Venezuelan

Caracas, March 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan workers, activists, and trade union organizers held marches in several cities on Thursday to demand wage increases and respect for labor rights.

A coalition of labor organizations staged protests in Caracas and over 25 other cities across the country. In the Venezuelan capital, around 1,000 demonstrators marched from Plaza Morelos and broke through a police cordon to reach the National Assembly in the city center.

“Mobilizations like the one we had today will continue and grow until the government changes its salary policies,” José Gregorio Afonso, president of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) professors’ association, stated. “We believe the economic conditions allow for the establishment of a minimum wage as determined by the Constitution and the Labor Law.”

Afonso added that the Constitution mandates the government adjust the minimum wage at least once a year to keep up with inflation, but the last increase was in 2022. He likewise pointed to recent official figures of economic growth and prospects of increased oil revenues.

Thursday’s rally consisted largely of education sector trade unions, as well as public sector retirees. A commission met with a group of legislators at the end of the march to deliver a list of 17 demands signed by over 200 trade unions. 

A similar document was delivered to the Labor Ministry following prior nationwide rallies on February 26. The labor organizations’ demands include raising the minimum wage in accordance with the Constitution and labor legislation, the release of workers and trade unionists allegedly arrested for defending labor rights, and the repeal of statutes such as the 2792 Memorandum that suspended several collective bargaining rights.

Activists have also voiced opposition to plans to implement a pro-business reform of the country’s Organic Law of Labor and Workers (LOTTT) that would cut benefits, social security contributions, and other employer responsibilities. 

The historic 2012 law, approved by former President Hugo Chávez, prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third-longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

Later on Thursday, the ruling Socialist Party (PSUV) held its own march in Caracas along the same route, with spokespeople urging the defense of the country’s peace and sovereignty, as well as calling for the release of kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Labor Minister Eduardo Piñate told reporters that the rally was in “firm backing” of the Maduro and Rodríguez government’s labor policies.

Gov’t increases bonus amid salary debates

On Friday, unofficial channels reported that the acting Rodríguez administration had raised the monthly “economic war bonus” by 25 percent, from US $120 to $150. Coupled with a $40 food bonus, the move brings the monthly income floor for public sector workers to $190. The amount is paid in bolívars at the official exchange rate.

Venezuelan government officials have not commented on the increase. It is not presently known whether public sector retirees and pensioners, who receive $70 and $50 economic war bonuses, respectively, will benefit from similar hikes.

Venezuela’s monthly minimum wage was set at 130 bolívars (BsD) in March 2022 and has not been adjusted since. At the time, 130 BsD amounted to around US $30, but with the Venezuelan currency’s devaluation, it is now equivalent to $0.29. With the Venezuelan economy heavily battered by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government prioritized non-wage bonuses as the main income source for workers and pensioners.

Trade unions and leftist organizations have criticized the policy for violating the country’s labor laws and favoring business sector interests by reducing labor costs and making dismissals more flexible.

In recent weeks, trade union coalitions have put forward proposals for a minimum wage adjustment. Center-right and right-wing alliances such as the Independent Union Alliance (ASI) and the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) have urged authorities to set the monthly minimum salary at $200 before pegging it to a cost-of-living index.

For its part, the government-aligned Bolivarian Socialist Union of Workers (CBST) proposed that the minimum wage be raised by $50 each quarter, though it did not specify a time frame. The CBST added that, should the government deem the salary increase unfeasible, it should implement a similar increase in non-wage bonuses.

Liberal economists, including Asdrúbal Oliveros and José Guerra, have argued that minimum wage increases beyond $100 and $150 a month, respectively, might place too high a burden on the state’s budget. At the same time, business sector representatives have called for a flexibilization of labor protections and benefits.

Leftist economists, including former PSUV congressman Tony Boza, Pasqualina Curcio, and Juan Carlos Valdez, have proposed raising wages and pegging them to inflation as is currently done by private banks with interest rates.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly preliminarily approved a new mining law on Monday as part of continued efforts to attract foreign investment to the country.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez had announced the new legislation last week during a visit from US Interior Secretary Doug Burgum alongside mining executives and urged parliament to act “swiftly.”

“This law will increase all the legal guarantees that can generate confidence and attract national and foreign investment,” said Orlando Camacho, a congressman from the ruling PSUV-led bloc, during the legislative session.

Camacho added that the bill is adapted to the Caribbean nation’s “present needs” and aims to take advantage of the country’s vast mineral riches, mostly located in the country’s Southeast.

Monday’s vote was endorsed by the pro-government legislative majority. Opposition deputies abstained, complaining that they received the draft less than one hour before the parliamentary session. The text will be subject to consultations and proposals before being put to a second and definitive vote in the coming weeks. 

Consisting of 126 articles split into 19 sections, the bill establishes regulations for small, medium, and large-scale mining, as well as the state’s ability to declare certain minerals as strategic and reserve areas for security purposes. It also creates a “social fund” to support mining workers, an oversight superintendency, and a state-run data bank.

Concerning mining activities, the proposed law establishes that joint ventures, private corporations, and small-scale artisanal mining groups are allowed to receive concessions. The new law will replace a 2015 decree that imposed state control over mining exploration, as well as the 1999 Mining Law.

The legislation establishes concessions of up to twenty years that can be renewed for two additional ten-year periods. The issuing of contracts is the responsibility of the Ministry of Ecological Mining Development and will not require National Assembly approval. Corporations are also entitled to several tax breaks, likewise granted at the ministry’s discretion, and can take disputes to international arbitration outside the Venezuelan court system.

The Venezuelan government is also seeking to reorganize the mining sector. A decree published on Friday ordered the Venezuelan General Mining Company (MINERVEN) to be absorbed by the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

The mining reform follows a similar pro-business overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law in January. In an interview, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez vowed that parliament would “adapt” laws to attract US investors in the wake of the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro

During his visit last week, Burgum touted Venezuela’s mineral riches and potential opportunities for Western conglomerates. On Friday, the Trump official announced the arrival of US $100 million worth of Venezuelan gold as part of a deal involving Trafigura to export up to 100 tons of gold doré bars worth approximately $165 million.

