Vietnam

Feb. 5 (UPI) — Though still awaiting Senate confirmation, Jennifer Wicks McNamara is preparing to land in Hanoi not with a ceremonial bouquet, but with a tariff ledger in hand instead.

The ambassador-designate steps into a newly minted “comprehensive strategic partnership” now defined less by warship visits and more by a $144 billion trade gap, market-economy disputes and rising economic friction between Washington and one of its most pivotal Asian partners.

Her posting follows the Trump administration’s unusual mass recall of career diplomats, a move that rattled U.S. embassies worldwide and signaled the White House impatience with the slow, methodical pace of traditional diplomacy.

McNamara’s mandate appears blunt: recalibrate a relationship the administration views as fundamentally lopsided. While security cooperation has expanded in response to shared concerns over China’s maritime pressure in the South China Sea, trade has become the gravitational center of U.S.-Vietnam relations — and it is pulling both sides toward confrontation even as they speak of partnership.

At her December confirmation hearing, McNamara adopted a notably hard line. She told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the trade relationship is “imbalanced” and pledged to press for “equitable market access” for U.S. goods and services.

The phrasing echoed the administration’s “America First” doctrine, which treats tariffs not as economic distortions, but as instruments of leverage — diplomatic tools by other means.

“In my view, this rhetoric reflects McNamara’s political calculations and a sober recognition that she had better adapt to the administration she is being nominated to serve in order to succeed in her post,” said Hunter Marston, a foreign policy analyst at the Center For Strategic &International Studies Southeast Asia Program.

Marston said he believes this single-minded attention to the trade dispute risks eroding trust upending the extraordinary progress in bilateral relations which brought the United States and Vietnam to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership under the Biden administration.

That philosophy is already in motion. Since August, most Vietnamese exports have faced a 20% tariff, with a 40% duty imposed on goods deemed to be transshipped from third countries such as China.

U.S. officials describe these measures as necessary to prevent Vietnam from becoming a backdoor for Chinese manufacturing, but in Hanoi, they are widely seen as collective punishment that risks undermining two decades of economic integration.

Yet, the coercive power of tariffs has, so far, produced little correction. Vietnam’s trade surplus with the United States surged to $144.2 billion between January and October 2025, at times rivaling — and even surpassing — China’s surplus in key sectors such as electronics, textiles and consumer goods.

The data suggest that U.S. demand for Vietnamese production remains stubbornly inelastic, a reflection of deeply embedded supply chains that cannot be easily rerouted.

“Vietnam and the U.S. will have to navigate the trade issue to propel the relationship forward,” said Khang Vu, a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College.

For McNamara, the test will be whether she can translate tough rhetoric into tangible changes in market access, investment rules and industrial policy, or whether she will preside over a continuing cycle of tariffs, retaliation and rhetorical sparring that leaves the underlying imbalance largely intact.

“Jennifer Wicks is a very senior and respected official within the State Department. U.S. tariff policies have been central to the U.S.-Vietnam relations since President Trump announced tariffs last April, so [she] will likely continue efforts to complete a U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement,” said Ambassador Brian McFeeters, president & CEO of the US-ASEAN Business Council.

At the core of the dispute lies Vietnam’s designation as a “non-market economy” by the U.S. Department of Commerce. That label allows Washington to calculate anti-dumping duties using surrogate prices from third countries — often higher-cost economies, such as Bangladesh or India — that inflates the “fair value” of Vietnamese shrimp, furniture and steel in the American market.

Hanoi has long argued that the classification is outdated and politically motivated. In September 2023, Vietnam formally requested a review of its status, pointing to reforms in pricing, competition policy and state enterprise governance.

But in August 2024, Commerce reaffirmed the non-market economy designation, citing continued “significant government involvement” in the economy despite acknowledging “substantive reforms.”

McNamara steps into an escalating legal and diplomatic standoff. While Hanoi has floated concessions on U.S. autos, medical devices and farm goods, Washington has made clear that limited tariff adjustments are not enough. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has called for broader structural reforms that would steer Vietnam toward a more market-driven system – a demand that challenges the core of its state-led economic model.

For Vietnam, shedding the non-market ecomony label is a matter of prestige and a multibillion-dollar economic imperative.

In practical terms, U.S. officials are expected to press Hanoi on several politically sensitive fronts. Currency policy is emerging as another point of tension. The officials question Vietnam’s management of the dong, citing limited convertibility and opaque reserve practices they say bolster export competitiveness.

Labor policy presents another fault line. A key metric for market economy status is whether wages are determined by free bargaining between independent unions and employers.

While Vietnam has introduced a revised Labor Code that allows more space for worker representation, U.S. officials question whether unions are truly independent from the ruling Communist Party. McNamara will almost certainly raise these concerns, even as Hanoi insists its model is evolving.

Equally contentious is the role of state-owned enterprises, which dominate sectors such as energy, telecommunications and transportation. Washington is likely to demand a faster pace of “equitization” — Vietnam’s term for partial privatization — along with tighter limits on state-backed financing.

U.S. negotiators also argue that government controls over land and energy prices distort production costs, giving Vietnamese manufacturers an unfair advantage. Addressing this would require Hanoi to relinquish a degree of control over core economic inputs — a politically fraught move that could unsettle domestic constituencies and state-linked elites.

Aware of the stakes, Vietnam appears to be preparing its own strategy: concessions rather than confrontation.

Diplomats in Hanoi say officials are preparing limited market-opening steps to ease pressure from Washington without reshaping Vietnam’s state-led economy. The measures could include selective tariff cuts and increased purchases of U.S. goods, offering visible trade concessions, while leaving core political and economic structures intact.

Vietnam is weighing major purchases of U.S. liquefied natural gas as it expands energy capacity to fuel industrial growth. Long-term LNG deals worth billions could help narrow the trade gap with Washington, while tying Hanoi more closely to U.S. energy supplies.

Agriculture could become another friction point. Vietnam enforces strict health standards on U.S. pork, poultry and grain imports, citing food safety concerns. McNamara is expected to press for science-based regulatory changes to expand access for American farm exports – a sensitive issue in a country where small farmers wield political influence.

Aviation is emerging as a highly visible battleground. Vietnam Airlines, VietJet and Bamboo Airways are all in the midst of fleet expansions. U.S. officials are keen for these multibillion-dollar orders to go to Boeing rather than European manufacturers, viewing aircraft sales as a concrete way to offset the trade deficit and demonstrate goodwill.

If Vietnam resists deeper reforms, it risks entrenching itself under punitive U.S. trade barriers that could discourage investment and slow export growth. If it moves too far, too fast, it could destabilize its own state-led development model and alienate domestic power centers that benefit from the current system.

For Hanoi, the challenge is even more delicate: proving it can behave like a market economy while remaining a one-party state — a contradiction that Washington is now probing with far sharper tools than before.

How McNamara navigates this dilemma will not only shape her legacy in Hanoi, but could redefine the future trajectory of U.S.-Vietnam relations in an era in which geopolitics and geo-economics are increasingly inseparable.