Yemen

The killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a United States-Israeli air campaign has sent shockwaves through the Middle East, decapitating the leadership of the “axis of resistance” at its most critical moment.

For decades, this network of groups allied with Iran was Tehran’s forward line of defence. But today, with its commander-in-chief dead and its logistical arteries cut, the alliance looks less like a unified war machine and more like a series of isolated islands.

Hassan Ahmadian, a professor at the University of Tehran, warned that the era of strategic patience is over and the Iranian government is now prepared to “burn everything” in response to the attacks.

While Tehran promised to retaliate against the US and Israel “with a force they have never experienced before”, the reaction from its key proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq revealed a deep hesitation driven by local existential threats that may outweigh their ideological loyalty to a fallen leader.

Hezbollah: Walking between raindrops

In Beirut, the response from Hezbollah, long considered the crown jewel among Iran’s regional allies, has been cautiously calibrated.

After Sunday’s announcement of Khamenei’s death, the group issued a statement condemning the attack as the “height of criminality”. However, Al Jazeera correspondent in Beirut Mazen Ibrahim noted that the language used was defensive, not offensive.

“If one dismantles the linguistic structure of the statement, the complexity of Hezbollah’s position becomes clear,” Ibrahim said. “The secretary-general spoke of ‘confronting aggression’, which refers to a defensive posture. … He did not explicitly threaten to attack Israel or launch revenge operations.”

This caution is rooted in a new strategic reality. Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in late 2024, the “land bridge” that supplied Hezbollah has been severed. Ali Akbar Dareini, a Tehran-based researcher, noted that this loss “cut the ground link with Lebanon”, leaving the group physically isolated.

Now with top leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) killed alongside Khamenei, Hezbollah appears paralysed – caught between a battered domestic front in Lebanon and a vacuum of orders from Tehran.

The Houthis: Solidarity meets survival

In Yemen, the Houthis face an even more volatile calculus.

In his first televised address after the strikes on Iran began on Saturday, the group’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, declared his forces “fully prepared for any developments”. Yet his rhetoric notably emphasised that “Iran is strong” and “its response will be decisive,” a phrasing that analysts interpreted as an attempt to deflect the immediate burden of war away from the Houthis.

The Houthis are under immense pressure. While they have successfully disrupted Red Sea shipping and fired missiles at Tel Aviv, they now face a renewed threat at home.

The internationally recognised Yemeni government, having won a power struggle against southern separatists, has sensed a shift in momentum. Defence Minister Taher al-Aqili recently declared: “The index of operations is heading towards the capital, Sanaa,” which the Houthis control. The statement signalled a potential ground offensive to retake Houthi territory.

This places the Houthis in a bind. While Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam recently met with Iranian official Ali Larijani in Muscat, Oman, to discuss “unity of the arenas”, the reality on the ground is different. Engaging in a war for Iran could leave the Houthis’ home front exposed to government forces backed by regional rivals.

“Expanding the circle of targeting will only result in expanding the circle of confrontation,” the Houthi-affiliated Supreme Political Council warned in a statement that threatened escalation but also implicitly acknowledged the high cost of a wider war.

Iraq: The internal time bomb

Perhaps nowhere is the dilemma more acute than in Iraq, where the lines between the state and the “resistance” are dangerously blurred.

Iran-aligned militias, many of which operate under the state-sanctioned Popular Mobilisation Forces, are now caught in a direct standoff with the US. Tensions have simmered since late 2024 when Ibrahim Al-Sumaidaie, an adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, revealed that Washington had threatened to dismantle these groups by force, a warning that led to his resignation under pressure from militia leaders.

Today, that threat looms larger than ever. Unlike Hezbollah or the Houthis, these groups are technically part of the Iraqi security apparatus. A retaliation from Iraqi soil would not just risk a militia war but also a direct conflict between the US and the Iraqi state.

With the IRGC commanders who once mediated these tensions now dead, the “restraining hand” is gone. Isolated militia leaders may now decide to strike US bases of their own accord, dragging Baghdad into a war the government has desperately tried to avoid.

