Armed

New imagery provides what appears to be the first visual confirmation that Singapore has begun installing the Blue Spear surface-to-surface missile, also known as the 5G SSM, on its Formidable class frigates. The appearance of Blue Spear aboard RSS Steadfast offers a first glimpse of a key element of Singapore’s broader naval modernization effort. The installation also gives the Israel-Singapore missile joint venture a high-profile reference point as it seeks to market Blue Spear to other operators looking to replace their aging Harpoon fleets.

In photos shared with TWZ by Koji Inoue (@kojiinet on X), a container for the missile is clearly visible aboard Steadfast, the third ship of Singapore’s six Formidable class frigates, offering what is believed to be the first publicly available photographic evidence of the weapon actually fitted to one of the ships.

The appearance of Blue Spear on Steadfast comes as the frigate prepares to open its doors to the public during guided tours at the Tokyo International Cruise Terminal on August 21-22.

Singapore had previously disclosed that Blue Spear would replace the class’s legacy Harpoon anti-ship missile as part of a mid-life upgrade (MLU). However, until now, confirmation of the weapon’s installation has largely come through official statements and industry reporting.

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) first introduced the RGM-84 Harpoon for its Sea Wolf class missile gun boats (MGB), when they were upgraded in the late 1980s. The Victory class multi-purpose corvettes continued using the Harpoon when they were introduced in the 1990s, and the same missile was then installed on the Formidable class when it came online from 2005 onwards.

Each of the Formidable class could carry as many as 24 Harpoons, if required, with capacity for six quad packs on the missile deck. The likelihood is that the same 24-mille capacity will be retained for Blue Spear, although as configured for its Japan visit, Steadfast has the mimimum fit, with one quad launcher.

Singapore first revealed plans to equip the frigates with Blue Spear in 2023, when a senior Republic of Singapore Navy officer outlined the intended missile upgrade during an interview with Janes ahead of the IMDEX exhibition. Then-Commander of the RSN’s First Flotilla, Colonel Ng Kok Yeng Daniel, outlined the plans during the exhibition preview.

The MLU is considerably broader than the missile replacement. Singapore’s Ministry of Defense has said the programme will also introduce upgrades to the frigates’ combat management, communications, and engineering systems.

Blue Spear is produced by Proteus Advanced Systems, a joint venture between Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Singapore’s ST Engineering. The weapon traces its development lineage to the Israeli Gabriel family of anti-ship missiles, but is intended to provide a modern, multi-role precision-strike capability.

The missile was publicly displayed for the first time at the Singapore Airshow 2022, soon after a contract had been signed with the Estonian Defense Forces to meet its coastal anti-ship missile requirement. In this form, the missile is fired from a truck-based launcher.

Blue Spear was also proposed to the U.K. Royal Navy as a Harpoon successor, under the name Sea Serpent. However, the Interim Surface-to-Surface Guided Weapon (I-SSGW) requirement was ultimately won by the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM), a weapon also used by the U.S. Navy, among others.

According to specifications released by Proteus, Blue Spear is a subsonic missile with a range of around 180 miles. It is designed for beyond-line-of-sight engagements and can be employed against both maritime and land targets.

The turbojet-powered weapon incorporates a radio-frequency seeker and guidance system designed to operate in complex electromagnetic environments, including scenarios in which an adversary is employing electronic countermeasures. The missile uses ‘advanced algorithms’ for target discrimination and can be launched in fire-and-forget or fire-and-update modes. Proteus has said in the past that is has considered installing an imaging infrared seeker, if required.

Blue Spear is designed to engage moving targets and can dynamically modify its flight path during an engagement. Its low-level, sea-skimming approach is intended to make detection and interception more difficult for defending forces.

For the Republic of Singapore Navy, the transition from Harpoon to Blue Spear brings a substantially longer-range strike capability to a class of ships that remains a central component of the country’s surface fleet. The Harpoon has a range of around 130 miles and, in the RGM-84C form used by the RSN, lacked a land-attack capability. In the anti-ship role, the missile provides a critical capability for Singapore, considering the dense littoral region and the strategic strait that it sits on.

As well as the pacing maritime threat posed by China, there other potential adversaries in the region are also investing in new ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, as Roy Choo, a defense journalist and TWZ contributor explained:

“The introduction of the Blue Spear will help the Singapore Navy keep pace with the growing lethality and range of new and upgraded anti-ship missiles being introduced across the region. Indonesia has the Russian-made Yakhont on the Ahmad Yani class frigates and will get the Turkish-made ATMACA missile soon, among the many types it operates. Malaysia was supposed to introduce the Naval Strike Missile on its littoral combat vessels but is now searching for a replacement.”

Meanwhile, Singapore is building a new class of drone motherships, or Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCV), the largest and most complex ships the RSN has ever operated. Blue Spear is provided an an option for these hulls, with at least four mounting points, exploiting their modular design.

The MRCVs will form the cornerstone of the navy’s fleet modernization effort, alongside two additional Type 218SG submarines in addition to the previous four, and the Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which will also provide a significant capability boost.

The Blue Spear program also underscores a decades-old, largely low-profile defense-industrial relationship between Israel and Singapore, one that has produced cooperation across some of the city-state’s most sensitive and advanced military capabilities.

Among the very advanced arms acquired by Singapore from Israel is the Gulfstream G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) aircraft, four of which were bought from IAI. Singapore’s Block 52 F-16s are equipped with Israeli-supplied equipment, including avionics, electronic warfare kit, and air-to-air missiles. There have long been rumors that Singapore acquired Merkava main battle tanks from Israel, but these vehicles have never been publicly seen.

Now, after sales to Estonia and Singapore, Proteus is pitching Blue Spear as a Harpoon replacement for other nations, with the company eyeing potential customers across Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Estimates for the number of Harpoon missiles built range from 6,400 to around 8,000, depending on source. The missile has been ordered by 30 countries, so there is potentially a very significant market for a new weapon in this class.

For the time being, the arrival of Blue Spear aboard Steadfast underscores the scale of Singapore’s ongoing naval modernization, extending the reach and flexibility of one of the RSN’s core surface combatants. As the service introduces new frigate weapons alongside MRCVs, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft, the missile also offers a glimpse of the increasingly long-range and networked force Singapore is building.

With thanks to Roy Choo.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

New president, who replaces leftist Gustavo Petro, continues rightward political shift in Latin America.

Right-wing lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella has been sworn in as Colombia‘s president after winning a run-off election on promises to crack down on the armed groups, cut government spending by as much as 40 percent, and revive the South American country’s oil and gas industry.

De la Espriella, 48, took the oath of office on Friday, breaking with tradition by holding the ceremony not in the capital, Bogota, but in Cali, a city in Colombia’s volatile southwest that has long borne the brunt of the government’s conflict with armed groups.

The choice signaled a decisive break from the strategy of negotiated peace with those groups pursued by outgoing leftist leader Gustavo Petro, whom de la Espriella defeated in June’s runoff. De La Espriella has dismissed Petro’s policy as a failure.

“There will be no room for maneuvers that undermine the stability of the nation,” de la Espriella said on Friday, as he pledged to “relentlessly defeat narco-terrorism”.

He added that “the option of dialogue is completely exhausted”.

A political newcomer known to supporters as “El Tigre”, The Tiger, de la Espriella built his fortune and public profile as a lawyer and businessman rather than through elected office, largely self-financing his campaign as an outsider candidate.

His arrival in power marks a sharp ideological reversal for a country that, for the past four years, was led by a former rebel fighter who was frequently critical of the drug and immigration policies of United States President Donald Trump.

De la Espriella has, in contrast, hewed closed to Trump and his militaristic approach to drug crime in Latin America.

Security dominated Friday’s ceremony, which was held at a university auditorium before Congress. Soldiers and armoured vehicles lined roads near the venue, and police manned checkpoints screening vehicles for explosives in the preceding days.

After the ceremony, de la Espriella travelled to a nearby military battalion to address troops directly, framing the visit as both a morale boost for the armed forces and a signal to the country’s armed groups of the approach he plans to take.

