Zimbabwe

Harare, Zimbabwe – Precious Mvundura woke up with joint pain, a high fever and a pounding headache on a chilly autumn morning in eastern Zimbabwe.

The 37-year-old initially thought it was just the flu. But when the headache persisted for three days, she became worried.

Her five-year-old son had also fallen ill and was sweating heavily.

In early May, the pair sought help from a village health worker in Chishakwe, a rural farming community outside Zimbabwe’s third-largest city, Mutare. Both tested positive for malaria.

“I felt relieved,” Mvundura told Al Jazeera.

“From the moment I took that medication, I started getting better.”

Her son has also recovered and is back in school.

Their ordeal comes as malaria cases and deaths surge across Zimbabwe after US funding cuts disrupted key malaria control programmes.

Shortly after returning to office for a second term in 2025, US President Donald Trump slashed foreign aid funding, including programmes backed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Zimbabwe, the cuts disrupted tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria research, prevention and treatment programmes.

Among the affected initiatives were the Zimbabwe Entomological Support Programme in Malaria (ZENTO) at Africa University in Mutare, which provided scientific research to support the country’s National Malaria Control Programme, and the Zimbabwe Assistance Programme in Malaria II (ZAPIM II), which helped strengthen malaria diagnosis, treatment and prevention in high-burden districts.

USAID had disbursed $270m for health and agriculture programmes in Zimbabwe in 2024.

Malaria cases jumped to 65,399 between January and April 2026, up from 36,000 recorded during the same period in 2025 and 17,000 in 2024, according to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health National Malaria Control Programme weekly surveillance report.

Deaths have also risen sharply, reaching 174 between January and April 2026, compared with 85 during the same period last year and 34 in 2024.

Mvundura and her son survived because they sought treatment early. In many other cases, the disease has been fatal.

Shortages of mosquito nets, test kits

Thomas Chuchu, the health programme lead at Save the Children Zimbabwe, said several malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II had been disrupted.

“In practice, elimination has continued through government and other partners, but with weaker operational capacity and slower implementation,” Chuchu told Al Jazeera.

The ZAPIM II programme ran through Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health system in 11 districts across the provinces of Central and East Mashonaland and the province of Matabeleland North.

Before falling ill, Mvundura said she had not been using mosquito nets or repellents.

“I only started using a mosquito net a friend shared when I fell sick,” she said.

In December 2025, Caroline Mawombedzi was diagnosed with malaria while living in Burma Valley, a farming community about an hour’s drive from Mutare.

She had last contracted the disease in the late 2000s while still a child.

In mid-May, her five-year-old daughter was also diagnosed with malaria by a village health worker in Chishakwe after suffering severe headaches and stomach problems.

Although her daughter received treatment, Mawombedzi said she could not afford preventive measures such as mosquito nets.

“I am unemployed. I cannot afford to buy a mosquito net. We have not been sleeping under a mosquito net for years,” she said.

Virginia Chakandinakira, a village health worker serving Chishakwe, said malaria diagnostic kits and drugs are now in short supply.

“I used to get plenty of malaria test kits and drugs. But in 2025, they did not give me. I referred everyone showing malaria to a nearby Chitakatira clinic,” she said. Chitakatira is a rural settlement about an hour’s drive from Chishakwe.

“I only received test kits and drugs in February. However, the supplies are limited. The authorities told us they were only distributing them to hotspot communities.”

Research programmes crippled

Professor Sungano Mharakurwa, the director of Africa University’s Malaria Institute, said the abrupt withdrawal of US support had worsened the malaria outbreak by affecting the programme.

ZENTO was contributing data from the surveillance of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, which guided strategies employed by the National Malaria Control Programme to control malaria transmission, he said.

The Trump administration’s funding cuts have also effectively put a stop to the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), launched in 2005 by former President George W Bush to control and eliminate malaria worldwide. Mharakurwa said the PMI had played a major role in funding malaria medications, and communities had been left exposed without it.

He said the Malaria Institute later secured funding from the United Methodist Church General Board of Global Ministry, but it fell far short of previous US assistance.

Zimbabwe’s dependence on donor funding for essential medicines, diagnostic kits and mosquito-control supplies has left the country vulnerable.

Itai Rusike, the director of Zimbabwe’s Community Working Group on Health, said the government needed to strengthen domestic health financing to reduce dependence on foreign donors.

