Venezuelan

Recently, the United States reached a new historic milestone: it produced over 13.6 million barrels per day, a staggering feat for a country that many thought had peaked in 2008 when production bottomed out at 5 million bpd. This staggering increase was not achieved by a state giant, but by an ecosystem of thousands of independent operators driven by market-based incentives that, in Venezuela, might seem from another planet.

Meanwhile, Venezuela has traveled the opposite path: from a proud peak of 3.7 million bpd in 1970, it has collapsed to a stagnant output below 1 million bpd. 

In Texas, the landowner owns the oil; in Venezuela, it is the State—which claims, all the while, to represent us all.

The hundred-year war

Since the Los Barrosos II blowout in December 1922, our oil history has been defined by a relentless tug-of-war between private capital and the State over the capture of oil rent. This conflict is not unique to Venezuela, but as we enter this “third opening,” the question is unavoidable: how do we prevent a third nationalization?

Having done it twice before (1976 and 2006), Venezuela has established a precedent that alters risk assessment across all investment horizons. How can we guarantee investors that history won’t repeat itself? While often sold as a patriotic triumph, nationalization is a terminal breach of contract and a direct assault on property rights, deterring the very capital profiles that otherwise would be participating. International arbitration, legal reforms, and institutional frameworks are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Government take and the global race

To put things in perspective: before the 2026 reform, the Venezuelan fiscal system was among the least competitive on the planet. Between royalties on gross income, income tax (ISLR), and “windfall profit” taxes, the State extracted a “Government Take” that often exceeded 80%, with marginal tax rates reaching up to 95% depending on price thresholds. In a scenario where the operator’s net margin was squeezed to a minimum, production became a game of survival and reinvestment became technically impossible.

While the January 2026 reform moves in the right direction, we aren’t just competing against our own past; we are competing against the world. Consider the current margins (Operator Share) in the region:

• Canada (Alberta, Heavy Oil): Private 50%-55% | Government 45%-50%
• Texas (Permian Basin): Private 45%-55% | Government 45%-55%
• Colombia (New Reforms): Private ­40% | Government ­60%
• Brazil (Pre-Salt): Private 39% | Government 61%
• Guyana (2025 Model): Private 25%-35% | Government 65%-75%
• Venezuela (2026 Law): Private 20%-35% | Government 65%-80%

Even with the recent reform, Venezuela is far from being a “bargain” for long-term investment.

The proposal: from State-partner to citizen-owner

To mitigate expropriation risk and attract long-term capital, I propose a model built on four foundational pillars:

• Private Capital-Citizen Partnership: The State is removed from operations. Incentives are aligned directly between citizens—the ultimate owners of the subsoil—and those who risk the capital to extract it.

• Zero Corporate Taxes (Tax Displacement): Eliminate corporate income tax, royalties, and all “shadow” taxes at the source. This slashes the operational break-even to technical average levels of $30 to $40 per barrel, turning “iron cemeteries” into profitable ventures even in low-price environments. This is not a tax holiday, but a redirection of the fiscal take: the operator delivers a major share of the value directly to the citizens, while the State sustains itself by taxing the total income of the citizenry and companies in the rest of the economy.

• The Citizen Dividend (Oil-to-Cash): Instead of paying a traditional tax to a discretionary Treasury, the operator delivers 50% of its net profit—effectively a flat tax paid to the owners—directly into a sovereign trust (or similar non-state mechanism) managed by top-tier international banks. While 50% is a significant share, the absence of any other fiscal burden makes this model one of the most competitive in the region. This trust distributes periodical dividends to every Venezuelan citizen, including those abroad. The State then funds its operations by taxing these dividends as part of the citizens’ total income via personal income tax (ISLR) and other tax sources from a diversified economy. This ensures that the government’s budget depends on the collective prosperity of its people, not on political control over the oil.

• The Citizen as “Guardian” and Auditor: This is the ultimate shield. In 1976 and 2006, the State nationalized because it was easy to seize control from a “multinational” and hand it to a bureaucracy. Under this scheme, any government attempting to expropriate would be taking directly from the pockets of 30 million owners. Transparency is embedded: citizens monitor production and distributions through real-time digital platforms, independent audits, and other decentralized oversight mechanisms. The citizen ceases to be a spectator and becomes the industry’s most powerful defender.

Unlike the State, whose lust for oil rent is political and lacks immediate consequences for those in power, the citizen acts with the prudence of an owner—because they become one. Under this model, any attempt to “suffocate” the private partner translates immediately into a drop in personal dividends. Private ownership of the benefit is, in itself, the best guarantee of stability for capital.

Application and reality

Under this model, the direct net profit split for the oil industry would be: Private 50%, Citizens 50%, State 0%.

This “State 0%” applies exclusively to the source to insulate the industry from political rent-seeking. It does not mean a zero-revenue State; the government continues to fund its functions, but through a transparent tax system (ISLR, VAT) derived from a citizen-owned economy.

To illustrate, with oil at $100 and production at 3.5 million bpd, each citizen would have received $1,500 annually ($6,000 for a family of four). At a $60 base price, the dividend would be $640 per person. Today, with production stalled below one million barrels, a citizen would receive a mere $185. It is modest, but it represents the starting point of a virtuous cycle where the State only prospers if its citizens do first.

Herein lies the virtue of the model: the alignment of interests. Under the current system, citizens watch from the sidelines as oil wealth vanishes into the state vortex. With this approach, each Venezuelan has a personal stake: the more their private partner thrives, the more they themselves benefit. Citizens move from passive critics to primary stakeholders in the nation’s industrial growth.

Considerations for a new Venezuela

Under other circumstances, I might not be a proponent of direct “cash” transfers. But given the alternatives, it is the “lesser evil”. The political class will likely claim this is neither feasible nor “patriotic.” For many politicians, the incentive is two-fold: the salivating prospect of managing an immense oil “booty,” and the recurring ideal of “doing good” with other people’s resources.

Still in doubt? Look at our track record: despite having the world’s largest proven reserves and over 20 different administrations of every political stripe since 1922, the State captured and managed over $1.2 trillion in rent between 1920 and 2015. The result? A Guinness world record in squandered booms, the largest migration in the hemisphere without a formal war, and unprecedented institutional destruction.

Isn’t it time to withdraw the State from oil? 

This proposal would achieve:

• Real competitiveness: By matching Texas and Alberta margins (50%+ for the private sector), we compensate for institutional risks with top-tier global profitability.
• A limited State: The State ceases to be an inefficient businessman and becomes an arbiter: providing control, arbitration, and security. Its funding would come from taxing other economic activities, forcing it to foster general prosperity rather than living off the subsoil.
• A path towards a dividend-producing nation: Why not extend this to all extractive activities (gas, gold, iron, rare earths)? Perhaps the gold of the Arco Minero would stop being a black hole and become a direct dividend, shielding resources from looting and opacity.

The January 2026 reform is just a sigh in a prolonged agony. We cannot expect different results by doing the same thing. The “Hundred-Year War” over oil rent has left the State as a jailer rich in promises and a citizenry poor in realities.

Avoiding a third nationalization requires moving the subsoil out of the political arena and into the sphere of economic freedom. The US does not dominate markets by government mandate, but through an ecosystem that rewards risk and efficiency. Venezuela can emulate this success, but only by breaking the State lock and allowing a fabric of investors to flourish in direct alliance with citizens.

True sovereignty is not the State running the wells; it is Venezuelans themselves being the real owners of the benefits. Only through this pact of ownership can we hope that oil becomes, at last, an engine of development and not the tool of our own institutional destruction.

Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. 

The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.”

The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a blanket amnesty for crimes or offenses committed in the context of political violence between 1999 and 2026. The final document explicitly lists high-profile contexts, including the 2002 coup against then-President Hugo Chávez, the 2014 and 2017 opposition-led violent “guarimba” street protests, and the unrest following the July 2024 presidential elections.