Colombia’s southwest remains contested territory for dissident factions of the demobilised FARC rebel movement who rejected the peace deal signed a decade ago. The Clan del Golfo drug cartel, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN guerrilla group are also active in the area.

The new president has also pledged to join the so-called “Shield of the Americas”, a US-backed regional coalition against drug trafficking that grew out of a summit hosted by the Trump administration in March. He has vowed to restored diplomatic relations with Israel and sever ties with Cuba and Nicaragua, branding them “tyrannies”.

Petro had initially refused to accept the election result, alleging that vote tallies had been manipulated. The claim was dismissed by international observers and Colombia’s own electoral authorities. Petro ultimately conceded he would respect the outcome.

Still protests broke out in Cali, Bogota and Barranquilla on inauguration day.

In Cali’s Puerto Resistencia neighbourhood, once the epicentre of mass anti-government demonstrations in 2021, 25-year-old protester Sebastian Ocampo said residents were “defending dignity” against a president he said had not won their support.

De la Espriella’s win extends a run of electoral victories by conservatives across Latin America, with seven elected since Trump returned to the White House in January 2025. That includes Peru’s Keiko Fujimori, Jose Antonio Kast in Chile, and Argentina’s Javier Milei.

Trump personally endorsed de la Espriella’s campaign.

Leaders in attendance at Friday’s event included Spain’s King Felipe VI, acting US Attorney General Todd Blanche, FIFA president Gianni Infantino, and several of Latin America’s other conservative leaders, including Milei and Kast.

Photos of the United Arab Emirates’ Falaj 3 class patrol boat are a reminder that a vessel doesn’t need to be a corvette or even a frigate to be armed like one. At a little over 200 feet long, the Falaj 3 is officially designated an offshore patrol vessel (OPV), but it boasts a weapons suite that would be impressive on a missile corvette and, in some respects, even a light frigate. In fact, at around 670 tons full load displacement, and a crew of just 39, it may be one of the most heavily armed warships anywhere in the world for its size.

OPVs are generally built for constabulary duties rather than high-end naval combat. Their primary missions include enforcing exclusive economic zones, countering piracy and smuggling, fisheries protection, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. As a result, they typically prioritize endurance, seakeeping, and low operating costs over heavy armament. Many Western designs in this category carry little more than a medium-caliber gun and a handful of remotely operated weapon systems, with no dedicated anti-ship missiles or significant air-defense systems.

The Falaj 3 takes a very different approach, as is immediately apparent from these photos.

Forward sits a Leonardo 76mm OTO Super Rapid gun equipped with the STRALES guided ammunition system, giving the ship a weapon capable of engaging everything from surface targets to fast-moving aerial threats. The STRALES system combines the 76mm gun with DART projectiles, which are guided to the target by a radio beam. The projectile is fitted with a proximity fuze, and the result is claimed to be especially effective against manoeuvring supersonic missiles, as well as fast-manoeuvring small boats. The DART ammunition also comes at lower cost than dedicated anti-air missiles, an increasingly important consideration, especially in the Middle East, where costly surface-to-air missile effectors are routinely expended, in significant quantities, against far cheaper incoming threats.

Strales system with DART ammunition

Directly behind the gun is an eight-cell vertical launch system loaded with MBDA VL MICA surface-to-air missiles. This ‘fire and forget’ missile can intercept targets at a range of up to around 12 miles and at altitudes of up to 30,000 feet.

VL MICA (Sea)

Further aft is a 21-cell Raytheon Mk 49 launcher for the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), giving the vessel a second, independent layer of point air defense. Most OPVs are fortunate to carry an adapted man-portable air defense system, if they have any dedicated air-defense system at all.

The offensive fit is equally notable. Four MM40 Exocet Block 3C anti-ship missiles provide over-the-horizon strike capability, while two 12-cell Low-cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) guided rocket launchers offer an inexpensive way to engage drones, uncrewed surface vessels, and fast attack craft without expending much more costly missiles.

The MM40 Block 3C is the latest iteration of the well-known Exocet sea-skimming missile and has a range of around 150 miles.

The LOGIR, a weapon we have discussed in the past, is part of a growing number of 70mm rockets with an infrared seeker on the market now. A U.S.-South Korean co-production, the LOGIR was developed primarily for coastal defense and other maritime applications. It has a maximum range of around a few miles.

[밀당] 해상침투 방어 최강자 ··· 대한민국 첨단기술의 정밀유도무기 ‘비궁’

Completing the package are two Electro Optic Systems (EOS) R400-M 30mm remote weapon stations and two 32-barrel Rheinmetall Multi Ammunition Soft-kill System (MASS) decoy launchers, providing close-range firepower and survivability against incoming guided weapons, respectively.

The Falaj 3 class is also well equipped with sensors, including a Leonardo Kronos 3D G-band multifunction radar for air and surface search in the conical radome of the integrated mast. The mast also features the SPYNEL infrared search and track suite.

Combining all of these systems results in a ship with genuine layered air defense, anti-ship strike capability, counter-swarm weapons, modern electronic self-protection, and a sophisticated medium-caliber gun, all crammed into a hull roughly one-third the displacement of many contemporary corvettes.

Instead of sacrificing armament for patrol endurance, the Falaj 3 concentrates an extraordinary amount of firepower into a compact hull. The design is closer to a ‘pocket’ missile corvette optimized for Gulf operations than a conventional OPV.

The Persian Gulf is a relatively confined operating environment where naval combat is more likely to occur at short ranges, with vessels operating under constant threat from anti-ship missiles, drones, helicopters, and swarms of fast attack craft. In that environment, packing as many defensive and offensive systems as possible into a relatively inexpensive platform makes considerable operational sense.

For more demanding missions, including in true blue-water environments, the United Arab Emirates Navy can call upon close to a dozen true missile corvettes, with four different active classes constructed in France, Germany, and Italy. These carry many of the same weapons as found on the Falaj 3, but the largest examples displace close to 3,000 tons, and all can also embark a helicopter.

Based on the Fearless class patrol vessel operated by the Republic of Singapore Navy, the Falaj 3 class is built by the Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), a subsidiary of the UAE’s Edge Group. The first ship of the class, Altaf, was commissioned in February 2025.

ADSB Launches First Vessel in the FALAJ 3 Programme

The Edge Group is also building eight vessels of the same design for Kuwait, these being known as the Al Dorra class.

The design of the Falaj 3 reflects a broader trend in naval warfare. Advances in radar, combat management systems, vertical launch technology, and compact missile designs increasingly allow capabilities once reserved for frigates or larger vessels to be integrated successfully in much smaller vessels. Rather than relying exclusively on a handful of expensive large combatants, navies that operate heavily in littoral geography have the opportunity to field larger numbers of smaller ships that still possess credible offensive and defensive capabilities.

The Falaj 3 represents perhaps one of the most extreme examples of that philosophy.

Special thanks to X user @D__Mitch for alerting us to this story.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Loaded pistol and rifle among items found in suspect’s pocket, car and home following arrest, police say.

A man carrying a loaded handgun and hollow-point ammunition has been arrested at Donald Trump’s Los Angeles-area golf club, days before a scheduled visit by the US president, local authorities said.

The man, arrested on Sunday at the Trump National Golf Club in Rancho Palos Verdes, was identified by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department as 38-year-old Jeanine John Taele. The department said he had been seen photographing and filming the grounds while appearing to monitor security preparations ahead of Trump’s scheduled appearance at a Republican Party fundraising dinner on Tuesday.

Deputies said they found a 16-round magazine loaded with ammunition in his pocket, and later recovered a loaded pistol with a round chambered, along with a second loaded magazine, from his vehicle in the golf course car park.

Officials said Taele had already been under investigation by the El Segundo Police Department over a separate robbery case.

On Monday, detectives working with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force searched Taele’s Downey home, where they said they recovered an illegally modified rifle, a second pistol, body armour, high-capacity magazines, bulk ammunition and other radio signal devices and notebooks containing what officials described only as “concerning statements”.

