Africa

Opapo, Kenya – Perched in the grass alongside the Rongo-Homa Bay Road in Kenya’s Migori County, a rusted sign announces the Melkio St Joseph Missions of Messiah Church in Africa. Beyond it, a sandy path meets big blue and purple gates that barricade the now-deserted grounds from view.

Just more than a month ago, the church in Opapo village was thrust into the spotlight when reports of secret burials and “cult-like” practices emerged.

On April 21, local police stormed the grounds and discovered two bodies buried within the fenced compound – including that of a police officer who was also a church member – as well as dozens of other worshippers who had been living there.

During the raid, 57 people were rescued and taken into custody. In the weeks since, most have been released, but police have banned them from returning to the church and sealed off the compound.

For Kenyans, the incident has unearthed the memory of other controversial churches steeped in allegations of abuse, like the 2023 case where more than 400 people linked to a church-cult starved to death in the Shakahola Forest.

In Opapo village, residents are troubled by the deaths and the decades-long secrecy surrounding the church. Many want to see the permanent closure of the compound and the exhumation and return of the bodies buried there.

Brian Juma, 27, has lived directly beside the church all his life. He told Al Jazeera locals believe it was started by a man who fashioned himself as a sort-of god figure, and who the followers of the church prayed to.

Juma claims that when the church leader died 10 years ago, followers did not immediately bury him but prayed for three days in the hope that he would rise.

Pauline Auma, a 53-year-old mother of six who also lives near the church, said the congregation was set up in their area in the early 1990s, although she could not recall the exact year.

“When it came, we thought it was a normal church like any other. I remember my sister even attended a service there, thinking it was like other churches, only to come and tell us things that were not normal were taking place. For example, she said the Father there claimed to be God himself,” Auma recounted.

In the years that followed, the church recruited members from different locations across the country. Juma said congregants were not from around the area, spoke different languages, and never left the compound to go to their own homes.

According to Caren Kiarie, a human rights activist from neighbouring Kisumu County, the church has several branches across the Kenyan Nyanza region, and sends members from one location to the other.

Many people came to worship and live within the church full time, Opapo villagers remember.

“They were very friendly people who did business around the Opapo area and interacted well with the people here,” Juma said. “But they would never live outside the church, as they all went back inside in the evening. Within the church compound, they had cattle, sheep, poultry and planted crops for their food.”

Though the worshippers could interact with outsiders, locals say the children living there – some with their parents and others who neighbours said were taken in alone – never attended school, while members were barred from seeking medical care if they were sick.

On the day of the police raid and rescue, many of the worshippers looked weak and ill, said Juma, who over the years befriended some young people whose parents belonged to the church. “They were sickly, as they were never allowed to go to the hospital or even take pain medication,” he said, quoting what his neighbours had told him. Auma believes those who were rescued that day were the sickly ones, as the others had escaped.

The 57 initially refused to leave the compound at all, insisting the church was their only “home”. But police took them to the nearby Rongo Sub-county Hospital to be treated. They again refused medical care and instead began singing Christian praise songs in the Dholuo language. Auma said the songs were chants asking God to save them and take them home to heaven.

Disturbed by the commotion, health workers recommended that they be moved from the hospital because they were making other patients uncomfortable. That’s when they were taken into police custody. According to the assistant county commissioner, Josphat Kingoku, the worshippers were released from police custody two weeks ago, but he did not know their whereabouts.

Seeking news about loved ones

In Kwoyo in Homa Bay County, Linet Achieng worries about her 71-year-old mother, who left home to join the Migori church 11 years ago and never returned.

Her mother was introduced to the church by a neighbour who was originally from Migori, Achieng said.

“Initially, she had gone to seek healing from a backache that had troubled her for years,” said the 43-year-old, explaining that the church offered promises of health.

The family initially kept in touch with their mother, asking when she would come home after being healed. She kept making promises to return, but never did. Achieng tried to convince her mother to leave the place, she said, but her attempts were in vain.

“At some point, she stopped talking to us, and when my younger brother and I went to inquire how she was doing, we were sent away from the church and told that unless we were willing to join the church, we were not welcome in there,” she said.

After the raid last month, Achieng learned her mother was among those rescued but says she does not want anything to do with her family.

While many worshipers’ families wait to hear about their relatives, one family knows for sure they will never see their loved one again.

Dan Ayoo Obura – a police constable – was one of those who died at the church compound, reportedly on March 27, according to local media reports.

He had been introduced to the church by his wife, who was a leader there, his relatives said.

Obura had left his workplace at the General Service Unit police headquarters in Nairobi in February before travelling home to Kisumu County on sick leave, according to his uncle Dickson Otieno.

He was taken to a hospital in the area, but after a week at the facility, “he disappeared”, Otieno told Al Jazeera.

“We reported to the police and started looking for him everywhere, panicked that we might never see him again. Later, we had information from some neighbours that he is in Migori at a church. That’s when we went there to ask the church leaders where he was. They told us he was not at the church and had not seen him.

“About a month later, they called us to say that the person we were looking for had died the previous night and that they had buried him that day.”

The family then informed the police and human rights activists like Kiarie, and travelled to Opapo to try and locate his body.

Kiarie, who is a rights defender and paralegal at the Nyando Social Justice Centre, accompanied the family to Opapo in March.

“We’ve not been given the body,” she told Al Jazeera, explaining that she interviewed residents and church members while in Opapo and heard concerning reports about what was happening at the compound.

No one was allowed to have an intimate relationship at the church, she said, while husbands and wives were required to separate after joining. These practices were echoed by the compound’s neighbours in Migori.

“There are also serious claims of sexual violence at the church where the male leaders were having sex with the girls and women there,” Kiarie said. “That was why they did not want any man inside to touch the women because they belonged to them,” she alleged.

Kiarie said since the police raid, the compound’s neighbours have also reported there may be more than just two bodies buried inside – which she said could be what is delaying Obura’s exhumation. “They’re still waiting because they said the issue has been picked up by the national government, and they [the national authorities] want to exhume the other bodies [that may be there],” she said.

Kiarie feels the Migori church may prove to be another case like the Shakahola cult “massacre” if it is found that more people indeed died and were buried there without their families’ knowledge.

From Shakahola to Migori

The events in Migori have opened wounds for many survivors and relatives of the 429 people who were starved to death in Kilifi County’s Shakahola, in 2023.

Led by Pastor Paul McKenzie, the congregants there also left their families and abandoned property, seeking to go to heaven and meet their messiah. But news reports said that at the church, they were radicalised and brainwashed, convinced that if they stopped eating they would die peacefully, go to heaven and meet their god.

Both Grace Kazungu’s parents and two of her siblings perished in the Shakhola church cult, says the 32-year-old mother of three from Kilifi.

Whenever she and her brother tried to question the church’s teachings, the others would not hear a word against it, she told Al Jazeera.

“They would argue that we were ‘anti-Christ’ and that their church was the only sacred and holy way to heaven,” she said.

“Months later, I heard from my brother that they had sold the family’s property and were going to live inside the church after ditching earthly possessions.

“We tried to reach them but were blocked by their leader. My husband broke the news to me one morning after a year that they had been found inside the forest and they were dead and buried.”

After their deaths, they were buried in mass graves within the Shakahola Forest where the church was located. Upon discovery, following a tip from the local media, the police launched an operation to cordon off the area so they could exhume the bodies, test for DNA, and return the deceased to their relatives for proper burial.

They later arrested the church leader, McKenzie, and charged him with the murder of 191 people, child torture, and “terrorism”. He and several other co-accused remain in police custody, pending sentencing.

Unlike Shakahola, the Migori church allowed its followers to work, eat and run businesses in the nearby Opapo and Rongo towns. But like Shakahola, it also kept them living apart from the rest of society, barred them from accessing school, marriage and medical care, and severely punished supposed transgressions, according to locals who heard and witnessed violent beatings and fights inside the compound.

In many societies, religious leaders are widely respected and trusted, and they often influence beliefs and actions in the private and public spheres, explained Fathima Azmiya Badurdee, a postdoctoral researcher in the faculty of Religion, Culture and Society at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

“People are in search of ‘hope’ in the daily issues they confront. Religious leaders are pivotal in this role in providing hope to sustain their futures … or even in life after death,” she explained.

Still, “awareness among religious communities on opportunistic leadership and cult dynamics is needed,” she said, referring to the Opapo and Shakahola forest cases.

“Many people blindly trust religious leaders without questioning them. Words and opinions of religious leaders are taken as the gospel truth. The lack of questioning, critical thinking skills, or even the lack of religious literacy often influences individuals to believe in any extreme forms propagated by these leaders,” she added.

‘I fear she might die’

Most of the 57 Migori worshippers are now back in society once more. However, police extended the detention of four key suspects while investigations and autopsies continued this month.

