Yemen

Wadi Dawan, Yemen – From above, Wadi Dawan looks untouched – a ribbon of date palms winding through towering cliffs, divided by a white wadi bed. Scattered mud‑brick homes cling to the rocky slopes, overlooking one of Yemen’s most celebrated agricultural valleys, renowned for its palm dates and quality honey.

But continuing down into the valley, a starkly different picture emerges: plastic waste litters the flood channels, while the smell of burning rubbish hangs in the air, triggering coughs and polluting the valley’s once‑clean atmosphere.

“By God, this is a very serious problem,” said Yousef Abdullah, a 65‑year‑old farmer and orchard owner, speaking angrily to Al Jazeera. “If it remains unresolved, it will cause a disaster.”

Yousef stood beneath the shade of date palms, surrounded by a blanket of plastic bags, bottles, and food wrappers.

Throughout Wadi Dawan, home to thousands of people across dozens of scattered villages in Yemen’s eastern Hadramout province, plastic bags, bottles, and other household waste litter roadsides and palm groves.

Piles of rubbish – including dead animals – are dumped into flood channels that irrigate the valley’s farms. Household waste is mixed with sewage discharged into the wadi bed, while mounds of rubbish are dumped along roadsides just metres from people’s homes.

Yousef said that floods flowing through the valley pick up the waste, blocking irrigation channels, and depriving some farms of the vital waters they need. That has forced farmers to rush to the channels whenever the floods arrive, clearing the waste that has accumulated before the water recedes.

“We move from one irrigation channel to another leading to our farms, removing plastic bags, construction debris, and trees,” Yousef said. “We have to do it carefully because broken glass hidden in the rubbish can easily cut us.”

And then, after the floodwater recedes, Yousef and other farmers return to their fields and collect the plastic bottles and bags before they can sow their seeds.

Waste awareness initiative

Residents, environmental advocates, and local officials say the growing problem is driven by the lack of a proper waste collection system and limited public awareness of the environmental and health risks of indiscriminate dumping.

Large parts of the valley have no waste collection points at all. In the places that do, green rubbish bins can be seen along the roads, but are often overflowing. Garbage trucks are supposed to collect waste from the bins once a week, but the service is often disrupted because of a lack of funding and poor vehicle maintenance.

With almost no funding or resources, Salem Raji, who heads the Ministry of Agriculture’s office in Wadi Dawan and is also an agricultural researcher, launched an initiative to draw attention to the growing problem of waste dumping in his home valley. He has met with local officials, spoken to local media and used social media to warn residents about the environmental consequences of dumping rubbish into the valley’s flood channels.

“The agricultural sector is particularly affected by plastic waste, which contaminates the soil and leads to poor or even failed crop yields,” Raji said. “Waste causes numerous problems in the main irrigation canals, blocking water flow, damaging canal walls and preventing floodwater from reaching farmland. As a result, some farmers lose an entire harvest season because their fields receive no irrigation.”

The problem has worsened over the past decade as Yemen has been engulfed in a war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government. The conflict has killed hundreds of thousands of people, displaced millions, and devastated state institutions, leaving local authorities, including municipalities and agricultural offices, with little funding or capacity to provide basic services.

“The problem has worsened in recent years because of the war, which has led to administrative instability and a lack of funding for local authorities,” Raji said.

Raji appeared frustrated that his efforts had yet to bear fruit and that his warnings had largely fallen on deaf ears, with residents continuing to dump waste across the valley. He called for an increase in his office’s monthly budget, currently just 8,000 Yemeni riyals, or about $5, so that staff could conduct field visits, reach more residents, and help remove rubbish from farms and flood channels.

Despite Raji’s best efforts, he has had little success with his attempts to raise awareness. “Our office’s [limited] budget leaves us unable to carry out regular field visits to educate the public or remove waste from flood channels.”

Expanding problem

The crisis extends far beyond Wadi Dawan. Across Yemen, years of war, collapsing public services and inadequate waste management have turned rubbish dumping into a growing environmental and public health problem.

In cities such as Taiz, waste has polluted farmland, contaminated drinking wells and dams, and increased the risk of waterborne diseases, according to local officials and health experts.

Dr Yassin Abdul Malik al-Shuraihi, who heads disease surveillance in central Yemen’s Taiz governorate, told Al Jazeera by telephone that the province, home to millions of people, suffers from a severe shortage of rubbish bins and chronic delays in waste collection.

As a result, many residents have resorted to dumping rubbish into flood channels that run through agricultural areas.

“Sewage, household waste and construction debris are now being dumped directly into these channels,” al-Shuraihi said. “We record a large number of diarrhoea cases throughout the year because sewage contaminates some drinking wells, making the water unsafe.”

Environmental experts are now calling for urgent action, warning of the particular dangers the waste poses to Yemen’s rural areas and farmland.

Khaled Saleh Bawahidi, a professor and director of the Environmental Studies and Water Resources Centre at Hadramout University, said indiscriminate waste dumping poses serious long-term environmental and public health risks.

“Accumulated waste is degrading natural habitats and polluting the soil around the palms, threatening tree growth and long‑term productivity,” Bawahidi said. “Bee health is also at risk as grazing areas deteriorate and the quality of natural resources declines. This could lead to a drop in the quality of dates and honey.”

And ultimately, it will be local Yemenis who face the consequences.

“Waste dumped in valleys contaminates soil and surface water,” Bawahidi added, “and creates breeding grounds for insects and rodents that can transmit diseases to humans and livestock.”

The announcement by the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, to resume oil exports starting July 20 following a halt that began in late 2022 has revived hope that the Yemeni government’s most important source of foreign currency will be restored. The government, struggling economically and facing continued Houthi rebel control over Yemen’s northwest, needs the money – and has pledged to direct the revenues towards paying salaries, improving services, and supporting economic stability.

However, the flow of oil from Yemen’s fields to global markets does not depend solely on a decision made by politicians; it requires creating a security environment, after years of war, that allows for the protection of facilities, pipelines and ports, in addition to restoring the confidence of shipping and insurance companies, as well as international buyers.

With Yemen’s war threatening to escalate after a four-year period of calm, the stability the country needs to resume oil exports may be elusive.

The export test

Yemen has proven oil reserves estimated at about three billion barrels, primarily concentrated in the Masila, Marib and Shabwa basins. While the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates that the country still holds sufficient resources for production and export, the security environment hinders their extraction and transport to global markets.

Yemen’s oil production reached a historical peak of about 439,000 barrels per day (bpd) at the beginning of the millennium, but it has gradually declined due to the depletion of some old fields. This decline accelerated with the outbreak of the war in 2014 and the targeting of oil infrastructure, settling at a level of 19,000bpd in 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A report published by S&P Global estimated actual production, following the halt in exports, at about 7,000bpd to 10,000bpd in 2023 and 2024, almost all of which was for domestic use.

Yemeni Minister of Oil and Minerals Mohammed Bamqaa said that export revenues would be deposited in the Central Bank as part of a government directive to bolster the state’s financial resources, pointing out that there are oil stockpiles exceeding 1.7 million barrels ready for export.