However, Caracas is not expected to immediately receive the revenue. The US Treasury issued General License 51 (GL51) allowing US entities to purchase, transport and resell Venezuelan-sourced gold but mandating that proceeds be deposited in US government-run accounts before being returned to Venezuela under conditions dictated by the White House.

The sanctions waiver additionally blocks transactions with companies from Cuba, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, and bans involvement in exploration and refining activities.

In tandem, the Trump administration reportedly issued a 30-day license allowing select companies, including Canada’s Gold Reserve, to negotiate mining concessions with the Venezuelan government.

Venezuela possesses vast proven reserves of gold, iron, and bauxite, in addition to lesser quantities of copper and nickel. Analysts have also drawn attention to Venezuela’s significant reserves of coltan, which has important military, aerospace, and electronics applications, as well as unproven deposits of rare earth minerals.

Former President Hugo Chávez sought to end foreign mining concessions in the 2000s, pushing instead for the state to play a leading role and link extraction activities to its basic industries in sectors such as steel and aluminum. 

The Chávez government likewise revoked a number of concessions from Western mining companies. Several of them, including Canada’s Crystallex and Gold Reserve, went on to secure compensation via international arbitration bodies.

Since 2015, the Nicolás Maduro administration looked to mining as a potential revenue source amid escalating US sanctions, particularly in the 112,000 square-kilometer Orinoco Mining Arc. Nevertheless, the sector was likewise hit by unilateral coercive measures, while the proliferation of irregular mining groups has generated environmental concerns.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

One of the fundamental issues that a Constitution must regulate is what happens when the head of State is absent. The most important scenario is how to proceed when the president’s absence is absolute, that is, when it is known that he will no longer serve as president permanently.

So what should happen in Venezuela when the president of the republic is absent?

The two scenarios of presidential absence: Under the 1999 Constitution, there are two scenarios of presidential absence: temporary absence and absolute absence. The Constitution implicitly categorizes all scenarios of absence into one of these two: either the president is temporarily absent, or the president is absolutely absent. The Constitution assigns different consequences to each scenario.

Constitutional rules regarding temporary absence: If the absence is temporary, the vice president fills the vacancy for a period of 90 days, which may be extended by the National Assembly for up to another 90 days. If the temporary absence extends beyond 90 days, the National Assembly may, by a majority vote, consider the absence to be permanent (Article 234). After these 90 or 180 days have elapsed, depending on whether or not the period is extended, the absence must necessarily be considered permanent. Consequently, in accordance with Article 233 of the Constitution, elections must be held within 30 days of the permanent absence.

Constitutional rules regarding permanent absence

If the absence is permanent and occurs within the first four years of the constitutional term, elections must be held within 30 days of the permanent absence (Article 233). The Constitution lists, in a non-exhaustive manner, the circumstances of absolute absence (that is, there may be other reasons, such as the president’s removal and imprisonment abroad): death, resignation, or removal from office decreed by a TSJ ruling; permanent physical or mental incapacity certified by a medical board appointed by the TSJ and approved by the National Assembly; abandonment of office, declared as such by the National Assembly; and referendum recall of the president.

The Constitution distinguishes how to proceed in the event of the president’s absolute absence depending on the time elapsed since the beginning of the presidential term.

Under the 1999 Constitution, there is no constitutional provision that supports Maduro’s forced absence. His absence is either temporary, to which the rules of temporary absence must be applied, or permanent, to which the Constitution also says what to do.

When the president-elect becomes absolutely absent before taking office, a new universal, direct, and secret election will be held within the following 30 consecutive days. While the new president is being elected and takes office, the president of the National Assembly will assume the presidency (this was the rule used analogously to support then-Speaker Juan Guaidó as interim president in 2019).

If the president’s permanent absence occurs during the first four years of the constitutional term, a new universal, direct, and secret election will be held within the following 30 consecutive days. While the new president is being elected and takes office, the executive vice president will assume the presidency. In the aforementioned cases, the new president will complete the corresponding constitutional term. If the permanent absence occurs during the last two years of the constitutional term, the executive vice president will assume the presidency until the end of that term.

Maduro’s absence occurred within the first four years of the presidential term.

What the Supreme Tribunal of Justice has said

What has been the TSJ’s position on Maduro’s absence and the constitutional consequences of that absence? First, it issued a ruling on January 3rd ordering that Delcy Rodríguez, as executive vice president, assumes and exercises, in an “acting” capacity, all the powers, duties, and faculties inherent to the office of president.

It characterized Maduro’s absence as “forced.” However, it did not specify whether this absence is temporary or permanent.

Therefore, the Constitutional Chamber considers that Maduro is in a forced absence, which must be filled by Delcy Rodríguez.

Under the 1999 Constitution, there is no constitutional provision that supports Maduro’s forced absence. His absence is either temporary, to which the rules of temporary absence must be applied, or permanent, to which the Constitution also says what to do. There’s no situation such as “forced absence”. That “forced absence” of Maduro, from which the “interim” presidency of Delcy Rodríguez derivates, is based only on the sentence issued by the Constitutional Court on January 3.

Furthermore, Rodríguez is simultaneously holding the acting presidency (and therefore cannot be considered executive vice president) and the Ministry of Hydrocarbons. In Venezuela, ministers are appointed by the president. Therefore, the only person who could remove Rodríguez as minister is Rodríguez as President. A constitutional absurdity.

If the extension is declared, it will expire on July 3. From that day, 30 days must elapse within which the presidential election must be held.

There’s an additional peculiarity: in Official Gazette No. 6,963 of January 14, a ruling was announced by which the Constitutional Chamber supposedly had the authority to “determine the applicable legal framework to guarantee the continuity of the State, the administration of government, and the defense of sovereignty in the event of the forced absence of the President of the Republic.” That is, the Constitutional Chamber was or is going to issue a posterior sentence to define the constitutional route after Maduro’s absence.