Resistance without a head

Khamenei’s assassination has essentially shattered the command-and-control structure of the “axis of resistance”.

The network was built on three pillars: the ideological authority of the supreme leader, the logistical coordination of the IRGC and the geographic connection through Syria. Today, all three are broken.

“The most important damage to Iran’s security interests is the severing of the ground link,” Dareini said. With Khamenei gone, the “spiritual link” is also severed.

What remains is a fragmented landscape. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is too exhausted to open a northern front. In Yemen, the Houthis face a potential domestic offensive. In Iraq, militias risk collapsing the state they live in.

When the dust settles in Tehran, the region will face a dangerous unpredictability. The “axis of resistance” is no longer a coordinated army. It is a collection of angry, heavily armed militias, each calculating its own survival in a world where the orders from Tehran have suddenly stopped coming.

Aden, Yemen – Abu Amjad was shopping with his two children last week, finally able to take them out and buy them new clothes – a cherished Ramadan tradition in Yemen.

The 35-year-old is a teacher, and he had just received his salary. That payment was a sign things are improving in Aden – the salaries are funded by Saudi Arabia as a way of backing the Yemeni government, which has recently arrived to take control of Aden after the defeat of secessionist forces.

But problems and instability are never far away in Yemen.

Just as soon as the children, Amjad, 10, and Mona, 7, began trying on their outfits, the sound of gunfire erupted. Shoppers froze. Amjad and Mona clutched their father, asking to leave.

About 3km (2 miles) away, security forces had opened fire on protesters who attempted to breach the gates of al-Maashiq Palace, where members of the Yemeni government have been based since they arrived from Riyadh a week ago.

The gunfire shattered the family’s moment of joy.

“It ruins your joy when you see a person bleed and robs you of peace when you hear prolonged gunfire,” Abu Amjad told Al Jazeera.

After years of operating from exile, Yemen’s Saudi-backed, UN-recognised cabinet is spending Ramadan in Aden, a move that has coincided with improvements in basic services and a renewed sense of relief. Yet that relief was overshadowed by the deadly confrontation between security forces and antigovernment protesters, in which at least one person was killed.

“That was the first clash after the return of the government to Aden. Our concern is that it may not be the last,” said Abu Amjad.

Government wins

Yemen’s new Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani has said that stabilising Aden and other areas under government control was among the new government’s main priorities.

The Yemeni government is currently in its strongest position for years. An advance by the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) at the end of last year in eastern Yemen ultimately was a step too far for the United Arab Emirates-backed group.

Saudi Arabia considered the STC advance the crossing of a red line, and lent its full military backing to the Yemeni government, allowing it to take territory it had not controlled for years.

Now, the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia are focused on attempting to improve conditions in the southern and eastern areas of Yemen under government control, to attract more public support. That would in turn weaken support for both the STC and the Houthi rebels, who have controlled northwestern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, since the country’s war began in 2014.

Lit city and busy markets

Abdulrahman Mansour, a bus driver and resident of Khormaksar in Aden, said Ramadan this year feels different.

“When I see the lights on and the markets busy on Ramadan nights in Aden, it feels like a different city. The improvement is undeniable,” Mansour, 42, told Al Jazeera.

He noted that one distinct difference this Ramadan is the stable provision of electricity. “This reminds me of the pre-war time. We used to take that service for granted,” said Mansour.

“When the city is dark at night, it appears gloomy, and families prefer to stay home. The movement of people brings life to the city and helps small businesses keep afloat, especially in Ramadan,” Mansour added.

Yemeni Electricity Minister Adnan al-Kaf said last week that efforts to improve electricity services in Aden and other provinces continue, noting that Saudi support had contributed to improved service over the past two months.

Wafiq Saleh, a Yemeni economic researcher, said the improvement in the living standards of citizens in Aden and southern Yemen, in general, was obvious, particularly after Saudi Arabia’s payment of public sector salaries and the supply of basic services such as water and electricity.