The sheriff’s department said it had not identified any credible threat to the public and that Taele is being held without bail while prosecutors weigh charges.

Trump’s visit is part of a broader campaign swing through California and Nevada ahead of the November midterm elections.

The attacks reflect a surge in violence as armed gangs continue raiding villages in northwest and central Nigeria.

At least 20 people have been killed in northwest Nigeria after armed gang members attacked villages in Zamfara State, according to the AFP news agency.

“Today, between 3pm [14:00 GMT] and 4pm [15:00 GMT], a large number of bandits have invaded our communities, targeting all the people they meet,” Nasiru Lauwali, the representative of the Sauna district in the local government zone of Talata Mafara, told AFP on Wednesday.

The attacks come amid increasing violence in northwest and central Nigeria, where armed gangs or bandits have raided villages in recent weeks. They are accused of stealing livestock and kidnapping residents for ransom.

Late on Tuesday, at least three suspected bandits were killed by security forces in the country’s Kwara State, according to Nigeria’s The Punch news website. The news service said that security forces managed to rescue a businessman, Tuhkur Sanni.

Kidnappings have become common in Nigeria, as armed groups seek large ransoms from the government and citizens.

The situation has been worsened by a security crisis, partly fuelled by the Boko Haram rebellion in the country’s northeast. In 2024, attackers earned more than $1.6m in ransom payments, according to SBM Intelligence.

Dozens of students and teachers were rescued earlier this month, 56 days after they were kidnapped from three schools in the southwestern state of Oyo.

Eight of the suspected kidnappers were arrested and an unspecified number were killed, according to a statement issued by President Bola Tinubu.

Defence Minister Christopher Musa said the suspects planned to use the hostages as leverage to pressure the government to release some of their commanders from prison.

Bamako, Mali – The ambush that killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps near the northern town of Anefis on July 18 was more than another battlefield setback.

It underscored how Mali’s armed groups are becoming increasingly coordinated, exposing the limits of the military government’s security strategy, despite growing Russian military support.

The Malian military confirmed the assault and said it had launched counter-operations, while Africa Corps later released footage it said showed drone strikes targeting fighters involved in the ambush.

The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated operations across northern Mali since April, raising questions about why armed groups are increasingly cooperating, whether Bamako’s security strategy is working, whether Russia’s military role has – and has not – changed, and what the conflict could mean for the wider Sahel.

Why are separatist and Islamic armed groups fighting together?

The July 18 ambush was jointly claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of predominantly Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.

Until recently, such cooperation would have seemed unlikely as they have different longterm political aims. The FLA seeks greater autonomy or independence for northern Mali, while JNIM aims to establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law across the region.

For Héni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) monitor, the answer lies in a shared battlefield enemy rather than a shared ideology.

“The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners from the Africa Corps,” Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.

“In doing so, they act as force multipliers for one another, allowing them to pool resources and mutualise their efforts to confront their adversaries more effectively. These groups also share kinship ties despite their ideological differences and regard one another as sons of the land, defending their ancestral territory against invading forces.”

For Mali’s military, that cooperation makes attacks harder to anticipate and more difficult to repel, allowing armed groups to combine local knowledge, manpower and operational experience while pursuing separate objectives.

The military government’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and deepen military cooperation with Russia reshaped the conflict. The collapse of the peace framework removed one of the few mechanisms managing relations between Bamako and northern armed groups, while the military’s increasingly confrontational approach encouraged former rivals to coordinate against a common adversary.

The shift became increasingly visible during coordinated attacks launched across several parts of the country in April, stretching Malian and Russian forces across multiple fronts. More recently, fighting around Anefis has shown that the alliance is capable not only of launching simultaneous operations but also of sustaining pressure on strategically important military positions.

With negotiations abandoned and military confrontation becoming the dominant strategy, armed groups that once competed with one another have found greater incentives to cooperate on the battlefield.

Has Russia changed the course of Mali’s war?

Since replacing the Wagner Group as Moscow’s principal military presence in Mali, Africa Corps has become an increasingly important partner for the Malian army.

Its personnel have provided combat support alongside Malian forces, while Russian drones and aircraft have expanded the military’s surveillance and strike capabilities. Those capabilities have strengthened the army’s ability to respond to attacks and defend key positions.

“Russia has helped strengthen Mali’s military, which was at risk of being overrun, and has given it more support on the battlefield,” Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst specialising in West Africa and the Sahel, told Al Jazeera.

“But this attack, as well as the earlier seizure of Kidal, suggests the Kremlin’s military support has not changed the overall picture. The conflict remains deeply rooted, with geographical and ideological dimensions that are proving difficult for the junta to tackle.” The army seized Kidal, a key town in the country’s north that the Tuareg rebels held for nearly a decade, in November 2023, but Tuareg and allied fighters retook the town in April this year.

Rather than transforming the conflict, Moscow’s military backing appears to have strengthened the army’s battlefield capabilities without addressing the political, governance and security conditions that continue to fuel the violence.

Recent operations reinforce that assessment. Convoys travelling through northern Mali continue to face frequent ambushes, particularly along routes linking Gao, Anefis and other military positions, exposing the continued vulnerability of military supply lines despite increased Russian support.

The shift away from Western security partners also changed the type of assistance available. While Africa Corps has strengthened Mali’s combat capabilities, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ended an international presence that provided logistics, monitoring and intelligence support across much of northern Mali.

The result is a military that has become more effective in direct combat but continues to struggle to secure vast, remote territory against increasingly adaptable armed groups.

Has Bamako’s strategy paid off?

The limitations of Bamako’s security strategy raise broader questions about whether it is translating battlefield gains into lasting security.

Since seizing power in 2020, Mali’s military government has centred its strategy on military force, ending longstanding cooperation with Western partners while strengthening defence ties with Russia.

But the repeated ambushes around Anefis and along northern supply routes suggest the measurable gains of this approach on the battlefield have yet to translate into lasting strategic control.

More fundamentally, the growing cooperation between armed groups with different objectives suggests that Bamako’s strategy has not prevented them from adapting and reshaping the conflict.

What could this mean for the wider Sahel?

The implications of the Anefis ambush extend well beyond Mali.

JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate, already operates across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while fighting continues to spread across the central Sahel.

The evolving battlefield also presents a challenge for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members all face persistent armed violence despite expanding military cooperation. The alliance was created to strengthen collective security, but increasingly coordinated attacks suggest that cooperation among governments is being matched by equally adaptable cooperation among armed groups.

At the same time, Mali’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reduced opportunities for regional coordination with neighbouring countries confronting many of the same security threats.

If the FLA-JNIM partnership proves durable, it could encourage similar tactical cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, further complicating efforts to contain armed groups whose operations already span national borders.

“The AES was supposed to mean that our security was finally our own business. But when Mali bleeds, Niger bleeds with it, because the armed groups attacking those convoys do not recognise the Alliance of Sahel States any more than they recognised ECOWAS. We traded one set of partners we did not trust for another, and the war is still coming south,” a Niger-based security expert, who requested anonymity because he feared potential repercussions, told Al Jazeera.

Whether the tactical partnership between the FLA and JNIM proves durable remains uncertain. But the Anefis ambush suggests that as Mali’s security strategy shifts, armed groups are adapting in response, with consequences that could extend far beyond Mali’s borders.

BAE Systems is exploring how the Eurofighter Typhoon could control uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) as part of a broader effort to introduce new capabilities for the jet. The company is currently pursuing concepts to integrate CCAs with the Typhoon to expand ‘combat mass’ and better address emerging threat environments. Ultimately, however, the experience gained here will be ported over to the future Tempest combat jet — designed to work closely with drones from the outset.

At this point, BAE Systems is working on concepting how Typhoon/CCA could work and is also investing as a company in CCAs and crewed-uncrewed teaming more generally. The work involving the Typhoon and CCAs has accelerated over the previous 12 months. Officials from BAE Systems outlined the work so far in a briefing at the Farnborough Air Show today, just a week after the U.K. Royal Air Force launched a new CCA program, named Storm Fighter, which you can read more about here. That program should lead to a CCA that can fly into combat with the Typhoon, F-35, and Tempest.

