Armed Groups

At least 24 people were killed and more than 50 injured when a suicide car bomb detonated on a train carrying soldiers in Quetta, capital of the southwestern Pakistani province of Balochistan, on Sunday.

The attack came amid Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s four-day visit to China, and the day before his meeting in Beijing with China’s President Xi Jinping, marking 75 years of diplomatic ties between the two nations.

Pakistan is among an exclusive group of countries China regards as an “all-weather strategic partner”, with ties featuring close economic, trade and security cooperation.

Responsibility for the train attack was claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an armed Baloch separatist group which, apart from calling for an independent state, also strongly objects to large-scale Chinese investment in the region.

While the BLA has long carried out attacks that have killed civilians and members of the security forces in Balochistan and beyond, there has been a recent uptick in such incidents.

We examine what is behind this increase in attacks:

What happened in Sunday’s attack?

Reporting from the scene, Al Jazeera’s Kamal Hyder said several houses and buildings adjacent to the railway line were severely damaged in the blast, which caused train carriages to overturn and catch fire.

According to local media reports, a state of emergency was declared at public hospitals in Quetta, with doctors and other medical staff ordered to remain on duty.

Footage shared online showed charred vehicles and train carriages lying on their sides, with thick plumes of black smoke rising into the sky.

Pakistan has experienced several attacks by separatist groups in recent months. The attacks have increased in ferocity and have also targeted Chinese workers amid protests over Beijing-backed infrastructural projects in Balochistan.

As part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project – one of the main arms of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” designed to improve trading routes – China’s Xinjiang region has been connected to Pakistan’s deep-sea Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea in Balochistan.

Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif condemned Sunday’s train attack in Quetta in a post on X.

“Such cowardly acts of terrorism cannot weaken the resolve of the people of Pakistan. We remain steadfast in our determination to eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” he said.

He added that while initial reports indicated a suicide bombing, this has not been officially confirmed. If it is, Yunas Samad, an emeritus professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Bradford in the UK, told Al Jazeera, “this would reflect tactics that insurgent organisations in the region have increasingly adopted over recent years”.

“There are also persistent claims regarding the circulation of sophisticated weaponry originating from stockpiles left behind after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan,” he said.

Are we seeing a new phase of armed separatist attacks in Balochistan?

According to research gathered by the independent, Islamabad-based think tank Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Balochistan recorded at least 254 attacks in 2025 – roughly 26 percent more than in 2024.

A December 2025 report published by independent conflict monitor Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) found that separatists had also intensified attacks and pressure on security forces. The report said the number of attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenades, mainly targeting convoys and police stations, grew by more than 65 percent in the first 11 months of 2025, compared to the same time period in 2024.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report this year found that there has been more Baloch armed group activity in Pakistan in 2025 as well. The GTI is an annual report published by the Australia-based independent think tank Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).

Its 2026 report states that the BLA was responsible for Pakistan’s largest terror attack of 2025 – when the Jaffar Express, a train travelling from Quetta to Peshawar, was hijacked in March.

The BLA claimed responsibility and reported that six military personnel had been killed. Hundreds of people were taken hostage from the train, which was carrying 400 passengers.

“What can reasonably be said is that, following the earlier coordinated attack on the Jaffar Express, the Pakistani authorities appear to have intensified security measures around transport infrastructure, military personnel and key lines of communication,” Samad, of Bradford University, told Al Jazeera.

“The fact that this latest incident nevertheless occurred may suggest that militant groups retain a significant operational capability despite those efforts,” he noted.

The group stunned Pakistan’s security establishment in 2022 when it ‌stormed army and navy bases. In August 2024, militants carried out coordinated ⁠attacks across Balochistan, including highway assaults in which passengers were pulled from buses and shot after identity checks.

“While statistics in such conflicts are always contested and should be treated cautiously, they do indicate that the intensity of the conflict has not significantly diminished,” Samad said.

“Whether this constitutes an entirely ‘new phase’ is perhaps too strong a conclusion at present. However, it does appear to indicate a degree of resurgence in militant capability and confidence among sections of the Baloch insurgency.”

Who are the BLA and major Baloch armed groups?

The BLA, which has a suicide squad called the Majeed Brigade, says it is fighting for the independence of Balochistan, a province located in Pakistan’s southwest and bordering Afghanistan to the north and ⁠Iran to the west.

