Venezuelas

Venezuela’s National Assembly President Jorge Rodriguez has said that the country will not hold presidential elections in the immediate future, emphasising that the government’s current focus is on national stability.

His comments came late on Monday in an interview published with the conservative outlet Newsmax in the United States.

Presidential terms run for six years in Venezuela, and the last election was controversially held in 2024. Newsmax host Rob Schmitt asked if that meant another election would not happen for another five years.

“The only thing I could say is that there will not be an election in this immediate period of time where the stabilisation has to be achieved,” Rodriguez replied.

He explained that the decision is tied to a wider effort to rebuild and strengthen Venezuela’s state institutions.

“What we’re working on at the moment is what we call the re-institutionalisation of the country, so that every single institution of the country can again be brought to full power and full recognition by everybody,” he said.

Rodriguez, who has led the National Assembly since 2021, added that Venezuelans are seeking a return to normalcy following the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

“The government of Delcy Rodriguez is actually looking for that, to stabilise the country completely and to make it all good and reconcile everybody, all the population of Venezuela,” he said.

The US abducted Maduro in a military action on January 3. In the weeks since, the Venezuelan Supreme Court has appointed Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, the National Assembly leader’s sister, as acting president.

She was formally sworn in on January 5, with support from both Venezuela’s military and the governing party, as well as the US.

Jorge Rodriguez told Newsmax that the current government would need to “reach an agreement with all sectors of the opposition” to create a “timetable” for new elections.

Amnesty law

Maduro’s abduction had initially inspired hope that a new election would be carried out after the controversy that accompanied the 2024 presidential race.

In that election, Maduro controversially claimed victory for a third straight term, despite the opposition publishing voter tallies that appeared to show its candidate won.

Protests broke out, and Maduro’s government responded with a violent crackdown. An estimated 25 people were killed, according to the US State Department.

In Monday’s interview, Rodriguez rejected the assertion that the 2024 race was not legitimate. Instead, he emphasised his push for national unity, saying, “We have been divided for a very long time.”

He highlighted the legislature’s efforts to pass a mass amnesty law, which would result in the release of all political prisoners and forgive any crimes related to political dissent since 1999.

The bill was approved unanimously in the first of two votes on Thursday and is expected to pass this week.

Still, questions have surrounded the bill. Critics fear that political repression could take other forms after the prisoners’ release.

Schmitt asked whether opposition leader Maria Corina Machado would be able to return to Venezuela and campaign freely in a future election, following the bill’s passage.

“So, allow me not to speak about only one single name, because there are many, many actors abroad that have to be included in this discussion,” Rodriguez responded.

“There is an amnesty law that is being done at the moment that contemplates working with people, but there are sectors of the opposition abroad which have promoted violence.”

He then indicated that the amnesty bill would not apply to the opposition leaders accused of violent crimes.

“Through this amnesty law, we are promoting for all the sections of the opposition who are abroad to comply with the law, so they can come back to the country,” Rodriguez said.

Opposition leaders, however, have long alleged that the government has peddled false accusations of violent crime to arrest and jail them.

Machado herself was accused of conspiring to assassinate Maduro in 2014, leading to her expulsion from the National Assembly.

Rodriguez’s comments also come amid developments in the case of former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa.

The leader was released on Sunday after spending more than eight months in pretrial detention, but he was rearrested less than 12 hours later, after speaking with the media and supporters.

According to his family, he was detained by armed men without identification or a court order. His son, Ramon Guanipa, described the incident as an “abduction”.

Officials later stated that they had requested the revocation of his release order, citing his alleged failure to comply with the conditions imposed upon his release.

In the early hours of Tuesday, Guanipa was transferred to his residence in Maracaibo, where he remains under house arrest.

Machado condemned the actions, stating that Guanipa’s case demonstrates that the releases announced by the government do not guarantee the full exercise of political and civil rights.

“What was Juan Pablo’s crime? Telling the truth. So are these releases, or what are they?” Machado said on Monday.

She proceeded to question whether the released prisoners were truly free from what she described as the repressive machinery of the Venezuelan government.

“Can’t we talk in Venezuela about those who have been in prison? Can’t we recount what they have experienced? Can’t we describe the horror of what is happening in our country today?”

