maritime

For decades, the image of maritime power centered on gray hulls and carrier groups. Today, the center of gravity has shifted to the white hulls that police, escort, ram, repel, rescue, and repair in the murky space between peace and open conflict. Call it the coast-guardification of security. In the Indo-Pacific, and especially around the South China Sea, coast guards are now the first responders for sovereignty spats, illegal fishing, disaster relief, drone sightings, and the protection of undersea infrastructure. The trend is not cosmetic. It is strategic, and it is accelerating. Recent scenes off Scarborough Shoal and near Thitu Island show why. In September and October 2025, the China Coast Guard used water cannons and ramming tactics on Philippine civilian and government vessels, injuring crew and damaging hulls, while Washington and others publicly backed Manila. These were not naval shootouts. They were high-stakes law enforcement encounters led by white hulls that managed political sensitivity without signaling immediate military escalation.

History helps explain how we got here. Through the 2010s, piracy in Southeast Asia declined as coordinated patrols tightened the Strait of Malacca. At the same time, gray zone pressure rose as coast guard and militia fleets, not destroyers, pushed claims around the Senkakus and the Spratlys. A 2015 Reuters dispatch already highlighted Japanese and Philippine coast guard anti-piracy drills, and by 2025 Japanese reporting still records routine intrusions by Chinese coast guard vessels around the Senkakus. White hull presence became the everyday instrument of statecraft at sea, a domain where legal authorities matter as much as tonnage.

Coast guards have also become the backbone of coalition building. The most telling images of 2025 are not only of naval flotillas but also of trilateral coast guard exercises among Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. Tokyo hosted large drills in June, the Philippine flagship returned from joint maneuvers later that month, and USNI News has tracked a steady tempo of multilateral activities that blend navies and coast guards. These events rehearse search and rescue, firefighting, interdiction, and uncrewed systems integration. They build habits of cooperation at the level most relevant to day-to-day friction.

What counts as “security” has widened too. Undersea cables that carry the world’s data now sit squarely on the white hull docket. Policymakers across the region are writing playbooks for detection, attribution, and rapid repair when cables are cut or damaged. Analysts urge Quad Plus partners to formalize protocols and run sabotage response drills that rely on law enforcement and coast guard authorities. New scholarship details how geoeconomic competition around cables is intensifying across the Indo-Pacific and why civilian maritime forces will need new sensors, legal tools, and public-private coordination to keep data flowing after an incident.

The mission creep is not only about geopolitics. It is also about fish. Vietnam has spent 2025 pushing to shed the European Commission’s IUU “yellow card,” tightening enforcement and compliance across its vast fishing fleet. IUU policing is classic coast guard work. It requires boarding teams, AIS analytics, community outreach, and a credible threat of penalties. Success here matters for livelihoods and for legitimacy, since foreign perceptions of fishing practices can shape export earnings as much as tariffs do.

Technology is transforming these forces in real time. Maritime drones and high-altitude ISR have moved from prototypes to daily tools for search and rescue, disaster response, and wide-area surveillance. Regional programs, from Japanese UAV support to Southeast Asian partners to Malaysia’s investments, reflect a simple truth. Persistent eyes and quick cueing make small coast guards feel bigger without inviting the diplomatic blowback that armed naval build-ups can trigger.

If coast guards now run the show, two practical steps can help them run it better.

First, fund an Indo-Pacific Seabed Protection Network with coast guards in the lead. Start with an agreed checklist for cable incident response that combines attribution standards, rapid permitting for repair ships, common data on seabed maps, and a secure channel for operators to notify authorities. Build this around recurring tabletopand at-sea exercises that simulate simultaneous cable cuts, and let civilian agencies command the play unless naval forces must step in. The legal authorities and public legitimacy of coast guards make them the right first responders for cable attacks that sit below the threshold of armed conflict. Allies are already converging on this logic. They should codify it.

Second, scale coast guard capacity through targeted training pipelines and shared tech. The U.S. Coast Guard’s 2025 program that opens more than a hundred training courses to Philippine personnel is a good template. Expand it to include a regional curriculum on IUU enforcement, drone employment, incident documentation, and evidence handling for prosecutions. Pair classrooms with pooled hardware. A rotating inventory of UAVs, portable radars, and small craft that partner coast guards can book for surge operations would lift outcomes faster than waiting for each budget cycle to deliver new ships.

Coast Guard decks will never replace carrier decks, and they should not try. What they can do is shape almost every day short of war. In Southeast Asia’s crowded waters, that is where strategy lives. The white hulls are already writing the script. Policymakers should give them the resources and rules they need to keep the peace, protect the seabed, and put predatory behavior on notice.