Speaking at Farnborough, Chris Moon, Typhoon Future Capability Director, BAE Systems, explained:

“Unsurprisingly, what we’re finding is that in the enlarged battlespace of the future, we’re able have a Typhoon — some people use the phrase ‘quarterback,’ choose what you will — with its extensive radar capabilities at range, and speed and agility, processing, to be able to work alongside collaborative combat aircraft and increase the combat mass that is needed from our air forces into the future, and the persistence and the range at which they’re able to reach, and bring more missiles into the fight.”

The CCA capabilities are planned to be added to the Typhoon under a much wider effort known as the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) program. This is expected to roll out a number of other features that will ensure that the jet can get the most out of teaming with CCAs. These features include the large-area display (LAD) cockpit, European Common Radar System (ECRS) Mk 2, and the Striker II helmet-mounted display system.

In terms of technology, the ECRS Mk 2 is especially interesting here. As well as the various advantages of an active electronically scanned array (AESA), it has a swashplate repositioner, an articulated mounting that means the antenna can be swung to face at far greater angles off the centerline. This allows a much wider field of regard, with a significant boost in angular (azimuth) coverage. It allows the Typhoon to retain missile guidance even when beaming and hiding in the Doppler notch of the enemy’s radar, which functions much like a blind spot.

In the past, Eurofighter has claimed that the repositionable array provides a field of regard that is “some 50 percent wider than traditional fixed-plate systems.”

All of these components have been tested in a CCA environment in a specially equipped Typhoon simulator.

Moon highlighted one particular scenario, off the east coast of Scotland, in which a pair of Typhoons worked with a four-ship of CCAs to extend the range, coverage, and persistence of the crewed jets. The scenario can be expanded to include the entire east coast of the United Kingdom, adding more Typhoons and CCAs as well as F-35Bs.

More detail was provided by Andrew ‘Blyty’ Mallery-Blythe, Typhoon Operational Requirements Manager at BAE Systems.

A huge advantage here is the new LAD cockpit, replacing the Typhoon’s current three-multifunction display (MFD) configuration with a single unit.

Using the LAD means that “everything is available,” Blyty said. “You can see everything at the top level. You have to do very little manipulation to the display. The LAD provides a literal big picture of the combat scenario, including friendly assets, among them the various CCAs, with their heading, height, speed, and what they’re carrying in terms of sensors or stores.

“What we’re trying to take advantage of is combat mass,” Blyty added. “Obviously, combat mass I don’t really need to explain in any great detail. We’ve got four CCAs and two Typhoons. Clearly there’s an improvement and an increase in combat mass without having to have those additional very expensive, complex aircraft. We can bring more weapons to the fight through the use of the CCAs.”

In terms of attrition, the Typhoon is classed as a strategic asset in these concepts, while a CCA is more of a tactical asset.

“We certainly don’t want to put ourselves in a position where we’re going to lose one of those [CCAs], but it’s a tactical asset,” Blyty continued. “That means that we can position them far closer to the threat, potentially taking a little bit more risk with those assets. They’re also smaller, they have a lower observability, and that is also an advantage that our friendly Typhoons exploit.”

Having a better overview of the battlespace via the LAD cockpit, ECRS Mk 2 radar, Striker II helmet, and the CCAs themselves is only one part of the equation.

BAE Systems is also trying to minimize the workload on the pilots. This is especially important for the U.K. Royal Air Force, which has reduced the number of two-seat Typhoons in its fleet, scrapping all its Tranche 1 ‘T-birds.’ Other nations are meanwhile working on developing CCA concepts by relying heavily on two-seat combat aircraft, with the back-seater a ‘drone controller.’

Blyty: “We don’t want to be in a situation where the pilot is having to close-control each of those assets. There’d be far too much workload. So through our rapid prototyping, and the way that we’ve been doing this, we’ve been looking into how we minimize that workload and how we give simple commands through the extant HOTAS [‘hands on throttle and stick’ controls] to send those CCAs to carry out our task with the minimum workload that we can achieve.” It is meanwhile widely understood that drones require an advanced autonomy package to facilitate this level of ease of use by a single pilot.

Blyty went on to run through an engagement scenario, again aided by the LAD’s ‘god’s eye view’ of the battlespace. A kill box was drawn on the LAD before the hostile aircraft entered that area.

“Once that was activated — we do that through a button on the screen which is just off the top — we effectively give the CCAs the authorization or the command that they can engage anything that enters that kill box.”

With that command, the CCAs start employing weapons, including very long-range Meteor air-to-air missiles, the ramjet-powered weapon that the Typhoon also carries.

The aspiration to have CCAs armed with Meteor is a significant one, due to the very particular set of capabilities that the missile brings. The Meteor is among the longest-ranged of any Western air-to-air missile, generally considered to be able to engage certain types of targets out to around 130 miles. Critically, while CCAs are already a forward extension of the fighter, a missile of this kind would provide a major increase in engagement range when combined with the uncrewed jet, allowing the Typhoon to stay outside the engagement range of the enemy.

The missile also uses a two-way datalink, which feeds it with in-flight updates as it flies out to its target and provides the pilot in the launch aircraft with information on the Meteor’s fuel, energy, and tracking state. Adding CCAs into the mix, provided they have their own sensors, would allow them to pass data to the Typhoon and to the Meteor, regardless of which platform launched the missile.

Meteor

Ultimately, of course, the CCAs might end up with different missiles entirely, including a successor to the Meteor that is now being developed. Regardless, air-to-air combat at extended ranges is very much part of the U.K.’s CCA thinking. Meanwhile, we are already seeing CCA-type aircraft firing beyond-visual-range missiles in tests in the United States and elsewhere.

In this particular scenario, Blyty said the Typhoons were at a distance of roughly 114 miles from the enemy.

“Let’s say that’s outside the range of Meteor,” Blyty continued, downplaying the likely true range of the missile, which is a closely guarded secret. “The CCAs, less than half that. Let’s say that’s within the range of Meteor. So, we’ve got a clear tactical advantage that those CCAs have over the Typhoons. They’re on a little bit more risk out there than the Typhoons are. But that’s entirely appropriate to how we manage those Typhoons with the ECRS Mk 2 as a more strategic asset, and we quarterback the CCAs as a more tactical asset.”

Blyty said that BAE Systems is working on a lot more features to minimize pilot workload, without providing more details.

Meanwhile, BAE Systems has been working alongside QinetiQ on crewed-uncrewed teaming in the air, with a synthetic trial in which a Typhoon, a swarm of QinetiQ Banshee drones, and a Malloy Aeronautics T-150 small heavy-lift uncrewed aerial system (UAS) were flown using current operational military datalinks including Link 16.

Clearly, concept demonstrations of how crewed combat aircraft could operate alongside CCAs, highlighting the role of crewed-uncrewed teaming in future air operations, are a high priority as the Typhoon continues to evolve. The United Kingdom has not exactly been quick to adopt the CAA concept, at least compared to the United States and China, but with uncrewed platforms very much at the forefront of the recent Defense Investment Plan, that looks like it is set to change.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

A robotic boat glides through the darkness, reaches an occupied shoreline, and releases an armed ground robot that rolls inland to fight without a single soldier setting foot on the beach. While this sounds like a scene from a future war, it recently played out in southern Ukraine, reflecting Kyiv’s rapid embrace of uncrewed systems as it seeks to counter Russia’s invasion.

Described as the first of its kind anywhere in the world, the operation took place on the Russian-occupied Kinburn Spit in Ukraine’s southern Mykolaiv region, according to Ukraine’s 123rd Separate Territorial Defense Brigade, which carried it out on an unspecified recent date.

“A new era of war begins with the decisions of courageous commanders,” the brigade stated today on its Telegram page, adding that the operation was led by the 123rd’s commander, Col. Oleg Makukha. The mission involved the brigade’s 1st Unmanned Systems Battalion, under Maj. Denys Gipik.

