swarm

It’s the dead of night when the buzz of the engines of a series of Shahed-136 one-way attack drones breaks the silence. Carrying their lethal payloads the drones slip into the darkness with a distant supply base as their target. Tracking, identifying, and then destroying this swarm of drones is no easy task.

The unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threat environment is changing rapidly with an increasing variety of killer drones that demand differing methods of tracking and identification to engage and defeat them. Operational users are learning from rapidly-evolving- conflicts, and modern air defense methods increasingly rely on scalable, layered, and persistent sensing teams that can detect and track small, fast, low-altitude, and even swarming, aerial threats in all kinds of complex situations, on land or at sea.

Ray Bischoff served active-duty with the U.S. Army for nearly 25 years, and he’s now the senior director of business development at Leonardo DRS, specialising in evaluating tactical formations and defensive requirements at all operational levels throughout the Department of War and allied nations. He is particularly focused on emerging threats from drones..

Bischoff spoke at length with TWZ’s Jamie Hunter about the use of tactical radar systems as part of a layered counter-drone system that is sufficiently versatile to tackle the toughest drone problems now, and what may come in the near future.

JH: Can you set the scene with regards to how you see the counter-UAS mission right now from a sensing perspective.

RB: The counter-UAS environment is changing and advancing very quickly. At the top level, we need to employ a variety of sensor systems – in this particular case we’re talking about tactical radars – but there are many other types of sensors, and at the highest end of the threat level it’s about connecting these together into a networked architecture.

Layering different systems in depth is vital, both from a communications architecture perspective and physically layering them in different places to protect different routes or avenues of approach, or sensitive facilities.

Look at the Strait of Hormuz, for instance, which is a vast area, with a layered and networked system to maximize the depth of coverage. The primary reason for this is that the biggest enemy in many situations like these is time. That networked architecture and having sensors in depth really gains you time, which gives you opportunities to make a better decision, time to reposition, to better evaluate. You need time to evaluate what different things in space are doing, where they’re going or where they’re coming from.

JH: When you say layered, are you talking about different systems that can look in different ways over different distances and systems in different positions that help you with that time element? What does layered actually mean?

RB: You can layer different types of sensors. Think of baseball. If all your players are home-run hitters, you probably aren’t going to do very well. You need to have different skills across your team to succeed, and it’s the same thing here. Layering of radar sensing bands, different types of technology such as electro-optic and infra-red that “see” in long, short and midwave, acoustic sensors, electronic warfare sensors to look for signals and other types of energy. It’s also about physically layering them in space, or depth.

We often see large exquisite sensors that have a lot of range and cover a large area. But this makes them susceptible to being targeted and destroyed. Layering sensors gives you redundancy, retaining the ability to defend. So, this is layering both in physical location, and in different types of technology.

This way, if one of your sensors is taken down by any means – for example by electronic countermeasures – your other systems can theoretically continue to operate. Just think how you can see, smell, touch, taste – it’s the same concept with layering different types of technologies, which is exactly what we at Leonardo DRS do and we integrate them so we can interact and share information to maximize the benefits of this layered approach. A team ultimately makes the sensors more effective across networks and architectures.

JH: Presumably you get good indicators on developments from the current operations in Ukraine. You already mentioned the Strait of Hormuz as well. What are the big lessons that you’re getting here about different types and sizes of drones?

RB: Without going into the details of combat operations, the bottom line is you have to advance your technologies at the rate or as close to the rate of the advancement of the weapons systems that are being utilized. We’re seeing a mixture of things when it comes to the UASs; that’s larger craft that are getting faster and can carry heavier payloads, or smaller ones with longer ranges that can move through areas almost undetected. 

There’s been so much investment in UAS technology, and they are becoming cheaper and easier to manufacture. People can 3D-print these things in their houses now. So, looking at this from a sensing perspective, that layering is becoming increasingly important.

