A10

The service says the Warthog will fly to 2030. Evidence shows a lack of commitment and the irreversible loss of A-10 combat capability is instead just months away.

This September, the A-10 “Warthog” Thunderbolt II was scheduled to make its final flight. Instead, the A-10 deployed again, this time supporting combat operations over the Strait of Hormuz, striking Iranian fast-attack craft and maritime threats near one of the world’s most important shipping chokepoints. The A-10 was also the “Sandy” escort that recovered two downed F-15E airmen from inside Iran. Then, later in April, the Air Force reversed course and announced it would keep the jet flying through 2030.

While the Air Force changed the headline, it has yet to follow through with the harder financial commitment needed to preserve actual A-10 combat power. Its fiscal 2027 budget, released shortly after the extension announcement, funds zero dollars of A-10 modernization, cuts depot maintenance below the service’s own stated requirement, and is crippled by “sunset” policy and institution resistance around the aircraft’s “upcoming divestment.” 

In other words, by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity. To a community that was scheduled for final retirement this October, every month waiting for the promised extension makes rebuilding slower, costlier, and closer to infeasible. Without action, the A-10 will transition from a combat asset to a line item waiting for liquidation.

A-10 combat capacity requires a meaningful shift in priorities that brings back resources and overcomes institutional resistance. Saving a limited number of aircraft is wasteful unless it is matched with resources, personnel, and policy that make it clear the A-10 is a valuable combat asset. The justification for preserving the A-10 is measurable in combat utility and financially sound reasoning. 

I have no sentimental attachment to the A-10. I flew combat fighters as both an F/A-18 TOPGUN graduate and later as a U.S. Air Force F-22 Mission Commander with more than 2,000 flight hours, including combat deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Since leaving the cockpit, I have worked closely alongside the A-10 community as it reinvented itself around modern warfare and Indo-Pacific priorities. I care about preserving combat capability and making disciplined present-value force-management decisions grounded in operational reality.

The A-10 was not preserved out of nostalgia. It was preserved because recent operations reminded the Air Force that immediate combat power still matters and the A-10 has proven useful in ways many planners underestimated. Today, it provides unique value unmatched by any of its peer tactical aircraft. It operates from austere locations, supports standoff and maritime strike, and validates emerging lower-cost weapons that reduces pressure on more expensive strike aircraft. 

As noted in the opening of this article, the A-10 also fills a critical combat role many have discounted: Sandy missions supporting combat search and rescue. Recent recovery operations over Iran protecting two F-15E airmen demonstrated again that personnel recovery escort, permissive strike, armed reconnaissance, and low-altitude tactical coordination remain critical and complex combat skills. The A-10 community has been supporting these missions for over 50 years. That wealth of knowledge and experience is being displaced. Without a replacement, the Air Force carries a mission requirement it may prove unable to fulfill. 

Why Preserving The A-10 Was The Right Decision 

For years, the Air Force’s divestment logic rested on several assumptions: that future conflicts would prioritize different force packages, that replacement capability would mature on schedule, and that preserving the A-10 generated less value than retiring it. 

Recent events changed that projection. The A-10 has sustained operations in both Europe and the Middle East. Simultaneously, Air Force strategy in the Pacific has benefited from ongoing A-10 support developing distributed combat employment, maritime strike, and advanced weapons integration. The same platform once dismissed as a legacy close-air-support aircraft is now proving adaptable to several emerging operational problems and service priorities. 

The A-10 is not theoretical surge capacity sitting in storage. It remains active combat power supporting real operational demand today. Combat escort, personnel recovery, permissive strike, armed reconnaissance, and maritime interdiction remain ongoing Air Force missions and long-standing A-10 strengths. 

A less known strength of the A-10 is the leverage it provides as a modernization platform. The A-10 community has quietly become one of the Air Force’s most effective rapid integration ecosystems. Because the aircraft relies heavily on government-owned hardware and software architectures, operators and engineers have been able to test and field new capabilities in weeks instead of years. The community has been behind recent breakthrough integrations including AGR-20 APKWS, Small Diameter Bomb, ADM-160 MALD employment, beyond-line-of-sight communications, maritime strike weapons, and network-enabled command and control. 

Nobody is arguing the A-10 is the future of Pacific airpower. It doesn’t need to be. The aircraft has become a low-cost operational laboratory for rapid tactical adaptation fully integrated into real combat capacity. 

