Analysis: Could the Venezuela model be applied to Iran?

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 8 (UPI) — The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in a dramatic military operation ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump represents another blow — a new red flag — for Iran and its main proxy, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, potentially depriving the group of an ally and a foothold, or safe haven, in Latin America.

The predawn raid in Caracas not only sparked renewed U.S. accusations that both entities were involved in drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and evading sanctions, but also raised questions about whether the Venezuela model could be applied to Iran.

“No more drug trafficking, no more Iran‑Hezbollah presence there and no more using the oil industry to enrich all our adversaries around the world,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in summarizing his country’s. goals for Venezuela and its allies.

Venezuela and Iran, which developed deep political, diplomatic, economic and military cooperation under Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez, as part of an “Axis of Unity” against U.S. influence, have suffered from U.S.-imposed crippling sanctions that have intensified their economic crises.

In June 2022, Iran and Venezuela signed a 20‑year cooperation agreement intended to strengthen their alliance and circumvent U.S. sanctions by expanding collaboration in areas such as energy, oil, petrochemicals, science and technology, and other sectors.

The accord envisaged Iranian assistance with Venezuela’s oil industry and broader technical cooperation, and since then, the two countries have also deepened military cooperation, including links involving drone technology.

Long-standing ties between Iran and Venezuela created conditions in which Hezbollah — through networks embedded in Venezuela and parts of the diaspora — was reportedly able to establish financial and logistical operations in the country.

According to U.S. congressional testimony in October, these activities included fundraising, money transfers, smuggling and using Venezuelan‑issued travel documents.

The Maduro government denied these allegations, but Washington sanctioned Venezuelan officials and businessmen accused of assisting Hezbollah operatives.

Such accusations against Hezbollah, whose military capabilities were significantly degraded during the war with Israel, have been described by analysts in Lebanon as exaggerated and unsupported by clear evidence.

Mohanad Hage Ali, an analyst and fellow at the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center, said Venezuela offered “a window of opportunity” for Hezbollah to be active in a state where the regime is friendly to the group and sympathetic to its ideology. But many claims describing a vital Hezbollah-Venezuela relationship exceeded what publicly available evidence supports.

“This is because what we have seen are instances of involvement by individuals who have relationships with Hezbollah, whether relatives or others, and these relationships and the roles they play seem small compared to Hezbollah’s budgetary needs in Lebanon,” Hage Ali told UPI.

Undoubtedly, he said, Hezbollah has some form of presence, representation, financial and economic activities, or plays a role in drug trafficking, but these are “limited,” as is its ability to expand abroad.

With the militant group relying more on direct funding from Iran, Hage Ali said Hezbollah would be affected in the event of a regime change in Caracas, but added, “I fail to see Venezuela as a crucial part of the overall puzzle of Hezbollah financing.”

It remains to be seen whether Trump can translate or invest the success in capturing Maduro into political gains.

It would not be easy to contain a country such as Venezuela simply by abducting its president, retired Lebanese Brig. Gen. Hassan Jouni argued.

“Would Trump be able to control and subjugate the Venezuelan regime? Would that require boots on the ground– a land invasion?” Jouni asked, warning that such a move would entail significant attrition and deep involvement for the United States, making the operation highly risky.

Snatching Maduro from his home in Caracas and charging him with drug trafficking and terrorism sent a clear message from Trump to countries around the world — especially those opposing his policies, chief among them Iran: Cooperate or face the use of force.

Jouni said the message capped the Dec, 29 meeting between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with threats that Iran would not be allowed to restart its nuclear program or rebuild its ballistic missile industry.

Could the Venezuela scenario be used for Iran? Could Trump do in Tehran what he did in Caracas — even going so far as to reach and capture Iran’s Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?

Jouni ruled out such a possibility, explaining that Iran differs from Venezuela because of the nature of its regime, its geographical location and the vast size of the country. Moreover, Khamenei would be protected by an “exceptional protection system.”

“Would Russia and China accept the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with a pro-U.S. one?” Jouni asked during an interview with UPI, suggesting “under-the-table” coordination with Russia on Ukraine and with China on Taiwan for possible exchanges.

Moreover, Iran would not stand idle and would strike back at Israel — as it did during the 12-day war last June, causing considerable damage — and would likely target U.S. bases across the region.

Kassem Kassir, a political analyst who specializes in Islamic movements and is close to Hezbollah, said Iran is being targeted, whether through economic pressures and sanctions affecting the internal situation, or militarily.

“Today, Tehran is ready for all possibilities, working to contain popular movements and street protests by addressing economic problems,” Kassir told UPI.

With Hezbollah no longer constituting a threat to Israel, a war against Iran, which would require Trump’s approval and his green light for Israel, might not change much, given the fighting round in June, according to Jouni.

A possible way out could be a deal — modeled on the recently forced arrangement with Venezuela regarding its oil, under which Caracas agreed to export up to $2 billion worth of crude to the United States — through which Trump could secure substantial investments in Iran in exchange for eased tensions or dropping threats of regime change.

Whether all these new U.S. interventions could bring stability remains uncertain and doubtful, especially given the chaos unleashed after the 2003 Iraq invasion, when disbanding the army and rebuilding the state from scratch backfired both in the country and across the region, Hage Ali noted.