Assistant county commissioner Kingoku declined to provide details to Al Jazeera about any charges against the worshippers, saying they did not appear in court.

Meanwhile, the Kenya National Police Service spokesperson Michael Muchiri told Al Jazeera: “All individuals found culpable will be taken through the prosecution process as guided by the law.”

Investigations are ongoing into Obura’s cause of death, verification of additional burials alleged by residents, and a probe into whether the church operated as an unregistered “company” rather than a licensed religious organisation.

According to the county commissioner, Mutua Kisilu, the church had been irregularly registered as a company. After the raid last month, Nyanza regional commissioner, Florence Mworoa, announced a region-wide crackdown on unregistered churches.

Muchiri said the government regulates religious outfits in the country and will bring to book all those found to have broken the law.

“Any illegally operating organisation – the government has been clear about it – is quickly shut down. Prosecution, like in the Migori case, follows. Identification of such ‘cult-like’ illegal religious entities is through the local intelligence and security teams and information from the local people,” Muchiri said.

In the meantime in Homa Bay, Achieng finally heard from her mother one last time after the worshippers were released from custody. She told her daughter that she had found a new home and that her family were “worldly” people who she should never associate with again.

“I thought of going to get her from police custody and secure her release, but I [was] worried that she will not agree to go home with me,” Achieng told Al Jazeera. She believes her mother will never return home. “I fear she might die [at the church].”

Meanwhile in Kisumu, Obura’s family continues to mourn him as they work with Kiarie’s organisation and the police to try and secure a court order allowing them to exhume his remains.

All they want, they say, is to transfer him from the church to his ancestral home to bury him according to Luo culture and traditions.

“We are not interested in a lot of things,” Otieno said. “We just want the body of our son so we can bury him here at home. Just that.”

Within the context of an enduring relationship dating back to May 1975, the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a regional bloc with an aspiration of transforming the elongated region along the Atlantic coast and stretching across the Sahel-Savanna bordering the Maghreb. ECOWAS sets out its broad operations incorporating politics, economy, security, social, and culture. The long-term goal is ensuring regional economic sovereignty and political unity among its twelve countries of West Africa.

Today, ECOWAS’s 50 years of its existence represent its marked achievement. It has lagged with issues of fostering strategic solidarity and commitments to its expected goals of sustainable economic transformation. As the regional bloc marked its 50th anniversary in May 2025, ECOWAS had a few achievements to show to the public but faced remarkable and daunting challenges, and these have raised questions about its future.  

On the stage of its aggrandizement, on May 26, ECOWAS officially launched activities commemorating its 50th anniversary in Praia, the capital city of Cabo Verde. The ceremony brought together high-level dignitaries, including the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Cabo Verde, Miryan Vieira; the Acting Resident Representative of the ECOWAS Commission in Cabo Verde and Executive Director of ECREEE, Francis Sempore; the Director of the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre for Zone G; members of the diplomatic corps; representatives of various municipalities; and ECOWAS officials in Cabo Verde.

Francis Sempore emphasized the importance of the golden jubilee, noting that “this 50th anniversary is a remarkable milestone — a time not only for celebration but also for reflection. As we mark five decades of regional cooperation and solidarity, we must redouble efforts to strengthen integration and foster collaboration for a brighter, united future in West Africa.”

Miryan Vieira commended ECOWAS for its continued presence and impact in Cabo Verde. Referring to the promotion of sustainable energy, she underlined the immense growth potential of the ECOWAS region and further called for a “people-centered approach” to regional integration that prioritizes human development and inclusivity.

The final launch was preceded by a press conference at the ECOWAS Representation in Praia. It is most important to remember here that ECOWAS’s golden jubilee commemorations aimed to deepen citizens’ connection to the regional vision, promote shared values, and inspire the next generation of West Africans to contribute to a more integrated and prosperous community.

Despite its excellent aspirations and objectives, regional security has been one of the main obstacles in the region. ECOWAS has seemingly been losing its decades-old credibility primarily due to its approach in ensuring regional peace and stability. The overarching combined narratives starkly pointed to this as its major weakness. The ultimate failure to comprehend the neocolonial goals of foreign powers has created deep cracks in ECOWAS.

According to our monitoring, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, on 29 January 2025, declared withdrawal from the bloc. The three French-speaking West African countries, currently governed by military juntas, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States, citing sovereignty concerns and dissatisfaction with ECOWAS’s responses to political and security developments. As the Sahel region continues to grapple with instability and conflict, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger sought other alternatives, and foreign powers are competing to explore and control the abundant mineral resources of these countries in West Africa.

The regional bloc still looks for mechanisms to resolve the security crisis. It has persistently come under fierce criticism; it slackens on its primary responsibilities. Some experts have called for staff changes, attributing them to deep inefficiency. In fact, its reputation has been at stake, and most probably, it needs new dynamic faces at the Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.

On May 16th, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) held their second joint consultative meeting at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which served as a strategic platform to strengthen cooperation on governance, peace, and security within the frameworks of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Governance Architecture (AGA), and the AU’s Master Roadmap to Silence the Guns by 2030.

Opening the session, Ambassador Harold Bundu Saffa, Chair of the AU PSC for May 2025, welcomed the symbolic significance of holding the meeting and called for a deeper AU–ECOWAS cooperation built on mutual trust and joint responses to emerging challenges such as climate-related security risks, digital conflicts, and youth-led peace initiatives.

In his remarks, Ambassador Musa Sani Nuhu, Chair of the ECOWAS MSC, stressed the urgent need to intensify regional cooperation amid rising insecurity across the continent. He cited threats such as unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and humanitarian crises. “Africa stands at a defining moment in its history,” he stated. “It is vital that we engage in open and constructive dialogue to identify synergies and build a strong, united response to the challenges we all face.”

For his part, Ambassador Abdel-Fatau Musah, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, emphasized the need for inclusive and responsive governance, as well as stronger regional solidarity. “History will not remember our communiqués, but the peace we built, the lives we protected, and the future we dared to imagine together,” he said. Musah, however, advocated for the full involvement of youth and women in peace processes and urged Member States to make subsidiarity a practical foundation for trust and cooperation.

In his keynote address, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, highlighted the importance of long-term institutional partnerships and regular consultations to secure regional peace and foster economic integration. “The AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC must work hand-in-hand on peace and security issues in West Africa,” he stated, commending ECOWAS’s leadership and achievements over its 50-year history, especially in conflict prevention and peace support operations.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the African Union and ECOWAS reaffirmed their strong commitment to strengthening their partnership in addressing the continent’s peace and security challenges through preventive diplomacy, mediation, and joint peace support operations, guided by the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage. Nevertheless, there is hope, most probably in the near future, to overcome these existing development roadblocks and make way for practical strategic development, as the countries in the region have both abundant human and natural resources under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Joseph Kabila is visiting the eastern city of Goma, which has been seized by rebels, after he was stripped of immunity.

Former President Joseph Kabila has returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just days after he lost his immunity amid accusations he has helped armed rebels fighting in the eastern DRC, according to the Reuters and AFP news agencies.

Kabila, on Thursday, was visiting the eastern city of Goma, which had been seized by the Rwanda-backed M23 militia along with several other areas in the resource-rich east of the country earlier this year.

A team of AFP journalists saw Kabila meet local religious figures in the presence of M23’s spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka, without giving a statement.

Citing three unidentified sources close to Kabila, Reuters also said the ex-president held talks with locals in Goma.

The visit comes despite the former president facing the possibility of a treason trial over his alleged support for M23.

Earlier this month, the DRC Senate voted to lift Kabila’s immunity, paving the way for him to be prosecuted.

The ex-president, who has been in self-imposed exile since 2023, denies the allegations and has slammed the charges against him as “arbitrary decisions with disconcerting levity”.

On Thursday, a member of Kabila’s entourage told AFP that though no formal alliance existed between his party and M23, both shared the “same goal” of ending the rule of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The United Nations and the DRC’s government say Rwanda has supported the M23 with arms and troops – an accusation the neighbouring country denies.

The renewed violence has raised fears of igniting a full-blown conflict, akin to the wars that the DRC endured in the late 1990s, involving several African countries, which killed millions of people.

The current fighting has already displaced about 700,000 people this year, according to the UN.

On Tuesday, Amnesty International accused M23 of committing abuses against civilians in areas under its control, “including torture, killings and enforced disappearances”.

“These acts violate international humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes,” the group said in a statement.

M23 says its goal is to protect ethnic minorities against the government in Kinshasa.

A South African mother has been sentenced to life in prison for kidnapping and trafficking her six-year-old daughter, Joshlin Smith, who vanished over a year ago. A witness testified the child was sold to a traditional healer for $1,100.

Ngugi’s work critiqued both British colonialism in Kenya and postcolonial Kenyan society.

