability that will give our Armed Forces the ability to defend and deter thousands of kilometres from the front line, but this U.K.-led initiative will allow us to step up our cooperation, bringing European Allies together to ensure NATO remains safe and secure for years to come,” said Starmer.

NATO said in a statement that the breakthrough came after NATO allies “made progress on providing innovative and cost-effective solutions for munitions and deep strike systems, delivering them faster and at greater scale.”

The costs and complexity involved in developing and making advanced strike capabilities, together with recurring compatibility and interchangeability problems and the rapidly evolving threat of long-range strikes requiring a nimble response, meant it made sense for allies to work together, NATO said.

Leveraging multinational projects and shared defense purchasing would spread the cost, realize economies of scale and deliver field capabilities much faster than working individually, it added.

Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Turkey will work together on developing the proposed long-range missile deterrent and other “novel deep precision strike capabilities,” including new missiles and launchers.

The remainder of the countries — plus Denmark, Norway and Turkey — agreed to work together to address issues created by the array of different weapons systems used by NATO member states by developing a prototype generic NATO artillery round, aimed at establishing standards for a “future fully interchangeable, interoperable NATO 155mm munition.”

Speaking in Ankara, British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said the new deep precision strike capability would deter would-be aggressors by enabling NATO to target high-value military assets and “the logistical engines that drive armies.

“At Ankara we are sending a clear message to President Putin; NATO is stronger, more European and ready to defend our citizens against the long-term threat posed by him and the Russian state,” said Cooper.

Britain is already working on a multi-billion-dollar project to jointly develop long-range stealth and hypersonic missiles with Germany as part of an enhanced defense cooperation pact between the countries signed in summer 2024.

It is also working with France and Italy on Stratus, a new family of long-range cruise and anti-ship weapon, to replace the Storm Shadow cruise missile and Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship weapons used by the militaries of the three countries.

Stratus is being developed by the pan-European defense contractor MBDA Missile Systems.

Wednesday’s developments came amid a summit at which the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has been doubling down on its burden-sharing message that Europe must shoulder more responsibility for its own defense and for member states to meet pledges made in The Hague in 2025 to up core military spending to 3.5% of GDP, or 5% total defense and security-related spending.

President Donald Trump says it’s ‘unfair’ for Iran to lack ballistic missiles if other regional countries have them. Trump is at the G7 in France where the US-Iran deal has taken centre stage.

Iran has launched a new barrage of missiles at Israel, according to the Israeli Defense Forces. Iranian officials say the attack, the first such strike since the April 8 ceasefire, was in response to Israel bombing Beirut a few hours ago. With Israel under direct attack from Iran, how much longer the ceasefire will hold is an open question.

“A short while ago, the IDF identified missiles launched from Iran toward the territory of the State of Israel,” the IDF stated on Telegram.  “Defensive systems are operating to intercept the threat.”

Iran acknowledged launching missiles at Israel.

Videos emerged on social media showing Israeli air defenses working to intercept the missiles.