We are looking to do things to counter these developments, such as maybe elevate the sensors to “see” across the top of the trees or place a sensor down in a valley – so that adds layering in altitude or elevation to remove blind spots. Just like the military, if you’re setting-up a defensive position, you have to cover what we called “dead space” where you can’t see with eyes or sensors from ground level.

JH: Can we dig further into the role of tactical radars in counter-UAS, specifically Leonardo DRS’ 202 Expeditionary Skid, which I believe is based on your Extended Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radar [exMHR].

RB: Radars “see” things that are physically present in space and time, and that’s why they are such great tools in the counter-UAS kit bag of sensors. That said, some radars are affected by weather and other factors, some work better in particular environments.

The 202 Expeditionary Skid is a new system from Leonardo DRS that uses our long-range exMHR, which is a software-defined AESA [Active Electronically Scanned Array] pulse-Doppler radar. It operates in the S-Band and that’s a very reliable band for all weather conditions including strong performance in dust storms and rain. When you get into K, Ku, and X-bands, they typically have smaller beams and therefore greater accuracy, but they suffer in poor weather and can become extremely degraded. S-band radar suffers significantly less degradation in that environment.

The 202 Expeditionary Skid, also known as U-KIT-0091, has a single radar panel that has a search area of 90 degrees by 90 degrees, so we often mount them in groups of four to provide full 360-degree coverage. Each panel has a really fast scan rate, much faster than a traditional spinning radar set. Plus, having multiple radar faces to make up a complete system is much more survivable. They can also overlap their field of regard without impairing each other.

We have sought to provide a solution that marries an appropriate level of range, accuracy, capability, and performance, that can still be very flexible in its ability to relocate or change mission sets. This is designed to be extremely versatile, meaning that it operates in different environments quickly. U-KIT-0091 has been purposefully designed to be mobile in a compact system that can either be used by itself or networked and fused together with other systems. Back to the baseball analogy, this is the kind of guy you really want on your team because you can use them wherever you need them.

The radar or set of radars sit on a small skid system that can slide into the back of a pickup truck, into the back of a tactical vehicle, onto a trailer, you can set it just about anywhere and it occupies a four-by-four-feet position. It has its own power generation, its own positional information that works in denied environments, basically it’s capable of working by itself from the get-go. The best part is that it’s truly mobile – the operator doesn’t have to stop the vehicle to make it work. You can turn it on and set-off. It’s working. If you come to a stop, it’s still working. It can be mounted on a ship, it can be taken airborne by an aircraft, so it’s got land, sea, and air applications. We’ve installed these on all types of ground platforms, water-based platforms, on top of a building or some sort of structure and it’s already in service, but I can’t specify where. It tracks drones very well, but of course it can track just about anything that can exist in that space.

JH: So you could strategically locate several of your radars to look in different directions or be positioned to look in a certain direction if you knew the expected paths that the threats would use?

RB: The system is designed exactly for things like that. Instead of putting all of your eggs in one basket, you disperse your eggs, and focus on different avenues or approach angles so that you can then have sensors strategically located where they can pick up these things and then as long as they’re networked back into weapons systems that have the overlapping fields of fire or bubbles – coverage areas – then you can protect your area. 

Any time you can decouple a sensor from a weapon system or multiple types of sensors from each other, you stand a far greater chance of survivability and optimizing accuracy. If you put all your eggs in one basket, and if you lose that basket, you lose everything. In addition, if you separate sensors, you gain accuracy because you have different angles and you can leverage simple geometry.

JH: Could you depict what an end-to-end engagement might look like using your tactical radar.

RB: The radar sensors will typically be emitting energy as they search for objects in a particular space. If something is detected and determined to be a valid target then the data is sent from the radar to some type of a command and control system, which may well be receiving information from other complementary sensors too. It then fuses that data and passes it to an effector, whether that’s a non-kinetic or a kinetic system, for engagement.

