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Ben Rhodes, a former United States deputy national security adviser under President Barack Obama, famously called Washington’s foreign policy establishment “the Blob” to describe its entrenched ecosystem of think tanks, former officials, journalists and funders that perpetuate a narrow vision of power, global order and legitimate actors. This apparatus not only sustains conservative inertia but also defines the limits of what is considered possible in policy. In Sudan’s two-and-a-half-year conflict, these self-imposed boundaries are proving fatal.

A particularly insidious practice within the Blob is the invocation of moral and rhetorical equivalence, portraying the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese armed forces (SAF) as comparable adversaries. This ostensibly balanced US stance, evident in establishment analyses and diplomatic statements, represents not an impartial default but a deliberate political construct. By equating a criminalised, externally backed militia with a national army tasked with state duties, it sanitises RSF atrocities, recasting them as mere wartime exigencies rather than orchestrated campaigns of ethnic cleansing, urban sieges and terror.

Reports from Human Rights Watch on ethnic cleansing in West Darfur, civilian killings, rape and unlawful detentions in Gezira and Khartoum and United Nations fact-finding missions confirm the RSF’s deliberate targeting of civilians. Furthermore, a report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) monitor from late 2024 attributed roughly 77 percent of violent incidents against civilians to the RSF, underscoring this asymmetry, yet the Blob’s discourse frequently obscures it.

This notion has dominated US and international discourse on Sudan’s war since its outbreak when the then-US ambassador to Khartoum, John Godfrey, tweeted in the first month of the war a condemnation of RSF sexual violence but vaguely attributed it to unspecified “armed actors”. By refraining from explicitly identifying the perpetrators despite extensive documentation of the RSF’s responsibility for systematic rapes, gang rapes and sexual slavery, his wording essentially dispersed accountability across the warring parties and contributed to a climate of institutional impunity. RSF militiamen carry out their atrocities with confidence, knowing that responsibility will be blurred and its burden scattered across the parties.

What drives this equivalence? The Blob’s institutions often prioritise access over veracity. Framing the conflict symmetrically safeguards diplomatic ties with regional allies, particularly the RSF’s patrons in the United Arab Emirates while projecting an aura of neutrality. However, neutrality amid asymmetric criminality is not objectivity; it is tacit complicity. Elevating an internationally enabled militia to parity with a sovereign military confers undue legitimacy on the RSF, whose methods – including the besieging and starving of cities such as el-Fasher, the systematic use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war, the deployment of drones against mosques and markets, and acts of genocide – are demonstrably systematic, as corroborated by investigative journalism and human rights documentation. To subsume these under “actions by both parties” distorts empirical reality and erodes mechanisms for accountability.

Compounding this is the Blob’s uncritical assimilation of RSF propaganda into its interpretive frameworks. The RSF has strategically positioned itself as a vanguard against “Islamists”, a veneer that conceals its historical criminal nature, patronage networks, illicit resource extraction and foreign sponsorship.

In a similar vein, the RSF has publicly expressed sympathy and strong support for Israel, even offering to resettle displaced Palestinians from Gaza in a bid to align with US interests. This discourse serves as an overture to the Blob, leveraging shared geopolitical priorities to portray the RSF as a pragmatic partner in regional stability.

Certain establishment pundits and diplomats have echoed this narrative, casting the RSF as a viable bulwark against an “Islamist resurgence”, thereby endowing a force implicated in war crimes with strategic and ethical credibility. When the Blob internalises this “anti-Islamist” trope as analytical shorthand, it legitimises an insurgent militia’s rationalisations as geopolitical truths, marginalising the reality of the war and the Sudanese who repudiate militarised binaries and sectarian lenses.

Contrast this with the recurrent accusations of external backing for the SAF from an ideologically disparate coalition, including Egypt, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Iran. These claims, often amplified in mainstream media narratives and aligning with RSF discourse, expose profound inconsistencies: Egypt’s secular anti-Islamist state, Turkiye’s Islamist-leaning government, Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Wahhabi monarchy and Iran’s Shia theocracy embody clashing regional rivalries, evident in proxy wars from Yemen to Libya, rendering their purported unified support for the SAF implausible unless opportunistic pragmatism overrides ideology.