However, at the time of writing, this ruling has not been published on the Supreme Court’s website. This is an anomaly, since the general rule is that when a ruling is published in the Official Gazette, it has already been published on the Supreme Court’s website several days prior. Something happened within the regime that led its leaders to decide it would be better not to publish such a sentence.

We can assume that the acting president and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice consider Maduro’s absence to be temporary. Under that scenario, according to the Constitution, on April 3, 2026, the National Assembly could extend Delcy Rodríguez’s acting presidency for another 90 days.

If it does not, the Constitution requires us to assume that Maduro is permanently absent, and elections must be held within the following 30 days.

If the extension is declared, it will expire on July 3. From that day, 30 days must elapse within which the presidential election must be held.

Any other solution has no basis in the 1999 Constitution.

And that is something that should be discussed.

The licence follows a push from US President Donald Trump to open Venezuela’s resource sector to international investment.

The United States government has authorised a limited licence for the export of Venezuelan gold, following a high-level meeting to expand mining in the country.

On Friday, a notice appeared on the US Department of the Treasury’s website announcing the licence.

It allows Venezuela’s state-run mining company Minerven and its subsidiaries to export, transport and sell Venezuelan gold to the US, within the parameters set out under US law.

Under the licence, however, no Venezuelan gold will be permitted to be exchanged with Cuba, North Korea, Iran or Russia.

The licence also requires payments to sanctioned individuals to flow through Treasury accounts known as Foreign Government Deposit Funds, the same system that has been used to store the proceeds from Venezuelan oil sales.

Minerven and other state-owned industries have faced US sanctions for years, as a penalty for the push to nationalise Venezuela’s resources under former President Hugo Chavez.

But the US has been pushing for inroads into Venezuela’s oil and mining sectors since January 3, when it launched an operation to abduct and imprison the country’s then-president, Nicolas Maduro.

The January 3 military operation has been condemned as a violation of international law, and critics argue that US President Donald Trump has since sought to exploit Venezuela’s natural resources for his country’s gain.

Trump and his allies maintain that Venezuela’s oil resources were stolen from the US, citing the expropriation of assets from US businesses in 2007.

But international law guarantees that countries have permanent sovereignty over their own natural resources, which cannot be exploited by foreign powers without consent.

So far, the government of interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez has complied with Trump’s requests to surrender oil to the US and open the country’s oil and mining sectors to foreign investment.

Just this week, Rodriguez agreed to send a mining reform law to the country’s National Assembly, following a two-day visit from Trump’s Interior Secretary Doug Burgum.

And in late January, Rodriguez signed into law a separate reform that allowed for the expansion of private investment from abroad in Venezuela’s oil sector and lowered taxes on the industry.

Venezuela’s economy has struggled under tightening US sanctions and government mismanagement, forcing millions of citizens from the South American country to flee its borders over the last decade.

Proponents of the reforms say outside investment can help revive Venezuela’s ailing economy and fund upgrades to its outdated mining infrastructure.

On Friday, Venezuela’s central bank released its first inflation statistics since November 2024, showing that inflation skyrocketed to 475 percent in 2025, when the US placed an embargo on Venezuelan oil exports.

Gold production from Venezuela in 2025 amounted to nearly 9.5 tonnes, according to the government, and the country sits on some of the largest oil deposits in the world.

Mérida, March 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan popular movements condemned the recent US and Israeli attacks against Iran and expressed support and solidarity with the West Asian nation. 

On Saturday, February 28, the International Platform for Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause and the Alexis Vive Patriotic Force were among the organizations issuing statements rejecting Washington and Tel Aviv’s military actions.

The organizations decried the bombings of Iranian territory, including against civilian targets, and described the operations as serious violations of international law. The International Platform for Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause expressed “deep outrage” over the bombing of a girls’ school in Minab that killed over 175 people.

“This infamous act will not crush the heroic resistance of the Iranian people, in their example of dignity in the face of imperialist and zionist aggression,” the platform’s communiqué read.

For its part, the Alexis Vive Patriotic Force emphasized that the latest attacks are not an isolated incident, but rather “another attempt to impose regime change and undermine Iran’s self-determination.” 

“These actions seek to reconfigure the political map of Western Asia in favor of the strategic interests of Washington and Tel Aviv,” the organization, a driving force in El Panal Commune in Caracas, added in its statement.

The Venezuelan chapter of Alba Movimientos, a continental alliance of social movements, likewise issued a statement declaring “unrestricted solidarity” with Iran and calling on multilateral organizations to deter the US and Israel’s “warmongering.”

Venezuelan grassroots organizations scheduled a rally on Tuesday in front of the Iranian embassy in Caracas to reiterate their support and condemnation of the foreign aggression against the country.

West Asia has been thrown into open conflict after the US and Israel launched operations “Epic Fury” and “Lion’s Roar,” respectively, on Saturday, with widespread bombings against Iran and targeted assassinations against the country’s leadership. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, was killed along with several relatives by an Israeli strike. 

Washington and Tel Aviv justified the systematic bombing of Tehran and other cities as a “preemptive strike,” with officials from both countries claiming without evidence that Iran was working toward nuclear weapons.

In response, Iranian forces launched defensive maneuvers and retaliatory attacks against US military assets in the region, striking bases and other targets in countries including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, and Jordan. Iran has also launched multiple waves of missiles against Israel and vowed to implement a strategic blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.

Caracas withdraws statement, expresses solidarity with Qatar

The Venezuelan government issued a statement on Saturday expressing its “condemnation and deep regret” that the “military option was chosen” with attacks against Iran while diplomatic talks were ongoing. However, Caracas did not name the US and Israel as the perpetrators. 

The communiqué went on to condemn Iran’s retaliatory actions as “inappropriate and reprehensible military reprisals against targets in various countries in the region.” The document ended with a call for a return to negotiations between all parties.

The government’s position drew widespread criticism on social media and was removed from the Foreign Ministry’s official accounts, as well as from Foreign Minister Yván Gil’s Telegram and X platforms, on Saturday evening.