A video published by the brigade shows parts of the operation from an overhead aerial drone as well as from the uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV), and from the vessel that transported it to the shore. The uncrewed surface vessel (USV), powered by an outboard motor, beaches itself before lowering a bow ramp that allows the wheeled UGV to drive ashore. Armed with a machine gun, the UGV is then seen engaging a target beyond the beach. The USV subsequently departs, although it is unclear whether any attempt was made to recover the UGV.

The UGV appears to be a member of the Rys family, produced by Roboneers and armed with a 7.62mm machine gun. These platforms typically incorporate a ballistic computer for accurate fire and artificial intelligence that assists with autonomous target detection, tracking, and engagement.

The Rys family of vehicles is already widely used for logistics, casualty evacuation, combat engineering, and combat support missions. Variants have also been configured for minelaying and demining operations.

A Ukrainian UGV being used for the evacuation of wounded soldiers:

Ukraine has stepped up its use of similar UGVs, which it claims have been crucial in certain engagements. Earlier this year, a Droid TW-7.62, also fitted with a 7.62mm machine gun, is said to have destroyed two Russian drones before opening fire on Russian infantry, killing one and injuring another. The Droid remained in the fight, despite artillery fire, and pushed back another Russian infantry attack.

You can read our in-depth account from inside Ukraine’s effort to build its UGV arsenal here.

Meanwhile, the Kinburn Spit is among southern Ukraine’s most fiercely contested coastal areas.

Russian forces occupied the roughly six-mile-long, narrow spit in the summer of 2022. Overlooking the mouth of the Dnipro River, it became a base for electronic warfare systems as well as missile and artillery strikes against southern Ukraine. Russia also constructed concrete bunkers and reportedly established a drone control station there.

Ukraine has repeatedly targeted the spit since late 2022 with reconnaissance missions, raids, and precision strikes in an effort to erode Russia’s hold on the area. Although Moscow retained control for much of the war, Ukrainian attacks steadily increased the cost of defending the position.

As of June, the Institute for the Study of War, a U.S. think tank, reported that Russian troops had withdrawn from the spit under sustained Ukrainian pressure, while Ukrainian marines later flew a national flag there using a drone. Russian forces retreated under heavy fire, with the evacuation of surviving personnel continuing, a statement from Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces said on June 25.

Whether Russian forces have since returned in some capacity remains unclear, meaning the latest operation may have been intended as reconnaissance, a technology demonstration, or both.

Regardless of the current disposition of Russian troops, the Kinburn Spit is an ideal proving ground for uncrewed operations. Heavy surveillance, artillery, and drone coverage make conventional amphibious landings exceptionally dangerous, while robotic systems can conduct reconnaissance and combat missions without exposing troops to direct fire.

The operation reflects Ukraine’s growing reliance on uncrewed systems, with ground robots increasingly taking on high-risk tasks such as logistics, engineering, fire support, and battlefield scouting to reduce the exposure of frontline troops. At the same time, Ukraine has become the world’s leading innovator in uncrewed surface vessels, fielding versatile platforms for strike missions, intelligence gathering, logistics, and, increasingly, the deployment of other robotic systems.

While the mission was likely something of a battlefield proof-of-concept, it provides more evidence of Ukraine’s rapid pace of innovation in the field of uncrewed systems. It could also provide a glimpse of a future where amphibious landings are led by uncrewed systems.

Reflecting on the Kinburn Spit operation, the 123rd Brigade offered a simple prediction: “It’s going to get even more interesting.”

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Tuareg-led armed ⁠group says it attacked northern town where Malian troops and Russian fighters are based.

Armed fighters have launched ⁠attacks in five ⁠locations across Mali, more than two months after gunmen attacked the capital and other parts of the country.

The attacks took place on Saturday in areas including ‌a northern town where government forces and Russian fighters are ⁠based, and ⁠a town south of ⁠the capital, ⁠Bamako, Mali’s military and security sources said.

The army said the attacks targeted Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevare and Kenieroba.

The AFP news agency said a prison in Kenieroba was attacked, citing residents and security sources.

It reported that the fighting in different locations started at about 5am local time (05:00 GMT).

A Tuareg-led armed ⁠group confirmed that it had attacked a northern Malian town early on Saturday.

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, a spokesperson for the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), told the Reuters news agency that fighters from the group ⁠attacked the town of Anefis ⁠in the northeastern Kidal region.

Government and Russian troops deployed in Anefis in the wake of attacks on April 25 and 26, in which the FLA and the regional al-Qaeda ⁠affiliate seized control of Kidal town.

Ramadane also told AFP that “several positions have fallen, but fighting is still underway inside the city” of Anefis.

An Anefis resident contacted by AFP said “armed groups are in the town, but the army is still putting up resistance. The camp [there] has not yet fallen”.

Anefis and Aguelhok, both in the north, are the last remaining locations where Mali’s army maintains a presence in the Kidal region, following the April attacks.

Meanwhile, in ⁠the central city of Gao, a local official told Reuters that gunfire and rockets had been launched at a military ‌camp since before dawn. It was not immediately clear which fighters were responsible.

In Sevare, another central town, “explosions rang out … around 5am, though their origin is not yet known. Shortly thereafter, several aircraft were spotted flying over the area”, a security source told AFP.

In Kenieroba, the major prison complex was also under attack, a prisoner in the facility told AFP.

Saturday’s assault was the latest threat to the military-led government in the landlocked Sahel country where rebels staged high-profile attacks in ‌April, hitting the airport in the capital, Bamako, killing the defence minister and seizing a string of army bases in the north.

The attacks targeted a secondary school in the northeastern town of Lassa, in Borno State.

At least 37 students remain missing after gunmen raided their school in northeast Nigeria, according to local officials.

The attack occurred on Monday when assailants from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) group stormed a secondary school in the town of Lassa, in Borno State, which has faced years of violence by armed groups.

The AFP news agency reported on Tuesday that at least 37 students remain missing following the attack, which occurred while they were sitting exams.

At least three people were killed in the attack, including a soldier and a teacher, according to the military, who initially said that authorities had rescued 10 of them and that only one remained missing.

The “list of students in captivity”, showing the students’ genders and their parents’ mobile phone numbers, was shared with journalists by the area’s local government councillor, Ijagla Ijabila.

An intel source also showed AFP the same list.

Borno Commissioner for Education Lawan Abba Wakilbe told reporters in Lassa that 25 female students, 11 male students and one staff member were still being held, reported the Reuters news agency.

Abba Wakilbe added that eight people, including the school’s vice principal, have been freed.

Kidnapping for ransom, especially of students, has become a common tactic for both armed groups and non-ideological “bandit” gangs operating across the country’s conflict-hit north and centre.

While the 2014 kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls from the town of Chibok by members of Boko Haram remains Nigeria’s most infamous, school abductions continue to be prevalent across the country.

In May, gunmen kidnapped more than 40 pupils – who remain in captivity – from Borno State’s Mussa village.

That same month, armed men rounded up dozens of schoolchildren from three schools in Oyo State – a rare attack in southwest Nigeria, considered to be the safest region in the country.

Nigeria has been fighting an armed uprising since 2009, concentrated in the northeast.

While violence has waned since the peak of the conflict a decade ago, analysts have warned of an uptick in attacks since last year.

The ongoing armed violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has stalled national examinations, putting the future of students at risk. Many students in the region have complained about not being able to reach the locations of their examinations due to roadblocks mounted by rebels and local militants.

Michel Buingo, the chief of the provincial sub-division for primary, secondary, and new citizenship education in Walikale 4, North Kivu, said that 540 final-year students were expected to sit two examinations at different centres within the sub-division. However, only 387 students arrived, while 153 were unable to access the examination centres due to security issues.

Local authorities in the education sector attribute the low student participation at examination centres to ongoing insecurity affecting several areas from which the candidates come. Recent armed clashes, population movements, and forced displacements in the DRC’s eastern region have disrupted the educational activities of many students, making it difficult for them to access examination centres.