Bamqaa added that total production will initially reach about 60,000bpd. He explained that the ministry has directed oil companies to prepare timelines to increase production and develop the fields, in a way that raises production capacity by up to 25 percent during the first month after exports resume.

Professor of financial economics at Hadramout University, Mohammed al-Kasadi, told Al Jazeera that while he expected oil production to meet the 60,000bpd figure mentioned by Bamqaa, the figure does not reflect the actual volume of exports, as the local market consumes about 20,000bpd to operate refineries and power plants, which makes the quantities available for export likely to hover at about 40,000bpd.

Hassan Mohammed Moghalis, an expert in Yemeni affairs, told Al Jazeera that most of the fields located in government-controlled areas remain capable of production. At the forefront of these are the Masila fields in Hadramout and the al-Uqla fields in Shabwa, which represent the fundamental base for any anticipated resumption. Moghalis explained that crude oil can be transported via pipelines to Arabian Sea ports.

However, Moghalis pointed out that resuming exports does not simply mean opening the valves, as some fields require maintenance and restoration after a long period of suspension. Additionally, pipelines and pumping stations require technical reviews to ensure their readiness before resuming regular operations.

Market confidence

Despite the importance of restarting production at the oilfields, experts believe bigger obstacles await after the oil reaches Yemen’s ports. Houthi attacks targeting export ports in Hadramout and Shabwa in late 2022 made shipping and insurance companies more wary of handling Yemeni crude, pushing up insurance costs and weakening buyers’ willingness to enter into contracts.

The Houthis have conditioned the resumption of exports on them receiving a share of the revenues to cover public sector salaries.

Al-Kasadi, of Hadramout University, says that the government’s success in pumping oil to the port does not automatically guarantee a successful export process. Maritime transport and insurance companies primarily assess the level of security risks and the likelihood of ports or tankers facing renewed attacks – currently a particular concern in light of Houthi attacks on shipments tied to Saudi Arabia, which supports the Yemeni government.

Al-Kasadi added that the oil market relies heavily on trust and stability. Therefore, any export operation requires buyers to be convinced that shipments will depart safely and that export activities will not suddenly halt again.

Moghalis, the expert, believes that providing military protection for ports and pipelines is the first step, but not the only condition. It is also imperative to restore the confidence of insurance companies and international buyers, as oil does not reach markets solely through production, but rather via an interconnected system of transport, financing and insurance.

He added that any new attack on the ports, even if it does not cause significant material damage, could be enough to send the sector back to square one, given shipping companies’ sensitivity to risks in conflict zones.

But, as al-Kasadi pointed out, a resumption in exports is vital. He argued that the halt in exports was not merely an oil sector crisis, but rather developed into a comprehensive financial crisis. The government lost its most crucial source of foreign currency, which negatively impacted the Yemeni rial’s exchange rate and the state’s ability to finance basic services.

Economic pressure

Despite the importance of resuming exports, Yemeni affairs expert Abdul Karim al-Ansi warned against overstating its immediate impact on the Yemeni economy.

He told Al Jazeera that the resumption of exports will undoubtedly provide a vital source of foreign currency and afford the Central Bank greater leeway to support monetary stability. However, it will not be enough on its own to end the economic crisis, as the Yemeni economy faces broader challenges related to the division between government- and Houthi-controlled areas, weak non-oil revenues and declining economic activity.

Al-Ansi added that the extent to which Yemenis benefit from oil revenues will ultimately depend on how these funds are managed and the government’s ability to channel them into salaries and basic services, rather than solely on the volume of exports.

And while successful initial shipments could send a positive signal to markets and investors, al-Ansi stressed that the real test would be whether exports can be sustained. Yemen’s economy needs a steady flow of foreign currency, rather than sporadic shipments that stop whenever security conditions deteriorate.

The suspension of oil exports has not only deprived the government of its most important source of revenue, but also intensified pressure on the foreign exchange market. As dollar inflows from oil sales have dried up, demand for foreign currency has remained high to finance imports of essential goods, particularly food, fuel and medicine. The resulting shortage has weakened the Yemeni rial and contributed to rising inflation.

These pressures have been compounded by the monetary division between the Central Bank in Aden and the Houthis in Sanaa, which has created two separate financial systems and exchange rates. The split complicates monetary policy and limits the authorities’ ability to use oil revenues in a coordinated way to stabilise the economy.

Al-Kasadi said that Saudi financial support for the government had recently helped contain currency volatility in government-held areas. However, he stressed that such support was no substitute for a steady and sustainable flow of oil revenues – which needs a period of stability, something that may be difficult if the conflict escalates in Yemen, as it is currently threatening to do.

The conflict in Yemen has entered a new chapter with a declaration by the Houthis that they are imposing a maritime siege on all shipping to Saudi Arabia.

The Yemeni rebel group, also known as Ansar Allah (or supporters of God), has attacked a number of Saudi tankers in the Red Sea.

This development has placed the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the strategic waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean, at the heart of the war between the United States and Iran, and amplifies pressure on global trade routes.

The Iranian-backed Houthis, who seized Yemeni capital Sanaa in 2014, have threatened to close the strait, the route through which much of Europe’s energy supplies pass. It is also a key passage for imports to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis’ decision to announce a maritime blockade cannot be separated from the turmoil created by the ongoing war between Washington and Tehran, which erupted on February 28 when the US and Israel attacked Iran.

Houthis raise stakes for Saudi’s support

On Monday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government claimed responsibility for an air strike on Sanaa airport, saying that it was a measure to prevent an Iranian plane from landing in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital. But the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia for it.

The Houthis responded by firing missiles into Saudi Arabia – a key backer of the Aden-based Yemeni government – and later upped the stakes by announcing a naval blockade on the kingdom.

These developments mark a major escalation in Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia, which has sought in recent years to avoid a new war on its southern borders, is facing a more complex equation with the threat shifting from land to sea, and the targeting of one of the most important alternative routes for its oil exports.

All of this raises the question: will this escalation cause a new confrontation between the Yemeni government and the Houthis? And if so, what does the balance of power look like between the Houthi and government sides after more than a decade of war? Has the balance changed enough to increase the odds of a military resolution to the conflict?

There has been talk of potential escalations in recent years, but this now seems more likely, especially since it intersects with local, regional and international events and the return of the US-Iran war.

The Yemeni government has restructured its military with a single decision-making centre, and regional messages suggest the military option has not been shelved, as was once thought.

So, will retaking Sanaa return to the table as a military objective to be thought of seriously, and what does that mean practically? And how ready are the parties, especially the Yemeni government, for battle?

The structure of government-affiliated forces

The anti-Houthi camp today comprises the National Army as the official framework of the Ministry of Defence, in addition to new formations with independent commands, such as the Giants Brigades, and the Guardians of the Republic forces in al-Makha, or Mocha, in the west.

These different groupings – all on the anti-Houthi side in the conflict – have emerged over the years due to the weakening power of the central government, the growth of independent figures, and the backing of regional countries.

The number of National Army personnel in the field is estimated at about 400,000, according to recent statements by the Defence Ministry. Its organisational structure includes Yemen’s seven military regions, but troop deployment is concentrated in Marib, Taiz and the country’s southern and eastern governorates, as a result of Houthi control over vast parts of the country’s northwest, including Sanaa.

