Navy

WASHINGTON — President Trump has announced a bold plan for the Navy to build a new, large warship that he is calling a “battleship” as part of a larger vision to create a “Golden Fleet.”

“They’ll be the fastest, the biggest, and by far 100 times more powerful than any battleship ever built,” Trump claimed during the announcement at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida.

According to Trump, the ship, the first of which will be named the USS Defiant, will be longer and larger than the World War II-era Iowa-class battleships and will be armed with hypersonic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, rail guns, and high-powered lasers — all technologies that are in various stages of development by the Navy.

The announcement comes just a month after the Navy scrapped its plans to build a new, small warship, citing growing delays and cost overruns, deciding instead to go with a modified version of a Coast Guard cutter that was being produced until recently. The sea service has also failed to build its other newly designed ships, like the new Ford-class aircraft carrier and Columbia-class submarines, on time and on budget.

Meanwhile, the Navy has struggled to field some of the technologies Trump says will be aboard the new ship.

The Navy spent hundreds of millions of dollars and more than 15 years trying to field a railgun aboard a ship before finally abandoning the effort in 2021.

Laser technology has seen more success in making its way onto Navy ships in recent years, but its employment is still limited. One system that is designed to blind or disable drone sensors is now aboard eight destroyers after spending eight years in development.

Developing nuclear cruise missile capabilities or deploying them on ships may also violate non-proliferation treaties that the U.S. has signed with Russia.

A U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing plans, told the Associated Press that design efforts are now underway for the new ship and construction is planned to begin in the early 2030s.

Both Trump and Navy Secretary John Phelan spoke about the new Trump-class warship as a spiritual successor to the battleships of the 20th century, but historically that term has referred to a very specific type of ship — a large, heavily armored vessel armed with massive guns designed to bombard other ships or targets ashore.

This type of ship was at the height of prominence during World War II, and the largest of the U.S. battleships, the Iowa-class, were roughly 60,000 tons. But after World War II, the battleship’s role in modern fleets diminished rapidly in favor of aircraft carriers and long-range missiles. The U.S. Navy did modernize four Iowa-class battleships in the 1980s by adding cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles, along with modern radars, but by the 1990s all four were decommissioned.

According to a newly created website for the “Golden Fleet,” this new “guided missile battleship” is set to be roughly the same size as Iowa-class battleships but only weigh about half as much, around 35,000 tons, and have far smaller crews — between 650 and 850 sailors.

Its primary weapons will also be missiles, not large naval guns.

Trump has long held strong opinions on specific aspects of the Navy’s fleet, sometimes with a view toward keeping older technology instead of modernizing.

During his first term, he unsuccessfully called for the return to steam-powered catapults to launch jets from the Navy’s newest aircraft carriers instead of the more modern electromagnetic system.

He has also complained to Phelan about the look of the Navy’s destroyers and decried Navy ships being covered in rust.

Phelan told senators at his confirmation hearing that Trump “has texted me numerous times very late at night, sometimes after one (o’clock) in the morning” about “rusty ships or ships in a yard, asking me what am I doing about it.”

On a visit to a shipyard that was working on the now-canceled Constellation-class frigate in 2020, Trump said he personally changed the design of the ship.

“I looked at it, I said, ‘That’s a terrible-looking ship, let’s make it beautiful,’” Trump said at the time.

He said Monday he will have a direct role in designing this new warship as well.

“The U.S. Navy will lead the design of these ships along with me, because I’m a very aesthetic person,” Trump said.

Phelan said the new USS Defiant “will inspire awe and reverence for the American flag whenever it pulls into a foreign port.”

Toropin and Madhani write for the Associated Press.

The recent decision by the United States Navy (USN) to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program after eight years of development and billions of dollars in investment represents a significant setback in US naval modernization drive. The Constellation-class was meant to become a modern, multi-mission combat vessel capable of relieving operational pressure from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and narrowing the growing numerical advantage of the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Instead, continuous design changes, and subsequent delays changed what was supposed to be an easy-to-construct warship platform into a costly and significantly delayed project. After failure of several major projects like Zumwalt destroyer and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate project has degraded Washington’s efforts to sustain the naval balance of power against rapidly expanding naval fleet of PLAN.