Moreover, the evidentiary threshold falls short of the robust, independent documentation implicating the UAE in RSF operations, relying instead on partisan assertions and circumstantial reports that appear designed to muddy asymmetries. Critically, any verified SAF assistance typically involves conventional arms transactions with Sudan’s internationally recognised government in Port Sudan, a sovereign authority, as opposed to the unchecked provisioning extended to the RSF, a nonstate actor formally designated by the US as genocidal. This fundamental distinction highlights the Blob’s contrived equivalence, conflating legitimate state-to-state engagements with the illicit empowerment of atrocity perpetrators.

Even more corrosive is the Blob’s propensity to credential “pseudo-civilian” entities aligned with the RSF and its external sponsors, particularly those bolstered by UAE influence, such as Somoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who also chairs the Emirati business-promotion organisation, the Centre for Africa’s Development and Investment (CADI). These networks are often presented in Blob forums as “civilian stakeholders” or “pragmatic moderates”, sidelining authentic grassroots entities inside Sudan.

This curation of externally amenable proxies transforms mediation into theatre, channelling international validation towards RSF-aligned gains and ignoring Sudanese agency rather than supporting any real civic architects of Sudan’s democratic aspirations. Documented UAE-RSF logistical and political linkages alongside Gulf-orchestrated narrative amplification should serve as a warning against endorsing such fabricated authority.

These lapses are not merely intellectual; they yield tangible harms. Legitimising the RSF through equivalence or narrative cooption dilutes legal and political tools for redress, confining policy options to performative ceasefires and superficial stability blueprints that preserve war economies and armament flows. It defers genuine deterrence, such as targeted interdictions, robust arms embargoes and the exposure of enablers until atrocities become irreversible.

The repercussions do not end there. They deepen, fuelling the militia’s authoritarian ambitions in alliance with its civilian partners. Drawing on this contrived equivalence, they have recently declared Ta’asis, parallel governing structures in western Sudan, claiming a layer of legitimacy while, at least rhetorically, brandishing the threat of partition despite the clear international consensus against recognising such authority.

To counter the Blob’s pathologies, a paradigm shift is imperative. Analysts and policymakers must abjure false symmetry, distinguishing symmetric warfare from asymmetric atrocity campaigns. Where evidence is found of systematic rights abuses, international rhetoric and actions should reflect this imbalance through targeted sanctions and disruptions while avoiding generic “both-sides” statements.

They must also repudiate RSF narratives. The “anti-Islamist” rhetoric is partisan sloganeering, not objective analysis. US engagement should centre on civilian protection, privileging authentic civil society testimonies over manufactured proxies. The question of who governs Sudan is, first and foremost, the prerogative of the Sudanese people themselves, who in April 2019 demonstrated their sovereign agency by toppling Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist regime without soliciting or relying on external assistance.

Equally important is to withhold recognition from contrived civilians. Mediation roles should hinge on verifiable grassroots mandates. Entities tethered to foreign patrons or militias merit no elevation as Sudan’s representatives.

Finally, policymakers must dismantle enablers. Rhetorical and legal measures must be matched by enforcement through transparent embargo oversight, flight interdictions and sanctions on supply chains. Justice without implementation offers only solace to victims.

Should the Blob prove intransigent, alternative forces must intervene. Sudanese civic coalitions, diaspora advocates, independent media and ethical policy networks can amass evidence and exert pressure to compel a recalibration of global approaches. A diplomacy that cloaks complicity in neutrality perpetuates atrocity machinery. Only one anchored in Sudanese agency, empirical truth and unyielding accountability can forge a viable peace.

Sudanese seek no sympathy, only a recalibration among the influential: Cease equating aggressors with guardians, amplifying perpetrator propaganda and supplanting vibrant civic realities with orchestrated facades. Until Washington’s elite perceives Sudanese not as geopolitical subjects but as rights-bearing citizens demanding justice, its epistemic maze will continue to license carnage over conciliation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Croix Bethune scored on a header in the 71st minute to pull the Washington Spirit into a 2-2 draw with Angel City on Thursday night in the National Women’s Soccer League.

The Spirit (10-4-7) remained in second place in the league standings behind the Kansas City Current with a nine-game unbeaten run.

The draw stopped a two-game losing streak for Angel City (6-9-6), which was below the playoff line but still within reach of a berth.