This situation illustrates the consequences of the security crisis for the education sector in several zones of North Kivu. While authorities said they are doing their best to ensure that students write their national examinations, several students continue to pay the price of security instability, with their educational futures compromised.

Cases of stalled examinations have become a recurring issue in recent years. In 2025, the continuation of national exams in active conflict zones was only made possible in part by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). They facilitated the transport of sealed trunks containing exam papers from Kinshasa to various locations in North Kivu, including areas controlled by rebel groups. In 2024, hundreds of students were also unable to write their examinations due to widespread violence in the city of Bweremana in the North Kivu region.

The ongoing armed violence in the DRC has significantly impacted the quality of education. A 2025 UNICEF report states that more than 1.6 million children are currently out of school due to escalating conflict and mass displacement. In the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, over 2,500 schools and learning centres have been forced to close, leaving approximately 795,000 children without access to education.

“Even before the latest escalation of the conflict, the education system in eastern DRC was under immense strain, due, in part, to the high number of displaced people,” the report partly noted.

Following the US attack on January 3, Venezuela was left in a state of turmoil and uncertainty that does not rule out further military actions. In recent days, there was “a joint operation between Venezuelan and US security agencies in the southeast of Bolívar state, in which organized crime networks were dismantled,” according to a statement from the Venezuelan government. Days earlier, the Coordinadora Simón Bolívar, a historic Chavista organization, had denounced DEA involvement in planning a repressive offensive with the aim of “decapitating” the popular movement in the iconic 23 de Enero neighborhood, which Juan Contreras describes as “the most important in Caracas.”

A community leader, social work graduate, and president of the Coordinadora, Contreras is a longtime Chavista activist and staunch defender of the Bolivarian Revolution. Today he believes there are “shameful situations that must be denounced,” but he holds the US government – ”our enemy” – responsible. Contreras was born and raised in the densely populated and combative 23 de Enero neighborhood, where he still lives and where he welcomed us to analyze the complex situation facing Venezuela, and in particular the social movements.

How are Venezuelan social organizations responding to what has been happening in the country since the US military attack on January 3?

What happened was an act of aggression, an act of war. They [the US] sought and continue to seek to break our people, but we in the social movements have kept up our efforts because we still believe in the revolutionary process. Our enemy is the US government, which must have realized that the problem wasn’t Chávez, because Chávez died and the revolution continued. President Maduro has been kidnapped, and here we are. What we’re experiencing today is unique in history; I don’t think anything like what’s happening in Venezuela has ever happened anywhere else in the world – the closest thing was in 1989 in Panama, when they kidnapped Noriega. But here, their narrative has fallen apart: it has not been proven that Venezuela is a drug trafficking country, that its government is linked to drug trafficking, or that President Nicolás Maduro was one of the biggest drug lords, as they claimed. On the contrary, today all those narratives have been debunked, and what is clear is that they are coming after our energy reserves. The Venezuelan people are well aware of this.

Is identifying a state of war and an enemy the context for the denunciation you issued about the danger of a DEA-orchestrated attack on 23 de Enero?

This is information we’ve received from a reliable source indicating that a large-scale operation is being planned against 23 de Enero, which is not far-fetched. 23 de Enero, as a barrio, has historical significance dating back to the Fourth Republic, between 1958 after the fall of Pérez Jiménez and the advent of democracy. That threat is very real. I believe that at the time, there was an underestimation of the threats posed by the US empire: the fact that our coasts were blockaded, the fact that our airspace was blockaded… Now, what we’re denouncing here has all the hallmarks of becoming a reality. It’s not just me saying this, nor the source that gave us this information, which is a reliable one. It’s that all the propaganda out there points in that direction, starting with the journalists who now live in Miami and are waging a full-scale campaign against the colectivos. “What’s going on with the colectivos? Why aren’t they attacking the colectivos? Why don’t they disarm the colectivos?” Marco Rubio himself has said it, and just recently one of the top military leaders said it: they’re coming for the “armed groups.” The problem is that, in their narrative, they label social movements as armed groups, accusing them of being armed in order to justify their aggression. Well, today our people are armed with consciousness; today, after 27 years, our people are more Bolivarian than ever. These are the people who placed their trust in Comandante Chávez, who committed to refounding the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. That is why we can understand all this cognitive warfare being waged against Venezuela.

There are no guerrillas here; what we have here is a people with a consciousness, a mobilized people, a people who, through culture, through popular education, have managed to advance in building the Bolivarian embryo from the barrio level, with the communal councils and the communes. So, the US seeks to dismantle that organization by employing the tactic of decapitation. They want to destroy the collectives, those who raise their voices against the empire, those who today denounce what is happening in our country, those of us who disagree with what is happening today, and who have maintained a principled and firm stance in the face of that aggression and invasion by the US empire.

Based on the information you have, how would the DEA carry out an attack of that kind on Venezuelan territory?

They have been operating by applying pressure. In all our countries, we have a repressive police force. Perhaps there is a segment of the police ranks – among their core leadership – that understands human rights issues, but there are other segments that are easily co-opted. We have 27 years of experience in which generals, colonels, and captains have turned their backs on us and served the empire’s policies. So, it’s not far-fetched to say that the United States is working with certain police forces, or with specific officials who might be willing to carry out an operation against the most important symbol in Caracas, which is the 23 de Enero parish. From 1958 to 1998, approximately 160 martyrs were killed there by the police. In other words, this is not crazy: it is serious, and as the pressure on our government to move toward an electoral process intensifies, the plan of aggression may also accelerate.

So, of course, it’s entirely possible that they’ll move forward with an action like this to eliminate what they consider “the Bolivarian resistance,” represented by social movements organized into communes, communal councils, and long-standing social organizations such as the Coordinadora Simón Bolívar, which is an expression of the popular power.

Did you receive any show of solidarity from the government?

Someone with influence within the government called us, reached out, we talked, and they agreed to investigate and look into the matter. What they recommended was caution: to steer clear of any provocation. And well, we’re waiting to see if what was discussed will be carried out, that a thorough investigation is conducted into what we’re denouncing. Because up until now, we thought [the US] would never invade, but they did; we underestimated them, and they invaded. And today they have the audacity to sell our oil, manage our finances, provoke us, and say they’re going to turn us into their 51st state. And on top of that, they’ve placed us under tutelage as if they were the owners of our country. This is, of course, shameful, and we must denounce it.

That is why we, as part of the popular movement, remain mobilized and continue to denounce what happened on January 3 and the consequences we are enduring in Bolívar’s homeland.

This situation has not yet had any international repercussions. What message do you have for the social and political forces in Latin America?

It has been 200 years since the Amphictyonic Congress, that call made by the Liberator to build a confederation of nations and defend ourselves against the US empire, which was already showing its claws. What better time to call for a continentalization of the struggle of our social organizations? It is not just Venezuela that is at risk: it is all of Latin America. They are coming for their backyard. Today, brazenly and in an interventionist manner, they are meddling in Colombia’s elections and declaring which candidate they want to win. They did the same in Honduras. 

So, in light of these events, the call to expand the struggle across the continent must be a reality today. Latin America’s only chance to escape the aggression of Donald Trump’s administration is through the coordination of the popular and revolutionary movement across the region. We must unite, we must denounce this situation, and we must move forward, because they’re coming for everything. The only way forward is to make the struggle a continental one. This is something that, at one point, was not only stated by Bolívar but also attempted by Comandante Ernesto Guevara. I believe that is where we should focus our efforts: on uniting the popular and revolutionary forces of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Source: Tiempo Argentino

Caracas, June 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) have launched a large-scale operation on Tuesday in Bolívar state, one of the country’s main mineral-rich regions in the southeast and also one with a heavy presence of criminal organizations.

Local media outlets and non-governmental organizations reported helicopter overflights, explosions, and the displacements of hundreds of people leaving gold extraction zones in Las Claritas and the area known as Kilometer 88, two key locations within the Orinoco Mining Arc.

According to Bloomberg, the military actions targeted illegal mining operations controlled by armed groups. Former opposition lawmaker for Bolívar state Américo De Grazia claimed that military forces attacked several gold-mining enclaves through aerial bombardments and gunfire.