The Air Force is trying to solve exactly these problems across the broader force. It has built doctrine around Agile Combat Employment, dispersed basing, rapid combat regeneration, and operations from degraded infrastructure. The A-10 has honed these skills for more than 30 years, proving proficient in these missions as early as Operation Desert Shield, including highway landings, integrated combat turns, austere maintenance operations, and distributed basing experimentation. 

Preserving one of the few communities with real operational experience executing tactics the broader force is still learning is strategically wise. The A-10’s latest life extension was never simply about preserving an airframe. It was about preserving combat capability, operational experience, and one of the Air Force’s few proven rapid-integration ecosystems.

What The Air Force Will Lose 

The current plan has the service preserving a limited number of airframes while allowing the combat system behind the A-10 to collapse. A fleet that numbered more than 280 aircraft just a few years ago, and 162 at the start of fiscal 2026, is set to fall to 54 next year and just 36 by 2030. The cuts land hardest where the expertise is hardest to rebuild: the Air National Guard’s A-10 force, 47 aircraft as recently as last year, goes to zero, its flying hours swapped for a new cyber mission. What survives risks becoming a ghost-fleet. Of the “three squadrons to 2030” the Chief of Staff has promised, the active-duty force shrinks to a single squadron of 17 jets with no spares behind it. 

Combat capability does not reside in aluminum alone. It resides in maintainers, instructor pilots, operational test teams, weapons officers, logistics pipelines, and institutional continuity accumulated over decades. All of that is currently at risk. The capacity to produce, refine and retain this talent and experience is perishable. Airmen face irreversible career decisions. Maintainers transition to other fleets. Weapons instructors leave. Operational test is blocked. Once assignment pipelines close and personnel move on, the impact compounds quickly. To a community that was previously scheduled for final retirement this October, every month of uncertainty adds to the complexity of sustained readiness. Rebuilding later becomes expensive and slow, if not impossible. 

How perishable A-10 specific knowledge is was documented by the Air Force’s own testing. When the Pentagon ran a 2018–2019 flyoff to determine whether the F-35 could replace the A-10 in close air support, forward air control-airborne (FAC-(A)), and combat search and rescue (CSAR), F-35 pilots had no qualification or training requirement for the FAC(A) and CSAR missions. To make the comparison work, the test had to crew the F-35 with former A-10 pilots, aviators who carried their Sandy and weapons-school training over from the very aircraft being retired. The report demonstrated mission performance depended on the aircrew, not the airframe. 

Years later, in 2023 and 2024, the Air Force still had no close-air-support or CSAR training requirement for any F-35 pilot. In April 2026, the formal A-10 training unit at Davis-Monthan, the 357th Fighter Squadron, the schoolhouse that is home to the Sandy qualification, graduated its last class. On the same day, halfway across the world, A-10 flew the combat rescue mission saving downed aircrew inside Iran. The dissonance between real world combat value and misaligned budget politics will be on full display if the 357th schoolhouse and its Sandy training syllabus are allowed to fully inactivate in just a few months. The Air Force has confirmed there is no transition underway to move the Sandy mission to any other airframe, and no successor qualification program in development.

This is not a new concern. In 2021, the Senate formally recorded that A-10 combat search and rescue had been “100 percent effective” in Operation Allied Force, recovering a downed F-117 and F-16 pilot. The Warthog has now done it again over Iran. Congress has consistently levied the concern but the Air Force and its budget still haven’t made this a real priority.

The Air Force has already invested heavily to preserve A-10 viability well beyond 2030: roughly $1.1 billion to re-wing 173 aircraft, completed in 2019, and a follow-on contract worth up to $999 million to put new wings on the remaining 109, about $2.1 billion in total to extend the entire fleet’s structural life into the late 2030s. But even those investments faced similar institutional resistance inside the Air Force. The service repeatedly placed A-10 funding on its “unfunded requirements” list rather than in its base budget, while funding upgrades to other legacy fighters instead. Congress has consistently met Air Force resistance, such as in 2021 when the service spent just $15.6 million of $100 million Congress had appropriated to sustain the fleet into the 2030s. Allowing the enterprise behind those re-winged jets to collapse now would write off an investment the taxpayer and Congress already paid for and has barely begun to recoup.

