The recent decision by the United States Navy (USN) to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program after eight years of development and billions of dollars in investment represents a significant setback in US naval modernization drive. The Constellation-class was meant to become a modern, multi-mission combat vessel capable of relieving operational pressure from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and narrowing the growing numerical advantage of the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Instead, continuous design changes, and subsequent delays changed what was supposed to be an easy-to-construct warship platform into a costly and significantly delayed project. After failure of several major projects like Zumwalt destroyer and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate project has degraded Washington’s efforts to sustain the naval balance of power against rapidly expanding naval fleet of PLAN.
The Constellation-class project was a product of USN’s urgent need to fill the gap left behind Oliver Hazard Perry-class (OHP) frigates which were phased out from USN services in 2015. The OHPs, despite lack of built-in vertical launch system (VLS), were regarded for their reliability, and versatility in missions ranging from open-ocean escorting to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The retired hulls of OHPs were purchased by navies of several US allies including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkiye. Their withdrawal from USN created a capability void that the Littoral LCS program – comprising of Freedom class and Independent class vessels – was expected to fill. However the LCS encountered numerous mechanical failures in hulls and propulsion system, cost overruns, and capability gaps that rendered it unsuitable for missions in contested naval environments.
As USN halted further procurement and early retirement of LCS, it attempted to follow a new approach, i.e., opt for a proven design tailored to meet USN requirements. Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design was chosen as the baseline for a modern, affordable American Constellation-class frigate. At initial stage, it appeared a sound idea. The FREMM platform had already proven itself in European naval forces, and the USN specific variant was modified to carry 32 Mk-41 VLS cells capable of firing SM-series interceptors and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, alongside Naval Strike Missiles. This program committed to be a potent yet affordable and rapid addition in USN fleet while retaining 85 percent commonality with original design. But as USN continued to impose new requirements, complications in construction, and alteration in designing began to inhibit the efficiency of the program. Constellation-class frigate undertook major size increment than parent FREMM design, stretching from 466 feet to nearly 500 and increasing to over 7,200 tons. Instead of leveraging a proven design, USN trapped itself with a pseudo-original design which now shared mere 15 percent commonality with the original design. By 2024, the first frigate was already three years behind schedule, and the program’s cost enlarged well beyond initial estimations. Faced with increasing costs, long delays, and design complications, the USN eventually axed the Constellation-class frigate program too, leaving behind a significant gap in USN surface fleet which this frigate was supposed to fill.
USN now wants a new frigate class structured on proven American design by 2028. Reportedly, the design of US Coast Guard (USCG) Legend Class cutter will be used as baseline to develop a USN specific variant. These 4,600 tons class ships are capable of conducting blue water operations and support 57mm deck gun, Phalanx CIWS, and flight deck with hanger to support rotary wing operations. Its USN specific frigate version can accommodate a 16-cell Mk-41 VLS module, 8x Harpoon/NSM cruise missiles in canisters, RIM-116 Sea RAM, and torpedo tubes. Using an American proven design for mass producing USN specific frigate of relatively smaller size and low tonnage will allow USN to produce and commission larger number of hulls in relatively less time. But on flip side, this new frigate class will be far less capable than recently cancelled Constellation-class as they are unlikely to carry Aegis CMS, and will have significantly less range, endurance, and weapon load-out.
Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the rapid growth of China’s naval power. PLAN is now commissioning highly capable naval combatants including flat-deck aircraft carrier (Fujian), next generation destroyers (Type-055 and Type-52DL) and frigates (Type-54B), and new class of conventional as well as nuclear submarines. Chinese coast guard, and maritime militia collectively operate more than 750 vessels – more than twice the number of hulls under US control. While the US Navy still retains qualitative advantages, especially in nuclear submarines and carrier aviation, trends in shipbuilding capacity significantly favor Beijing. China commands more than half of global commercial ship production, while the US share barely registers at a tenth of a percent. This allows China to mass produce modern warships for PLAN at a pace the United States cannot simply match.
Although USN plans to expand its fleet from 296 manned warships to 381 manned warships and 134 unmanned vessels by 2045, but so far trends of decline hull strengths have been observed. Ticonderoga class cruisers are gradually retiring, next-generation DDG(X) destroyers are still in far future, Ford class nuclear aircraft-carriers and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are facing delays, and Arleigh Burke Flight-III destroyers are not producing at rate faster enough to accommodate these growing gaps. Unmanned vessels are sometimes perceived as a viable solution to fill-up the gaps but these vessels cannot replace manned warships on one-on-one basis. In sum, aforementioned projects expose the persistent limitations of ship production capacity of US shipyards. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that reviving the shipbuilding sector to meet the USN long-term needs would require annual investments of more than $40 billion for three consecutive decades—a staggering commitment that would require political consensus and sustained strategic vision.
The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate, just like past projects of Zumwalt and LCS- thus represents a persistent crisis in US naval build-up. As China accelerates its naval production and expands power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the United States finds itself struggling to revive its own shipbuilding capacity. Whether Washington can reverse this trajectory will depend on its ability to reform procurement processes, invest in industrial capacity, and adopt realistic designs aligned with strategic needs. Without such changes USN risks entering the next decade with too few ships to meet global demands.