Venezuelas

A new economic partner?

Libertad Velasco, a Chavista who grew up in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood, was only a teenager when Chavez came to power.

She went on to become one of the founding members of the youth wing of Chavez’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Eventually, she became the head of a government agency to expand access to higher education to members of vulnerable communities.

Still, Velasco described the period after Maduro’s abduction as a sort of awakening.

“It’s like we’re looking at ourselves without makeup,” Velasco said. “Now, everything is laid bare, revealed in its purest state, and we are beginning to recognise ourselves again.”

Since the US attack and Maduro’s removal, Velasco has thought deeply about her “red lines”: the ideals she feels should not be violated under the new government.

Standing up against invasive foreign powers remains one of her top priorities.

“I refuse to be colonised,” Velasco said. “For me, we shouldn’t have relations with Israel, and abandoning anti-imperialism is non-negotiable.”

Yet Velasco does not believe that the Venezuelan government has crossed that line yet. Rather, she is open to the prospect of the US as a trading partner to Venezuela, paying for access to its natural resources.

“It is a customer who should pay market price for the product they need. If Venezuela must act as a market player to lift people out of suffering, I can go along with that,” Velasco said.

But it is unclear whether that is happening. Critics point out that the Trump administration has demanded greater control over Venezuela’s natural resources. It has even claimed that Chavez stole Venezuelan oil from US hands.

Already, Venezuela has surrendered nearly 50 million barrels of oil to the US, with the Trump administration splitting the proceeds between the two countries.

Rodriguez, Venezuela’s interim president, has also agreed to submit a monthly budget to the US for approval.

Among Chavistas, there remains debate about whether the relationship with the US is beneficial or exploitative.

But economic recovery is an overwhelming priority for many Venezuelans of all political leanings. Under Maduro, Venezuela entered one of its worst economic crises in history. Inflation is currently at 600 percent, and living standards remain low.

Many Chavista loyalists blame US sanctions for their economic woes. Yet, analysts credit a combination of factors, including declining oil prices, economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption.

Delia Bracho, 68, lives in a district of Caracas called Caricuao, where water is delivered just once a week. Once a committed Chavista, she said her faith in the movement has faded.

Today’s movement, she explained, has been “ruined”, and she no longer wants anything to do with it.

“It’s like when you put on a pair of shoes,” she said. “They break, and you throw them away. Are you going to pick them up again, knowing they are no longer useful?”

Despite her initial fear after the US intervention, Bracho said she now feels cautiously optimistic that Venezuela might change for the better.

“It’s not that everything is fixed, but there is a different atmosphere — one of hope.”

The Venezuelan leader, who is accused of plotting to traffic cocaine, denies all charges as part of an imperialist plot.

Former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is set to return to a New York courtroom as he seeks to have his drug trafficking indictment dismissed.

Thursday marks the first time that Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, will be in court since a January arraignment at which he protested his abduction by United States military forces and pleaded not guilty to all charges against him.

Maduro, 63, and Flores, 69, remain jailed at a detention centre in Brooklyn. Neither has requested bail.

Judge Alvin Hellerstein has yet to set a trial date, though that could potentially be announced at the hearing.

Maduro, who has led Venezuela since 2013, was abducted in Caracas by US special forces on January 3.

His lawyer contends that Washington is violating the deposed leader’s constitutional rights by blocking Venezuelan government funds from being used to pay his legal costs.

The former president and Flores continue to enjoy some support in Venezuela, with murals and billboards across the capital, Caracas, demanding their return.

However, while Maduro’s ruling party remains in control, he himself has been gradually sidelined within the government led by acting President Delcy Rodriguez.

Rodriguez has removed key figures loyal to Maduro, including his longtime defence minister and attorney general. She has also reshaped state institutions, named new ambassadors, and dismantled core elements of the self-declared socialist project that has governed Venezuela for more than 20 years.

Accusations of helping Colombian rebels

US prosecutors have accused Maduro and several alleged associates of “narco-terrorism” and plotting to traffic cocaine into the United States. If convicted, the charges could carry maximum penalties of life in prison under US law.