Saleh told Al Jazeera, “The recent Saudi financial support has been very generous, and it can help the government during this period by enabling it to work on reactivating dormant resources, resuming oil exports, combating corruption, and improving the efficiency of revenue collection with transparency and good governance.”

But Saleh emphasised that the progress achieved so far is not the result of economic reforms by the Yemeni government, but rather because of Saudi support.

Therefore, according to the economist, the improvement in the living situation and the currency’s value may not be sustainable, even if it is a positive indicator and may be the first step towards promised economic reforms in the country.

“There must be a comprehensive vision for developing revenue collection so that the government can implement sustainable economic reforms,” Saleh said.

Search for cooking gas

While the distribution of electricity has improved in Aden, other essential services remain strained. Cooking gas shortages remain a major concern. The search for it remains a daily struggle for families in the port city, and the crisis has intensified in Ramadan.

Lines of vehicles queue at stations, while residents wait with cylinders for a few litres (quarts) of gas.

“Going from one station to another in search of cooking gas while fasting is exhausting,” said Fawaz Ahmed, a 42-year resident of Khormaksar district.

Fawaz describes the shortage of cooking gas as a cause of hunger in the city. “If I stay in [my home] village, I would resort to firewood. But in the city, that option is not available, and if we find firewood in the market, it is expensive.”

Gas distributors say the quantity of cooking gas supplied to them is not adequate, citing this as the root cause of the crisis. Supplies are transported from Marib province in northern Yemen.

Tensions to continue

The cooking gas shortage is a sign that it will not be plain sailing for the Yemeni government in Aden.

And opponents will likely seize on any ongoing problems to foment more unrest.

Majed al-Daari, editor-in-chief of the independent Yemeni news site Maraqiboun Press, described the situation in Aden as “very worrying”.

“What happened to the demonstrators at the start of Ramadan underscores the fragility of the political and security situation. Tensions are set to continue,” al-Daari said.

“The STC will continue mobilising its supporters against the government. This is its last card that it will use to restore lost political interests,” al-Daari added.

The STC said in a statement last week that raids and arbitrary arrests had targeted people who had participated in the recent protests. These attacks, the statement emphasised, would only increase the determination of the southerner secessionists.

For Abu Amjad,  demonstrations in Aden give space to chaos, which he resents.

“At least, Ramadan should pass without protests. Political actors should spare us this month so we can fast and share some joy with our children,” he said.

Aden, Yemen – Lying on the outskirts of Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, al-Basateen district starts where the paved roads end, stretching into narrow, sandy alleyways. It reveals a decades-old refugee story in which Arabic blends with Somali and the faces harbour memories of a different place, across the sea.

Residents know the area by several names, including “Yemen’s Mogadishu” and “the Somalis’ neighbourhood” – a reference to the demographic shift it has seen since the 1990s, when civil war in Somalia pushed thousands of families across the Gulf of Aden in search of safety.

Today, local sources estimate the district’s population at more than 40,000, with people of Somali origin making up the majority. They live in harsh conditions where economic vulnerability overlaps with an unresolved legal status.

Some arrived as children holding the hands of relatives, while others were born in Aden and have known no other home. But they all share one thing in common: the refugee label stamped on their official documents.

Harsh living conditions

As dawn breaks, dozens of men gather at the entrances of the area’s main streets, waiting to be picked up to do a day’s work in construction or manual labour. Many depend on this fragile pattern of employment to put food on the table.

Residents say the lack of regular work has become the defining feature of life in al-Basateen, as extreme poverty spreads and humanitarian aid declines.

Ashour Hassan, a resident in his mid-30s, waiting at a main road junction for someone to hire him to wash a car, told Al Jazeera that he earns between 3,000 and 4,000 Yemeni rials a day (less than $3). That amount is not enough to cover the needs of his family, which lives in a single room in a neighbourhood lacking basic services, surrounded by dirt roads and piles of rubbish.

In a voice mixed with fatigue and despair, Ashour summed up life in al-Basateen: “We live day to day. If we find work, we eat. If we don’t, we wait without food until tomorrow.”