Renowned Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o has died at age 87, his family members have announced.

“It is with a heavy heart that we announce the passing of our dad, Ngugi wa Thiong’o,” his daughter Wanjiku Wa Ngugi wrote on Facebook on Wednesday.

“He lived a full life, fought a good fight,” she said.

At the time of his death, Ngugi was reportedly receiving kidney dialysis treatments, but his immediate cause of death is still unknown.

Born in Kenya in 1938, Ngugi will be remembered as one of Africa’s most important postcolonial writers. Formative events in Ngugi’s early life included the brutal Mau Mau war that swept British-ruled Kenya in the 1950s.

Ngugi’s work was equally critical of the British colonial era and the postcolonial society that followed Kenya’s independence in 1963. Other topics in his work covered the intersection between language, culture, history, and identity.

Ngugi made a mark for himself in the 1970s when he decided to switch from writing in English to the Kikuyu and Swahili languages – a controversial decision at the time.

“We all thought he was mad… and brave at the same time,” Kenyan writer David Maillu told the AFP news agency.

“We asked ourselves who would buy the books.”

One of his most famous works, “Decolonising the Mind”, was published in 1986 while living abroad. The book argues that it is “impossible to liberate oneself while using the language of oppressors”, AFP reports.

Besides holding the position of acclaimed writer, Ngugi was a prisoner of conscience. In 1977, he was jailed in Kenya for staging a play deemed critical of contemporary society.

He once described the country’s new elite class as “the death of hopes, the death of dreams and the death of beauty”.

In 1982, Ngugi went into self-imposed exile in the UK following a ban on theatre groups and performances in his home country. He later moved to the US, where he worked as a professor of comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine. He also continued writing a range of works, including essays, memoirs and novels about Kenya.

Following news of Ngugi’s death, praise for his life and work quickly appeared online.

“My condolences to the family and friends of Professor Ngugi wa Thiong’o, a renowned literary giant and scholar, a son of the soil and great patriot whose footprints are indelible,” Kenya’s opposition leader Martha Karua wrote on X.

“Thank you Mwalimu [teacher] for your freedom writing,” wrote Amnesty International’s Kenya branch on X. “Having already earned his place in Kenyan history, he transitions from mortality to immortality.”

Margaretta wa Gacheru, a sociologist and former student of Ngugi, said the author was a national icon.

“To me, he’s like a Kenyan Tolstoy, in the sense of being a storyteller, in the sense of his love of the language and panoramic view of society, his description of the landscape of social relations, of class and class struggles,” she said.

In 2015, as a civil war was raging in South Sudan, the United Nations Security Council imposed the first set of sanctions on the country, including asset freezes and travel bans on various senior officials. Three years later, after a ceasefire agreement was repeatedly violated, the UNSC mustered the votes to impose a full arms embargo. Fragile peace eventually settled in, but the embargo was kept in place and was extended every year.

The review of the embargo is now coming up on May 29 and there is a push from African members of the UNSC – Sierra Leone, Somalia and Algeria – to lift it. On March 18, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) publicly called for this measure to end.

But lifting the embargo on South Sudan at this moment would be a mistake. Violence has come back to plague the country, killing at least 180 people between March and mid-April, amid deepening divisions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, who has been placed under house arrest.

Allowing more weapons to enter the country would only escalate the dire situation. This would not be in the interest of neighbouring countries and the African Union as a whole.

Under the AU’s development plan, Agenda 2063, the continent set itself an ambitious goal of “Silencing the Guns” by 2020, later extended to 2030. With this, the AU wants to “end all wars and violent conflicts and promote dialogue-based mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution”.

Yet, the AUPSC’s call for lifting the embargo on South Sudan does not fall in line with these goals. The justification for this stance is that free access to more weapons can enable the unification of government and opposition forces and reform the security sector.

But this logic ignores the growing fractures in South Sudan amid the renewed tensions between Kiir and Machar. Placing more guns in the hands of warring parties involved in serious human rights violations and crimes under international law would only make the situation worse.

South Sudan’s security and defence forces have attacked the very people they are tasked to protect: Civilians. The South Sudanese army, National Security Service and armed opposition forces have been implicated in war crimes and human rights violations for well more than a decade, including by the AU’s Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan and the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan.

Indeed, around the time the AUPSC called for the lifting of the arms embargo, South Sudan’s government reportedly used improvised incendiary weapons in aerial attacks, killing at least 58 people and injuring others, including children.

To be sure, the existence of the arms embargo is not enough – its enforcement is key. That is already faltering after in early March, Uganda sent troops and military equipment to South Sudan without providing notification or receiving special exemption from the UNSC Sanctions Committee. This is a clear violation of the embargo.

South Sudan’s Mi-24 helicopters also seem to be on the move, despite the government’s fleet reportedly being non-functional and grounded since the arms embargo was imposed in 2018. This suggests spare parts have been sourced in violation of the embargo.

On May 4, Doctors Without Borders, known by its French initials MSF, reported that two helicopter gunships had bombed its medical facility in Old Fangak the day before and fired at the town, killing seven and injuring 20 others. Deliberate attacks on a medical facility performing its humanitarian function violate international humanitarian law and would constitute a war crime.  This is yet another indication of why the UNSC must renew the arms embargo and strengthen its enforcement.

If properly implemented and enforced, a renewed UNSC arms embargo would not obstruct security sector reform. Instead, it would block the disorderly and destabilising accumulation of arms in South Sudan, which is spurring the current conflict and contributing to violations against civilians.

If the AU is serious about silencing the guns, it should back the strict controls prohibiting arms transfers to South Sudan, and the African states in the UNSC should vote to renew the arms embargo.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Amnesty International says torture, killings and enforced disappearances have taken place in areas under rebel control.

M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have committed serious abuses against civilians, “including torture, killings and enforced disappearances”, in areas under their control, according to Amnesty International.

“These acts violate international humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes,” Amnesty said in a statement on Tuesday.

The allegations come amid a renewed surge in violence that erupted in January, when the Rwandan-backed M23 group captured the strategic city of Goma in North Kivu province. The rebels went on to seize Bukavu in South Kivu in February, escalating a conflict that has displaced hundreds of thousands.

Between February and April, Amnesty researchers spoke to 18 people who had been detained by M23 in Goma and Bukavu. Many said they were held on accusations of supporting the Congolese army or government – claims for which no proof was presented. Several were not told why they were being held.

According to Amnesty, detainees were crammed into overcrowded, unhygienic cells, lacking adequate food, water, sanitation and medical care. Some of those interviewed said they saw fellow prisoners die due to these conditions or from acts of torture.

Witnesses described gruesome scenes, including two detainees being bludgeoned to death with hammers and another shot dead on the spot.

All of the former detainees said they were either tortured or saw others being tortured with wooden sticks, electric cables or engine belts, the rights group said.

Relatives searching for the missing were often turned away by M23 fighters, who denied the detainees were being held – actions Amnesty says amount to enforced disappearances.

Peace deal remains elusive

“M23’s public statements about bringing order to eastern DRC mask their horrific treatment of detainees. They brutally punish those who they believe oppose them and intimidate others, so no one dares to challenge them,” said Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty International’s regional director for East and Southern Africa.

“Regional and international actors must pressure Rwanda to cease its support for M23,” added Chagutah.

The United Nations and DRC’s government say Rwanda has supported M23 by providing arms and sending troops – an accusation Kigali denies.

The UN estimates that about 4,000 Rwandan soldiers support M23.

M23 is among roughly 100 armed groups fighting for control in eastern DRC, a region rich in minerals and bordering Rwanda. The ongoing conflict has driven more than seven million people from their homes, including 100,000 who fled this year alone.

Despite recent pledges by the Congolese army and the rebels to seek a truce, clashes have continued. M23 previously threatened to advance as far as the capital, Kinshasa, more than 1,600km (1,000 miles) away.

In April, Rwanda and DRC agreed to draft a peace deal by May 2, committing to respect each other’s sovereignty and refraining from providing military support to armed groups.

Claude fears he may soon die – either from starvation or violence – as he waits at a food distribution tent in a refugee camp in Burundi.

He is among thousands of Congolese refugees trapped between a brutal conflict across the border and severe reductions in international food assistance.

A former bouncer from Uvira, a town in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Claude fled after violence erupted in the east, sparked by the rapid advance of the Rwanda-backed M23 group.

Armed groups “were shooting, killing each other, … raping women,” recalled the 25-year-old, who escaped across the border into Burundi in February.

In the overcrowded Musenyi camp, Claude now faces a different struggle as food rations dwindle.

Hunger has fuelled new tensions within the camp, prompting Claude to join volunteers who patrol the area to prevent theft of what supplies remain.

