Uzbekistan

Authors: Marin Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Uzbekistan has recently commenced construction of a new airport in Tashkent, valued at $2.5 billion, as a symbol of the country’s reinvention. The project, slated to begin operations in 2029, aims to serve as Central Asia’s key aviation hub by supporting more than 40 take-offs and landings per hour and serving 20 million passengers annually. Economists predict that increased air traffic at the airport could generate $27 billion in annual revenue and create thousands of new jobs.

To achieve this ambitious goal, Tokyo and Seoul will be critical partners: Japan’s Sojitz Corporation, which has extensive experience in the aviation sector, has agreed to invest millions of dollars and share technical expertise. As for South Korea, the Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) signed a $24.5 million consulting contract to provide operational and service support for the development of the new Tashkent airport.

Investment Incoming

While the Tashkent airport is one of the most recent and buzzworthy examples of Uzbek cooperation with Japan and South Korea, it is hardly the only area of engagement. With a projected 6.2% economic growth rate for 2025, Uzbekistan is on track to become one of the five fast-growing economies in Europe and Central Asia, making it a highly attractive market for trade and investment. In July 2025, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) announced a three-year initiative to fund and implement $3.7 billion in projects across the energy, petrochemical, textile, and infrastructure sectors. Sojitz also agreed to expand its cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, including the Syrdarya II power generation facility. Mining is another lucrative sector, with the Japanese corporation Itochu investing heavily in Uzbek uranium mining operations.

Similarly, South Korea is playing a vital role in financing Uzbekistan’s infrastructure projects, including supplying high-speed trains for its electrified transport networks and providing over $12 million to promote sustainable resource extraction methods and supply equipment and training for Uzbek engineers. Another notable project is a South Korean-funded $150 million medical center in Tashkent.

High-Level Diplomacy

The two East Asian governments have also increased intergovernmental engagement with Uzbekistan in recent years. Visits and engagement between policymakers in Tashkent and Tokyo are relatively common: this year alone, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya visited Tashkent in June, while then-Minister of Justice Keisuke Suzuki visited in May. While the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has yet to fully formulate her foreign policy strategy, it is hoped that she will continue Tokyo’s engagement with Uzbekistan.

Then-South Korean President Yun Suk Yeol visited Tashkent in June 2024, while President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and current President Lee Jae Myung spoke by phone in July. They pledged to strengthen the “special strategic partnership” and expand “multifaceted cooperation,” noting that Korean companies have invested over US$8 billion in the Uzbek economy.

Japan and South Korea have proven to be invaluable official development assistance (ODA) providers. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo’s primary international aid organ, along with other Japanese NGOs, have worked extensively on infrastructure and human capital development in Uzbekistan. While Japanese ODA to Central Asia is of lower priority compared to Southeast Asia, Tokyo has consistently remained a top donor to Uzbekistan and the rest of the region. South Korea- which famously transformed from a major aid recipient to a prominent aid donor – has currently designated Uzbekistan as a “priority partner country” in terms of its ODA allocation. South Korean development assistance increased tenfold from 2006 and 2019, concentrating on social infrastructure and public service projects. Given the current instability of the global humanitarian and international development sector, it is difficult to say with certainty which current and future projects involving Japan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan will be pursued.  Nevertheless, ODA from Japan and South Korea has clearly had, and will continue to have, a positive lasting impact in Uzbekistan. 

The Other Pillar: People-To-People Interactions

People-to-people relations, facilitated through tourism and educational opportunities, can serve as additional pillars to strengthen interstate relations. Tourism among the three countries is surging, as Uzbekistan has noted increased tourist traffic from Japan and South Korea and vice versa. Initiatives like “Cool Japan” and “the Korean Wave” have transformed the two East Asian nations into soft power titans, while Uzbekistan is emphasizing strategies such as its Silk Road mystique to boost its soft power and tourism potential. If construction of the new airport stays on track, by the end of the decade, Japanese and South Korean tourists will arrive at a state-of-the-art facility their governments helped build.

Studying abroad is a significant phenomenon in Uzbekistan, ranking fifth globally in 2021 in terms of the number of students studying abroad. Japan offers numerous scholarships, language programs, and exchange programs designed for Uzbek students to study there. South Korea is an even more popular destination, with an estimated 5,000 Uzbek students studying in Korean universities. While comparatively fewer Japanese and South Korean students study in Uzbekistan, exchanges among the three countries can only strengthen their long-term ties.

Finally, Uzbekistan contributes to South Korea’s academic community and workforce: nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens were living in South Korea as of June 2025, comprising the fifth largest foreign-born population in the country.