Venezuelan leaders, including Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, have offered no explanation for the statement’s publication and deletion. On Monday, Rodríguez reported a phone conversation with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in which she expressed “solidarity” amidst the “violence and instability” in the region.

“I expressed my condolences and deep concern over the loss of civilian lives due to the ongoing conflict, reiterating our call to respect international law and preserve peace,” the acting president wrote.

Caracas’ latest stance contrasts with its previous fierce condemnations of US and Israeli actions in West Asia, including the genocide in Gaza, attacks against Lebanon, and the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Venezuela had likewise firmly backed Iran, one of its strongest allies in the past quarter century, against foreign attacks, including during the June 2026 war against Israel.

During Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013), Caracas and Tehran consolidated a multidimensional strategic alliance based on opposition to US expansion and a commitment to building a multipolar world. During this period, more than 270 bilateral agreements were signed in sectors such as energy, housing, agriculture, and technology.

The close ties, described by both governments as a “revolutionary brotherhood,” also provided key lifelines as both countries faced US-led economic sanctions. Venezuela benefited from Iranian technology transfers in areas such as drone manufacturing, cement, and vehicle assembly.

Iran provided key fuel shipments in 2020, defying US threats, as the Venezuelan economy reeled under US coercive measures.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, February 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – A group of trade unions and political organizations protested outside Venezuela’s Labor Ministry headquarters in Caracas on Thursday to urge salary increases and respect for labor rights.

A crowd of around 100 people held banners expressing multiple demands, including pegging wages to a cost-of-living index.

Eduardo Sánchez, president of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) workers’ union, told reporters that it is urgent to adjust wages and protect working-class rights ahead of announced plans to reform the country’s labor law.

“The workers here today demand an increase in their wages, not through bonuses,” he said. “We are also calling for the repeal of the Onapre and 2792 memoranda,” he added, in reference to policies implemented in 2022 and 2018, respectively, which flattened wage scales and froze a number of collective bargaining rights.

Sánchez also denounced a social media campaign “paid for by the business sector” with the purpose of “demonizing” workers’ benefits and social security.

The groups present at the rally delivered a 17-point petition addressed to Labor Minister Eduardo Piñate.

Venezuela’s monthly minimum wage was set at 130 bolívars (BsD) in March 2022 and has not been adjusted since. At the time, 130 BsD amounted to around US $30 at the time, but with the Venezuelan currency’s devaluation, it is now equivalent to $0.31.

In recent years, with the Venezuelan economy heavily battered by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government has prioritized non-wage bonuses as the main income source for workers and pensioners. Public sector employees have a monthly income floor of $160 from a combined $120 economic war bonus and a $40 food bonus. They are paid in bolívars at the official exchange rate.

Public sector retirees and pensioners receive $70 and $50 economic war bonuses, respectively.

Trade unions have denounced the bonus-over-salary policies for being tailored to private sector interests, since they drastically reduce employer obligations, including social security contributions, vacation pay, severance, and other benefits. 

In 2023, a group of Chavista organizations delivered a constitutional appeal before the Venezuelan Supreme Court, arguing that under Venezuelan labor law bonuses must be considered as salaries with all their implications. However, the petition received no answer from the country’s highest judicial body.

Thursday also saw activists and trade unionists hold demonstrations outside regional Labor Ministry offices in 14 Venezuelan states.

Arvilio Hidalgo, secretary general of the CUTEC trade union in Carabobo state, called on the government to “restore the infringed-upon rights of the working class.”

“Our struggle right now is to restore the minimum wage and social security,” he stated. “We are also calling for the release of workers and trade unionists who were arrested for defending labor rights.”

In recent years, trade unions and human rights groups have denounced dozens of arrests of labor leaders, claiming that they were targeted for upholding collective bargaining rights or opposing corruption in the public sector and state-owned companies. Several trade union representatives have been released in past days following the approval of the Amnesty Law.

The labor organizations that rallied on Thursday announced a new protest on March 12.

In recent months, Venezuelan authorities have announced plans to develop a “new labor model” and engaged in consultation processes with pro-government trade unions.

The country’s main business lobby, FEDECÁMARAS, has openly voiced support for an overhaul of labor legislation reform that cuts down on benefits and other employer responsibilities.

One of the core legacies of the Hugo Chávez administration, Venezuela’s Organic Law of Labor and Workers (LOTTT) was hailed as the “most advanced labour law in the world.” The historic 2012 law prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

Feb. 26 (UPI) — The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control said it will allow certain operations to resell Venezuelan-origin oil destined for Cuba, provided the fuel is used by citizens and private companies on the island.

The island nation relied for years on Venezuela for fuel, but shipments stopped after the United States captured Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3 and took control of Caracas’ energy industry.

After the operation, President Donald Trump repeatedly warned that Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse, and he threatened to impose further economic pressure on the country to reach an agreement with the United States. Trump has not publicly defined what kind of agreement he seeks.

The trade measure, published Wednesday, says that the transactions must comply with the conditions of General License 46A for Venezuela. This license is an authorization issued by foreign assets office that allows companies to conduct operations involving Venezuelan oil under specific terms, despite the sanctions in place against that country’s energy sector.

Companies that seek authorization will not need to have an entity established in the United States, and the usual Cuba-related restrictions set out in that license will not apply.

The Treasury Department specified that the policy will cover only exports for commercial or humanitarian purposes that benefit Cuba’s private sector.

Operations involving the Cuban armed forces, intelligence services or other government entities will not be permitted, including those listed on the U.S. Department of State’s Cuba Restricted List.

The Treasury Department recalled that the Commerce Department primarily regulates the export or re-export of U.S.-origin oil to Cuba.

Under the Support for the Cuban People License Exception, certain exports of gas and other petroleum products intended to improve living conditions and support independent economic activity in Cuba do not require separate authorization from foreign assets office provided the applicable terms are met.

The agency referred to its Frequently Asked Question 1226 for the definition of “Venezuelan-origin oil,” which includes petroleum products.

Preliminary data from the Energy Information Administration show that Venezuela exported 339,000 barrels per day of crude to the United States in the third week of February.