“When I arrived here, I was given 3.5kg [7.7lb] of rice per month. Now it’s a kilo [2.2lb]. The 3kg [6.6lb] of peas have dropped to 1.8kg [4lb]. What I get in tomato sauce lasts one day. Then it’s over,” said Claude, whose name has been changed for security reasons, as have the names of other refugees interviewed.

Some of the most desperate resort to slashing neighbours’ tents in search of food, he added, while gangs “spread terror”.

“The reduction of assistance will lead to many crimes,” he warned.

Oscar Niyibizi, the camp’s deputy administrator, described the cut in food rations as a “major challenge” that could “cause security disruption”.

He urges refugees to cultivate land nearby but said external support remains desperately needed.

The administration of United States President Donald Trump slashed its aid budget by 80 percent, and other Western nations have also reduced donations. As a result, many NGOs and United Nations agencies have been forced to close or significantly scale back their programmes.

These cutbacks have come at a “very bad time” as fighting escalates in the DRC, according to Geoffrey Kirenga, head of mission for Save the Children in Burundi.

Burundi, one of the world’s poorest countries, has received more than 71,000 Congolese refugees since January while still hosting thousands from previous conflicts.

Established last year to accommodate 10,000 people, the Musenyi camp’s population is now nearly twice that number.

In addition to food shortages, the reduction in aid has led NGOs to discontinue support services for survivors of sexual violence, who are numerous in the camp, Kirenga said.

His gravest concern is that “deaths from hunger” may become inevitable.

The World Food Programme has halved rations since March and warned that without renewed US funding, all assistance could end by November.

According to the UN, hundreds of Congolese refugees are compelled to risk returning across the border in search of food.

Last week, Ugandan lawyer Agather Atuhaire was finally set free five days after she was detained by the Tanzanian police for unclear reasons. She was unceremoniously dumped at the Mutukula border crossing between the two countries.

Details of Atuhaire’s condition remain unclear, but a statement from the organisation she works with as well as Kenyan activist Boniface Mwangi, who was detained with her, alleged that she was tortured. He himself showed signs of physical abuse after he was also dumped at the Kenya-Tanzania border a day earlier.

For East Africans, Atuhaire and Mwangi’s ordeal has been a painful reminder of just how far democracy in the region has retreated. People organising to resist state excesses have been increasingly facing structural and physical violence with little space for redress.

Mwangi and Atuhaire were among a small group of regional activists and political figures who flew into Tanzania to show solidarity with Tundu Lissu, the leader of the Tanzanian opposition. Lissu is facing several charges, the most grievous among them treason, for comments he allegedly made at a political rally.

But Lissu is not alone in the region in facing reprisals for political action. In neighbouring Uganda, leader of the opposition Kizza Besigye is facing the same charges, based on the same idea that organising and leading opposition against an entrenched political power amounts to treason.

Meanwhile, in Kenya, the aftermath of the 2024 anti-finance bill protests is haunting the country. In the absence of a well organised political opposition, which is stymied by frenetic deal-making and horse-trading, protesters and youth activists have become the country’s unofficial political opposition.

The youth have borne the brunt of political violence during last year’s protests, which killed at least 82 people. Kidnappings and abductions of protesters spiked after the demonstrations, and activist groups alleged that some people remain unaccounted for despite President William Ruto’s assertion to the contrary.

In Burundi, people continue to live under the shadow of police excesses and in fear of the possibility of war with its expansionist neighbours.

In Rwanda, several opposition figures who tried to run against President Paul Kagame were jailed on various charges. The neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo is perennially caught between war and political crisis.

So how did we get to this state of affairs? The simplest answer is that we allowed ourselves to conflate elections with democracy, and the malicious intentions of those who wield power took advantage of that faith. The reality of building robust democratic systems is far more complicated than lining up to vote every four or five years, and real democracy requires round the clock vigilance.

A meaningful democracy requires robust local government, transparent political parties as well as institutional accountability and participation, all of which have been on the retreat in the region in the past two decades.

Power has remained highly centralised in the executive, enabled by the capitulation of legislatures and the “naomba serekali” (“I am requesting of the government”) approach to politics.

Parliaments are empowered by the legitimacy of a popular vote, but they repeatedly submit to the executive. Proof of this can be easily found in the experience of women trying to run for office in the region.

As outlined in a 2018 volume on the Kenyan election that I co-edited, Where Women Are: Gender and the 2017 Kenyan General Election, the weakness begins within political parties, in which candidates must kowtow to a kingpin to gain permission to appear on the ballot. Those who do not are often locked out from competitive electoral cycles. As a result, save for constitutional quotas, women’s participation in electoral politics has declined – a canary in the coalmine of shrinking democratic space.

Meanwhile, parties have mastered the art of managing gender optics as a substitute for real change, reducing debates about democracy to the periodic performance of voting. Thus, Samia Suluhu’s presidency in Tanzania is not a sign of improving democracy but rather that of a political machine that picked the least contentious candidate who would allow the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, to continue managing the country. Similarly, the dominance of women in Rwanda’s parliament is not in itself indicative of progress for women but of the ability of the ruling party to select candidates who are less likely to push back.

Once these candidates are laundered through the political party machine, they enter the legislature more beholden to their political kingpin than to voters. And this is the case whether the kingpin is in government or in the opposition.

In Kenya, opposition candidates like Edwin Sifuna, who vociferously defended the rights of protesters during the June 2024 protests, have become tongue-tied in 2025 because their party kingpin has since struck a deal with Ruto and blind obeisance is the only guaranteed pathway to power in this system.

In Uganda, politicians are bought off with state cars and loans, and in Tanzania, they are silenced by arrests, detentions and disappearances of critics of the state. The net effect is that elections become a performance whose actual impact diminishes rapidly over time.

A quick scan of global politics will affirm that this is not a uniquely East African problem. The same crisis is taking shape in the United States, particularly after the evisceration of the Republican Party by Tea Party politics and of the Democratic Party by careerist politicians.

But the events of the last week show that for East Africa, an extra layer of risk exists because of the unquestioning and blind loyalty of security services to the whims of the state – something the current US administration seeks to build into the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency.

The long-term solution to this state of affairs is for ordinary people to become more engaged in localised democratic practices, changing the quality of people who rise up the ranks in politics. Of course, this can be difficult when people are merely trying to survive a hostile political and economic climate, but in the long term, it creates new entry points for civic engagement.

Democracy is strengthened when more people participate in the governance of civic institutions like schools, hospitals, trade unions, cooperatives, neighbourhood associations, and even sports and social clubs – in processes that they can immediately connect to their quality of life.

Elections then become the culmination of four or five years of regular exercises of democracy, not a separate process that floats above the reality of people’s lives.

In parallel, the onus is on the legislators of East Africa to find their teeth and their purpose. Their job is not political survival or the pursuit of political careers. Their job is to defend the people who elected them, to rein in the excesses of the executive and to defend the integrity of the constitution.

Meanwhile, we, the people, should all heed the call of Nigerian public intellectual Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem: “Don’t agonise, organise,” and seek to rebuild democracy in East Africa from the ground up.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

At least 260 miners have been brought to the surface in South Africa after being stuck underground at a gold mine for 24 hours.

Africa is at the centre of a rising demand for minerals and precious metals.

Lithium is essential to the transition away from fossil fuels, used for batteries in electric vehicles and other clean energy technologies.

But in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rights groups continue to denounce the dangerous working conditions of children in artisanal mines, particularly for cobalt.

So, are the continent’s critical minerals at a critical juncture? And what will be the impact of the global scramble for Africa’s natural resources?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

Claude Kabemba – Executive director of Southern Africa Resource Watch

Christopher Vandome – Senior research fellow at Chatham House Africa Programme

Maurice Carney – Co-founder and executive director, Friends of the Congo

Fake stories of a coup d’etat in the West African nation of Ivory Coast surfaced this week amid mounting tensions over the upcoming October general elections.

Several accounts on social media sites, including Facebook and X, posted videos of huge crowds on streets with burning buildings, which they claimed were from the country’s commercial capital, Abidjan.

However, no violence was reported by security forces or any other government authorities in the city this week. Abidjan residents also denied the claims on social media.

On Thursday, the country’s National Agency for Information Systems Security of Ivory Coast (ANSSI) denied the rumours.

In a statement published on local media sites, the agency said: “Publications currently circulating on the X network claim that a coup d’etat has taken place in Cote d’Ivoire [Ivory Coast] … This claim is completely unfounded. It is the result of a deliberate and coordinated disinformation campaign.”

The rumours come just weeks after popular opposition politician Tidjane Thiam was barred from running for office after his eligibility was challenged in court over a technicality relating to his citizenship status. Thiam is appealing the ruling and claims the ban is political.

Ivory Coast, Africa’s cocoa powerhouse, has a long history of election violence, with one episode a decade ago spiralling into armed conflict that resulted in thousands of deaths.

