BACN

The Senate Armed Services Committee is “concerned” about the U.S. Air Force’s current plan to retire its E–11A Battlefield Airborne
Communications Node (BACN) aircraft in Fiscal Year 2028. Legislators want more details about how the service expects to plug any capability gaps that might result from axing the highly specialized communications planes. The Air Force abruptly announced plans to retire the E-11A fleet, which has more than doubled in size in recent years, and supplant it with new space-based capabilities back in April.

A formal request for a briefing on the Air Force’s plans surrounding the E-11A fleet is included in a report accompanying a draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year. The Senate Armed Services Committee released a full copy of the proposed legislation and the report yesterday.

The Air Force currently has 7 BACN jets in service, which are based on several different models from the Bombardier Global Express family of business jets. The BACN package has also flown operationally in the past on one of NASA’s high-flying WB-57F research aircraft and a fleet of now-retired EQ-4B Global Hawk drones.

“The committee is aware of the Department of the Air Force’s decision to cancel the E–11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) capability, which has historically provided critical communications relay and data translation functions enabling joint and coalition operations, particularly in contested and communications-degraded environments,” the report says. “The committee is concerned about the operational risk associated with the loss of the E–11 BACN capability and the lack of clarity regarding the Department’s plan to mitigate resulting gaps in airborne communications, data integration, and battle management.”

“Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department’s plan to address capability gaps resulting from the cancellation of the E–11 BACN capability,” it continues.

The briefing needs to at least provide the following:

• “A detailed justification for the decision to cancel the E–11 BACN capability, including cost, survivability, and operational considerations.”
• “An assessment of the operational risks created by the cancellation, including impacts on joint all-domain command and control, communications interoperability, and support to combatant commander requirements.”
• “A description of alternative capabilities, programs, or concepts of operation the Department plans to employ to replicate or replace E–11 BACN functionality, including any space-based, airborne, or ground-based solutions.”
• “Associated timelines, funding requirements, and acquisition strategies for such alternatives.”
• “A description of how the Department will ensure continuity of communications relay and gateway capabilities in contested environments during any transition period.”
• “An assessment of impacts to joint and coalition interoperability, including any risks to ongoing operations or contingency plans.”

Currently, the BACN aircraft provide an extremely valuable airborne communications gateway that can be used to relay data across various waveforms between platforms in the air, at sea, and on land. The planes offer a vital way to ‘translate’ between data-sharing systems that may not otherwise be able to ‘talk’ to each other. E-11As can also provide a vital node between line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight links. During the conflict in Afghanistan, the BACN aircraft became known for providing this service and creating an active data-sharing rebroadcasting network in a country where mountainous terrain could often limit the reach of line-of-sight links.

The Air Force first announced its intention to divest the E-11A fleet earlier this year as part of the rollout of its annual budget request. The service offered few additional details publicly at that time, beyond that the Hybrid Satellite Communications (STACOM) Terminal program would provide a “bridge” capability in the near term.

Hybrid SATCOM is a capability the Air Force is working to field on a variety of aircraft, including aerial refueling tankers and cargo planes, which is intended to give them better access to government-owned and operated and commercial satellite constellations. SpaceX’s Starlink network and its government-focused cousin, Starshield, are already in particular widespread and still-growing use across the U.S. military. Distributed constellations of satellites, like the ones used for Starlink and Starshield, to support various mission requirements are changing warfighting, and the pace of those developments is accelerating.

An annual force structure report that the Pentagon released last month offers some further insights into the Air Force’s argument for retiring the E-11As.

“Predicated on the successful deployment of next-generation orbital systems, the E-11A fleet is scheduled for divestment in FY 2028,” the force structure report says. “These space-based assets will provide equivalent relay and datalink capabilities, superseding current E-11A functions and enabling a modernized transition of the mission set. Consequently, all cost savings will be reinvested into the replacement capabilities.”

“As part of a broader strategy to align resources with the most pressing operational needs, the Department of the Air Force will divest its fleet of seven E-11A aircraft, with the action planned for FY 2028,” the report adds. “This decision allows for the strategic reallocation of fiscal resources to fund more critical, high-priority service requirements and accelerate modernization efforts in other key areas.”

The Air Force’s decision regarding the E-11A came without any real warning, at least publicly. As noted, the service had significantly increased the fleet size in recent years, driven in part by the retirement of the EQ-4Bs. The aircraft had looked set to continue serving for years to come.

