strategy

Russia has suddenly ramped-up the number of attacks, and their duration, on Kyiv. Ukrainian officials state there was a record number of waves of one-way attack drones on the capital on Thursday. This is in contrast to the typical Russian mass barrages that launch a larger number of missiles and drones that strike over a short period in an attempt to overwhelm defenses and inflict maximum damage. The change from prioritizing amplitude to frequency of these assaults indicates that Moscow could be switching to a new strategy aimed at wearing down the populace, halting commerce and exhausting air defenders.

“Again and again throughout the day, sirens sounded as Russia launched drones in small groups towards the Ukrainian capital,” the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry noted on X. “Each new threat put people at risk and forced them to seek safety – while repeatedly interrupting work, public services, transport, and everyday plans. In total, Kyiv spent 872 minutes – almost 15 hours – under air raid alert that day.”

This was reportedly the largest number of air raid alerts experienced in Kyiv since the opening days of the all-out war. “The previous record appeared to be set on March 1, 2022, when Kyiv was placed under air raid alert 12 times in a single day,” the Kyiv Independent explained.

In addition, “the capital saw eight more air raid alerts by the morning of Aug. 28 as Russian forces continued attacking Kyiv and the surrounding areas overnight,” the publication added.

Iryna Terekh, CEO of the Fire Point company that makes FP-1 and FP-2 drones and heavy-hitting Flamingo cruise missiles, suggested that Russia is trying to drain the populace of the will to resist.

“For over 40 hours straight, Russia has been terrorizing Ukraine’s capital with combined barrages, setting a new grim record for the number of air raid alerts and destroyed civilian infrastructure sites,” Terekh stated on X Friday. “The enemy has long employed this tactic in frontline cities, scorching the earth and any chances of normal life. Its goal is to make our hands drop in despair. To make us search for culprits among ourselves. To make us snap at our own. To make us peer into the future with squinted eyes. To leave not a single minute when it’s appropriate to rejoice in anything: from life’s little joys to our successes on the front lines. To let exhaustion win.”

A former high-ranking Ukrainian military officer offered us a similar assessment, though he surmised that it could backfire on Moscow.

“They want to keep constant pressure on the population and plant a fear of losing lives, increasing starvation, demoralizing the population, plant panic etc.,” the retired officer told us. “My belief is that they won’t achieve such strategic objectives. It is too late. It could have the opposite effect: more hate, more aggression and anger toward Russians.”

The retired officer posited that this spike in the pace of Russian strikes could be part of the escalation Russian President Vladimir Putin recently threatened. Still, it remains unknown at this point whether this is a one-off or the sign of things to come. The coming days should give us an indication of that.

The Latest

Most of the fiercest fighting at this point is centered around Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Slovyansk in Donetsk. Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessment:

• Kharkiv: Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. The Russians also continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.

• Donetsk: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked around Lyman. Russian forces also continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area, Pokrovsk, near Novopavlivka itself and northeast and south of Oleksandrivka on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

• Zaporizhia: Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance.

• Kherson: Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 27.

Ukrainian officials are investigating why weapons were stored in a residential neighborhood after a deadly Russian drone attack on a warehouse in a village near Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the investigation centers on negligence. The strike and resulting secondary explosions at the facility in the village of Myla killed at least 37 people and injured at least another 15, according to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry (MoD).

Zelensky didn’t specify the exact variants of the weapons stored, but the Russians claimed they struck a warehouse containing the Fire Point company’s FP-1 and FP-2 drones and another one in a different Kyiv suburb that stored Flamingo cruise missiles.

TWZ cannot independently verify this Russian claim and Ukriane did not confirm the attack on the warehouse containing the Flamingos. We’ve reached out to Fire Point for more details.

“Since yesterday evening and throughout the day today, I have been receiving reports on the situation in the village of Myla, Kyiv region, where detonation began following a Russian strike,” Zelensky stated on X. “A terrible situation and terrible negligence on the part of those who stored explosives right next to people. Another such crime – after what happened in Vyshneve – is absolutely unacceptable.”