Fears that President Alassane Ouattara might run for a fourth term have added to the tensions this time. Although the country has a two-term limit for presidents, a constitutional amendment in 2016 reset the clock on his terms, the president’s supporters argue, allowing him to run for a third five-year term in 2020. That same argument could also see him on the ballot papers this October, despite what experts say is widespread disillusionment with the political establishment in the country.

Here’s what we know about the current political situation in the country:

How did the coup rumours start?

Videos showing hundreds of people demonstrating in the streets and setting fires to shops and malls started appearing on social media sites on Wednesday this week. French is the official language in Ivory Coast, but most of the posts and blogs with images purporting to be from were from Abidjan and claiming that a coup d’etat was in progress were written in English.

Some posts also claimed that the country’s army chief of staff, Lassina Doumbia, had been assassinated and that President Ouattara was missing. These claims were untrue and have been denied by the office of the president. Credible media outlets, including Ivorian state media and private news media, did not report the alleged violence.

It is unclear how the rumours that President Ouattara was missing emerged. On Thursday, he chaired a routine cabinet meeting in the capital. He also attended a ceremony commemorating the revered former president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, alongside Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe.

Why are there political tensions in the country?

The upcoming general elections on October 25 are at the root of current political tensions in the country.

Elections have in the past been violent: During the October 2010 general election, former President Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Ouattara, who was proclaimed the winner by the electoral commission.

Tense political negotiations failed, and the situation eventually spiralled into armed civil war, with Ouattara’s forces, backed by French troops, besieging Gbagbo’s national army. France is the former colonial power in Ivory Coast, and Ouattara has close ties to Paris.

Some 3,000 people were killed in the violence. Gbagbo’s capture on April 11, 2011, marked the end of the conflict. He was later tried and acquitted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in 2019.

That painful history has spurred fears that this year’s polls could also turn violent, as several opposition candidates, including Gbagbo, have been barred from running, mainly due to past convictions. In 2018, the former president was sentenced in absentia to a 20-year jail term over the looting of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) during the country’s post-election crisis.

Last December, the governing Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) party nominated Ouattara for a fourth term as president. So far, Ouattara has refused to say whether he intends to run, triggering concerns among Ivorians, many of whom feel the president has outstayed his welcome. Analysts see the party’s nomination as setting the stage for his eventual candidature, however.

Analysts also say there is widespread sympathy for the young military leaders who seized power in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso, and who have maintained a hostile stance towards France, unlike Ouattara.

What is the popular view of Ouattara?

He has been praised for overseeing rapid economic stability in the last decade and a half, which has made the country the regional economic hub.

Ouattara is also credited with bringing some level of political peace to the country. In 2023, he welcomed back Gbagbo, who had been living in Brussels since his 2021 ICC acquittal. Since then, election campaigns have not been as inflamed as they were in the 2000s when Gbagbo played on ethnic sentiments to incite opposition to Ouattara, whose father was originally from Burkina Faso.

However, Ouattara’s critics accuse him of fighting to hold onto power unconstitutionally. Some also accuse him of coercing state institutions into railroading his political opponents, including in the latest case involving Thiam.

His closeness with France, which is increasingly viewed as arrogant and neo-colonialistic, particularly by younger people across Francophone West Africa, has not won the president any favour from the country’s significant under-35 population.

Who is Tidjane Thiam, and why has he been barred from the elections?

Thiam, 62, is a prominent politician and businessman in Ivorian political circles. He is a nephew of the revered Houphouet-Boigny and was the first Ivorian to pass the entrance exam to France’s prestigious Polytechnique engineering school. He returned from France to serve as a minister of planning and development from 1998 until 1999, when a coup d’etat collapsed the civilian government, and the army took control of the country.

Thiam declined a cabinet position offered by the military government and left the country. He went on to take high-profile positions, first as the chief executive of the UK insurance group, Prudential, and then as head of global investment bank Credit Suisse. A corporate espionage scandal at the bank led to his resignation in 2020 after a colleague accused Thiam of spying on him. Thiam was cleared of any involvement.

After returning to Ivory Coast in 2022, Thiam re-entered politics and rejoined the Democratic Party (PDCI), the former governing party which held power from independence in 1960 until the 1999 coup d’etat, and which is now the major opposition party.

In December 2023, the party’s delegates overwhelmingly voted for Thiam to be the next leader following the death of former head and ex-President Henri Konan Bedie. At the time, PDCI officials said Thiam represented a breath of fresh air for the country’s politics, and many young people appeared ready to back him as the next president.

But his ambitions came to a halt on April 22 when a judge ordered his name be struck off the list of contenders because Thiam had taken French nationality in 1987 and automatically lost Ivorian citizenship according to the country’s laws.

Although the politician renounced his French nationality in February this year, the court ruled he had not done so before registering himself on the electoral roll in 2022, and was thus ineligible to be the party leader, a presidential candidate, or even a voter.

Thiam and his lawyers argued that the law is inconsistent. Ivorian footballers on the country’s national team, Thiam pointed out in one interview with reporters, are mostly also French nationals, but face no restrictions on holding Ivorian nationality. “The bottom line is, I was born Ivorian,” Thiam told the BBC in an interview, accusing the government of trying to block what he said is his party’s likely success in this year’s elections.

Will Thiam be able to stand and who else is standing?

It is unclear if Thiam can legally make his way back onto the candidate list, but he is trying.

In May, he resigned as PDCI president and was almost immediately re-elected with 99 percent of the vote. He has yet to reveal if he will attempt to re-register as a candidate, but has promised to keep up the fight.

Thiam has pledged to attract industrial investment to the country as he once did as minister, and to remove the country from the France-backed CFA currency economy that comprises West and Central African countries formerly colonised by France, and sees their currencies pegged to the euro.

Meanwhile, other strong candidates include Pascal Affi N’Guessan, 67, a former prime minister and close ally of Gbagbo, who will represent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).

Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady who is now divorced from Gbagbo, will also run, as the nominee for the Movement of the Capable Generations. She was sentenced to a 20-year term in 2015 on charges of undermining state security, but benefitted from an amnesty law to foster national reconciliation later in 2018.

Kenya’s role in global environmental diplomacy is becoming more important than ever. Now that climate change is having the harshest effect on vulnerable countries, Kenya has had its share of opportunity to make its environmental work a kind of soft power—both to safeguard its ecosystems and to improve its reputation abroad. Although Kenya may not be the most industrialized or the most economically developed country, it somehow has become a respected voice in global environmental talks. This isn’t by accident. It’s the fruit of decades of struggle for conservation, international partnership in promotion of conservation works, and recognition of the fact that environmental policy can also be utilized to fund foreign policies.

Kenya has a reputation for great natural beauty. From the savannah of the Maasai Mara to the Aberdare Forest, the country is a homeland to some of the world’s most iconic wildlife and ecosystems. Kenya isn’t just a safari destination, though; it’s also one of the countries that has genuinely done its best to protect the environment. This goes back decades. When the U.N. decided to build its global environmental headquarters, it settled on Nairobi. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) still lies there — an extraordinary tribute and a prestigious mark of Kenya’s old environmental credibility. What is so special about Kenya is not the biodiversity itself, but the fact that this state considers it to increase its influence and to earn international goodwill. Put differently, besides serving the conventional diplomacy purposes of Kenya, environmental diplomacy also plays a part in the promotion of public diplomacy, namely, as a device for demonstrating the country to other nations as responsible, peaceful, and willing to cooperate on a global scale. Through sustainable development, conservation, and climate justice, by so doing Kenya is not just making a policy statement; it is very deliberately forming views of itself held by other countries and the international institutions.

Over the recent years, this strategy has become more welcomed by the recently elected presidents of Kenya. For instance, President William Ruto has made it obvious that green growth and environmental protection are at the heart of Kenya’s future. He has attended climate conferences such as COP27 and put Kenya in pole position on renewable energy and adaptation to climate change. Already, the country produces more than three-quarters of the electricity from clean sources such as geothermal, wind, and hydropower—a feat very few rich countries can achieve. This clean energy record enables Kenya to talk the talk and walk the walk on its quest to have other countries act on climate. It is in doing this that Kenya will not only enlarge their voice in climate talks but also build confidence from other nations. This is at the heart of its public diplomacy: presenting to the world that it is behaving in good faith and assuming responsibility towards its future and towards the planet’s future. Environmental diplomacy becomes a space for dialogue and trust development and international recognition. It gives Kenya an opportunity to shape policy but still draw investment, tourists, and partnerships.

Simultaneously, Kenya is doing its best to save its environment from the worst consequences of climate change. The country records regular occurrences of drought, floods, and other extreme weather patterns affecting farming, driving people from their homes, and jeopardizing wildlife. In response, Kenya has launched efforts like national tree-planting campaigns, water conservation projects, and climate-smart farming. These actions not only create domestic resilience but also enhance Kenya’s credibility once talks on global standards begin. If a country talks the talk at home, it receives greater respect in the international arena.