At the same time, regional fuel supply to Cuba has been limited. On Jan. 29, the Trump administration declared a national emergency with respect to Cuba, creating a new mechanism to impose tariffs on imports from any country that provides oil to Havana.

On Feb. 17, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said her government would not send fuel to Cuba “for now” amid the current situation and potential U.S. trade measures.

Cuba faces fuel shortages that have affected electricity supply, transportation and other basic services, and it relies heavily on oil imports.

Separately, the Russian Embassy in Havana confirmed two weeks ago that Russia will send crude oil and refined products to Cuba as humanitarian assistance.

Russia is sending the oil directly, not through intermediaries, and the shipments are considered to be aid, not commercial sales.

US eases oil embargo on Cuba as Caribbean neighbours warn worsening humanitarian crisis could destabilise region.

The United States has said it will allow the resale of some Venezuelan oil to Cuba in a move that could ease the island’s acute fuel shortages, as neighbouring countries raised the alarm over a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by Washington’s oil blockade.

In a statement on Wednesday, the US Department of the Treasury said it would authorise companies seeking licences to resell Venezuelan oil for “commercial and humanitarian use in Cuba”.

It said the new “favorable licensing policy” would not cover “persons or entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence services, or other government institutions”.

Venezuela had been the main supplier of crude and fuel ⁠to Cuba for the past 25 years through a bilateral pact mostly based on the barter of products and services. But since the US abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last month and took control of the country’s oil exports, Caracas’s supply to Cuba has ceased.

Mexico, which had emerged as an alternate supplier, also halted shipments to the Caribbean island after the US threatened tariffs on countries that send oil to Cuba. The US blockade has worsened an energy crisis in Cuba that is hitting power generation and fuel for vehicles, houses and aviation.

The shift in US policy came as Caribbean leaders gathering in Saint Kitts and Nevis expressed alarm at the impacts of the blockade on the island nation of some 10.9 million people. Speaking to Caribbean leaders during a meeting of the regional political group CARICOM on Tuesday, Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness affirmed solidarity with Cuba.

“Humanitarian suffering serves no one,” Holness said at the meeting. “A prolonged crisis in Cuba will not remain confined to Cuba.”

The Caribbean summit’s host, Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew, who studied in Cuba to be a doctor, said friends have told him of food scarcity and rubbish strewn in the streets.

“A destabilised Cuba will destabilise all of us,” Drew said.

But addressing the meeting in Saint Kitts and Nevis on Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that the humanitarian crisis had been caused by the Cuban government’s policies, not Washington’s blockade.

Rubio, whose parents migrated to the US from Cuba in 1956, warned that the sanctions would be snapped back if the oil winds up going to the government or military.

“Cuba needs to change. It needs to change dramatically because it is the only chance that it has to improve the quality of life for its people,” Rubio told reporters.

It is “a system that’s in collapse, and they need to make dramatic reforms”, he said.

Rubio went on to blame economic mismanagement and the lack of a vibrant private sector for the dire situation in Cuba, which has been under communist rule since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

“This is the worst economic climate Cuba has faced. And it is the authorities there, and that government, who are responsible for that,” Rubio said.

The US pressure on Venezuela and Cuba ⁠has left several fuel cargoes undelivered since December, according to the Reuters news agency, contributing to the island’s inability to keep the lights on and cars circulating. A Cuba-related vessel that loaded Venezuelan gasoline in early February at a port operated by state-run company PDVSA remained this week anchored in Venezuelan waters waiting for authorisation to set sail.

Mexico and Canada have meanwhile announced they would be sending aid to Cuba, and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also said his government was discussing the possibility of providing fuel to the island.

Separately on Wednesday, Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior announced killing four people and wounding six others on board a Florida-registered speedboat that it said entered Cuban waters.

Rubio told reporters it was not a US operation and that no US government personnel were involved.

“Suffice it to say, it is highly unusual to see shootouts in open sea like that,” he said. “ It’s not something that happens every day. It’s something frankly that hasn’t happened with Cuba in a very long time.”

Recently, the United States reached a new historic milestone: it produced over 13.6 million barrels per day, a staggering feat for a country that many thought had peaked in 2008 when production bottomed out at 5 million bpd. This staggering increase was not achieved by a state giant, but by an ecosystem of thousands of independent operators driven by market-based incentives that, in Venezuela, might seem from another planet.

Meanwhile, Venezuela has traveled the opposite path: from a proud peak of 3.7 million bpd in 1970, it has collapsed to a stagnant output below 1 million bpd. 

In Texas, the landowner owns the oil; in Venezuela, it is the State—which claims, all the while, to represent us all.

The hundred-year war

Since the Los Barrosos II blowout in December 1922, our oil history has been defined by a relentless tug-of-war between private capital and the State over the capture of oil rent. This conflict is not unique to Venezuela, but as we enter this “third opening,” the question is unavoidable: how do we prevent a third nationalization?

Having done it twice before (1976 and 2006), Venezuela has established a precedent that alters risk assessment across all investment horizons. How can we guarantee investors that history won’t repeat itself? While often sold as a patriotic triumph, nationalization is a terminal breach of contract and a direct assault on property rights, deterring the very capital profiles that otherwise would be participating. International arbitration, legal reforms, and institutional frameworks are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Government take and the global race

To put things in perspective: before the 2026 reform, the Venezuelan fiscal system was among the least competitive on the planet. Between royalties on gross income, income tax (ISLR), and “windfall profit” taxes, the State extracted a “Government Take” that often exceeded 80%, with marginal tax rates reaching up to 95% depending on price thresholds. In a scenario where the operator’s net margin was squeezed to a minimum, production became a game of survival and reinvestment became technically impossible.

While the January 2026 reform moves in the right direction, we aren’t just competing against our own past; we are competing against the world. Consider the current margins (Operator Share) in the region:

• Canada (Alberta, Heavy Oil): Private 50%-55% | Government 45%-50%
• Texas (Permian Basin): Private 45%-55% | Government 45%-55%
• Colombia (New Reforms): Private ­40% | Government ­60%
• Brazil (Pre-Salt): Private 39% | Government 61%
• Guyana (2025 Model): Private 25%-35% | Government 65%-75%
• Venezuela (2026 Law): Private 20%-35% | Government 65%-80%

Even with the recent reform, Venezuela is far from being a “bargain” for long-term investment.

