James P. Pinkerton, former deputy assistant to President Bush,
is the senior fellow at the John Locke Foundation in Raleigh, N.C.
A year ago, Ross Perot began his campaign with his if-the-volunteers-want-me appearance on “Larry King Live.” This evening, he tops off a round of rallies and a medley of talk shows as Jay Leno’s guest on “The Tonight Show.” Beyond the obvious question–when will he do Letterman?–lies an even bigger one: What does Perot want?
He’s already fulfilled one wish, destroying George Bush. Candidate Clinton must have enjoyed watching Perot torpedo Bush last year. After all, the nonpartisan Perot was much more credible attacking Bush for the deficit or Iraq-gate than any Democrat could have been. Now, it’s President Clinton’s turn. Perot’s Will Rogers-style gibes at Clinton’s attorneys-general follies are drawing blood. More ominously, Perot’s support for a balanced-budget amendment threatens to undercut, if not actually nullify, Clinton’s “investment” agenda.
Specific issues aside, Perot has a broad and true message: Washington is out of sync with the country. Does anyone think that the middle class wanted their new President to fill up his Cabinet with yuppies who have more experience dealing with domestics and chauffeurs than they do with nurses and auto workers? Does anyone think that this Congress will pass meaningful ethics or campaign-finance-reform legislation?
Perot’s sweeping critique of Washington’s “arrogance” poses tough questions to the Beltway culture. One such question comes from business guru Peter Drucker: “If we weren’t doing it now, would we start?” In other words, are the structures of the government, from the schools to welfare to the military, the best we can possibly do? If we can do better, what are the obstacles to real reform? Official Washington could find the answer in a mirror, which is exactly Perot’s point. Perot may seem simplistic, but he plays well in Peoria; especially as Clinton seems to have lost his “reinventing government” zest about the time he went to Pamela Harriman’s Georgetown mansion for cocktails.
Sen. Bob Krueger (D-Tex.) expressed the fundamental problem–that government is incompetent–in crisp Perotian terms: “If the government were a store, nobody would buy here. If it were an airline, nobody would fly it.”
A recent Business Week article described “The Virtual Corporation,” the new phenomenon of “temporary networks of companies that come together quickly to exploit fast-changing opportunities.” Global competition forces change. Virtual corporations “could well be the model for the American business organization in the years ahead.” What about government organization? With the current crew, the prospects of applying these profound lessons to Washington are nil. Perot, with his business background and his blunt desire to “get under the hood” and fix things, has reformist credibility no politician can dream of.
So what does Perot want? The average billionaire lives a life of quiet desperation. With every material need satisfied, he has to find something to do. Some buy tabloid newspapers; others, baseball teams. Perot clearly relishes his “Mr. Smith goes to Washington” role. And what if lightning were to strike? Perot must be haunted by an exit poll from last November which showed that a stunning 36% of the voters would have voted for him if they had thought he could have won. With that share of the vote in a three-way race in 1996, Perot could indeed win.
But Doug Bailey, a veteran Republican who foresaw Perot’s rise last year, isn’t sure that Perot actually wants to be President. “I think he really wants to be the First Kibitzer,” Bailey said in an interview. Perot is likely to keep his presidential options open till the last minute. That means 3 1/2 years of “will he or won’t he?” stories, with accompanying heartburn for both parties. The Republicans would love to march in Perot’s populist parade, but Perot understands that his aura would be smudged if he consorted with either party. Clinton can try to co-opt some of Perot’s juice with White House perk purges and call-in shows, but he lacks Perot’s earthy urgency.
Clinton used the wrong system of quotas when he staffed his Administration without a single one of the 19 million Perot voters. Now, he would be wise to call Perot in to the Oval Office for a humble-pie session. And if Clinton’s troubles continue, don’t be surprised if he reaches under the hood of his own Administration and offers Perot a “policy czar” appointment well before the next election.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
We have got what could be our first look at China’s CH-7 stealthy flying-wing drone in flight. While it’s no longer the biggest Chinese drone of this configuration, it’s still of impressive size and, as we have noted in the past, appears to be tailored for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR), as well as possibly a secondary strike role.
One of the first officially sanctioned images showing the CH-7 in the air. via Chinese internet
Video and stills released by Chinese state media today show the drone, for the first time, being prepared for flight, taking off, and landing. The video includes air-to-air footage of the CH-7 and, overall, the suggestion is that Beijing is making a notable effort to promote the progress of this program, especially in contrast to other, far more secretive flying wing drone programs.
It’s also notable that the CH-7 appears to have made its first flight from Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province, which also saw the recent maiden flight of the Jiutian heavyweight jet-powered ‘mothership drone,’ which you can read more about here. The Pucheng facility is operated by the China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE), underscoring its growing importance as a drone ‘center of excellence.’
The CH-7 over Pucheng Airport in Shaanxi province. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 seen in the new imagery retains the yellow-colored coat of primer that was seen in video and stills of the drone on the ground, released by Chinese state media earlier this year. Yellow primer is frequently seen on Chinese aircraft during their test phase. The drone also has air data probes on the leading edges of the wing and nose, again consistent with it being a prototype or perhaps a pre-production machine. Overall, the CH-7 has a ‘cranked-kite’ planform, of the kind that we have seen on various other Chinese drones. There are also various measures to reduce the radar and infrared signature, including a slot-like low-observable platypus engine exhaust, with the nozzle fully concealed from most angles of view, and serrated edges on doors and panels.
Interestingly, the attachment points previously seen on the upper surfaces of the rear of the drone have been removed in the new official imagery. It seems these were used to mount vertical tail surfaces.