Congress created the narcoterrorism statute 20 years ago to target drug traffickers who finance activities the US considers “terrorism”.

Since then, 83 people, including Maduro, have been charged with violating it.

According to the Reuters news agency, the 2006 statute at issue has produced four trial convictions. Two were later overturned over issues stemming from witness credibility.

Maduro is also accused of leading a conspiracy in which officials in his government helped move cocaine through Venezuela in collaboration with traffickers, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which Washington labelled a terrorist organisation from 1997 to 2021.

Maduro and his fellow indicted officials have always denied wrongdoing, saying the US charges are part of an imperialist plot to harm Venezuela.

Caracas, March 25, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has reiterated calls for foreign investment in the Caribbean nation.

Addressing the FII PRIORITY Miami Summit, Rodríguez showcased Venezuela’s economic growth and lauded the investment opportunities in the country’s vast oil, natural gas, gold, and other mineral resources. The Venezuelan leader highlighted the recent pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law and other upcoming reforms as key in generating “flexibility,” “guarantees,” and “security” for investors.

“The new Hydrocarbon Law creates important mechanisms for private sector control over production and commercialization,” Rodríguez said in her video message from Caracas. “It also creates flexible fiscal arrangements and establishes alternative conflict-resolution processes such as international arbitration.”

The acting president added that 64 percent of the price of a barrel is up for “negotiations with investors” in terms of reduced royalties and taxes, as well as dividends. 

Approved in late January by the Venezuelan National Assembly, the new Hydrocarbon Law allows the executive to reduce taxes and royalties at its discretion. The reform also grants expanded control to private corporations, curtailing the state’s sovereignty over the industry established under Hugo Chávez under the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law and subsequent reforms.

In her remarks, Rodríguez urged “de-ideologization,” vowing, “regardless of different [political] views, a favorable climate can be created so that investors have the mechanisms so that their investments foster returns.” She added that she has met with representatives from 120 multinational corporations since January. 

“Our reforms are a call for investors to participate,” Rodríguez stated. She went on to press for greater Latin American economic integration and for an end to unilateral sanctions against Venezuela, though she refrained from mentioning the US by name.

The Future Investment Initiative (FII) Institute is a non-profit run by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund and holds regular conferences bringing together business executives, analysts, and political leaders.

Rodríguez’s participation in the Saudi initiative came amid unprecedented energy market volatility as a result of the US and Israeli war against Iran. In spite of strong Venezuelan ties with Iran over the past 25 years, the Rodríguez administration has not taken a firm stance on the conflict, having published and later withdrawn a controversial statement. Caracas expressed solidarity with Qatar and the UAE after Iran retaliated against US military assets in the region.

The Venezuelan leader’s Wednesday message to investors in Miami followed a meeting with business executives at Miraflores Presidential Palace on Tuesday. The companies represented were not disclosed, though Houston-based oil giant Exxon Mobil has confirmed it has a team in Caracas “looking to assess the state of the resource that’s there.”

Rodríguez delivered a similar pitch hailing Venezuela’s natural resource potential and the prospects for foreign conglomerates opened by ongoing reforms. She appealed for the full lifting of sanctions, arguing that US Treasury licenses hurt investor confidence.

Since January, the Trump administration has issued a number of sanctions waivers allowing Western entities to engage with the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors. The licenses block transactions with companies from China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Additionally, the Treasury exemptions mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments destined for Venezuelan state entities be deposited in US-run accounts. Washington currently controls Venezuelan oil proceeds, having returned a reported US $500 million, out of an initial $2 billion agreement, to Caracas.

On Tuesday, Rodríguez likewise announced the imminent departure of a Venezuelan diplomatic mission to Washington. Félix Plasencia, slated to become the country’s ambassador to the US, will lead the delegation.

“Our delegation will manage this new stage of diplomatic relations and dialogue between our two countries,” she affirmed.

Caracas and Washington fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement in the wake of the January 3 US attacks against Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. The two governments reestablished diplomatic relations in early March after a seven-year hiatus. The Trump administration went on to recognize Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader” days later.