The impact the Rodríguez administration could have on the Venezuelan oil industry, even under the new Hydrocarbons Law, would be unsustainable and limited in scope. Structural weakness surrounding the Delcy government and the National Assembly’s lack of legitimacy, commitment to the rule of law, and popular support will restrain the reach of her reforms. Nevertheless, the law will test the willingness of the private sector to run both upstream and downstream operations. These measures could deliver a limited economic boost, that despite American supervision, will be weaponized politically by window-dressing the regime’s legitimacy and stalling further political and economic reforms. It’s precisely this flawed political and legal foundation that undermines the sustainability of the economic gains that the new law could provide.

For Venezuela and PDVSA to reclaim relevance in the international oil market what is required are not incremental improvements but a comprehensive overhaul of the industry, the company, and the constitutional framework that ties them together. The reforms must prioritize transparency, accountability, and insulating the industry and PDVSA from political pressures under strong political coverage that provides long term stability. These measures are something an interim administration, independent of who is in charge, will be unable to provide. Only then would international companies and capitals commit to the long term projects needed.

Once the country finds its political footing under a popularly elected and legitimate government can longlasting and durable reform take place. At this point multiple options may surface. There could be a scenario where we see PDVSA take a back seat while the country creates a competitive fiscal system prioritizing royalty collections while up and downstream operations are run by private enterprises. Remaining PDVSA assets and JV operations would be divested gradually as production capacity is recovered in the hands of private enterprises. However, revitalizing PDVSA as a competitive oil company should remain as a national strategic objective. Venezuelans would greatly benefit from building a company able to compete in and outside of the Venezuelan market.

However, the only way to relaunch PDVSA as a relevant actor in the international market is by allowing it to enter the 21st century oil dynamics and embracing a partial privatization via a minority share offering in international equity markets. Beyond the much needed capital that would be raised in the initial and consequent secondary offerings, plus the potential to tap debt markets along the way, going public will create an additional moat and isolate the company some steps from further political interference. A publicly traded PDVSA would not only need to answer to the government but to energy analysts, independent shareholders, and international compliance and regulatory frameworks alike. It will be the pressure generated by the external scrutiny that will enable PDVSA to be scaled up back into international relevance. Given the precarious financial and operational standing of the holding, a partial privatization is not feasible on day one or two of a political transition and economic recovery phase. But it is a question that will become relevant once the objective becomes long sustainable growth.

PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning.

The privatization of PDVSA has been a taboo for Venezuelan society despite serious attempts in late 1990s to execute such an operation. However, the devastation that the industry suffered under chavista mismanagement provides a clean slate opportunity to relaunch PDVSA and the oil industry under a modern governance framework. For too long the Venezuelan oil industry has been treated as the cash cow of whoever seats in Miraflores. Historically, this led to the centralization of political and economic power which hindered the development of democratic institutions and left the nation at the will of the administration’s oil revenue distribution policy. Taking control of PDVSA not only meant controlling the oil industry but the state itself. Reforms should aim to break the petro-state monopoly over oil revenue and to make PDVSA part of a dynamic national industry where other participants are allowed to play.

There are multiple precedents to back this move. Lessons from the partial privatizations of Chinese SINOPEC and Norwegian Statoil from the early 2000s could be drawn to prove that these operations are possible under different political systems. A PDVSA offering would be exceptionally complex, but in order to even start considering it there are three basic fundamentals that need to align.

First, the move would need overwhelming support from civil society to sustain the necessary political will. While that looks like a concrete goal in María Corina Machado’s energy proposals, the possibility seems remote under an interim Delcy government that still needs to appease other factions within the ruling coalition. In addition, chavismo’s current leader has not adhered to international transparency standards following her 2020 appointment as acting Minister of Economy and Finance—a role that earned her the title of Venezuela’s economic vice president before taking control of the national oil industry. Her tenure overlapped with the loss of an estimated $21 billion in oil payments, a scandal that ultimately led to the arrest and scapegoating of former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami.

Second, Petróleos de Venezuela needs a robust rule-of-law framework that can deliver credible guarantees to investors The current interim president is unlikely to provide such assurances, given the deep mistrust surrounding Venezuela’s public institutions—many of which she does not fully control. As Juan Guillermo Blanco points out, her posture may swing from alignment with Washington on this occasion to an anti-imperialist rupture if the circumstances allow it.

Shifting to global best practices

PDVSA cannot move forward without the goodwill of the market. Francisco Monaldi has repeatedly stated that the main risks of Venezuelan oil are above ground. Beyond the politics, sanctions, and the legal framework, PDVSA needs to get its house in order to regain market credibility. For starters, the holding needs to address its debt issue—estimated at $34.5b—through an agreement where debtholders walk away feeling it was a fair deal. Without serious debt restructuring, a share offering roadshow would be impossible.