The proposal: from State-partner to citizen-owner

To mitigate expropriation risk and attract long-term capital, I propose a model built on four foundational pillars:

• Private Capital-Citizen Partnership: The State is removed from operations. Incentives are aligned directly between citizens—the ultimate owners of the subsoil—and those who risk the capital to extract it.

• Zero Corporate Taxes (Tax Displacement): Eliminate corporate income tax, royalties, and all “shadow” taxes at the source. This slashes the operational break-even to technical average levels of $30 to $40 per barrel, turning “iron cemeteries” into profitable ventures even in low-price environments. This is not a tax holiday, but a redirection of the fiscal take: the operator delivers a major share of the value directly to the citizens, while the State sustains itself by taxing the total income of the citizenry and companies in the rest of the economy.

• The Citizen Dividend (Oil-to-Cash): Instead of paying a traditional tax to a discretionary Treasury, the operator delivers 50% of its net profit—effectively a flat tax paid to the owners—directly into a sovereign trust (or similar non-state mechanism) managed by top-tier international banks. While 50% is a significant share, the absence of any other fiscal burden makes this model one of the most competitive in the region. This trust distributes periodical dividends to every Venezuelan citizen, including those abroad. The State then funds its operations by taxing these dividends as part of the citizens’ total income via personal income tax (ISLR) and other tax sources from a diversified economy. This ensures that the government’s budget depends on the collective prosperity of its people, not on political control over the oil.

• The Citizen as “Guardian” and Auditor: This is the ultimate shield. In 1976 and 2006, the State nationalized because it was easy to seize control from a “multinational” and hand it to a bureaucracy. Under this scheme, any government attempting to expropriate would be taking directly from the pockets of 30 million owners. Transparency is embedded: citizens monitor production and distributions through real-time digital platforms, independent audits, and other decentralized oversight mechanisms. The citizen ceases to be a spectator and becomes the industry’s most powerful defender.

Unlike the State, whose lust for oil rent is political and lacks immediate consequences for those in power, the citizen acts with the prudence of an owner—because they become one. Under this model, any attempt to “suffocate” the private partner translates immediately into a drop in personal dividends. Private ownership of the benefit is, in itself, the best guarantee of stability for capital.

Application and reality

Under this model, the direct net profit split for the oil industry would be: Private 50%, Citizens 50%, State 0%.

This “State 0%” applies exclusively to the source to insulate the industry from political rent-seeking. It does not mean a zero-revenue State; the government continues to fund its functions, but through a transparent tax system (ISLR, VAT) derived from a citizen-owned economy.

To illustrate, with oil at $100 and production at 3.5 million bpd, each citizen would have received $1,500 annually ($6,000 for a family of four). At a $60 base price, the dividend would be $640 per person. Today, with production stalled below one million barrels, a citizen would receive a mere $185. It is modest, but it represents the starting point of a virtuous cycle where the State only prospers if its citizens do first.

Herein lies the virtue of the model: the alignment of interests. Under the current system, citizens watch from the sidelines as oil wealth vanishes into the state vortex. With this approach, each Venezuelan has a personal stake: the more their private partner thrives, the more they themselves benefit. Citizens move from passive critics to primary stakeholders in the nation’s industrial growth.

Considerations for a new Venezuela

Under other circumstances, I might not be a proponent of direct “cash” transfers. But given the alternatives, it is the “lesser evil”. The political class will likely claim this is neither feasible nor “patriotic.” For many politicians, the incentive is two-fold: the salivating prospect of managing an immense oil “booty,” and the recurring ideal of “doing good” with other people’s resources.

Still in doubt? Look at our track record: despite having the world’s largest proven reserves and over 20 different administrations of every political stripe since 1922, the State captured and managed over $1.2 trillion in rent between 1920 and 2015. The result? A Guinness world record in squandered booms, the largest migration in the hemisphere without a formal war, and unprecedented institutional destruction.

Isn’t it time to withdraw the State from oil? 

This proposal would achieve:

• Real competitiveness: By matching Texas and Alberta margins (50%+ for the private sector), we compensate for institutional risks with top-tier global profitability.
• A limited State: The State ceases to be an inefficient businessman and becomes an arbiter: providing control, arbitration, and security. Its funding would come from taxing other economic activities, forcing it to foster general prosperity rather than living off the subsoil.
• A path towards a dividend-producing nation: Why not extend this to all extractive activities (gas, gold, iron, rare earths)? Perhaps the gold of the Arco Minero would stop being a black hole and become a direct dividend, shielding resources from looting and opacity.

The January 2026 reform is just a sigh in a prolonged agony. We cannot expect different results by doing the same thing. The “Hundred-Year War” over oil rent has left the State as a jailer rich in promises and a citizenry poor in realities.

Avoiding a third nationalization requires moving the subsoil out of the political arena and into the sphere of economic freedom. The US does not dominate markets by government mandate, but through an ecosystem that rewards risk and efficiency. Venezuela can emulate this success, but only by breaking the State lock and allowing a fabric of investors to flourish in direct alliance with citizens.

True sovereignty is not the State running the wells; it is Venezuelans themselves being the real owners of the benefits. Only through this pact of ownership can we hope that oil becomes, at last, an engine of development and not the tool of our own institutional destruction.

Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. 

The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.”

The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a blanket amnesty for crimes or offenses committed in the context of political violence between 1999 and 2026. The final document explicitly lists high-profile contexts, including the 2002 coup against then-President Hugo Chávez, the 2014 and 2017 opposition-led violent “guarimba” street protests, and the unrest following the July 2024 presidential elections.

“This law is guided by principles of freedom, justice, equality, […] the primacy of human rights, and political diversity,” article 3 reads.

Article 7 of the amnesty bill defines the ethical and constitutional scope of the pardon, expressly excluding those who have participated in serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, in accordance with Article 29 of the Venezuelan Constitution.