Rodríguez, who had served as vice president since 2018, assumed the presidency in an acting capacity on January 5 with the endorsement of the Venezuelan National Assembly and Supreme Court, which declared Maduro’s absence as temporary.

Maduro and Flores pleaded not guilty to charges including drug trafficking conspiracy and will have a court hearing on Thursday. US officials have not presented evidence to sustain reiterated “narcoterrorism” accusations against Venezuelan leaders, while data from specialized agencies has found Venezuela to play a marginal role in global narcotics trafficking.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

MIAMI — Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified in court that he had no knowledge that former Florida congressman David Rivera was lobbying on behalf of Venezuela’s government — as prosecutors later alleged — when he met with his longtime friend to discuss U.S. policy toward the South American country several times at the start of the first Trump administration.

“I would’ve been shocked” had I known, Rubio said in almost three hours of testimony Tuesday at Rivera’s federal trial in Miami.

Rivera and an associate were charged in 2022 with money laundering and failing to register as a foreign agent after being awarded a $50-million lobbying contract by Nicolás Maduro’s government.

Prosecutors allege that the goal of the lobbying effort was to persuade the White House to normalize relations with Venezuela, while Rivera’s attorneys argue that the three-month contract, which ended before Rivera met with Rubio, was focused exclusively on luring Exxon Mobil back to Venezuela — commercial work that is generally exempt from the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

As part of his work, Rivera and his co-defendant are accused of trying to arrange meetings for then-Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez — now Venezuela’s acting president — in Dallas, New York, Washington and Caracas, Venezuela, with White House officials, members of Congress and the chief executive of Exxon.

Rubio testifies, an unusual move

In sometimes deeply personal testimony Tuesday, Rubio discussed at length friendships that date back to the start of his political career as an aide to Bob Dole’s 1996 presidential campaign and a West Miami council member.

Testifying in a packed courtroom with heightened security, Rubio said he and Rivera became “very close” when they overlapped as members of the Florida Legislature. The two Cuban American Republicans co-owned a house in Tallahassee, celebrated family events together and ardently opposed Venezuela’s socialist government when both went to Washington at the same time — Rubio elected to the Senate, Rivera to the House.

So when Rivera texted Rubio in July 2017 that he needed to see him urgently to discuss Venezuela, they agreed to meet the next day, a Sunday, at a friend’s home in Washington where the then-senator was staying with his family, Rubio said.

At the meeting, Rivera informed Rubio that he was working with Raul Gorrín, a media magnate in Venezuela, on what he described as a plan for Maduro to step aside.

“I was skeptical,” said Rubio, adding that the Maduro government was full of “double dealers” constantly pitching unrealistic plans to unseat Maduro. “But if there was a 1% chance it was real, and I had a role to play alerting the White House, I was open to doing that.”

Rubio said he had no knowledge Rivera was himself working for Maduro, as prosecutors would later allege. Rubio said he doubted Gorrín would betray Maduro even when the former congressman opened his laptop and showed millions of dollars in a Chase bank account that he was told were payments from the businessman to Venezuela’s opposition.

“It was an impressive amount,” Rubio said. “He didn’t tell me whose account it was. He said it was to support the opposition.”

Two days later, borrowing talking points provided by Rivera, Rubio wrote and delivered a speech on the Senate floor signaling the U.S. would not retaliate against Venezuelan insiders who worked to push Maduro from power.

“He provided me with insight into some of the key phrases that regime insiders would’ve wanted to hear to know this was serious,” Rubio testified. “No vengeance, no retribution.”

Rubio also spoke to Trump, alerting the president in his first term that there may be something “brewing” with Venezuela.

‘A total waste of my time’

But the peacemaking effort collapsed almost immediately. At a second meeting at a Washington hotel, Gorrín failed to produce a promised letter from Maduro to Trump that he wanted Rubio to hand-deliver to the president.

“It was a total waste of my time,” Rubio testified.

Shortly afterward, Trump imposed heavy sanctions on Maduro and members of his inner circle for their decision to go forward with what Rubio called a “fake election” to empower a constituent assembly that undercut the opposition-controlled legislature.