The Big Picture

Japan and South Korea have also robustly engaged with Uzbekistan through regional forums. Japan spearheaded the “C5+1” framework, which organizes the five Central Asian republics into a regional unit interacting with an extra-regional actor, with its 2004 “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue. Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union adopted this model for their own engagements with the Central Asian states. The Japan-centered C5+1 has continued, with the most recent summit being held in Astana in 2025. South Korea has helped organize a series of Central Asia-Republic of Korea Cooperation Forums and was set to host the first Central Asia-Korea summit in Seoul in 2025. The arrest of deposed President Yoon Suk Yeol earlier this year, however, has delayed those plans. South Korea announced a “K-Silk Road” initiative in June 2024, an ambitious project encompassing such areas as natural resource extraction, development aid, and cultural exchanges- though the arrest of Yoon has also halted progress on these objectives.

As a corollary to this analysis, it is worth noting two recent developments involving Central Asian engagement with  the Global Powers of China and the US, which often overshadow Japan and South Korea’s efforts in the region. A Chinese company reportedly plans to invest as much as US$500 million in Uzbekistan’s Andijan region to construct a hydroelectric power plant and modernize existing energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, US Ambassador-at-Large for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau visited Tashkent in late October as part of a regional tour. 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the US-Central Asia C5+1 format, and US members of Congress have requested the Trump administration to organize a presidential summit to celebrate this achievement.

The point here is that the Global Powers will continue to engage Tashkent, and matching dollar-for-dollar  investment to compete with them is unrealistic. That being said, Tokyo and Seoul are not necessarily positioning themselves to act like Global Powers in the region. Japanese engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia has been characterized by a flexible, piecemeal approach that targets key issues while forgoing rigid diplomatic protocol like geopolitical alliances or treaty obligations. In addition, Japan values “quality over quantity” regarding its projects: while it may not be as flashy or large-scale compared to its Global Power counterparts, Japan aims for long-term sustainability and success. South Korea, for its part, appears to be adopting a similar mode of engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Being involved in strategic projects, like a significant involvement in Tashkent’s new airport, will help Tokyo and Seoul continue to have a high-profile and visible presence in Uzbekistan’s development projects.

Conclusions

Since President Mirziyoyev took power in 2016, he has sought to create a “New Uzbekistan” characterized by economic dynamism and global integration. Tashkent’s relations with Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union have been extensively analyzed. However, two other countries that have developed their own special and successful partnerships with Uzbekistan are Japan and South Korea.

As the New Uzbekistan gains momentum, Tashkent must rely on international partnerships to sustain development and enhance its international prestige. Given the country’s history of subjugation under empires and global powers, Uzbekistan’s involvement with nations like Japan and South Korea offers an intriguing alternative: robust engagement with less risk of domination. In turn, these East Asian nations can expand their regional influence to offset rival powers, most notably China, and gain access to new markets and resources. The collaboration between these three countries thus offers mutual benefits for all parties.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He has co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and given presentations on environmental issues that affect the region.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reached Kazakhstan on Monday to attend the second China–Central Asia Summit, a high-stakes diplomatic gathering aimed at deepening Beijing’s economic and strategic ties with the region.

The summit, which will be held on Tuesday in the Kazakh capital Astana, comes at a time when China is intensifying its outreach to Central Asian countries amid shifting global power alignments — and mounting tensions in neighbouring Iran, which is roiled in an escalating conflict with Israel.

The summit will bring together the heads of state from all five Central Asian nations — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — along with Xi.

The Astana summit also carries symbolic weight: it is the first time that the five Central Asian nations are holding a summit in the region with the leader of another country.

So, what is the importance of the China-Central Asia Summit? And is China battling both the United States and Russia for influence in the region?

What’s on Xi’s agenda in Astana?

On Monday, Xi was greeted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other senior officials at the airport in Astana. The Astana summit follows the inaugural May 2023 China–Central Asia Summit, which was held in Xi’an, the capital city of China’s Shaanxi province.

Xi is expected to be in Astana from June 16 to 18 and is scheduled to hold bilateral meetings with Kazakhstan’s leaders on Monday before the summit on June 17.

At the summit, he is expected to deliver a keynote speech and “exchange views on the achievements of the China-Central Asia mechanism, mutually beneficial cooperation under the framework, and international and regional hotspot issues,” said a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson.

The office of Kazakhstan’s president noted that both countries are “set to further strengthen bilateral ties” and Xi will also chair “high-level talks with President [Tokayev] focused on deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership”.

Tokayev, who has been in office since 2019, is a fluent Mandarin speaker and previously served as a diplomat in China.

Zhao Long, a senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), told Al Jazeera that Central Asian countries see their partnership with China as a deep, multifaceted cooperation grounded in shared strategic and pragmatic interests.

“The alignment with China helps Central Asian states enhance their regional stability, pursue economic modernisation, and diversify their diplomatic portfolios,” said Zhao. Where Central Asia has abundant energy resources, he said, China offers vast markets, advanced technology, and infrastructure expertise.

Last Friday, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, told a news briefing that establishing “the China-Central Asia mechanism was a unanimous decision among China and the five Central Asian countries, which dovetails with the region’s common desire to maintain stability and pursue high-quality development”.