The Constellation-class project was a product of USN’s urgent need to fill the gap left behind Oliver Hazard Perry-class (OHP) frigates which were phased out from USN services in 2015. The OHPs, despite lack of built-in vertical launch system (VLS), were regarded for their reliability, and versatility in missions ranging from open-ocean escorting to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The retired hulls of OHPs were purchased by navies of several US allies including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkiye. Their withdrawal from USN created a capability void that the Littoral LCS program – comprising of Freedom class and Independent class vessels – was expected to fill. However the LCS encountered numerous mechanical failures in hulls and propulsion system, cost overruns, and capability gaps that rendered it unsuitable for missions in contested naval environments.

As USN halted further procurement and early retirement of LCS, it attempted to follow a new approach, i.e., opt for a proven design tailored to meet USN requirements. Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design was chosen as the baseline for a modern, affordable American Constellation-class frigate. At initial stage, it appeared a sound idea. The FREMM platform had already proven itself in European naval forces, and the USN specific variant was modified to carry 32 Mk-41 VLS cells capable of firing SM-series interceptors and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, alongside Naval Strike Missiles. This program committed to be a potent yet affordable and rapid addition in USN fleet while retaining 85 percent commonality with original design. But as USN continued to impose new requirements, complications in construction, and alteration in designing began to inhibit the efficiency of the program. Constellation-class frigate undertook major size increment than parent FREMM design, stretching from 466 feet to nearly 500 and increasing to over 7,200 tons. Instead of leveraging a proven design, USN trapped itself with a pseudo-original design which now shared mere 15 percent commonality with the original design. By 2024, the first frigate was already three years behind schedule, and the program’s cost enlarged well beyond initial estimations. Faced with increasing costs, long delays, and design complications, the USN eventually axed the Constellation-class frigate program too, leaving behind a significant gap in USN surface fleet which this frigate was supposed to fill.

USN now wants a new frigate class structured on proven American design by 2028. Reportedly, the design of US Coast Guard (USCG) Legend Class cutter will be used as baseline to develop a USN specific variant. These 4,600 tons class ships are capable of conducting blue water operations and support 57mm deck gun, Phalanx CIWS, and flight deck with hanger to support rotary wing operations.  Its USN specific frigate version can accommodate a 16-cell Mk-41 VLS module, 8x Harpoon/NSM cruise missiles in canisters, RIM-116 Sea RAM, and torpedo tubes. Using an American proven design for mass producing USN specific frigate of relatively smaller size and low tonnage will allow USN to produce and commission larger number of hulls in relatively less time. But on flip side, this new frigate class will be far less capable than recently cancelled Constellation-class as they are unlikely to carry Aegis CMS, and will have significantly less range, endurance, and weapon load-out.

Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the rapid growth of China’s naval power. PLAN is now commissioning highly capable naval combatants including flat-deck aircraft carrier (Fujian), next generation destroyers (Type-055 and Type-52DL) and frigates (Type-54B), and new class of conventional as well as nuclear submarines. Chinese coast guard, and maritime militia collectively operate more than 750 vessels – more than twice the number of hulls under US control. While the US Navy still retains qualitative advantages, especially in nuclear submarines and carrier aviation, trends in shipbuilding capacity significantly favor Beijing. China commands more than half of global commercial ship production, while the US share barely registers at a tenth of a percent. This allows China to mass produce modern warships for PLAN at a pace the United States cannot simply match.