Demand for the capabilities BACN offers has gone well beyond Afghanistan. The aircraft continue to be heavily utilized to support active combat operations, including as part of Operation Epic Fury against Iran this year. The platform was also utilized during the mission to capture former Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro in January.

At the same time, there are questions about the survivability of the E-11A going forward as a non-stealthy business jet-based aircraft, especially in the context of a future high-end fight. These concerns are even pronounced for the BACN aircraft given that a key aspect of their mission set to date has involved flying within range of line-of-sight links. A growing threat ecosystem that pushes the planes further and further from the forces they are expected to support would challenge their utility.

China and Russia, in particular, are developing very long-range anti-air missiles, and the Air Force itself has warned that designs with ranges of 1,000 miles could be in service by 2050. Ever-more sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) ‘bubbles’ will be an increasing challenge for traditional non-stealthy combat support aircraft, not just BACN, as time goes on. Even smaller adversaries like Iran and North Korea, and even some non-state actors, are continuing to field more threatening air defense systems, as well.

As an aside, the U.S. Army now views very long-range air-launched drones as a key capability to help ensure the relevance of its new Bombardier Global Express-based ME-11B High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) surveillance and reconnaissance planes in future large-scale conflicts. You can read more about the plans for HADES here.

All this being said, there is also something of an interesting parallel, very broadly speaking, between the Air Force’s current plans for the E-11A fleet and its failed Pentagon-backed attempt to cancel the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft program. The arguments for axing the E-7 were also heavily rooted in plans for new space-based capabilities, concerns about the vulnerability of a non-stealthy aircraft in future high-end conflicts, and a general desire to shift resources to other priorities. Congress ultimately intervened to save the Wedgetail program, and the Air Force and the Pentagon have now completely changed their tone, at least publicly, on the matter.

“I know our department had taken the position that it was … other satellite ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities] that was probably going to be capable of a lot of that in the future,” Secretary Pete Hegseth said in response to a question about the E-7 at a hearing in May. “But I think that mindset was indicative of a mindset that we’ve shed, which is the divest-to-invest mindset, which was an austerity mindset, that we’re going to get continuing resolution after continuing resolution. So, we [sic] got to get rid of these platforms in order to invest in these platforms. And there are gaps that need to still be filled. And there are systems that still need to be funded that are used on the battlefield right now, say, MQ-9s, A-10s, you name it.”

Hegseth’s comments here would seem to reflect a logic that one could also apply to the E-11A fleet, at least based on the arguments the Air Force has put forward for its divestment so far.

Whether Congress intervenes now to save the BACN aircraft remains to be seen. The Air Force is still expecting to continue flying the jets through next year at least.

The Air Force will now have a chance to more formally argue before members of the Senate Armed Services Committee for moving ahead with its plan to axe the E-11As.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The U.S. Air Force plans to fully retire its fleet of E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft in Fiscal Year 2028. The BACN jets provide highly specialized communications capabilities that allow for the rapid transfer of data between various aerial platforms, as well as forces on land and at sea, which you can read more about here. The Air Force more than doubled its fleet size in recent years, but now wants the mission to be taken over by space-based systems.

In their Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, and Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman state that the E-11A “will be fully divested” in FY2028.

In our previous coverage of the E-11A, we described the basic capabilities of the platform as follows:

The BACN payload is an extremely robust communications gateway that can rapidly send and receive data transmitted through various waveforms to and from a wide array of aerial platforms, as well as forces on the ground. In addition to being able to “translate” between various communications and data sharing systems, these aircraft have been vital communications relay nodes in Afghanistan, where the country’s mountainous terrain limits the reach of line-of-sight links.

In the short term, the capabilities provided by BACN will be bridged by the Hybrid SATCOM Terminal program. In a 2024 demonstration by Northrop Grumman, this type of satellite communications solution made use of commercial space Internet providers to establish a resilient multi-orbit, multi-constellation network.

The Posture Statement further adds that the Air Force is “executing a deliberate and balanced strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2), and Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) capabilities to meet the intent of the National Defense Strategy.”

This strategy includes “a generational shift away from legacy systems” like the E-11A and “towards next-generation capabilities in both air and space.” This also calls for continued investment in the DAF Battle Network, which is described as “a key capability to fuse sensor data and remain resilient against all adversaries.”