Also backing the army are the Emergency Forces, comprising between 30,000 to 40,000 personnel, and the Homeland Shield Forces, created in 2022 with between 30,000 and 40,000 recruits, and tasked with taking over camps in Hadramout and the southern governorates in December 2025, following the defeat of separatist forces who previously controlled those areas.

Fighting late last year between the Yemeni government and affiliated forces on one side, and United Arab Emirates-backed separatists on the other, has led to changes in Yemen’s south and west.

After the defeat of the 75,000-strong separatist Southern Transitional Council, following a Saudi intervention on the side of the government and the withdrawal of the UAE from Yemen, the group’s organisational cohesion has been impacted. But they have not been disarmed, and remain in many locations in the south, with some elements absorbed – even if nominally – into government structures.

Another formerly-UAE backed force, the Tariq Saleh-led Guardians of the Republic, is estimated to number about 20,000 fighters. They are stationed primarily on the Red Sea coast and are considered among the most heavily armed formations, due to the past Emirati support.

The Giants Brigades are among the most prominent combat formations in the anti-Houthi camp, with an estimated 20,000 fighters and a presence on the Red Sea coast, in Aden, and in some southern areas.

Consequently, the total size of the forces affiliated with the government and the anti-Houthi camp is estimated at more than 500,000 personnel, albeit with a clear disparity in levels of training, discipline and institutional integration.

Quality of armament and military equipment

The types of weapons held by these forces do not differ as significantly as the level of their operation and management. The National Army relies on conventional weapons inherited from the Yemeni army pre-war, including light and medium weapons, armoured vehicles, tanks and field artillery, alongside various communication and transport capabilities.

The Homeland Shield Forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, are considered among the most relatively well-equipped modern formations. They rely on tactical vehicles, light armoured vehicles, and superior communication systems suited for rapid deployment missions and the protection of institutions.

The Emergency Forces rely on light to medium armament focused on urban operations and rapid deployment missions, more akin to a field military force with rapid intervention duties, combining a security character with combat capability.

The Giants Brigades rely on medium and heavy armament, armoured vehicles and fire support units, and they are recognised for their capability to conduct offensive ground operations compared with other forces.

As for the formations affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, they rely on diverse weaponry, though readiness varies as a result of the organisational changes they have undergone.

In recent years, the majority of government forces have also developed their drone capabilities, both within regular units and some irregular formations. These assets are now used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions, and occasionally for limited tactical support.

Balance of power with the Houthis

Official military records in Sanaa indicate that Houthi-affiliated army units comprise more than 200,000 fighters and can also mobilise tens of thousands of members from their volunteer Popular Committees for rapid intervention and support.

However, these figures, much like the military rosters in the government camp, may not accurately reflect the actual combat strength on the ground due to the inclusion of reserve or inactive names in registries.

Although government-affiliated forces may possess more manpower, the balance of power in Yemen is not determined solely by numbers.

Despite sustaining significant damage to its forces and assets from US and Israeli strikes over the past few years, the Houthi side benefits from a more centralised command structure and possesses experience in managing asymmetric warfare.

This is in addition to possessing missile, drone and maritime threat capabilities that have proven their impact in the Red Sea and the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait. It appears that the military balance in Yemen is more a balance of organisational and war management rather than a balance of weaponry and numbers.

Readiness of government forces for a major battle

Indicators suggest government forces are capable of engaging in defensive battles, holding territory or managing extensive security deployments. However, they face significant challenges should they consider launching a large-scale offensive.

The most prominent of these challenges was the multiplicity of military decision-making centres – before Saudi Arabia assumed control of this decision-making following the UAE’s withdrawal – and the varying levels of training and discipline, compounded by the difficulty of operational coordination.

Geography is also a factor, as the Houthis’ control over the mountainous northwest grants them a defensive advantage, whereas government forces are dispersed across multiple fronts, limiting their ability to mobilise at a decisive point.

The scenario of entering Sanaa

So far, there are no clear public indications that any international power, including the US, has adopted a declared plan to support a large-scale military operation to take Sanaa.

Although Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have elevated the level of international interest in the Yemeni file, the international strategy has been focused on degrading Houthi capabilities related to the sea and smuggling, rather than on a ground offensive. However, reports have emerged from sources within the Yemeni state regarding a possibility of waging a war against the Houthis with US support.

If an operation towards Sanaa is considered, its success would require complex conditions, most notably unifying the government’s military command, providing broad domestic and regional political cover, and ensuring the ability to manage the city after seizing control of it. Some of these conditions may have already been met.

Has Saudi Arabia provided cover to confront the Houthis?

The Yemeni government’s military decision-making is largely tied to Saudi political and military support, and any broad move against the Houthis remains contingent upon Riyadh. But Riyadh has preferred to focus on protecting the kingdom’s southern borders, securing shipping lanes and preventing the expansion of the Houthi threat deep into Saudi territory.

It seems that Saudi strategy has previously leaned towards managing the conflict rather than resolving it, by combining limited military pressure, diplomatic moves and de-escalation tracks to reduce the security and economic costs of the war.

The Saudi position may have shifted recently in light of international and regional events, particularly concerning the security of navigation in the Red Sea. Riyadh may be pushed to re-evaluate its options regarding the Yemeni file, and the one currently on the table may be a military one.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

Claimed attacks come days after Houthis announced naval embargo on Saudi vessels.

Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis have claimed an attack on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea.

“We targeted two Saudi oil tankers, named ENCELA and LAYLIA, for their violation of the blockade decision issued by the armed forces,” Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said on Wednesday.

Saree added that the attacks were carried out, “using a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones”, and led to fires on the ships.

The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, had also forced “nearly ten ships… to abandon their routes, and turn back”, Saree said.

Saudi Arabia has not commented on the claims, but the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) centre said it had received reports that a tanker has been struck.

“The master of a tanker reports being struck by an unknown projectile which has caused a fire onboard that the crew are currently fighting,” UKMTO, which monitors shipping in the region, said.

Yemen’s Houthi group, which has fought the Yemeni government and a Saudi-led coalition that backs it for more than a decade, imposed a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20. That followed some of the worst violence Yemen has seen for four years, after the Yemeni government bombed the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian plane from landing.

The Houthis said the declaration of the maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia was “based on the equation of ‘an eye for an eye’ and affirmed “the right of our great people to respond to the blockade with a blockade”.

The group, which seized Sanaa in 2014, accused Saudi leaders of imposing “an unjust and oppressive siege” for nearly 12 years, “plundering our resources and imposing a comprehensive blockade on our ports and airports by land, sea, and air”.

“The Saudis feel that they can instigate a popular uprising against the Houthis using these economic strangulation methods,” Hussain al-Bukhaiti, a journalist based in Sanaa told Al Jazeera.

Riyadh has rejected claims that it was imposing a siege on the Yemeni people, and the group’s critics point out that they have rejected a proposal from Jordan to resume flights between Amman and Sanaa.

“The ultimate goal for Ansar Allah’s naval blockade against the Saudis, is to force Riyadh to lift its embargo on the ports and airports controlled by the Houthis,” al-Bukhaiti said.