By that time, the senator hewed closely to the Trump administration’s hard line. He taped a rare 10-minute address to the Venezuelan people in July 2017, a day after the divisive election, that was broadcast exclusively on Gorrín’s Globovision network.

“For Nicolás Maduro, who I am sure is watching, the current path you are on will not end well for you,” Rubio said in the televised address.

On the stand, Rubio said that had he known Rivera was working with Gorrín on behalf of Maduro, he never would have agreed to deliver the address on the network.

But Rivera said Rubio’s testimony backed his defense that as a lifelong opponent of communism he never worked to strengthen Maduro’s grip on power.

“Marco Rubio made it abundantly clear today that everything we worked on together in 2017 was meant to remove Maduro from power in Venezuela,” he said in a statement.

Throughout his testimony Rubio, a lawyer, spoke calmly and in command of granular details of U.S. policy toward Venezuela over the past decade, even as he struggled to recall the specifics of his text exchanges with Rivera on Venezuela matters.

His testimony was highly unusual. Not since Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan testified at a Mafia trial in 1983 has a sitting member of the president’s Cabinet taken the stand in a criminal trial.

As if to underscore the uniqueness of his appearance in federal court, Rivera’s attorney, Ed Shohat, asked Rubio to sign a copy of his 2012 autobiography, “An American Son,” at the conclusion of his testimony.

Rivera and his co-defendant, political consultant Esther Nuhfer, are among a small number of friends and family Rubio thanks in the acknowledgment section of his memoir.

Goodman writes for the Associated Press.

The events that transpired in Caracas on January 3rd drew global attention to the future of Venezuela’s well-known hydrocarbon industry, while another strategic facet of the country´s economy has remained largely unnoticed: mining. 

Historically overshadowed by the sheer scale of Venezuela’s oil-based economy, the country’s mines became an increasingly important source of revenue as sanctions closed the spigot on petrodollars during the Maduro years.

Alongside the vast reserves of hydrocarbons, the country’s privileged geological endowment covers extensive metal and mineral deposits. Concentrated largely in the Guyanese Shield in the southeast of the country, these reserves include some of the region’s largest gold reserves, extensive iron ore deposits, and a range of minerals that have been labelled as critical for the global energy transition by actors like the European Union. 

Despite its vast mineral wealth, Venezuela’s mining sector remains poorly governed. Reforming it will be essential to rebuilding a stable republic.

The harsh reality is that the mining sector in Venezuela is currently a cesspool of some of the most atrocious activities conducted by the regime in the last decade, from human trafficking to international guerrillas like the Colombian Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) controlling illegal mining operations that cause considerable environmental damage and serve to finance terrorist acts abroad. The fact remains that if these actors continue to be a force in the sector, the hopes of establishing a strong and robust Venezuelan economy will be slashed before they even get off the ground. 

All conversations start with the regime’s establishment of the infamous Orinoco Mining Arc in 2016. This Zona de Desarrollo Estratégico Minero Nacional contains an estimated 7,000 tonnes of gold, alongside millions (literally millions) of tonnes of iron ore and bauxite, as well as dozens of other high value resources. In theory, it is managed by the State and the armed forces. In practice, investigations by Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the International Crisis Group, and research projects such as SOS Orinoco consistently describe it as a criminal economy dominated by irregular armed groups, through which the Venezuelan regime captures significant revenue from gold extraction and international sales. 

It’s important to mention that three important developments have happened in recent days. The first is that on March 9th 2026, the National Assembly in Venezuela approved the first draft of a new mining reform law. Supported by the Rodríguez-led executive, the bill presents the first significant set of changes to the Venezuelan mining law that has been in full effect since 1999, since the gold reform in 2015. Among the most important aspects of the bill are the extension of concessions from 20 to 30 years, the welcoming of both national and international companies to directly develop projects in Venezuela, and the introduction of an “international arbitration program”.

When the strong control of a mafia-like regime is combined with a lack of true judicial safeguards for foreign investment in the country, most of the reliable foreign investors will be scared away.