Trinity Rodman’s penalty attempt was stopped, but she scored on the rebound to give the Spirit the lead in the 12th minute.

Just two minutes later, rookie Evelyn Shores scored her first NWSL goal off a cross from Gisele Thompson. Thompson has five assists this season, tied for the league lead.

Angel City went ahead in the 56th on an own goal by Spirit defender Tara McKeown. Bethune pulled Washington back even with her header.

Deborah Abiodun was bloodied when she caught a cleat in the head in a collision with Angel City’s Jun Endo that caused a lengthy delay in the first half. Abiodun returned to the match with a wrap on her head.

American warships edging closer to Venezuelan waters earlier this year barely made global headlines, overshadowed by louder crises in Ukraine and the South China Sea. Yet this quiet buildup is not accidental. It is part of Washington’s long pattern of targeting regimes that stand at the crossroads of energy and geopolitics. Venezuela, sitting atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves, remains an indispensable square on the global chessboard, despite years of economic decay. The question worth asking is: Why does the United States persist in exerting pressure on Venezuela, Iran, and Russia and even spar with rising oil consumers like India? The answer lies in a combination of old-fashioned energy security, the logic of sanctions, and a twenty-first-century version of tariff wars.

Energy, Empire, and the Logic of Control

From the early Cold War to the Gulf Wars, American power has been tethered to oil. Securing access to hydrocarbons was never about mere consumption; it was about leverage. Whoever controlled the flow of oil controlled the arteries of the global economy. Venezuela, like Iran and Russia, belongs to the category of states with energy abundance but frail political legitimacy in Washington’s eyes. These states could, in theory, undermine the U.S.-led order by weaponizing supply.

The Trump administration revived this logic with unusual bluntness. Sanctions on Venezuela’s PDVSA, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company, and Russia’s energy giants were not simply punitive. They were instruments of economic siege, aimed at reducing rivals’ fiscal lifelines while simultaneously making American shale oil more competitive on the global market. The “tariff war” with China, and by extension India, fit the same pattern: weaken alternative energy partnerships and redirect trade flows toward U.S.-friendly networks.

Venezuela: A Pawn or a Prize?

Venezuela is not merely an oil state; it is a symbolic battleground. For Washington, Nicolás Maduro’s survival is a reminder that authoritarian regimes can withstand Western pressure when shielded by Moscow and Beijing. For Russia and China, supporting Caracas is inexpensive but symbolically priceless: it frustrates U.S. hegemony in its own hemisphere.

This symbolism has recently translated into direct diplomatic gestures. When Washington deployed warships off Venezuela’s coast, Beijing condemned the action as a violation of sovereignty and publicly reaffirmed its support for President Maduro. India, in contrast, has been more circumspect: while historically engaged with Venezuelan crude, New Delhi stepped back from oil imports earlier this year under U.S. tariff threats, signaling its preference for strategic neutrality. These divergent responses underscore how Venezuela has become a stage where multipolar fault lines are performed in real time.

The irony is that Venezuela’s oil industry today is a ghost of its former self. Decades of mismanagement and sanctions have collapsed production to levels unthinkable in the 1990s. And yet, the reserves beneath Venezuelan soil still represent untapped potential insurance against a future where Middle Eastern supply chains might be disrupted. U.S. naval maneuvers around Venezuela send a dual message: to Caracas, that Washington retains coercive power; to global markets, that American dominance in the Western Hemisphere is not up for negotiation.

Tariffs, Sanctions, and the Shifting Global Economy

Sanctions and tariffs are often portrayed as separate instruments, but in practice they converge. By sanctioning Venezuela, Iran, and Russia, Washington narrows the playing field for global oil suppliers. By imposing tariffs on India and China, it simultaneously curbs the bargaining power of large consumers. The effect is to reinforce the role of the United States as both an energy producer (through shale) and a gatekeeper of energy commerce (through financial sanctions and naval dominance).

This strategy, however, comes with risks. Sanctions have accelerated experiments in de-dollarization, as Russia and China expand oil trade in rubles and yuan. India, caught between cheap Russian crude and American pressure, finds itself hedging. Venezuela, despite its pariah status, has quietly courted Asian markets with barter-style deals. In short, the very pressure that once guaranteed U.S. leverage is now incubating alternatives.