The legislation also excludes those prosecuted for or convicted of homicide, corruption offenses while in public office, and drug trafficking with sentences exceeding nine years.

During a press conference at the National Assembly, the head of parliament Jorge Rodríguez stated that the new law represents “a step forward to avoid the mistakes of the past.” 

“I believe that this law recognizes the victims in its articles and represents a step toward avoiding the mistakes of the past,” he told reporters. “This sends a powerful message that we can live, work, and grow politically within the framework established by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”

During the Thursday session, opposition Deputy Henry Falcón from the Democratic Alliance affirmed that “amnesty is an opportunity that the state offers to forget. We cannot cling to past differences in the face of a higher interest: the country itself.”

After twenty days of consultations and debates and three two legislative debates, Jorge Rodríguez presented the final text that was unanimously endorsed by all 277 deputies. He also announced the creation of a Special Monitoring Commission, chaired by Jorge Arreaza (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) and Nora Bracho (A New Era, UNT). This commission is responsible for ensuring the law’s implementation and addressing requests for release.

At a special ceremony held at Miraflores Palace on Thursday evening, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez formally received the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence following approval by the legislature and called for national reconciliation.

“This amnesty law opens an extraordinary door for Venezuela to come together again, to learn to live together democratically and peacefully, and to rid itself of hatred and intolerance,” she expressed. “ 

Regarding the exclusions contemplated, Rodríguez asked the Commission for the Judicial Revolution, chaired by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, to review cases not covered by the amnesty and formulate recommendations to “heal wounds.”

The president of the legislature’s special commission, Jorge Arreaza, stated on a televised interview that the first 379 amnesty applications had been processed, primarily in Caracas.

“Both the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office have received 379 requests for amnesty,” he explained. “These individuals should be released in the coming hours. This process will continue in the coming days.”

Parliamentary leader Jorge Rodríguez said on Saturday that there are a further 1,500 cases being revised.

Meanwhile, Ernesto Villegas, minister of culture and coordinator of the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, reported on his Telegram channel a meeting with campesino, tenant, and labor organizations to discuss cases of activists facing legal proceedings due to social struggles over land, housing, and employment. These groups were not explicitly contemplated among the direct beneficiaries of the law.

The grassroots collectives denounced the criminalization of their social demands and provided concrete information that will be forwarded to the relevant authorities in coordination with the National Assembly’s special commission.

The meeting hosted by Villegas also saw relatives of individuals imprisoned for alleged corruption in the public sector criticize the penal system and advocate for their loved ones’ rights.

The Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence promised to promptly send the complaints to the relevant bodies and encourage corrective actions.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, February 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration is forcing all royalty, tax, and dividend payments from Venezuelan oil production be paid into accounts managed by Washington.

The mandate reinforces the White House’s control over Venezuelan crude export revenues in the wake of the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, as well as a naval blockade imposed in December.

The US Treasury Department updated its FAQ section on February 18 to clarify conditions on recently issued sanctions waivers allowing expanded participation in Venezuela’s oil sector to Western corporations.

Under the licenses, only “routine payments of local taxes, permits, and fees” to Venezuelan authorities are permitted.

“Other payments, including royalties, fixed per-barrel production levies, or federal taxes to blocked persons, such as the Venezuelan government or (state oil company) PDVSA, must be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Fund,” the text read.

The acting Rodríguez administration has yet to comment on the new restrictions. 

Since January, Washington has imposed control over Venezuelan crude exports, with proceeds deposited in a US-administered account in Qatar. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced recently that funds will now be deposited directly in a US Treasury account. Senior administration officials have stated that the arrangement gives the White House “leverage” to condition Venezuelan government policies, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Caracas must submit a “budget request” to access its own oil revenues.

At least US $500 million, out of an initial deal estimated at $2 billion, have been returned to Venezuela and offered by banks in foreign exchange auctions. Venezuelan authorities have also reported the import of medicines and medical equipment from US manufacturers using “unblocked funds.”

On Thursday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 50A allowing select firms to conduct transactions and operations related to hydrocarbon projects with PDVSA or any other Venezuelan public entity. The document mirrors General License 50 issued on February 13 but added French firm Maurel & Prom to a list including BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell.

Maurel & Prom’s main project in the Caribbean nation is a minority stake in the Petroregional del Lago joint venture, which currently produces 21,000 barrels per day (bpd). The company’s executives recently held a meeting with Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as part of Caracas’ efforts to secure foreign investment.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued several licenses to boost US and European involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, with imports of diluents, inputs and technology now allowed. General License 49, issued on February 13, demands that companies apply for a special license before striking production and investment deals with Venezuela.

The US Treasury issued sanctions waivers while maintaining existing coercive measures against the Venezuelan oil industry in place, including financial sanctions against PDVSA. The licenses likewise block any transactions with companies from Cuba, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

The selective flexibilization of sanctions followed the Venezuelan National Assembly’s approval of a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform grants private corporations expanded control over operations and sales, while opening the possibility for disputes to be taken to external arbitration.

The reformed law also allows the Venezuelan executive to arbitrarily reduce royalties and a new “integrated tax,” capped at 30 and 15 percent, respectively. The executive is likewise entitled to grant reductions to the 50 percent income tax set for the oil industry if deemed necessary for projects to be “internationally competitive.”

According to US-set conditions and the reformed law, minority partners such as Repsol are authorized to sell crude from Venezuelan joint ventures before depositing the owed royalty and tax amounts, as well as dividends belonging to PDVSA, to US Treasury-designated accounts.

The initial crude sales as part of the Trump-imposed arrangement were conducted via commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura, which lifted cargoes at Venezuelan ports before re-selling them to final customers. However, according to Reuters, US-based refiners including Phillips66 and CITGO are looking to secure crude directly from Venezuela to maximize profits.

CITGO, a subsidiary of PDVSA, is close to being taken over by vulture fund Elliott Management following a court-mandated auction to satisfy creditor claims against the South American country. The company has been managed by boards appointed by the US-backed Venezuelan opposition since 2019.

