US military attack

Jorge “Toti” Vilalta is a political spokesperson for the Otro Beta social movement, and also a member of the ALBA Movimientos platform. He works for La Ceiba, a Latin American and Caribbean outlet focused on stories from the territories. A longtime Bolivarian and Chavista activist, he specializes in cultural, communications, and productive processes, as well as international solidarity initiatives. In this interview, Vilalta offers his views on the present challenges for Venezuelan popular movements and international solidarity initiatives, and argues that there is a need to articulate a clear narrative for the Chavista grassroots.

In the wake of the US attacks on January 3, which followed years of the blockade, what are the challenges to sustaining morale and keeping hope alive?

It is an important question. Maintaining high morale is essential for everything we need to do in the country. Venezuela needs to increase oil production to boost the economy. With the possibility that US sanctions and the oil blockade will be lifted, there is some hope. Additionally, the market upheaval due to the war against Iran has raised hydrocarbon prices, so that could improve our conditions to negotiate with our “kidnapper,” which is the US government.

The United States, despite being the world’s largest oil producer, still needs our crude. Its refineries in the South are geared to receive Venezuelan crude. Therefore, the US-Israeli war against Iran could help us negotiate sanctions relief, and that will help improve living conditions in the country.

Venezuelans need better jobs, healthcare, education, and access to culture. I believe this is also the priority for Acting President Delcy Rodríguez.

Politically, to sustain the revolution, our goal as grassroots movements is to advance the communal state as a Bolivarian socialist model. The regular national consultations make democracy stronger by creating direct connections between the government and the people, bypassing bureaucracy. We must keep working in the communities.

Another objective is maintaining peace. The multiple dialogue processes, under President Maduro and now with Acting President Rodríguez, have exposed and isolated neo-fascism and the far-right.

What is your take on the multiple and often competing narratives that have emerged since January 3?

There is a lot of work to be done in terms of communication and culture. There is no unified narrative on our side. The only Chavista version comes from the government. We need to explain what we’re doing and where we’re going. On January 3, we had a big chance to tell all the people of Venezuela: “Here is the enemy, clearer than ever; let’s unite.”

That work wasn’t finished. Many people today are confused and see no clear goals. People are still dealing with the trauma of the bombings, they fear not knowing what will happen. There is a lot of speculation on issues like early elections, not to mention the generalized perception that Trump is calling the shots. and the country’s commitment to following the US president’s dictates.

The Bolivarian Revolution has always had a weakness in communication. We do a lot, but we explain little about everything we do. It is hard to counter all the mainstream media propaganda. So in the end we feel trapped under bombings and blockades without being able to provide convincing explanations to the people. We need to create new communications channels, not just copy influencers from other countries.

What role does international solidarity play in the present circumstances? In particular, what are grassroots movements doing to press for the release of kidnapped President Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores?

International solidarity is going strong. We have cultivated internationalist practices in Venezuela for over a decade. 

Concerning the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and Congresswoman Cilia Flores, here in Venezuela we had near-daily demonstrations all over the country in the first two or three weeks after the kidnapping. El Otro Beta and ALBA Movimientos were present in many of them. We have also been working with solidarity brigades that have arrived since the bombing and kidnapping.

Around the world, every third of the month there are concrete actions to push the “Bring Them Back” (“Los queremos de vuelta”) campaign. We have coordinated activities, rallies, webinars, and more with grassroots movements from other countries. ALBA Movimientos, the International People’s Assembly and the Simón Bolívar Institute have been at the forefront of this campaign.

In the US, solidarity collectives have been protesting at the New York prison where the president is being held. They’ve been marching, chanting, and holding signs with information, challenging the false narratives of drug trafficking and “narcoterrorism.” We also saw street actions outside the court, and in many cities around the world, on March 26 to coincide with the latest court hearing.

In Latin America, we are witnessing the rise of the far right, with deeply reactionary agendas. What, in your opinion, is the strategy for resisting and fighting back?