History’s Echoes

To understand today’s maneuvers, one must recall history. Washington’s approach to oil-rich adversaries is not new; it is a recycled script. The 1953 coup in Iran, the sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1990s, and even the naval blockades against Cuba: each reflects a doctrine that energy and ideology cannot be separated.

Yet, history also reminds us that such strategies rarely yield clean victories. Sanctions tend to harden regimes rather than topple them. Tariffs often spark retaliation rather than capitulation. Recent analyses have underscored this dynamic: for instance, an Investopedia study notes that overuse of dollar-based sanctions has accelerated global de-dollarization, with the dollar’s share of global reserves dropping below 47%—as nations increasingly shift into gold, yuan, and local currencies. Venezuela under Maduro looks less like a state on the verge of collapse than a state perpetually enduring collapse, too weak to recover, too stubborn to die.

Theoretical Lens: Realism with a Neoliberal Mask

International relations theory offers a useful lens. Realists would argue that Washington is simply acting in line with its structural interests: preventing rival powers from weaponizing energy. But a neoliberal reading highlights how this coercion is cloaked in the rhetoric of democracy, human rights, and market freedom. Sanctions are framed as moral instruments, when in reality they are economic tools of statecraft. Tariffs are justified as corrections for “unfair trade,” though their deeper function is to secure strategic dominance.

The United States, in effect, performs a balancing act: dressing realist power politics in neoliberal language. Venezuela becomes not just a state to be disciplined but a case study in how the American order sustains itself through economic pressure rather than outright invasion.

Conclusion: A Risky Bet

The naval encirclement of Venezuela may not escalate into open conflict, but it signals a broader pattern: Washington is unwilling to let go of energy geopolitics as the anchor of its global primacy. By targeting Venezuela, Iran, and Russia, and by sparring with India and China over tariffs, the U.S. reasserts its role as the central broker of oil and trade.

The gamble, however, is whether this strategy is sustainable in a world edging toward multipolarity. Sanctions fatigue is growing; tariff wars strain alliances; and new financial infrastructures are slowly eroding the dollar’s monopoly. History teaches us that great powers can overextend. The United States risks learning that lesson the hard way, with Venezuela serving less as a pawn to be cornered and more as a mirror reflecting the limits of American power.

WASHINGTON — Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced Wednesday that his department is taking management of Union Station, the main transportation hub in Washington, away from Amtrak, in another example of how the federal government is exerting its power over the nation’s capital.

Duffy made the announcement in a statement before he joined Amtrak President Roger Harris at Union Station for the launch of the NextGen Acela, the rail service’s new high-speed train.

The secretary said Union Station, located within walking distance of the U.S. Capitol, had “fallen into disrepair” when it should be a “point of pride” for the city.

“By reclaiming station management, we will help make this city safe and beautiful at a fraction of the cost,” Duffy said.

At the event, Duffy said President Trump has been “pretty clear” about what he wants.

“He wants Union Station to be beautiful again. He wants transit to be safe again. And he wants our nation’s capital to be great again. And today is part of that,” Duffy said.

Duffy echoed the Republican president, who said last week he wants $2 billion from Congress to beautify Washington as part of his crackdown on the city. The Republican president has sent thousands of National Guard troops and federal law enforcement officials into Washington in a bid to fight violent crime he claimed had strangled the city.

Local police department statistics show violent crime in Washington has declined in recent years, but Trump has countered, without offering evidence, that the numbers were fudged.

National Guard troops have been on patrol inside and outside of Union Station after Trump launched the anti-crime effort earlier this month. Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth were shouted down by opponents of the federal intervention when they visited with troops there last week.

During Wednesday’s train unveiling, Duffy will also talk about what the administration is doing to turn Union Station into a world class transit hub, according to a Transportation Department news advisory.

Duffy had pressed Amtrak about crime at Union Station in a March letter to its chief operating officer and requested an updated plan on how it intended to improve public safety there.

Superville writes for the Associated Press.

Some of the District of Columbia’s homeless residents were packing their belongings Thursday before expected sweeps to clear out remaining encampments around the nation’s capital, part of President Trump’s federal takeover of policing in the city.

Trump said this week that homeless people will be moved far from the city in his crackdown on crime. But details of the plan to do so are unclear.