Since yesterday evening and throughout the day today, I have been receiving reports on the situation in the village of Myla, Kyiv region, where detonation began following a Russian strike. A terrible situation and terrible negligence on the part of those who stored explosives… pic.twitter.com/YyRpBxQ8Kz

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) August 29, 2026

Vyshneve is a town where an ammunition depot belonging to the Ukrainian defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom, the country’s largest weapons manufacturer, was attacked in July. The secondary explosions killed seven and wounded 29 others, according to the Kyiv Independent.

“I expect the details to be presented to the public promptly,” the Ukrainian leader added. “The first strike was on an ammunition storage site that definitely shouldn’t have been there – a Defense Forces storage facility. Shells, mines, other ammunition, and drones detonated. The scale is significant. We have already spoken with the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the Commander-in-Chief – they have everything necessary for the investigation. I want to separately thank everyone who is there on the ground and at other sites of Russian strikes, doing everything possible to help and save people.”

Smoke is still rising from the ammunition depot in the village of Myla, Bucha District, Kyiv Oblast, which was targeted by Russian Geran-4 drone strikes.

The reported death toll has risen to 37, with at least 42 others injured and 381 people evacuated.

Ukrainian President… https://t.co/PBAQllR7BI pic.twitter.com/toDpPvjFkU

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) August 29, 2026

The retirement home at Myla near Kyiv where twenty people died after a Russian strike caused secondary detonations at a secret ammunition depot placed amidst dense suburbia. pic.twitter.com/iPhODiVXJ7

— Leonid Ragozin (@leonidragozin) August 29, 2026

The Ukrainian MoD called for a full accounting of all weapons and ammunition storage locations.

“Siting depots holding explosives next to civilians is unacceptable,” MoD stated on X. “The heads of all relevant components of the Security and Defence Forces and of Ukraine’s defence industry must carry out a full audit of the sites where weapons and ammunition are stored. Facilities of this kind must not stand next to residential buildings where people live.”

We bow our heads in deep sorrow together with every family that has lost loved ones in the terrible tragedy in the village of Myla, Kyiv region.

As of 15:00 on 29 August, 37 people are known to have been killed and 15 injured. Two more are still being searched for under the…

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) August 29, 2026

As we noted earlier in this story, the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) claims it hit “an ammunition depot in [Myla] (Fire Point LLC), where components and launch boosters for long-range FP-1/FP-2 unmanned aerial vehicles were stored in warehouses.”

The MoD also claims it struck the “Fim Service transport and logistics centre in Chayki” whose “warehouses were used to store Flamingo long-range cruise missiles.” The village is also near Kyiv; however, there have been no reports of collateral damage. Ukrainian officials have not independently confirmed that weapons were stored there. The Kyivschina24 media outlet reported that the Chayki attack struck a tile warehouse owned by the Agromat company, not a weapons storage area.

Whether it was the case in these instances or not, it should come as absolutely no surprise that Moscow would do everything possible to target Fire Point standoff munitions and their supply chain, considering how big of a threat they have become. Regardless, while Ukrainian officials are now investigating why explosives were stored so close to a residential neighborhood, the incident highlights the precarious nature of the country’s weapons production. Due to repeated Russian attacks, this work is widely distributed to avoid having a single point of failure.

In a recent interview with TWZ, Terekh, the Fire Point CEO, addressed that concern.

“Well, the logistics are hell, to be frank,” she told us. “But we do not have the luxury to have the factory in a classic way, with the walls and roof, … when I say factory — and we have 90 of them in the moment — when I say factory I mean this whole ecosystem with logistics, with warehouses, everything is hidden and dissolved in a way that the critical components are always duplicated, triplicated, quadruplicated. It’s a lot of additional investments and, of course, a lot of risks and a lot of additional time for logistics specifically, but again, we do not have any other choice. Therefore, the factory in this matter is a whole ecosystem.”

Footage of the production and testing of the FP-1/2 attack UAVs and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile

In the wake of the Vyshneve attack, Ukroboronprom fired two of its directors after Zelensky said that the ammunition depots were stored too near to civilian areas “in violation of Ukrainian law and orders from military leaders,” the Kyiv Independent noted. The criminal investigation in that case is ongoing.

