undermine

On December 13, a joint US-Syrian patrol was ambushed by a member of Syria’s own security forces near Palmyra, a city in central Syria once controlled by the ISIL (ISIS) group.

Two US soldiers and an interpreter were shot dead, and four people were wounded, before Syrian forces killed the gunman.

In the aftermath of the attack, US and Syrian officials linked the attacker to ISIL, which once controlled vast swaths of Syria and Iraq, and promised to retaliate.

The incident highlights the growing cooperation between the United States and Syria against ISIL, particularly after Damascus joined the US-backed coalition against the group in November.

While it is still unclear if the attacker was a member of ISIL or another group opposed to US-Syrian relations, analysts say that cooperation between the two countries is strong and growing stronger.

“The Syrian government is responding very robustly to fighting ISIL following US requests to do so, and it is worth noting that HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham], before it was in government, had a long-term policy of fighting ISIL,” Rob Geist Pinfold, a scholar of international security at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera, referring to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s former group.

“It [HTS] did it in Idlib, and cracked down on insurgents and cells, and this is more a continuation of that policy.”

Syria’s Minister of Interior spokesman, Noureddine al-Baba, told Syria’s Al-Ikhbariah TV that there was no direct chain of command to the gunman within Syria’s internal security forces, and that he was not part of the force tasked with escorting the US forces. Investigations are under way, he added, to determine whether he had direct ties to ISIL or adopted violent ideology.

ISIL attacks down

In May 2015, ISIL took over the city of Palmyra from the former Syrian government.

Famous for its Greco-Roman ruins, the city bounced back and forth between regime forces and ISIL until the group was expelled in 2017.

In May 2017, the US-led coalition also forced the group out of Raqqa, which ISIL had declared the capital of its so-called caliphate three years earlier.

Many surviving ISIL fighters were imprisoned in the al-Hol and Roj camps in northeast Syria, controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Others escaped into the Syrian desert around Palmyra, from where they have occasionally launched attacks.

When the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fell on December 8, 2024, analysts said ISIL fighters used the ensuing chaos to go into various cities across the country. In June, the group launched an attack on a church in Damascus that killed at least 25 people.

Samy Akil, a fellow at the Tahrir Institute, said recent estimates put ISIL’s manpower in Iraq and Syria at between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

But experts told Al Jazeera that the coordination between Damascus and Washington has improved over the last year, and pointed to the fact that Syria’s security forces have thwarted several ISIL attacks due to US-provided intelligence.

“Ahmed al-Sharaa’s new government is committed to fighting the group and, in contrast to the Assad era, al-Sharaa’s government gets regular tip-offs from US intelligence, and probably other forms of US support as well. That’s a pretty powerful combination,” Aron Lund, a research fellow at Century International, focusing on Syria, told Al Jazeera.

This collaboration has seen a decrease in ISIL attacks in Syria, according to a report by consulting firm Karam Shaar Advisory. ISIL launched an average of 63 attacks a month in 2024, while in 2025, that number dropped to 10, according to the report.

“Since HTS arrived in Damascus, collaboration [with the US] has become much easier,” Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera.

Structural flaws

After the fall of the Assad regime, there were questions over how security would be enforced. The few thousand HTS members who had previously only controlled Idlib in northwest Syria would not be enough to enforce security across the country.

Syria’s security forces undertook a serious recruitment drive, bringing in tens of thousands of new recruits to add to many of the existing former opposition battalions that were incorporated under the state’s new security apparatus.

With such a huge recruitment campaign, analysts said, vetting was a difficult task.

“The Palmyra attack points to structural flaws rather than a mere one-off event. Integration of former faction fighters and rapid new recruitment have produced uneven vetting and oversight, compounded by a permissive environment for radical views, allowing infiltration to persist,” Nanar Hawash, International Crisis Group’s senior Syria analyst, told Al Jazeera.

“Together, these factors blur early warning signs and create space for hidden threats, raising the risk of repeat attacks.”

Analysts said they expect Syrian security forces to improve the vetting process with time. Meanwhile, another attack like December 13’s was possible and could dent the US’s faith that al-Sharaa’s government can provide security in Syria.

“It could happen again due to the sheer numbers [of new recruits], but over time, the government will improve its game and be more thorough to prevent that from happening again, because it will have consequences,” Drevon said.

“We should be careful over generalising based on one attack, which can be a one-off. But if it happens again, it might change the perception of the Syrian government.”

What does ISIL want?

As for ISIL, analysts said the group’s priorities have changed since the fall of al-Assad.

“What we’re seeing now is ISIL is trying to test boundaries and conduct attacks knowing it cannot gain territorial control,” Akil said.

“It aims at destabilising and staying relevant.”

“ISIS cannot hold cities or topple governments. But it doesn’t need to. Its strength lies in destabilisation,” Hawach said. “The Palmyra attack showed that one operative with the right access can kill three US personnel and shake a bilateral relationship.”

Analysts said ISIL could destabilise Syria by targeting state security forces, religious minorities – like it did in the Damascus church attack in June – or any foreigner on Syrian soil, from US soldiers to humanitarian or United Nations workers. The group could also look to capitalise on tensions between the SDF and Damascus over disagreements on how to integrate the former into the state’s security apparatus.

The SDF also manages the al-Hol and Roj prison camps in northeast Syria, where many of ISIL’s most battle-hardened fighters and commanders are held. This could prove to be a key target for ISIL in Syria.