Amid the disruption in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz due to the US-Israel war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has been attempting to facilitate oil flow through alternative routes through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. But that route is now under threat from the Houthis.

The Houthis disrupted global commerce when they began attacking ships around the Bab al-Mandeb after the launch of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023. The attacks ended with the announcement of a “ceasefire” in Gaza in October 2025.

“The people who are questioning if the Houthis can successfully do a blockade against the Saudis should remember, how successfully the Houthis closed access to the Red Sea for the Israeli ports, which in fact resulted in the closure of Eilat port in southern Israel,” said al-Bukhaiti. “Eventually the Americans had to do a deal with the Houthis, with mediation from Oman,” he added, referring to a May 2025 agreement.

The Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is one of the world’s most important shipping routes, including for oil exports.

Between Yemen to the northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa to the southwest, the strait is just 29km (18 miles) wide at its narrowest point, limiting traffic to two channels for inbound and outbound vessels using the Suez Canal.

In 2024, about 4.1 billion barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products passed through the strait – about 5 percent of the global total.

With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed since Israel and the US launched their war on Iran in late February, shutting down Bab al-Mandeb as well could block 25 percent of the world’s oil and gas supply.

The Houthi declaration that they intend to block Saudi shipping and vessels bound for Saudi ports in the Red Sea is not another act of revolutionary theatre. It is Iran’s latest attempt to test Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience through one of its most capable regional proxies. That is a dangerous gamble because Riyadh has spent nearly a decade avoiding the wider regional war that Tehran increasingly appears determined to provoke.

Saudi restraint has never reflected military weakness. It has been a deliberate strategic choice intended to preserve regional stability while enabling the kingdom to focus on its historic economic transformation. Unable to compete with Saudi Arabia’s regional trajectory through conventional means, Iran has increasingly turned to proxy warfare, maritime coercion, and economic intimidation.

The Houthis have become the principal instrument of that strategy.

By threatening shipping in both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, Tehran seeks to pressure Saudi Arabia from its eastern and western maritime gateways while raising the cost of regional stability. The objective is not military victory but economic disruption: undermining investor confidence, threatening energy exports, and projecting instability onto the Middle East’s largest economy.

That strategy carries consequences far beyond the region. Saudi Arabia remains the world’s largest crude oil exporter, OPEC’s leading producer, and the only country with sufficient spare production capacity to stabilise global energy markets during periods of crisis – as it did during the first phase of the Iran war through its 7 million barrels per day East West Pipeline. Sustained disruption of Saudi exports would ripple through international shipping, insurance markets, inflation, and the global economy.

Iran tried to prepare for the present escalation by attempting to restore the Tehran-Sana’a air bridge. The flights were never simply about reconnecting two capitals. They would have provided a direct logistical corridor through which operational planning advisers, missile specialists, drone technicians, and intelligence officers could rotate into Houthi-controlled territory. Such an air corridor would have allowed Tehran to transfer not only equipment but also operational expertise and command capability.

This explains why the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) strike on Sana’a International Airport carried significance beyond denying a specific aircraft permission to land. The objective was to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent logistical architecture capable of sustaining a more sophisticated proxy campaign against Saudi Arabia’s maritime and economic interests.

It is clear Tehran’s calculations increasingly rely on outdated assumptions about Saudi military capability. The Saudi-led Joint Forces Command (JFC) bears little resemblance to the force that first entered Yemen a decade ago. Years of hard learnt lessons from past mistakes and operational experience have transformed it into an integrated coalition built around persistent intelligence, fused command-and-control, precision strikes, air missile defence, and cyber operations.

Rather than functioning as separate military combatant commands, these capabilities now operate as a single decision-making architecture capable of compressing the time between intelligence collection and operational execution.

That transformation extends beyond the Saudi armed forces alone. The Saudi-led JFC now includes more than 650,000 personnel drawn from Saudi Arabia and allied Yemeni, Pakistani, Sudanese, and limited but symbolic GCC formations operating within a unified operational framework. Its principal advantage lies not simply in numbers but in its ability to synchronise military effects across multiple domains while maintaining operational tempo and centralised escalation control.

The JFC maturity became unmistakable during RSAF’s campaign that restored control over southern Yemen in less than a week in January. Built upon an advanced command and control (C2) fused architecture that supports persistent intelligence, electronic warfare, precision targeting, and synchronised manoeuvre, has demonstrated a level of operational sequencing and command integration unseen in earlier phases of the war.

The same C2 maturity was evident during Iran’s coordinated missile and drone attacks launched from Iranian territory and allied formations in Iraq, when RSAF executed synchronised precision strikes across multiple theatres while maintaining centralised escalation control.

The broader consequences extended beyond the battlefield. Saudi operational performance helped create the conditions under which Pakistan was able to broker an unofficial ceasefire between the Saudis and Iranians while reinforcing a new deterrence equation in which further direct Iranian military pressure carried significantly greater operational and political risk. Tehran’s subsequent caution reflected not diplomacy alone but recognition that the kingdom had entered a fundamentally different stage of military maturity.

None of this means the Houthis cannot impose costs. Their missiles, drones, maritime attacks, and psychological operations remain capable of generating disruption disproportionate to their size. But disruption is fundamentally different from sustaining a prolonged confrontation against an opponent possessing overwhelming advantages in intelligence, air power, maritime control, and operational endurance.

Every escalation therefore increases the likelihood of a comprehensive Saudi response. Such a campaign would not simply target missile launchers or drone facilities. It would seek to dismantle the command-and-control networks, logistics infrastructure, communications systems, intelligence apparatus, and operational support that enable Houthi military operations.

This is why the current trajectory is so dangerous.

Saudi Arabia has consistently demonstrated that it prefers stability to confrontation because its overriding strategic priority remains economic transformation and long-term national development. But no state can indefinitely tolerate an Iranian-backed proxy threatening its economy, energy infrastructure, and maritime lifelines.

Ultimately, the Houthis are not testing Saudi military capability. Years of operational adaptation have already answered that question. They are testing Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience.

History suggests that even the greatest strategic patience has limits. If Tehran continues using the Houthis as an instrument of coercion against the kingdom, Riyadh may conclude that the costs of restraint have exceeded the costs of decisive action. If that moment arrives, the campaign that follows will bear little resemblance to the Yemen war of a decade ago. It will reflect years of coalition integration through an elaborate C6ISR architecture to be strategically prepared for such a war. Iran, and the Houthis, may then regret testing the limits of Saudi Arabia’s strategic patience.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Washington vows revenge for US military casualties, while Iran claims attacks on US sites across the region.

The United States is carrying out its 10th consecutive night of attacks against Iran, with Iranian media reporting explosions in Sirik, Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and Isfahan.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the operation on Monday evening, claiming that the strikes are “designed to further degrade Iranian military capabilities used to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz”.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a statement claiming to have retaliated by launching ground-to-ground missiles at “US HIMARS missile systems” stationed at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait.

Two Greek-owned oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz were struck earlier on Monday, while the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, which monitors attacks on ships, reports that another tanker has been hit off the coast of Oman’s port city of Limah.