“This law is guided by principles of freedom, justice, equality, […] the primacy of human rights, and political diversity,” article 3 reads.

Article 7 of the amnesty bill defines the ethical and constitutional scope of the pardon, expressly excluding those who have participated in serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, in accordance with Article 29 of the Venezuelan Constitution.

The legislation also excludes those prosecuted for or convicted of homicide, corruption offenses while in public office, and drug trafficking with sentences exceeding nine years.

During a press conference at the National Assembly, the head of parliament Jorge Rodríguez stated that the new law represents “a step forward to avoid the mistakes of the past.” 

“I believe that this law recognizes the victims in its articles and represents a step toward avoiding the mistakes of the past,” he told reporters. “This sends a powerful message that we can live, work, and grow politically within the framework established by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”

During the Thursday session, opposition Deputy Henry Falcón from the Democratic Alliance affirmed that “amnesty is an opportunity that the state offers to forget. We cannot cling to past differences in the face of a higher interest: the country itself.”

After twenty days of consultations and debates and three two legislative debates, Jorge Rodríguez presented the final text that was unanimously endorsed by all 277 deputies. He also announced the creation of a Special Monitoring Commission, chaired by Jorge Arreaza (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) and Nora Bracho (A New Era, UNT). This commission is responsible for ensuring the law’s implementation and addressing requests for release.

At a special ceremony held at Miraflores Palace on Thursday evening, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez formally received the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence following approval by the legislature and called for national reconciliation.

“This amnesty law opens an extraordinary door for Venezuela to come together again, to learn to live together democratically and peacefully, and to rid itself of hatred and intolerance,” she expressed. “ 

Regarding the exclusions contemplated, Rodríguez asked the Commission for the Judicial Revolution, chaired by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, to review cases not covered by the amnesty and formulate recommendations to “heal wounds.”

The president of the legislature’s special commission, Jorge Arreaza, stated on a televised interview that the first 379 amnesty applications had been processed, primarily in Caracas.

“Both the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office have received 379 requests for amnesty,” he explained. “These individuals should be released in the coming hours. This process will continue in the coming days.”

Parliamentary leader Jorge Rodríguez said on Saturday that there are a further 1,500 cases being revised.

Meanwhile, Ernesto Villegas, minister of culture and coordinator of the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, reported on his Telegram channel a meeting with campesino, tenant, and labor organizations to discuss cases of activists facing legal proceedings due to social struggles over land, housing, and employment. These groups were not explicitly contemplated among the direct beneficiaries of the law.

The grassroots collectives denounced the criminalization of their social demands and provided concrete information that will be forwarded to the relevant authorities in coordination with the National Assembly’s special commission.

The meeting hosted by Villegas also saw relatives of individuals imprisoned for alleged corruption in the public sector criticize the penal system and advocate for their loved ones’ rights.

The Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence promised to promptly send the complaints to the relevant bodies and encourage corrective actions.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, February 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration is forcing all royalty, tax, and dividend payments from Venezuelan oil production be paid into accounts managed by Washington.

The mandate reinforces the White House’s control over Venezuelan crude export revenues in the wake of the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, as well as a naval blockade imposed in December.

The US Treasury Department updated its FAQ section on February 18 to clarify conditions on recently issued sanctions waivers allowing expanded participation in Venezuela’s oil sector to Western corporations.

Under the licenses, only “routine payments of local taxes, permits, and fees” to Venezuelan authorities are permitted.

“Other payments, including royalties, fixed per-barrel production levies, or federal taxes to blocked persons, such as the Venezuelan government or (state oil company) PDVSA, must be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Fund,” the text read.

The acting Rodríguez administration has yet to comment on the new restrictions. 

Since January, Washington has imposed control over Venezuelan crude exports, with proceeds deposited in a US-administered account in Qatar. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced recently that funds will now be deposited directly in a US Treasury account. Senior administration officials have stated that the arrangement gives the White House “leverage” to condition Venezuelan government policies, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Caracas must submit a “budget request” to access its own oil revenues.

At least US $500 million, out of an initial deal estimated at $2 billion, have been returned to Venezuela and offered by banks in foreign exchange auctions. Venezuelan authorities have also reported the import of medicines and medical equipment from US manufacturers using “unblocked funds.”

On Thursday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 50A allowing select firms to conduct transactions and operations related to hydrocarbon projects with PDVSA or any other Venezuelan public entity. The document mirrors General License 50 issued on February 13 but added French firm Maurel & Prom to a list including BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell.

Maurel & Prom’s main project in the Caribbean nation is a minority stake in the Petroregional del Lago joint venture, which currently produces 21,000 barrels per day (bpd). The company’s executives recently held a meeting with Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as part of Caracas’ efforts to secure foreign investment.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued several licenses to boost US and European involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, with imports of diluents, inputs and technology now allowed. General License 49, issued on February 13, demands that companies apply for a special license before striking production and investment deals with Venezuela.

The US Treasury issued sanctions waivers while maintaining existing coercive measures against the Venezuelan oil industry in place, including financial sanctions against PDVSA. The licenses likewise block any transactions with companies from Cuba, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

The selective flexibilization of sanctions followed the Venezuelan National Assembly’s approval of a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform grants private corporations expanded control over operations and sales, while opening the possibility for disputes to be taken to external arbitration.

The reformed law also allows the Venezuelan executive to arbitrarily reduce royalties and a new “integrated tax,” capped at 30 and 15 percent, respectively. The executive is likewise entitled to grant reductions to the 50 percent income tax set for the oil industry if deemed necessary for projects to be “internationally competitive.”

According to US-set conditions and the reformed law, minority partners such as Repsol are authorized to sell crude from Venezuelan joint ventures before depositing the owed royalty and tax amounts, as well as dividends belonging to PDVSA, to US Treasury-designated accounts.

The initial crude sales as part of the Trump-imposed arrangement were conducted via commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura, which lifted cargoes at Venezuelan ports before re-selling them to final customers. However, according to Reuters, US-based refiners including Phillips66 and CITGO are looking to secure crude directly from Venezuela to maximize profits.

CITGO, a subsidiary of PDVSA, is close to being taken over by vulture fund Elliott Management following a court-mandated auction to satisfy creditor claims against the South American country. The company has been managed by boards appointed by the US-backed Venezuelan opposition since 2019.

Feb. 17 (UPI) — The Venezuelan government on Tuesday released Evanan Romero, a Venezuelan-American oil consultant detained four days earlier at the Maracaibo airport, without a judicial warrant or formal charges publicly announced.

Romero, 86, a Venezuelan with U.S. citizenship, was detained by authorities under Delcy Rodríguez’s government while attempting to travel from Maracaibo to Caracas, where he had scheduled a series of meetings with companies in the oil sector.

After an initial detention, Romero spent the first night at Interpol facilities at the airport. The next day, due to his advanced age and medical condition, authorities authorized his transfer to a private clinic in Maracaibo, where he remained under guard, local outlet Efecto Cocuyo reported.

The release occurred without official statements from the government. Local journalists and media outlets, such as Spain’s ABC, reported Romero’s detention.

“I’ve been here since Friday,” the expert said from a private clinic, while guards remained in an adjacent room.

Romero had planned to meet with the local management of Repsol and to participate in a videoconference with Reliance’s leadership in India to discuss a possible return to oil blocks in the Orinoco Belt.

He also had meetings scheduled with investors interested in the energy stabilization phase that would reportedly be coordinated from Washington after the capture of President Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. military operation Jan. 3.

The consultant had arrived in Venezuela from Panama, with a stop in Colombia, intending to visit a relative before traveling to the capital.

In statements to ABC, Romero said his detention could be linked to a past administrative dispute related to a family investment, which he said was resolved in his favor by the Supreme Court of Justice.

No Venezuelan authority has publicly confirmed that or provided details about the case.

Romero is part of a committee of about 400 former state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela technicians and executives dedicated to developing proposals for rebuilding the energy sector under a future government, Infobae reported.