It is too early to say what will happen with this latest incident. The investigation into the Myla case has just started and there is no immediate word about whether Ukraine is also investigating the storage of weapons in Chayki. We will monitor this situation and provide updates when warranted. A satellite image obtained by TWZ appears to back up Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s claim that his country’s Alpha Unit destroyed a Tu-95MS Bear bomber during a drone attack on Russia’s Engels Air Base. The facility is located about 350 miles east of Ukrainian-held territory.

The satellite image, provided by Vantor, shows the right wing of the bomber partially severed. It is unclear from the image how extensive any damage was caused by shrapnel.

Ukraine has frequently attacked Engels in its effort to destroy the bombers housed there. Russia, trying to defend against this ‘kill-the-archer’ approach, is building protective shelters for its military aircraft, which now extend to long-range bombers, an unprecedented development for the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Engels, also known as Engels-2, is one of the most important airfields of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation Branch. It is home to the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, which is responsible for Russia’s only squadron of Tu-160s, plus another squadron of Tu-95MS bombers.

Both of those types have been widely employed in the conflict in Ukraine and especially in the standoff strikes that have targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, among other objectives, civilian and military, across the country.

Zelensky said the U.S. read him in Friday on CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s mysterious visit to Moscow. However, the Ukrainian leader offered no details of what was discussed.

“Today, we received information from the American side about the meetings in Moscow that took place the other day,” the Ukrainian leader stated on X. “There was a series of meetings. We spoke before the meetings, and we have spoken again now with the Americans. Thank you for the information – and for the necessary tone of the conversation with Russia.”

“We value the alignment of steps and the fact that America is advancing a realistic vision of what needs to be done and what must be achieved,” he added. “Russia must end its war, and all the necessary conditions must be created to make that happen.”

Ratcliffe’s visit has sparked a wide range of conjecture, and disparate reports about the purpose. The New York Times, for instance, wrote that the journey was made “to privately share his bleak assessment of the state of the Russian war against Ukraine, and to urge the Russians to cut a deal before their military and economic situation gets worse.”

The Wall Street Journal reported that Ratcliffe was there to warn Putin, whom he didn’t see, not to attack NATO.

President Donald Trump, for his part, tried to downplay the whole thing, calling it “semi-routine,” which doesn’t exactly square with the fact that this was the first publicly known visit of a CIA director to Moscow since November 2021, just months before Putin launched his full-on invasion.

Today, we received information from the American side about the meetings in Moscow that took place the other day. There was a series of meetings. We spoke before the meetings, and we have spoken again now with the Americans.

Thank you for the information – and for the necessary… pic.twitter.com/2dBbHH4y2X

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) August 28, 2026

Kyrylo Budanov, the Head of the Office of the President, said the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to mobilize 30,000 every month in order to keep defending against Russia. He made the comments during an interview on the national nightly newscast.

 “Unfortunately, we have to accept it [mobilization] as it is,” Budanov explained. “We cannot do otherwise. We have to find the courage and honestly say: we cannot mobilize fewer than 30,000 people a month. This is the minimum number needed to maintain what we have.”

Budanov’s comments come as Ukraine is struggling to put enough troops on the front lines and is facing opposition to how recruits are often forced into service, sometimes physically.

“So, no matter how we say that we are now going to recruit people differently, the numbers will not change,” Budanov added. “And that means the number of dissatisfied people will not change either. There is nothing we can do about it.”

Meanwhile, Budanov expressed hope that it would be possible to change the approach to what he described as “forceful mobilization” to some extent.

“I hope we can change the approach to this forceful mobilization, which sometimes takes place,” Budanov acknowledged. “It is not happening everywhere, but such cases do occur. We need to tackle this.”