Although USN plans to expand its fleet from 296 manned warships to 381 manned warships and 134 unmanned vessels by 2045, but so far trends of decline hull strengths have been observed. Ticonderoga class cruisers are gradually retiring, next-generation DDG(X) destroyers are still in far future, Ford class nuclear aircraft-carriers and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are facing delays, and Arleigh Burke Flight-III destroyers are not producing at rate faster enough to accommodate these growing gaps. Unmanned vessels are sometimes perceived as a viable solution to fill-up the gaps but these vessels cannot replace manned warships on one-on-one basis. In sum, aforementioned projects expose the persistent limitations of ship production capacity of US shipyards. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that reviving the shipbuilding sector to meet the USN long-term needs would require annual investments of more than $40 billion for three consecutive decades—a staggering commitment that would require political consensus and sustained strategic vision.

The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate, just like past projects of Zumwalt and LCS- thus represents a persistent crisis in US naval build-up. As China accelerates its naval production and expands power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the United States finds itself struggling to revive its own shipbuilding capacity. Whether Washington can reverse this trajectory will depend on its ability to reform procurement processes, invest in industrial capacity, and adopt realistic designs aligned with strategic needs. Without such changes USN risks entering the next decade with too few ships to meet global demands.

The U.S. Navy has recovered an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an F/A-18F Super Hornet from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz that crashed within half an hour of each other in the South China Sea on Oct. 26. They were located and retrieved at a depth of about 400 feet on Dec. 5. You can read about the effort to find the jet and helicopter in our initial story here.

“Both aircraft were recovered intact,” a Navy official told TWZ on Tuesday morning.

“All recovered aircraft components are being transported to a designated U.S. military installation in the Indo-Pacific region for detailed analysis,” the Navy’s 7th Fleet also said in a press release. Officials have not released details about exactly where in the South China Sea the aircraft went down and were subsequently retrieved.

The retrieval effort was conducted by Commander, Task Force 73 (CTF 73); Task Force 75; the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV); and CTG 73.6’s Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit, according to the Navy’s release. Task Force 73 is responsible for logistics activities within the 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility, while Task Force 75 oversees diving and salvage units and other expeditionary capabilities.

In addition, the Navy says it employed a “contracted Vessel of Opportunity, equipped with a government-owned, contractor-operated unmanned system, to lift and recover the aircraft.” The 7th Fleet release did not name that ship, and we have reached out for additional details. Contracted vessels have assisted in the recovery of U.S. military aircraft in the past, including in the South China Sea.

On Nov. 20, the Navy had told TWZ that the USNS Salvor (T-ARS 52), a Safeguard class salvage ship operated by Military Sealift Command, was “on-scene conducting operations in support of the recovery efforts.” It is unclear at the moment what role that ship might ultimately have played in retrieving the lost aircraft. It was seen docked in Singapore on Dec. 7, according to the MarineTraffic ship tracking website.

“This recovery was a true Navy team effort across CTF 73, SUPSALV, Task Force 75, HSM 73 [Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 73], VFA 22 [Strike Fighter Squadron 22], and our Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit,” Navy Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Andersen, the CTF 73 officer who led the salvage mission, said in a statement. “Everyone involved brought critical expertise ensuring we could safely and successfully bring these aircraft back under U.S. custody. This operation highlights the importance of naval integration, readiness, and the unmatched capability of our salvage and diving teams.”

As we have previously noted, the tense and contested nature of the South China Sea and its proximity to China would have put additional emphasis on ensuring the aircraft, or components from them, were not recovered by the Chinese. Like the United States, China has foreign materiel exploitation, or FME, programs aimed at recovering weaponry for intelligence analysis and developmental purposes. Both crashed Navy aircraft have a number of sensitive components that would be of particular interest to a major global competitor like China. You can read more about that here.

The aircraft from Nimitz that went down in the South China Sea were recovered a day after the Navy released results of investigations into the separate losses of three F/A-18s from the aircraft carrier USS Truman. Those incidents included one in which a Super Hornet was shot down by the Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser USS Gettysburg. Unlike the case of the Nimitz aircraft, those jets were never recovered, a Navy official previously confirmed to us.

The cause of the crashes of the Nimitz aircraft in October remains unknown. President Donald Trump previously suggested that the mishaps could have been caused by “bad fuel,” and you can read more about potential fuel issues in our initial coverage here. Navy officials have also previously confirmed to us that they believe there are no “nefarious” circumstances behind the crashes.