He has maintained contacts with U.S. oil companies such as Exxon and ConocoPhillips, and his name has appeared in discussions about compensation for expropriated assets and the opening of new blocks, the publication added.

Romero is considered a veteran expert in Venezuela’s oil sector, with more than six decades of experience. He served on the board of PDVSA, since the 1960s, with responsibilities in operational oversight, capital projects and maritime operations.

He later served as president and chief executive officer of Grupo Asesor Petrolero Venezolano LLC, a firm specializing in reservoir performance studies, reserves evaluation, thermal recovery of heavy crude and basin master development plans.

He has also been affiliated with the Harvard Electricity Policy Group at Harvard University.

The detention occurred just days after the visit to Caracas by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright at a time when the White House has intensified pressure for the release of political prisoners and reiterated that reconstruction of the oil sector will depend on clear legal and political guarantees.

President Donald Trump has publicly argued that major U.S. companies should invest billions of dollars to repair deteriorated infrastructure and restore production.

In the streets of Cartagena, Colombia, cumbia musicians beat tambora drums and blow into flautas, women in red, yellow and blue ruffled dresses whisk by, and sweating food vendors push carts, their arepas sizzling.

Among the music and striking color of Cartagena, my dad handed me my first arepa. Arepas are the most essential dish of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela, centered around South America’s most treasured crop: corn.

To prepare an arepa, corn kernels are ground into flour or pre-ground corn flour is used (often the iconic yellow bag of Venezuelan brand P.A.N.), and mixed with water and salt. The soft dough is then fried, grilled or baked into a pancake-like shape. The result is delightfully simple yet endlessly customizable.

“My memory of arepas is eating them morning, afternoon and night,” said Yesika Baker, owner of Chamo’s Venezuelan Cuisine in Pasadena. “In Venezuela, the areperas are open 24/7.”

The arepa has deep roots. Before Colombia and Venezuela came to be known as separate territories, they were unified by Indigenous groups with similar culinary traditions. When the Spanish first arrived in South America, Indigenous women were cooking corn cakes similar to the modern arepa, meaning the tradition likely goes back thousands of years, according to University of Venezuela anthropology professor Ocarina Castillo.

Today, the arepa is popular in both countries. In Colombia, an arepa tends to be simple: topped with cheese by street vendors, filled with egg for a tasty breakfast or, most often, served as a side to a hearty meal. Some say the masa of a Colombian arepa tends on the thinner side as well.

“Growing up in Colombia, the arepa is like the Mexican’s tortilla. Everything comes with an arepita,” said Santiago Restrepo, owner of Sus Arepas in East L.A. “Venezuelans, on the other hand, use it like a pita — stuffed. With Venezuelan-style arepas, you can really have fun with the fillings.”

The Venezuelan arepa “rellena” or stuffed style, is one that you’ll see dominate this list, with an experimental appeal that makes them a favorite for Angelenos. One of Venezuela’s most popular arepas is the Reina Pepiada, which translates to “curvy queen” and is typically filled with shredded chicken, avocado, cilantro and mayonnaise. According to Castillo, the name is in honor of a real beauty queen, Susana Duijm, the first Venezuelan to win Miss World in 1955.

In Colombia and Venezuela, it’s common to eat arepas at least once a day, especially at breakfast. But for a dish so essential to millions of people, for a long time, arepas were underrepresented in L.A.’s food scene.

“When I first moved to L.A. [in the ‘80s], you couldn’t find arepas anywhere,” Restrepo said. “Up until 2020, I wouldn’t have considered them a popular dish here. But just in the past few years, they’ve exploded.”

Restrepo credits their meteoric rise to a photogenic appeal. If you’re an avid consumer of food content online, then you’ve likely seen the arepa rellena — after a typical wait time of 20 minutes, they come layered and overflowing with ingredients like shredded beef, stewed beans, melted cheese or plantains.

“A good arepa rellena is all in the fillings,” said Mercedes Rojas, chef of the Arepa Stand, which pops up at local farmers markets on the weekends.

From creative picks stuffed with mango and cheese to a Koreatown-inspired arepa with bulgogi and plenty of traditional options, this guide features nine standouts in L.A.’s growing arepa scene.

Although, for your sake, don’t try to ask which country created the arepa, or who does it best. “It’s a long fight, amiga,” Baker said. “From Venezuela or Colombia, we defend our arepas.”

With astonishing speed amid so many postponed emergencies, the reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons, enacted in 2006 by President Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, has been approved. Amending the work of such a towering figure requires prudence and restraint. Let us examine the result.

First of all, what stands out is the unconstitutional attempt to repeal Article 151 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic through Article 8 of a simple law, which proposes:

Article 8. Any doubts or disputes of any nature that may arise in connection with the activities covered by this Law and that cannot be resolved amicably by the parties may be decided by the competent courts of the Republic or through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and independent arbitration.

This article directly contradicts Article 151 of the Venezuelan Constitution:

Article 151. In the public interest contracts, unless inapplicable by reason of the nature of such contracts, a clause shall be deemed included even if not expressed, whereby any doubts and controversies which may raise concerning such contracts and which cannot be resolved amicably by the contracting parties, shall be decided by the competent courts of the Republic, in accordance with its laws and shall not on any grounds or for any reason give rise to foreign claims.

There is no doubt that the Constitution of the Republic is the Supreme Law of the Nation and therefore cannot be repealed by a lesser legal norm. Contracts on hydrocarbons are in the public interest, as Article 12 of our Constitution considers them to be “public domain assets”:

Article 12. Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits of any nature that exist within the territory of the nation, beneath the territorial sea bed, within the exclusive economic zone and on the continental sheaf, are the property of the Republic, are of public domain, and therefore inalienable and not transferable. The seacoasts are public domain property.

Articles 103, 126, paragraph 12, and 136, paragraphs 8 and 10, as well as Article 156, paragraphs 12 and 16 of the Constitution assign the same classification of public interest and public domain to mines and hydrocarbons.

This is a harmonious development of what Article 1 of our Constitution considers “Fundamental Principles”: immunity, the sovereign power not to be subject to foreign courts or jurisdictional bodies to decide disputes of internal public interest: “The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is irrevocably free and independent, basing its moral property and values of freedom, equality, justice and international peace on the doctrine of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator. Independence, liberty, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination are unrenounceable rights of the Nation.”

These are not mere abstract principles. Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a political body to make its own laws, enforce them, and resolve for itself any disputes that may arise from their application. A state that loses any of these powers ceases to be sovereign and independent. This is what happens when we agree to resolve disputes over internal public interest issues not through our courts and laws, but “through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and independent arbitration.” Precisely because we handed over the resolution of the dispute concerning our sovereignty over Guayana Esequiba to “independent arbitration” [in 1899], that territory was taken from us.

Venezuela has systematically lost almost all disputes on matters of public interest brought before foreign bodies, which is why we withdrew from the infamous ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, part of the World Bank) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR, part of the OAS).

In short, if we allow external courts to decide on matters of public interest, how can we oppose foreign courts also judging our legitimate President Nicolás Maduro Moros and his wife, Congresswoman Cilia Flores, according to foreign laws?

The law we are examining includes numerous other objectionable proposals. Among them, Article 34 establishes that the creation of joint ventures and their operating conditions require only the mere “notification” of the National Assembly, which has no decision-making powers in matters so fundamental to the interests of the nation.

Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, and 40 [of the reform] progressively grant joint ventures and minority partners authority for the extraction, management, and commercialization of hydrocarbons, which Article 302 of our Constitution reserves for the Republic:

Article 302. The State reserves to itself, through the pertinent organic law, and for reasons of national expediency, the petroleum industry and other industries, operations and goods and services which are in the public interest and of a strategic nature. The State shall promote the domestic manufacture of raw materials deriving from the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, with a view to assimilating, creating and inventing technologies, generating employment and economic growth and creating wealth and wellbeing for the people.