The Venezuelan government, led by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, and the armed forces have offered no official information regarding the operations, as well as casualties, arrests, or official goals. Rodríguez met with military leaders on Wednesday to discuss a “100-Day Plan” to optimize the functioning of the armed forces but did not comment on the reported Bolívar deployment.

The operation took place in a region where the state has struggled to assert authority in the face of a proliferation of armed groups that control and administer mines, run artisanal mining activities, and regulate economic activity linked to gold extraction.

At the same time, local reports indicated that the military operation could be aimed at capturing Yohan José Romero, known as “Yohan Petrica,” a founding member of the Tren de Aragua criminal outfit, who reportedly operates in the area alongside Juan Gabriel Rivas Núñez, alias “El Negro Juancho,” and a third figure known as “Humbertico.”

Some sources have also not ruled out the presence of Héctor Guerrero, alias “Niño Guerrero,” the top leader of the large-scale criminal group that emerged inside Tocorón prison in Aragua state.

In September 2023, the Venezuelan government deployed “Operation Gran Cacique Guaicaipuro,” with more than 11,000 security personnel, to intervene in Tocorón prison. However, multiple reports indicated that “Niño Guerrero” and other senior gang leaders were warned in advance and escaped through a network of secret tunnels.

Guerrero is currently the subject of an Interpol Red Notice on charges related to transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms trafficking. The US State Department is offering a reward of up to US $5 million for information leading to his capture.

For its part, the media platform Miraflores al Momento denied separate reports alleging the presence of US military contingents in El Callao, another major gold-mining area in Bolívar state. Likewise, fact-checking outlets Cazadores de Fake News and CotejoInfo confirmed that images circulating were generated by artificial intelligence.

However, local outlets confirmed that, though without any military presence, US officials and business executives have conducted visits to gold-processing facilities belonging to the state-owned Venezuelan Mining Corporation (Minerven) in El Callao.

Last April, Venezuela approved a new mining law granting expanded incentives for private corporations to exploit gold and other “strategic minerals.” Concessions will last up to 30 years and may be renewed for two additional ten-year periods. The new law 

The legislation additionally introduced provisions for international arbitration in dispute resolution, a safeguard sought by investors, and a reduction of royalties and taxes at the Venezuelan government’s discretion.

Among the companies expressing interest are Canadian firms Gold Reserve and Augusta Capital Corporation, which seek to revive the large-scale gold and strategic minerals project known as “Siembra Minera.” Likewise, Roland Mineral Enterprises Corp. has already begun procedures to explore and develop gold, copper, and silver deposits. Swiss commodities giant Trafigura is also advancing a responsible sourcing program in partnership with state-owned Minerven.

There have additionally been corporate initiatives and feasibility studies by US companies—including mining firms such as Hartree, Peabody Energy, Ivanhoe, and TechMet—to enter the sector, though security concerns reportedly remain an obstacle.

Mining municipalities in southern Venezuela report some of the country’s highest rates of homicide, as well as reports of forced labor and widespread sexual violence. The gold extracting activities are mostly unregulated. According to former opposition lawmaker Américo De Grazia, only the gold processed by Minerven enters official records, while the rest circulates through parallel channels.

Similarly, Transparency Venezuela estimates that just 14 percent of the revenues generated by the gold sector reach the Central Bank and public coffers through royalties and export-related payments.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

For thieves looking to strip Los Angeles for parts, copper has become a fast-moving currency.

The problem has become so persistent that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power is now asking for its own armed police force to protect vulnerable utility equipment, street lighting and critical infrastructure, insisting that the department’s contracted and unarmed security guards aren’t cutting it.

“They lack the authority to detain or arrest suspects, intervene in crimes in progress, conduct searches, or carry firearms for enforcement purposes,” according to a May 21 report from the city agency. “Delays hinder timely intervention, reduce investigative effectiveness, and contribute to repeat victimization of LADWP facilities.”

Under DWP’s current “observe and report” security model, an officer who sees someone cutting a fence or stripping copper from a transformer has little authority apart from yelling a warning or making a 911 call, according to the department report.

The proposal asks for 20 to 50 sworn officers to start, hired over a five-year period, along with support staff. If approved, the force would give the agency’s officers the authority to carry a firearm, make arrests and investigate thefts. The plan was scheduled to be discussed Thursday by the City Council.

The push comes as citywide service requests for streetlight repairs have surged over the last several years.

L.A.’s historic streetlights outside the Bureau of Street Lighting near Virgil Avenue and Santa Monica Boulevard.

(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)

The city logged 14,328 electronic streetlight service requests in 2018, according to data from the Bureau of Street Lighting. Requests have tripled since then, reaching an all-time high of 46,079 in 2024, the last full year of available data.

Mayor Karen Bass’ office said in March that copper thefts are a leading cause of streetlight outages. Repairs have been backlogged for months.

Prices for the metal are at an all-time high, driven by major supply disruptions in Indonesia and Chile, and soaring demand from artificial intelligence data centers and electric grid infrastructure. Thieves typically exchange the metal for cash at recycling centers, where it can fetch up to $5.30 per pound. The City Council last year approved a program offering up to $5,000 for information in metal and wire theft cases.

Theft losses alone exceed $1 million annually, according to DWP.

Establishing a new police force would require changing the city charter, meaning voters will have a say come the November midterm elections. Authorities will also need to obtain state legislative approval for the plan.

Officials said rolling out the police department would cost $9.7 million over three years, plus up to $6 million annually to pay for staffing. They maintain those costs are less than the $46 million combined DWP spends each year on private security contractors and unarmed staff security.

On Hill Street in downtown L.A., streetlights have been targeted by thieves and vandals.

(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)

Any cost overflows would be paid for by DWP customers.

Timothy O’Connor, executive director for the Los Angeles Office of Public Accountability, a spending watchdog, said his office is not convinced that the agency could minimize long-term cost creep, or that the new force would offset enough costs to justify the program. The proposed force of a few dozen officers, he said, would be too small to get the job done.

“Theft losses at DWP are real and are increasing. However, eliminating these losses is not enough to offset the proposed costs,” he said. “Furthermore, DWP will be unable to fully eliminate theft given the diffuse nature of the DWP system.”

But O’Connor also said the department is faced with real security risks like those posed by drone attacks or terrorism threats, which he said “appear to justify the proposal at some level.”

In February, a man shot himself after he drove his car through the perimeter fence of a power substation while carrying explosives and several firearms. Dubbing the incident an attempted terrorist attack, officials said the episode could have caused catastrophic infrastructure damage.

David Levitus, executive director of the advocacy group LA Forward, said he was surprised to learn of the proposal so late in Los Angeles’ ongoing charter reform process, which his organization has monitored closely.

“The fact that this is being dumped in late May — what’s the rush?” Levitus said. “I think we really need to be wary of creating new police departments in general, but especially without a clear case and clear constraints and accountability mechanisms.”

At least 24 people were killed and more than 50 injured when a suicide car bomb detonated on a train carrying soldiers in Quetta, capital of the southwestern Pakistani province of Balochistan, on Sunday.

The attack came amid Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s four-day visit to China, and the day before his meeting in Beijing with China’s President Xi Jinping, marking 75 years of diplomatic ties between the two nations.

Pakistan is among an exclusive group of countries China regards as an “all-weather strategic partner”, with ties featuring close economic, trade and security cooperation.

Responsibility for the train attack was claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an armed Baloch separatist group which, apart from calling for an independent state, also strongly objects to large-scale Chinese investment in the region.

While the BLA has long carried out attacks that have killed civilians and members of the security forces in Balochistan and beyond, there has been a recent uptick in such incidents.

We examine what is behind this increase in attacks:

What happened in Sunday’s attack?

Reporting from the scene, Al Jazeera’s Kamal Hyder said several houses and buildings adjacent to the railway line were severely damaged in the blast, which caused train carriages to overturn and catch fire.

According to local media reports, a state of emergency was declared at public hospitals in Quetta, with doctors and other medical staff ordered to remain on duty.