It is the largest of several ethnic separatist groups that have been fighting the federal government for decades. Balochistan’s mountainous border region serves as a safe haven and training ground for both Baloch separatist fighters and Islamist armed groups.

The BLA often targets infrastructure and security forces in Balochistan, but has also struck in other areas – most notably the southern port city of Karachi.

The BLA has deployed women suicide bombers, including in an attack on Chinese nationals in Karachi, and was designated a “foreign terrorist organisation” by the United States in August 2025 in a move welcomed by the Pakistani government. Analysts say BLA is particularly known for its ability to recruit young, often well-educated fighters.

The group, separately, was at the centre of tit-for-tat strikes in 2024 between Iran and Pakistan over what each said were armed group bases on each other’s territory, which brought the neighbours to the brink of war.

What is the Baloch cause?

Home to about 15 million of Pakistan’s roughly 240 million people, according to the 2023 census, Balochistan is the country’s poorest region despite its wealth of natural resources, including coal, gold, copper and gas.

These resources generate significant revenue for the federal government – unfairly, according to the BLA, which wants Balochistan’s natural wealth to belong to its people and rejects federal control over resource extraction and security.

The province is Pakistan’s largest by area, but smallest by population. It has a long Arabian Sea coastline, not far from the Gulf’s Strait of Hormuz oil shipping lane.

Balochistan is also home to one of Pakistan’s major deep-sea ports at Gwadar, a crucial trade corridor for China’s $65bn investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a wing of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative.

The province is home to key mining projects, including Reko Diq, which is operated by Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold and is believed to be one of the world’s largest gold and copper mines.

China also operates a gold and copper mine in Balochistan.

The province – which was annexed by Pakistan in 1948, six months after partition from India in August 1947 – has a long history of marginalisation. It has since experienced at least five separatist uprisings.

Separatist sentiment was particularly high in the 2000s, around the time the BLA emerged. Analysts of Baloch resistance movements say it was led by Balach Marri, the son of veteran Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.

After the government of military ruler Pervez Musharraf killed prominent Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, the separatist movement escalated.

Rebel fighters have targeted Pakistan’s army and Chinese interests, in particular the strategic port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, accusing Beijing of helping Islamabad to exploit the province. Fighters have killed Chinese citizens working in the region and attacked Beijing’s consulate and language centre in Karachi.

More recently, the BLA has also attacked civilians and migrant labourers from other provinces, a shift that officials say marks an escalation in tactics.

Pakistan accuses India and Afghanistan of backing Baloch armed fighters, an allegation both countries deny.

“Baloch separatist groups themselves have, at times, sought to internationalise their cause and last year publicly appealed for diplomatic recognition by India,” Samad said.

“However, establishing clear evidence of direct state support is considerably more difficult, and much of the discussion in this area remains politically contested.”

Hundreds of Baloch activists, many of them women, have protested in Islamabad and Balochistan over alleged abuses by security forces – accusations the government denies.

Over time, the BLA has set itself apart as a group explicitly committed to Balochistan’s full independence from Pakistan. Unlike more moderate Baloch nationalist parties, which press politically for greater provincial autonomy, the BLA has consistently rejected compromise.

Why is this significant now?

Regional stability and international investment

The attack comes as Prime Minister Sharif meets with China’s President Xi in Beijing to discuss economic and security cooperation – something the BLA is strongly opposed to.

The movement could pose a challenge to Pakistan’s attempts to retain Chinese and American investment, experts say, if it reveals a deeper instability.

The Baloch separatist movement is one of the major unresolved questions over Pakistan’s statehood. It is a constant reminder of the challenges of the Pakistani state to stay united, they say.

“More broadly, the persistence of insurgency has had implications for Pakistan’s wider political system,” Samad explained. “Security concerns in Balochistan have increasingly shaped governance and political discourse, strengthening the role of the military and security establishment in national affairs and undermining the democratisation process.”

“Internationally, the issue matters because Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed state of enormous strategic importance,” Samad told Al Jazeera.

“While speculation about state fragmentation is highly premature, any significant escalation in internal instability in a country with nuclear capabilities inevitably attracts international concern. For that reason alone, developments in Balochistan are likely to remain closely watched both regionally and globally.”