Article 41 of the aforementioned law authorizes private companies to carry out the “integrated management” of exploitation, receiving crude oil as payment, which displaces PDVSA and the State from their decisive functions in the industry, as set forth in the aforementioned Article 302 of our Constitution.

Article 52 of the recently approved reform empowers the executive branch to reduce the amount of royalties at will when it is demonstrated “to its satisfaction” that the project’s economic needs justify it. It should be noted that the previous [2006] law allowed the nation to receive between 60% and 65% in royalties and taxes, while the provisions of the recently amended law allow multinationals to reduce this contribution to below 15%, depending on the category of assets and activity. This represents a significant reduction in public revenue from this source of up to 50% in favor of private operators, almost all of which are foreign.

Article 56 of the recently amended law defines a 15% “integrated hydrocarbon tax” but the executive is also allowed to reduce it at its discretion. Ultimately the national fiscal share can go down from 65% to 25%.

On the sensitive issue of royalties, Andrés Giuseppe noted in a study dated January 28, 2026 (Poli-data.com): 

This report thoroughly analyzes the premise that royalties, as compensation for the depletion of a non-renewable asset, should be inalienable and non-negotiable, and argues that any incentives for the industry should be limited to the scope of taxes on profits and not to the owner’s gross share. (…) The transition from the current legal framework to the 2026 proposal represents a significant change in the protection of oil revenues. While the [2006] law strictly limits the conditions under which payments to the State can be reduced, the reform expands the discretion of the National Executive. The 2026 reform introduces greater flexibility that, in practice, weakens the concept of royalties as a “floor” for state participation. Under the 2006 law, the reduction to 20% was restricted to specific fields with proven geological difficulties; in contrast, the new Article 52 allows the National Executive to reduce the royalty at its discretion for any project, provided that the lack of economic viability is demonstrated “to its satisfaction” (,,,) The oil royalty, historically linked to jus regale, represents the compensation that the exploiter of a non-renewable natural resource owes to the State for the right to extract and appropriate an asset that belongs to the public domain. In Venezuelan doctrine, this concept is based on Article 12 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which establishes that hydrocarbon deposits are public property, inalienable, and imprescriptible.

The royalty, therefore, is non-negotiable and cannot be diverted from its spirit, purpose, and rationale to satisfy other legal obligations arising from different causes and motivations. Furthermore, the Organic Law on National Public Finance establishes: “Article 5. Under no circumstances is compensation against the Treasury admissible, regardless of the origin and nature of the credits to be compensated.” 

Compensation is an institution of private law whereby an individual can extinguish a debt with another individual by offsetting it against a debt that he or she has with that individual. As we can see, the Organic Law on National Public Finance itself, which has specific jurisdiction in tax matters, categorically prohibits it, which means that a citizen cannot cancel the payment of royalties on the grounds that he or she used that debt to satisfy another obligation.

In summary, numerous provisions of the recently reformed Organic Law on Hydrocarbons tend to diminish the Republic’s exclusive jurisdiction over hydrocarbon exploitation, enabling a gradual privatization of the industry. Other provisions make significant reductions in public revenue dependent on the discretion of officials, which do not take into account the real value of the hydrocarbons extracted but rather the alleged economic situation of the private company involved in the project. The overal result will be to significantly reduce the revenue generated by these resources, jeopardizing the financial management of state oil company PDVSA and that of the Republic itself.

Translated and with minor edits by Venezuelanalysis.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Luis Britto García

Caracas, February 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez said Venezuela has enjoyed a “very good understanding and relationship” with the Trump White House in the period since the January 3 US attacks.

In an interview with Newsmax’s Rob Schmitt aired on Monday, Rodríguez stated that Caracas and Washington have a “golden opportunity” to build a “win-win” relationship.

“Right now, we have opportunities for mutual respect, for cooperation, to build a win-win situation for both countries, for both peoples,” he said.

Rodríguez confirmed regular contact with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in dialogue “based on mutual respect.” He added that US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright is expected in Venezuela in the coming days.

The two governments have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement in recent weeks, with US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu arriving in Caracas and meeting Venezuelan leaders on February 2.

Rodríguez, the older brother of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, also defended recent legislation  pushed through by the executive and parliament, including an overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law. On January 29, the National Assembly approved a pro-business reform that lowers taxes and royalties for private corporations while granting them expanded control over operations and sales.

“What we are doing is adapting laws so that it can promote investment especially from the USA,” Rodríguez told Schmitt. “We have an oil industry that needs developing, and if we [the US and Venezuela] can stay on the path of mutual respect and cooperation, we have a bright future ahead of us.”

The parliamentary leader emphasized that the Venezuelan government’s priority is to turn oil revenues into social welfare and promote education and healthcare in a “free market economy.”

The Trump administration’s January 3 military strikes also saw special operations forces kidnap Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. Rodríguez made one mention of Maduro and Flores in the interview, responding when asked by Schmitt that both should be released “immediately” in accordance with international law.

The Venezuelan president and first lady pleaded not guilty to charges including drug trafficking conspiracy in their January 5 arraignment. The next hearing is scheduled for March 26. 

Despite reiterated accusations of “narcoterrorism,” US officials have never provided evidence tying Maduro and high-ranking Venezuelan officials to drug trafficking activities, while specialized agency reports have found the South American nation to play a marginal role in the global narcotics trade.

In his interview with the pro-Trump news channel, National Assembly President Rodríguez additionally ruled out Venezuela holding elections in the near future.

“There will not be an election in this immediate period of time where the stabilization of the country has to be achieved,” he explained. “In Venezuela we have a very clear calendar for elections established in the Constitution.”

Maduro had begun his third six-year term in January 2025, while a new legislature took office on January 5, 2026, for a five-year period. Regional and municipal officials likewise started new four-year terms in the second half of 2025.

Rodríguez mentioned US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statements that, according to the Trump administration, the priority is stability in Venezuela. Rubio has claimed that the White House has a three-phase plan of “stabilization, economic recovery and reconciliation, and transition.”

Mérida, February 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly has launched discussions on a preliminarily-approved “Amnesty Bill for Democratic Coexistence,” including public consultations with community peace judges, NGOs and academics. 

Deputy Jorge Arreaza, who heads the parliament’s special commission for the amnesty bill, said that the legislature’s intention was to shape the law as a mechanism to ensure political stability in Venezuela but without impunity.

“The goal of this law is to contribute to peace, democratic coexistence and national reconciliation,” he explained during a meeting with community peace judges on Sunday. “It is a necessity of the new political moment we are going through.” Arreaza had previously served as Foreign Minister and Communes Minister.

The National Assembly commission’s consultations included a meeting with NGOs such as Provea, Foro Penal, and Acceso a la Justicia on Saturday. One they earlier, the legislators hosted deans from sixteen public and private university law schools to receive their input on the project. 

During these meetings, Arreaza stressed the importance of community justice participation, civil society organisations and academia. 

“We went to the law, reviewed each of the contributions, and will conduct an evaluation. We must contribute to the dialogue; we must listen to each other with patience and empathy,” he emphasized.

The Amnesty Bill for Democratic Coexistence, first announced by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez on January 30, was approved in its first reading on Thursday. A revised text is expected to be submitted to a final vote in the coming weeks.

The central stated objective of the initiative is national reconciliation and social peace through the pardon of political and related crimes committed between January 1, 1999, and January 30, 2026. 

According to Venezuelan authorities, the project aims to address the political conflict that occurred between 1999 and 2026 by channelling differences through constitutional means, as well as modernise the legal system to help secure social peace.

The bill’s Article 6 explains that the selected period covers significant conflicts such as the 2002 coup d’État, the 2002-03 oil lockout and opposition-led violent street protests in 2013, 2014 and 2017.

However, the bill sets strict limits, excluding those responsible for serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, homicide, drug trafficking, and corruption from any benefits. In addition to the release of those who have been prosecuted or convicted, the law establishes the termination of legal proceedings and the removal of criminal records from police and military files for those who benefit from it.

