Arctic

March 5 (UPI) — This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Arctic Council, once a hallmark of post-Cold War cooperation in the far north.

For decades, the Arctic Ocean remained at the margins of global power politics — a remote, ice-locked expanse governed largely through scientific collaboration and consensus-based frameworks.

That balance is now shifting. Rapid ice loss is opening seasonal sea lanes, exposing fragile ecosystems and drawing new commercial and strategic interest, even as the suspension of routine cooperation with Russia has strained the council’s role.

The Arctic is emerging as a maritime crossroads where environmental risk, economic ambition and intensifying geopolitical competition increasingly converge.

Established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council — bringing together eight Arctic states from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden the United States, Indigenous permanent participants and observers including China — remains the region’s central forum for coordinating science, environmental policy and cooperative governance. Despite mounting geopolitical strain, it continues to provide an institutional platform that could support future U.S.-China maritime cooperation in the Arctic.

Recent diplomacy suggests that even as tensions rise across trade, technology and security, cooperation is still possible when interests align.

The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, in force since 2021, offers a case in point. By imposing a 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing while joint scientific research assesses the ecosystem, the pact places precaution ahead of competition and provides a model for managing emerging Arctic risks.

The significance of the fisheries decision should not be understated. The agreement brought together Arctic coastal states and distant-water fishing powers, including Washington and Beijing, to manage a region where no fisheries regime previously existed.

In doing so, it transformed an ungoverned expanse of high seas into a shared space of stewardship — governed not by territorial claims, but by science, restraint and a shared recognition of ecological risk.

“The Arctic Council is a dedicated body creating a platform for collaboration built on consensus. It is far from perfect, but it has produced a number of highly influential assessments and created an international community devoted to cooperation and shared stewardship,” said Henry P. Huntington, arctic science director of the Ocean Conservancy.

Science diplomacy as a foundation

For the United States, the Arctic is a strategic frontier and an environmental priority, tied to maritime access, national defense, Indigenous livelihoods and ecological protection.

For China, it is an emerging arena of economic opportunity and global governance engagement. Beijing’s self-description as a “near-Arctic state,” combined with its investments in polar research, ice-capable vessels and Arctic shipping studies, reflects a broader ambition to participate in shaping the rules that will govern the region’s future.

International law scholar Michael Byers said China’s Arctic posture differs sharply from its behavior in the South China Sea. While Beijing has strategic interests in the region through its “Polar Silk Road,” it has no territorial claims in the Arctic and has largely operated within the existing legal framework.

In contrast to its role as a resident power in the South China Sea, Byers notes that China presents itself in the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” focused on resource access and emerging shipping routes — a presence that Arctic nations are watching more closely as its footprint grows.

Despite competing strategic interests, both countries share a clear objective: preventing a governance vacuum in the Arctic. The fisheries accord underscores that even amid rivalry, Washington and Moscow recognize the dangers of unregulated exploitation in fragile waters and the need for baseline rules. As such, the agreement serves not only as a conservation tool, but as a diplomatic signal that pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic remains possible.

At its center is a commitment to joint scientific research. Participating states will collaborate to monitor fish stocks, map Arctic ecosystems and assess climate impacts, generating the shared data needed to determine whether any future fishing can be conducted sustainably.

“The Arctic Council’s 30th anniversary finds its consensus-based structure severely tested. Western states suspended cooperation with Russia in 2022, effectively paralyzing what was once exemplary post-Cold War diplomacy,” said Pavel Devyatkin, a senior associate at the Arctic Institute. He said the council’s experience offers practical lessons for managing contested waters elsewhere, including the South China Sea.

Arctic marine science has long bridged geopolitical divides, including cooperation with China, showing how shared environmental risks can transcend political tension. As Devyatkin noted, the region offers a clear lesson: ecological disruption can outweigh traditional security concerns. When U.S.-Russia fisheries monitoring was suspended, key data gaps emerged just as warming waters pushed fish stocks northward — a cautionary signal for any contested maritime region facing climate-driven change.

China’s Arctic engagement is anchored in scientific diplomacy. Unlike more securitized theaters such as the South China Sea, Beijing has framed its Arctic role around cooperation, climate research and environmental stewardship. Its Yellow River Station in Svalbard has supported long-term research since 2004, while icebreakers such as Xue Long and Xue Long 2, along with polar-capable satellites, have expanded China’s research reach and technological presence in the region.

At the same time, Western policymakers remain cautious about the potential dual-use nature of these activities. Concerns focus on whether data gathered from satellites, seabed mapping or subsea systems could support military applications. U.S. and NATO officials have questioned how China might use its growing Arctic data capabilities.

The model reflects a broader principle of science diplomacy — one that has long shaped cooperation in contested maritime regions. Scientific collaboration provides a low-politics entry point for engagement, allowing rival states to build trust, exchange data and establish working relationships even when political tensions remain high.

