access

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

PARIS — France’s top diplomat requested on Monday that U.S. Ambassador Charles Kushner no longer be allowed direct access to members of the French government after he skipped a meeting to discuss comments by the Trump administration over the beating death of a far-right activist.

French authorities had summoned Kushner to the Quai d’Orsay, which houses the Foreign Affairs Ministry, on Monday evening, but he did not show up, according to diplomatic sources.

Jean-Noël Barrot, the foreign affairs minister, moved to restrict Kushner’s access “in light of this apparent misunderstanding of the basic expectations of the mission of an ambassador, who has the honor of representing his country.”

The ministry, however, left the door open for reconciliation.

“It remains, of course, possible for Ambassador Charles Kushner to carry out his duties and present himself at the Quai d’Orsay,” it said, “so that we may hold the diplomatic discussions needed to smooth over the irritants that can inevitably arise in a friendship spanning 250 years.”

Kushner had been summoned following a statement by the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau, which posted on X that “reports, corroborated by the French Minister of the Interior, that Quentin Deranque was killed by left-wing militants, should concern us all.” The U.S. Embassy had posted that statement on social media.

Deranque, a far-right activist, died of brain injuries this month from a beating in the French city of Lyon. He was attacked during a fight on the margins of a student meeting where a far-left lawmaker was a keynote speaker.

His killing highlighted a climate of deep political tension ahead of next year’s presidential vote.

“We reject any instrumentalization of this tragedy, which has plunged a French family into mourning, for political ends,” Barrot said over the weekend. “We have no lessons to learn, particularly on the issue of violence, from the international reactionary movement.”

The State Department said in its post that “violent radical leftism is on the rise and its role in Quentin Deranque’s death demonstrates the threat it poses to public safety. We will continue to monitor the situation and expect to see the perpetrators of violence brought to justice.”

Kushner was summoned in August over his letter to French President Emmanuel Macron alleging the country did not do enough to combat antisemitism. France’s foreign officials met with a representative of the U.S. ambassador since the diplomat did not show up.

WASHINGTON — As progressives seek to place a new tax on billionaires on California’s November ballot, a Republican congressman is moving in the opposite direction — proposing federal legislation that would block states from taxing the assets of former residents.

Rep. Kevin Kiley (R-Rocklin), who faces a tough re-election challenge under California’s redrawn congressional maps, says he will introduce the “Keep Jobs in California Act of 2026” on Friday. The measure would prohibit any state from levying taxes retroactively on individuals who no longer live there.

The proposed legislation adds another layer to what has already been a fiery debate over California’s approach to taxing the ultra-wealthy. It has created divisions among Democrats and has placed Los Angeles at the center of a broader political fight, with Bernie Sanders set to hold a rally on Wednesday night in support of the wealth tax.

Kiley said he drafted the bill in reaction to reports that several of California’s most prominent billionaires — including Meta Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg and Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin — are planning to leave the state in anticipation of the wealth tax being enacted.

“California’s proposed wealth tax is an unprecedented attempt to chase down people who have already left as a result of the state’s poor policies,” Kiley said in a statement Wednesday. “Many of our state’s leading job creators are leaving preemptively.”

Kiley said it would be “fundamentally unfair” to retroactively impose taxes on former residents.

“California already has the highest income tax of any state in the country, the highest gas tax, the highest overall tax burden,” Kiley said in a House floor speech earlier this month. “But a wealth tax is something unique because a wealth tax is not merely the taxation of earned income, it is the confiscation of assets.”

The fate of Kiley’s proposal is just as uncertain as his future in Congress. His 5th Congressional District, which hugs the Nevada border, has been sliced up into six districts under California’s voter-approved Proposition 50, and he has not yet picked one to run in for re-election.

The Billionaire Tax Act, which backers are pushing to get on the November ballot, would charge California’s 200-plus billionaires a onetime 5% tax on their net worth in order to backfill billions of dollars in Republican-led cuts to federal healthcare funding for middle-class and low-income residents. It is being proposed by the Service Employees International Union-United Healthcare Workers West.