The Venezuelan government’s consultations likewise included a meeting between Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and former Spanish President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in Caracas on Friday. Zapatero, who has mediated past dialogue initiatives with the Venezuelan opposition, expressed his support for the Amnesty Bill, considering that it will mark “a turning point” for the country’s future and reconciliation.

He emphasized that the amnesty should be as extensive as possible and implemented swiftly to meet the expectations of families affected by arrests. Zapatero pledged to assist in any requested way, arguing that forgiveness and dialogue are essential elements in what he described as an “extraordinary moment” for the Caribbean nation.

Amid amnesty debates, the Committee of Family and Friends for the Freedom of Imprisoned Workers demanded that the legislation extend to imprisoned workers who have been criminalized on charges of ‘terrorism’ and ‘treason’ for defending labor rights or speaking out against corruption.

In a statement, the committee argued that the amnesty should not be limited to high-profile political figures, but rather apply to working-class and grassroots activists as well. 

Investigative blog La Tabla also put forward a proposal to expand the removal of charges and convictions to campesino leaders who have been targeted amid ongoing land struggles. In recent years, rural organizations have denounced a growing criminalization of local activists, accusing judicial authorities of favoring landowning interests.

Releases of high-profile opposition figures continue

In recent days, Venezuelan judicial authorities have continued a process of prisoner releases which, according to the President of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, are intended to promote national reconciliation. The Venezuelan government has reported around 900 releases since December.

Rodríguez recently announced that further detainees would be released this week, describing the process as an “act of justice and forgiveness.” The people released are still facing trial, with charges against high-profile anti-government figures including “terrorism” and “treason.”

NGO Foro Penal reported the release of dozens of opposition politicians on Sunday, including several associates of far-right leader María Corina Machado. However, hours after exiting prison, former Deputy Juan Pablo Guanipa was arrested again in Caracas.

The Venezuelan Attorney General’s Office published a statement arguing that Guanipa had violated the conditions of his release, though it did not offer specifics, and requesting a court order to move him to house arrest.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

World News // 3 hours ago

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The January 3 US strikes in Caracas have no historical precedent, not only for Venezuela but for all of South America. It was the first US military attack against a capital in this part of the world in our history as independent nations. 

To understand the underlying motivations behind such an outrageous bombing of Caracas, and going beyond the professed US interests in the country’s natural resources, we have to understand the position, the ideas, and the role played by elites in shaping key areas of national interest, including the concept of sovereignty, the nation’s resources, the model of state, and Venezuela’s foreign relations – in their own image, over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This meant the imposition of a political thought and socioeconomic model that ended up, above all, benefiting the Spanish-descendant or Creole oligarchy, which had been known in colonial times as the mantuanos.

Venezuela emerged from the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest as what is known in Venezuelan historiography as the “colonial-implanted society” (1), that is, a settler formation. At its zenith, it was a Creole elite with ample economic privileges but with a highly restricted political reach, limited to participation in municipal town halls (“cabildos”). This privileged sector was the dominant political class in colonial society for three centuries, with deep Hispanic cultural roots, a notion of superiority towards the popular classes alongside a complex of inferiority towards peninsular Spaniards who controlled the political and administrative affairs of the colony.

Between 1810 and 1816, the Creole elite played a leading role in the national independence struggle. Later, during his Caribbean tour of Jamaica and Haiti, the Liberator Simón Bolívar managed to pierce through his social and ideological class blinders, thus evolving from a mere mantuano military chief to become the revolutionary leader of the process of Venezuelan and South American emancipation. The historic step was taken through the decree issued in July 1816, in Ocumare de la Costa, with the momentous incorporation of enslaved people into the independence struggle, promising freedom, land, and citizenship to all those who answered the patriotic call. This revolutionary act, like many others in Bolívar’s life, would provoke splits and internal conflicts among military leaders and patriotic politicians, which would later lead to the separation of Gran Colombia in 1830 and the creation of Venezuela as an independent state. Likewise, the founding of the new Venezuelan republic in that same year by the Creole elites was essentially based on anti-Bolivarian political and ideological foundations, and it would undergird the model of the state and the socioeconomic system to be maintained until the end of the twentieth century. (2)

The main political positions assumed by Bolívar during his lifetime certainly did not please certain social sectors within independent America. His clear vision of a centralist government in contrast to the federal model adopted in the United States; his desire to grant freedom to enslaved Black people so that they could become citizens with full rights; his ideal of Colombian unity and the creation of a confederation of independent American states under a model of regional integration –all these plans became factors of discord and internal disagreement among the Venezuelan elites who, together with seditious elements in New Granada and Quito, ultimately brought about the disintegration of Gran Colombia.  

At the same time, in 1823, a geopolitical doctrine emerged from the United States that would mark the history of US interventionism in the hemisphere to this day. Known as the Monroe Doctrine, it proclaimed US hegemony over political, economic, and military affairs in the hemisphere, against any intervention from outside the region and in favor of US capital, exacting a horrific toll on the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean over the last two centuries.

In Venezuela, the entire first century of republican life was marked by struggles between liberal and conservative elites. Conservative sectors launched political campaigns against liberal factions with the hidden intention of handing the country over to foreign interests while securing their own economic benefits. Once the republic was established, internal strife prevented the Venezuelan political class from even diplomatically agreeing on the border limits with Colombia, eventually leading the country to lose vast territories due to external interference before the borders with our neighbors were ultimately settled. (3) Later, amid the post-1858 crisis, Conservative Creole elites even promoted the creation of an English protectorate in Venezuela, with Pedro Gual and Manuel Felipe Tovar appealing to the then United Kingdom chargé d’affaires in Venezuela, Edward St. John, for British intervention in order to prevent the Liberal Party from coming to power with the support of the African-descendent masses. It was this ongoing political hostility between these two parties for almost three decades that, over time, inevitably degenerated into the so-called Federal War or Long War, between 1859 and 1864, the last episode of civil war in the country.

Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, Venezuela lost all the political power it had gained during independence, all the accumulated military power that had led it to victory across the continent, and all its productive and economic capacity. It became trapped in a monoculture agricultural dependency based on coffee and cocoa crops. In addition, during these times of neglect, the country became a republic without the material capabilities needed to institutionalize a central state that did not even have its own infrastructure until 1873, when the first part of the Federal Legislative Palace was finally built. 

Later, at the end of the nineteenth century, during the government of General Cipriano Castro, a military chief from the southwestern Andean state of Táchira who put an end to the struggles between liberal and conservative elites, the country once again fell victim to imperialist designs on the national wealth. In 1899, in the so-called Paris Arbitration Award, Venezuela was stripped of a significant part of its eastern territory when it lost Guayana Esequiba to the British Empire, thanks to the legal assistance of Russia, acting as judge, and the United States, as the supposed defender of Venezuelan interests before the international courts.  

A few years later, in 1902, Venezuela was once again the target of imperialist threats through diplomatic siege and international media campaigns against the government by the UK, Germany, and Italy. Under the pretext of collecting debts acquired by the Venezuelan state, the European powers imposed a naval blockade and took over the ports of La Guaira and Maracaibo. These events were clearly acts of intervention intended to trigger a military invasion of the country, supported by elite sectors in favor of the presence of imperialist forces in the country.

There has thus been a clear continuity in the servility of the Creole oligarchy to imperial powers since the nineteenth century, with the appeal for an English protectorate, followed by whitening immigration policies, territorial dispossession, and a naval blockade. In the twentieth century, the subordination took the form of oil concessions, with petroleum becoming a key battleground for class struggle. Fast forward to the present, over the past 27 years, Venezuela under the Bolivarian Revolution, has been the target of relentless US-led hybrid warfare, with traditional manutano elites like María Corina Machado openly calling for a US military intervention. 