One of the most visible examples of Kenya’s environmental diplomacy influencing others was the hosting of the Africa Climate Summit in 2023. Held in Nairobi, the summit gathered several African leaders to harmonize their climate policies and speak as one voice. The issued Nairobi declaration demanded immediate global reforms on climate finance and on the sharing of technologies. Kenya took advantage of this chance to not only determine continental climate action but also use the platform to present itself as a convening power and thought leader on climate policy. Other countries, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Africa, associated themselves with Kenya, thus showing that environmental diplomacy can lift a country’s regional floor.

Kenya has received massive green investment in the form of partnerships with countries such as Germany and members of the European Union. Among the major green investments is major renewable energy like the Lake Turkana Wind Power Plant. Germany has acknowledged Kenya’s initiative positively; it has provided the latter with technical and financial support to shift towards the use of cleaner energy. Kenya, at the same time, also succeeded in guiding Chinese investment to greener practices. For example, although there are concerns about the environment concerning the Standard Gauge Railway project, Kenya insists on environmental assessments and green standards so that China’s infrastructural deals are more climate aware. Kenya’s relationship with the United States has also been enhanced through cooperation in the environment. The U.S., via USAID and other bodies, has supported initiatives covering such areas as wildlife conservation, clean energy, and even climate-smart agriculture. This environmental partnership has enhanced Kenya’s image as a reliable friend in East Africa; they have opened more diplomatic and economic doors.

Kenya’s environmental credibility makes bridges for it both to the Western countries and also to the Global South. Through the active promotion of climate justice, particularly at times of significant climate confabulations such as COP27, Kenya has become a voice for the rest of the developing countries that suffer the effects of climate on them. This was evident in Kenya’s support for the establishment of a “Loss and Damage” fund that compensates the vulnerable countries—a call that was later adopted. Kenya is also diversifying its external cooperation from the traditional Western powers. It is collaborating with countries like India and Brazil and other emerging economies to jointly develop green economies. This spreads out Kenya’s alternatives, enhances its diplomatic clout, and argues for a more multipolar cooperation in climate leadership. Once more, this fits into its public diplomacy, as that makes Kenya a welcoming and collaborating nation ready to collaborate with many partners towards common environmental interests. Finally, Kenya’s environmental diplomacy is not only about savages from forests but also about wildlife and carbon emission cutting—it is all about the influence.

Kenya has managed to turn around its environmental activities into instruments of foreign policy and public diplomacy. Involving heavy nations such as Germany, China, the U.S., and Africa’s regional partners, Kenya is defining how other governments see climate justice, clean energy, and sustainable development. It is fighting for global reforms, setting the examples, organizing major summits, and appealing for justice on behalf of developing nations. Kenya’s green leadership is not only doing its environment good; it is a calculated policy to shape global discussions, draw other nations to its angle on climate, and gain respect, confidence, and collaboration in the world. In a nutshell, Kenya’s environmental diplomacy is about transforming the international agenda and (not by force but rather by the values, vision, and responsibility) demonstrating that even the midsized African nation can lead the world.

Kabila, accused of ‘treason’ and ‘war crimes’, denies government accusations of links to M23 rebel group.

Joseph Kabila, former president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has attacked the country’s justice system after the Senate voted to lift his immunity, paving the way for him to be prosecuted for alleged treason and war crimes.

Kabila gave a livestreamed speech from an undisclosed location on Friday, a day after losing his immunity over alleged links to the M23 rebel group, saying that the justice system was “an instrument of oppression for a dictatorship desperately trying to survive”.

The 53-year-old, who denies supporting the Rwanda-backed rebels who have seized two major cities in the country’s conflict-battered east, has been in self-imposed exile since 2023.

The former president, who has repeatedly said he was returning from exile to help find a solution to the crisis, accused Kinshasa of taking “arbitrary decisions with disconcerting levity”.

Congo’s Senate voted overwhelmingly on Thursday to grant the government’s request to lift the lifetime immunity Kabila – leader of the country from 2001 to 2019 – had enjoyed because of his honorific title as “senator for life”.

Justice Minister Constant Mutamba said Kabila’s alleged crimes included “treason, war crimes, crimes against humanity and participation in an insurrectional movement” in the country’s east.

On Friday, Kabila said the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were non-negotiable. “As a soldier, I swore to defend my country to the supreme sacrifice … I remain more faithful than ever to this oath,” he said.

Kabila’s return to the DRC could complicate the bid to end the rebellion in the east, which contains vast supplies of critical minerals that United States President Donald Trump’s administration is eager to access.

Washington is pushing for a peace agreement to be signed between the DRC and Rwanda this summer, accompanied by minerals deals aimed at bringing billions of dollars of Western investment to the region, according to Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior adviser for Africa, cited by news agency Reuters.

Mining company Sibanye-Stillwater says all workers are safe and have been provided with food as they await rescue.

Rescue efforts were under way in South Africa on Friday as more than 200 miners were trapped at a gold mine for a second day.

Mining company Sibanye-Stillwater said on Thursday that the miners were trapped after what it referred to as a “shaft incident” at the Kloof gold mine, one of the company’s deepest.

It said that all the workers were safe and gathered at an assembly point where they had been provided with food as efforts were being made to get them out.

“It was decided that employees should remain at the sub-shaft station until it is safe to proceed to the surface,” the company said.

The total number of workers trapped was not immediately clear. News agencies reported that 260 people were trapped, while a company spokesperson said 289 miners were in the shaft.

The National Union of Mineworkers, representing the workers at the Kloof mine, said they had been trapped for more than 24 hours as Sibanye-Stillwater continued pushing back its estimated time to retrieve the workers.

“We are very concerned because the mine did not even make this incident public until we reported it to the media,” said NUM spokesman Livhuwani Mammburu.

The mine, located 60km (37 miles) west of Johannesburg, is among a few collecting from some of the world’s deepest gold deposits.

The resurgence of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has drawn renewed international attention following M23’s swift capture of Goma and Bukavu in late January 2025. In response, global actors have called for an immediate ceasefire and direct negotiations. Notably, Qatar and the United States have stepped forward as emerging mediators. This new momentum offers a rare opportunity to revisit the shortcomings of past mediation efforts – particularly failures in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), wealth-sharing, and regional consensus. Any new diplomatic initiative must prioritise these elements to forge a durable settlement and lasting regional stability.

To achieve a sustainable and enduring peace in eastern DRC, it is essential to address the root causes of the conflict. The region’s vast deposits of natural resources – especially rare earth minerals – have attracted international, regional and local actors competing for control, fuelling instability. Compounding this is the Congolese central government’s limited capacity to govern the eastern provinces, enabling the proliferation of armed groups with diverse allegiances. Ethnic tensions further exacerbate the crisis, particularly since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, after which the arrival of Hutu refugees and the formation of hostile militias heightened insecurity and cross-border conflict.

While regional dynamics, including Rwandan involvement, are undeniably significant, attributing the conflict solely to Rwanda risks oversimplification. Such narratives obscure the DRC’s longstanding structural inequalities, particularly the marginalisation of Congolese Tutsi communities. A durable peace must engage with these internal dynamics by ensuring the meaningful inclusion of Congolese Tutsi in the national political framework and addressing their grievances through equitable and just mechanisms.

Despite repeated international engagement, past mediation efforts in eastern DRC – from the Pretoria Agreement to the 2009 peace accords – have consistently failed to deliver lasting peace. These initiatives were undermined by structural weaknesses that eroded both their credibility and effectiveness.

A central flaw has been the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms. Most agreements relied on voluntary compliance and lacked robust, impartial monitoring frameworks capable of verifying implementation or deterring violations. Where monitoring mechanisms existed, they were often under-resourced, poorly coordinated, or perceived as biased. The international community’s inconsistent attention and limited political will to exert sustained pressure further undermined these efforts. In the absence of meaningful accountability, armed groups and political elites repeatedly violated agreements without consequence, fuelling a cycle of impunity and renewed violence.

Equally problematic has been the exclusionary nature of the peace processes. Negotiations were often dominated by political and military elites, sidelining civil society, grassroots communities, and particularly women – actors essential for building sustainable peace. Without broad-based participation, the accords failed to reflect the realities on the ground or earn the trust of local populations.

Moreover, these efforts largely ignored the root causes of the conflict, such as land disputes, ethnic marginalisation, governance failures and competition over natural resources. By prioritising short-term ceasefires and elite power-sharing arrangements, mediators overlooked the deeper structural issues that drive instability.