Kyrylo Budanov: “Unfortunately, we have to accept it [mobilization] as it is. We cannot do otherwise. We have to find the courage and honestly say: we cannot mobilize fewer than 30,000 people a month. This is the minimum number needed to maintain what we have.”… pic.twitter.com/csebu3b3cV

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) August 28, 2026

As we have frequently noted, AI plays a key role for Ukraine, especially helping guide weapons to target. To help improve these functions, Ukraine has created a sandbox of sorts where weapons developers can fine-tune their AI systems with real-world data. 

“In the past, coordinating a fire mission – from an observer detecting a target to the actual opening of fire – could take 15–20 minutes, or even longer, when done manually,” the Ukrainian Defense Ministry (MoD) explained. “In modern warfare, such a delay is effectively unacceptable. This is where artificial intelligence comes in to assist human operators.”

“At the find stage of the kill chain, reconnaissance drones can use visual data repositories to detect objects,” the MoD noted. “For this purpose, the Brave1 defense innovation cluster created Brave1 Dataroom, a secure platform that provides developers with access to structured datasets for testing, training, and fine-tuning military AI solutions.” 

Over 100 Ukrainian companies are already using this platform to train AI models on real-world data, MoD added. 

“The platform specializes in detecting and intercepting aerial targets, including Shahed-type drones,” the ministry proffered. “To train drone AI systems using real-world battlefield data, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has provided Ukrainian developers with access to Avengers Labs. The platform provides access to an annotated dataset of 5 million frames collected during military missions.”

The dataset is regularly updated, with Ukraine’s homegrown DELTA battlefield management and situational-awareness system serving as its primary source. 

“Targets included in the dataset range from tanks, artillery, and air defense systems to enemy infantry groups and aerial targets, including reconnaissance UAVs and Shahed-type drones,” according to the ministry.

Coordinating a fire mission manually once took 15-20 minutes. In this war, that’s a lifetime.

Avengers AI, trained on 5M annotated battlefield frames and integrated into DELTA, now flags 70% of enemy equipment in real time across 100,000+ video streams a month.

Read more:…

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) August 28, 2026

The city of Druzhkivka, in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, is on the front line of a grinding battle. It is part of the so-called fortress belt of cities where ensconced Ukrainian forces have held off brutal waves of Russian attacks for years. Recently released drone video shows the extent of the damage, with virtually no building untouched and vast swaths of the city completely abandoned.

Irish journalist Caolan Robertson provides a gripping view of another fortress belt city, Kramatorsk, and the last power plant in the region, which is a frequent target of Russian attacks.

Another Ukrainian city is being wiped out right now while the world looks away

Here’s what’s happening in Kramatorsk:

• Glide bombs & FPVs pound the city to make them unliveable.

• Civilians evacuated every day but not everyone is leaving.

• I spent the night with power… pic.twitter.com/oUU4FoSfnc

— Caolan (@CaolanReports) August 28, 2026

Ukraine claims that Russian forces have executed at least 345 Ukrainian service members who surrendered and killed 375 Ukrainian citizens whose deaths in Russian captivity have been verified, the Ukrainian Ukrinform news outlet reported.

Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets made the statement during a press conference held at the publication, focused on Russian disinformation concerning prisoners of war, exchanges, and people missing in action.

According to the ombudsman, the 345 documented executions involved Ukrainian soldiers who had clearly surrendered, including by laying down their weapons, raising their hands, or lying on the ground to demonstrate that they were no longer taking part in hostilities.

TWZ cannot independently verify those figures.

That’s it for now.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

WASHINGTON — Immigration and Customs Enforcement is taking more and more steps to avoid oversight by local and state authorities of immigration detention centers amid growing complaints alleging unsanitary and unsafe conditions at the facilities.

The efforts to sidestep laws in California and elsewhere take many forms. In some instances, contracts have been changed to declare that the centers are simply not subject to certain local or state laws.

In other instances, ICE has purchased facilities owned and operated by private companies. Though the companies continue to run the centers holding thousands of detainees, federal ownership could aid their defense in the event of legal action.

George Zoley, the chief executive of GEO Group, which contracts with ICE to run detention centers in California and across the country, said as much to company shareholders this year. In an earnings call in May, he said that ownership bolsters the facilities’ protection from “unwarranted litigation” around medical care and other detention conditions.

