Yemen

Dec. 26 (UPI) — Saudi Arabia has reportedly fired on the eastern Hadramout province in Yemen.

The Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group in Yemen, claims that the Saudis fired warning airstrikes at its forces.

The STC seized two oil-rich provinces in December. The group is backed by the United Arab Emirates. It released a video showing the airstrikes that it said were close to its positions in Wadi Nahab in the Hadramaut province.

The strikes haven’t been independently verified.

Saudi Arabia on Thursday made a diplomatic appeal urging the STC to abandon Hadramaut and al-Mahra, which it recently captured . The strikes would be the first military action by Saudi Arabia since that plea.

“The kingdom remains hopeful that the public interest will prevail through ending the escalation by the Southern Transitional Council and the withdrawal of its forces from the two governorates in an urgent and orderly manner,” Saudi Arabia said in a statement on Thursday.

“The kingdom stresses the importance of cooperation among all Yemeni factions and components to exercise restraint and avoid any measures that could destabilize security and stability, which may result in undesirable consequences,” the statement said.

On Thursday, there were large demonstrations in the port city of Aden calling for STC President Aidarous al-Zubaidi to declare independence from Yemen. The U.N. and several other gulf states back Yemen and want it to stay whole. The United States hasn’t taken a side.

The Houthis have controlled the northern areas of Yemen since 2015.

A spokesperson for Antonio Guterres calls for UN staffers’ immediate release, as 69 now detained in the country.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has condemned the detention of 10 more UN staff members by the Houthis in Yemen.

Stephane Dujarric, a spokesperson for Guterres, confirmed on Friday that the previous day’s arrests had brought the total of detained local staffers to 69, calling for their immediate release.

“These detentions render the delivery of UN humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas untenable. This directly affects millions of people in need and limits their access to life-saving assistance,” Dujarric said.

The Houthis, who control most of northwestern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, have stepped up their arrests of UN staff since the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, accusing them of spying for the United States and Israel.

The UN has repeatedly rejected Houthi accusations that its staff or operations in Yemen are involved in spying, a charge that carries the death penalty in the country.

On Thursday, the organisation confirmed that the detainees were all Yemeni nationals.

The latest arrests came days after Guterres discussed detained UN, diplomatic and NGO staff with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman, which has served as a mediator in the conflict in Yemen.

Guterres also commented this week on the Houthis’ recent referral of three detained UN staffers to a criminal court, saying they had been charged in relation to “their performance of United Nations official duties” and calling for charges to be dropped.

Shift in balance of power

A decade of civil war has plunged Yemen into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, according to the UN.

Guterres said this week that 19.5 million people in the country – nearly two-thirds of the population – need humanitarian assistance.

The conflict has recently entered a new phase, as separatists with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) extended their presence in southeastern Yemen – marking one of the largest shifts in power since the war began.

They now claim to control areas including the eastern governorates of oil-rich Hadramout and al-Mahra and the port city of Aden.

The STC, which wants to establish an independent state in the south of Yemen, has fought in the past alongside the internationally recognised, Saudi-backed government, which is based in Aden, against the Houthis.

However, the STC’s advance in the south brings it into direct confrontation with the government in Aden, known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which condemned the seizure of territory as “unilateral and a blatant violation”.

The STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has a seat on the PLC, officially as one of its vice chairmen.

But relations have often been shaky between the group and the internationally recognised government, which came under major pressure in areas under its control over power outages and a currency crisis this year.

The two entities have previously fought, most notably in 2018 and 2019, in Aden and its surrounding governorates.

This week, Guterres urged all parties to exercise “maximum restraint, de-escalate tensions, and resolve differences through dialogue”.

Yemen’s separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) is trying to create facts on the ground with its recent advances in the country’s eastern governorates of Hadramout and al-Mahra.

Its military push this month highlights that Yemen’s conflict – ongoing for more than a decade – cannot be reduced to one simply between the internationally recognised government and the Houthis. Instead, an overlapping map of influence is evident on the ground with de facto authorities competing over security, resources and representation.

At the heart of these changes is the STC, backed by a regional power, which now stands as the most powerful actor in Yemen’s south and parts of its east at a time when the government’s ability to impose unified administration over the whole country is distant and the economy is suffering.

In this context comes what the Yemeni government has said is the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) decision to suspend activities in the country. While the IMF has not publicly commented on the topic, President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, warned on Sunday that the decision was a “wake-up call” and an early signal of the cost of the STC’s security and military escalation in Hadramout and al-Mahra.

Al-Alimi stressed that Yemen’s economic circumstances – the country is the poorest in the region and has suffered immensely during the war – cannot withstand any new tensions. He added that the security instability in eastern Yemen would immediately affect the distribution of salaries, fuel and services and international donor confidence.

The solution, according to al-Alimi, is for the withdrawal of forces who have arrived in Hadramout and al-Mahra from outside the two governorates, calling it a necessary step to contain tensions and restore a path of trust with the international community.

But that economic warning cannot be understood in isolation from the shift in power in eastern Yemen, where competition for influence has become a direct factor in generating tension that leaves donors wary.

A new balance of power

The STC is clear that its goal is ultimately the secession of the territories in Yemen – its south and east – that formerly made up the country of South Yemen before unification in 1990.

It is opposed to the Houthis, who control Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and much of Yemen’s populous northwest, and the STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has a seat on the government’s Presidential Leadership Council, officially as one of its vice chairmen.

The STC and government forces have previously fought, most notably in 2018 and 2019, in Aden and its surrounding governorates.