DDR programs – vital to breaking the conflict cycle – have also been inadequately designed and poorly executed. Many former combatants were left without viable livelihoods, creating fertile ground for re-recruitment into armed groups and further violence.

Crucially, these flaws were compounded by a lack of political will within the Congolese government. Successive administrations have, at times, instrumentalised peace talks to consolidate power rather than to advance genuine reform, undermining implementation and eroding public confidence.

More recent efforts, such as the Luanda and Nairobi processes, aimed to revive political dialogue and de-escalate tensions. However, they too have struggled to gain legitimacy. Critics argue that both initiatives were top-down, narrowly political and failed to include the voices of those most affected by the conflict. Civil society actors and marginalised communities perceived these dialogues as superficial and disconnected from local realities.

These processes also fell short in addressing the underlying drivers of violence – displacement, land ownership disputes, poor governance and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Without credible mechanisms for local participation or structural reform, the Luanda and Nairobi processes came to be seen more as diplomatic performances than genuine pathways to peace.

Taken together, these recurring shortcomings explain why international mediation efforts in DRC have largely failed. For any new initiative – including those led by Qatar and the United States – to succeed, it must move beyond these limitations and embrace a more inclusive, accountable and locally rooted approach.

The latest round of international facilitation – led by the United States and Qatar, alongside African-led efforts by the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) under Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe – offers renewed potential for meaningful progress. However, success will depend on whether these efforts can overcome the systemic failures that have plagued previous mediation attempts.

To chart a more effective and durable path to peace, Qatari and American engagement should be guided by three core principles drawn from past experience:

First, prioritise inclusive participation. Previous peace processes were largely elite-driven, involving governments and armed groups while excluding civil society, women and affected communities. This lack of inclusivity weakened legitimacy and failed to address the grievances of those most impacted by violence. A credible mediation process must include these actors to build a broad-based coalition for peace and ensure that negotiated outcomes reflect the lived realities of eastern DRC communities.

Second, address the root causes of the conflict – not just its symptoms. Earlier efforts focused narrowly on ceasefires and power-sharing, without tackling the structural drivers of instability. Effective mediation must engage with unresolved land disputes, ethnic marginalization, governance failures and the socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants. Without addressing these underlying issues, any agreement will be fragile and short-lived.

Third, establish credible enforcement and accountability mechanisms. One of the most persistent weaknesses of past agreements has been the absence of strong implementation tools. Agreements often lacked independent monitoring bodies, clear benchmarks and consequences for violations. The international community, including Qatar and the United States, must commit to sustained diplomatic pressure and support mechanisms that can ensure compliance and respond decisively to breaches. Without this, the risk of relapse into violence remains high.

By adopting these principles, current mediation efforts stand a greater chance of breaking the cycle of failed peace initiatives and laying the groundwork for a more just and lasting resolution in eastern DRC.

The crisis has once again reached a critical juncture. The involvement of new actors such as Qatar and the United States, working alongside African regional mechanisms, presents a rare opportunity to reset the approach to peacebuilding. By learning from past failures and committing to an inclusive, root cause oriented, and enforceable mediation framework, these efforts can move beyond temporary fixes and lay the foundation for a durable peace – one that finally addresses the aspirations and grievances of the Congolese people.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

East African rights groups condemn Tanzania, saying human right activists ‘abandoned’ at border show signs of torture.

A Ugandan human rights activist, arrested in Tanzania after travelling to the country to support an opposition politician at a trial for treason, has been tortured and dumped at the border, according to an NGO.

Ugandan rights group Agora Discourse said on Friday that activist and journalist Agather Atuhaire had been “abandoned at the border by Tanzanian authorities” and showed signs of torture.

The statement echoes reports regarding a Kenyan activist detained at the same time and released a day earlier, and supports complaints of a crackdown on democracy across East Africa.

Atuhaire had travelled to Tanzania alongside Kenyan anticorruption campaigner Boniface Mwangi to support opposition leader Tundu Lissu, who appeared in court on Monday.

Both were arrested shortly after the hearing and held incommunicado.

Tanzanian police had initially told local rights groups that the pair would be deported by air. However, Mwangi was discovered on Thursday on a roadside in northern Tanzania near the Kenyan border.

Agora Discourse said it was “relieved to inform the public that Agather has been found”. However, the rights group’s cofounder Jim Spire Ssentongo confirmed to the AFP news agency on Friday that there were “indications of torture”.

‘Worse than dogs’

Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan has been accused of increasing authoritarianism, amid rising concerns regarding democracy across East Africa.

Activists travelling to Lissu’s trail accused Tanzania of “collaborating” with Kenya and Uganda in their “total erosion of democratic principles”.

Several high-profile political arrests have highlighted the rights record of Hassan, who plans to seek re-election in October.

The Tanzanian leader has said that her government is committed to respecting human rights. However, she warned earlier this week that foreign activists would not be tolerated in the country as Lissu appeared in court.

“Do not allow ill-mannered individuals from other countries to cross the line here,” Hassan instructed security services.

Several activists from Kenya, including a former justice minister, said they were denied entry to Tanzania as they tried to travel to attend the trial.

Following his return to the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, Mwangi said that he and Atuhaire had suffered a brutal experience.

“We were both treated worse than dogs, chained, blindfolded and underwent a very gruesome torture,” he told reporters.

“The Government of Tanzania cannot hide behind national sovereignty to justify committing serious crimes and human rights violations against its own citizens and other East Africans,” the International Commission of Jurists in Kenya said in a statement.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa met Donald Trump in a bid to reset US ties. But critics say he missed a key chance to counter Trump’s false ‘white genocide’ claims. Al Jazeera’s @FahmidaMiller reports on the mixed reaction from Johannesburg.

On May 21, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stunned the world by announcing that his government had officially granted refugee status to 48 million African Americans. The decision, made through an executive order titled “Addressing the Egregious Actions and Extensive Failures of the US Government”, was unveiled at a news conference held in the tranquil gardens of the Union Buildings in Pretoria.

Poised and deliberate, Ramaphosa framed the announcement as a necessary and humane response to what he called “the absolute mayhem” engulfing the United States. Flanked by Maya Johnson, president of the African American Civil Liberties Association, and her deputy Patrick Miller, Ramaphosa declared that South Africa could no longer ignore the plight of a people “systematically impoverished, criminalised, and decimated by successive US governments”.

Citing a dramatic deterioration in civil liberties under President Donald Trump’s second term, Ramaphosa specifically pointed to the administration’s barrage of executive orders dismantling affirmative action, gutting DEI (diversity, equity, inclusion) initiatives, and permitting federal contractors to discriminate freely. These measures, he said, are calculated to “strip African Americans of dignity, rights, and livelihood – and to make America white again”.

“This is not policy,” Ramaphosa said, “this is persecution.”

President Trump’s 2024 campaign was unabashed in its calls to “defend the homeland” from what it framed as internal threats – a barely veiled dog whistle for the reassertion of white political dominance. True to his word, Trump has unleashed what critics are calling a rollback not just of civil rights, but of civilisation itself.

Ramaphosa noted that under the guise of restoring law and order, the federal government has instituted what amounts to an authoritarian crackdown on Black political dissent. Since Trump’s inauguration in January, he said, hundreds of African American activists have been detained by security forces – often on dubious charges – and interrogated under inhumane conditions.

While Ramaphosa focused on systemic oppression, Johnson sounded the alarm on what she bluntly described as “genocide”.

“Black Americans are being hunted,” she told reporters. “Night after night, day after day, African Americans across the country are being attacked by white Americans. These criminals claim they are ‘reclaiming’ America. Police departments, far from intervening, are actively supporting these mobs – providing logistical aid, shielding them from prosecution, and joining in the carnage.”

The African American Civil Liberties Association estimates that in the past six weeks alone, thousands of African Americans have been threatened, assaulted, disappeared, or killed, she said.

The crisis has not gone unnoticed by the remainder of the continent. Last week, the African Union convened an emergency summit to address the deteriorating situation in the US. In a rare unified statement, AU leaders condemned the US government’s actions and tasked President Ramaphosa with raising the issue before the United Nations.

Their mandate? Repatriate African Americans and offer refuge.

Ramaphosa confirmed that the first charter flights carrying refugees will arrive on African soil on May 25 – Africa Day.

“As the sun sets on this dark chapter of American history,” Ramaphosa said, “a new dawn is rising over Africa. We will not remain passive while a genocide unfolds in the United States.”

***

Of course, none of this has happened.

There was no statement on “Egregious Actions and Extensive Failures of the US Government” from South Africa. There was no news conference where an African leader highlighted the plight of his African brothers and sisters in the United States and offered them options.

There will be no refuge flights from Detroit to Pretoria.

Instead, after the US cut off aid to South Africa, repeated false accusations that a “white genocide” is taking place there and began welcoming Afrikaners as refugees, a pragmatic Ramaphosa paid a respectful visit to the White House on May 21.