“Marine science is an area that can promote international cooperation. That is true in many contexts, including in relation to the next International Polar Year collaborations currently being planned, that will include China,” claimed Evan T. Bloom, polar governance chair at the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.

Collaborative mapping of sensitive habitats could inform conservation planning and risk management. Even the design of Arctic marine protected areas, an issue gaining attention as part of global “30 by 30” conservation goals, could become a platform for coordinated policy development.

From fisheries to shipping and conservation

Shipping governance is emerging as the next test of whether U.S.-China scientific cooperation can translate into operational rules in the Arctic. As sea ice recedes, a transpolar route linking Asia, Europe and North America could reshape global trade, but the region remains poorly charted, remote and environmentally fragile, with high risks of accidents and long-term damage.

Analysts say a cooperative framework on Arctic shipping, covering safety standards, environmental protections, data sharing and emergency response, could reduce those risks. Joint monitoring of ice and vessel traffic, coordinated search-and-rescue protocols and agreed-upon environmental rules for polar operations would form the backbone of such an approach.

Marine conservation offers another pathway for cooperation. The precautionary logic underpinning the fisheries agreement aligns with broader global efforts to expand ocean protection and safeguard biodiversity.

The United States and China have expanded marine protected areas domestically and have endorsed international conservation targets. Extending that logic to the Arctic through coordinated conservation zones or networks of protected areas would reinforce ecological resilience while creating a stabilizing framework for governance.

Such initiatives also would resonate with a wider global trend: the recognition that environmental security and geopolitical stability are increasingly intertwined. As climate change accelerates, the management of shared ecosystems is becoming a central component of international relations. The Arctic, like the South China Sea or the Mediterranean, is emerging as a test case for how science-based stewardship can mitigate strategic rivalry.

The obstacles to deeper cooperation, however, remain substantial. The broader U.S.-China relationship is marked by strategic distrust, trade disputes and military competition. Arctic policy cannot be entirely insulated from tensions in other theaters, including the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also disrupted Arctic diplomacy, limiting the functioning of multilateral bodies such as the Arctic Council and injecting new security concerns into the region.

Trust remains a central obstacle.

Washington remains wary of Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions in the Arctic, particularly the dual-use potential of infrastructure and emerging shipping routes.

Beijing casts itself as a legitimate stakeholder in global commons governance and is pressing for a greater role in shaping the rules of the evolving Arctic order.

At the same time, Russia’s continued isolation from Arctic Council processes since 2022 has pushed Moscow to seek new partners, further complicating the diplomatic landscape and slowing meaningful progress on joint conservation efforts for Arctic flora and fauna.

Against that backdrop, any expansion of cooperation will need to be incremental, transparent and anchored in verifiable scientific collaboration. The fisheries agreement provides a template: begin with a shared risk, rely on joint science, build institutional mechanisms and create habits of cooperation over time. That process is gradual, but it can be durable.

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Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18^th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

US President Donald Trump writes on Truth Social that a ‘great hospital boat’ is going to Greenland as he mocks its healthcare system.

Greenland said “no thanks” to US President Donald Trump’s plan to send a hospital ship to the Arctic island after he repeatedly threatened to seize the Danish autonomous territory for “national security” reasons.

Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said in a post on Facebook on Sunday that Trump’s proposal to send the US medical vessel had been “noted”.

“But we have a public healthcare system where treatment is free for citizens. It is a deliberate choice,” Nielsen said, reiterating Greenland remained open to dialogue and cooperation.

“But talk to us instead of just making more or less random outbursts on social media,” he added.

The historically strong bilateral ties after World War II between NATO allies Denmark and the United States have come under severe strain in recent months as Trump ratcheted up talk of a possible US takeover of the mineral-rich and strategically located Arctic island.

Danish Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen told Danish broadcaster DR that the population of Greenland “receives the healthcare it needs”.

“They receive it either in Greenland or, if they require specialised treatment, they receive it in Denmark,” he said. “It’s not as if there’s a need for a special healthcare initiative in Greenland.”

On Saturday, Trump said in a post on his Truth Social account – with an AI-generated image of the US Navy vessel the USNS Mercy – that it was on its way to Greenland to treat those being medically neglected.

“We are going to send a great hospital boat to Greenland to take care of the many people who are sick, and not being taken care of there. It’s on the way!!!” Trump wrote.

Trump has repeatedly expressed his interest in the US taking control of Greenland, citing it as a way to secure US national security. However, Greenland and Europe rejected the US desire to take the Arctic island and have upheld Greenlandic sovereignty.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said she was “happy to live in a country where access to healthcare is free and equal for all”.

Greenland is a place “where insurance or wealth does not determine whether one receives dignified treatment,” she added in an apparent criticism of the US healthcare system, which is not universal.

Threats to take Greenland ebbed after Trump struck a “framework” deal with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in January to ensure greater US influence.