That’s a million-dollar question. I wish we had a definite answer. We missed our chance to unite Latin America and the Caribbean in the first ten years of this century.

Now, there are more reactionary and far-right governments, it feels like we are surrounded. We are seeing the launch of the “Shield of the Americas,” a new version of the Plan Condor from the 1970s. 

With this worrying scenario, one priority would be for leftist and progressive governments to stop fighting among themselves. Beyond governments, the people of Latin America and the Caribbean must also set aside their differences, including ideological ones. If there’s one thing we all have in common, it’s our opposition to fascism. We are facing an advance of neocolonialism, fascism, and US imperialism.

If we do not put our differences aside to work together towards a common goal, which is to protect the 99% against the 1% of billionaire pedophiles and genocidal Zionists, who are leading us towards a totalitarian dictatorship of AI surveillance and robot police, we are doomed.

Comandante Chávez and the other revolutionary leaders said it: we must unite and fight together. The people of Latin America and the Caribbean are starting to understand this. It is also great to see US citizens standing up against war and the neo-fascism seen in ICE and immigration enforcement practices. And the demonstrations in support of Cuba and Palestine have been inspiring. More and more people are realizing that they live under a racist and war-mongering state.

We know that the masses bring about change. The Bolivarian Revolution had its genesis in the 1989 Caracazo uprising. The Vietnam War ended because people refused to fight, and a massive anti-war movement emerged. We are in a similar situation in history: the US faced serious setbacks in Iran, wasting taxpayers’ money, and losing soldiers in a war driven by Zionism. The imperialist defeat in this war can create new possibilities for left-wing governments, and for the global struggle for sovereignty. We must provide tools to popular power organizations and for mass mobilizations.

On February 28, the Venezuelan government issued and then deleted a statement regarding the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, which sparked controversy. How did you interpret this incident? And beyond the government’s stance, what position should Latin American movements take regarding the war that is spreading in the Middle East?

I do not believe that this was the government’s position. That is exactly why the statement was removed, even before people started criticizing it. It was the position of someone who was not politically affiliated, not of the government or the Venezuelan people.

The most important thing to know about the war in West Asia is that Iran is currently the world’s most significant anti-imperialist beacon. Its people are on the frontlines resisting against sanctions, global criminalization, and constant attacks by the genocidal state of Israel.

Iran has responded with full force, politically and militarily. It has well-trained leaders and a very clear narrative. Furthermore, Iran is taking advantage of its strategic ability to influence the global economy. With its control over the Strait of Hormuz, it aims to break the petrodollar dictatorship and the US’ ability to impose its will.

The dictatorial Gulf monarchies, which violate human rights but get a free pass on Western media, are paying the price. And we have seen the immediate impacts on energy markets. If the war continues, the balance of power between countries will change quickly and there are prospects of things improving for people in the Global South.

We must thank Iran and mourn its thousands of dead because they have stood up not only for their Islamic revolution and their nation-state, but also opened a window for the rest of the Global South’s peoples to fight against imperialism.

In Cuba, food and fuel shortages are worsening due to the US’ escalating blockade and sanctions. What are ALBA Movimientos and grassroots organizations across the continent doing to get concrete aid to the island?

ALBA Movimientos has been collecting supplies and goods for Cuba. The same people who were part of the flotilla for Cuba are the ones organizing this effort. We are sending aid from Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia.

Several Latin American countries are supporting this movement through their local communities. Brazil works with the MST, in Argentina it is via several social organizations. The Nuestra América Flotilla was the first of its kind, and it will happen again. There is an open humanitarian channel from Mexico to continue sending humanitarian supplies.

In Venezuela, we started the campaign “Love is Repaid with Love” (“Amor con amor se paga”). It has three phases. The first one, which was for donating medicines, was organized regionally, with collection centers in each state and in Caracas. The second phase, now underway, involves raising funds through various events (street fairs, a concert, and more) because what’s coming next is more expensive.

