balance

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is travelling to the United States for talks with President Donald Trump, in what will be his first foreign trip since taking office in May.

During this week’s meetings, al-Zaidi is expected to sign agreements in energy and trade while also boosting investment with US companies.

Iraqi government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi told reporters on Sunday the visit to Washington, DC, will mark a shift in the countries’ relations “from a framework of crisis management to a strategic economic partnership”.

The focus, he said, would not be about striking a “temporary” agreement but about establishing “a durable, long-term partnership that serves the shared interests of both countries”.

Al-Aboudi said oil would be “a top priority” during the visit as the Iraqi government seeks to increase production and find alternative export hubs to lessen the consequences of any future closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iraq was one of the countries badly hit by the shutting down of the critical waterway in recent months due to the US-Israel war on Iran, as about 90 percent of its 3.4 million barrels per day (bpd) of exports passes through it.

Al-Aboudi said Iraq’s proposal to establish an energy and development fund with the US would be on the table to finance any projects that would be agreed upon, especially in the energy sector.

Al-Zaidi had previously said the fund would initially be structured in oil exports of 500,000 bpd with the goal of increasing to as much as two million bpd.

The prime minister has also said Iraq seeks to increase oil production to seven million bpd over the next three years, up from its current output of about 4.5 million bpd.

“Iraq is in need of such kind of cooperation, especially with a partner like the United States to enhance and strengthen its capacity, particularly in the energy, oil, gas, electricity, and petrochemicals sectors,” said Abdulrahman Almashhadani, an Iraqi economic expert and professor.

“However, the critical question remains whether Iraq can provide a safe and stable environment that would encourage US companies to come to Iraq,” he said. “This issue is sensitive and unresolved; it largely depends on the government’s ability to deliver on its commitments to restrict weapons to state control.”

Large delegation

Sources told Al Jazeera the Iraqi delegation to the US comprises more than 70 people, including key ministers, the head of the central bank, the national security adviser, lawmakers and businessmen.

A well-informed source said meetings with US administration officials and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also been planned. According to the source, who asked not to be named, Iraq is seeking to secure an IMF loan of up to $8bn.

A separate well-informed source told Al Jazeera that the disarming of pro-Iran Iraqi armed factions and restricting weapons under state authority, as well as Baghdad’s relationship with Tehran, are expected to be among the issues the US side will raise during the visit.

In his first speech in parliament as prime minister, al-Zaidi had promised that the state would have control over weapons in a country where paramilitary groups, including many supported by Iran, have been powerful since the 2003 US-led war on Iraq.

Some armed factions said they would abide by the prime minister’s declaration, but others – particularly the powerful ones that launched missiles and drones at US facilities during the war on Iran – rejected it.

In a statement released hours before al-Zaidi’s trip to Washington, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed armed groups in the region, including Iraq, rejected the prime minister’s visit and its outcomes.

“We will not give a blank cheque for all government policies. We warn against replacing military occupation with an economic occupation that is even more dangerous,” the statement said.

“The option of defending Iraq and its legitimate interests will remain on the table,” it added.

Al-Zaidi has said his government is eager to implement a 2024 deal made with the US-led coalition’s military mission in Iraq to end its presence as combat forces by the end of September.

Some of the factions that rejected the prime minister’s disarmament statement said they would wait to see what happens on September 30 and then act accordingly.

Ehsan al-Shammary, a professor of international studies at Baghdad University, said the economic initiatives and the backing that al-Zaidi is seeking from Trump during Monday’s talks would inevitably be overshadowed by the issue of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

Ultimately, he added, it is the issue that will determine the success or failure of a “very important” visit that could “redefine” bilateral relations and “give it a push”.

“Al-Zaidi has little room for manoeuvre. He should choose either to align with the United States or move closer to Iran,” said al-Shammary. “I do not believe Washington is willing to accept a divided sphere of influence in Iraq alongside Tehran. That is why the prime minister’s task appears to be almost impossible.”

Those close to the Dutch national team speak of a unified squad and, after a difficult domestic season, Gakpo has started the tournament impressively.