With the F/A-18F and MH-60R now recovered, the investigations into their crashes are continuing, the Navy said on Tuesday.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

The U.S. Navy says it is aiming to have the first of a new class of frigates based on an existing American design “in the water” by 2028. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter is reportedly the basis for the design in question. This all follows a decision to cancel the Constellation class frigate, a program marred by major delays and cost growth, which has now further exposed a highly concerning gap in the service’s future force structure plans. Constellation, meant to right the wrongs of the disastrous Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program by buying a largely off-the-shelf frigate, had turned into a boondoggle of its own.

Navy Secretary John Phelan had announced the cancellation of Constellation just over two weeks ago. The Navy had awarded the first contract for a fleet of at least 10 of those warships in 2020. The service picked a design based on the existing Franco-Italian FREMM frigate, with the expectation that only relatively minor changes would be needed, and that this would help keep the program on track. However, over the past five years, the Constellation design morphed into almost a completely different vessel with only 15 percent commonality with its ‘parent.’ As of April, construction of the future USS Constellation was only around 10 percent complete, and the delivery timeline had slipped to 2029.

Finally deciding to axe Constellation, though driven by harsh realities, is the latest addition to now decades-long struggles the Navy has had in bolstering its surface fleets. As noted earlier, the frigate debacle follows on from the acquisition of two chronically underperforming classes of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and the decision to slash purchases of Zumwalt class stealth destroyers (also known as DDG-1000s) down to just three hulls. The service currently relies heavily on its Arleigh Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers, the last of the latter of which are set to be retired in 2029. As such, the service has a very pressing need for additional smaller, but more capable surface combatants, as well as more surface warships overall.

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the official currently performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, told attendees at the U.S. Naval Institute’s annual Defense Forum Washington on Wednesday, according to Breaking Defense.

“We will be building a frigate. It will be based on an American design,” Phelan had said last weekend at the Reagan National Defense Forum, according to Defense One. “It is something we can build that we think, actually, will be done before the old Constellation.”

Phelan also said the follow-on frigate effort was part of a larger naval force structure and shipbuilding plan the Navy has been crafting under the current Trump administration, referred to as the “Golden Fleet.”

In addition, Breaking Defense reported that Phelan recently told individuals at a private dinner that the Legend class National Security Cutter, developed by U.S. shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), would be the basis of the new frigate, citing two unnamed sources. That outlet said the Navy and HII declined to confirm or deny any connection between the National Security Cutter design and the post-Constellation frigate plans.

TWZ has also reached out for more information. In response to our queries, HII declined to speak to the Navy’s current frigate plans.

Starting with the National Security Cutter, 10 of which were built for the Coast Guard between 2005 and 2024, would not necessarily be a surprising choice. HII notably entered a variation of its Patrol Frigate concept, derived from the National Security Cutter, into the Navy’s FFG(X) competition that led to the Constellation class, something we will come back to later on.

As TWZ has explored in the past, the 4,600-ton-displacement Legend class ships are themselves modern and capable, and are intended for open-ocean ‘blue water’ operations. In Coast Guard service, the cutters have often operated far from America’s shores and regularly integrate with elements of the Navy and other branches of the U.S. military.

At the same time, the National Security Cutter design would have been modified significantly to meet Navy mission requirements for a frigate. The primary armament of each one of the Coast Guard’s Legend class cutters consists of a single 57mm gun in a turret on the bow. They also have a Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) with a 20mm Vulcan cannon, and mounts for crew-operated machine guns at various points around the ship. The possibility of arming them with Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles has come up in the past, but there has been no actual movement to integrate that capability.

In comparison, the Constellation class frigate design, with a displacement approaching 7,300 tons (at least per the original target), included a 32-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS) intended to fire SM-2 Block IIICs and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM). These are both surface-to-air missiles. Some of those VLS cells were also expected to be loaded with a vertically-launched anti-submarine warfare weapon, likely a member of the RUM-139 Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket (VL-ARSOC) family or a follow-on design. All variants of the VL-ARSOC carry lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes as their payloads. There had been talk of integrating SM-6 multi-purpose missiles and Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles onto Constellation in the future.