The third phase is purchasing supplies, primarily solar panels, which are very expensive, along with wiring and batteries, and other essential items. The information is available on our social media channels, and the shipments will happen at some point. They are not scheduled yet.

Against the backdrop of ongoing US sanctions against Cuba and Venezuela, how can solidarity organizations navigate the tension between the need to accommodate pressure from Washington and the defense of sovereignty and anti-imperialism?

Let me focus on the Venezuelan case because I believe the situation in Cuba is different right now. 

In my view, the historic, Bolivarian project continues. Communes continue their work toward a communal state even if this is not evident in other territories or at the institutional level. Social movements are working hard, staying true to anti-imperialism, and the acting government is following President Maduro’s line.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has made it clear that Venezuela should be able to make its own decisions and that the US should recognize Venezuela as an independent nation.

But it is necessary to explain this to the entire country, not just to the hardcore chavista base. The US government ultimately wants Chavismo to disappear. The best way to achieve this right now is not to bomb it, but to destroy it from within.

We understand that the government must keep negotiating with the US, and that Delcy Rodríguez has a gun pointed to her head. We have to be honest: we are negotiating with a kidnapper, and the conditions are not equal.

Still, internally, we need a narrative that explains to the country what happened, where we are, and where we are headed. Chavismo needs answers. In communities, people are asking questions that the media, including state outlets, are not answering, and this is a problem. To continue with our program, we need to have a shared understanding, a common narrative with which to influence national public opinion.

Beyond what the government does, we in the popular power organizations must battle for common sense. We need to explain that we are living through an extraordinary situation and that only a united country can overcome it. We cannot just wait for the right time to act; we need to keep moving forward, even though the circumstances are much more difficult.

Reinaldo Iturriza is a Venezuelan intellectual and writer who served as Minister of Communes (2013-14) and Culture (2014-16). He currently heads the Socialist Democracy Studies Center (CEDES) in Caracas. In this interview with Diario Red, Iturriza offers his views on the present Venezuelan context, the US’ January 3 invasion and subsequent impositions, the phenomenon of political disaffiliation and the importance of organizing a counter-offensive.

Although US aggression against Venezuela has been going on for decades, what happened on January 3, 2026, was an unprecedented and, to some extent, disconcerting event. This is because of the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, but also because it wasn’t a coup d’État, at least not according to the White House’s usual playbook, which involves a change in the government’s political alignment. What is your analysis of what happened that day?

What happened that day was an invasion, in every sense of the word. A flagrant and criminal violation of our sovereignty, preceded by constant threats and provocations, as well as the murder of dozens of fishermen in the Caribbean Sea – to which must be added the hundred Venezuelan military personnel and Cuban internationalists responsible for the president’s security who fell in combat during those early morning hours.

Regarding the shift in the government’s political alignment, the first thing this outcome reveals, in my view, is that it is absolutely false that the US aggression was motivated by anything even remotely related to its concern for democracy, just as the siege immediately preceding it had nothing to do with the Venezuelan government’s alleged ties to drug trafficking.

It is clear that the US government acted out of an interest in regaining control of our strategic resources, starting with our oil. Additionally, while weighing options and considering possible scenarios, the US concluded that the least traumatic way to achieve that objective was to leave the government structure virtually unchanged.

How did we reach this critical juncture?

Only someone completely unversed in politics would dare to claim that we should thank the United States for taking the first decisive steps to free us from a “tyranny” that had been in power for 25 years and that, otherwise, might have persisted indefinitely.

I mention this because Venezuelan society is not exactly known for its apolitical nature. What I’m getting at is that this is a narrative that is not only self-serving but also very dangerous, seeking to defend the indefensible. It is a version of events that is stumbling its way forward and aspires to become common sense. That is why it is essential to block its path once and for all.

And this requires emphasizing that throughout the first decade of this century, and even during the first half of the past decade, Venezuela was characterized as a high-intensity democracy, with very notable advances in all aspects of the material and spiritual lives of the popular majorities. What needs to be understood is what has happened here over the last 10 years.