Unofficial imagery, captured from an observer on the ground, suggests that the CH-7 was initially flight-tested with outward-canted tailfins, presumably to ensure stability during initial sorties, or otherwise to test an alternative aerodynamic configuration.
While the identity of this drone has not been confirmed, it appears to be the CH-7, with the outward-canted tailfins fitted. via Chinese internet
Compared to the previous imagery, we now also get to see some other details of the CH-7, including a distinctive small teardrop-shaped fairing mounted below the fuselage. This enclosure is very likely an air-to-ground datalink used for line-of-sight control of the drone and is a common feature on larger drones, including the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. This very unstealthy feature would be removed for most operational uses once the aircraft has entered service.
via Chinese internet
We now have a much better look at the series of antennas that runs in a line along the spine, flanked by two air scoops. There are also two prominent blade aerials, above and below the fuselage. Below the fuselage, immediately behind the nose landing gear, there appears to be a large radio frequency sensor aperture, and there could also be space for conformal arrays under the inner wings.
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
As we presumed, the previous prominent gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps, where the wing meets the blended body section, were a temporary configuration and have now been filled.
The latest configuration of the CH-7, with the attachment points for tailfins deleted and with the gaps removed inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese internetvia Chinese internetThis view of the CH-7 prototype on the runway reveals the previous gaps inboard of the trailing-edge flaps. via Chinese Internet
The CH-7 was previously assumed to have an internal payload bay. That is not immediately obvious in the new imagery, but there is a suggestion of a notably long and slender bay immediately inboard of the main landing gear on the right-hand side, presumably with a similar bay on the left-hand side, too. If these are indeed for weapons, then they would be able to accommodate smaller stores only. This could point to a secondary strike role, but that seems somewhat less than likely at this point.
An underside view of the drone reveals only limited evidence of internal stores bays. via Chinese internet
The CH-7 has already gone through several different iterations since it was first revealed, as a full-scale mockup in 2018, with the design being progressively adapted. Earlier changes included a less sharply swept wing compared to at least one early model, as well as an apparent growth in overall size.
The CH-7 (or Caihong-7, meaning Rainbow-7) has been developed by the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), specifically by its 11th Research Institute. A high-altitude, long-endurance drone, it is generally understood to be optimized for penetrating into or very near hostile airspace. It achieves this through a combination of a low-observable (stealth) design and flying at high altitudes, leading it to operate for extended periods of time without being successfully engaged.
via Chinese internet
Published specifications for the CH-7 include a length of 10 meters (33 feet), a maximum takeoff weight of 10,000 kilograms (22,000 pounds), a maximum speed of 926 km/h (575 mph), and an endurance of up to 15 hours. Bearing in mind the various design changes, these figures should be considered very much as provisional.
Earlier this year, Chinese state-owned media reported that the CH-7 had completed testing and was scheduled to complete development in 2024. This would imply it had also completed the flight-test program by this date, which remains possible, and the new imagery may actually date back a year or so.
via Chinese internet
Regardless of the timeline, the CH-7 is a fascinating program.
It represents one part of China’s accelerated efforts to develop low-observable, long-endurance drones, and there is a general expectation that, once in service, it will be used for both ISR and as a UCAV. Official statements from Beijing claim that, as well as bringing back critical intelligence, the CH-7 should also be able to strike strategic targets.
When it was unveiled, the CH-7 was described as a high-altitude, long-endurance stealth combat drone. Its chief designer, Shi Wen, said the aircraft would be able to “fly long hours, scout, and strike the target when necessary.”
via Chinese internetvia Chinese internet
It should be noted, however, that the latest imagery doesn’t provide definitive evidence of an extensive internal payload capacity, which might throw some doubt on the strike role, at least as a primary mission.
Even if the CH-7 ends up being exclusively an ISR platform, it remains highly relevant within China’s growing portfolio of stealthy drones, especially since it is apparently tailored to penetrate into or very near hostile airspace at high altitudes. Flying ISR missions with this profile would be especially relevant for China in a naval context, with the drone potentially roaming far out into the Pacific, monitoring the movements of enemy ships and providing targeting data for ground-based long-range missiles, for example, as well as anti-ship missiles launched from warships and bombers. Other theaters of operation in which a drone of this kind would be valuable include around the islands of the South China Sea and along the border with India.
A rear three-quarter view of the CH-7. via Chinese internet
Furthermore, it seems that the CH-7 will be offered for export. This hypothesis might also be supported by the unusually open nature of the imagery that’s been released of the drone so far.
If the CH-7 were to be offered for foreign customers, it would come with advanced capabilities that no other country is currently pitching on the arms market. It would also come without the various restrictions that limit the sale of high-end U.S. and other Western defense products.
A still from an official video showing what is purported to be a control center used for the CH-7 testing. via Chinese internet
Not only is the United States not currently able to offer for export a stealthy long-endurance surveillance drone or UCAV, but it’s also possible that no uncrewed platform of this class is even under development in that country — the still-mysterious RQ-180 may have fit in this category, but its current status is unknown. The stark contrast between the U.S. and Chinese approaches to very stealthy uncrewed aircraft for independent strike missions is something that we have addressed before in this feature of ours.
At this point, we should remember that we don’t know exactly how far the development of the CH-7 has progressed and when it might end up being ready for service with China, let alone with export customers. It remains possible that they might have to wait for a downgraded or otherwise sanitized version of the drone.
Nevertheless, the CH-7 program remains very much one to watch. Provided it fulfills its promise, it could provide China with a multirole low-observable drone family that could also be offered for export. For now, the CH-7 stands as more evidence of the huge strides that China is making in terms of drone technology, and the particular focus being placed on stealthy uncrewed aircraft.