Families in al-Basateen typically rely on both men and women to be breadwinners.

Some women work cleaning homes, while others run small businesses, such as selling bread and traditional foods that blend Yemeni and Somali flavours, and which become especially popular during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.

Many children also find themselves pushed into work despite their age. One of the main jobs for children involves sifting through waste for materials they can sell, such as plastic or scrap metal, to help support their families.

Little sense of belonging

Poverty is clearly visible in al-Basateen’s architecture and appearance, with tightly packed homes, some made of metal sheets and consisting of only one or two rooms, separated by dirt roads covered in rubbish.

But that is not the only burden weighing on al-Basateen’s Somali residents. A deeper feeling of what many here call “suspended belonging” hangs over them, with the first generation of refugees still carrying memories of a distant homeland and speaking its language, while the second and third generations know only Aden and speak Arabic in the local dialect, with Somalia only known through family stories.

Fatima Jame embodies this paradox. A mother of four, she was born in Aden to Somali parents. She told Al Jazeera: “We know no country other than Yemen. We studied here and got married here, but we do not have Yemeni identity, and in front of the law, we are still refugees.”

Fatima lives with her family in a modest two-room home. Her husband works as a porter in one of the city’s markets, while she helps support the family by preparing and selling traditional foods. Even so, she says their combined income “barely covers rent and food” because of the high cost of living and few job opportunities.

A bleak reality

Conditions in Yemen were never the best for migrants and refugees, but they have significantly worsened since a civil war began in 2014 between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the central government in Sanaa, in Yemen’s north.

The violence from that war, along with declining aid and shrinking job opportunities have increased pressure on both host communities and refugees.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that funding for support programmes in Yemen in 2025 met only 25 percent of the country’s actual needs, directly affecting the lives of thousands of families. Residents of al-Basateen say the aid they used to receive has sharply declined, and in many cases has stopped altogether.

Youssef Mohammed, 53, says he was one of the first Somali arrivals to the district in the 1990s, and now supports a family of seven.

“[We] have not received any support from organisations for years,” Youssef said, adding that some families “chose to return to Somalia rather than stay and die of hunger here”.

He believes the crisis affects everyone in Yemen, “but [that] the refugee remains the weakest link.”

Despite the bleak picture, a few have managed to improve their material conditions through education or by opening small businesses that have helped stimulate the local economy. But they remain an exception, and the flow of refugees continues.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, but is also the region’s only signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore allows foreign arrivals to apply for asylum or refugee status. According to the United Nations refugee agency, Yemen hosted more than 61,000 asylum seekers and refugees as of July 2025, the vast majority from Somalia and Ethiopia.

Arrivals in recent years have typically travelled to Yemen via boats, with many planning to use Yemen as a transit point before moving on to richer countries like Saudi Arabia.

Hussein Adel is one of those recent arrivals. He is 30, but leans on a crutch on a street corner in al-Basateen.

Hussein arrived in Aden only a few months ago, having made the dangerous journey on a small boat carrying African migrants.

He told Al Jazeera that he fled death and hunger, only to find himself facing a harsher reality. Hussein shelters on the rooftop of a relative’s home and spends his days searching the city for occasional work. His leg injury, he said, was caused by Omani border guards who shot him while he was crossing into Yemen.

As evening falls, the noise in al-Basateen’s alleyways quiets down. Men lean against the walls of worn-out homes, and children chase a ball through narrow passages barely wide enough for their dreams.

On the surface, life looks normal – like any working-class neighbourhood in a city exhausted by crises. But here, in “Yemen’s Mogadishu”, there is an extra trauma – the sense of a lack of belonging, the memory of refugees fleeing danger and poverty at home, and a lack of stability that will not go away.

It is no longer possible to interpret the Yemeni landscape solely through the lens of politics. The developments witnessed in the southern Yemeni governorates under government control in recent months clearly indicate that security and military affairs have become the decisive factor in determining the course of power on the ground. Any governmental or political arrangements will be unsustainable unless the issue of security control and the unification of military command are resolved.