This law comes following two key visits from high-ranking Trump administration officials. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum had discussed Venezuela’s potential as a reliable source of strategic minerals. And previously, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said the same about oil. Today came the announcement from Swiss commodity trading giant Trafigura, where they are committing with Minerven to help build a program for the responsible sourcing of Venezuelan gold.

Rebuilding Venezuela’s mining ecosystem will be an uphill battle that will require more than a few high-level visits, a tenuous attempt at legal reform, or a single agreement from a renowned international trader. The shadow mining economy is a key issue in the consolidation of a future Venezuelan republic that aims towards a stable political and economic development. This will in turn place some pressure on Delcy Rodríguez and the regime’s inner circle to address a system that has been successful under their watch. Without a doubt, there’s a big question mark over their willingness to dismantle one of its main cash cows, but this should remain a key issue in discussions over Venezuela’s future.

But just cleansing the system is not nearly enough to revitalize the sector. Because for Venezuela to become a key exporter of gold, iron and critical materials, international standards must be adopted. That is why Venezuela must create a true pathway for foreign investment to become an engine for the sector. One of the main concerns is just how much control the state exerts over the mining system, which can be argued to be even larger than the one seen in the energy industry. Three key State-owned companies “officially” control most of the mining operations in Venezuela: Corporación Venezolana de Minería (CVM), Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) and Minerven.

The problem is not the fact that State-owned companies operate in the country, but rather that the State that operates them is basically a criminal organization. When the strong control of a mafia-like regime is combined with a lack of true judicial safeguards for foreign investment in the country, most of the reliable foreign investors will be scared away. The ones who can start to create pathways to reintroduce Venezuela into the broader global economy, and transform the country into a crucial source of minerals. 

The main reason why foreign direct investment must drive the growth patterns is due to the fact that international operators can bring much needed expertise and technical know-how to develop stable mining projects across the region. It is important to note that for Venezuela to eventually meet high operational, environmental and safety standards, some time must pass. Many of these international companies have vast experience operating in less than ideal scenarios in countries like Angola or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and they have managed to meet the minimum benchmarks to sell on Western markets. Thinking that in only a couple of years Venezuela will meet the same standards as minerals sourced from Europe, Canada or Australia is plain wishful thinking. For the industry to take off, production should start, as soon as viable, and as soon as a realistic negotiation and hopefully a government change can happen.

In this vein, the main Western drivers of foreign investment into mining globally, Canada and Australia, have adopted strict technical instruments like the NI 43-101 and JORC following mining scandals like BRE-X in the late 1990s. These frameworks are meant to prove the reliability standards to even invest in mining companies both locally and abroad. These regulations, which are widely accepted interchangeably worldwide, have created considerable scrutiny for the international mining sector, and the ones who can reliably bring these instruments into Venezuela are Western actors who have included them into their internal practices. If international actors bring these in, they can become a major first step in establishing the global standards required for projects in Venezuela. An important facet of this scenario is how retribution for past seizures of assets from companies like Crystallex International and Rusoro Mining will factor into the negotiations into the future of the Venezuelan mining industry.

The Venezuelan armed forces must commit to cooperating with international companies, switch their allegiances, and start a pushback against the criminal structures across the territory.

Thinking that high international standards will be adopted quickly might be too idealistic, but future negotiations in the country should include three key elements. First, territorial control must eventually be regained. Waiting to purge the Arco Minero before starting full production would be unrealistic, as it will require a comprehensive, and time-consuming security strategy. In this case, and considering that international investors will most likely bring in their own private security, there should be a commitment from the high command of the Venezuelan armed forces to cooperate with these companies, switch their allegiances, and start a pushback against the criminal structures across the territory.

Furthermore, international observers should be welcomed into the country with open arms to provide both expertise and external oversight with a true “punitive” capacity to ensure the transparency of the process. While this is happening, the third standard will come naturally, which is the systematic integration of international compliance levels. 

These two steps can eventually lead future governments in the country to invest in the creation of internal independent agencies that oversee the entire process, which will hopefully be embedded into the broader State apparatus that will be revamped in the coming years. 