“It is risky for a country to depend substantially on external partners, as donors can withdraw financial support anytime should their interests shift,” he said.

Climate change fuels spread

Experts say climate change is also driving the spread of malaria and other vector-borne diseases across Africa.

Rising temperatures are allowing malaria to spread into higher-altitude areas, which were once less vulnerable to outbreaks.

Zimbabwe experienced El Niño between 2023 and 2024, a climate phenomenon marked by unusually warm temperatures in the Pacific Ocean, which typically disrupts rainfall patterns across Southern Africa.

Heavy rainfall followed in 2025 and 2026, creating ideal breeding conditions for mosquitoes.

Chuchu, from Save the Children Zimbabwe, said that the current spike in malaria cases was closely linked to the heavy rains during the 2025–2026 season.

“The rains created favourable breeding conditions for mosquitoes, particularly in already endemic provinces such as Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West,” he said.

“The effect of heavy rains is likely being amplified by weakened prevention systems, including reduced mosquito-net coverage, delayed vector-control activities, reduced community surveillance, and challenges with timely testing and treatment following the discontinuation of ZAPIM,” he added.

Professor Mharakurwa, meanwhile, said that above-normal rainfall required equally strong preparation and resources to contain malaria transmission.

Government efforts

Zimbabwe aims to eliminate malaria by 2030, in line with the target set by the African Union.

Over the years, the government, working with international donors and aid organisations, has relied on indoor residual spraying, mosquito-net distribution, mass testing and public awareness campaigns to contain outbreaks, particularly in rural communities.

Health workers continue to carry out indoor spraying campaigns in malaria-prone areas, while village health educators use community meetings and radio programmes to encourage early testing and treatment. Authorities have also expanded surveillance and rapid-response systems in high-risk districts.

But some of these efforts have weakened following the disruption of donor-funded programmes. Key malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II included active case tracking, targeted distribution of long-lasting insecticidal nets and district rapid-response systems.

For years, the government and aid organisations distributed mosquito nets annually to vulnerable communities, such as Chishakwe. But since the US funding cuts, shortages have become increasingly common.

Village health workers say malaria diagnostic kits and treatment drugs are also running low in some rural areas, forcing suspected malaria patients to travel long distances to clinics for testing and treatment.

Health experts warn that unless funding gaps are urgently addressed, Zimbabwe risks losing years of progress made in reducing malaria infections and deaths.

For Mvundura and her son, surviving malaria still feels like escaping death.

“We cheated death,” she said. “It was so bad.”

On May 7, Zimbabwe’s Agriculture Minister Anxious Masuka announced in parliament that the government would return 67 farms seized during the country’s land reform programme to European nationals from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The farms, he said, were protected under bilateral investment protection agreements signed between Zimbabwe and the four European states before the land seizures.

The measure forms part of President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s effort to restore relations with Western governments and international financial institutions after more than two decades of crisis, sanctions, isolation and debt default linked in part to the fast-track land reform programme of the early 2000s.

Zimbabwe is trying to restructure about $11.7bn in external debt, including $7.7bn owed to multilateral and bilateral creditors. On May 20, the International Monetary Fund approved a staff-monitored programme to support reforms and debt restructuring.

Resolving disputes linked to land reform has become central to that re-engagement process. In July 2020, Zimbabwe signed a $3.5bn compensation agreement with former white commercial farmers for infrastructure and improvements on acquired land. Last year, it began compensating treaty-protected foreign farmers, including claimants from Germany, Switzerland and Belgium.

But this development also exposes a deeper contradiction embedded in the global order governing land and property rights in former settler colonies: European claims arising from postcolonial redistribution are treated as urgent, enforceable and respectable, while African claims arising from colonial dispossession remain largely outside the same legal and moral framework.

The colonial dispossession that created white land ownership in Rhodesia never received the same urgency as the one now directed at restoring European claims after postcolonial redistribution. At independence in April 1980, no comparable mechanism forced Britain, Rhodesia or settler beneficiaries to compensate Africans dispossessed through conquest, racial legislation and forced removal. Yet once postcolonial Zimbabwe attempted to redistribute that land, its protection suddenly became tied to legality, investor confidence and international respectability.