Shortly before the night’s bombing began, US President Donald Trump took to social media to warn that Iranian attacks on US military personnel would be paid back “many times over”. On Friday, two US soldiers were killed, and a third was reported missing when an Iranian missile struck a military site in Jordan, while another US service member was killed in northern Iraq.

Trump also reiterated earlier warnings that continued Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz would be met with a stronger response.

Meanwhile, Yemen’s pro-Iranian Houthis have declared a blockade on Saudi Arabia, escalating tensions and sparking fears that the Yemeni conflict, which had been relatively quiet for four years, may be about to reignite and threaten shipping in the Red Sea.

Mojtaba Khamenei says Trump’s signature is ‘worthless’ and that ‘bullying’ is a core element of US foreign policy.

Iran’s supreme leader has warned that the United States will suffer “unforgettable lessons” at the hands of Tehran and its regional allies, accusing the US of repeatedly violating the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the two countries.

A written statement attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei was read out on state television on Saturday, in which the supreme leader said Washington’s breaches of last month’s MoU showed that President Donald Trump’s signature was “utterly worthless and invalid”.

“The repeated breach of agreements by the Great Satan vis-a-vis the accord has once again proven to all that the signature of the President of America is now utterly worthless and invalid, and that bullying, hegemonism and savagery are inseparable components of the American creed and doctrine,” the statement read.

“Now that the American enemy is seeking to foment war and suffer heavier costs and further humiliation, it should know that the dear nation of Iran and the Resistance Front hold unforgettable lessons for it,” it added.

The US dramatically escalated its attacks on Iran this week by targeting civilian infrastructure, including bridges, railway lines and water desalination plants.

Tehran has responded by successfully striking civilian infrastructure in Kuwait, with authorities there urging everyone to ration electricity.

The US-Israeli war on Iran, which began in February, is seen as existential by the country’s senior leadership.

Tehran has shown no sign of caving to the increasing demands from the Trump administration, as regional countries continue to push for an end to the conflict behind the scenes.

Khamenei said the US has “revealed its true face,” exposing its “deceitfulness, irrationality, unreliability and wickedness”.

He called on Iranians to trust the leadership to protect the country, urging people to remain “vigilant” and “active” as the fighting grinds on.

Reports have surfaced in recent days that the Houthis in Yemen could close the Bab al-Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea in support of their crucial ally Iran. That would further destabilise global energy markets, increase inflation and apply additional pressure on Trump to halt attacks.

The war is deeply unpopular in the US and has inflicted economic harm on Americans.

The MoU mediated by Qatar and Pakistan and signed last month aimed to create the conditions to bring the war to a permanent end.

However, Tehran and Washington have since declared the accord “over” after accusing each other of violating it.

Tehran, Iran – The United States has reinforced its naval blockade on Iran’s southern ports, amid the escalating military confrontation between them.

The US blockade on Iran was first imposed in mid-April and remained for over nine weeks. It was only lifted after the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June to end four months of fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran immediately began exporting tens of millions of barrels of crude oil, much of it stored on supertankers anchored close to its oil terminals. However, after the recent resurgence in military strikes over control of the Strait of Hormuz, Washington rescinded oil and banking waivers issued as part of the MoU and prevented vessels linked to Iran from returning to port to load more Iranian oil.

Since the MoU effectively fell apart due to recent strikes, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has redirected several ships operating in the Strait of Hormuz. It also launched a strike to disable the Curacao-flagged supertanker Belma, which had allegedly been transporting Iranian crude during the war.

Iran has also been accused of striking ships in the waterway, leading to the US bombing Iranian coastal areas.

Iranian authorities have acknowledged the previous blockade drastically reduced Iranian crude exports. Iran’s parliament speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, said in a TV interview at the end of June that “we did not export even one barrel” during the blockade.

Energy analyst Hamidreza Shokouhi told Al Jazeera that the new US siege means that at least 1.5 million barrels per day of Iranian oil exports will be taken off the market. That has contributed to pushing oil prices up to around $90 per barrel and sustained conflict could cause further increases.

“That means more pressure on global strategic reserves, which have already been tapped during the war and are facing unprecedented pressure,” he said.

Washington’s insistence on vessels using the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz close to the coast of Oman for the duration of the MoU has contributed to the current military escalation, the analyst said.

Shokouhi noted that Iran responded to the siege by trying to ensure that no other regional country could export their oil via the strait, piling pressure on the US and its allies.

“When the US acts this way, Iran also moves in the direction of not prioritising the economy and using the leverage at its disposal,” Shokouhi said.

A broadening conflict

Seven nights of tit-for-tat strikes between the US and Iran have quickly escalated and intensified as the week progressed.

The attacks left a trail of destruction in both Iran and countries across the region, with Kuwait and Bahrain heavily targeted by Iranian missiles and drones in recent days.

The US military has also heavily targeted provinces across Iran, particularly areas in the south closer to the strait.

Civilian infrastructure – including bridges and tunnels, ports and dock facilities, power stations and water plants – have been systematically hit, along with military sites. Some have speculated that could be in preparation for a ground invasion of Iranian coastal regions.

The Aq Tekeh railway bridge in the northern Iranian province of Golestan was among the first targets to be struck by US forces last week after the fighting re-erupted.

Iranian authorities said damage to the bridge was quickly repaired, but the strike signalled US willingness to attack potential import-export routes to exacerbate the impact of the naval blockade.

Aq Tekeh is on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line, which connects Iran to the east, including Turkmenistan, Russia and China. It is where food and other essentials are imported from Central Asia and Iranian goods are exported, such as iron ore and polyethylene.

Rising inflation

The previous US naval blockade had also significantly impacted goods and markets in Iran, making everyday life for over 90 million people more difficult.

Although there were no widespread shortages of staples, Iran’s inflation rate – already one of the world’s highest – surged. The price of some basic foodstuffs, such as eggs, chicken and cooking oil, has more than tripled compared to a year ago.

Price increases have also damaged other sectors of the Iranian economy and industries.

“Our sales are very inconsistent. The market is struggling to find prices, there’s too much instability and uncertainty about the future,” said Borzou, a merchant dealing in industrial motors and equipment at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar.

“It looks like most distributors here are still tapping into imported inventories from before, we don’t know what to expect in a few months since many of these goods came through China and the UAE and not all can be imported through inland routes,” he told Al Jazeera.

Rial hits all-time low

There has also been intense pressure on the Iranian rial from the renewed military escalation and reimposition of the naval blockade.

The rial changed hands for over 1.93 million against the US dollar in Tehran’s open market on Saturday, the first day of the Iranian week, registering a new all-time low.

The Tehran Stock Exchange continued its downward trend over the past week, with its main index losing another 120,000 points or 2.4 percent on Saturday to stand at 4.77 million.

Iran’s armed forces have warned they will retaliate against any US strikes on Iran’s civilian infrastructure by attacking similar targets in regional countries hosting US military bases.

“Let’s not forget that the US and Israel started attacks against infrastructure, when they hit South Pars gas fields, Tehran’s oil depots and the petrochemicals in Mahshahr,” said energy analyst Shokouhi.

Utilising help from the Houthi group in Yemen, Tehran could also cause significant disruptions to shipping in the strategically important Bab al-Mandab strait off Yemen’s coast – if US President Donald Trump realises his threat to hit more civilian infrastructure in Iran such as power plants and bridges.