This is not a theoretical risk. When the F-22 production line closed at 186 aircraft, well short of the original requirement of 750, the assumption was that follow-on capability would arrive to fill the gap. The limited F-22 fleet now bears disproportionate sustainment costs awaiting delivery of the proposed F-47 sometime in the mid-2030s, and even then, the two could serve alongside each other for a period of time. Timing errors in force design can become effectively irreversible, especially once the infrastructure that sustains a capability is dismantled. In the A-10 case, that includes not only the aircraft but also the depot and integration ecosystem that support it. Once those are gone, the option value is gone with them. 

The financial logic behind accelerated divestment is also less straightforward than topline savings figures suggest. Retiring the A-10 does not eliminate operational demand. Combat search and rescue escort, permissive strike, armed reconnaissance, and distributed-operations requirements still exist. Those missions and their costs migrate elsewhere: more flight hours on higher-cost aircraft, additional maintenance burden, increased schoolhouse demand, and greater operational tempo across communities already under strain.

The A-10 offers combat power at a discount through both cost per flight hour and cost per effect on target. Mission specialization means A-10 employing laser-guided rockets, gun, or other comparatively low-cost weapons provides a strong complement to high-end fighter packages and their standoff weapons. 

The Air Force mission, its airmen, and our nation’s combat capacity all stand to benefit from a more complete commitment to the A-10 and its community.

What The Air Force Should Do 

The Air Force must revisit their A-10 commitments to ensure the extension is real. 

Restore and protect the 357th Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan. The 357th is the Air Force’s formal A-10 training unit and the institutional home of the Sandy qualification, the schoolhouse where combat-search-and-rescue expertise is produced, refined, and passed to the next generation of aircrew. It graduated its last class in April 2026 and is set to inactivate this year. No successor Sandy qualification program exists across the Department of War, and the Air Force has confirmed none is in development. Inactivating the 357th severs the center of excellence that produces the very capability the service says it values. Reversing that decision is the single highest-leverage action available, and the clearest signal of whether the 2030 commitment is real. The squadron should be retained until a validated replacement for the Sandy mission is stood up and producing qualified aircrew on a replacement platform.

Stabilize the rest of the enterprise through the extension timeline. If the service intends to preserve meaningful capability through 2030, the supporting structure has to survive with it. That means protected funding for depot maintenance, training, operational-test, and maintainer retention. Exempt the A-10 from “sunset” policy where budgets are still being slashed with justification of “upcoming divestment.” Instead, leverage the A-10 operational-test process as a rapid-integration and tactics pathfinder, capturing and transferring those lessons across the broader force before the capability disappears. 

Tie any future divestment to demonstrated replacement readiness, not the calendar. Do not divest the A-10 until there is a trained and capable replacement for each mission it performs. Build a deliberate plan for a clean handoff of mission responsibility and the community knowledge behind it, and gate future retirements on proven replacement capability rather than programmatic timelines.

The case for retiring the A-10 was always a timing argument: accept a measured reduction in near-term capacity in exchange for a better future force. The Air Force already announced the A-10 was back. Now it must fund the decision it already made before the combat capacity disappears anyway.

Paul “Gu$” Garcia is a TOPGUN Navy Fighter Weapons School instructor and graduate who flew combat missions in the F/A-18 across Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. He transitioned to fly the F-22 in the IndoPacific as a member of the Hawaii Air National Guard, leading the Homeland Defense mission for the Hawaii and Guam Air Defense Region for Operation Noble Eagle. He retired from the U.S. Air Force as the lead for PACAF modernization and innovation in 2025. He is Managing Partner and founder of Merge Combinator.

The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Nearly a dozen A-10C Thunderbolt II attack jets landed at RAF Lakenheath in the U.K. earlier on Friday, sporting mission marks from operations in the Middle East as well as their distinctive nose art. The photos were taken by aviation photographer Andrew McKelvey, who told us that 11 Warthogs landed at Lakenheath at about 3 p.m. local time. McKelvey was kind enough to share his photos with us.

According to the Coronet East X account, the jets belong to the 75th Fighter Squadron and arrived through Aviano Air Base in Italy from Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan.

One of the most interesting shots shows one of the jets with an F-15E tail marking, green footprints of the Air Force Pararescue Jumpers (PJs) and the words “So others may live,” which is their motto. As we have previously reported, A-10s took part in the daring mission to rescue two F-15E crewmembers whose Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran, acting in the Sandy low-altitude escort role for the rest of the rescue package. One A-10 was struck by Iranian fire and crashed. The pilot survived.