There had been much discussion in the past about whether even the 32-cell VLS was sufficient for the Constellation‘s expected combination of anti-air, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine mission profiles, as you can read more about in detail in this past TWZ feature.

Beyond the VLS, each Constellation class frigate was set to be armed with launchers for 16 RGM-184 Naval Strike Missile (NSM) cruise missiles (which have anti-ship and land-attack capabilities), a single launcher loaded with RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) for close-in defense, a 57mm main gun, and mounts for multiple crew-operated machine guns.

Navy requirements for sensors and other systems missions, as well as other design features, would also differ from what the Coast Guard has laid out for the Legend class, which would require significant changes to the existing design. As one example, the Constellation class frigates were expected to feature a version of the Aegis Combat System, a key capability not found on the Coast Guard’s cutters.

There is also the matter of the Navy’s distinct shipbuilding and survivability standards for surface warships. Power generation, cooling, and even tweaks to propulsion could be needed.

It is important to remember, as mentioned, that a central factor in the collapse of the Constellation class program was the excessive changes between that design and the Franco-Italian FREMM (which stands for Fregata Europea Multi-Missione, meaning European Multi-Mission Frigate in English), from which it was derived. The Navy had expressly intended to reduce risks for that program by starting with a proven, in-production warship.

As mentioned, HII has already done significant design work on the Patrol Frigate concept over the past decade or so. HII has put forward multiple variations of that design, including ones with 12 and 16-cell VLS arrays, as well as various other weapons and mission systems beyond what are found on the Legend class configuration.

Patrol Frigate Variants – Information Video

“Regarding the original frigate competition, we did bid a variation of the NSC [National Security Cutter] that was lethal, low risk, and affordable,” an HII spokesperson had told Breaking Defense when asked about Phelan’s reported comments. “We look forward to partnering with the Navy on designs for the ships they need.”

There is also a question of whether the Navy might be able to more directly leverage the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter program in its new frigate plans. In June of this year, HII confirmed to USNI News that it had stopped work on what was expected to be the 11th member of the Legend class, set to be named the USCGC Friedman, following the settlement of a contract dispute with the Coast Guard. How far along work on that ship was at the time, and whether it would be feasible to complete it in a new Navy-specific configuration, is unclear. Fabrication of the future Friedman had started in 2021. In addition, Congress previously approved funding for the Coast Guard to purchase long lead time materials in relation to an option to buy a 12th Legend class cutter, which has never been executed.

The National Security Cutter’s career with the Coast Guard to date has not been entirely smooth sailing, either. The service has been open about the challenges it has been facing in operating and sustaining its Legend class ships.

“When a National Security Cutter pulls into port, we do a controlled parts exchange, which is a fancy term for cannibalizing our readiness,” Acting Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Kevin Lunday had said at the Navy League’s annual Sea Air Space conference earlier this year. “You can only cannibalize your readiness and eat your own readiness for so long in that downward death spiral, and that’s where we’re at.”

Lunday made clear that this was reflective of broader readiness issues facing his service, compounded by budgetary challenges. The Navy fielding a fleet of National Security Cutter-derived frigates might help here by spreading cost burdens differently across a shared supply chain. The Navy already has a history of cooperating with the Coast Guard on major shipbuilding efforts.

Though the Navy’s plan to use the National Security Cutter as a starting place for a new frigate does remain unconfirmed, it’s unclear what other options there might even be for a new warship in this category that is “based on an American design.” The U.S. subsidiary of Australian shipbuilder Austal and Lockheed Martin did compete for FFG(X) with expanded versions of their respective Independence and Freedom class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Lockheed Martin dropped out of the running early, reportedly because it could not rework the Freedom design enough to meet the Navy’s requirements. Austal USA had continued on, but the Navy passed on its offer, as well. Variations of the Freedom class LCS are still being built, including four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) derivatives for Saudi Arabia. The last Independence class LCS was delivered to the Navy earlier this year.

