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Bamako, Mali – The ambush that killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps near the northern town of Anefis on July 18 was more than another battlefield setback.

It underscored how Mali’s armed groups are becoming increasingly coordinated, exposing the limits of the military government’s security strategy, despite growing Russian military support.

The Malian military confirmed the assault and said it had launched counter-operations, while Africa Corps later released footage it said showed drone strikes targeting fighters involved in the ambush.

The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated operations across northern Mali since April, raising questions about why armed groups are increasingly cooperating, whether Bamako’s security strategy is working, whether Russia’s military role has – and has not – changed, and what the conflict could mean for the wider Sahel.

Why are separatist and Islamic armed groups fighting together?

The July 18 ambush was jointly claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of predominantly Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.

Until recently, such cooperation would have seemed unlikely as they have different longterm political aims. The FLA seeks greater autonomy or independence for northern Mali, while JNIM aims to establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law across the region.

For Héni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) monitor, the answer lies in a shared battlefield enemy rather than a shared ideology.

“The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners from the Africa Corps,” Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.

“In doing so, they act as force multipliers for one another, allowing them to pool resources and mutualise their efforts to confront their adversaries more effectively. These groups also share kinship ties despite their ideological differences and regard one another as sons of the land, defending their ancestral territory against invading forces.”

For Mali’s military, that cooperation makes attacks harder to anticipate and more difficult to repel, allowing armed groups to combine local knowledge, manpower and operational experience while pursuing separate objectives.

The military government’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and deepen military cooperation with Russia reshaped the conflict. The collapse of the peace framework removed one of the few mechanisms managing relations between Bamako and northern armed groups, while the military’s increasingly confrontational approach encouraged former rivals to coordinate against a common adversary.

The shift became increasingly visible during coordinated attacks launched across several parts of the country in April, stretching Malian and Russian forces across multiple fronts. More recently, fighting around Anefis has shown that the alliance is capable not only of launching simultaneous operations but also of sustaining pressure on strategically important military positions.

With negotiations abandoned and military confrontation becoming the dominant strategy, armed groups that once competed with one another have found greater incentives to cooperate on the battlefield.

Has Russia changed the course of Mali’s war?

Since replacing the Wagner Group as Moscow’s principal military presence in Mali, Africa Corps has become an increasingly important partner for the Malian army.

Its personnel have provided combat support alongside Malian forces, while Russian drones and aircraft have expanded the military’s surveillance and strike capabilities. Those capabilities have strengthened the army’s ability to respond to attacks and defend key positions.

“Russia has helped strengthen Mali’s military, which was at risk of being overrun, and has given it more support on the battlefield,” Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst specialising in West Africa and the Sahel, told Al Jazeera.

“But this attack, as well as the earlier seizure of Kidal, suggests the Kremlin’s military support has not changed the overall picture. The conflict remains deeply rooted, with geographical and ideological dimensions that are proving difficult for the junta to tackle.” The army seized Kidal, a key town in the country’s north that the Tuareg rebels held for nearly a decade, in November 2023, but Tuareg and allied fighters retook the town in April this year.

Rather than transforming the conflict, Moscow’s military backing appears to have strengthened the army’s battlefield capabilities without addressing the political, governance and security conditions that continue to fuel the violence.

Recent operations reinforce that assessment. Convoys travelling through northern Mali continue to face frequent ambushes, particularly along routes linking Gao, Anefis and other military positions, exposing the continued vulnerability of military supply lines despite increased Russian support.

The shift away from Western security partners also changed the type of assistance available. While Africa Corps has strengthened Mali’s combat capabilities, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ended an international presence that provided logistics, monitoring and intelligence support across much of northern Mali.

The result is a military that has become more effective in direct combat but continues to struggle to secure vast, remote territory against increasingly adaptable armed groups.

Has Bamako’s strategy paid off?

The limitations of Bamako’s security strategy raise broader questions about whether it is translating battlefield gains into lasting security.