So it is possible that the Warthog with this marking took part in the F-15E crew’s CSAR operation or another one that we do not know of. We reached out to the 75th Wing for more information.

Following a long aviation tradition of personalizing aircraft, the Warthogs are emblazoned with colorful nose art that includes Nintendo game characters homages like Ridley the giant purple space dragon, ‘Diddy Kong,’ King Dedede, Samus Aran, Star Fox and Little Mac. Non video game references include Macho Man, Doc Holiday and the Reaper.

We have previously noted that personnel have applied nose art as part of other deployment to Muwaffaq Salti, which appears to be becoming something of a trend in the region. F-15Es from RAF Lakenheath are well known for their often comical nose art designs and the practice is now allowed after the USAF forbid it unless under very particular circumstances for many years.

The mission marks show a mix of weapons used against Iranian targets. They include Small Diameter Bombs, GBU-12 Paveways, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) laser-guided rockets, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles. Miniature Air-Launched Decoys (MALDs) and generic bombs that probably signify Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). The A-10 notorious gun is also represented.

There are also a couple of target type ‘kill’ markings seen, as well. This includes a pair of boats and a truck that appears to have made a giant secondary explosion, based on the mushroom cloud marking.

As we have previously reported, the venerable Warthogs were pressed into service helping to destroy the Iranian Navy, strike Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria, and take part in the aforementioned rescue mission, among other tasks, as part of Operation Epic Fury.

All this took place as the seemingly ceaseless debate between the Air Force and Congress about the future of these jets and their survivability in future conflicts rages on. We recently wrote that an amendment added to the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization bill threw a lifeline to the jets. It called for the Secretary of the Air Force to keep supporting A-10 training, testing, experimentation, maintenance, and sustainment efforts through to the planned retirement date, as well as preserving lessons learned and operational expertise from A-10 missions to help shape future replacement systems.

Regardless of what ultimately becomes of the A-10, the markings seen in these pictures shows they still provided a lot of value in this most recent fight.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The U.S. Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada, recently completed its final weapons instructor course for the A-10 Warthog. Despite an extension in service for three A-10 squadrons to 2030, and recent combat operations in the Middle East, the Weapons School has shuttered its elite training course in line with USAF divestment plans for the type, which were previously set for the end of 2026.

TWZ’s Jamie Hunter recently visited the 66th Weapons Squadron (WPS) and got a detailed cockpit and walk-around tour of an A-10C with “Trippin,” an experienced instructor pilot attached to the unit.

A full episode that goes in-depth with the A-10 Weapons School will kick-off TWZ’s first season of Special Access on YouTube soon, so stay tuned!

A-10 Cockpit And Walk-Around Tour With A Warthog Weapons Instructor

Recently published imagery confirms that the A-10C attack jet is now operating in the Middle East with its new refueling probe fitted, something that has been achieved remarkably fast. As we reported at the time, the Warthog’s probe-type aerial refueling capability was first demonstrated in early April, and the adaptation comes as the jet cruises into the twilight of its career after it got a small reprieve from final retirement.

The U.S. Air Force has released images showing an A-10C using its Probe Refueling Adapter to take on fuel from an HC-130J Combat King II earlier this month, somewhere in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The Warthogs in question belong to the 107th Fighter Squadron from Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, which deployed to the Middle East in early April.

As we discussed in the past, the Probe Refueling Adapter could be of significant importance to the A-10 and the wider Air Force, during a future fight in the Pacific. Clearly, however, it is equally applicable to ongoing operations in the CENTCOM theater.

Indeed, the Air Force previously confirmed that the Probe Refueling Adapter effort was in response to an urgent combatant command requirement.

Adding the Probe Refueling Adapter is also relatively straightforward, since it makes use of the existing air refueling receptacle on the nose of the A-10. In turn, this means that the A-10 loses its regular nose-mounted receptacle.

As of April, the non-probe-equipped A-10 was only able to refuel from the KC-135, since the KC-10 had been retired, and the KC-46 was not yet certified to refuel the Warthog. This last issue is due to a long-running “stiff boom” problem, which runs the risk of damaging the receiving aircraft. The addition of the probe also means that the A-10s can now refuel from KC-46s too, which have a built in hose and drogue system, as well as a boom.

However, the A-10 can now take on fuel from Air Force HC-130s and MC-130s, or even Marine Corps KC-130s, as well as KC-130Js from other operators. Initial tests of the Probe Refueling Adapter involved an HC-130J from the 418th Flight Test Squadron.