Feb. 17 (UPI) — The Venezuelan government on Tuesday released Evanan Romero, a Venezuelan-American oil consultant detained four days earlier at the Maracaibo airport, without a judicial warrant or formal charges publicly announced.

Romero, 86, a Venezuelan with U.S. citizenship, was detained by authorities under Delcy Rodríguez’s government while attempting to travel from Maracaibo to Caracas, where he had scheduled a series of meetings with companies in the oil sector.

After an initial detention, Romero spent the first night at Interpol facilities at the airport. The next day, due to his advanced age and medical condition, authorities authorized his transfer to a private clinic in Maracaibo, where he remained under guard, local outlet Efecto Cocuyo reported.

The release occurred without official statements from the government. Local journalists and media outlets, such as Spain’s ABC, reported Romero’s detention.

“I’ve been here since Friday,” the expert said from a private clinic, while guards remained in an adjacent room.

Romero had planned to meet with the local management of Repsol and to participate in a videoconference with Reliance’s leadership in India to discuss a possible return to oil blocks in the Orinoco Belt.

He also had meetings scheduled with investors interested in the energy stabilization phase that would reportedly be coordinated from Washington after the capture of President Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. military operation Jan. 3.

The consultant had arrived in Venezuela from Panama, with a stop in Colombia, intending to visit a relative before traveling to the capital.

In statements to ABC, Romero said his detention could be linked to a past administrative dispute related to a family investment, which he said was resolved in his favor by the Supreme Court of Justice.

No Venezuelan authority has publicly confirmed that or provided details about the case.

Romero is part of a committee of about 400 former state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela technicians and executives dedicated to developing proposals for rebuilding the energy sector under a future government, Infobae reported.

He has maintained contacts with U.S. oil companies such as Exxon and ConocoPhillips, and his name has appeared in discussions about compensation for expropriated assets and the opening of new blocks, the publication added.

Romero is considered a veteran expert in Venezuela’s oil sector, with more than six decades of experience. He served on the board of PDVSA, since the 1960s, with responsibilities in operational oversight, capital projects and maritime operations.

He later served as president and chief executive officer of Grupo Asesor Petrolero Venezolano LLC, a firm specializing in reservoir performance studies, reserves evaluation, thermal recovery of heavy crude and basin master development plans.

He has also been affiliated with the Harvard Electricity Policy Group at Harvard University.

The detention occurred just days after the visit to Caracas by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright at a time when the White House has intensified pressure for the release of political prisoners and reiterated that reconstruction of the oil sector will depend on clear legal and political guarantees.

President Donald Trump has publicly argued that major U.S. companies should invest billions of dollars to repair deteriorated infrastructure and restore production.

In the streets of Cartagena, Colombia, cumbia musicians beat tambora drums and blow into flautas, women in red, yellow and blue ruffled dresses whisk by, and sweating food vendors push carts, their arepas sizzling.

Among the music and striking color of Cartagena, my dad handed me my first arepa. Arepas are the most essential dish of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela, centered around South America’s most treasured crop: corn.

To prepare an arepa, corn kernels are ground into flour or pre-ground corn flour is used (often the iconic yellow bag of Venezuelan brand P.A.N.), and mixed with water and salt. The soft dough is then fried, grilled or baked into a pancake-like shape. The result is delightfully simple yet endlessly customizable.

“My memory of arepas is eating them morning, afternoon and night,” said Yesika Baker, owner of Chamo’s Venezuelan Cuisine in Pasadena. “In Venezuela, the areperas are open 24/7.”

The arepa has deep roots. Before Colombia and Venezuela came to be known as separate territories, they were unified by Indigenous groups with similar culinary traditions. When the Spanish first arrived in South America, Indigenous women were cooking corn cakes similar to the modern arepa, meaning the tradition likely goes back thousands of years, according to University of Venezuela anthropology professor Ocarina Castillo.

Today, the arepa is popular in both countries. In Colombia, an arepa tends to be simple: topped with cheese by street vendors, filled with egg for a tasty breakfast or, most often, served as a side to a hearty meal. Some say the masa of a Colombian arepa tends on the thinner side as well.

“Growing up in Colombia, the arepa is like the Mexican’s tortilla. Everything comes with an arepita,” said Santiago Restrepo, owner of Sus Arepas in East L.A. “Venezuelans, on the other hand, use it like a pita — stuffed. With Venezuelan-style arepas, you can really have fun with the fillings.”

The Venezuelan arepa “rellena” or stuffed style, is one that you’ll see dominate this list, with an experimental appeal that makes them a favorite for Angelenos. One of Venezuela’s most popular arepas is the Reina Pepiada, which translates to “curvy queen” and is typically filled with shredded chicken, avocado, cilantro and mayonnaise. According to Castillo, the name is in honor of a real beauty queen, Susana Duijm, the first Venezuelan to win Miss World in 1955.

In Colombia and Venezuela, it’s common to eat arepas at least once a day, especially at breakfast. But for a dish so essential to millions of people, for a long time, arepas were underrepresented in L.A.’s food scene.

“When I first moved to L.A. [in the ‘80s], you couldn’t find arepas anywhere,” Restrepo said. “Up until 2020, I wouldn’t have considered them a popular dish here. But just in the past few years, they’ve exploded.”

Restrepo credits their meteoric rise to a photogenic appeal. If you’re an avid consumer of food content online, then you’ve likely seen the arepa rellena — after a typical wait time of 20 minutes, they come layered and overflowing with ingredients like shredded beef, stewed beans, melted cheese or plantains.

“A good arepa rellena is all in the fillings,” said Mercedes Rojas, chef of the Arepa Stand, which pops up at local farmers markets on the weekends.

From creative picks stuffed with mango and cheese to a Koreatown-inspired arepa with bulgogi and plenty of traditional options, this guide features nine standouts in L.A.’s growing arepa scene.

Although, for your sake, don’t try to ask which country created the arepa, or who does it best. “It’s a long fight, amiga,” Baker said. “From Venezuela or Colombia, we defend our arepas.”