When did the turning point occur? What circumstances led to the erosion of our high-intensity democracy? 

It seems to me that Antonio Gramsci provides invaluable analytical insights to begin understanding this historical development. What we witnessed and endured was nothing other than what the Italian intellectual calls the “reciprocal destruction” of the forces in conflict, with the consequent deterioration of democratic life and the progressive weakening of the political class and its respective social bases of support.

It is in this context that the intervention of the “foreign guard” took place on January 3, to continue using Gramscian terminology. A “foreign guard” that, incidentally, played a leading role in the conflict, decisively supporting one of the forces [the Venezuelan opposition] and doing everything possible to undermine the foundations of the national economy.

As the weeks went by, it became clear that the government of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has largely accepted the conditions imposed by the United States. Is this a “betrayal,” or is it a tactical retreat aimed at sustaining the Bolivarian Process in the long term?

Speaking in terms of betrayal or loyalty to the cause contributes little or nothing to understanding the situation. Opinions one way or the other are part of what Gramsci himself described as “petty political criticism.” Nor, it must be said, does the abuse of historical analogies aid in this regard.

I clearly recall that regarding the government’s rapprochement with certain factions of the bourgeoisie throughout 2016, and later in connection with the implementation of the orthodox monetarist program in 2018 – aimed primarily at controlling hyperinflation, which meant, among other things, reducing public spending to unprecedented levels and freezing wages – some comrades asked me in good faith whether this was something akin to Lenin’s New Economic Policy or whether, on the contrary, we were witnessing the abandonment of the strategic programmatic banners of the Bolivarian Revolution.

I would almost invariably tell them that what was needed was an analysis of the balance of power and that, regardless of how one chose to characterize it, the indisputable fact is that a recomposition of the ruling bloc was taking place: the working class, slowly but surely, ceased to be the backbone of that power bloc, as it undoubtedly had been throughout the Hugo Chávez era and even during Maduro’s early years.

Since January 3, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk has been invoked to try to explain the reasons behind the rapprochement with the US government, much in the same way that anything was previously justified by invoking Stalin’s defeat of fascism because we were facing the far right.

It is paradoxical that over the past 10 years we were able to find ourselves in the situation of the Soviet Union in March 1921, then in May 1945, and finally in March 1918, yet today, following one tactical retreat after another, the Bolivarian Process is hardly in a better position to face the future.

In retrospect, the facts seem to point to a structural retreat or, more precisely, a full-fledged strategic retreat.

A few days after January 3, you wrote an article in which you noted that the public reaction following the kidnapping [of Maduro and Flores] was one of “silence.” At that initial moment, there were no celebrations by the opposition, nor were there pro-government demonstrations; instead, a mood of “mourning for the humiliated nation” prevailed. And you made a very interesting point by arguing that “far from signifying consent with what had happened,” it was a manifestation of dissent that could find no “means of expression.” This is striking given the narrative of polarization that has surrounded Venezuela for years, which seems to encompass the entire society, dividing it between Chavistas and anti-Chavistas. Is there a vacuum of political representation?

Indeed, quite contrary to the prevailing narratives, Venezuelan society over the last 10 years has become increasingly depolarized, or perhaps we should work with the hypothesis that polarization has taken on new contours: the majority of the population versus its political class.

On several occasions, I have argued that during this period, no political phenomenon has been more significant and with more far-reaching implications than political disaffiliation. And this is by no means a recent “discovery”; I first raised this point in December 2015, in the context of the opposition’s parliamentary election victory.

When we analyzed the situation in depth, it became clear that the defeat of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) stemmed from the fact that, in Chavismo’s electoral strongholds, there had been a protest vote against the government.

It is no small matter that, despite the historical and contextual differences, that 2015 defeat, as was the case on January 3, was not celebrated by the people. That protest vote reflected a demand for correction.