These refuelers can operate from shorter runways and can offload fuel at very low altitudes, something the KC-135 is not able to do. Pairing the A-10 with these kinds of tankers, which can routinely operate from shorter fields and do so with far more flexibility, provides expanded aerial refueling flexibility for mission planners.

Working with the HC-130 and MC-130 is especially relevant for the A-10, bearing in mind its combat search and rescue ‘Sandy’ mission. This involves the jets providing escort and close air support for special operations helicopters working to retrieve personnel from highly contested territory. A-10s have flown this very mission over Iran. Already, HC-130s and MC-130s provide fuel to rotary-wing aircraft during these kinds of operations, and a probe-equipped A-10 would provide extended endurance and range in such scenarios.

The Probe Refueling Adapter also comes with a degree of flexibility. The Air Force describes it as “a field-configurable solution designed for installation by operational flight line personnel.”

“Units can install or remove the adapter in a matter of hours, allowing aircraft to be reconfigured between boom and probe refueling capability based on mission requirements,” the service says.

It is also notable that the Air Force imagery shows that the A-10s in CENTCOM are now also using the Angry Kitten electronic warfare pod.

The Angry Kitten had previously been test flown on the A-10, but had not been seen in an operational context. The store is also used operationally by Air Force F-16s and HC-130s and Navy F/A-18E/Fs. Angry Kitten was originally developed to replicate hostile electronic warfare threats during testing and training, as part of a cooperative effort between the Air Force and the Navy, but was so effective that it was adapted to operational use.

Using advanced Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology, Angry Kitten detects and ‘captures’ radio frequency (RF) signals. Those signals are then manipulated and retransmitted. For example, RF signals from an enemy air defense radar can be recorded and sent back in a way that creates false or otherwise confusing tracks. The same data can also be used for broader intelligence-gathering purposes. You can read more about the capabilities of the pod here.

As well as the Angry Kitten pod, the A-10C seen in the accompanying imagery carries a Litening targeting pod and a pair of 500-pound-series Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

Returning to the Probe Refueling Adapter, the A-10 is now putting it through its paces in an operational context in the Middle East.

But as we have discussed in the past, equipping A-10s and other combat jets with probes makes a good deal of sense for Pacific contingencies, too. They could also be operated alongside smaller tactical tankers, which could also play a very important role in that kind of conflict.

Simply put, the receptacle and boom mode of aerial refueling is optimized for plugging in at higher altitudes, for maximum efficiency and safety. However, in the Pacific, combat operations are likely to require fighters to take off with heavy loads from short runways, potentially battle-damaged ones, then immediately hook up to a tanker. Lower-level refueling using a probe is much more appropriate here and, indeed, is entirely in line with the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy. This envisages fighters hopping from one austere forward airfield to another, keeping them close to the action, but farther away from the enemy’s strikes. Such airfields can also be accessed by standard C-130 transports, which can also help support tactical jets with spares, weapons, crews, etc.

There is also the fact that higher-level aerial refueling puts the tanker and receiver at higher risk of detection and engagement by the enemy. Aerial refueling assets, in particular, will be among the highest-priority targets for China in any confrontation in the Pacific. Indeed, there is a whole Chinese development thread focused on air defenses to engage aircraft like these, and other critical force-multipliers. Having refueling operations and tankers operate at a lower altitude puts them below the radar horizon, providing another layer of survivability, especially when working from islands closer to major target areas.

While the A-10 continues to evolve, the Air Force is still committed to its plans to retire the type for good before the end of the decade. For the time being, however, the Warthog is still in demand in combat theaters.

If the Probe Refueling Adapter concept could be extended to fighters like the F-16 and F-15, and potentially even future versions of the F-35A, these aircraft could rely more heavily on C-130 tankers, which are, at least in some cases, better suited to the ACE concept. Meanwhile, the larger KC-46s and KC-135s could operate somewhat further from the battlespace, including dragging tactical aircraft to and from the theater of operations, as well as supporting bombers and transports.

For some time now, the Air Force has also been looking at the possibility of acquiring the kinds of tankers that would be better suited to the kinds of mission likely to be encountered in the Pacific theater, albeit retaining the boom and receptacle method.

Now that the Probe Refueling Adapter is being proven in a combat theater, its success there could help keep the A-10 relevant throughout the last few years of its service, and perhaps even longer.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com