In his floor speech, Kiley worried that the tax, if approved, could cause the state’s economy to collapse.

“What’s especially threatening about this is that our state’s tax structure is essentially a house of cards,” Kiley said. “You have a system that is incredibly volatile, where top 1% of earners account for 50% of the tax revenue.”

But supporters of the wealth tax argue the measure is one of the few ways that can help the state seek new revenue as it faces economic uncertainty.

Sanders, an independent from Vermont who caucuses with the Democrats, is urging Californians to back the measure, which he says would “provide the necessary funding to prevent more than 3 million working-class Californians from losing the healthcare they currently have — and would help prevent the closures of California hospitals and emergency rooms.”

“It should be common sense that the billionaires pay just slightly more so that entire communities can preserve access to life-saving medical care,” Sanders said in a statement earlier this month. “Our country needs access to hospitals and emergency rooms, not more tax breaks for billionaires.”

Other Democrats are not so sure.

Gov. Gavin Newsom, who is eyeing a presidential bid in 2028, has opposed the measure. He has warned a state-by-state approach to taxing the wealthy could stifle innovation and entrepreneurship.

Some of he wealthiest people in the world are also taking steps to defeat the measure.

Brin is donating $20 million to a California political drive to prevent the wealth tax from becoming law, according to a disclosure reviewed by the New York Times. Peter Thiel, the co-founder of PayPal and the chairman of Palantir, has also donated millions to a committee working to defeat the proposed measure, the New York Times reported.

Sen. Bernie Sanders, a political hero among liberals and populists, next week will formally kick off the campaign to place a new tax on billionaires on California’s November ballot.

The controversial proposal, which would impose a one-time 5% tax on the assets of the state’s wealthiest residents, is critical to backfilling federal funding cuts to healthcare enacted by the Trump administration, Sanders said in a statement.

“This initiative would provide the necessary funding to prevent over 3 million working-class Californians from losing the healthcare they currently have — and would help prevent the closures of California hospitals and emergency rooms,” he said. “It should be common sense that the billionaires pay just slightly more so that entire communities can preserve access to life-saving medical care. Our country needs access to hospitals and emergency rooms, not more tax breaks for billionaires.”

The independent senator from Vermont, who caucuses with Democrats in the nation’s Capitol, will appear Feb. 18 at the Wiltern in Los Angeles alongside prominent musical acts. Sanders has a deep base of support among California Democrats, winning the state’s 2020 presidential primary over Joe Biden by eight points, and narrowly losing the 2016 primary to Hillary Clinton. In both elections, he won the votes of more than 2 million Californians, who were also a major source of the small-dollar donations that fueled his insurgent campaigns.

The tax proposal, which Sanders previously endorsed on social media, is proposed by the Service Employees International Union-United Healthcare Workers West. The supporters need to gather the signatures of nearly 875,000 registered voters and submit them to county elections officials by June 24 for the measure to qualify for the November ballot. They began gathering signatures in January.

Supporters of the tax argue it is one of the few ways the state can backfill major federal cuts to healthcare services for California’s most vulnerable residents. Opponents warn it would kill the innovation that has made the state rich and prompt an exodus of wealthy entrepreneurs.

More than 200 billionaires in Californians would be affected if the proposal qualifies for the ballot and is approved. Some prominent billionaires have already left the state, notably PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel and venture capitalist David Sacks.

Both men were major supporters of President Trump.

Democrats are divided about the issue. Notably, Gov. Gavin Newsom and San Jose Mayor Matt Mahan, who is among a dozen candidates running in November to replace the termed-out governor, oppose the proposal.

“Israel, as the occupying power, has the obligation to ensure the needs of people are met in Gaza.” As he prepared to leave Gaza, the Red Cross’s Patrick Griffiths is hopeful the Rafah crossing’s “opening” will give Palestinians a chance to heal, but says more must be done.