The federal ownership strategy has become particularly crucial, he said, “as some blue states are considering more active involvement in oversight of facilities.”

Local oversight has taken on greater significance since the Trump administration hollowed out federal offices that were charged with investigating civil rights and safety issues at detention centers and began restricting visits by members of Congress. A recent analysis by the Project on Government Oversight found detention center inspections under the second Trump administration have increasingly resulted in “superior” grades.

Eunice Cho, a former American Civil Liberties Union attorney and an expert in immigration detention, called ICE’s efforts a “naked strategy” to evade local scrutiny of detention centers.

“This is a huge sea change in the way that immigration detention is expanding and hardening in the United States,” she said, adding that “this was every advocate’s nightmare scenario.”

In California, state leaders once attempted to shut down privately run detention centers and, after losing, resorted instead to proposing other oversight measures. California is home to eight ICE detention centers with a combined capacity of nearly 9,000 people.

State laws allow monitoring and investigation of the facilities by the California Department of Justice and local health authorities.

A 2021 law allows people to sue for damages when private detention center operators fail to follow the care standards laid out in their contracts. Starting in January, another law will require independent medical investigations into deaths in law enforcement custody, including in immigrant detention facilities.

Several bills are being considered by the California Legislature that would further regulate detention centers. Among them are bills that would authorize the California attorney general to bring civil action and impose fines to protect detainees’ constitutional rights and require the disclosure of public records, such as 911 calls from the facilities.

Recent attempts to limit California’s oversight actions haven’t been successful. CoreCivic turned San Diego health inspectors away from the Otay Mesa Detention Center in February, but after legal action the visit took place in June.

Another oversight battle concerns the rights of detainees who work at a facility, perhaps as a janitor, for $1 per day.

GEO Group recently settled with California regulators after a years-long fight over workplace health and safety violations. The settlement affirmed that immigrants who perform work while detained are considered employees.

Weeks earlier, ICE released new detention standards in June declaring that detainees who participate in the voluntary work program aren’t employees “and are not entitled to wages or benefits under applicable wage laws or labor regulations.”

Because the new standards will take effect as contracts are established or modified, the rules don’t yet apply to existing facilities in California, though they were implemented at a new facility in Minnesota.

An ICE spokesperson did not respond to questions but said the agency consulted with a variety of stakeholders, including facility operators, while revising its standards. The spokesperson, who did not provide their name in an emailed statement, said the agency consistently looks for ways to improve detention facilities to ensure they provide detainees the best care.

“ICE is regularly audited and inspected by external agencies to ensure that all ICE facilities comply with performance-based national detention standards,” the spokesperson wrote, adding that “ICE has higher detention standards than most U.S. prisons that hold actual U.S. citizens.”

An oversight battle involving changes to contracts is also playing out in other states.

For the last three years, GEO Group has blocked Washington health officials from inspecting the Northwest ICE Processing Center near Seattle despite 3,500 complaints from detainees about black mold, unsafe drinking water and substandard medical care.

A previous contract for the facility stated that services must comply with “federal, state and local laws and standards. Should a conflict exist between any of these standards, the most stringent shall apply.”

But in March, ICE and GEO Group established a new contract that says the opposite — that “applicable or more stringent state or local laws or regulations shall not apply.”

A federal district judge, rejecting that contract provision, ruled last month that GEO Group must let health inspectors in, writing that “GEO’s new contract cannot preempt state law, even if it purports to.” That decision is now paused under appeal.

But this week, GEO Group had a court victory in Colorado, where a federal judge prevented the state from enforcing a law that requires unannounced public health inspections of detention facilities and stiff penalties for refusal. Colorado health officials wanted to investigate a tuberculosis case at the Aurora ICE Processing Center near Denver, but have been refused entry and records.

The judge wrote that GEO Group’s contract with ICE “plausibly” requires the company to follow only state laws that existed when the contract was signed. At GEO Group’s suggestion, the judge’s order remains in effect until Oct. 15, when the contract expires.