The company must also cut all non-essential ventures, subsidies, and social project funding from the nucleus. From PDVAL supermarkets to F1 teams, PDVSA bankrolled it all during chavismo. Despite how bizarre the outflows party got, these types of splurges and subsidies have been ingrained in the Venezuelan mindset and will be hard to get rid of. Such measures would represent a comprehensive detachment from century-old beliefs in the magical powers of the Venezuelan petro-state.

Furthermore, PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning. In addition, investors and banking partners must be able to track every dollar. Auditable records are not only essential for building reliable financial projections but also necessary for protecting stakeholders from anticorruption liability. This underscores the need for a new framework of transparent, efficient contract allocation and fully auditable accounting trails, ensuring that financial statements can withstand market scrutiny and compliance verification.

Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market.

Figures such as the “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) or joint ventures that currently dominate private investments in the industry are compatible with this model as PDVSA should seek alliances in cases where it makes financial sense to do so. However, the secrecy under which these ventures have been working on needs to end.

Finally, PDVSA will need to bring in an independent leadership team and board with enough protection to isolate operational and financial decision-making from politics. Venezuela would be represented in the board as the majority shareholder, but would be restrained from running the day-to-day business operations and resource allocation. Studies that examine initial offerings of National Oil Companies (NOC) suggest that a substantial amount of the efficiency gains are delivered before an IPO is launched, as the company restructures itself to be introduced into the public market. PDVSA has a long way to go before we can consider this scenario. Nevertheless, aiming toward partial privatization would provide a blueprint for rebuilding PDVSA as an operationally, financially, and commercially viable company.

A share offering should consider a dual listing that includes the Caracas Stock Exchange, which is also in need of an extreme makeover (that’s part of a different discussion, however). The overhaul needed is not only about getting barrels out of the ground, but about including the company in the wider economy and making it subject to the highest managerial and corporate governance standards. Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market. Ultimately, this would constrain the government’s ability to overreach into the private sector.

Whichever path is chosen for the future of PDVSA and the Venezuelan oil industry, it should be preceded by an inclusive debate that considers implications beyond the industry itself and sets the country on a sustainable growth path. This debate must happen in public, in conditions of full political and economic freedom, free from coercion by either internal or external powers. It should be the opposite of what occurred prior to the swift approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law, when secrecy prevailed and the legislative body responsible for drafting the statute showed no significant deliberation.

The one-sided vote in the illegitimate 2025 National Assembly should not overshadow the legislature’s failure to comply with its own parliamentary rules during the bill’s passage, as purported opposition lawmakers reportedly received a copy of the draft only hours before the first debate. That episode underscores why the legal and constitutional reforms needed to break the petro-state and refound PDVSA can only follow the renewal of all institutions, including a truly multiparty, independent congress.

The end goal is simple, yet history-changing: to dismantle Miraflores’ total control and discretion over oil-industry revenues.

An amnesty law that would provide clemency to political prisoners in Venezuela has passed an initial vote unanimously in the National Assembly, stirring hopes among the country’s opposition.

On Thursday, members of both the governing socialist party and the opposition delivered speeches in favour of the new legislation, known as the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence.

“The path of this law is going to be full of obstacles, full of bitter moments,” said Jorge Rodriguez, the head of the National Assembly.

But he added that it would be necessary to “swallow hard” in order to help the country move forward.

“We ask for forgiveness, and we also have to forgive,” Rodriguez said.

But critics nevertheless pointed out that the text of the bill has yet to be made public, and it offers no clemency for individuals accused of serious crimes, including drug trafficking, murder, corruption or human rights violations.

Instead, media reports about the legislation indicate that it focuses on charges often levelled against protesters and opposition leaders.

What does the bill say?

The bill would grant amnesty to individuals accused of crimes like treason, terrorism, rebellion, resisting authorities, instigation of illegal activities, and spreading hate, if those crimes were committed in the context of political activism or protest.

Opposition leaders like Maria Corina Machado would also see bans on their candidacy for public office lifted.

In addition, the legislation specifies certain events that would qualify for amnesty, including the demonstrations that unfolded in 2007, 2014, 2017, 2019 and 2024.

That period stretches from the presidency of the late President Hugo Chavez, founder of the “chavismo” movement, through the presidency of his handpicked successor, Nicolas Maduro.