Email sent to US sex offender Jeffrey Epstein in 2011 outlines what the sender described as financial and legal opportunities in Libya.

A newly released document shows that an associate of late US financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein had outlined plans to pursue access to Libya’s frozen state assets, including seeking potential support from former British and Israeli intelligence officials.

The tranche of documents released by the United States Department of Justice on Friday included an email sent to Epstein that outlines what the sender described as financial and legal opportunities linked to political and economic uncertainty in Libya at the time.

The email dated July 2011 was sent several months after a NATO-backed uprising against then Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi began. Gaddafi was killed by Libyan rebels in October of the same year.

According to the email, about $80bn in Libyan funds were believed to be frozen internationally, including roughly $32.4bn in the US.

“And it is estimated that the real number is somewhere between three to four times this number in sovereign, stolen and misappropriated assets,” the email states, adding that “if we can identify/recover 5 percent to 10 percent of these monies and receive 10 percent to 25 percent as compensation we are talking about billions of dollars”.

The sender also said certain former members of Britain’s foreign intelligence service, MI6 and Israel’s external intelligence agency, Mossad, had expressed a willingness to assist in efforts to identify and recover “stolen assets”.

The email also referenced expectations that Libya would need to spend at least $100bn in the future on reconstruction and economic recovery.

“But the real carrot is if we can become their go-to guys because they plan to spend at least $100 billion next year to rebuild their country and jump start the economy,” the email said.

The email characterised Libya as a country with significant energy reserves and strong literacy rates, factors it said could be advantageous for financial and legal initiatives.

It also stated that discussions had been held with some international law firms about working on a contingency-fee basis.

In his first press conference since taking over federal immigration operations in Minnesota after the killing of two U.S. citizens, border policy advisor Tom Homan said operations in the state would wind down if the agents are allowed into the local jails instead.

“The withdrawal of law enforcement resources here is dependent upon cooperation,” Homan said Thursday. “As we see that cooperation happen, then the redeployment will happen.”

Homan stated that the federal government was not backing down on its aggressive immigration agenda.

“We are not surrendering our mission at all … We are not surrendering the president’s mission of immigration enforcement: let’s make that clear.”

President Trump announced Monday he was sending Homan to Minnesota, sidelining Border Patrol Commander Gregory Bovino who had been leading operations in the state, as public outrage swelled over Border Patrol agents’ shooting of Alex Pretti, a 37-year-old intensive care unit nurse.

Pretti was the second U.S. citizen fatally shot by federal agents in Minneapolis in recent weeks. On Jan. 7, a federal officer shot and killed U.S. citizen Renee Good, a 37-year-old mother of three.

“I’m not here because the federal government has carried out this mission perfectly,” Homan said Thursday. “President Trump wants this fixed, and I’m going to fix it.”

Since Homan arrived in Minnesota, he has met with a range of Democratic officials, including Gov. Tim Walz, Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey and and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison.

“Bottom line is you can’t fix problems if you don’t have discussions,” Homan said. “I came here to seek solutions and that’s what we’re going to do.”

Homan said that Ellison had agreed that county jails “may notify ICE of the release dates of criminal public safety risks” so ICE can take them into custody. If local officials agreed to allow ICE access to jails, Homan said, the Trump administration would deploy fewer agents in communities.

“More agents in the jail means less agents in the street,” Homan said. “This is common-sense cooperation that allows us to draw down on the number of people we have here.”

Immigration and Customs Enforcement has long conducted targeted operations of criminals. However, in the first year of Trump’s second term, federal agents began to broaden their focus, conducting sprawling raids that picked up non-English speakers and brown people in parking lots of Home Depots, car washes, or operating vendor cards on the streets.

Positioning himself as a moderate, Homan, a former acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement under Trump, said he had begged for months for de-escalation.