The reality is that the current situation in Venezuela presents an interesting path towards the reactivation of the mining industry. The sector will be crucial, and the road to restart will be long. As more than a compromise between an unreliable government partner in Delcy Rodríguez and her cadre of officials, and the global hegemon, the industry is in desperate need of foreign investment and a firm commitment from international operators to start implementing the world-class standards. Because eventually, these players will be the ones to push for the creation of viable frameworks during the rebuilding of the Venezuelan Republic.

Changes in Venezuela are slow and imperfect, but they are happening. The question is not whether chavismo will attempt to produce results that benefit Venezuelans, because it has no alternative. The real question is how it will do so and who is on the playing field trying to shape those outcomes.

The reform of the Hydrocarbons Law, the enactment of the Amnesty Law, and the proposed reform of the Mining Law seem to indicate that the vehicle for implementing the institutional measures demanded by the United States is the National Assembly. A National Assembly that lacks legitimacy and does not represent the majority of the country’s political sectors.

Two weeks ago, Tareck William Saab resigned from his position as chief prosecutor, and Alfredo Ruiz resigned as ombudsman. Both had held those posts since August 2017 and had used the justice system against those who think differently. Following their resignations, the National Assembly confirmed Larry Devoe as acting head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and appointed Saab himself as acting ombudsman. While Saab’s resignation represented a step forward, appointing Saab as acting ombudsman was a direct violation of the Constitution. These dissonant signals only confirm that the Rodríguez leadership has no political will to move toward a democratic transition.

The process to appoint the heads of the Citizen Power branch has begun with the convening of the Evaluation Committee, and once again the academic world and civil society organizations have decided to participate. The nomination of Dr. Magaly Vásquez for chief prosecutor is a clear example and reflects the same logic that led human rights organizations to participate in the discussions around the Amnesty Law: when civil society comes together, it can take advantage of even minimal conditions to make itself heard and push decision-making toward, at the very least, more “palatable” outcomes.

Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized?

In this process, as in the legislative debates mentioned earlier, there is an absence: the representation of all the country’s political actors. This absence (which includes a large portion of the opposition) is not simply an act of selfishness. On the contrary, their position is rooted in values and principles that prevent them from recognizing any legitimacy in the National Assembly. That stance deserves respect and admiration. However, it is worth asking whether that inflexible position is preventing them from becoming involved in processes that are producing real consequences for real people, inside and outside the country.

We know that these steps are not gestures of democratization. They appear instead to be targeted concessions designed to manage external pressure and preserve power. But achieving the appointment of a credible chief prosecutor or ombudsman could, even if only gradually, begin to rebuild a degree of institutional independence.

This leads me to ask those in the opposition who still remain on the sidelines: if we do not recognize these processes from their origin, what happens to their results when an eventual political change arrives? Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized? Will the institutional reforms that may emerge within the framework of the path outlined by the US be rejected? These questions arise when one notices the absence of the main political figures, or when their presence remains limited to criticism.

These are not rhetorical or ill-intentioned questions. Nor is this about abandoning principles. Rather, it is about recognizing that civil society organizations need backing, especially from political parties and movements. As was demonstrated on July 28, 2024, when society’s desire for change translates into participation and is channeled by political parties, it becomes an overwhelming movement with the potential to materialize that will for change.

At the same time, we must be realistic: the response of opposition leaders cannot be unconditional recognition of the National Assembly. Structurally, it remains an instrument of authoritarian control. What can materialize, however, is support for civil society in the processes in which it is already participating. These expressions of support do not seek to legitimize lawmakers elected under questionable circumstances. Rather, they seek to recognize the work and struggle of the intermediary organizations that are fighting to open spaces for institutional life.

Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding.

A clear example of support could be the one mentioned earlier. The process to appoint the heads of Poder Ciudadano should not be rejected from the outset. Instead, those who have chosen to submit their candidacies before the National Assembly’s Evaluation Committee—and who possess the necessary technical and civic credentials—should receive public support, while their names are circulated in the public arena. Put more plainly: make noise about it. Doing so would increase the cost for the regime, in the eyes of the Trump administration, of selecting individuals who are the complete opposite: people without technical qualifications or chosen solely for political loyalty.