In the eyes of a very significant portion of the social base supporting the Bolivarian Revolution, that correction did not occur. Quite the contrary: it was precisely from that point on that this process of recomposition of the power bloc I have already referred to began or intensified.

Why do you think this political disaffiliation occurred?

I am working on the hypothesis that the massive disaffiliation from Chavismo – understood here as a political identity – is directly proportional to the gradual distancing of the official political class from its working-class origins. In other words, to the extent that political identity ceased to embody the interests of the popular majorities, they ceased to feel represented by that political identity.

What occurred was what René Zavaleta Mercado termed a political and ideological hollowing out of the popular classes. This hollowing out, incidentally, should not be confused with depoliticization. The concept refers rather to the fact that the main guiding ideas that organize and give meaning to the way we conceive of the political are no longer associated with a specific identity.

This is particularly evident among younger people: my generation (and even more so the generations that preceded us) often laments the depoliticization of youth. And yes, there is depoliticization. But it is not uncommon to strike up a conversation with a young person from the working class in their twenties and realize that several of the key ideas that historically defined Chavismo are still there, yet those ideas have no political expression today.

In any case, I must emphasize that this phenomenon is far from being exclusively limited to young people. In reality, it describes the situation of the vast majority of Venezuelan society. A majority that does not condone something like a foreign invasion, but that cannot find ways to express its deep discontent with the state of affairs.

In your role as Minister of Communes between 2013 and 2014, but also as an activist and intellectual, you have been involved in the process of organizing and building the communes. This is a novel form of popular organization proposed by the Bolivarian Revolution and particularly by Hugo Chávez. For those unfamiliar with the topic, what are the communes? What is their objective?

The communes, and before them the communal councils, can be understood as the political formula devised by the Bolivarian leadership, and in particular by Hugo Chávez, to organize fundamentally that segment of the working class that came to constitute the backbone of the movement: the subproletariat, understood as the working poor whose labor does not guarantee them sufficient means to ensure their reproduction as a labor force.

Elsewhere I have elaborated in greater detail on what I am now only touching upon very briefly: the subproletariat was the driving force behind the popular uprising of February 27, 1989, [known as the Caracazo]. During the 1990s, under neoliberalism, the subproletariat came to represent the largest segment of the Venezuelan working class.

Excluded from the market, politics, and citizenship, it became politicized under Chávez’s leadership. It did everything possible to bring him to power. It defended democracy when it was threatened by the elites and led the massive street demonstrations that succeeded in reversing the 2002 coup d’état. Months later, it was on the front lines of resistance against the strike-sabotage of the oil industry and the corporate lockout: the Bolivarian Revolution would not be defeated by hunger and unemployment.

In a country on the brink of economic ruin [in 2002-03], we witnessed the recovery of the oil industry and experienced the effects of the first attempts at the democratic redistribution of oil rents – an experience that was entirely foreign to the more recent subproletariat.

Citizenship and the market were no longer off-limits: they gained gradual access to healthcare, education, and food. Their neighborhoods began to appear on official maps. Millions were able to obtain an identity card for the first time. They achieved their most resounding political victory in the 2004 referendum, which decided whether Chávez would remain in power.

In 2005, the Bolivarian leadership faced the challenge of how to organize a sub-proletariat that, by definition, is not in the factory, that due to its political culture distrusts the more traditional forms of political representation, and that also demonstrates a strong inclination toward political experimentation.

The answer, broadly speaking, was that it was necessary to promote the creation of popular self-government in the territories; this self-government had to, among other things, identify the productive potential of those territories and organize itself to develop that potential.

It was in this context that the first community councils were established. Later, in 2008, in areas where the self-governance initiatives were deemed to have the greatest political potential, efforts were intensified with the pilot launch of the first communes.

The communes were conceived as spaces with relative autonomy. This means that they were not to be subordinate to any formal power, nor were they to function as small, self-sufficient communities – like tiny islands in the sea of capitalism.