“Trump’s actions over recent months, and particularly over recent days, have only made the situation more intractable and the outlook more uncertain. The current situation cannot continue for much longer, but it is broadening the scope of the conflict and that is concerning,” Shokouhi said.

In recent weeks, there have been renewed tensions in Yemen. Attacks by the Houthi group – which has controlled Sanaa and large parts of northern Yemen since 2014 – have coincided with controversy prompted by the arrival of an Iranian plane at Sanaa airport and renewed concern over navigation in the Red Sea.

This comes in the context of a stalled peace process and the failure to reach an agreement on de-escalation mechanisms.

In this climate, movements on the front lines appear to be an attempt by the Houthis to exert pressure and to test the limits of the response of the internationally recognised government, its ally, Saudi Arabia, and the international community at large.

So far, these developments do not point to a decision to launch a broad military confrontation, but they show that the truce announced in 2022 can no longer contain the conflict.

From Hays to Al-Jawf: Limited clashes and tribal mobilisation

The Hays district in Hodeidah governorate near the port of Hodeidah on the Red Sea has been one of the main flashpoints in recent weeks.

On July 5, Houthi rebels attacked government forces’ positions using mortar shells, drones and sniper fire. According to medical and military sources cited by Al Jazeera, 16 government soldiers were killed in the attack and 22 others were wounded. The Houthis did not announce their casualty toll or provide a detailed account of how the clashes began.

Hays is of particular importance because it has remained relatively calm since the truce, and because its location is close to the coast and shipping lanes.

The tensions are not confined to Hodeidah. Marib, Taiz and al-Dhale have also witnessed varying levels of military mobilisation.

In al-Jawf, the picture is different. A tribal disturbance was triggered by a dispute over a house in Sanaa and then turned into a test of the Houthis’ influence and their relationship with the tribes. Sheikh Hamad bin Rashid bin Fadgham al-Hazmi intervened in the dispute, per tribal custom, but was detained by the Houthis.

This turned discontent into an anti-Houthi tribal movement, which is accompanied by calls for a “tribal nakaf”, a traditional call for mobilisation and support, alongside the “al-Rayyan sit-ins”, temporary tribal gatherings to rally supporters.

This development points to how developments in the battlefield are causing tensions in the tribal and social sphere.

Al-Jawf lies near Marib and within a sensitive military and tribal zone, and any prolonged unrest there could open an additional pressure front on the Houthis and complicate their calculations in one of the most important fronts of Yemen’s northeast.

Tensions have also extended to the Red Sea. On July 5, the British military said that a cargo ship had come under attack off the coast of Hodeidah, which did not result in any injuries. No one claimed responsibility, but the incident took place near an area under Houthi control and at a time when the group has renewed its threats regarding navigation.

The attack highlights the continuing risks ships face in transiting in the vicinity of Hodeidah and Bab al-Mandab, one of the world’s busiest straits.

Sanaa airport tensions and a frozen prisoner exchange deal

Tensions between Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the Houthis havе not been confined to the battlefield. On July 3, an Iranian aircraft arrived at Sanaa airport to pick up a Houthi delegation to attend the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

A week later, the internationally recognised government announced that Iran had submitted a request to operate a Mahan Air flight from Tehran to Sanaa to return the Houthi delegation. It rejected the request and proposed returning the individuals on an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

In response, some Houthi leaders insisted on the continuation of Mahan Air flights to Sanaa, presenting them as part of their right to operate the airport and open direct routes with the outside world. Thus, the dispute went beyond a single flight to the issue of managing an international airport and airspace outside government institutions, and the resulting struggle over sovereignty and de facto recognition of Houthi authority over the entry point.

Saudi Arabia is also affected by the dispute. The operation of a direct route between Sanaa and Tehran would affect the security and political arrangements that accompanied the reopening of the airport during the truce. Riyadh views the expansion of airport traffic outside an agreement as a factor that strengthens the Houthis’ relationship with Iran near the kingdom’s southern border. Therefore, its position is linked to keeping flights within declared arrangements while continuing to operate the national carrier.

Another issue that has heated up in the past few days is a long-negotiated prisoner and detainee exchange deal, which has stalled.

On July 10, Hadi Haig, head of the government negotiating team on the prisoners and abductees file, announced that the team had received notification from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the office of the United Nations envoy that the Houthis have refused to implement the agreement on its scheduled date and have postponed it indefinitely.

In response, the head of the Houthis’ Prisoners Affairs Committee, Abdulqader al-Murtada, blamed the government side for the delay, accusing it of failing to abide by the terms of the agreement and of refusing to add names to the agreed list.

The deal includes more than 1,600 detainees and requires field arrangements and an air bridge under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Regardless of each side’s responsibility, the postponement places the negotiation track before a new test and confirms the continued use of humanitarian files as tools of political and military pressure.

Regional tension and the limits of confrontation

Regional developments have directly impacted Yemen. The US-Israel war on Iran and tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have reduced the ability of Yemeni parties to control escalation and increased the influence of external calculations on the course of the conflict.

This has given the Houthis greater room for political and military manoeuvre, while the government has struggled to assert its sovereign presence.

Saudi Arabia wants to contain the Houthi threat while preserving the gains of de-escalation. The Houthis, for their part, are betting on combining military action with pressure over the airport, prisoners, and navigation files to extract broader recognition of their authority and their direct relationship with Iran.

These developments reflect the fragility of the de-escalation process and the growing political and military pressures.

Limited clashes and mobilisation are likely to continue, with each side using the leverage it possesses to apply pressure. So far, there is no evidence of a decision to engage in a full-scale confrontation, but repeated attacks and faltering negotiations could end the state of relative calm that has persisted since 2022.

The risk of confrontation will remain as long as the root causes of the war remain unresolved, and as long as the parties use weapons to impose their vision and improve their political fortunes.

Yemeni government officials say the Houthis launched a surprise offensive targeting army barracks in southern Hodeidah as fighting intensifies across western Yemen.
The renewed clashes come as both sides seek to regain territory and strengthen control over the strategic Red Sea coast.

United States President Donald Trump has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he might find himself fighting on his own if Israel returns to war with Iran.

The warning on Monday came as Israel and Iran said they would pause attacks following their most serious escalation since a ceasefire took effect in April.

Trump, who has reportedly grown increasingly exasperated with Netanyahu, demanded that both sides stop “shooting” in a post on his Truth Social platform and said that “final negotiations” towards peace would proceed “subject to ignorance or stupidity getting in its way”.

He also called Netanyahu and told him to stop the strikes, according to media reports.

In an interview with Axios, Trump said he had warned Netanyahu about the consequences of continuing the war.

“I said, ‘Bibi, you better be careful, or you will be on your own very soon’,” Trump said.

The flare-up began on Sunday, triggered by Israel’s deadly bombardment of Lebanon’s capital, Beirut. Iran – which has long said any peace deal with the US depends in part on an end to the fighting in Lebanon – responded with a wave of missiles at northern Israel.

Trump reportedly called Netanyahu on Sunday evening and asked him not to retaliate, but Israel launched attacks on Iran early on Monday.