“I don’t want to see anybody die, not the officers, not members of the community and not the targets of our operations,” Homan said.

“I said in March, if the rhetoric didn’t stop, there’s going to be bloodshed, and there has been,” he said. “I wish I wasn’t right. I don’t want to see anybody die — not officers, not members of the community and not the targets of our operations.”

Homan said he had also urged local law enforcement leaders to work with the federal government to keep immigration agents safe.

“The chiefs I’ve talked to are committed to responding to 911 calls when protesters turned violent, agents are in a dangerous situation and there’s assaults,” Homan said. “They have committed to upholding public safety and responding to the needs not to enforce immigration law, but to keep the peace.”

Homan said that people in Minneapolis have threatened and assaulted federal agents. “If you don’t like what ICE is doing, go protest Congress,” he said.

More than 3,000 federal immigration agents have been working in Minnesota under the Trump administration’s aggressive enforcement, Operation Metro Surge.

Homan spoke as an internal memo reviewed by Reuters showed ICE officers operating in the state were directed on Wednesday to avoid engaging with “agitators” and only target “aliens with a criminal history.”

“DO NOT COMMUNICATE OR ENGAGE WITH AGITATORS,” Marcos Charles, a top official in ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division, instructed officers via email, according to Reuters.

This story will be updated

Court gives Israeli government until March to justify ban on foreign media from Gaza

Israel’s Supreme Court has postponed a decision on whether to allow foreign journalists independent access to Gaza, in the latest delay of a legal battle that has stretched over a year.

The court granted the government until March 31 to respond to the petition filed by the Foreign Press Association, despite state attorneys failing to provide detailed justifications beyond citing security risks.

The decision extends a policy that has barred foreign correspondents from entering Gaza to report on conditions there, unless reporters are prepared to embed with the Israeli army.

At the hearing on Wednesday, justices appeared frustrated with the government’s explanations for maintaining the blanket ban on independent press access, which has remained in place since Israel launched its genocidal war against the Palestinian people of Gaza following the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023.

A ceasefire took effect in October 2025, though Israel has continued carrying out attacks, which have killed more than 400 people.

Justice Ruth Ronen rejected the state’s arguments, insisting that “it is not enough to cite ‘security risks’ without providing details” and noting there had been “a very significant change on the ground” since the ceasefire.

The FPA’s legal team was barred from attending or accessing the material presented to the judges.

The FPA, which represents 370 journalists from 130 media outlets, said it was “deeply disappointed that the Israeli Supreme Court has once again postponed ruling on our petition for free, independent press access to Gaza.”

“All the more concerning is that the court appears to have been swayed by the state’s classified security arguments,” the FPA added, calling the closed-door process one that “offers no opportunity for us to rebut these arguments and clears the way for the continued arbitrary and open-ended closure of Gaza to foreign journalists.”

This marks the ninth extension granted to the government since the petition was filed in September 2024.

Just days earlier, on January 25, Israel extended its shutdown of Al Jazeera’s operations for another 90 days, citing national security threats the network denies.

US plan for Gaza demilitarisation

The postponement comes as mediators continue to press for progress in the US-backed plan to end Israel’s war on Gaza.

At the UN Security Council, the United States said it had unveiled plans for an “internationally funded buyback” programme to disarm Hamas as part of Gaza’s demilitarisation, which is a key element in the second phase of the US-backed plan.

US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz told the Security Council on Wednesday that “international, independent monitors will supervise a process of demilitarisation of Gaza to include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning”, supported by the buyback scheme.

Hamas still controls just under half of the territory in Gaza beyond the Yellow Line, where Israeli forces remain present.

The second phase of the US plan will also require the Israeli army to withdraw, though Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said demilitarisation would have to come before any further progress on the ceasefire.

Two Hamas officials told the Reuters news agency this ‌week that neither the United States nor the mediators presented the Palestinian group with any detailed or concrete disarmament proposal.