In Chávez’s words, they were to be capable of organizing themselves in a networked manner, “like a gigantic spiderweb covering the territory of the future, but in no case outside the strategic horizon of the Bolivarian Revolution.” In this sense, they represented a kind of popular vanguard in the process of implementing the program of transformation in the territory.

What is the current state of communal organization in Venezuela compared to previous years? How has the process been affected in recent years?

That’s a good question, especially since it has become customary in recent years to point to the existence of the communes as a kind of political – and even ethical – bulwark that could eventually serve as a counterweight to more authoritarian or conservative tendencies within Chavismo.

As a sort of consolation: we admit that things aren’t going very well, to say the least, and it’s equally true that the outlook isn’t encouraging at all, but at least the communes exist.

However, we must emphasize a few points I’ve already mentioned: the last 10 years have been a time of recomposition of the ruling bloc, of massive political disaffiliation, and of an economic policy that does not prioritize the interests of the working class. These are times of managing the status quo, which means that the scope for political experimentation has been reduced to historic lows.

To this, of course, we must add that after January 3, it is the US government that ultimately administers and decides how our revenues are spent. In other words, the problem is no longer even the scope of action of the communes, but rather the scope of the republic’s sovereignty.

This issue of the communes’ relative autonomy presents itself to us today in a radically different context: it remains to be seen whether, beyond the ability to manage very limited resources for the implementation of very limited local projects, communal leadership has the will and capacity to reaffirm its autonomy – no longer in the face of state or party institutions, but primarily in the face of a “foreign guard” that seeks to decide the nation’s fate.

Regarding the latter point you mentioned, Donald Trump’s offensive against Latin America, within a global context of military escalation and the rise of the far right, presents a very complex scenario for leftist governments, movements, and organizations. Added to the aggression against Venezuela is the intensification of the blockade against Cuba and the pressure on progressive governments in the region. How do you see the future of Chavismo and the Bolivarian Revolution in this context?

Let me refer once again to Gramsci: the analysis I have attempted here is not an end in itself. Its purpose is not to demonstrate clarity, eloquence, or anything of the sort. Such an analysis only makes sense if it aims to create the conditions for “optimism of the will.” 

The global onslaught of the far right cannot be met with voluntarism or naive pragmatism. There is no more effective incentive than developing the capacity to conduct analyses of the balance of power that are as rigorous and unflinching as possible. In times of retreat, the priority must be on organizing the counteroffensive. And such a thing is impossible based on complacent analyses or those aimed at reaffirming our status as victims.

In the battle of ideas, it is imperative to construct an effective narrative regarding the Bolivarian Revolution. One that does not shy away from pointing out our mistakes or limitations, but at the same time – and drawing on abundant historical evidence – properly highlights our numerous successes, starting with the fact that we managed to outline a programmatic vision that the popular majority embraced, feeling for the first time in a long while that they were masters of their own destiny.

The current state of affairs is not the inevitable consequence of an anachronistic program –one alien to our ideas and customs –that carried within it the seeds of authoritarianism from the very beginning. On the contrary, our program was well-suited to its time, consistent with our political culture, and realized itself as a high-intensity democracy. We must account for the multiple causes of various kinds that led to the interruption of the process of implementing that program.

This must take place within the context of a profound crisis of political representation, so we will most likely have to be prepared to witness – and even foster – the emergence of a new political identity that does not renounce its national, popular, and anti-capitalist character.

In the short term, what is essential is the convergence of all forces of different stripes that oppose the imposition of conditions of tutelage on our nation. We are on the threshold of new battles to recover our full sovereignty. This is only just beginning.

Source: Diario Red

The Venezuelanalysis Podcast is back. In our new season premiere, we tackle the fallout of the January 3rd military escalation against Caracas, an event that marks a volatile new chapter in the long history of US intervention in the region.

Join Venezuelanalysis Lead Editor Ricardo Vaz, Associate Editor Lucas Koerner, and VA Founder Greg Wilpert as they break down the geopolitical shift from “maximum pressure” to direct confrontation. This episode goes beyond the headlines to analyze the underlying causes and the global consequences of Washington’s renewed focus on “its” hemisphere.