Nor can the escalating Saudi–Emirati rift between two allies who have militarily, politically and economically shaped southern Yemen in recent years be overlooked, given its direct impact on the balance of power and stability.

Over the past years, a complex security structure has taken shape across the southern governorates, comprising official units and others that emerged during the war. Some of these units are linked to state institutions, while others were established with Emirati support, such as the Southern Transitional Council’s forces, which number in the tens of thousands, or through local arrangements shaped by the circumstances of the conflict.

Although recent months have seen moves to restructure this landscape following the defeat of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which declared its dissolution in Hadhramaut and al-Mahra on January 3, 2026, security control remains uneven from one governorate to another. Furthermore, the STC’s security and military formations have not disappeared entirely; some have been redeployed, while the fate of others remains unknown.

In Aden, the temporary capital, security agencies operate within a complex structure. Some units formerly affiliated with the STC have seen their personnel and weapons disappear, while others have been renamed or redeployed. However, longstanding networks of influence remain, and the transfer of leadership or redeployment of camps reflects attempts to rebalance power rather than a definitive resolution of the situation.

The same applies, to varying degrees, to Lahij, Abyan, Dhale, Shabwah and Hadhramaut, where the state’s ability to assert effective authority varies, as does the level of coordination between official security forces and the formations that emerged during the war.

The most sensitive issue at this stage is the integration of military and security formations into the Ministries of Defence and Interior. The state seeks to end parallel security authority, but the process faces complex challenges, including differing sources of funding for some units, varying political loyalties, fears among some commanders of losing local influence, and considerations related to the composition of these forces. As a result, integration appears gradual, relying more on redeployment and restructuring than on decisive measures that could risk triggering confrontation.

The government now based in Aden, southern Yemen, finds itself facing a delicate equation: it must impose its security authority without plunging the country into renewed internal conflict.

The transition from multiple armed groups to a state monopoly on the use of force requires political consensus, regional support and international backing. Any hasty move could reignite internal clashes, particularly given existing political and regional sensitivities, as well as fears that the Saudi–Emirati dispute could once again trigger confrontation on the ground.

For this reason, government efforts are focused first on establishing a stable security environment.

This trajectory cannot be understood without considering the regional dimension. Saudi Arabia views Yemen as a direct strategic depth for its national security and seeks the emergence of a stable state along its southern border.

The dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, particularly after Yemen requested the withdrawal of Emirati forces from its territory, has become a significant factor shaping the course of the crisis, especially amid Saudi accusations that Abu Dhabi continues to support the STC and consolidate its influence on the ground.

Yemen today is part of a broader regional landscape, intertwined with Red Sea dynamics and maritime routes, competition for influence in the Horn of Africa, and tensions stretching from Sudan to Somalia to the Gulf. For this reason, international actors — particularly the United States — are keen to keep the situation in Yemen under control, fearing that a security collapse could trigger intra-Gulf conflict, threaten international shipping, create space for a new wave of armed groups, or allow the Houthis to exploit the situation.

In the next phase, the government is likely to continue efforts to consolidate security control in Aden and other southern governorates, including Hadhramaut, which borders Saudi Arabia, while gradually integrating military units and maintaining political balances to prevent renewed conflict.

The success of these efforts will determine whether the country is moving towards gradual stability or another round of reshaping power centres. Given this reality, the central question remains: who truly possesses the ability to impose security on the ground, particularly as some actors continue to push the Southern Transitional Council towards escalation that could reignite the conflict?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Sanaa, Yemen – Ahmed Abdu, 28, parked his motorbike near a hall under construction in the al-Jiraf neighbourhood of Sanaa. He walked some metres to deliver a food parcel to a customer.

Nearly a minute later, an air strike hit the hall, setting off a thunderous explosion.

Fire erupted, and smoke rose on the dark street at night. Passersby screamed and fled in panic. The attack happened last Ramadan, on March 19, 2025, in the Yemeni capital.