The FFG(X) effort was itself widely seen as a rebuke of the long-troubled LCS program. Independence and Freedom class ships have both suffered from a variety of major issues over the years that have called their basic utility into question, though the Navy has made certain strides in expanding their operational employment in recent years. This all underscores the Navy’s clear, continued desire for new frigates, despite Constellation‘s cancellation.

It should also be noted that there are several modern frigate designs available on the open market elsewhere in the world. Japan’s futuristic Mogami class stands out particularly in this regard, with examples of an expanded version with a larger 32-cell VLS array now being built and a historic export deal for additional hulls for Australia secured earlier this year. This means two U.S. allies in the Pacific are now set to have fleets of these ships, which could offer operational and sustainment benefits, especially in the context of a major conflict or other contingency that both nations might find themselves involved in. Finding ways to maximize that kind of commonality would also be advantageous for the U.S. Navy when selecting a new frigate.

There are two more frigate designs, the Type 26 and Type 31, in active production in the United Kingdom, and there are export orders for both on the order books already. There is also South Korea’s Daegu class, export versions of which are set to be built in Peru, and the F110 from Spanish shipbuilder Navantia, among others.

A version of the Type 26 now in development for Canada, called the River class, as well as the F110, both notably feature the Aegis Combat system, as well as versions of Lockheed Martin’s still very new AN/SPY-7 radar. It’s also worth pointing out that the Canadian armed forces also refer to the future River class warships as destroyers rather than frigates, reflecting a particular view of their expected capabilities and mission sets. In the context of the U.S. Navy’s new frigate plans, being able to leverage an existing design that already has key desired systems baked in, at least in certain subvariants, could be highly beneficial. Integrating Aegis, and the radar arrays that go along with it, in particular, is a major design driver for any warship, and having to modify an existing type to incorporate those features would come along with costs and complexities.

This all can only prompt questions about whether the Navy may be hamstringing itself now by centering its new frigate plans on an existing American design. The U.S. shipbuilding sector, overall, faces significant challenges at present, especially around workforce retention, after decades of contracting in size. This contributed to delays with Constellation, and continues to impact other Navy shipbuilding programs. These issues have become increasingly concerning from a broad national security perspective, especially given the huge gap now that exists in shipbuilding capacity compared to that of China, and the U.S. government has been trying to take steps to reverse the worrisome trends. The prospect of leveraging foreign yards to help build future Navy warships, as well as sustain existing fleets, has been raised. American authorities have also been courting foreign investment in the shipbuilding industry in the United States. A U.S.-South Korean trade agreement announced in November notably included a pledge by the latter country to pump $150 billion into America’s shipbuilding sector.

Given what happened with the Constellation class, any future Navy frigate program is likely to face significant scrutiny, including from Congress, in general, and be seen as a major test of the service’s ability to avoid past pitfalls. Since he was confirmed to the post in March, Navy Secretary Phelan has been consistently pledging to shake up how the service buys ships and submarines, especially when it comes to accelerating delivery timelines and cutting costs.

“The requirements are going to be put in and done before we start building the first one,” Phelan also said about the new frigate plans at the Reagan National Defense Forum this past weekend, according to The Washington Times. “When we start building the first one, any change order will have to be put through me.”

“The Constellation class frigate was canceled because, candidly, it didn’t make sense anymore to build it,” Phelan also said. “It was 80 percent of the cost of a destroyer and 60 percent of the capability. You might as well build destroyers.”

Locking in the design of any future class of frigates for the Navy, and doing so relatively quickly, will be absolutely key to avoiding what happened with Constellation. This, in turn, will require the service to accept the fact that frigates are not destroyers, and the tradeoffs and risks that come with that, especially when it comes to potentially employing the ships more independently in a higher threat environment.

How the Navy proceeds in its push now to right the wrongs of the Constellation class program, and have the first example of a still sorely needed class of new frigates launched by 2028, will be an area of keen interest going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com