Since seizing power in 2020, Mali’s military government has centred its strategy on military force, ending longstanding cooperation with Western partners while strengthening defence ties with Russia.

But the repeated ambushes around Anefis and along northern supply routes suggest the measurable gains of this approach on the battlefield have yet to translate into lasting strategic control.

More fundamentally, the growing cooperation between armed groups with different objectives suggests that Bamako’s strategy has not prevented them from adapting and reshaping the conflict.

What could this mean for the wider Sahel?

The implications of the Anefis ambush extend well beyond Mali.

JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate, already operates across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while fighting continues to spread across the central Sahel.

The evolving battlefield also presents a challenge for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members all face persistent armed violence despite expanding military cooperation. The alliance was created to strengthen collective security, but increasingly coordinated attacks suggest that cooperation among governments is being matched by equally adaptable cooperation among armed groups.

At the same time, Mali’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reduced opportunities for regional coordination with neighbouring countries confronting many of the same security threats.

If the FLA-JNIM partnership proves durable, it could encourage similar tactical cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, further complicating efforts to contain armed groups whose operations already span national borders.

“The AES was supposed to mean that our security was finally our own business. But when Mali bleeds, Niger bleeds with it, because the armed groups attacking those convoys do not recognise the Alliance of Sahel States any more than they recognised ECOWAS. We traded one set of partners we did not trust for another, and the war is still coming south,” a Niger-based security expert, who requested anonymity because he feared potential repercussions, told Al Jazeera.

Whether the tactical partnership between the FLA and JNIM proves durable remains uncertain. But the Anefis ambush suggests that as Mali’s security strategy shifts, armed groups are adapting in response, with consequences that could extend far beyond Mali’s borders.

Retired US General Mark Kimmitt warns renewed attacks in the Strait of Hormuz could push the US and Iran back towards wider conflict.

July 9 (UPI) — Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said early Thursday that it has launched attacks targeting U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, hours after U.S. Central Command announced the completion of its attacks against Iran.

The tit-for-tat strikes follow President Donald Trump a day prior saying the cease-fire agreement between Washington and Tehran was all but over, and threatened the return to all-out war in the Middle East.

Fighting had simmered between the two sides following last month’s agreement to conditions that could lead to an end of the war, but the Strait of Hormuz has proved a sticking point. The Trump administration is demanding a return to freedom of navigation through the chokepoint; Iran is seeking to maintain control over the vita energy transit route.

As negotiations were stalling, three commercial vessels were struck while transiting the strait, resulting in the United States attacking Iran early Wednesday, kicking off the continuing retaliatory strikes as Iran appears unrelenting in its oversight of the Strait of Hormuz.

“America still hasn’t learned that bullying and breaking promises are no longer cost-free. Let me put it plainly: if you strike, you’ll get hit,” Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said in a social media statement early Thursday.

“Don’t flail around pointlessly, or you’ll sink ever deeper: the Strait of Hormuz will only open with ‘Iranian arrangements,’ not American threats.”

The IRGC said it had not only attacked but “smashed important infrastructure and facilities” at Arifjan and Ali Al Salem bases in Kuwait and Juffair and Sheikh Isa bases in Bahrain.

State-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported that Iran early Tuesday was attacking U.S. bases from Bushehr city, stating the United States had targeted those assets hours earlier.

The state broadcaster also claimed the U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain was also hit.

The extent of potential damage was not immediately clear, but both Kuwait and Bahrain confirmed incoming attacks.

The elite military unit in charge of protecting the Islamic regime warned that the United States that “should it repeat its aggression, our crushing responses will expand to other American bases in the region,” it said.

The attack came as the U.S. Central Command announced that it had completed strikes against Iran late Wednesday.

CENTCOM said late Wednesday that it had completed strikes against about 90 Iranian military targets, including air defense systems and coastal surveillance assets, were hit. The announced follower an earlier round of U.S. attacks overnight Tuesday that struck about 80 targets in Iran.