Choosing to support participation from an external position carries implications that become clearer with every issue appearing on the legislative agenda. The reform of the Mining Law presented this week, for example, cannot follow the path taken by the Hydrocarbons Law, which was approved without consultation, transparency or the participation of those who will bear its costs.

Venezuelan scholars, environmental organizations, and Indigenous communities must be sitting at the table in the discussions on the mining law. And the opposition, if it truly aspires to represent Venezuelans and not simply oppose the regime, could present its own reform proposals to the organizations that decide to participate in the process. In this way, participation would be effectively “outsourced.” The direct actors are not recognized, but the work of leading institutions is acknowledged.

What is at stake is more than a specific law or appointment. January 3 set in motion a process of transition in Venezuela that we hope will reach a safe harbor and conclude with free elections. But we cannot forget that there is also a risk that these changes will become little more than a negotiation between the US and remnants of chavismo. Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding. On one side, civil society must act as the principal driver. On the other, the opposition must decide whether it will remain on the margins or become an active ally.

Transitions are never perfect, because in most cases the preexisting institutions are not trustworthy. Yet decisions made within those institutions tend to be more durable than the circumstances that gave rise to them. Participating in a flawed process does not mean surrendering one’s principles. Refusing to acknowledge the reality of the moment, by contrast, allows others to shape what will become the legal and institutional architecture of the transition. And possibly, the political landscape of the coming decades.

Two months after January 3, the country has found itself at an unprecedented crossroads with three main political actors: the chavista regime, the government of the United States, and the Venezuelan opposition.

Chavismo now faces a historically unique situation after 27 years of political (as well as social and economic) control. It is under pressure from the US to move toward a transition, while at the same time trying to contain the tensions that exist within its own internal structures.

For its part, Washington is trying to steer a transition in Venezuela that is acceptable for both its domestic and foreign policy, leveraging the influence it gained from the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores over both the regime and the opposition.

And the opposition has entered a situation of undeclared conflict. In just a few days, the opposition landscape has shifted in unimaginable ways, with the perception of inaction from María Corina Machado, the sudden emergence of Enrique Márquez during the State of the Union address, and the rest of the opposition reassessing its options.

The inevitable amid uncertainty

The path toward a transition at this moment is uncertain. The regime is seeking a balance between satisfying US demands while avoiding, as much as possible, the deterioration of its own internal political and economic arrangements. At the same time, it continues to move quickly to consolidate control over the process, and more and more details are emerging about how it is setting the guidelines for the Rodríguez siblings. For instance, the visit this week by Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum.

The opposition universe appears to be an earthquake, above all amid the practical disappearance of María Corina Machado from public debate and, more recently, the “Márquez effect,” whose medium or long-term impact remains uncertain. Where there is consensus, however, is on the need for a new election. Marco Rubio, María Corina Machado, and now Enrique Márquez are on the same page: there must be new elections that legitimize the political transition. As for the Rodrigato, we can imagine what it thinks about that.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room.

Until just a few days ago, it would have been easy to argue that the opposition’s presidential candidate should be Machado. After all, the results of July 28, 2024 were fundamentally the result of her leadership, and she would have been the presidential candidate if the Maduro regime had allowed it.

But Márquez’s appearance in Washington DC and his subsequent press conference suggested that this Zuliano “black swan” could be acting with the acquiescence of both the Rodrigato and the Trump administration. Evidence of this includes Márquez being invited to Trump’s address, as well as his comments about a figure as close to the Rodríguez siblings as José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

For that reason, it now seems that there will be an election sooner or later. It also seems that, as things stand today, we could head into that election with at least two candidates on the opposition side.

That would be a good scenario for the Rodrigato.