Rare-earth metals

Another major issue is that geological assessments suggest Balochistan contains 12 of the 17 rare-earth minerals on the periodic table. Rare earths are critical minerals used to manufacture a vast array of modern items, including batteries, clocks, wiring, military hardware, smartphones and semiconductors, among other technological products.

Since the start of his second term, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly pushed plans to diversify Washington’s stockpile of critical minerals in order to reduce reliance on China, which currently dominates the supply and processing of the world’s rare-earth minerals.

When Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif met with Trump at the White House in September 2025, he offered the US access to critical minerals and rare earths.

Then, in December 2025, the US announced a $1.25bn investment in critical minerals mining at Reko Diq to drive “economic growth in Balochistan”.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been tense since the Taliban took power in 2021.

On Monday, Pakistan summoned a senior Afghan diplomat after an attack claimed by the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TPP. The group said it carried out two more attacks since, mostly against security forces.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of backing the fighters, which it denies.

The latest violence started with a major border skirmish in February. Mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye and China led to a pause in the fighting.

But the two sides have continued to target each other. This includes a Pakistani strike on a drug rehabilitation centre that killed more than 250 people.

Will these breaches lead to a resumption of hostilities? And is lasting peace possible between the neighbours?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Masood Khan – Former permanent representative of Pakistan, United Nations

Michael Kugelman – Senior fellow, Atlantic Council

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer, American University of Afghanistan

The presidents of Nigeria and the United States have announced the killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, described as the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS).

Donald Trump first made the announcement in a social media post on Friday, without disclosing when or where the joint Nigerian-US military operation happened.

On Saturday, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu said in a statement that al-Minuki, also known as Abu-Mainok, was killed “along with several of his lieutenants” during a strike on his compound in the Lake Chad Basin.

The Nigerian army described it as “a meticulously planned and highly complex precision air-land operation” carried out on Saturday between midnight and 4am (23:00 to 03:00 GMT) in Metele, in Borno state in northeast Nigeria.

Borno has been the epicentre of a long-running campaign by the Boko Haram armed group and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which is linked to ISIL.

Who was al-Minuki?

Little is publicly known about al-Minuki, who had been under US sanctions since 2023.

Before pledging allegiance to ISIL in 2015, al-Minuki was a prominent Boko Haram leader, according to the Nigerian army.

An army statement described him as a “key” operational and strategic figure who provided guidance to ISIL entities outside Nigeria on media operations, economic warfare and weapons manufacturing.

“His death removes a critical node through which ISIS coordinated and directed operations across different regions of the world,” the army said.

It added that al-Minuki oversaw ISIL-linked operations across the Sahel and West Africa, including attacks against “ethnic and religious minority communities”. In 2018, he was linked to the kidnapping of more than 100 schoolgirls in Dapchi, in northeastern Nigeria’s Yobe state.

Emerging power

Al-Minuki is believed to have risen through the ranks of ISWAP following the disappearance of veteran commander Mamman Nur in 2018.

His reported ability to operate discreetly and avoid public attention helped him maintain influence over operations, while evading detection by regional and international security forces.

Cheta Nwanze, chief executive of the Lagos-based advisory group, SBM Intelligence, said al-Minuki had previously been declared killed in 2024 after a military operation in Kaduna state.

“That earlier announcement did not produce a lasting degradation of ISWAP’s capabilities,” he told Al Jazeera, warning that eliminating a single commander may have a limited impact.

Nwanze said the group will be able to recover as long as a growing “ransom economy” in Nigeria – which raised some $1.66m between July 2024 and June 2025, according to an SBM intelligence report – “remains intact”.

“The ultimate tool for control is the man on the ground with a gun, and the ultimate backing for that man is a functional social contract, which sadly Nigeria does not have,” he said. “Until the economic logic that feeds these groups is disrupted, the cycle will continue.”

Experts say leaders such as al-Minuki have been central to coordination between local fighters and ISIL’s broader network, but are not irreplaceable due to the group’s decentralised command structure.

“The killing of al-Minuki will disrupt ISWAP operationally in the short term,” Alex Vines, the Africa programme director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera.

“ISWAP has proven resilient to leadership losses, suggesting this killing will not be strategically decisive on its own.”

‘Inclusive governance reforms’

ISWAP has recently intensified attacks along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, targeting military outposts and humanitarian convoys.

These operations are seen as part of a deliberate effort to consolidate territory and demonstrate the group’s continued relevance despite ongoing pressure, including after Trump accused Nigeria of not doing enough to protect Christians in the country’s north from attacks.