Powered by RedCircle

Caracas, March 26, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US Judge Alvin Hellerstein ruled out dismissing the case against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores in a hearing on Thursday in Brooklyn.

The defense team for Maduro and Flores—who face charges including drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession—requested that the case be thrown out after the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) denied them authorization to use Venezuelan state funds to pay for legal counsel. OFAC had initially granted the license on February 9 but revoked it three hours later.

New York Southern District Judge Hellerstein declined to throw out the charges due to the blockaded funds, calling it “a serious step based on hypotheticals.” However, he did not formally rule and left the door open to revisit the decision in the future. 

US Justice Department prosecutor Kyle Wirshba argued that allowing access to Venezuelan state funds would undermine existing sanctions policy, adding that if the defendants are unable to hire private attorneys, court-appointed counsel could be assigned. Maduro attorney Barry Pollack countered that such a measure would violate their Sixth Amendment right to choose their own legal representation.

During the hearing, Hellerstein challenged the prosecutors’ arguments, adding that OFAC’s personal sanctions against Maduro and Flores would also block them from using personal funds. The judge likewise disagreed with the prosecution’s claims that the blocking of funding for the defense was a matter of national security, stating that Maduro and Flores “no longer represent a threat.” 

He further remarked that “things have changed” and that the United States is already “doing business” with Venezuela.

According to observers in the courthouse, Maduro and Flores, both in beige prison uniforms and handcuffed, appeared calm throughout the hearing, using headphones for simultaneous translation. Neither spoke. Observers noted that Maduro appeared thinner. Flores’ attorney, Mark Donnelly, made an urgent request for a medical evaluation, specifically an electrocardiogram, citing a pre-existing condition. The judge approved the request.

Hellerstein will set a new court date in the coming days. Maduro and Flores have not requested bail and were returned to the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn after the hearing.

Maduro and Flores, who is also a lawmaker, were kidnapped by US special forces during a military attack against Caracas on January 3. They pleaded not guilty at their arraignment two days later. Despite recurring “narcoterrorism” accusations over the years, US officials have not presented evidence tying high-ranking Venezuelan leaders to narcotics activities. Specialized agencies have consistently found Venezuela to play a marginal role in global drug trafficking.

Trump calls for additional ‘charges’

Prior to the hearing, US President Donald Trump argued before reporters that additional charges should be brought against the Venezuelan president. 

“He emptied his prisons into our country, and I expect that at some point he will be charged for that,” he said. Trump has repeatedly raised unfounded claims that the Venezuelan government “emptied” prisons and mental institutions into US territory.

Outside the courthouse, a heavy police presence separated Venezuelan opposition supporters from solidarity activists demanding the release of Maduro and Flores and an end to US attacks against the Caribbean nation.

In Caracas, social movements gathered at Plaza Bolívar to express support for the president and first lady. The demonstration followed another mobilization earlier in the week demanding the lifting of US economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Speaking at the rally, lawmaker Nicolás Maduro Guerra—the president’s son and also facing US Justice Department charges—described his father as “a worker” who identifies “as a son of God above any political office.” Days earlier, in a social media post, Maduro Guerra had said his father would appear “in high spirits” and “in good shape” due to regular exercise.

He was joined by Caracas Mayor Carmen Meléndez, while the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) also called for Maduro’s release in a public statement. 

For her part, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has yet to comment on Thursday’s hearing. Venezuelan authorities have also not publicly addressed US efforts to block the funding of Maduro and Flores’ legal expenses. 

Since January 3, the Rodríguez administration has led a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington, with several White House officials visiting Venezuela in recent weeks. A Venezuelan government delegation arrived in the US capital on Thursday, led by Vice Minister Oliver Blanco, who reported meetings with State Department officials to boost “mutually beneficial” relations.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.