His World Cup record – including the 2022 tournament – is impressive, with five goals in seven games. Twenty-three goals across 52 international caps in total since his debut five years ago bears further testimony to his quality.

For now, his focus is entirely on the national team, where he also plays an important role off the pitch too in helping fellow Christians within the squad.

“Cody is our pastor – he leads the prayers,” said Crysencio Summerville.

Netherlands and Liverpool captain Virgil van Dijk needs no convincing of Gakpo’s qualities on the pitch.

“He is an outstanding footballer,” he said after the 5-1 win over Sweden. “He works so hard for the team, he’s disciplined and his quality stands out – his crosses, his assists, his goals.”

Continuing to impress at the World Cup may well enhance Liverpool‘s desire to retain Gakpo for at least another season.

One need only consider the relative struggles of Isak and Wirtz in their debut campaigns at Anfield to be reminded of just how challenging it can be for new signings.

But as Iraola and Liverpool‘s recruitment team reshapes an attack that laboured last season, the Gakpo conundrum is one to keep an eye on this summer.

May 7 (UPI) — As Washington and Hanoi enter a dense stretch of trade diplomacy, the coming weeks will test whether one of the Indo-Pacific’s most pragmatic economic partnerships can sustain its momentum or become entangled in the very frictions it has worked to avoid.

A series of meetings — including Section 301 hearings on industrial capacity from Tuesday to Friday this week, forced labor discussions April 28 to May 1 and bilateral consultations next Monday and Tuesday, arrives at a pivotal juncture.

They will help determine whether the United States and Vietnam can preserve a trade relationship that has become central to supply chain resilience, U.S. business interests and Vietnam’s continued economic ascent.

At its core, the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is grounded not in diplomacy alone, but also in economic logic.

Partnership built on complementarity

Over the past decade, Vietnam has emerged as one of the fastest-growing U.S. trading partners, driven by a convergence of structural interests. As American firms diversify production beyond China, Vietnam has become a preferred destination, offering cost competitiveness, political stability and deepening integration into global value chains.

U.S. data show Vietnam ran a $123.5 billion trade surplus with the United States last year — the fourth-largest imbalance after China, the European Union and Mexico. It is a figure that has drawn increasing scrutiny in Washington even as it reflects the depth of bilateral trade integration.

From electronics to apparel and consumer goods, Vietnam-based production is often embedded within supply chains designed and financed by U.S. and allied firms. American companies benefit from lower production costs and diversified risk, while Vietnamese exports sustain growth and employment at home.

Disrupting this ecosystem through blunt trade measures risks undermining the very businesses Washington seeks to protect.

Hanoi has consistently signaled a willingness to engage. It has approached trade tensions not with confrontation, but with negotiation — a posture that stands in contrast to more adversarial economic relationships. The upcoming consultations should reinforce that cooperative trajectory, not derail it.

Rethinking “overcapacity”

The debate over “overcapacity” has become a central issue in U.S. trade discussions, with concerns that the term is being applied broadly across different economic models.

In Vietnam’s case, officials and industry observers note that production growth is largely driven by market-based investment and global supply chain shifts rather than state-directed industrial surpluses.

“Vietnam’s overcapacity is much different from China’s,” said Murray Hiebert, head of research for Bower Group Asia. “China’s factories are producing huge surpluses that it dumps onto the world’s markets below market prices. Instead, Vietnam relies on foreign investment companies to produce for export.”

He noted that Vietnam’s export engine is overwhelmingly foreign-driven, with multinational firms, particularly from the United States and South Korea, accounting for roughly 80% of outbound shipments, while domestic producers contribute only about one-fifth.

“Vietnam’s economy is largely a manufacturing platform for foreign companies,” Hiebert said. “U.S. policymakers need to understand Vietnam did not create overcapacity by subsidizing manufacturing, but by courting foreign investors who used Vietnam as a low-cost base to serve global markets.”

Vietnam’s manufacturing expansion has been shaped by global supply chain realignment, accelerated by U.S.-China trade tensions and pandemic-era disruptions, rather than by state-led efforts to flood international markets. Many of the factories operating in Vietnam were relocated or expanded by multinational firms seeking to maintain access to U.S. consumers.