Washington’s status as a congressionally established federal district gives Trump the opportunity to push his tough-on-crime agenda. It’s prompted concern from advocates and others who say there are better ways to address homelessness than clearing encampments and leaving their occupants worrying about where they go.

Here’s a look at what we know and what questions remain about how Trump’s actions will affect the city’s homeless population:

What’s happening to encampments?

Near the Institute of Peace on Thursday morning, AP journalists saw about a dozen homeless D.C. residents packing their belongings. Items weren’t being forcibly thrown out by law enforcement, but an earth mover dug out and scooped away the remains of encampments, depositing them into the bed of an idling truck.

Yards away, several protesters held signs, some critical of the Trump administration. Volunteers from some of the agencies around the city that help homeless people were on hand, and advocates said they expected law enforcement officers to fan out across Washington. later Thursday to take down any remaining homeless encampments,

Amber W. Harding, executive director of the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, said she believed that “federal law enforcement will begin systematically rounding up and arresting unhoused people.” She believed officers would ask people to move on or would “offer shelter,” arresting people if they refused either directive.

“We do not have enough shelter beds for everyone on the street,” Harding said. “This is a chaotic and scary time for all of us in D.C., but particularly for people without homes.”

Lucho Vásquez, executive director of the Coalition for the Homeless, said his group was “focusing all energies on opening and operating temporary facilities” for anyone in need of emergency shelter, food or other resources after the removals.

Where will the city’s homeless people be taken?

It’s not entirely clear.

Trump wrote on his social media site before Monday’s news conference announcing the takeover that homeless people will have to leave immediately. “We will give you places to stay, but FAR from the Capital,” he posted.

Asked this week where homeless people would be relocated, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said local police and federal agencies would “enforce the laws that are already on the books,” which, she said, “have been completely ignored.”

Citing a city regulation that she said gives local police “the authority to take action when it comes to homeless encampments,” Leavitt said homeless people “will be given the option to leave their encampment, to be taken to a homeless shelter, to be offered addiction or mental health services.” Those who refuse “will be susceptible to fines or to jail time.”

In the past five months, U.S. Park Police have removed 70 homeless encampments, giving the people living in them the same options, she said. As of Tuesday, Leavitt said only two homeless encampments remained in district parks maintained by the National Park Service and would be removed this week.

How many homeless people are in Washington?

It is difficult to obtain accurate counts of homeless populations.

On one day at the end of each January, municipal agencies across the United States perform a “point-in-time” count aimed at capturing the total number of people in emergency shelters, transitional housing or without any housing.

The 2025 count in the district put the total at 5,138 adults and children, a 9% decrease compared with the year before, according to Democratic Mayor Muriel Bowser.

What are city officials doing for the homeless?

District officials said Tuesday they were making additional shelter space available.

Kevin Donahue, the city administrator, said outreach workers were visiting homeless encampments and the city has a building available that could house as many as 200 people, if needed.

Donahue made the comments during a conversation with community advocates and Bowser. The conversation was broadcast on X.

He said the outreach would continue through the week with a “greater level of urgency.”

Bowser said that when Trump sees homeless encampments in the city it “triggers something in him that has him believing our very beautiful city is dirty, which it is not.”

What are people in Washington saying?

Washington residents emphasized reductions in crime in recent years and concerns over the removal of homeless encampments in interviews Tuesday criticizing the federal takeover of the city’s police department.

Jeraod Tyre, who has lived in the city for 15 years, said “crime has been slowing down lately” and argued that federal troops would only escalate tensions because they do not have “relationships with the people in the community” like local police do.

Sheiena Taylor, 36, said she is more fearful as a result of the presence of federal forces in the city where she was born and raised.

Taylor said she has seen federal officers around her home and on the subway and worries about their targeting of young people and people experiencing homelessness.

“Being homeless isn’t a crime,” she said, emphasizing the need for solutions to the root causes of homelessness or crime rather than policing.

In several spots across the city, AP journalists talked to homeless people who were being told either by federal law enforcement officials or advocacy groups to pack up tents and belongings from parks and other public spaces before more official removal measures. Some expressed fear and anxiety about what might be coming.

Kinnard writes for the Associated Press. AP writers Christine Fernando in Chicago, Mike Balsamo and Darlene Superville; video journalists River Zhang and Nathan Ellgren; and photographer Jacquelyn Martin contributed to this report.