In October 1889, Cecil John Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC) received a royal charter from the British Crown, accelerating white settler expansion across the territory that became Southern Rhodesia. The 1893 war against King Lobengula’s Ndebele kingdom opened vast areas of land to settler occupation, while the crushing of the 1896-97 First Chimurenga, led by resistance figures such as Mbuya Nehanda, consolidated British control across the colony.

Early dispossession was not only territorial. After 1893, BSAC forces seized cattle on a large scale in Matabeleland, weakening the economic foundations of local communities. By 1958, Southern Rhodesia’s European population of roughly 207,000 controlled almost 48 million acres of prime agricultural land, while about 2.55 million Africans had 41.95 million acres of poorer, overcrowded and less arable land.

From the 1890s onwards, colonial land seizures in Rhodesia were enforced and legitimised through the selective application of British imperial law and BSAC decrees. African ownership of land was never recognised with the same standing granted to settler occupation.

That legal order survived the expansion of settler rule through the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and continued to shape later legal frameworks.

That lopsided inheritance still shapes the global response to Zimbabwe’s land question decades after independence.

Bilateral investment treaties signed between Zimbabwe and foreign states gave protected investors the right to seek compensation when property covered by those agreements was expropriated. In practice, certain foreign-owned farms seized during fast-track land reform entered an international system backed by arbitration mechanisms, treaty enforcement and diplomatic pressure, even though the land itself had been acquired through conquest and war. The 67 farms covered by Masuka fall into that category.

Africans dispossessed under colonial rule were never granted comparable access to international reparations or protected claims against empire.

Part of this asymmetry is structural: European farmers can invoke treaties their governments signed and a compensation deal Zimbabwe itself agreed, while the dispossessed have no counterparty to sue, no instrument to enforce and, in Rhodesia, no surviving state to hold to account. But that is precisely the point. The legal architecture was built to recognise one kind of loss and not the other.

In April 2009, Dutch farmers protected under a bilateral investment treaty brought Funnekotter and others v Zimbabwe before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the tribunal ordered Zimbabwe to compensate them for expropriated farms. In 2015, another ICSID tribunal ruled in favour of European claimants linked to Swiss and German property interests in von Pezold and others v Zimbabwe after land seizures under fast-track reform.

The contrast is stark for everyday Zimbabweans.

My maternal grandparents lived in what was the Seke Reserve in Mashonaland, a place where most people were settled on small plots of land with “rather poor sand veldt with a lot of bush”. The reserve was created in 1899 along a boundary that ran roughly along the Hunyani River to the north and northeast, separating African-occupied land from areas soon to be claimed by white settlers.

On the other side of that line, colonial authorities allocated fertile, riverfront and midslope land to white commercial farmers, while families who had once farmed across that broader landscape were confined to a narrow, overcrowded reserve with low-grade soils and limited water.

This was part of a wider colonial regime that, from 1894, also pushed many Ndebele communities into the dry, low-rainfall and tsetse-fly-infested Gwaai and Shangani reserves in Matabeleland North.

Their subsequent, imposed impoverishment and losses, of land, cattle, livelihoods, political authority and economic autonomy, were absorbed into colonial history rather than treated as enforceable claims demanding compensation from the imperial system that created them.

They all died landless and economically broken, largely invisible to the global legal order and without meaningful redress, much like countless Indigenous communities around the country.

Yet Zimbabwe’s compensation framework, shaped largely by external pressure and Western imperatives, recognises losses arising from fast-track land reform and treaty-protected commercial farms. It does not recognise losses like those experienced by my grandparents, or by countless families whose land, cattle and livelihoods were taken under colonial rule.

For years, Zimbabwe’s debt re-engagement process has been tied to arrears clearance, economic reforms and the settlement of land-related disputes. The restoration of treaty-protected European claims has therefore become intertwined with Zimbabwe’s attempts to regain access to international finance and repair relations with Western creditors, chiefly the IMF and World Bank.

Compensation agreements and investor protections are presented as proof that Zimbabwe is becoming governable, predictable and safe again for international capital. In effect, Zimbabwe is being asked to rehabilitate confidence in settler-derived property rights as part of its return to global financial legitimacy.

Launched in 2000, Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme was characterised by widespread economic disruption and violence against Black farmworkers, white farmers and opposition MDC supporters. Those failures do not erase the history of land theft that made redistribution a central political question in the first place.

The unresolved collision between colonial property systems and African restitution claims extends far beyond Zimbabwe. In former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, it is overwhelmingly Black Africans who are expected to absorb mass land dispossession without compensation.