Meanwhile, the radar continues to track and it can determine whether that object was removed or if its path changed, and so on and so forth. But you know, a lot of these radars operate in a way whereby they can be turned on or off by different sensors to avoid them having to constantly transmit energy, they’re very customizable to meet the requirements and the emissions that are needed, whether that’s air defense, counter-drone, etc.

They can operate independently too, maybe covering a small area that needs to be protected, and integrated with a localized weapon system, or, as I already explained, they can be networked into a much larger set-up, they are modular, open system architecture and easily incorporated.

Most customers tend to choose their own command and control systems, which is why the plug-and-play part of our system is so important. It really doesn’t matter what they want to partner it with, what we provide enables that very easily.

JH: To be clear, your tactical radars could be deployed to defend the entire eastern seaboard of the U.S., they could be positioned to defend an air base, or they could be used to defend a ship in the Strait of Hormuz.

RB: The architecture can scale geographically through a distributed, networked sensor approach. The specific coverage area depends on factors including sensor density, the threat environment, command-and-control integration, and the available effectors.

Customers can deploy multiple radars and feed them into a single command-and-control system, positioning sensors to optimize coverage for the operational need. For example, one radar set could cover a valley vulnerable to low-flying drone ingress, while another positioned on higher ground provides longer-range surveillance. The key is a modular capability that enables users to tailor coverage and layer sensors where they are most needed – without relying on one large radar system to see everything from a single location.

JH: I’m keen to know what you consider to be the most challenging drones to detect and track. Is the challenge the speed they’re traveling out at, maybe new low observable designs, or the fact they’re flying very low. What are the big issues you’re seeing?

RB: It’s really all of the above. The other really challenging problem is when something is flying very low to the ground. The lower they bring them in altitude, they are harder to track as an independent target.

The challenge with drone swarms isn’t detection – if you can see the drones, you can track them. The harder problem is managing those tracks, deciding which threats matter most, and assigning the right effector to each one.

If 100 drones are inbound, it’s not just about having 100 weapons available. It’s about coordinating a fast, cost-effective response across a large number of simultaneous threats.

Ultimately, pairing radars and electro-optical/infrared sensors together is the way to go, because each of those have their own strengths. One of those sensors is going to see the drone better than the other, plus you have the redundancy that at least a couple of them will “see” the threat and give you enough information in sufficient time to prosecute it. Fitting into that team, however it is constructed, is exactly how we position our 202 Expeditionary Skid U-KIT-0091 radar.

Contact the write: Jamie.Hunter@teamrecurrent.io

Many questions remain about the complex mission to rescue the crew of the U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle that came down over Iran in April of this year and what led to it. Now, the reported testimony of the Strike Eagle pilot involved describes a ‘jellyfish-like’ swarm of drones in the sky, moments before they ejected from the stricken jet.

According to a report from CNN, the pilot recounted seeing “multiple Iranian drones hovering in the air, moving as one, in a formation that resembled a jellyfish.” The report is based on statements from four unnamed sources said to be familiar with the matter.

Needless to say, the veracity of the report should be treated with caution, especially bearing in mind the highly dynamic and confused nature of the situation. However, CNN claims that the account was taken seriously enough to prompt debate within the U.S. intelligence community. It should also be noted that the testimony relates only to the pilot and not the Weapon Systems Officer (WSO).

The report suggests that, during a post-incident debriefing, the F-15E pilot told intelligence officials that they saw:

“Multiple drones interconnected and moving as one with smaller drones below the bigger drones like legs. Real alien shit.”

Those words are not from the pilot themselves, but are said to be from one of the sources familiar with the witness account.

Another source told CNN that the same pilot described seeing a “minefield of drones” in the air.

Again, provided these accounts are correct, we cannot say for sure that the pilot actually saw what they described. After all, this was during an extremely high-stress period, and the pilot also ended up with a concussion. Even the U.S. intelligence officials involved in the debrief reportedly disagreed on how to interpret what the F-15 pilot described, and whether the pilot could recount the incident clearly, according to CNN.