The Nigerian government has rejected the claim, insisting that Muslims are also being targeted by armed groups. In recent months, dozens of US troops have been deployed to Nigeria to help in the fight against armed groups by providing intelligence sharing and technical support.

Tinubu said Nigeria “appreciates” the partnership with the US “in advancing our shared security objectives,” adding that he looked forward “to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation”.

Vines said al-Minuki’s killing was “a tactical win” for the Tinubu administration, but ISWAP remains a “serious security concern”.

As for the US, eliminating al-Minuki is likely to be framed as a victory against ISIL’s Africa network. It will also reinforce Nigeria’s importance “as a key security partner and a reminder that bilateral relations are much better than a year ago”, Vines told Al Jazeera.

Nwanze said the joint nature of the strike signalled a deepening of US‑Nigeria security cooperation, but the collaboration “will face limits”.

“Washington’s willingness to engage is likely contingent on narrow counter‑terrorism objectives, not on a wholesale commitment to rebuilding Nigeria’s fractured security architecture,” he added.

Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security risk analyst, called the elimination of al-Minuki “a remarkable operational success”. He stressed, however, that “broader, inclusive governance reforms remain fundamental to solving the long-term security challenges in the wider region”.

Bomber and several fighters detonate explosives-laden vehicle near security post in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, near Afghanistan.

A car bombing at ⁠a police post followed by an intense firefight has killed at least three officers ⁠in northwestern Pakistan, according to police and security sources.

The attack took place in Bannu, a district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, late on Saturday.

Police official Zahid Khan told The Associated Press that a suicide bomber and several fighters detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a security post. Shortly after, multiple explosions were heard and the security post collapsed from the impact of the blast, he said.

Pakistan’s Dawn reported that nearby civilian areas also suffered severe damage due to the blasts, and two civilians were injured.

The Reuters news agency, citing security officials, reported that after the bombing, there was an ambush on police personnel rushing ⁠to the scene to provide backup.

Police official Sajjad Khan told Reuters that more casualties were feared. He added that fighting was ongoing and the extent of the damage would only be known once ‌the operation was over.

Police sources told Reuters ⁠the aggressors also used drones in the attack.

Ambulances from ⁠rescue agencies and civil hospitals were dispatched to the scene, with officials saying a state of emergency has been declared in government hospitals in Bannu.

No group immediately claimed responsibility. However, such attacks have the potential to reignite fighting along Pakistan’s border ⁠with Afghanistan.

The worst fighting in years erupted ⁠between the allies-turned-foes in February, with Pakistani air strikes inside Afghanistan that Islamabad said targeted fighters’ strongholds.

Fighting has since eased, with occasional skirmishes breaking out along the border, but no official ceasefire ‌has been brokered.

Islamabad blames Kabul for harbouring armed groups who use Afghan soil to plot attacks in Pakistan. The Taliban has denied the allegations and ‌said ‌militancy in Pakistan is an internal problem.

The Pakistan Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and allied fighter groups have carried out similar attacks in the past. The Pakistan Taliban is a separate group but is often aligned with the Afghan Taliban, who seized power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Zawiya refinery shut down in ‘precautionary measure’ as emergency declared following explosions and gunfire nearby.

Libya’s largest operational oil refinery at Zawiya has been shut down and ‌an emergency declared following fighting between armed groups nearby.

The National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Zawiya Refining Company announced a “precautionary halt” to operations and evacuated employees from the oil complex and port.

NOC confirmed the safety of all employees and added that fuel supplies would continue as normal.

A Facebook statement said alarm sirens were activated “following armed clashes involving heavy weapons that erupted around the oil complex in the early hours of Friday”.

“These clashes resulted in several heavy weapons projectiles landing in various locations within the oil complex,” adding that no significant damage had been reported.

“However, the clashes have intensified and reached the residential area adjacent to the refinery, making the area a direct target for heavy shelling and significantly increasing the risk of further damage,” it said.

Authorities in Zawiya, west of the capital Tripoli, said they had launched a “large-scale operation” against criminal groups, as fighting and explosions were heard, the AFP news agency reported.

The operation targeted “criminal hideouts and wanted individuals” who were “involved in serious acts”, the authorities said, citing “murder and attempted murder, kidnapping and extortion, drug, arms and human trafficking and illegal migration”.