Israeli forces struck Iranian air defence systems and a petrochemical plant, while Iran retaliated by hitting a similar facility in Haifa and targeting two Israeli airbases. Many of the missiles were intercepted over the occupied West Bank.

No deaths were reported on either side.

Israel plays down tensions

The exchanges complicated Trump’s push to end a war that the US and Israel launched on February 28. A ceasefire announced on April 8 paused all-out warfare. But flare-ups in the Gulf have continued.

For his part, Netanyahu said in a televised statement that he had told Trump that “Israel has a full right to self-defence, and we are exercising it as required”.

“Right now, the fire at the front is contained, because after we hit the terrorist regime in Tehran, it stopped attacking us,” he said.

Netanyahu also warned that should Iran “make the mistake of resuming attacks against us, we will respond with full force”.

Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, downplayed reports of tension between the US and Israeli leaders, telling Fox News that “sometimes, lovers have a spat”.

He said that while Netanyahu had “decided” to “lower the temperature” at Trump’s request, the US president understands “full well” that Israel cannot “absorb ballistic missiles into our country without responding.”

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Esmaeil Baghaei, blamed Washington for the escalation.

“The US is directly responsible,” he said. “They are party to the ceasefire negotiations. Therefore, any act in violation of the ceasefire, be it through the interception of vessels [in the Strait of Hormuz], the targeting of southern Lebanon by Israel, or any other event, will cause the United States to be directly responsible for the escalation in the region.”

Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the operation against Israel, dubbed “Nasr” or victory, showcased “a new level of deterrence from mighty Iran” and that Israel had been “forced to beg once again” for a ceasefire.

Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian posted on X that Tehran was still “at the negotiating table”, while Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Amir Saeid Iravani, said that Washington and Tehran, through Pakistan as an intermediary, are “presenting and exchanging views” towards an agreement.

Iravani told The Associated Press news agency he was hopeful that “very soon” the two sides would reach “a conclusion”.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said efforts for a peaceful diplomatic solution was ongoing “earnestly and painstakingly” and called for restraint, “especially when the final objective is just about to be achieved”.

He also said Israel and Iran’s exchange of fire was a “reminder of the dangers associated with a tenuous ceasefire and the unbearable consequences it may lead to”.

Attacks on Lebanon continue

The escalation on Monday also drew in Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

The group fired missiles at Israel early in the morning and declared a complete ban on Israeli maritime navigation in the Red Sea, warning that all Israeli movements would be considered “legitimate military targets”.

Later on Monday, air raid sirens sounded in the Israeli port city of Eilat, with the military saying a suspected aerial target was launched from Yemen.

Violence has also continued in southern Lebanon.

An Israeli strike killed five people in the city of Tyre, while another, in the Nabatieh district, left seven dead. A third strike in Marwanieh killed two people, the Lebanese Ministry of Health said.

Phyllis Bennis, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, said Trump was trying to give an impression that he was tougher on Israel than he actually is.

“The words could be significant if they were matched by actions,” she told Al Jazeera.

“As long as they’re sending billions of dollars directly to the Israeli military, and as long as they’re protecting Israel from being held accountable in the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, as long as those actions don’t change, the words just don’t mean very much,” she added.

Mukalla, Yemen – At the Mukalla Creative Hub, a man in a black T-shirt leans over a desk to help a colleague with his project, while other men remain fixed on their laptop screens. Nearby women sit in ergonomic office chairs, writing or scrolling on their phones. On the other side of the space in Yemen’s coastal city of Mukalla, a sleek cafe-style counter stands at the entrance, while colourful armchairs are neatly arranged and occupied by a few people working among rows of computers.

What draws entrepreneurs, remote freelancers, and students here is not just the stylish setting or uninterrupted electricity, but something far more essential: fast, reliable Starlink satellite internet.

“Four Starlink devices power the space, delivering speeds of 100 to 150 Mbps and allowing users to stay constantly connected,” Hamzah Bakhdar, a digital freelancer who also works at the hub, told Al Jazeera.

In a country where war has devastated telecommunications, eroded salaries and cut off remote areas, Starlink is helping create a small but growing digital workforce of designers, developers, teachers, and freelancers who can now work for clients abroad and earn far more than Yemen’s crumbling local economy would otherwise allow.

Internet access in Yemen has also been weaponised, with buried land cables sometimes cut, leaving parts of the country abruptly disconnected. The Houthi rebels, who are based in the Yemeni capital Sanaa and have fought the internationally recognised government since 2014, control the country’s major internet providers. That allows them to block websites they view as linked to their opponents inside and outside the country, including key platforms used by tech developers and remote workers.

The arrival of Starlink satellite internet has provided an alternative, allowing people to bypass the Houthis’ tight grip on telecommunications and stay online even in remote areas.

Mohammed Helmi, a video editor and motion graphics designer, was juggling projects for three clients in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Thanks to the fast internet at the cafe, he no longer worries about losing connection or missing deadlines, problems he said repeatedly disrupted his work in the past.

“In the past, when I downloaded files to my laptop, it would stop as soon as my data ran out,” Helmi, a young man with a thin moustache, told Al Jazeera at the cafe. “I had to buy another gigabyte and start the download all over again. Because of this, I often had to turn down projects.”

Control over the internet

Starlink is operated by billionaire Elon Musk’s SpaceX company, and delivers internet by linking a ground dish to low-orbit satellites owned and operated by the company.

While other satellite internet companies exist, and others are quickly entering the space, Starlink is the only low-orbit satellite internet service legally available in Yemen after the internationally recognised government signed an agreement with the company in September 2024.

But it’s not for everyone.

The kits cost about $500, a price that remains unaffordable for the vast majority of Yemenis, living in one of the poorest countries in the world, where more than 80 percent of people live below the poverty line.

Owning a dish is therefore still a distant dream for many Yemenis desperate to get online.

University students, like Mariam, a student at Hadramout University, says that even buying internet vouchers from local providers who resell Starlink access is beyond her reach – let alone purchasing a device herself.

“People are using vouchers because they cannot afford Starlink devices, whose prices are very high,” Mariam, who preferred to be identified only by her first name, told Al Jazeera.

The Houthis have also reacted aggressively to the arrival of Starlink, launching a campaign warning people against using the service and threatening legal action against anyone found in possession of the device.

They have accused the company of serving as a “US espionage agent” and said it posed “a major threat to national security”. Experts have worried that data gathered over Starlink’s internet service could be used for “intelligence gathering and economic exploitation“.

There are also concerns internationally over the concentration of satellite internet services and infrastructure in the hands of Starlink, particularly in light of Musk’s ownership, with the South African-born billionaire increasingly associating himself with far-right causes in the United States and Europe.

Connecting Yemen’s remote areas

But despite Houthi threats and the high cost of the devices by Yemeni standards, Starlink has spread across the country, reaching areas that had long been isolated.

Omer Banabelah, a mobile app developer, said that before Starlink arrived, a visit to his home village in Hadramout’s countryside meant disappearing from the digital world altogether. He could not make a phone call, let alone connect to the internet, leaving him anxious that clients would move on when their messages went unanswered. With Starlink now available in rural parts of the province, Banabelah said he no longer fears losing work every time he travels.