The same report also repeats the assertion that the pilot had previously been shot down in the same conflict, during a friendly-fire incident that left three Strike Eagles downed over Kuwait in March. The High Side, a publication on Substack, first reported this detail, citing unnamed current and former Air Force officials. CBS News also subsequently reported this, citing anonymous individuals familiar with the events.

As for the F-15E incident over Iran, you can read our analysis of what was previously revealed about what happened here.

While the exact cause of the loss of the F-15E hasn’t been revealed, NBC News previously quoted three unidentified officials who said the jet “was probably struck by a Chinese-made shoulder-launched missile” and that the engagement may have been supported by a “long-range early-warning radar that spots stealth aircraft,” which Iran received in the “early days” of the war. U.S. President Donald Trump also reportedly said that the Iranians used a shoulder-fired missile, and that “they got lucky.”

Furthermore, while the pilot was rescued within hours, the WSO hid out in a crevice as both rescuers and Iranians frantically searched for him. They were picked up around 50 hours after ejection, aided by a rescue mission involving hundreds of troops, scores of aircraft, and diversion operations over more than a half dozen different parts of Iran. The effort also saw the loss of a second aircraft, an A-10 attack jet in the air, as well as two MC-130J Commando II special operations cargo planes and several H-6 Little Bird special operations helicopters that were destroyed on the ground.

The most dramatic interpretation, that a drone swarm directly participated, even if by happenstance, in the shootdown of the Strike Eagle, cannot be entirely ruled out, but there is no publicly available evidence supporting it. There is the description of this formation being a “minefield,” as in something the F-15 could stumble into. This is an interesting note and it may just be how it was mentioned figuratively. At the same time, putting up some sort of a drone screen formation along a known route, especially if it is being used for low-level transits, or near a high-risk facility, could make some sense. Basically, the aircraft would fly into it and be destroyed if it hits a drone, the drones are detonated in close proximity to the aircraft or even if they are connected physically somehow and the aircraft hits the cables. This would match with the description, to a degree, and it would not require any sort of real swarming capability. This would be something of a new ‘barrage balloon’ concept that is more flexible and easier to deploy on demand. China is using balloons in a similar manner to protect key installations today. In addition, Iran certainly has employed its fair share of bizarre tactics and weapons concepts to that point that this doesn’t seem that implausible, but still, it is just a guess.

Returning to the new report, if the pilot really did see a ‘jellyfish-like’ group of Iranian drones that were truly swarming, that would point to previously unknown capabilities within that country, but this is technology that is certainly within the realm of credibility.

Swarms, in this context, are groups of vehicles or guided munitions that are interconnected via datalink and work cooperatively to maximize their combined abilities to accomplish an objective or set of objectives. It is important to note that a major role is played by the nature of a swarm’s computing and autonomy capabilities, and the supporting communications architecture. Swarms can range from ones offering basic cooperative capabilities to far more advanced and dynamic, advanced AI-driven ones. Swarms are not to be confused with a group of drones that are simply sent on a mission together, but have no true cooperative capabilities. These can be best viewed, at least in the aerial sense, as formations of drones or ‘flocks’ of drones that are basically preprogrammed, with tactical planning and large numbers providing an advantage, not the ability to react to external stimuli and make decisions as a team in real-time.

Regardless, based on two of its sources, CNN asserts that “initial reports indicated that it was possible the drone formation had in some way enabled Iran to shoot down the American jet.”

This would raise questions about what type of performance and configuration these drones had, including what altitude the drones were at when they were supposedly sighted, as well as the flight level of the Strike Eagle.

Previously, U.S. officials disclosed that Iran had made use of smaller drones in the hunt for the missing F-15E WSO, but there was no mention of any kind of drone swarms.

For China and Russia, to name just two nations, both of which have provided military assistance to Iran, drone swarming is very much an area of focus. Swarms have many uses, not just to overwhelm the enemy, but also to sense broad areas cooperatively and to work as a highly efficient group offering mixed capabilities that equate to a sum greater than their parts.