Both Chavez and Maduro were accused of the violent suppression of dissent, through arbitrary arrest, torture and extrajudicial killings.

But on January 3, the administration of United States President Donald Trump launched a military operation in Venezuela to abduct Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They have since been transported to New York City, where they await trial on charges related to drug trafficking.

While members of Venezuela’s opposition have cheered the military operation as a long overdue move, experts have argued that the US likely violated international law as well as Venezuela’s sovereignty in removing Maduro from power.

Weighing Maduro’s legacy

Images of Chavez were a common sight during Thursday’s debate at the National Assembly, which has been dominated since 2017 by members of the chavismo movement.

That year, Venezuela’s top court dissolved the opposition-led National Assembly and briefly absorbed its powers, before re-establishing a legislature stacked with Maduro supporters.

In 2018 and again in 2024, Maduro claimed victory in contested elections that critics say were marred by fraud.

In the July 2024 vote, for instance, the government refused to release voter tallies, as was previously standard practice. The opposition, however, obtained copies of nearly 80 percent of the tallies, which contradicted the government’s claims that Maduro had won a third six-year term.

After Maduro’s abduction last month, the remnants of his government remained in power.

Within days, his vice president — Delcy Rodriguez, the sister of the National Assembly leader — was sworn in as interim president.

She used her inaugural speech to denounce the “kidnapping of two heroes who are being held hostage: President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores”.

Rodriguez has nevertheless cooperated with US demands, including by supporting a bill to open Venezuela’s nationalised oil industry to foreign investment.

On the floor of the National Assembly on Thursday, her brother Jorge raised a photo of Chavez holding a crucifix while he spoke. Maduro’s son, National Assembly member Nicolas Maduro Guerra, also presented remarks.

“Venezuela cannot endure any more acts of revenge,” Maduro Guerra said as he appealed for “reconciliation”.

Venezuela’s opposition reacts

Still, opposition members in the National Assembly expressed optimism about the bill.

National Assembly representative Tomas Guanipa, for instance, called it the start of a “new, historic chapter” in Venezuelan history, one where political dissidents would no longer be “afraid to speak their minds for fear of being imprisoned”.

Nearly 7.9 million Venezuelans have left the country in recent decades, fleeing political persecution and economic instability.

But there have been lingering concerns about the human rights situation in Venezuela in the weeks following Maduro’s abduction — and whether it is safe to return home.

President Rodriguez has pledged to release political detainees and close the infamous prison El Helicoide, where reports of torture have emerged. But some experts say the number of people released does not match the number the government has reported.

The human rights group Foro Penal, for instance, has documented 383 releases since January 8.

That figure, however, is lower than the 900 political prisoners the government has claimed to have released. Foro Penal estimates 680 political prisoners remain in detention.

Opposition figures also allege that the government continues to intimidate and harass those who voice sympathy for Maduro’s removal and other opinions that run contrary to the chavismo movement.

Still, the head of Foro Penal, Alfredo Romero, applauded the initial passage of the amnesty law as a step forward.

“Amnesty is the framework that will ensure… that the past does not serve to halt or derail transition processes,” Romero told the news agency AFP.

A second vote is expected to be held on Tuesday next week.

It all started with a direct US attack on Venezuela earlier this month.

Back then, US President Donald Trump made it clear that he was only interested in the country’s substantial oil reserves.

On Thursday, the government in Caracas announced a massive overhaul of the petroleum sector.

Venezuela’s interim president has signed a law easing state control and opening the door for private firms to invest in the country.

For many, it paves the way for US oil giants to return to Venezuela with significant investments.

But who will stand to gain from the changes, Venezuela or the United States? Or both?

Presenter: Adrian Finighan

Guests

Elias Ferrer – founder and director of Orinoco Research

Andrew Lipow – president of Lipow Oil Associates

Phil Gunson – senior analyst at the International Crisis Group

Rodriguez calls for healing ‘wounds left by political confrontation’ while announcing notorious El Helicoide prison to shut down.

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez has announced an amnesty bill that could lead to the release of hundreds of prisoners, her latest major reform since the US military abducted the country’s President Nicolas Maduro and his wife earlier this month.

“We have decided to push ahead with a general amnesty law that covers the whole period of political violence from 1999 to the present day,” Rodriguez said on Friday.

Speaking at a gathering of justices, magistrates, ministers, military officials and other government leaders, the acting president said the National Assembly would take up the amnesty bill with urgency.