Colonial seizure is treated as inconvenient background history, while postcolonial attempts to restructure ownership are framed as threats to “markets” and “investor confidence”.

African efforts to recover land face more obstacles than the colonial systems that stole it.

Land reform should be lawful, accountable and economically productive. Nonetheless, international law cannot treat property rights created through settler colonialism as morally untouchable while dismissing African compensation as dangerous or illegitimate.

The 67 farms are standing remnants of an old and unresolved colonial atrocity.

My grandmother’s people also have rights.

Zimbabweans are still waiting for justice.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Harare, Zimbabwe – Zimbabwe’s real estate and farming sectors are seeing a surge in diaspora-driven investment, with two young content creators quietly emerging as unexpected influencers shaping the trend.

Kundai Chitima, 31, and Kelvin Birioti, 20, each running their own social media channel, have built followings that seem to influence a growing number of Zimbabweans abroad considering return or investment.

On YouTube and Instagram, they share short videos and posts highlighting opportunities in Zimbabwe. Their popular content ranges from property tours and agricultural tips to market trend analysis.

For some in the diaspora, decisions about returning or investing increasingly appear to be shaped less by official narratives and more by social media content offering on-the-ground perspectives of life in Zimbabwe.

One of those influenced is Catherine Mutisi, who spent 17 years living in the United Kingdom working as an accountant. During that time, she had already begun investing in Zimbabwe, building two houses, buying a small plot and starting a business.

She said her thinking shifted after coming across Birioti’s content during construction.

“Gradually, my mind and plans shifted from just visiting Zimbabwe towards wanting to permanently relocate,” she said.

Mutisi said earlier narratives about Zimbabwe had made her cautious, but online content presented a different perspective.

“Previously, I was just building my houses for my family to get some money. But after watching the videos, my eyes opened,” she told Al Jazeera.

Her experience is not isolated. Both Chitima and Birioti say they hear similar accounts from the Zimbabwean diaspora reassessing their long-term plans.

UK-based Zimbabwean Nyashadzashe Nguwo, an Africa market entry and global expansion adviser, said many people like Mutisi are relocating to Zimbabwe due to what he described as a combination of emotional and lifestyle-driven factors.

“There’s a strong desire among many in the diaspora to reconnect with their roots and contribute meaningfully to national development. For some, the lower cost of living and the opportunity to build something impactful at home outweigh concerns about economic instability,” Nguwo told Al Jazeera.

Two influencers

After growing up in Chinhoyi, a town in northern Zimbabwe about 120km (75 miles) northwest of the capital, Harare, Birioti sought a new start and enrolled at Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University (ZEGU) in Bindura. He dropped out, however, due to financial challenges and decided to move to Harare.

There, he met Chitima and began learning content creation. From the outset, he said he avoided entertainment-style content, instead focusing on what he saw as an information gap.

“I saw a gap: the diaspora community was being scammed.”

He built his platform about real estate, rural development and farming projects, often working with diaspora Zimbabweans who granted access to their properties for documentation.

On the other hand, Chitima worked as a teacher in South Africa before returning to Zimbabwe in 2015.

He said workplace inequality influenced his choice: “We were earning lower than my South African colleagues. I thought of my dignity and made a decision to return home.”

Chitima returned to Zimbabwe with limited resources and a pregnant wife, entering a very different economic environment from the one he had left.

Before his time in South Africa, he had worked as a civil servant. After returning, he gradually moved into content creation, beginning in 2015 and later training younger creators who went on to build large audiences.

Today, he reflects on his platform as both educational and protective for diaspora audiences.

“I receive calls from people crying … they have been scammed.”

He says his content aims to replace uncertainty with grounded information about the realities and opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Economic pressure and unemployment

While no official figures are publicly available on the exact number of Zimbabweans leaving the country or their reasons for doing so, reports from the International Organization for Migration and independent migration studies indicate consistent migration.

The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat) reported a 21.8 percent unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2024, based on strict International Labour Organization definitions.

Between 76 percent and 80 percent of workers are in the informal sector, relying on subsistence or unregulated employment. Youth unemployment is particularly acute: a 2025 World Bank report estimates it at 76.8 percent.

For many young people, stable employment is increasingly difficult to secure.

Susan Sibanda, 26, describes moving between short-term and informal work.

“I have been switching from one casual job to the next,” Sibanda said.