To conflate this model with subsidy-driven overproduction risks misdiagnosing the issue and penalizing a partner that has facilitated, rather than distorted, market outcomes.

Labor reforms and supply chain progress

Concerns over labor practices and supply chain integrity remain part of the policy conversation, particularly in the context of ongoing forced labor discussions. But these concerns should be weighed against Vietnam’s steady, if incremental, progress.

In recent years, Hanoi has undertaken significant labor reforms aligned with the International Labor Organization, including updates to its labor code, expanded worker representation rights and enhanced compliance mechanisms.

Vietnam has also prioritized traceability and transparency across key export sectors. From fisheries to manufacturing, authorities have invested in monitoring systems, strengthened inspections and improved regulatory oversight — steps aimed at meeting the expectations of international partners and markets.

This is an evolving process, not a completed one. But the trajectory is clear: Vietnam is moving toward higher standards, not retreating from them.

The case for market economy recognition

Another unresolved issue, Vietnam’s designation as a non-market economy under U.S. trade law, has become increasingly difficult to justify.

Vietnam operates within the framework of the World Trade Organization and has been recognized as a market economy by more than 70 countries. Its private sector has expanded rapidly, its regulatory environment continues to evolve and its integration into global markets is deepening.

Maintaining Vietnam’s current non-market economy designation under U.S. trade law has raised concerns among policymakers and business groups, who say it could affect the application of trade remedies and investor confidence. The issue comes as Washington seeks to expand economic partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

Avoiding unintended consequences

Intellectual property has emerged as a new point of tension in U.S.-Vietnam trade relations. Ambassador Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative, has designated Vietnam as a “Priority Foreign Country” — its most serious classification — in its latest intellectual property rights report, opening the door to a potential Section 301 investigation within 30 days.

The designation, the first of its kind in more than a decade, reflects ongoing U.S. concerns over Vietnam’s intellectual property protections and could affect the trajectory of current trade negotiations.

Sweeping trade measures designed to address structural concerns could disrupt supply chains, raise costs for American businesses and consumers, and weaken a partnership that has delivered measurable benefits. In an already fragile global economy, such outcomes would be counterproductive.

Vietnam’s own incentives align with stability. Its growth depends on open markets, foreign investment and compliance with international standards. That alignment should be viewed as a strategic asset.

Washington should avoid applying a China-centric lens to Vietnam’s trade profile, said Dan Harris, a partner at the law firm Harris Sliwoski. Treating Vietnam as an “overcapacity” case without clear evidence risks penalizing U.S. firms that relocated production there in line with Washington’s own push to reduce reliance on China and strengthen supply chain resilience.

“We will end up punishing the companies that did what we asked,” Harris warned.

He added that the broader strategic context matters: Vietnam’s long history of conflict and mistrust with China sets it apart from Beijing, even as it emerges as an increasingly important U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific.

But the implications of Washington’s trade posture toward Hanoi extend far beyond economics. Vietnam’s export-driven growth, fueled primarily by multinational investment rather than state subsidies, has quietly elevated the country into a strategic linchpin in the Indo-Pacific.

A stable and prosperous Vietnam not only supports supply chain diversification, but also reinforces the rules-based order in the South China Sea.

Economic resilience in Vietnam is not peripheral to U.S. strategy. It is foundational to maintaining balance in contested Indo-Pacific waters. Trade policy cannot be divorced from strategic reality: A weakened Vietnamese economy would do more than disrupt production flows. It could undercut one of the region’s most important counterweights to China’s expanding maritime presence.

Balancing trade and security alignments

Rising risks of policy missteps could carry strategic costs. Analysts warn that overly punitive U.S. trade measures, particularly those misreading Vietnam’s market-driven model, may push Hanoi toward alternative economic alignments, reshaping regional supply chains and weakening U.S. influence in an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific.

U.S. policymakers are weighing more targeted, cooperative measures in managing trade concerns with Vietnam, including a bilateral supply chain monitoring mechanism, expanded data-sharing on industrial capacity and the potential creation of a standing U.S.-Vietnam trade and standards working group.