Meanwhile, ICE appears to be trying a different route to apply the same restrictive contract language to the facilities near Seattle and Denver, among others.

Last month, the agency posted a solicitation with draft contract terms seeking 5,500 detention beds in Colorado, Florida, Pennsylvania and Washington. The locations and requirements match four existing GEO-owned facilities where operating contracts are set to expire in the coming months. During a shareholder call earlier this month, Zoley, the GEO Group CEO, indicated that the four facilities could also be sold off to the federal government while the company would continue to operate them.

The facilities would be governed by the new 2026 detention standards and include terms that mirror those from the Northwest facility’s contract, that stricter state or local laws “shall not apply.”

Zoley said ICE is contemplating buying more than 10 facilities, and that number “could continue to grow.”

GEO Group’s main competitor, CoreCivic, recently sold four detention centers to ICE — two of them in California — for a combined $2.2 billion. Spokesman Ryan Gustin said the facilities were valuated using independent appraisers and federal acquisition standards “to determine objective fair market value.”

ICE paid for them using $45 billion approved by Congress for ICE detention last year, enough for the agency to meet the administration’s goal of 100,000 detention beds. ICE is about 30,000 beds shy of meeting that goal.

Among more than 200 facilities ICE now relies on nationwide (most being local jails) are 36 privately owned detention centers. Those facilities hold the vast majority of detainees.

A Homeland Security spokesperson previously told The Times that it’s crucial for ICE to own detention centers on the West Coast so the agency can maintain the detention capacity it needs.

“Unlike in states like Florida and Oklahoma, ICE can not rely on local state and county partners for detention space in California,” the spokesperson said last month. “The state’s sanctuary politicians continue to push legislation to outlaw or make private prisons financially [unfeasible].”

GEO Group didn’t respond to a request for comment. Gustin, of CoreCivic, said its facilities operate under substantial government oversight, including “on-site government personnel, regular audits and inspections, detention-standard reviews, independent accreditation processes, and routine visits by government officials, attorneys, families and community representatives.”

How much power the federal government would be required to grant states is an open question if more facilities become federally owned, even if private companies continue to run the day-to-day operations.

Claire Trickler-McNulty, a former Homeland Security official who led efforts to reform detention standards, said federal ownership of detention facilities isn’t, on its face, a bad idea. If the goal was to own facilities that would be needed long term, she said, the agency could slowly transition to staffing those facilities with its own employees and cut out the need for private contractors.

Trickler-McNulty said federal ownership of detention centers could make state oversight “slightly more complicated.” But that doesn’t mean the centers can be operated without any review.

“I don’t think it shields the government from liability in total,” she said. “If the government owns a facility whose negligence causes harm or death in the government’s custody, I don’t think you can just buy away liability.”

NEW YORK — Nearing the six-month mark of the Iran war and facing diminishing stockpiles of key weapons, the Trump administration is touting a crushing financial campaign against Tehran, promising an “economic D-Day” against a country that has withstood nearly five decades of punishing American sanctions.

With sparse details, President Trump announced this week that the U.S. would be imposing an “unprecedented” level of economic warfare and isolation on Iran, aiming to force its leadership to cave to demands to end its nuclear program and fully reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz to oil and natural gas tankers.

It reflects the dire reality Trump faces with an increasingly unpopular war he can’t seem to end just months before pivotal midterm elections that will decide whether his Republican Party keeps control of Congress. Whether out of desperation or strategy, the president is refocusing America’s might on bringing Iran to its knees through an accelerated sanctions campaign against one of the most economically penalized countries in the world.

In response to the threat, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi posted Friday on X the history of U.S. sanctions against Iran, saying, “We have seen this movie before. Same bull. Different bullies.”

The immediate reaction from Iran hawks has been praise and a call for patience as it plays out, while other analysts warn that Trump is refusing to learn the lessons of his predecessors.

In an interview Thursday on CNBC, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent offered a small glimpse of what may be ahead, threatening secondary sanctions on nations and companies that conduct business with Iran.