June 26 (Asia Today) — South Korean defense experts, mine-clearance researchers and technology companies called for broader government, military and civilian cooperation to remove land mines and unexploded ordnance near the Demilitarized Zone, saying the weapons continue to threaten residents more than seven decades after the Korean War.

The Defense and Security Forum held its fourth roundtable Thursday at the Korea Mine Clearance Research Institute’s DMZ Peace Center in Haemaru Village in Paju, a restricted border area north of the Civilian Control Line.

The event, titled “Korean War DMZ Field Forum: Peace Grows When the Land Heals,” coincided with the 76th anniversary of the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War and South Korea’s month of remembrance for veterans.

Security specialists, field researchers, border residents and representatives of defense and information technology companies discussed mine removal, restoration of contaminated land and cooperation among government agencies, the military and private organizations.

The forum said areas contaminated by land mines, unexploded ordnance and other explosives in and near the DMZ and Civilian Control Zone are estimated to cover about 128 square kilometers, or 49 square miles.

It also cited estimates that about 2 million land mines remain buried across the Korean Peninsula’s heavily fortified border region.

The mines are not merely remnants of a past conflict, participants said. They continue to endanger people living in border communities and impede plans to preserve the DMZ as an internationally recognized area of peace and environmental conservation.

Residents in front-line communities face risks while farming, traveling and using land near suspected minefields.

Participants said previous mine-clearance accidents have also made local governments reluctant to pursue development, public infrastructure and community revitalization projects in some border regions, including areas around Cheorwon in Gangwon Province.

The discussion came after South Korea’s mine-action law took effect in February 2025.

The law establishes procedures for safely detecting and removing mines, unexploded ordnance, abandoned munitions and booby traps that are no longer considered militarily necessary.

It also allows qualified private corporations and organizations to conduct detection and removal work under government approval and safety requirements. The military previously handled most such operations.

Participants said cooperation with civilian specialists has become increasingly important as South Korea’s military faces declining troop numbers and difficulties retaining experienced mine-clearance personnel.

Baek Gun-ki, chairman of the Defense and Security Forum, said the country must remember the lessons of war while working toward a safer future.

“We must reflect on the tragic lessons of war and open the way toward a secure future for South Korea,” Baek said.

Seo Nam-yeol, president of the forum, moderated the discussion.

Kim Ki-ho, director of the Korea Mine Clearance Research Institute, presented an assessment of unconfirmed minefields and proposed directions for future clearance operations.

Forum director Kang Tae-jun outlined the South Korean Defense Ministry’s mine-action road map and discussed steps needed to expand cooperation between military and civilian organizations.

Representatives of South Korean defense and technology companies developing artificial intelligence-based detection systems and other advanced mine-clearance equipment also attended.

They discussed the technical limitations of equipment now used by the military and civilian organizations and agreed to pursue cooperation on developing and testing more advanced systems under field conditions.

Participants said mine action is evolving from a labor-intensive military task into a broader security and humanitarian undertaking that combines advanced technology, government policy and specialized civilian expertise.

Following the roundtable, participants visited a nearby area classified as an unconfirmed minefield.

The forum said the visit demonstrated that land mines are not solely a military issue but also affect public safety, land use, economic development and the daily lives of people in border communities.

“Land mines are like bullets lodged in the waist of the Korean Peninsula,” the forum said. “Only after those bullets are removed can vitality return to the peninsula and the lives of border residents fully recover.”

The group called on the central government, military, local governments and private mine-clearance organizations to develop a coordinated national response.

The forum said it plans to launch a nationwide campaign supporting mine clearance across the Korean Peninsula.

It also plans to strengthen South Korea’s mine-action capabilities and expand cooperation with international organizations and overseas specialists, including the United Nations Mine Action Service.

Organizers said South Korea could use its growing defense technology expertise to contribute to international humanitarian mine-clearance operations as well as domestic efforts.

A preliminary discussion featuring Kim and Seo was released online before the event. Video of the roundtable and field visit is expected to be published through the YouTube channel Cheongunmanma.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

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Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260626010009324