“May this law serve to heal the wounds left by the political confrontation fuelled by violence and extremism,” Rodriguez said in the prerecorded televised event.

“May it serve to redirect justice in our country, and may it serve to redirect coexistence among Venezuelans,” she said.

Rodriguez also announced the shutdown of El Helicoide, a notorious secret service prison in Caracas, where torture and other human rights abuses have been documented by independent organisations.

El Helicoide, she said, will be transformed into a sports, social and cultural centre for the surrounding neighbourhoods.

Rodriguez made her announcement before officials whom former prisoners and human rights watchdogs have accused of overseeing El Helicoide and other detention facilities.

The Venezuelan-based prisoners’ rights group Foro Penal estimates that 711 people are in detention in facilities across Venezuela over their political activities. Of those, 183 have been sentenced, the group said.

Foro Penal President Alfredo Romero welcomed the planned amnesty but said it must apply to all prisoners “without discrimination”.

“A general amnesty is welcome as long as its elements and conditions include all of civil society, without discrimination, that it does not become a cloak of impunity, and that it contributes to dismantling the repressive apparatus of political persecution,” Romero wrote in a post on social media.

Foro Penal has calculated that some 302 prisoners have been released by Rodriguez’s government in the aftermath of the abduction of Maduro by the US.

The organisation later released a video clip on social media of what is said showed the moment that human rights worker Eduardo Torres was released from prison on Friday night, following his detention since May 2025.

Translation: Our colleague from @proveaong Eduardo Torres has been released from prison, human rights defender, former political prisoner.

Families and rights advocates have long demanded that charges and convictions against detainees who are considered political prisoners be dropped.

Government officials – who ⁠deny holding political prisoners and say those jailed have committed crimes – report that more than 600 people have been released from prison, but they have not been clear on the timeline and appear to be including prisoners released in previous years.

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez has signed into law a reform bill that will pave the way for increased privatisation in the South American country’s nationalised oil sector, fulfilling a key demand from her United States counterpart, Donald Trump.

On Thursday, Rodriguez held a signing ceremony with a group of state oil workers. She hailed the reform as a positive step for Venezuela’s economy.

“We’re talking about the future. We are talking about the country that we are going to give to our children,” Rodriguez said.

The ceremony came within hours of the National Assembly – dominated by members of Rodriguez’s United Socialist Party – passing the reform.

“Only good things will come after the suffering,” said Jorge Rodriguez, the assembly’s head and brother of the interim president.

Since the US military’s abduction of Venezuela’s former leader Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores on January 3, the Trump administration has sought to pressure President Rodriguez to open the country’s oil sector to outside investment.

Trump has even warned that Rodriguez could “pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro”, should she fail to comply with his demands.

Thursday’s legislation will give private firms control over the sale and production of Venezuelan oil.

It would also require legal disputes to be resolved outside of Venezuelan courts, a change long sought by foreign companies, who argue that the judicial system in the country is dominated by the ruling socialist party.

The bill would also cap royalties collected by the government at 30 percent.

While Rodriguez signed the reform law, the Trump administration simultaneously announced it would loosen some sanctions restricting the sale of Venezuelan oil.

The Department of the Treasury said it would allow limited transactions by the country’s government and the state oil company PDVSA that were “necessary to the lifting, exportation, reexportation, sale, resale, supply, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil, including the refining of such oil, by an established US entity”.

Previously, all of Venezuela’s oil sector was subject to sweeping US sanctions imposed in 2019, under Trump’s first term as president.

Thursday’s suite of changes is designed to make Venezuela’s oil market more appealing to outside petroleum firms, many of whom remain wary of investing in the country.

Under Maduro, Venezuela experienced waves of political repression and economic instability, and much of his government remains intact, though Maduro himself is currently awaiting trial in a New York prison.

His abduction resulted in dozens of deaths, and critics have accused the US of violating Venezuelan sovereignty.

Venezuela nationalised its oil sector in the 1970s, and in 2007, Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez, pushed the government to increase its control and expropriate foreign-held assets.

Following Maduro’s abduction, Trump administration officials have said that the US will decide to whom and under what conditions Venezuelan oil is sold, with proceeds deposited into a US-controlled bank account.

Concerns about the legality of such measures or the sovereignty of Venezuela have been waved aside by Trump and his allies, who previously asserted that Venezuelan oil should “belong” to the US.