He did not reveal who would be targeted as part of this next phase of the administration’s Operation Economic Fury, which earlier had focused on entities and people who buy oil from or bank with Iran. China and India, however, are major buyers of Iranian oil.

“If you insist on doing business with them, then the U.S. Treasury and U.S. government will put its full might and force against you,” Bessent said. “It’s time for our allies and the rest of the world to make a decision.”

Some experts see ‘uncharted waters’ that could force Iran’s hand

Despite decades of U.S. sanctions against Iran, the Trump administration is arguing that it’s only a matter of time and that striking the right economic target would get Tehran to its breaking point.

Richard Goldberg, who coordinated efforts to put diplomatic pressure on Iran in Trump’s first term, said the consequences of U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites last year, the war this year and the American naval blockade on Iranian ports have created the perfect storm for capitulation — one that didn’t previously exist.

“I think we’re watching a strategy, whether it takes a short time or a long time, that is very much about fundamentally changing the future of the world by seeing the end of this regime,” said Goldberg, who is now at the hawkish Washington think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, or FDD.

“I caution everyone — including myself, who has worked on sanctions, who’s worked on financial warfare — to have the humility to admit that we are in uncharted waters,” he said.

He said the decision this week by the United Arab Emirates — once one of Tehran’s most important trading partners — to suspend trade with Iran over an alleged missile attack will only further isolate the government.

Beyond trade in domestically produced goods, the Emiratis had helped the country absorb some of the shocks caused by sanctions through its re-export hub.

Targeting allies and partners comes at a price

With nearly all of Iran’s energy, financial and transportation sectors already covered by U.S. sanctions, Trump’s aim appears to be to apply secondary sanctions on countries, including allies and partners, that have not cut all ties with Iran to starve the country of any remaining income it may still be receiving.

In many ways, it is a redux of Trump’s first-term maximum-pressure campaign, which he has ramped up during his second term to include military action.

But as Trump and his allies discovered during his first administration, it can be difficult to enforce secondary sanctions without harming U.S. interests and provoking reciprocal measures. There were numerous instances of the administration granting sanctions waivers to countries, particularly those that rely on Iranian oil for their energy needs.

“Trump’s strategy now rests on targeting Tehran directly by impeding its touch points and access to the formal financial system and international economy,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the FDD’s Iran program. “This will require making the Iran issue more important in U.S. bilateral relations with countries in Europe and Asia.”

Iran doesn’t see an ‘open door’ at the end of the sanctions campaign

Iranian officials and analysts have accused the Republican president of flip-flopping with his latest pivot to economic pressure against Tehran. Trump has long derided past leaders who used sanctions to limit Iran’s ability to pay for its military and nuclear development.

In a post last week on X, Esmail Baghaei, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, wrote that Washington’s pattern of retreating to sanctions when it doesn’t want to pursue diplomacy has proven to be futile.

“Iran has demonstrated over decades that it will not be strangled by these exhausted refrains,” he said. “The real risk is that American politicians, clinging to this bad habit, will instead strangle their own remaining chances of a less humiliating exit from a crisis of their own making.”

Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group, said the Trump administration’s decision to take its own maximum-pressure policy to new heights with military action seems to ignore years of U.S. foreign-policy lessons that show Iran does not respond well to pressure.

If anything, he says, the latest economic campaign has only “hardened Iran’s position.”

“I think (Trump’s) blind spot is the fact that the only thing that the Iranian regime views as more dangerous than suffering from U.S. sanctions is surrendering to U.S. terms,” Vaez said.

Plus, the past year of start-stop diplomacy has only worsened the already fragile dynamic between the longtime adversaries, Vaez says, adding that Iranian officials’ lack of trust in Trump and his mediators has created an untenable foundation.

“They believe that even if they capitulate to U.S. terms under economic duress, Trump would move the goalposts and ask for more,” he said. “And this is really the fundamental problem: Pressure without an open door is an exercise in futility.”

Amiri writes for the Associated Press. AP writers Matthew Lee and Fatima Hussein in Washington contributed to this report.