Her experience reflects a wider labour market where formal employment continues to shrink. In recent years, several big retailers, including Choppies, Truworths, OK Zimbabwe, and N Richards, have downsized or closed operations.

Emigration pressures remain strong

Against that backdrop, migration still features heavily in the decisions of young Zimbabweans.

Sibanda said she now considers that “leaving Zimbabwe is in my best interest”.

Economist Tashinga Kajiva said the story of emigration from Zimbabwe has largely remained high, driven by a combination of push and pull factors that encourage people to seek what they see as greener pastures.

“Zimbabwe’s economy is marked by complex and, some would say, difficult dynamics. For ordinary citizens, disposable income remains low while the cost of living continues to rise. The marginal propensity to save among working-class citizens is also low, as many are living hand to mouth,” he told Al Jazeera.

Zimbabwe’s diaspora is concentrated in South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, according to government figures.

Keeping ties alive from abroad

The economic link between Zimbabwe and its diaspora remains strong.

According to real estate agents, diaspora buyers now account for a significant share

They state that up to 50 percent of high-end residential properties sold were purchased by Zimbabweans living abroad in recent years. In some regions, land prices have risen by 20–30 percent year-on-year, a surge partly attributed to diaspora buyers.

Diaspora investment is also noticeable in agriculture. Reports from the Zimbabwe Farmers Union indicate that about 10-15 percent of new farm leases over the past two to three years involve diaspora investors, with activity concentrated in Mashonaland Central and Matabeleland regions.

Remittances reached $1.7bn in 2023 and continue to rise. In 2025, Zimbabweans abroad sent $2.45bn home, with the UK and South Africa the largest sources, according to government data. A significant portion of these funds is reportedly invested in real estate, agriculture, and small businesses.

This reflects both practical necessity and emotional attachment to home, as well as a preference for investing in familiar environments, according to economists.

Still, return seems to generate mixed reactions.

Some diaspora Zimbabweans appear cautious, citing political developments and recent protests abroad over governance concerns.

For them, financial ties to Zimbabwe are still strong, but physical return remains uncertain.

With social media reshaping perceptions of life in Zimbabwe, many in the diaspora remain caught between investment opportunities and the country’s economic realities.

As content creators like Chitima and Birioti reshape how some see opportunity in Zimbabwe, domestic economic pressures appear to be pushing others away, leaving the country’s relationship with its diaspora open-ended and still evolving.

“For many Zimbabweans living abroad, investing back home is not just about profit – it’s about staying connected to their roots and shaping the future of their communities,” said Chitima.

It is the only place in the world where you can see four countries at once — and it’s fast becoming a must-visit travel destination

Holidaymakers are adding a rather unusual spot to their bucket lists. The Kazungula Bridge, which spans the Zambezi River and links Zambia and Botswana, is the only location on Earth where four countries can be seen simultaneously.

While Botswana and Zambia are connected by the 923-metre structure, both Namibia and Zimbabwe sit just metres away on the opposite bank. From the bridge and nearby vantage points, visitors can witness multiple international frontiers within seconds, making this an extraordinary and essential stop for anyone exploring these nations.

The bridge, which opened in 2021, replaced a slow and rather unreliable ferry crossing, making access far simpler for tourists and locals alike.

Now, thanks to the bridge and swifter border procedures, visitors can arrange multi-country trips with considerably more ease.

Dr Mohanjeet Brar, seasoned travel expert and MD at African safari camp operator Gamewatchers Safaris, points out that while this spot may provide a one-of-a-kind experience, it’s crucial to bear in mind that you’ll be crossing at least one frontier, and therefore adequate preparation is essential.

He said: “This is exactly the kind of experience that sounds easy on paper but can quickly become complicated without proper planning.

“You’re dealing with multiple border crossings, visa requirements, and varying wait times – all within a relatively small geographic area.

“The key is to treat it less like a spontaneous stop and more like a structured itinerary.

“With the right preparation, it can be one of the most rewarding travel experiences in Africa.”

This convenient crossing makes it straightforward to combine several unmissable destinations into a single trip, such as Chobe National Park in Botswana alongside Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe or Zambia.

For those seeking something a little closer to home, where you can set foot in multiple countries at once, Europe offers plenty of options.

These include Drielandenpunt, where Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands converge, or Trojmedzie, where the borders of Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia all meet.