Videos verified by Al Jazeera showed explosions and gunfire, as well as damage to several cars and facilities inside the refinery. The sound of sirens was audible after shells fell inside operational sites.

The Zawiya Refining Company called on all parties to cease fire immediately and for the Libyan authorities to intervene to protect lives and key facilities.

The refinery, around 40km (25 miles) west of Tripoli, has a capacity of 120,000 barrels per day. It is connected to the 300,000 ⁠bpd Sharara oilfield.

Since Muammar Gaddafi’s downfall in 2011, Libya has been plagued by violence between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the eastern-based government, led by military leader Khalifa Haftar which is not internationally recognised.

It is unclear what caused the fighting, but local media said it started following a security operation against armed groups.

Fighters attack ‘Africa’s Alcatraz’, which detains high-value prisoners, and disrupt crucial supply chains to the capital.

In a new wave of attacks in Mali, an al-Qaeda-linked group has stormed a main prison housing fighters from the armed group and set fire to trucks with food supplies heading to the capital Bamako.

Fighters from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group stormed the Kenieroba Central Prison, a recently built complex dubbed “Africa’s Alcatraz”, located about 60km (37 miles) southwest of Bamako, Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reported on Wednesday.

The detention centre houses 2,500 prisoners, including at least 72 inmates considered “high value” by the Malian state, Haque said, adding that Malian armed forces were repelling the attack.

Among the prisoners are JNIM fighters and a number of people arrested following large-scale attacks last month by the group’s fighters and Tuareg separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).

The fighters attacked several military bases across multiple cities, including areas where senior government officials live, and took control of the northern city of Kidal in a coordinated offensive on April 25 and April 26, which struck at the heart of the West African country’s military government.

One of those attacks killed Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara and his family in their home in Kati, a garrison town near the capital. On Monday, the leader of the country’s military government, Assimi Goita, took on the role of defence minister. At least 23 others were also killed in the attacks.

Since then, “there has been a wave of arrests of former and current military officers, members of civil society, lawyers, members of the political opposition – all accused of colluding with al-Qaeda fighters,” said Haque, who has been reporting for years on and in Mali. He added that fighters linked to the armed group were also arrested.

Security sources told AFP news agency that opposition figures Mountaga Tall, Youssouf Daba Diawara, and Moussa Djire are among those “abducted”.

According to family members and security sources who spoke to the agency, Tall, a lawyer, was taken on May 2 in Bamako by hooded men on charges of plotting with opposition figures in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, to overthrow the military government. Since his arrest, Tall has been questioned at least once for “attempted destabilisation”.

The security sources said Diawara and Djire were suspected of links with, respectively, the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko and Oumar Mariko, two opposition figures in exile. At least two other civilians who are close to Mariko were also arrested following the attacks, a judicial source told AFP, without giving further details.

The military prosecutor’s office said on May 1 that it had “solid evidence” of the “complicity” of certain military personnel, accusing them of helping with the “planning, coordination and execution” of the attacks.

In a report published on Tuesday, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) said there have also been “gravely concerning reports of extrajudicial killings and abductions, allegedly carried out by members of the security forces” following the attacks.

The violence has set off fighting across Mali’s vast desert north, raising the prospect of significant gains by armed groups that have shown an increasing willingness to strike neighbouring countries.

JNIM has called on Malians to rise up against the government and transition to Islamic law. The group has also pledged to besiege Bamako, and on Friday, it had reportedly set up checkpoints around the city of four million.

Haque said the blockade has the potential to cause a humanitarian disaster.

“These are al-Qaeda fighters that have pointed 12.7mm machine guns on their motorbikes, stopping any outgoing or incoming traffic,” the correspondent said. “We have seen on social media these fighters stopping food trucks trying to enter the area. This blockade is not just affecting people living in Bamako; it’s affecting people throughout Mali.”

On May 3, the mayor of Diafarabe village, in the Mopti region, called on the authorities to act before people started dying of hunger, as the village had run out of food.

Mass kidnappings are a common way for gangs and armed groups to make quick money in Nigeria.

Gunmen have raided an orphanage and kidnapped at least 23 children, authorities in Nigeria report.

The gang took the children late on Sunday from an unregistered facility called the Dahallukitab Group of Schools, located in an “isolated area” in Kogi State’s capital, Lokoja, Kogi Information Commissioner Kingsley Fanwo said in a statement on Monday.