Shipping containers are stacked on a cargo ship in Bayonne, N.J., in 2020. Now the United States, with the help of Russia and Saudi Arabia, has halted a global agreement to reduce cargo ship greenhouse gases because of the Trump administration’s view that climate change is a “scam.” File Photo by John Angelillo/UPI | License Photo

Oct. 17 (UPI) — The United States delayed the adoption of an international requirement for commercial cargo ships to reduce their greenhouse emissions or be subject to fines that is widely supported globally.

Using threats of sanctions and tariffs, and backed by Saudi Arabia and Russia, the Trump administration forced representatives of more than 100 countries to table the International Maritime Organization’s Net-zero Framework, which would have set a mandatory marine fuel standard.

The draft framework, agreed to in April and aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from cargo ships to net-zero by 2050, would have gone into effect in 2027 for all ocean going ships weighing more than 5,000 tons, according to the IMO.

President Donald Trump has referred to nearly all efforts to reduce human impacts on the environment as a “green scam.”

In an Oct. 10 statement meant to put “IMO members on notice,” Trump’s secretaries of state, energy and transportation said that the United States would employ a series of penalties “against nations that sponsor this European-led neocolonial export of global climate regulations.”

“President Trump has made it clear that the United States will not accept any international environmental agreement that unduly or unfairly burdens the United States or harms the interests of the American people,” Secs. Marco Rubio, Chris Wright and Sean Duffy said in the statement.

The new regulation would have gone into effect in 2027 after a standard for ships to reduce their annual gas fuel intensity — the amount of greenhouse gases released for each unit of energy a ship uses — and economic measures and penalties were established at meetings planned for 2026.

The IMO plan was widely supported — Britain, Canada, the European Union, Japan and China were all in favor — and was expected to pass by most of the roughly 100 countries represented at Friday’s meeting.

Although a handful of countries were not in favor of delaying talks about the regulation for a year, the United States persuaded several countries, including China, to join it, Russia and Saudi Arabia to push off negotiations on the deal.

“We are disappointed that member states have not been able to agree [on] a way forward at this meeting,” International Chamber of Shipping secretary-general Thomas Kazakos told reporters.

“Industry needs clarity to be able to make investments,” he said, reiterating the already known overall support the shipping industry reportedly has for the global standard.

A Gaza-bound aid flotilla is currently sailing toward the enclave, entering a high-risk zone where previous missions have faced attacks and interceptions.

On Wednesday, Israel’s public broadcaster Kan reported that the Israeli military is preparing to “take control” of the flotilla with naval commandos and warships. Israel wont tow all 50 vessels however and will sink some at sea, Kan said.

Israel intends to detain hundreds of activists on naval ships, question them then deport them via the port of Ashdod.

The Global Sumud Flotilla, which set sail from Spain on August 31, is the largest maritime mission to Gaza to date. It brings together more than 50 ships and delegations from at least 44 countries, as part of an international effort to challenge Israel’s naval blockade and deliver aid to Gaza.

The map below shows the latest location:

So, is Israel entitled to board ships that are in international waters? The answer is no, here’s how territorial and international waters work.

Which waters does a country control?

Coastal countries control the waters closest to their shores, called territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast. In this zone, the state has full sovereignty, just like over its land.

Beyond that, they have rights over up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) of ocean, including the water and seafloor. This area is called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the EEZ, countries can regulate activities such as fishing, mining, drilling, and other energy projects, while still allowing other countries freedom of navigation.

France has the largest EEZ, covering approximately 10.7 million square kilometres (4.2 million sq miles), thanks to its overseas territories. It is followed by the US, Australia, Russia, and the UK.

Where are international waters?

Covering about 64 percent of the ocean, the high seas lie beyond any country’s territorial waters and economic zones and are not controlled by a single state, with their use governed by international agreements.

What are the laws of the high seas?

The laws of the high seas are governed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It stipulates that all states can enjoy freedom of movement of ships in the high seas and aircraft can fly freely.

It also allows the laying of subsea cables and pipelines, as well as fishing, scientific research and the construction of islands. All three of which are subject to international agreements and laws.

Ships that are on the high seas are subject to the jurisdiction of the flag they fly, except those conducting piracy and other unauthorised activities.

Israel has attacked previous flotillas in international waters

Several Freedom Flotilla vessels have attempted to break the blockade of Gaza since 2010. All were intercepted or attacked by Israel, mostly in international waters where it has no territorial rights.

