After the Bombs: Venezuelans Concerned About a Future of Coercion and Colonization

CARACAS, Venezuela — It was 1:58 a.m. on Jan. 3 when a thunderous roar made the windows of my apartment in downtown Caracas shake. Are the New Year’s celebrations still going on? Is a storm coming or is it an earthquake, I wondered. Despite multiple threats from the United States against Venezuela, I couldn’t believe that bombing was possible; not like this, not now. As people say in Venezuela, “It’s one thing to call on the devil, and another to see him actually arrive.” As the missiles began to fall one after another, my phone was inundated with the same message: “They are bombing us.”

Residents in the southwest of the city witnessed at least 11 helicopters entering Fort Tiuna, Caracas’ most important military complex, which is surrounded by dozens of civilian buildings jointly known as Tiuna City. Andrea Pérez, a resident of the area, heard the roar of the helicopters, followed by high-pitched whistles that ended in a massive explosion. The glare lit up her apartment, and the dense air tightened in her young son’s chest.

“We ran down eight floors, using our phone flashlights and we bumped into all our neighbors. Some were half-naked, running for their lives. Some of us got into our cars, but the traffic was so bad it took nearly 20 minutes just to get out of there,” she tells Truthdig.

Within minutes, the highway filled with people trying to flee on foot from whatever was happening. “There was no light. You could hear indescribable, terrifying noises. You didn’t know where they were coming from. We had no idea what was happening outside, but we had to get out. I carried my dog, which weighs almost 30 kilos and just had surgery,” Oleno León, another resident, says.

Later, we learned that a U.S. cyberattack had crippled a large part of Caracas’ power supply. This helped enable 150 stealth fighters, electronic warfare aircraft, bombers, assault helicopters, drones and intelligence satellites to penetrate the skies of at least four Venezuelan states.

Negotiation and betrayal: Does it matter?

Hours later, we knew there had been an incursion, but we weren’t certain if the objective — to abduct President Nicolás Maduro — had been achieved. However, later in the morning, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez established a phone link with the state television channel and confirmed the situation by asking the U.S. for “proof of life” for the president and his wife, Cilia Flores.

People hunkered down. The streets turned into deserts. A harsh quietness descended that was only broken the next day by desperate lines at supermarkets, pharmacies and shops selling drinking water. What followed is now well known: multiple and contradictory statements from various U.S. government officials, images of Maduro and Flores arriving at the Drug Enforcement Administration office and later the courthouse in Manhattan, and Rodríguez being sworn in as acting president in the National Assembly.

However, as the days passed, people had questions: What happened to the Russian air defense systems or the Chinese radar for detecting air attacks — including the 5,000 Igla-S missiles that Maduro himself claimed to have in October 2025? Why were there no air-to-air battles? Did everything fail? Would this amount to treason? Or, if it was a negotiation, was the now-kidnapped president involved or not?

The picture became somewhat clearer when the United States government explained how its high-level technology managed to dismantle Venezuelan defenses, as well as the role played for months by several undercover CIA agents in Caracas. Rodríguez stated that “no one surrendered” and that “there was combat here.” The lives of at least 100 people “were taken in a vile, unequal, unilateral, illegal and illegitimate attack,” she said.

Maduro’s son, National Assembly member Nicolás Maduro Guerra, also stated that the U.S. neutralized the radar used for detection. “We were left blind; they attacked us with an aircraft that emits an electromagnetic wave that affects all defense systems,” he said. “It was impossible to get a plane off the ground, and most likely, if we had taken off, they would have shot it down. The technology they used was impressive. I believe this was a rehearsal for something bigger, and humanity should know about it.”

However, days earlier, Maduro Guerra had also hinted at the possibility of treason within the government. In statements to Truthdig, historian and Caracas-based commentator Álvaro Suzzarini notes that in catastrophes of this scale, the responses and actions of those under attack will inevitably range from betrayal and compromise to acts of heroism. However, he says, beyond the sensationalism and debates in the media and public generated by that dynamic, history will eventually reveal what role the key figures ultimately played.

Central University of Venezuela social psychology and criminology professor Andrés Antillano tells Truthdig that speculation doesn’t help while the situation is still so volatile. “The fact is that there is a negotiation with Trump; whether it happened before or after the military intervention and Maduro’s kidnapping is a matter of speculation, and perhaps it is not the most relevant issue right now,” Antillano says. “What matters more is understanding what comes after this brutal and ruthless intervention, which also served to intimidate the entire continent.”

Venezuelans worry about US role and economy

“I worry about losing power again or running out of water. Luckily, I have some food at home, but I also fear not being able to find what I need. I am also worried about safety, about the emptiness that takes over the streets at night and what that could lead to,” says Ariadna García, a young writer. She, like other Venezuelans I spoke with, isn’t sure what the role and reach of the U.S. in Venezuela will ultimately be.