Mass kidnappings have become a common way for gangs and armed groups to make quick money in Africa’s most populous country, especially in rural areas with little government presence.

Fanwo said the “prompt and coordinated response” of security agencies led to the rescue of 15 children but eight are still missing.

The wife of the proprietor of the orphanage was also abducted, according to the statement.

“Intensive operations are ongoing to secure the safe return of the remaining eight victims and apprehend the perpetrators,” the official said.

The orphanage was operating “illegally” in a remote location without the knowledge of relevant authorities and security agencies, Fanwo added.

The statement did not disclose the ages of the abducted children, but it referred to them as “pupils”, which in Nigeria usually refers to someone in kindergarten or primary school, covering ages up to 12.

No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

Nigeria faces multiple conflicts from long-running violence by the Boko Haram armed group to “bandit” gangs, farmer-herder violence and southeastern separatists.

The ISIL (ISIS)-linked Lakurawa group also operates in communities in the northwestern part of the country bordering Niger.

The North Central Zone of Nigeria, where Kogi is located, has seen violent attacks, including raids on schools, in recent months with some of the attacks blamed on armed groups.

Hundreds of students were taken by gunmen from their school in neighbouring Niger State in November in an attack security sources blamed on Boko Haram.

Unrest reported in several locations around the country.

In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria have shattered the comforting illusion that the region’s long insurgency has receded into the background of national life. As violent incidents have proliferated, many Nigerians have refused to confront this uncomfortable reality and have opted instead to embrace conspiracy theories suggesting that the resurgence is somehow tied to renewed American involvement in Nigeria’s  counterterrorism efforts.

It is not difficult to see why the theory of foreign collusion with terrorist groups resonates in Nigeria. In February 2025, United States Congressman Scott Perry claimed that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded Boko Haram, but offered no evidence for the allegation. Richard Mills, then the US ambassador to Nigeria, rejected Perry’s statement, but by then the claim had already acquired a life of its own in the public space and on social media.

Then, American officials like Congressmen Ted Cruz and Chris Smith made statements that fuelled the “Christian genocide” narrative, which falsely claims that the killings in Nigeria exclusively target Christians.

Attacks on Christians have happened, including most recently on a church in Kaduna state on Easter Sunday, but Muslim communities have also been regularly targeted. The truth is that terrorist groups have long operated indiscriminately.

What this moment demands, therefore, is to go beyond the seduction of easy explanation, and embark on serious analysis of what is really happening in northern Nigeria.

That diagnosis must begin with clarity about what the attacks reveal. First, they reveal that the insurgency has adapted in both form and method. Second, northern Nigeria’s insecurity can no longer be understood in isolation from the rest of the region; it is part of the wider regional disorder across the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel. And third, the violence continues to feed on deeper domestic vulnerabilities that extend far beyond the battlefield: chronic poverty, educational exclusion, weak local governance, and the long erosion of the social contract in parts of the North.

Let us begin with the first point. Recent attacks demonstrate that the insurgent ecosystem has learned, adapted, and expanded beyond the old image of a crudely armed rebellion fighting in predictable ways. The ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP), in particular, has become more adaptive in structure and tactics, while its conflict with Boko Haram has weakened the latter and left ISWAP as the more organised and deeply entrenched threat in the Lake Chad region. It has consolidated its presence in parts of the Lake Chad basin and expanded into Sambisa Forest, widening the space from which it can threaten civilians and military formations alike.

This matters because insurgencies are sustained not by ideology alone, but by terrain, supply routes, local economies, and the ability to move men and materiel through spaces where the state is weak or absent. In that sense, the insurgency is no longer merely surviving in familiar hideouts; it is entrenching itself in a broader and more fluid battlespace, with ISWAP’s control of trade in and around Lake Chad now a major pillar of its resilience.

ISWAP has also refined the way it fights, demonstrating a growing capacity for coordinated assaults, night raids, ambushes, and operations designed not merely to inflict casualties, but to isolate military positions and slow the movement of reinforcements. This challenge is magnified by the sheer scale of the theatre itself.

Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states are each comparable in size to entire European countries: Borno is slightly larger than the Republic of Ireland; Yobe is roughly the size of Switzerland; and Adamawa is slightly larger than Belgium. Policing territories of that scale would test any state, all the more so when they border a fragile regional neighbourhood.