The most deadly occurred on May 31, 2010, when Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara in international waters. The commandos killed 10 activists, most of them Turkish, and injured dozens more, sparking global outrage and severely straining Israel-Turkiye relations.

The map below shows the approximate locations where prominent flotillas were stopped, some encountering deadly Israeli forces.

In 2024, amid ongoing flotilla missions delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza, UN experts stated that: “The Freedom Flotilla has the right of free passage in international waters, and Israel must not interfere with its freedom of navigation, long recognised under international law.”

The Sumud Flotilla had been sailing through international waters and into Palestinian territorial waters, where it has the legal right to navigate and deliver humanitarian aid.

According to Stephen Cotton, the General Secretary of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), representing more than 16.5 million transport workers globally, “The law of the sea is clear: attacking or seizing non-violent, humanitarian vessels in international waters is illegal and unacceptable.”

“Such actions endanger lives and undermine the basic principles that keep the seas safe for all. This is not only about seafarers, it’s about the safety of everyone at sea, whether on a commercial ship, a humanitarian vessel, or a fishing boat. States cannot pick and choose when to respect international law. The seas must not be turned into a theatre of war.”  Cotton told Al Jazeera.

According to the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, the mission is not only lawful but also protected under a comprehensive set of international legal instruments. Including:

• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – Guarantees freedom of navigation on the high seas
• San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea – Prohibits blockades that cause starvation or disproportionate suffering and forbids the targeting of neutral humanitarian missions
• UN Security Council Resolutions 2720 and 2728 – These binding instruments demand unimpeded humanitarian access and the removal of all barriers to aid delivery
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – Includes the prevention of acts deliberately endangering civilians
• Fourth Geneva Convention – Imposes an obligation to permit the free passage of humanitarian aid and prohibit interference with relief operations and the targeting of civilian infrastructure
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Criminalises the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and willful obstruction of humanitarian aid.

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

An uncrewed hydrogen-powered autonomous surveillance airship the size of a small bus has been floating over Portuguese waters, collecting imagery of ships and other objects. The goal of these test flights is to see if this airship can provide NATO with situational awareness of the maritime domain.

The flights are part of the alliance’s annual demonstration seeking new robotic technology to boost its defenses. The airship is one of several systems that NATO is evaluating during this exercise, which is called Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping using Maritime Unmanned Systems (REPMUS) 25 and Dynamic Messenger (DYMS) 25. NATO is also trialing unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, as well as other aerial ones, as part of the exercise.

The airship being tested is made by the Finnish Kelluu company, which also operates the aircraft. It is one of about 10 that are providing imagery and other sensing capabilities for commercial and scientific purposes. With NATO already conducting maritime security missions, the company sees a potential military role for its airships to provide persistent, low-level surveillance. 

A Finnish hydrogen-fueled dirigible called “Kelluu” is participating in NATO’s annual REPMUS exercise.
The long-range reconnaissance airship covers an area up to 300 km in diameter.
And the promotional video is beautiful. pic.twitter.com/TZYsZaqE4K

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) September 17, 2025

The Kelluu LTA is relatively small as far as airships go, clocking-in at about 12 meters long. It can fly for up to about 12 hours at low level, the company states. They are designed to carry an assortment of sensors, including electro-optical/infrared cameras and passive systems that can detect electromagnetic emissions. Able to launch from austere locations with no runways, these airships operate “very quietly and without emissions, providing real-time connectivity without being limited by radio-link ranges (BRLOS),” company CEO Janne Hietala told us on Wednesday.

NATO officials did not want to elaborate on any particular system taking part in REPMUS25. However, they did discuss the overall goals for this demonstration.

“All of these systems require experimentation and integration into the operational environment,” Cmdr. Arlo Abrahamson, spokesperson for NATO’s Allied Maritime Command, told TWZ on Wednesday. “We want to place these systems in the hands of our operators and ensure those systems meet the operational requirements of Allied forces.”

Dynamic Messenger/REPMUS is working to bring new unmanned systems into the operational environment by gaining user feedback to spur development, Abrahamson told us. With the tests still being conducted, it is too early to say if or how an airship would be useful for NATO operations, Abrahamson noted.

Earlier this year, the alliance stood up Operation Baltic Sentry in response to several instances of underwater cable sabotage believed to have been carried out by China and Russia. In one such incident, Finnish authorities say the Russian-linked Eagle S purposely dragged its anchor across the sea floor to break undersea cables. The ship was later found to be full of spy equipment. Finnish authorities detained the ship and its crew, which you can see in the following video.