Rodríguez has stated that the country “was attacked by a nuclear power but is not at war,” that “no external agent governs it,” and that it is entering “a new political moment” — one that has already included meetings with opposition lawmakers and the release of political prisoners.

But for citizens like university professor María Mercedes Cobo, national and personal fears have emerged. “First of all, I fear this aggression could be repeated, but I’m also terrified that we may no longer be a country with self-determination, and instead a colonized territory. Every time Trump speaks as if he were the president of Venezuela, it scares me. But I also wonder what will happen to our economy,” she tells Truthdig.

In the first week of January, the official exchange rate for the U.S. dollar against the Venezuelan bolívar rose by almost 10% , while the gap between the official and parallel rates is around 100%. This devaluing of the bolívar — through which most workers receive their income — reduces purchasing power, which was already very low. As of the end of last year, the monthly minimum wage in Venezuela was less than one U.S. dollar, and most income was received as bonuses.

Since Jan. 3, “In a context of deep political uncertainty, the economy has stopped being a priority. The failure to address this gap is causing a contraction in people’s purchasing power due to the breakdown of the pricing system,” economist Asdrúbal Oliveros tells Truthdig. He says that until the Venezuelan oil market stabilizes, the exchange rate will not stabilize either.

Venezuelan experts on the future

In purely political terms, what could happen in the coming months? According to Suzzarini, predicting outcomes with limited data under conditions of high uncertainty is risky, but he believes the emerging and most plausible scenario is the current one. “The continuity of Chavismo in power under the figure of Delcy Rodríguez, with at least the current 2025-2031 presidential term being fulfilled,” he says.

In his view, Venezuela is experiencing a “transition without transition,” where the U.S. has removed the president, but the governing party is the same, a sign that Washington did not and does not fully understand the phenomenon of Chavismo — the ideology embraced by followers of the late President Hugo Chávez — as a political movement. “This is not the kind of government, as calculated in the United States, where decapitating Maduro’s leadership would cause everything else to collapse,” he says.

“There are multiple converging leaderships and a political maturity of 30 years,” he says, referring to the decades of Bolivarian revolution and related organizing and movements.

The historian also points out that the right-wing opposition, led by María Corina Machado, will likely remain “outside the equation and the mathematics of power” because it lacks the capacity or support to sustain it, especially in such a delicate moment. Meanwhile, he says, Russia and China could still shift the global political landscape, with repercussions for Venezuela.

Trump is willing to receive Machado at the White House and she would like to award him her Nobel Peace Prize, but both know that the opposition leader could not run the country — especially not now. “She lacks the support and the respect,” Trump stated on Jan. 3.

However, the country is still essentially being held hostage by the U.S. and is under constant threat, Carlos Raúl Hernández, a political science professor at the Central University of Venezuela, explains. He says this makes acting President Rodríguez a sort of lifeline.

“Venezuela has a somewhat similar population and geographic size to Iraq [when it was bombed in 2003], so if the United States decided today to proceed with an invasion, it could … cause the deaths of 40,000 Venezuelans. It’s an extremely grave threat, one that must be avoided through agreements,” Hernández tells Truthdig.

To Hernández, Rodríguez is in a difficult position because, “theoretically or practically, the oil fleet linked to Venezuela has been seized, and of course that leaves no alternative but to negotiate. The tankers are in U.S. hands, so moving the oil requires U.S. approval. Another factor is China’s oil exploitation, which is also very important for the Venezuelan nation at this moment, as it represents 70% of exports. On the other hand, the United States is a key importer for China, and China is a major market for the United States.”

However, he believes that Rodríguez’s government could last a couple of years before new elections are held, “Until there is no longer a risk of confrontation, civil war or a process that destabilizes the world’s largest international oil reserve. Trump is interested in making sure this gigantic mine operates without setbacks, and that’s why he negotiates with the Chavista government — because it’s the only force with a real structure and control of the state apparatus.”

Hernández also thinks that if these agreements break down, new forms of invasion could follow. “But predicting it is difficult because everything that is taking place is unprecedented — astonishing in a civilized world like the one we thought we had.”

It would not be the first time a U.S. government chose to invade first and think later. But, at least for now, it seems that U.S. action will focus on coercing authorities through measures like those we experienced on Jan. 3.

Democratic U.S. senators, along with a small bloc of Republican senators, delivered a rebuke to Trump by voting in favor of advancing a resolution that would limit the future use of U.S. military force in Venezuela without congressional approval, but the resolution failed after two Republicans changed their votes and Vice President JD Vance voted to break a tie. Either way, Trump rarely respects U.S. legality, and he still has three years left in his term. Meanwhile, his next target could be Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Greenland … or once again, Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Truthdig