These internal and external efforts to dismantle the sovereign national project and seize the country’s vast wealth and resources finally culminated in the January 3 US bombing of Caracas and kidnapping of President Nicolas Maduro, bringing two centuries of republican history full circle.

Notes

1. The term “colonial-implanted society” was coined by Venezuelan historian Germán Carrera Damas to explain the long and ongoing process of the establishment of Venezuelan society, which began in the 1500s and can be approached theoretically and methodologically as a historical continuity that extends to the present day. By the 19th century, the socioeconomic elites would promote policies to position Venezuela as a mere supplier of raw materials for the global capitalist system, while guaranteeing their economic privileges. This sociopolitical dynamic, institutionalized through national projects, would continue until the end of the twentieth century. 
2. Not only in Venezuela, but the separatist oligarchies of Quito and New Granada, after their separation from Gran Colombia, also imposed political and administrative models contrary to Bolivarian ideas, establishing federal republics in the US style and opposed to Bolívar’s centralist model. 
3. The Pombo-Michelena dispute between the governments of Venezuela and Colombia, which lasted from 1833 to 1840, led to diplomatic conflicts between the two countries that were ultimately settled by Spain in an 1891 arbitration, with Queen Regent Maria Christina of Habsburg as the decision-maker. This award significantly harmed Venezuela, granting extensive territories to Colombia, such as La Guajira, the plains of Casanare, and the regions of the Meta, Guainía, and Vichada rivers.

The Insurgent History column features Venezuelan historians who explore key episodes of the country’s nineteenth and twentieth century history and their relevance for the present.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Christian E. Flores G. (Caracas, 1974) holds a bachelor’s degree in History from the Central University of Venezuela and MSc. in Venezuelan History from the National Experimental University of the Arts (UNEARTE). He currently serves as Director of Research and Historical Advisory Services for the Venezuelan National Assembly, Professor of Critical History of Puntofijismo (1958-1999) and Critical History of the Bolivarian Revolution at UNEARTE. He’s a researcher with more than 20 years of experience, and some of his published books are: 4F: Collapse of the Puntofijista Parliamentand 1815-2015, bicentennial of the Letter from Jamaica, in addition to articles and papers in Venezuelan and international publications.

Photograph by unknown author. “Trabajadores petroleros,” Fernando Irazábal Collection. Compiled by Archivo Fotografía Urbana.

On January 29, Venezuela experienced a legislative tectonic shift regarding the future of its hydrocarbon sector. The National Assembly approved a new petroleum law that effectively breaks with the post-1976 tradition of rigid state control, opening participation across the full value chain to private oil companies. 

This is not the first experiment with private participation since nationalization, but it is the clearest attempt since the 1990s Apertura to normalize it as the governing framework of the sector. The legislation, approved with striking speed and opacity, has elicited mixed reactions, ranging from denunciations of lost sovereignty and surrender to foreign interests to support for a first step that still requires major fixes. Despite these divergences, one thing is clear: the return of private companies to Venezuela’s oil sector inevitably revives parallels with the concessionary system under which the industry was born and flourished between 1914 and 1976, a mirror of what Venezuela’s energy sector could become in the twenty-first century.

The 1943 and 2026 hydrocarbons laws

The iconic 1943 bill enacted by President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–1945) regulated Venezuela’s privately run oil industry until the 1976 nationalization. It became the institutional template of the concessionary era: a rules-and-taxes state overseeing a privately operated industry. Together with related legislation, it established the famous 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement with the state, later tightened by reforms. Yet within the 1943 framework, the rentier state largely confined itself to setting the rules and collecting taxes and rents, while private companies assumed the capital risks. There was no government monopoly over day-to-day operations.

In spirit, the 2026 law reintroduces comparable conditions for private capital. Petroleum companies can now either hold operational control in joint ventures with the state or carry out activities independently through government contracts. The 1943 and 2026 frameworks also embrace flexible royalty schemes that prioritize business viability over rigid tax burdens. Differences, of course, abound. To mention a few, the 2026 version concentrates discretionary power in the executive branch regarding royalties, opens the possibility of international arbitration outside the country, simplifies the tax burden into a 15% integrated hydrocarbons tax, and diminishes the National Assembly’s authority over oil business.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration.

Divergences aside, both pieces of legislation share the same underlying imperative: attracting capital and technology. The 1976 and 2001 hydrocarbons laws, by contrast, were designed precisely to limit private initiative. But investment alone will not do all the work. Human capital is also desperately needed to lead a reborn hydrocarbon sector, and here the concessions model offers valuable lessons.

The Venezolanization of the industry

An underappreciated dimension of that era was human capital development. Over decades, foreign firms trained Venezuelans across the corporate hierarchy—in technical, managerial, and executive roles—so that by the mid-1970s expatriates were a small fraction of the workforce and Venezuelans increasingly ran the day-to-day business. This created a pipeline of local talent able to inherit operational responsibility and manage the 1976 transition to state control with unusual continuity.

This history is not nostalgia for a bygone era, but a lesson worth highlighting. Venezuela’s oil collapse in this century is inseparable from the degradation of corporate culture and human capital, deepened by the politicization of the industry. It triggered a professional brain drain and the hollowing out of operational efficiency. Multinationals like Chevron, and others that may follow, should explicitly lean on a “Venezolanization 2.0” that engages local talent still in the country and encourages the return of a diaspora of Venezuelan managers and engineers now abroad. Insulating the sector from partisan hiring and purging is essential if these cadres are to operate with full competence.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration. Many American expatriates, like Creole’s CEO Arthur T. Proudfit, embraced the social milieu of the country that welcomed them, often learning the language and speaking it fluently; his daughter even married a local businessman. In exchange, Venezuelans trained abroad and working for these firms absorbed US professional values and traditions. This cultural exchange helped forge durable bonds between both countries and contributed to the successful presence of foreign capital in Venezuela. And these corporations did not stop at their payrolls. They understood that long-term success in the hydrocarbon sector extended beyond employees to the surrounding communities of the oil fields, and beyond.

Social license

Creole, Shell, and Mene Grande undertook significant investments in the country. In the oilfields, they negotiated lucrative labor contracts with unions. They also financed hospitals, university campuses, and other infrastructure projects. These firms even joined the state in ventures like the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation to fund agro-industrial projects aimed at diversifying the economy, while supporting rural communities through initiatives such as the American International Association. They left an indelible imprint on everyday life, from how Venezuelans shopped through market chains like CADA, to culture through documentaries, corporate magazines, and even TV news programs like Observador Creole.

More importantly, they built alliances with domestic capitalists like Eugenio Mendoza to address social problems. Creole and Venezuelan business leaders, for instance, institutionalized private-sector social action through organizations like the Dividendo Voluntario para la Comunidad (DVC), founded in 1964 to mobilize corporate contributions toward community projects. This nonprofit continues to exist today, fulfilling the original goal of social action bequeathed by American and Venezuelan businessmen more than sixty years ago. Creole also created the Creole Development Corporation, a financial arm designed to provide seed capital for local entrepreneurial activity. This was hardly a frictionless era, but it shows how legitimacy was treated as a condition of stability.

Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies.

This largesse reached widely, but it was not mere corporate charity. To avoid jeopardizing their operations and invite nationalist backlash, companies engaged with surrounding communities and invested in their future. That is a lesson new capital arriving in Venezuela should pursue. There is even generational memory favorable to the presence of these firms in oil communities. 

Leveraging that legacy could open renewed opportunities for local professional growth while strengthening bonds between communities and multinationals. Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies: democratizing institutions, reconstructing the economy, and addressing the public services and humanitarian needs the population faces.

A spiritual return to the concessions system?

The new hydrocarbons law pushes Venezuela’s oil industry in a new direction, and it functions as a first step in the right path. However, there is room for significant improvement. 