“I can reply to their messages anytime, from anywhere,” he told Al Jazeera. “Work that takes 10 minutes with Starlink could take an entire day without it.”

Similarly, Yemeni teachers, struggling with poor and delayed salaries that have stagnated for years, have also benefited from the spread of the internet service, which has allowed them to offer uninterrupted online classes and earn badly needed extra income.

Raja al-Dubae, a school director in Taiz, told Al Jazeera that her school began offering online classes based on the Yemeni curriculum to Yemeni students living abroad in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and China in 2023. It started with just 50 students, with teachers connecting through local networks.

But when internet traffic surged in the densely populated city each afternoon, the connections would collapse, forcing teachers to abandon classes mid-session.

“Teachers were often disconnected from their students, and by the time the internet stabilised, the next class had already begun, leaving them frustrated and unable to finish their lessons,” she said.

Al-Dubae said she initially rejected her nephew’s proposal to buy Starlink because of the high upfront cost, but now regrets the delay. Since installing the service, the number of students has climbed to more than 200, revenues have grown, and teachers have begun earning better additional pay.

“With Starlink, the internet is very fast and reaches every corner of the school,” she said. “Teachers no longer disconnect from their students. I never imagined it would make such a difference. Videos load quickly, we no longer turn away new applicants, and our reputation for fast internet has spread.”

For Yemenis who have grown used to Starlink’s high-speed internet, and the better incomes and business opportunities it has helped create, the worst-case scenario is a return to the slow, unreliable service of local networks.

“Go back to the headache of local networks? Perish the thought. We hope the service will continue to improve,” al-Dubae said, scoffing at the idea of reverting to local internet providers.

Helmi reacted similarly. “If Starlink were cut off, I would be devastated and forced back into the local market, which cannot cover my expenses or living costs,” he said, shifting in his seat and smiling at the thought. “I would need to take on three or four jobs just to match what I earn from a single project from abroad.”

Sanaa, Yemen – It was August 2023, and Enaya Dastor was reading a school textbook while also keeping an eye on her goats as they grazed near her village, Jabal Habashy, in central Yemen’s Taiz governorate.

Whenever the livestock moved away, the then-13-year-old would walk or run to bring them back to the pasture near her house.

That afternoon, she was following them as usual when an explosion rang out.

A landmine had detonated beneath her.

“People gathered around me after the blast, and I was taken to the hospital immediately. It was a horrible moment, ” Dastor told Al Jazeera. Surgeons were forced to amputate her left leg, leaving her with a lifelong disability.

The incident took place more than a year after fighting between Yemen’s government and Houthi forces largely stopped, following a ceasefire in April 2022.

But landmines left behind on former battlefields and front lines continue to kill and injure Yemenis.

The hidden risks have turned fields, roads, and villages into areas of ongoing danger. Landmines and other explosives have killed at least 339 children and injured 843 since the 2022 truce, according to Save the Children. The organisation found that nearly half of child casualties related to the conflict were due to landmines and explosive remnants of war.

‘Sleeping killers’

The parties to Yemen’s conflict planted thousands of mines during the civil war, which began in 2014.

Two months before Dastor’s incident, a boy in a nearby village had stepped on a landmine. One of the boy’s legs was amputated in the explosion, she told Al Jazeera.

“Landmines are sleeping killers, waiting for the innocents to step on them or move them without caution. That is how they wake up to shed blood and take human souls,” said Dastor.

“I used to go with other girls to the pasture. We grazed the cattle and play for hours. We were not aware of the danger, and we did not know when these deadly objects were planted,” she added.

After the landmine explosion took her leg, her family and others fled the village, which had previously been on a front line.

To date, Dastor’s family has not returned. They now live in the city of Taiz.

“I do not want to see another child harmed or hear another landmine explosion. I loathe walking on the soil under which mines were planted,” she said.

In the first half of 2025 alone, 107 civilians were killed or injured, most of them children, according to Save the Children. Included in that number are five children who were killed while playing football on a dirt field in Taiz.

Lost hope

From 2015 through 2021, ground fighting was brutal, and warplanes continuously bombed across Yemen, killing and injuring thousands of civilians.

The landmines have added a lasting layer of danger. A study carried out in 2022 by Yemeni human rights groups found that 534 children and 177 women were killed by mines between April 2014 and March 2022.

In addition, 854 children, 255 women, and 147 elderly people were injured during the same period in 17 Yemeni provinces, with the heavily fought-over Taiz recording the highest number.

In 2018, Mohammed Mustafa lost his left leg in a landmine explosion in Taiz’s Maqbna district. He was only 20 years old. Eight years on, he can still recall the details of that moment.

“I stepped on a landmine when I was walking in a mountainous area at sunset time. After the blast, I looked towards my feet, and I found my left leg was gone,” he told Al Jazeera.

Mustafa was in a rural area with no hospitals nearby. He had to travel five hours by ambulance to the city of Taiz, and the distance he covered to reach a healthcare centre added to his pain.

“I fainted repeatedly on the way to Taiz city. The next day, I woke up in the hospital, and saw my leg amputated up to the knee,” he said.

With support from family, relatives and friends, he recovered. Mustafa is now a member of the Yemeni Amputee Football Federation, a father, and a small business owner.

“My family and friends stood by me, lifted my morale, and accompanied me on outings in the city to help me forget my pain and worry. I realised I was not alone,” he said.

De-mining challenges

Efforts to remove landmines from many areas in Yemen continue. But totally ridding the country of the problem remains complex, particularly as no final deal has been agreed upon to end the war.

Project Masam, a de-mining team funded and initiated by Saudi Arabia, said in a statement in March that, since the project’s launch in July 2018, a total of 549,452 mines, unexploded ordnance, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had been removed by March 20, 2026.

During the same period, the project’s teams cleared explosives from 7,799 hectares (19,272 acres) in Yemen. Similarly, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) said early this month it has cleared more than 23,302 square metres (250,820sq ft) of Yemeni land from mines and explosive remnants of war.

Adel Dashela, a Yemeni researcher and non-resident fellow at the MESA Global Academy, focusing on conflict and peace building studies, said that many factors make the de-mining process challenging.

“The mines have been planted indiscriminately in different areas, and some of the territories are under the control of different armed groups, which makes them inaccessible to de-miners,” Dashela told Al Jazeera.

“Other challenges facing the de-mining process in Yemen include the lack of clear maps and the lack of qualified local personnel to handle these mines effectively. There is also a shortage of government’s modern equipment for detecting these devices and explosives,” he added.

Dashela noted that flash floods, such as those Yemen experienced in August 2025, sweep away explosives from one area to another, complicating the clearance process and exposing more people to further risks.

This means many more Yemenis will likely suffer.

The loss of a limb might bring lasting sorrow to landmine survivors, but some, like Dastor, are determined not to dwell on the past. She is focusing on the future.

“Today, I am in tenth grade, and I will finish high school in two years,” she said. “After that, I will enrol in law college and will graduate as a lawyer. I want to defend those who face injustice.”

“The injury has changed how I move or walk, and separated my family from our home,” she said. “But it cannot disable my mind or stop my dreams.”