Since China first formalised and chaired the China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023, Lin said, “China’s relations with Central Asian countries have entered a new era … injecting fresh impetus into regional development and delivering tangibly for the peoples of all six countries.”

“We believe through this summit, China and five Central Asian countries will further consolidate the foundation of mutual trust,” Lin added.

“During the summit, President Xi will also meet with these leaders and lay out the top-level plan for China’s relations with [the] five Central Asian countries,” said the spokesperson.

SIIS’s Zhao said Xi’s attendance at the second summit sends a clear message: “China places high strategic importance on Central Asia.”

What’s ‘C5+1’ – and is China racing the US for influence?

Experts are dubbing the China-Central Asia Summit as a C5+1 framework, because of the five regional nations involved.

The United States first initiated the concept of such a summit with all five Central Asian nations in 2015, under then-US President Barack Obama. But at the time, the conclave was held at the level of foreign ministers. Then-US Secretary of State John Kerry led the first meeting in September 2015 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

In January 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual summit with the five Central Asian state heads, and then in June 2025, he invited them for a follow-up conclave in India.

Meanwhile, in 2023, Xi hosted the leaders in Xi’an. Four months later, then-US President Joe Biden hosted the C5 state heads on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York. It was the first time a US president met with Central Asian heads of state under this framework.

But current US President Donald Trump’s tariff policies could upset that outreach from Washington. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all been tariffed at 10 percent.

Trump initially imposed an even higher 27 percent tariff on imports from Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, though as with all other countries, the US president has paused these rates, limiting tariffs to a flat 10 percent for now.

China has cited these tariff rates to project itself as a more reliable partner to Central Asia than the US. At the meeting with the foreign ministers of the region in April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticised unilateralism, trade protectionism, and “the trend of anti-globalisation [that] has severely impacted the free trade system”.

The US, Wang said, was “undermining the rule-based multilateral trading system, and destabilising the global economy”.

Why does Central Asia matter to China?

The region, rich in uranium, oil, and rare earth metals, has become increasingly important to China as a key corridor for trade with Europe. Subsequently, China has increased its engagement with Central Asian countries.

Xi, who has curtailed his foreign visits since the COVID-19 pandemic, is visiting Kazakhstan for the third time since 2020. He visited in 2022, and then again in 2024.

Central Asia is also a critical part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — a network of highways, railroads and ports connecting Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America — as a gateway to Europe.

Experts expect the BRI to figure prominently at the summit in Astana on Tuesday, with additional emphasis on collaboration in energy and sustainable development.

A planned $8bn railway connecting China’s Xinjiang region to Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan is likely to be on the agenda, the SIIS’s Zhao said. Construction on the project is scheduled to begin in July. Expected to be completed by 2030, the railway route will provide China with more direct access to Central Asia and reduce the three countries’ reliance on Russia’s transport infrastructure.

Additionally, Zhao said, the summit may feature agreements on reducing tariffs, streamlining customs procedures, and lowering non-tariff barriers to boost bilateral trade volumes.

How much does Central Asia depend on China?

A lot.

China is today the top trading partner of each of the five Central Asian republics.

• Kazakhstan imported goods worth $18.7bn from China and exported goods worth $15bn in 2023 — making up 30 percent of its total imports and 16 percent of exports.
• Tajikistan imported goods worth $3.68bn from China and exported goods worth $250m in 2023 — making up 56 percent of its total imports and 16 percent of exports.
• Kyrgyzstan imported goods worth $3.68bn and exported goods worth $887m in 2023 from China — constituting 29 percent of its total imports and 26 percent of exports.
• Uzbekistan imported goods worth $12.7bn and exported goods worth $1.82bn in 2023 from the world’s second-largest economy — representing 32 percent of its total imports and 6 percent of exports.
• Turkmenistan imported goods worth $957m and exported goods worth $9.63bn in 2023 from China — or 20 percent of its total imports and 62 percent of exports.

China is also ramping up its investments in the region. It has committed to an estimated $26bn in investments in Kazakhstan, for instance.

Is China replacing Russia in Central Asia?

It’s complicated.

Formerly parts of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian republics have long belonged in Russia’s strategic sphere of influence. Millions of people from the five republics live and work in Russia, and since 2023, Moscow has become a supplier of natural gas to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which have faced energy shortages — even though Central Asia was historically a supplier of energy to Russia.

But though Russia remains a major economic force in the region, China has overtaken it as the largest trading partner of Central Asian republics over the past three years — a period that has coincided with Russia’s war on Ukraine. Some of that increased trade, in fact, is believed to be the outcome of China using Central Asia as a conduit for exports to Russia of goods that face Western sanctions.

Still, there are ways in which Russia remains the region’s preeminent outside ally. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — three of the region’s five nations — are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) — along with Russia, Armenia and Belarus. Like NATO, this bloc offers collective security guarantees to members. In effect, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have the cover of Russia’s protection if they are attacked by another nation — something that China does not offer.