The Air Force has previously described the DAF Battle Network as an “integrated system-of-systems connecting sensor, effector, and logistics systems enabling better situational awareness, faster operational decisions, and decisive direction to the force.”

Another option could be BACN-like solutions provided in podded form to various aircraft. Examples of these include the Smart Node Pod from Northrop Grumman, which is already in production.

Until recently, the Air Force seemed very much committed to its BACN fleet.

Back in 2021, the service confirmed it planned to acquire six more E-11As over the next five years; this would provide a total of nine BACN jets. This reflected the high demand for the fleet, which meant all of the existing operational examples had historically been forward deployed in Afghanistan, where one of them crashed after suffering an engine failure in 2020.

The BACN fleet has also conducted extensive operations in the Persian Gulf region, Central and South America, and elsewhere.

The E-11A has remained active in combat operations up to this day, including being deployed in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. It was also involved in the operation to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, an effort known as Absolute Resolve.

Another driver behind the force expansion was the Air Force’s retirement of four EQ-4B Global Hawk drones that were also equipped with the BACN communications package. These were later converted into the RangeHawk configuration to support hypersonic testing.

In 2022, the Air Force confirmed that the first of the additional six E-11As was now operating in the Middle East, having formally joined the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

It’s worth noting that the Air Force’s three oldest E-11As are based on older Bombardier BD-700 and Global 6000 business jets, while the newer airframes are based on the Global 6500 bizjet.

The aircraft has also taken on additional functions, such as in 2021, when at least one E-11A was involved in a combined U.S.-UAE exercise focused on employing “multiple platforms… together to execute and refine tactics, techniques and procedures to counter Unmanned Aerial System threats,” according to the Air Force.

In the past, we’ve also noted how the value of the BACN platform extends beyond Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Its capabilities would be equally useful for supporting operations over the vast expanses of the Pacific, where the U.S. military is increasingly focused on preparing for a potential future high-end conflict with China. It would also be suited to working on NATO’s eastern flank, where U.S. allies have been expanding their force posture in recent years to help deter Russian aggression.

More generally, as a fixed-wing bizjet platform, the E-11A lacks the low-observability characteristics to survive in highly contested airspace, so it would need to operate from considerable standoff distances when confronted by the kinds of peer- and near-peer adversaries that they are intended to help defeat. This is undoubtedly part of the reason for the Air Force deciding to discard the BACN fleet. In the same way, it also gave up its E-8C Joint STARS without any direct replacement, driven by the concern that platforms of this kind will simply be too vulnerable in the future.

After all, both China and Russia are developing very long-range anti-air missiles expected to be optimized for high-value targets such as BACN. In addition, airborne ISR platforms will increasingly face sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks before they even get to their operating areas. 

Furthermore, pushing the E-11A further away from the warfighter is a fundamental problem for its mission, especially when it comes to connecting to forces on the ground. BACN works as a bridge between forces using disparate radios and even the same radios, and is particularly valuable since units on the ground that are trying to communicate with other units or aircraft can be blocked by line of sight, especially in terrain. Regardless, the farther the E-11A flies away from its target area, the less it is capable of providing meaningful connectivity to the forces operating there, just due to the horizon.

Ultimately, the E-11A’s high-demand, low-density status may also have counted against it. Even after the Air Force decided to increase the fleet numbers, it remains a highly niche capability and one that comes at a lot of cost, with an extensive training, maintenance, and logistics burden needed to support it.

The Air Force’s ambition to migrate the BACN’s capabilities to space-based assets parallels, to some degree, its aim for its future airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) architecture. However, the service does at least still see a need for traditional crewed AEW&C aircraft, too. Partly this is due to the fact that the Air Force does not expect new space-based capabilities to be operational before, at best, the early 2030s. The service is seeing a similar shift with its ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) capabilities, which are being transferred from the now-retired E-8C JSTARS to a distributed network of space-based sensors to keep tabs on targets on land and at sea.

At this stage, it’s far from clear whether the terminals required for BACN’s successor have already been installed on aircraft, ships, and issued to ground units, and whether the system will be able to translate Link 16 and other waveforms.

Time will tell if space-based assets can take over the BACN’s role in what is a notably abbreviated timeframe.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com