One of the main goals of Baltic Sentry is to provide additional persistent surveillance to better track vessels. That in turn is meant to ensure a quicker response to ships acting in a suspicious manner. 

The case could be made that airships in general could potentially benefit such a mission because of their long loitering and diverse sensing capabilities, as well as their efficiency. It doesn’t take much imagination to see the potential that deploying larger numbers of these uncrewed airships over a wide area can provide a drastic increase in situational awareness. This distributed approach to persistent sea surveillance using extended-endurance uncrewed systems has garnered major interest from militaries around the globe.

Overall, the U.S. and other nations are either developing or increasingly using lighter-than-air-craft for just those reasons. The Chinese spy balloon incident brought this reality to the headlines.

Additionally, China, in particular, as we have frequently noted, appears to be investing heavily in lighter-than-air technologies. A huge hangar in a remote area in the country’s northwest is a key example of this. The War Zone has been following activities at the facility, which is tied to the country’s development of high-altitude airships that could potentially gather intelligence, facilitate long-range communications, provide early warning capabilities for missile defense, or even possibly serve as launch platforms for drones and other payloads.

Balloons, airships and aerostats have a long history as surveillance and maritime patrol platforms, and transportation aircraft.

Kelluu’s uncrewed concept is a revamping of sorts of the maritime patrol role of lighter-than-air craft dating back to the First World War and widely used during the Second World War.

However, several fatal accidents and mishaps in the past have created headwind for the development and fielding of these systems.

There appears to be growing interest in the Kelluu airship.

The Finnish Air Force tested the Kelluu LTA in June. It was the first time an airship took part in Atlantic Trident 25, a two-week tactical and operational training exercise held across multiple locations in Finland.

“The airships complement high-level intelligence with low-altitude precision data and multi-sensor capabilities that support real-time situational awareness,” the Finnish Air Force stated on X at the time.

The Finnish Air Force did not provide details about what, if any, plans it has to further test or use the Kelluu airships. We’ve reached out for comment. Kelluu declined comment.

There are at least two more NATO evaluations in the works for Kelluu as well. The company’s airships will take part in NATO’s Digital Backbone Experimentation (DiBaX) in Latvia. The goal of that exercise is to “test the use of unmanned vehicles in contested environments and the application of artificial intelligence in detection and decision-making tasks.”

Kelluu’s uncrewed airship is also being gauged by NATO’s DIANA accelerator program, which is looking to find and develop emerging technology.

There is no timetable for the rollout of any of the technologies being tested by NATO. Regardless of what happens with the Kelluu airship, the alliance is clearly interested in seeing if platforms like it can help protect its member nations.

Contact the author: [email protected]

On December 15, 2024, a powerful storm swept through the Black Sea. Two Russian oil tankers were wrecked in the Kerch Strait, spilling vast quantities of fuel oil into the surrounding waters. Within days, the thick black substance reached the shores of Russia’s Krasnodar region, annexed Crimea, and the Sea of Azov.

Evening reports from Greenpeace warned that the incident could mark one of the worst environmental disasters in decades. Yet, over six months later, key questions remain unanswered: how much fuel oil was on board, how much has spilled, and how much continues to leak? Russia has released no official data, and the opacity surrounding the incident has alarmed environmental observers across the region.

Scientists fear the worst. In the absence of containment, oil residues may soon reach the coastlines of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The Nikola Vaptsarov Naval Academy in Varna, Bulgaria, has been monitoring the situation closely. While no immediate threat has been detected in Bulgarian waters, local experts are cautious. The pollution zone, they say, could expand rapidly with changing winds and currents.

The Ukrainian Scientific Centre for Marine Ecology has published several projections showing the slow eastward spread of the slick through the Black Sea. Ukrainian Greenpeace confirms that oil traces have already reached the Odessa region and are approaching Romanian maritime boundaries.

Meanwhile, Russia’s official response — or lack thereof — has drawn sharp criticism. Unlike the Norilsk diesel spill in 2020, when a federal emergency was declared and Norilsk Nickel was fined billions, the Black Sea disaster has triggered no significant federal action. It is worth noting, however, that in the Norilsk case, the company went on to carry out extensive remediation, including full-scale river cleanup and contaminated soil removal.

In contrast, in 2025, volunteers are still collecting fuel oil from Russian beaches by hand. The companies responsible continue to dispute their liability in court. No fines, no cleanup mandate, no transparency. Only silence.