“ISIL thrives in those vacuums,” Hawach said.

“It’s a guerrilla insurgency, not a caliphate, but in a fragile state, that’s enough to cause serious damage.”

This week is shaping up to be crucial for the European Union’s policy on Ukraine. EU foreign ministers met in Brussels on Monday; EU heads of state will gather on Thursday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is meeting United States envoy Steve Witkoff. At the top of the agenda is the peace plan put forward by US President Donald Trump and continuing funding for Ukraine’s war effort.

The European strategy so far has been to alter the US-proposed peace plan in such a way that it becomes completely unacceptable to Russia. This, as European leaders hope, will reinforce the core narrative emanating from their capitals over the past two months – that Russian President Vladimir Putin is just playing games and doesn’t really want peace.

The idea behind it is to try to sway Trump to their side and have him apply additional military and economic pressure on the Kremlin rather than pressing Ukraine into signing an unsavoury peace deal right away. But this effort could easily backfire.

The main practical issue with regards to Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russian aggression during 2026 is who is going to fund its army as well as its state and social welfare system. Trump proudly states that the US is no longer financing Ukraine’s war effort because, in his parlance, it is “Biden’s war” – ie, his predecessor Joe Biden is to blame.

The burden of funding is now squarely on Europe – the EU and rich non-EU countries, such as the United Kingdom and Norway. The US keeps providing weapons to Ukraine, but these are being paid for with money from European coffers. US intelligence support, crucial in Ukraine’s war planning, is currently available to Kyiv for free.

European leaders have been vocal and aggressive throughout the year in rejecting any realistic compromise that could end the war. But even as 2025 is ending, there is no clarity as to how they are going to back up their jingoistic rhetoric with sufficient funding that would allow Ukraine not just to stay afloat but tip the balance in the conflict in its favour.

Their plan A is what they call the reparations loan. It envisages using the assets of the Russian Central Bank frozen by European banks to fund the Ukrainian defence. This means that rather than spending the money on actual reparations – as in Ukraine’s post-war restoration – it would be spent on the war itself.

The thinking behind this plan is that once Russia suffers a strategic defeat, it would retroactively agree to the confiscation rather than demand its money back, so European governments would not have to reach into their coffers to return the money to the Russians.

The obvious problem here is that exactly nobody – except war cheerleaders who have been promising Russia’s defeat for the past four years – believes this outcome is even remotely realistic. Belgium, which holds the bulk of these assets, is equally sceptical, which is why it opposes this plan. It has been joined by a growing number of EU states, including the Czech Republic and Italy.

The other big problem is that Trump’s peace plan has radically different designs for the assets in question. It envisages using them as actual reparations, as in spending them on restoring Ukraine’s economy. Most crucially, Moscow has on numerous occasions signalled that it agrees with this part of the plan. It considers the money lost and wants to make sure neighbouring Ukraine does not turn into a failed state.

This means that if the reparations loan plan goes ahead, it would undermine the most attractive provision of Trump’s plan. If this happens, the US and the EU may find themselves more at odds with each other than they already are, and that would hardly sway Trump.

His administration has indicated on a number of occasions that it could walk out of the peace process if it is derailed, which means ending any help to Ukraine, be it with weapons or intelligence.

The reparations loan plan also comes with an enormous risk for the European economy. The confiscation of Russian assets would discourage any central bank in the world from keeping its money in Europe, meaning the European banking system stands to lose.

More importantly, this move cannot guarantee that Ukraine would be able to stop Russia’s slow but steady advancement. Securing funding for another year under the current circumstances basically means that more Ukrainian lives and territory will be lost in 2026.

This money cannot in effect counter the biggest threat to Ukraine and its neighbours right now: that of Russia precipitating a humanitarian catastrophe that could spill over into the region by devastating Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this winter. The latest blackout in Odesa when the whole city was left without water and heating in the middle of winter is a dark prelude of things to come.

All this warrants the question of why European leaders are acting the way they are now. Could their irrational radicalism be explained by their extensive political investment in delusional outcomes of this war that they have been selling to voters for the past four years? Or are they engaging in incessant moral posturing so as to avoid being scapegoated for the real outcome of the war?

There is probably a bit of both. But there is perhaps also an even more sinister motive, recently expressed by Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference: the idea that “as long as this war is being fought, … Europe is safe because the Ukrainians have successfully tied down this mighty Russian army.” In other words, there are some within the European political elite who perceive ending the war as being against European interests.

But regardless of what those on top think or are motivated by, the war fatigue in Europe is real. The rise of pro-Russia far-right groups in Germany and elsewhere, capitalising on the ruling elites’ shining ineptitude in handling the conflict with Russia, is a clear sign of that.

If the reparations loan scheme does not pass this week, the EU would have to go to plan B, which envisages loaning money from the EU budget. That, of course, would be met with fierce opposition from the European public.

The failure to secure funding for Ukraine may be seen as an embarrassing failure in Europe, but it would make things easier for Zelenskyy. With his administration losing popularity amid continuing military upsets and a major corruption scandal, Ukraine’s president is well on his way to becoming the chief scapegoat in this debacle.

But no more funding from Europe would allow him to declare that the West has betrayed Ukraine and proceed with the inevitable: accepting an unsavoury peace largely on Russia’s terms.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.