Moreover, key questions remain unanswered. For instance, what will be the fate of PDVSA? Any plan that fails to address the resurrection of its operational capabilities undermines the development of an efficient sector. Only the re-democratization of the country can properly confront the deeper failings reflected in the current legislation. Many industry experts have already proposed an alternative framework that would solve several of the bill’s core problems by establishing clear rules, transparency mechanisms, and a dedicated government agency entrusted with regulating the hydrocarbon sector.

The spirit of the concessionary model walks once more around Venezuela’s refineries, port terminals, and petroleum wells. It is too soon to tell whether foreign capital will return with the same excitement it brought more than a century ago, or whether the scale of investments and engagement with surrounding communities will match that of its predecessors. The sector can either become a platform for institutional rebuilding and professionalization, or another discretionary channel for rents and corruption. 

Democracy, check and balances, and clear rules can turn the 2026 hydrocarbons law (and its potential future modifications) into enduring principles for the remainder of the century. If so, the oil industry might unlock a new period of prosperity. Much remains to be done to materialize that future, but what is undeniable is that a new era begins.

New Delhi, India – When US President Donald Trump announced a trade deal with India on Monday this week, he declared that New Delhi would pivot away from Russian energy as part of the agreement.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Trump said, had promised to stop buying Russian oil, and instead buy crude from the United States and from Venezuela, whose president, Nicolas Maduro, was abducted by US special forces in early January. Since then, the US has effectively taken control of Venezuela’s mammoth oil industry.

In return, Trump dialled down trade tariffs on Indian goods from an overall 50 percent to just 18 percent. Half of that 50 percent tariff was levied last year as punishment for India buying Russian oil, which the White House maintains is financing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

But since Monday, India has not publicly confirmed that it has committed to either ceasing its purchase of Russian oil or embracing Venezuelan crude, analysts note. Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesperson, told reporters on Tuesday that Russia had received no indication of this from India, either.

And switching from Russian to Venezuelan oil will be far from straightforward. A cocktail of other factors – shocks to the energy market, costs, geography, and the characteristics of different kinds of oil – will complicate New Delhi’s decisions about its sourcing of oil, they say.

So, can India really dump Russian oil? And can Venezuelan crude replace it?

What is Trump’s plan?

Trump has been pressuring India to stop buying Russian oil for months. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the US and European Union placed an oil price cap on Russian crude in a bid to limit Russia’s ability to finance the war.

As a result, other countries including India began buying large quantities of cheap Russian oil. India, which before the war sourced only 2.5 percent of its oil from Russia, became the second-largest consumer of Russian oil after China. It currently sources around 30 percent of its oil from Russia.

Last year, Trump doubled trade tariffs on Indian goods from 25 percent to 50 percent as punishment for this. Later in the year, Trump also imposed sanctions on Russia’s two biggest oil companies – and threatened secondary sanctions against countries and entities that trade with these firms.

Since the abduction of Maduro by US forces in early January, Trump has effectively taken over the Venezuelan oil sector, controlling sales cash flows.

Venezuela also has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at 303 billion barrels, more than five times larger than those of the US, the world’s largest oil producer.

But while getting India to buy Venezuelan oil makes sense from the US’s perspective, analysts say this could be operationally messy.

How much oil does India import from Russia?

India currently imports nearly 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian crude, according to analytics company Kpler. Under Trump’s mounting pressure, that is lower than the average 1.21 million bpd in December 2025 and more than 2 million bpd in mid-2025.

One barrel is equivalent to 159 litres (42 gallons) of crude oil. Once refined, a barrel typically produces about 73 litres (19 gallons) of petrol for a car. Oil is also refined to produce a wide variety of products, from jet fuel to household items including plastics and even lotions.

Has India stopped Russian oil purchases?

India has reduced the amount of oil it buys from Russia over the past year, but it has not stopped buying it altogether.

Under increasing pressure from Trump, last August, Indian officials called out the “hypocrisy” of the US and EU pressuring New Delhi to back off from Russian crude.

“In fact, India began importing from Russia because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the outbreak of the conflict,” Randhir Jaiswal, India’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, said then. He added that India’s decision to import Russian oil was “meant to ensure predictable and affordable energy costs to the Indian consumer”.

Despite this, Indian refiners, currently the second-largest group of buyers of Russian oil after China, are reportedly winding up their purchases after clearing current scheduled orders.

Major refiners like Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL), Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL), and HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd (HMEL) halted purchasing from Russia following the US sanctions against Russian oil producers last year.

Other players like Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Bharat Petroleum Corporation, and Reliance Industries will soon stop their purchases.

What happens if India suddenly stops buying Russian oil?

Even if India wanted to stop importing Russian oil altogether, analysts argue it would be extremely costly to do so.

In September last year, India’s oil and petroleum minister, Hardeep Singh Puri, told reporters that it would also sharply push up energy prices and fuel inflation. “The world will face serious consequences if the supplies are disrupted. The world can’t afford to keep Russia off the oil market,” Puri said.

Analysts tend to agree. “A complete cessation of Indian purchases of Russian oil would be a major disruption. An immediate halt would spike global prices and threaten India’s economic growth,” said George Voloshin, an independent energy analyst based in Paris.

Russian oil would likely be diverted more heavily towards China and into “shadow” fleets of tankers that deliver sanctioned oil secretly by flying false flags and switching off location equipment, Voloshin told Al Jazeera. “Mainstream tanker demand would shift toward the Atlantic Basin, most likely increasing global freight rates as a result,” he noted.

Sumit Pokharna, vice president at Kotak Securities, noted that Indian refineries have reported robust margins in the last two years, majorly benefitting from the discounted Russian crude.

“If they move to higher-costing, like the US or Venezuela, then raw material cost would increase, and that would squeeze their margins,” he told Al Jazeera. “If it goes beyond control, they may have to pass the excess onto consumers.”

Can India stop buying Russian oil altogether?

It may not be able to. One of India’s two private refiners, Nayara Energy, is majority-Russian-owned and under heavy Western sanctions. The Russian energy firm Rosneft holds a 49.13 percent stake in the company, which operates a 400,000-barrel-per-day refinery in India’s Gujarat, PM Modi’s home state.

Nayara is the second-largest importer of Russian crude, buying about 471,000 barrels per day in January this year, accounting for nearly 40 percent of Russian supplies to India.

Its plant has relied solely on Russian crude since European Union sanctions were imposed on the company last July.

Nayara is not planning to load Russian oil in April as it shuts its refinery for more than a month for maintenance from April 10, according to Reuters.

Pokharna said the future of Nayara hangs in the balance, with the US unlikely to grant India an overt exemption for the Russia-backed company to import crude.

Can India switch to Venezuelan oil?

India has been a major consumer of Venezuelan oil in the past. At its peak, in 2019, India imported $7.2bn of oil, accounting for just under 7 percent of total imports. That stopped after the US slapped sanctions on Venezuelan oil, but some officials of the government-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation are still stationed in the Latin American country.

Now, major Indian refiners have said they are open to receiving Venezuelan oil again, but only if it is a viable option.

For one thing, Venezuela is roughly twice as far from India as Russia and five times further than the Middle East, meaning much higher freight costs.

Venezuelan oil is more expensive as well. “Russian Urals [a medium-heavy crude blend] has been trading at a wide-ranging discount of about $10-20 per barrel to Brent, while Venezuelan Merey currently offers a smaller discount of around $5-8 per barrel,” Voloshin told Al Jazeera.

“Importing from Venezuela and forgoing the Russian discount would be a costly affair for India,” said Pokharna. “From transportation cost to forgoing discounts, it could cost India $6-8 more per barrel – and that is a huge increase in the importing bill.”

Overall, a complete pivot away from Russia could raise India’s import bill by $9bn to $11bn – an amount roughly equal to India’s federal health budget – per year, according to Kpler.

“Venezuelan crude must be discounted by at least $10 to $12 per barrel to be competitive,” argued Voloshin. “This deeper discount is necessary to offset the much higher freight costs, increased insurance premiums for the longer Atlantic voyage, and the somewhat higher operational expenses required to process Venezuela’s extra-heavy high-sulfur crude.”