Footage shared online showed charred vehicles and train carriages lying on their sides, with thick plumes of black smoke rising into the sky.

Pakistan has experienced several attacks by separatist groups in recent months. The attacks have increased in ferocity and have also targeted Chinese workers amid protests over Beijing-backed infrastructural projects in Balochistan.

As part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project – one of the main arms of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” designed to improve trading routes – China’s Xinjiang region has been connected to Pakistan’s deep-sea Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea in Balochistan.

Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif condemned Sunday’s train attack in Quetta in a post on X.

“Such cowardly acts of terrorism cannot weaken the resolve of the people of Pakistan. We remain steadfast in our determination to eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” he said.

He added that while initial reports indicated a suicide bombing, this has not been officially confirmed. If it is, Yunas Samad, an emeritus professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Bradford in the UK, told Al Jazeera, “this would reflect tactics that insurgent organisations in the region have increasingly adopted over recent years”.

“There are also persistent claims regarding the circulation of sophisticated weaponry originating from stockpiles left behind after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan,” he said.

Are we seeing a new phase of armed separatist attacks in Balochistan?

According to research gathered by the independent, Islamabad-based think tank Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Balochistan recorded at least 254 attacks in 2025 – roughly 26 percent more than in 2024.

A December 2025 report published by independent conflict monitor Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) found that separatists had also intensified attacks and pressure on security forces. The report said the number of attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenades, mainly targeting convoys and police stations, grew by more than 65 percent in the first 11 months of 2025, compared to the same time period in 2024.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report this year found that there has been more Baloch armed group activity in Pakistan in 2025 as well. The GTI is an annual report published by the Australia-based independent think tank Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).

Its 2026 report states that the BLA was responsible for Pakistan’s largest terror attack of 2025 – when the Jaffar Express, a train travelling from Quetta to Peshawar, was hijacked in March.

The BLA claimed responsibility and reported that six military personnel had been killed. Hundreds of people were taken hostage from the train, which was carrying 400 passengers.

“What can reasonably be said is that, following the earlier coordinated attack on the Jaffar Express, the Pakistani authorities appear to have intensified security measures around transport infrastructure, military personnel and key lines of communication,” Samad, of Bradford University, told Al Jazeera.

“The fact that this latest incident nevertheless occurred may suggest that militant groups retain a significant operational capability despite those efforts,” he noted.

The group stunned Pakistan’s security establishment in 2022 when it ‌stormed army and navy bases. In August 2024, militants carried out coordinated ⁠attacks across Balochistan, including highway assaults in which passengers were pulled from buses and shot after identity checks.

“While statistics in such conflicts are always contested and should be treated cautiously, they do indicate that the intensity of the conflict has not significantly diminished,” Samad said.

“Whether this constitutes an entirely ‘new phase’ is perhaps too strong a conclusion at present. However, it does appear to indicate a degree of resurgence in militant capability and confidence among sections of the Baloch insurgency.”

Who are the BLA and major Baloch armed groups?

The BLA, which has a suicide squad called the Majeed Brigade, says it is fighting for the independence of Balochistan, a province located in Pakistan’s southwest and bordering Afghanistan to the north and ⁠Iran to the west.

It is the largest of several ethnic separatist groups that have been fighting the federal government for decades. Balochistan’s mountainous border region serves as a safe haven and training ground for both Baloch separatist fighters and Islamist armed groups.

The BLA often targets infrastructure and security forces in Balochistan, but has also struck in other areas – most notably the southern port city of Karachi.

The BLA has deployed women suicide bombers, including in an attack on Chinese nationals in Karachi, and was designated a “foreign terrorist organisation” by the United States in August 2025 in a move welcomed by the Pakistani government. Analysts say BLA is particularly known for its ability to recruit young, often well-educated fighters.

The group, separately, was at the centre of tit-for-tat strikes in 2024 between Iran and Pakistan over what each said were armed group bases on each other’s territory, which brought the neighbours to the brink of war.

What is the Baloch cause?

Home to about 15 million of Pakistan’s roughly 240 million people, according to the 2023 census, Balochistan is the country’s poorest region despite its wealth of natural resources, including coal, gold, copper and gas.

These resources generate significant revenue for the federal government – unfairly, according to the BLA, which wants Balochistan’s natural wealth to belong to its people and rejects federal control over resource extraction and security.

The province is Pakistan’s largest by area, but smallest by population. It has a long Arabian Sea coastline, not far from the Gulf’s Strait of Hormuz oil shipping lane.

Balochistan is also home to one of Pakistan’s major deep-sea ports at Gwadar, a crucial trade corridor for China’s $65bn investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a wing of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative.

The province is home to key mining projects, including Reko Diq, which is operated by Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold and is believed to be one of the world’s largest gold and copper mines.

China also operates a gold and copper mine in Balochistan.

The province – which was annexed by Pakistan in 1948, six months after partition from India in August 1947 – has a long history of marginalisation. It has since experienced at least five separatist uprisings.

Separatist sentiment was particularly high in the 2000s, around the time the BLA emerged. Analysts of Baloch resistance movements say it was led by Balach Marri, the son of veteran Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.

After the government of military ruler Pervez Musharraf killed prominent Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, the separatist movement escalated.

Rebel fighters have targeted Pakistan’s army and Chinese interests, in particular the strategic port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, accusing Beijing of helping Islamabad to exploit the province. Fighters have killed Chinese citizens working in the region and attacked Beijing’s consulate and language centre in Karachi.

More recently, the BLA has also attacked civilians and migrant labourers from other provinces, a shift that officials say marks an escalation in tactics.

Pakistan accuses India and Afghanistan of backing Baloch armed fighters, an allegation both countries deny.

“Baloch separatist groups themselves have, at times, sought to internationalise their cause and last year publicly appealed for diplomatic recognition by India,” Samad said.

“However, establishing clear evidence of direct state support is considerably more difficult, and much of the discussion in this area remains politically contested.”

Hundreds of Baloch activists, many of them women, have protested in Islamabad and Balochistan over alleged abuses by security forces – accusations the government denies.

Over time, the BLA has set itself apart as a group explicitly committed to Balochistan’s full independence from Pakistan. Unlike more moderate Baloch nationalist parties, which press politically for greater provincial autonomy, the BLA has consistently rejected compromise.

Why is this significant now?

Regional stability and international investment

The attack comes as Prime Minister Sharif meets with China’s President Xi in Beijing to discuss economic and security cooperation – something the BLA is strongly opposed to.

The movement could pose a challenge to Pakistan’s attempts to retain Chinese and American investment, experts say, if it reveals a deeper instability.

The Baloch separatist movement is one of the major unresolved questions over Pakistan’s statehood. It is a constant reminder of the challenges of the Pakistani state to stay united, they say.

“More broadly, the persistence of insurgency has had implications for Pakistan’s wider political system,” Samad explained. “Security concerns in Balochistan have increasingly shaped governance and political discourse, strengthening the role of the military and security establishment in national affairs and undermining the democratisation process.”

“Internationally, the issue matters because Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed state of enormous strategic importance,” Samad told Al Jazeera.

“While speculation about state fragmentation is highly premature, any significant escalation in internal instability in a country with nuclear capabilities inevitably attracts international concern. For that reason alone, developments in Balochistan are likely to remain closely watched both regionally and globally.”

Rare-earth metals

Another major issue is that geological assessments suggest Balochistan contains 12 of the 17 rare-earth minerals on the periodic table. Rare earths are critical minerals used to manufacture a vast array of modern items, including batteries, clocks, wiring, military hardware, smartphones and semiconductors, among other technological products.

Since the start of his second term, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly pushed plans to diversify Washington’s stockpile of critical minerals in order to reduce reliance on China, which currently dominates the supply and processing of the world’s rare-earth minerals.

When Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif met with Trump at the White House in September 2025, he offered the US access to critical minerals and rare earths.

Then, in December 2025, the US announced a $1.25bn investment in critical minerals mining at Reko Diq to drive “economic growth in Balochistan”.