Its current expansion eastwards, focused on government forces and those affiliated with them, is part of that ongoing division in the anti-Houthi camp but one that redraws the balance of power within it, turning resource-rich Hadramout and al-Mahra into a multiparty arena of competition.

There are three concurrent trends that are emerging as a result: the expansion of STC forces with regional support, a desire by local and tribal forces – independent of the STC – to solidify their presence and the clearly limited tools the government has to confront its rivals.

The result is the further fragmentation of the state on three interconnected levels.

Politically, there is fragmentation within the same anti-Houthi camp with multiple decision-making centres. The government and regional actors are finding it more difficult to unify security and administrative policies, and the idea of a single “chain of command” controlling territory under anti-Houthi control has been eroded.

Geographically, new lines of contact have now been formed. Whereas lines of control were previously between the Houthis and government forces, they are now between Houthi and STC forces as well as grey areas contested by local and tribal forces and multiple military groups.

And then there is fragmentation on the representative level with mounting disputes over who actually speaks for the south and Hadramout and the practical decline of the concept of a single state as a sovereign framework for managing resources and institutions.

In Hadramout and al-Mahra, the fragmentation is particularly sensitive as both governorates include important border crossings with Saudi Arabia and Oman and also have a long coastline with routes tied to trade, smuggling and irregular migration.

Any imbalance here does not remain local; it quickly spills over into the region.

Economy hostage to security

The IMF’s suspension of activities carries not only financial implications but also a political reading that the security and institutional environments no longer provide sufficient conditions for sustaining support programmes.

The Yemeni state relies heavily on its own limited resources and fragile external support, so any disruption in resource areas, ports or supply routes translates into immediate pressure on livelihoods.

The latest military developments increase pressure on the exchange rate and the government’s ability to meet its financial obligations and widen the trust gap between society and the state, prompting non-institutional alternatives based on levies and loyalties.

And it will shrink the room for the government to manoeuvre, meaning the government has to take into account the cost of any escalation because any military move increases an economic bill that it cannot pay and drains what remains of the government’s ability to manage services.

Now that the impression has taken root that Yemen has turned into “islands of influence”, some external actors may be inclined to deal directly with de facto local authorities at the expense of the government, weakening the political centre rather than helping it to strengthen.

That is why the latest developments are so important if not existential to the government and al-Alimi. His call for the withdrawal of outside forces from Hadramout and al-Mahra is part of an attempt to stop the deterioration of trust in Yemen and to present the government once again as capable of controlling the other parties in the anti-Houthi camp if reasonable political and economic conditions are provided.

Houthis gain while rivals stay divided

The Houthis, who overthrew the government in Sanaa in a coup in 2014, have benefitted from the developments in Hadramout and al-Mahra even without being directly involved.

Every struggle for influence in areas outside the group’s control gives it clear gains, including the disintegration of the front opposing it and its rivals being preoccupied by internal conflicts rather than by the Houthis themselves.

In the anti-Houthi camp, the notion of a united front recedes every time a military confrontation between its components takes place, and the discussion shifts from confronting the Houthis to disputes over power and resources within the same camp.

The divisions within the anti-Houthi camp and the regional dimension to them also allow the Houthis to reinforce their narrative that their rivals are working within competing foreign agendas, as opposed to the Houthis, who portray themselves as independent actors able to carry out their own decisions.

Moreover, the recent conflict and its consequences ultimately improve the Houthis’ negotiating position now that the other side is even more fragmented and weak. The Houthis will enter any upcoming settlement from a more cohesive organisational and administrative position, raising the ceiling of their conditions.

The Houthis may have their own economic and social tensions, but divisions among their enemies give them extra time to sustain the war economy and their instruments of control over it and over the people they rule.

Rising risks, domestic and regional

The current course of events in Yemen elevates a number of overlapping risks.

Domestically, there is the possibility of front lines turning into actual borders between adjacent entities, the expansion of security vacuums and declining prospects for producing a unifying social contract.

Regionally, there could be an expansion of the areas considered lawless along the borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, increasing the risks of smuggling and leading to higher costs for managing border security.

Internationally, the growing need for global powers to communicate with multiple parties in Yemen prolongs the crisis and increases the chances that the conflict is internationalised through competition over ports, resources and shipping routes.

However, the picture painted does not mean there will be a decisive victory for any side and instead makes a mosaic of authorities, all needing external sponsorship, more likely. Inevitably, that will weaken the prospect of establishing a stable state.

A way out?

Lowering tensions by making partial deals on redeployments of forces is not enough. Instead, the path forward needs a broader approach based on three interlinked pillars.

First, the national project needs to be redefined by drafting a vision of the state that guarantees fair partnership for all the regions of Yemen within a viable federal framework and redefines the political centre as a guarantor of rights and services.

Second, security must be based on a model of local forces under a national umbrella. In Hadramout and al-Mahra, this should be done by building professional local forces within a clear national and legal framework with practical arrangements for withdrawing outside forces and ensuring that security decision-making in state institutions is uniform.

Third, an economic deal is necessary to restore trust by concluding a transparent agreement on managing resources in the governorates that produce them, the fair distribution of revenues and the linking of international support to an implementable reform plan with a clear commitment to protecting sovereign facilities under central management.

In the absence of these steps, Yemen will continue towards a gradual model of disintegration from the peripheries in which the most cohesive armed entities advance and contested margins expand.

If that continues, the economy will be the first victim of fragmentation, making conditions even more difficult for millions of Yemenis.

And the governance crisis will eventually turn into a prolonged stability crisis, the repercussions of which will be difficult to contain locally and perhaps even regionally.

Saeed Thabit is the Al Jazeera Media Network’s bureau chief for Yemen