Without deeper discounts, the longer journey and complex handling make Venezuelan oil more expensive on a delivered basis, he added.

Another major issue is that many Indian refiners simply do not have the facilities to process very heavy Venezuelan oil.

Venezuelan crude is a heavy, sour oil, thick and viscous like molasses, with a high sulphur content requiring complex, specialised refineries to process it into fuel. Only a small number of Indian refineries are equipped to handle it.

“[Venezuelan oil’s heaviness] makes it an option only for complex refineries, leaving out older and smaller refineries,” Pokharna told Al Jazeera. “The shift is operationally difficult and would require blending with more expensive light crudes.”

Then there is the question of availability. Today, Venezuela produces barely a million barrels per day when pushed to its limit. Even if all production was sent to India, it would not match the total Russian oil import.

Where else could India buy oil?

India’s Minister Puri has said that New Delhi is looking to diversify sourcing options from nearly 40 countries.

As India has reduced Russian imports, it has increased them from Middle Eastern nations and other countries in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Now, while Russia accounts for nearly 27 percent share in India’s oil imports, OPEC nations, led by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, contribute 53 percent.

Reeling from Trump’s trade war, India has also increased purchases of US oil. American crude imports to India rose by 92 percent from April to November in 2025 to nearly 13 million tons, compared to 7.1 million in the same period in 2024.

However, India would be competing for these supplies with the European Union, which has pledged to spend $750bn by 2028 on US energy and nuclear products.

Meanwhile, for Venezuela to return to higher production, Caracas needs political stability, changes in foreign investment and oil laws, and to clear debts. That will take time, experts say.

Oil becomes more meaningful when you turn it into fuel.

A barrel contains 159 litres of crude oil, or 42 gallons.

To use this oil, it must be refined. The refining process produces various products, including petrol, diesel, jet fuel and numerous household items, such as cleaning products, plastics and even lotions.

Once refined, a barrel typically produces about 73 litres, or 19.35 gallons, of petrol to power cars and trucks.

A pick-up truck that can drive 24 miles on 1 gallon of petrol, or 100km on 10 litres, can travel about 730km, or 450 miles, from one barrel of oil.

Put another way, one barrel of crude oil can fuel that pick-up on a trip from New York City to Cleveland, Ohio.

Now let’s scale that up to US national consumption. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the US has about 285 million motor vehicles and consumes nearly 9 million barrels of petrol every day.

If all of Venezuela’s crude oil were refined into petrol, it could supply US vehicles for roughly 40 years at today’s consumption rate.

Caracas, January 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President, Delcy Rodríguez, welcomed the “lifting of restrictions on the country’s commercial airspace”, which had been in place since last November, following talks with the US government.

Speaking at a rally on Thursday, Rodríguez said she received a phone call from US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio to address the issue as part of a “working agenda” between the two countries that includes the resumption of diplomatic relations.

“Let all the airlines that need to come, come. Let all the investors that need to come, come”, Rodríguez said. She assumed office following the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, amid the January 3 US attacks.

Earlier in the day, Trump ordered the reopening of “all Venezuelan airspace” to commercial flights, stating that US citizens would be able to travel safely and that Venezuelans wishing to return—either permanently or temporarily—would also be able to do so.

Trump ordered Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy and other officials, including military commanders, to ensure the reopening was “immediate.”

Trump went on to describe the exchange with his Venezuelan counterpart as “highly positive,” emphasizing that “relations have been very solid and very good.” He further sought to reassure international travelers by stressing that they would be safe while in Venezuelan territory.

Following the announcements, the US Federal Aviation Administration confirmed that it had removed four Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) in the Caribbean region, including one related to Venezuela. “They were issued as a precautionary measure and are no longer necessary”, the agency argued.

Likewise on Thursday, American Airlines announced its intention to resume daily direct flights between the United States and Venezuela, becoming the first US airline to take such a step.

The company, which began operations in Venezuela in 1987, stated that the resumption of the route would be subject to approval by both US and Venezuelan authorities, as well as the corresponding security assessments.

American Airlines Chief Commercial Officer Nat Pieper said the company was eager to offer its customers the opportunity to reunite with family members and to generate new business and trade opportunities with the United States.

Direct flights between the two countries were suspended in 2019, the same year diplomatic relations between Washington and Caracas were severed after the US recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president.

Last November, Trump declared that Venezuela’s airspace should be considered “completely closed.” A flurry of NOTAM warnings led international airlines to suspend their connections to the Caribbean country. Caracas withdrew licenses from several companies, including TAP, Iberia and Turkish Airlines.

On January 13, Panama’s Copa Airlines announced the resumption of flights to and from Caracas.

Embassy reopening in the works

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Wednesday during a Senate hearing that he expects the United States to reestablish a diplomatic presence in Venezuela in the near future. “We have a team there evaluating it, and I think we’ll be able to open a diplomatic presence soon,” he said.

Rubio argued that such a presence would allow Washington to “have real-time information and interact not only with government officials but also with members of civil society and the opposition.”

Laura Dogu has so far been appointed to lead the diplomatic mission from the Venezuela Affairs Unit in Bogotá, Colombia. According to CNN, the CIA is looking to establish a “foothold” in the South American country that may preced the formal arrival of US diplomats.

For her part, Rodríguez has defended her administration’s diplomatic engagement with the United States, while also urging Venezuelan political sectors to resolve their differences and internal conflicts without “orders from Washington.”

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump said Thursday he has informed acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez that he’s going to be opening up all commercial airspace over Venezuela and Americans will soon be able to visit.

Trump said he instructed U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and U.S. military leaders to open up the airspace by the end of the day.

“American citizens will be very shortly able to go to Venezuela, and they’ll be safe there,” the Republican president said.

Venezuela’s government did not immediately comment on Trump’s announcement.

Earlier this week, Trump’s administration notified Congress that it was taking the first steps to possibly reopen the shuttered U.S. Embassy in Venezuela as it explores restoring relations with the South American country following the U.S. military raid that ousted then-President Nicolás Maduro.

In a notice to lawmakers dated Monday and obtained by The Associated Press on Tuesday, the State Department said it was sending in a regular and growing contingent of temporary staffers to conduct “select” diplomatic functions.

“We are writing to notify the committee of the Department of State’s intent to implement a phased approach to potentially resume Embassy Caracas operations,” the department said in separate but identical letters to 10 House and Senate committees.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries collapsed in 2019, and the U.S. State Department warned Americans shouldn’t travel to Venezuela, raising its travel advisory to the highest level.

The State Department on Thursday still listed a travel advisory for Venezuela at its highest level, “Do not travel,” warning that Americans face a high risk of wrongful detention, torture, kidnapping and more.

The State Department did not immediately respond to a message Thursday inquiring about whether it was changing its warning.

In November, as Trump was ramping up pressure on Maduro, he declared that the airspace “above and surrounding” Venezuela should be considered as “closed in its entirety.”

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, which has jurisdiction generally over the U.S. and its territories, then told pilots to be cautious flying around the country because of heightened military activity.

After that FAA warning, international airlines began canceling flights to Venezuela because of heightened military activity.

American Airlines, which was the last U.S. airline flying to Venezuela when it suspended flights there in March 2019, announced Thursday that it intends to reinstate nonstop service there from the U.S. in the coming months.

“We have a more than 30-year history connecting Venezolanos to the U.S., and we are ready to renew that incredible relationship,” Nat Pieper, American’s chief commercial officer, said in a statement. “By restarting service to Venezuela, American will offer customers the opportunity to reunite with families and create new business and commerce with the United States.”

American said it would share additional details about the return to service in the coming months as it works with federal authorities on security assessments and necessary permissions.

Price writes for the Associated Press. AP reporters Matthew Lee in Washington and Regina Garcia Cano in Caracas, Venezuela, contributed to this report.