During his visit, watched closely by the world media, he did not even mention the millions of African Americans facing discrimination, police violence and abuse under a president who is clearly determined to “Make America White Again” – let alone offer them refuge in Africa. Even when Trump insisted, without any basis in reality, that a genocide is being perpetrated against white people in his country, Ramaphosa did not bring up Washington’s long list of – very real, systemic, and seemingly accelerating – crimes against Black Americans.

He tried to remain polite and diplomatic, focusing not on the racist hostility of the American administration but on the important ties between the two nations.

Perhaps, in the real world, it is too much to ask an African leader to risk diplomatic fallout by defending Black lives abroad.

Perhaps it is easier to shake hands with a man who calls imaginary white suffering a “genocide” rather than to call out a real one unfolding on his watch.

In another world, Ramaphosa stood tall in Pretoria and told Trump`: “We will not accept your lies about our country – and we will not stay silent as you brutalise our kin in yours.”

In this one, he stood quietly in Washington – and did.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Decision comes after two British nationals born on Diego Garcia, the largest island in the archipelago, claimed the islands should remain under UK control. 

A British High Court judge has temporarily blocked the government from transferring sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius.

The last-minute injunction on Thursday morning came hours before the agreement was expected to be signed at a virtual ceremony with representatives from the Mauritian government.

The High Court decision was granted after action was taken by Bernadette Dugasse and Bertrice Pompe, two British nationals who were born at the Diego Garcia military base on Chagos and claimed that the islands should remain under British control.

High Court judge Julian Goose temporarily blocked the British government from taking any “conclusive or legally binding step to conclude its negotiations concerning the possible transfer of the British Indian Ocean Territory, also known as the Chagos Archipelago, to a foreign government”.

“The defendant is to maintain the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom over the British Indian Ocean Territory until further order,” he said.

Another court hearing is set for 10.30am (09:30 GMT).

Earlier this year, the lawyer for the two nationals, Michael Polak, said on his chambers website that the government’s attempt to “give away” the islands without formal consultation with its residents is a “continuation of their terrible treatment by the authorities in the past”.

“They remain the people with the closest connection to the islands, but their needs and wishes are being ignored,” Polak said.

The UK, which has controlled the region since 1814, separated the Chagos Islands in 1965 from Mauritius to create the British Indian Ocean Territory.

In the early 1970s, the government evicted about 1,500 residents to Mauritius and Seychelles to make way for the Diego Garcia airbase on the largest island.

In October, the government announced a draft agreement to hand the islands to Mauritius and allow Britain and the United States to continue using the Diego Garcia base under a 99-year lease.

US President Donald Trump’s administration, which was consulted on the deal, gave its approval. However, finalising the agreement was delayed by a change in government in Mauritius and reported last-minute negotiations over costs.

South Sudan relies on oil for more than 90 percent of its government revenues, and the country depends entirely on Sudan to export the precious resource.

But this month, Sudan’s army-backed government said it was preparing to shut down the facilities that its southern neighbour uses to export its oil, according to an official government letter seen by Al Jazeera.

That decision could collapse South Sudan’s economy and drag it directly into Sudan’s intractable civil war between the army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), experts warned.

The announcement was made on May 9 after the RSF launched suicide drones for six consecutive days at Port Sudan, the army’s wartime capital on the strategic Red Sea coast.

The strikes destroyed a fuel depot and damaged electricity grids, shattering the sense of security in the city, which lies far from the country’s front lines.

Sudan’s army claims the damage now hampers it from exporting South Sudan’s oil.

“The announcement read like a desperate plea [to South Sudan] for help to stop these [RSF] attacks,” said Alan Boswell, an expert on the Horn of Africa with the International Crisis Group.

“But I think doing so overestimates the leverage that South Sudan has … over the RSF,” he added.

Predatory economics

Since South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, the former has relied on the latter to export its oil via Port Sudan.

In return, Sudan has collected fees from Juba as part of their 2005 peace agreement, which ended the 22-year north-south civil war and ultimately led to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan.

When Sudan erupted into another civil war between the army and RSF in 2023, the former continued collecting the fees from Juba.

“[Sudan and South Sudan] are tied at the hip financially due to the oil export infrastructure,” Boswell told Al Jazeera.

Local media have recently reported that high-level officials from South Sudan and Sudan are engaged in talks to avert a shutdown of oil exports.

Al Jazeera sent written questions to Port Sudan’s energy and petroleum minister, Mohieddein Naiem Mohamed, asking if the army is negotiating higher rent fees from South Sudan before resuming oil exports, which some experts suspected to be a likely scenario.

Naiem Mohamed did not respond before publication.

According to the International Crisis Group, Juba also pays off the RSF to not damage oil pipelines that run through territory under its control.

In addition, South Sudan has allowed the RSF to operate in villages along the Sudan-South Sudan border.

The RSF has increased its presence along the sprawling, porous border after forming a strategic alliance with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) in February.

The SPLM-N fought alongside secessionist forces against Sudan’s army. It controls swaths of territory in Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions and has historically close ties with Juba.

South Sudan’s relationship with the SPLM-N and RSF has increasingly frustrated Sudan’s army, said Edmund Yakani, a South Sudanese civil society leader and commentator.

“[Sudan’s army] is suspicious that Juba is helping RSF in its military capability and political space to manoeuvre its struggle against Sudan’s army,” Yakani told Al Jazeera.

House of cards

According to a report by the International Crisis Group from 2021, about 60 percent of South Sudan’s oil profits go to the multinational companies producing the oil.

The report explained that most of the remaining 40 percent goes to paying off outstanding loans and to South Sudan’s ruling elites in the bloated security sector and bureaucracy.

South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, will likely not be able to keep his patronage network together without a quick resumption in oil revenue.

His fragile government – a coalition of longtime loyalists and coopted opponents – could collapse like a house of cards, experts warned.

Al Jazeera emailed written questions to South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to ask if the country has any contingency plan in case oil exports stop indefinitely. The ministry did not respond before publication.

Experts warned that South Sudan has no alternative to oil.

Security personnel and civil servants are already owed months of back pay, and they may turn against Kiir – and each other – if they have no incentive to uphold the fragile peace agreement that ended South Sudan’s own five-year civil war in 2018.

“Kiir is on extremely fragile footing, and there is no backup plan for when the oil runs out,” said Matthew Benson, a scholar on Sudan and South Sudan at the London School of Economics.

A halt in oil revenue would also drive up inflation, exacerbating the daily struggles of millions of civilians.

The World Food Programme estimated that about 60 percent of the population is experiencing acute food shortages while the World Bank found that nearly 80 percent live below the poverty line.

The hardship and pervasive corruption have given way to a predatory economy in which armed groups erect checkpoints to shake down civilians for bribes and taxes.

Civilians will likely be unable to cough up any more money if the oil revenue dries up.

“I’m not sure people can be squeezed more than they already are,” Benson said.

Proxy war?

Some commentators and activists also fear that Sudan’s army is deliberately turning off the oil to force South Sudan to cut off all contact with the RSF and SPLM-N.

This speculation is fuelling some resentment among civilians in South Sudan, according to Yakani.

Meanwhile, some supporters of Sudan’s army argued that South Sudan should not benefit from oil as long as it provides any degree of support to the RSF, which they view as a militia waging a rebellion against the state.

Both the RSF and army have recruited South Sudanese mercenaries to fight on their behalf, Al Jazeera previously reported.

“What Port Sudan [the army] wants is for Juba to absolutely distance itself from aiding the RSF in any way, and that is the complication that the government of [Kiir] is in now,” Yakani told Al Jazeera.

“The majority of citizens of South Sudan – including myself – believe that South Sudan is becoming a land of proxy wars for Sudan’s warring parties and their [regional] allies,” he added.

Sudan’s army also believes that South Sudan’s government is relying increasingly on the RSF’s regional backers to buttress its own security.

Sudan’s army leaders were particularly spooked when Uganda, which it views as supporting the RSF, deployed troops to prop up Kiir in March, according to Boswell.

In addition, Sudan’s army has repeatedly accused the United Arab Emirates of arming the RSF.

The UAE has repeatedly denied these allegations, which United Nations experts and Amnesty International have also made.

“The UAE has already made absolutely clear that it is not providing any support or supplies to either of two belligerent warring parties in Sudan,” the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously told Al Jazeera in an email.

Despite tensions between Sudan’s army and the UAE, analysts said Juba may request a large loan from the UAE to keep its patronage intact if Sudan’s army does not promptly resume oil exports.

“[Sudan’s army] has been worrying and watching closely over whether the UAE might loan South Sudan a significant amount of money,” Boswell said.

“I think a massive UAE loan to South Sudan would be … a red line for Sudan’s army”, he added.