The terrain has also shaped the rhythm of the conflict, with the dry season, particularly the first quarter of the year, ushering in an intensification of attacks.

At the heart of this adaptation is the evolution of technology. What once seemed unthinkable in this theatre has now entered the insurgent repertoire. Drones, including commercially available models modified for combat, are now part of the operational environment. The significance of this shift is not merely technical; it is also psychological and strategic.

Beyond technology, the insurgency’s growing mobility has sharpened the threat further. Rapid assaults by motorcycle-mounted units demonstrate the extent to which insurgent violence now depends on speed, concentration, and dispersal. Fighters can assemble quickly, strike vulnerable locations, and disappear into difficult terrain before an effective response can take shape.

The advantage here lies not in holding territory in the conventional sense, but in imposing uncertainty, stretching the state’s defensive attentions, and proving that the insurgents can still choose where and when to shock the system.

Perhaps the most dangerous dimension of this adaptation is the infiltration of foreign fighters. Their significance lies not only in their numbers, but in what they bring with them: technical knowledge, battlefield experience, tactical imagination, and links to wider militant networks.

Their presence points to a deeper cross-fertilisation between local insurgency and global terrorist currents. More troubling still, they are now playing a more active role in the conflict, not only refining tactics and skills but also participating directly in combat.

That is why the regional dimension must be central to any serious analysis. The weakening of regional cooperation has come at the worst time, creating openings that insurgents are only too ready to exploit. A threat that has always been transnational becomes harder to confront when neighbouring states no longer act with sufficient cohesion.

Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force after the reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the military coup there has sharpened that challenge and weakened the perimeter defences of the north-east theatre. The force, comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, with a smaller Beninese contingent at its headquarters in N’Djamena, was instrumental in earlier gains and remains vital for reinforcing positions, conducting operations in difficult terrain, denying insurgents safe havens, and intercepting the movement of foreign fighters.

Yet even regional analysis, necessary as it is, does not fully explain the problem. Insurgencies endure not only because they move across borders, but because they can recruit, regroup, and exploit social weakness at home.

Violence in northern Nigeria is sustained by a combination of doctrinal extremism, chronic poverty, educational exclusion, and a state whose presence is often too limited to command confidence in the communities where armed groups seek recruits. The argument, therefore, cannot remain confined to the military sphere.

Poverty and lack of education do not directly produce terrorism, but they increase vulnerability, especially where alienation, weak institutions, and manipulative ideological narratives are already present. This is why the educational crisis in northern Nigeria should be seen not only as a developmental challenge, but as part of the wider security landscape. Education does more than impart literacy and numeracy; it provides structure, routine, and pathways to self-actualisation and social belonging.

It is important to note that the government is not without a response. In 2024, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Student Loans (Access to Higher Education) Act into law, and the rollout of the Nigerian Education Loan Fund has since opened a wider path to post-secondary education and skills development. But the more decisive educational challenge lies earlier, at the basic level, where literacy begins, habits are formed, and attachment to institutions is either built or lost. By the time a young person reaches the threshold of higher education, the foundational work has already been done or neglected.

This is why local governance matters more to security than is often recognised. In Nigeria’s federal structure, primary education sits closest to the weakest and most politically distorted tier of government. If local government remains fiscally weak, administratively paralysed, or politically captured, one of the country’s most important long-term defences against radicalisation will remain fragile.

That is why local government autonomy, though often framed in dry constitutional terms, has direct implications for security. President Tinubu, an ardent champion of local autonomy, welcomed the Supreme Court’s July 2024 judgement affirming the constitutional and financial rights of local governments and has pressed governors to respect it. Resistance, however, is unsurprising: many governors have long treated local governments as subordinate extensions of their authority.

So what does the present moment demand from Nigeria? It demands, certainly, continued military pressure on insurgent sanctuaries. It demands stronger force protection, sharper intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, improved rural and urban security, and a more serious approach to trans-border diplomacy. It demands that regional diplomacy be treated not as a luxury of peacetime statecraft, but as part of the operational infrastructure of security.

But the crisis cannot be addressed by military action alone. It also calls for social, institutional, and educational measures across all tiers of government. The state must confront extremism not only through force, but through education and functioning local institutions. It must rebuild governance, restore trust, and close the social and institutional fractures through which violence renews itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.