Ahmed, who survived, said he will never forget that moment of horror. He escaped unscathed, but his motorbike was charred, and nine civilians sustained injuries.

As Yemen enters this new Ramadan, memories of last year’s United States-led aerial campaign, Operation Rough Rider, are resurfacing in Sanaa.

The two-month operation, which Washington said targeted Houthi military infrastructure, killed at least 224 civilians, many of them in Ramadan last year.

Today, the country remains in tumult amid rising tensions in the region. Ahmed and thousands of people like him fear a repeat of the violence that shattered the holiest month of the year.

“I do not know whether this calm will continue in this Ramadan, or we will relive the intimidating war surprises we endured last year. Such an uncertainty is worrisome,” Ahmed told Al Jazeera.

Ready for the second round

About 10 days before this Ramadan, the Houthis, who control northwest Yemen, including Sanaa, staged a mass protest in the capital under the slogan “Steadfast and ready for the next round”, referring to a possible confrontation with local or foreign adversaries.

The protest expressed solidarity with and support for Houthi allies, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, against the US and Israel. Houthi leaders said their hands were on the trigger and that any US attacks on Iran would prompt them to intervene.

Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the political bureau of the Houthi movement, warned the US against launching any “military aggression” against Iran, saying that attacking Iran would amount to a full-scale war in the region.

“We are men of action, not words,” al-Bukhaiti told Iranian television.

With the Houthi threats to support Iran militarily against Washington, the fear for many regular Yemenis is that their country could soon find itself a target of US warplanes once again.

The missile in the kitchen

The scars from previous US-Houthi attack exchanges still linger in war-ravaged Yemen.

The US said the strikes last year were carried out in retaliation for Houthi attacks on Israeli-linked vessels passing through the Red Sea, in solidarity with Gaza.

Construction worker Faisal Abdulkareem, 35, welcomes the arrival of Ramadan, but memories of the last one remain painful. He prays this month will pass peacefully without the horror of warplanes, missiles, and explosions.

“On a Ramadan night last year, I was lying in my room, facing the street. I heard the roar of a warplane. I was worried but did not panic. I reassured myself: This is a residential area with no military facilities, and it would not be targeted,” Faisal recalled.

About a minute later, an explosion rocked the area. The aluminium window frames were blown outwards, and shards of glass flew into Faisal’s room.

“The glass fragments struck parts of my body, including my head and hands. I wiped the blood away with a tissue as I tried to process happened. It was terrifying,” he said.

Faisal went outside to see exactly where the rocket had hit. “The missile landed in my neighbour’s kitchen. His house is about 20 metres [66 feet] away from my first-floor apartment. That spiritual Ramadan night turned into a moment of terror,” he told Al Jazeera.

Fortunately, no one was killed or seriously injured. But Faisal’s neighbour’s house sustained damage.

“People in the neighbourhood rushed to the house. Some said it was an American missile. Others suggested the Houthis launched the missile to intercept the US plane over Sanaa, but it fell on the house accidentally.”

Faisal said his neighbour had to bear the financial burden of repairing the damage to his house alone.

“We fasted from food and drink last Ramadan, but not from fear and grief,” Faisal said.

Peace vs solidarity

In a speech on preparations for Ramadan on February 13, Houthi chief Abdel-Malik al-Houthi said Israel and the US have sought to dominate the Middle East.

“This is why [the US and Israel] focus on removing [Iran], because they consider it to be at the forefront of the major obstacles that stand in the way of achieving that goal,” he added.

Such a goal is unacceptable, he said. “This is something that no human being with even a shred of humanity or human dignity left can accept.”

While the Houthi leader views engaging in the war as a duty, others consider it “unfair” to risk peace in Sanaa for the sake of solidarity with Iran.

Ammar Ahmed, a law student in Sanaa, keeps abreast of the regional news and views the US-Iran military clash as catastrophic for northern Yemen.

“The Houthi leadership is defiant, and it will not hesitate to hit American military assets in the region. So, we [civilians in northern Yemen] will again face US strikes,” said Ammar.

He argued that peace in Yemen should be prioritised over solidarity with Iran.