The approach aims to address regulatory and transparency issues while maintaining stability in the broader economic partnership.

The challenge for Washington is alignment – translating economic logic into strategic necessity. That means recognizing Vietnam not as a trade problem to be managed, but rather as a partner whose economic trajectory is increasingly central to the region’s stability and security.

Beyond trade flows and investment figures, the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship carries broader strategic significance. It reinforces a rules-based framework in the Indo-Pacific and supports cooperation across sectors ranging from technology to maritime security.

Any escalation in trade tensions between the United States and Vietnam could disrupt commercial ties and place broader strategic cooperation at risk, as both sides seek to sustain recent gains in economic and security engagement.

James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Harvesting the Waves: How Blue Parks Shape Policy, Politics, and Peacebuilding in the South China Sea. Borton is the editor-in-chief of the South China Sea NewsWire. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

Oil markets face renewed instability following the United Arab Emirates’ formal exit from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its wider alliance (OPEC+), announced on Tuesday and taking effect on Friday.

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The move, which ends decades of membership, comes as the global economy continues to reel from the ongoing war with Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remains in place.

Investors are currently weighing the potential for higher future output from the UAE against the immediate and acute risks posed to global supply routes, as well as the increased chances that more countries drop out of OPEC and OPEC+.

Following the announcement, markets reacted swiftly as the potential for oversupply from the UAE was priced in. Oil prices fell by between 2% and 3%, particularly in futures contracts a couple of months ahead.

However, the move was just as quickly offset by the risk premium associated with the Middle East conflict and the current halt to US-Iran negotiations.

At the time of writing, US benchmark crude, WTI, is trading above $105 a barrel, while Brent crude, the international standard, is over $112. Both prices are around 4% higher on Wednesday from the UAE announcement low.

The UAE’s decision follows years of simmering tension between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh over production quotas. The UAE has invested over $150 billion (€128bn) in the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to expand its capacity to five million barrels per day.

However, under OPEC’s restrictive framework, much of this capacity remained underutilised, now prompting the government to prioritise its national interest.

The departure of the group’s third-largest producer is a significant blow to the cohesion of the 60-year-old organisation. Maurizio Carulli, global energy analyst at Quilter Cheviot, noted the limitations this exit places on the remaining members.

“Until tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is safe again, OPEC’s ability to stabilise prices is sharply constrained, while US producers have gained outsized influence,” Carulli explained.

While the UAE has pledged to bring additional production to the market in a “gradual and measured” manner, the sudden lack of coordination within OPEC has introduced a new layer of uncertainty.

For the UAE, the blockade served as a final catalyst for its exit. With its primary export route under threat, Abu Dhabi has sought the diplomatic flexibility to forge independent security and trade partnerships outside the traditional cartel structure.

Despite the geopolitical turmoil, energy equities have remained resilient.

According to Carulli, “integrated majors such as BP, Shell, TotalEnergies, ENI, Chevron and ExxonMobil are benefitting from a price uplift that could add 5-10% to operating cash flow for every $10 increase in oil prices.”

Standoff over the Strait of Hormuz

In a separate but related development, the security situation in the Middle East remains precarious despite a fragile ceasefire. Iran has recently offered a ten-point proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

In exchange for restoring maritime traffic, Tehran is demanding a full withdrawal of the US naval blockade and an end to the current hostilities.

US President Donald Trump, who recently extended the two-week ceasefire mediated by Pakistan, described the latest Iranian offer as “much better” than previous iterations but still did not accept the terms.

Shortly after, Trump posted on social media claiming that Iran is in a dire and desperate condition with no leverage to negotiate.

Washington continues to insist on a permanent settlement regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and an “unconditional” reopening of the waterway before sanctions are lifted.

The impact of this blockade on global energy security cannot be overstated.

“The prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz has removed roughly 12% of global oil supply from the market, according to the IEA, a bigger disruption than the Yom Kippur war, the Iran‑Iraq conflict, the invasion of Kuwait or even the fallout from Ukraine,” Carulli highlighted.