New primaries

In times of legitimacy crisis, the proper course is to look to the sovereign. Given everything that has happened, it seems necessary to call a new primary vote to choose an opposition candidate—whoever the Rodrigato’s candidate may be—in the presidential election that must take place given Maduro’s absolute absence.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room. The first is the need to present the other two actors (the regime and the United States) with an electoral calendar that should not be unnecessarily delayed. The second is the convenience of unifying and strengthening party structures. If the process is well managed, it could encourage a reunion of the different opposition forces around a common and higher objective.

Another elephant shaking Venezuela’s narrow public space is the urgency of restarting citizen mobilization around a concrete political initiative. Finally, those primaries could once again make it possible to go into a presidential election with a single candidate, preventing the regime from promoting multiple “opposition” candidacies to divide the electorate.

The primaries that chose Henrique Capriles as the candidate for the 2012 presidential election, and the primaries that selected María Corina Machado as the candidate for the 2024 presidential election, were good precedents for successfully resolving several political problems. Considering the sovereign is a good idea, or at least most of the time.

Venezuela has been going through an unprecedented political transformation(?) since the extraction of Nicolás Maduro. All political stakeholders will try to pitch the possible outcome  according to their respective interest: the Trump administration will say that it’s going fantastic; the Rodriguez regime will try to appear independent and in control; Team Machado will push for the full restoration of political rights; smaller actors like Enrique Marquez will try to conquer their own space; and the people will need to have proper tool, amid a sea of misinformation, to try to navigate between confusion and uncertainty.  

Media outlets like Caracas Chronicles are doing our best to reduce such uncertainty, but there are new initiatives sprouting everywhere, such as the one that friend of the blog Pablo Hernández Borges is leading with a team of researchers and technologists. Umbral (umbral.watch), defined as “a free, open-source analytical platform for monitoring and documenting Venezuela’s regime transformation in real time,” allows anyone with an internet connection to contribute, as follows: 

• Scenario Analysis with Citizen Participation. Five evidence-based trajectories for Venezuela’s political future, from full autocratization to complete democratic consolidation. Any person can rate the probability of each scenario on a 1 (least likely) to 5 (most likely) Likert scale. Results are disaggregated by profile and aggregated in real time, visible to all on the platform’s landing page.
• Citizen News Evaluation. Every article in the news feed can be voted on by users, who link it to whichever of the five scenarios they believe it signals. 
• Historical Trajectory. A V-Dem-style democracy index spanning 1900–2024, mapping four major regime transformation episodes in Venezuela’s history (like Pablo did in this piece).
• Political Prisoners Tracker. Arbitrary detention statistics with demographic breakdowns, sourced from leading Venezuelan human rights organizations.
• Internet Connectivity Monitor. Real-time IODA (Georgia Tech) data on BGP, Active Probing, and Network Telescope signals, both nationally and across all 25 Venezuelan states, visualized through a choropleth map and horizon heatmap.
• GDELT Media Signals. Daily-archived instability index, media tone, and article volume from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone, annotated with key political events.
• Fact-Checking Feed. Curated posts from three Venezuelan fact-checking accounts: @cazamosfakenews, @cotejoinfo, and @Factchequeado.
• Interactive Timeline. Democratic Episodes Event Dataset (DEED) with bilingual (Spanish/English) events.
• Reading Room. A curated archive of books, academic articles, investigative journalism, and reports on Venezuela.
• Prediction Markets. A Polymarket contract dashboard tracking Venezuela-related markets.

It’s Rotten Tomatoes for political junkies hooked on the Venezuela stuff.

To develop Umbral, Pablo, who is a data scientist with a PhD in Political Science from Texas Tech University, got the support of NGOs Ciudadanía Sin Límites and Code for Venezuela. The platform is fully bilingual (Spanish and English) and its source code is publicly available on GitHub, ensuring complete methodological transparency. Its analytical architecture is grounded in the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) methodology by the V-Dem Institute, which frames the inherent uncertainty of authoritarian transitions through concrete, evidence-based scenarios. 

Umbral is not just an observatory—it is a space for active civic participation. The goal is for community-generated data to complement—and ultimately calibrate—the academic models underpinning the platform.

Check it out: https://umbral.watch