“Iran is a powerful country, and it can defend its interests. Even if the Houthis intervened, their missiles or drones would not cripple the US military. They will only bring us trouble,” Ammar told Al Jazeera.

Legitimate concerns

The future of Yemen’s Houthis is tied to Iran, and civilian worry over what lies ahead during Ramadan and in the months following is legitimate, Abulsalam Mohammed, the head of the Yemeni Abaad Studies and Research Center, told Al Jazeera.

“A war against the Houthis in northern Yemen remains an option [for anti-Houthi forces]. This option will be scrapped should the group come to talks and recognise the legitimacy of the UN-recognised Yemeni government,” said Mohammed.

He indicated that Houthi involvement in any US-Iran military conflict would only accelerate the launch of anti-Houthi operations by Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government in Yemen’s north.

The Yemeni government has been emboldened by a recent campaign against the separatist Southern Transitional Council, forcing them out of much of southern Yemen with the backing of Saudi Arabia.

“The coming military operations against the rebel group, in my view, will not be limited to air strikes. There will be advances by local ground forces, coupled with foreign aerial cover. We witnessed how the separatists collapsed in the north, and the fall of the Houthis in the north is also possible,” Mohammed said.

The United Nations’s special envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, warned that stabilisation in any part of the country will not be durable if the broader conflict in Yemen is not addressed comprehensively.

“It is high time to take decisive steps in this regard. Without a wider negotiated political settlement to the conflict, gains will continue to remain vulnerable to reversal,” said Grundberg in a briefing delivered to the UN Security Council on February 12.

For Sanaa resident Ahmed Abdu, it does not matter who wins any future conflict in the country. His priority is staying safe from the direct consequences of hostilities.

“During Ramadan last year, I lost my source of income, the motorbike, in an air strike. That loss could be replaced. I only wish a peaceful Ramadan this year and a lasting end to the war,” said Ahmed.

Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem has determined it is safe for Yemenis to return to their country, despite ongoing conflict.

The United States government has ended the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Yemen, ordering the more than 1,000 Yemeni refugees and asylum seekers living in the country to leave within 60 days or face arrest and deportation.

The action on Friday came as part of US President Donald Trump’s broad immigration crackdown, which is impacting those who fled perilous lives in war-torn countries.

It will terminate TPS for roughly 1,400 Yemeni nationals who have had access to the legal status since September 2015 because of armed conflict in their country, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced on Friday.

“After reviewing conditions in the country and consulting with appropriate US government agencies, I determined that Yemen no longer meets the law’s requirements to be designated for Temporary Protected Status,” Noem said in a statement.

“Allowing TPS Yemen beneficiaries to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to our national interest,” she said, describing the revocation as an act of “putting America first.”

Contrary to Noem’s determination, Yemen continues to be riven by years-long conflict in one of the world’s poorest nations.

The State Department currently advises against travel to Yemen, citing “terrorism, unrest, crime, health risks, kidnapping, and landmines”.

TPS allows narrow groups of people in the US to live and work in the country if they’re deemed to be in danger if they return to their home nations, because of war, natural disaster or other extraordinary circumstances.

While the protections are technically temporary, historically, presidents have continued to renew TPS statuses for refugees and asylum seekers rather than revoking them and rendering them undocumented.

The TPS for Yemen was last extended in 2024 and was set to expire on March 3 of this year.

Yemeni beneficiaries with no other lawful basis for remaining in the US have 60 days to voluntarily depart the country or face arrest, the statement said, offering a complimentary plane ticket and a $2,600 “exit bonus” for those who “self-deport”.

Since coming to office last year, Trump has ended the status for Venezuelans, Hondurans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Somalis, Ukrainians and thousands of others.

The Trump administration has also expanded its travel restrictions since returning to power, imposing a total ban on citizens of 19 countries from entering the US, primarily targeting Muslim-majority and African nations, including Yemen, Somalia and South Sudan.

Citizens from a further 29 countries, including Nigeria and Senegal, are subject to partial bans.