In the case of China, as we have been reporting on for years, the country has moved especially fast on drone swarming, working to evolve these capabilities on different scales for many years. China has repeatedly demonstrated swarms of loitering munitions, deployed from container launchers that can be mounted on light vehicles or helicopters, for example. The country also has worked to develop higher-end swarming capabilities using larger drones, as well as advanced unmanned combat air vehicles. This is on top of the country’s place as an absolute leader in low-end unmanned technologies, including massive coordinated drone swarms for commercial purposes.

中国电科陆空协同固定翼无人机“蜂群”系统

The potential of this kind of warfare has not been lost on the U.S. military either, which has been working on it for decades. These efforts date back many years, with the public disclosure of the Perdix having come nearly a decade ago now, and cooperative swarming trials have been carried out repeatedly in the open since then. These efforts have since become ‘mainstream’ as the drone revolution has taken hold of the defense industry. Some of these technologies are now being operationalized in a publicized manner. All this is on top of what is likely an extreme level of development in the classified realm.

Only last month, TWZ reported on how the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was looking into drones with a high degree of autonomous operation, as well as remotely-operated containerized systems to launch, recover, and otherwise support them. The end result would be a largely self-sustaining “autonomous constellation” capable of supporting networked swarms consisting of as many as 500 drones at once.

By now, swarming capabilities are a key emerging tenet of modern military drone development and are beginning to be demonstrated on the battlefield in Ukraine.

At this point, it is worth noting that Iran has already demonstrated “loitering” surface-to-air missiles, an unusual category of weapon that blurs the distinction between a kamikaze drone and a more traditional surface-to-air missile. As far as we know, Iran has not attempted to use these weapons in swarms, although having them operate in larger groups would clearly boost the probability of success.

There is also the possibility that what the F-15E pilot saw was some kind of previously unknown drone technology fielded by the U.S. or Israeli military, before the Strike Eagle came down. Clearly, Israel and the United States deployed certain systems in the conflict that had not been seen before, and both countries have the ability to field platforms with swarming capabilities. Releasing a group of drones that can hunt and even kill over the Iranian countryside, looking for targets of opportunity over large areas, like air defenses and standoff weapons launchers, is exactly the kind of concept that swarms were envisioned as being so capable at realizing.

Subsequently, while the rescue effort was underway, the U.S. military certainly was making use of drones in the vicinity. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, previously described how “A-10s and […] drones and other tactical aircraft were violently suppressing and engaging the enemy in a close-in gunfight to keep them away from the front-seater and allow the pickup force to get into the objective area.” 

The use of drones for suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, as well as stand-in jamming of those systems, is a very real component of modern air warfare dating back decades. Israel was a pioneer in it, which you can read all about here. Those capabilities are far more advanced today, especially for long-range systems dedicated to those missions and for the emerging ‘launched effects’ segment of drone warfare. It’s hard to imagine that these proven capabilities were not put to some use over Iran during the war. The U.S. military even employed its own one-way attack munition, the LUCAS drone, with similar capabilities.

With all that being said, there is the possibility that the pilot experienced something else entirely, perhaps related to their concussion or another kind of phenomenon. Even a flock of birds or a group of balloons, the latter of which can be used as decoys to confuse enemy radar and bait fighter aircraft and other air defenses, could appear as a drone swarm, for example. Iran had every reason to use such cheap, but potentially effective tactics. While an experienced fighter pilot would normally be able to tell the difference between drones or birds, these were very much abnormal circumstances. Then there is the matter of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP), which this could fall into, just for the reason that what was seen may be hard to identify. We don’t know what the description of the configurations of the drones was, or if any was provided, which could help narrow down the possibilities. Also, did the aircraft’s sensors detect these craft? We just don’t know.

For now, the reported drone sighting remains an intriguing but unverified element of a much larger story, many important details of which are still to emerge.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com