Aug. 13 (UPI) — The Trump administration’s decision to close the U.S. Consulate in Medan, Indonesia, may save relatively little money. But it risks weakening American influence in one of the Indo-Pacific’s most strategically important regions at a time when Washington says competition with China is its foremost foreign policy priority.

The Medan consulate is small compared with the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta or major diplomatic posts elsewhere in Asia. Yet, its strategic value has long exceeded its size.

Situated on the island of Sumatra, the consulate serves roughly 60 million Indonesians across 10 provinces, supports U.S. commercial interests, advances educational and environmental partnerships and provides Washington with a permanent presence near the Strait of Malacca — one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.

The proposed closure comes as the United States seeks to deepen its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy and an increasingly influential G20 member.

Those ambitions sit uneasily alongside a shrinking American diplomatic footprint in one of Indonesia’s most important regions.

For years, U.S. officials have argued that competition with China extends beyond military deployments and naval exercises. It also depends on trade, investment, educational exchanges, environmental cooperation and people-to-people ties.

Those objectives require diplomats on the ground, particularly outside national capitals where many of today’s political and commercial relationships are forged.

“The administration should reconsider closing a strategically located consulate near the Strait of Malacca,” Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific Security at the Hudson Institute, told UPI. “Recent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz remind us how indispensable the Strait of Malacca remains to global commerce.”

Sumatra is one of Indonesia’s economic engines, producing energy, palm oil, coffee, rubber and other commodities, while anchoring important shipping and trade routes across the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean.

The island accounts for a large share of Indonesia’s palm oil production, while its provinces are also major exporters of rubber, coal, agricultural products and manufactured goods.

North Sumatra recorded more than $3.5 billion in exports in 2025, while South Sumatra recorded $6.3 billion. American companies operating in energy, agribusiness, manufacturing and logistics therefore have commercial interests that extend well beyond Jakarta, including relationships with provincial governments, suppliers, ports, industrial estates and local business communities.

A diplomatic presence in Medan provides U.S. officials with a base for supporting those relationships, monitoring commercial conditions and helping American companies navigate regulatory and administrative issues in a region central to Indonesia’s trade and resource economy.

“It will reinforce the perception that the United States is shrinking its footprint in Southeast Asia,” Murray Hiebert, head of research at BowerGroupAsia, told UPI. “Closing Medan also removes the only permanent U.S. diplomatic presence near the Strait of Malacca.”

Unlike many countries where political authority is concentrated in one capital, Indonesia’s decentralized system gives provincial governments considerable influence over investment, environmental management and economic development. Relationships built through a regional consulate cannot easily be replicated through periodic visits from embassy officials based in Jakarta.

Indonesia also occupies a distinctive place in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It is neither a treaty ally nor a strategic adversary, but an independent regional power that has consistently pursued its long-standing “free and active” foreign policy. Jakarta has resisted choosing sides between Washington and Beijing, preferring to cultivate strong ties with both.

Ted Osius, former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, who also served as president and CEO of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, said Washington has spent years strengthening its partnership with Indonesia as both countries seek closer trade and defense cooperation.

“The annual cost of operating the U.S. Consulate in Medan, staffed by just two American diplomats serving an island of more than 60 million people, is roughly equivalent to one minute of Pentagon spending during the conflict with Iran,” Osius told UPI. “The modest savings from closing the post would come at a disproportionate strategic cost.”

China has long recognized that influence is built through sustained local engagement as much as national diplomacy. Over the past decade, Beijing has expanded its presence across Indonesia through infrastructure projects, mining investments, industrial cooperation and Belt and Road financing.

Chinese companies dominate Indonesia’s rapidly growing nickel-processing industry, while the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway has become Beijing’s flagship infrastructure project in Southeast Asia.

Chinese engagement extends well beyond Jakarta. Provincial governments across the archipelago work directly with Chinese companies, universities and local officials, allowing Beijing to deepen relationships through consistent local engagement rather than high-profile diplomatic initiatives alone.

Against that backdrop, reducing the American presence outside the capital risks reinforcing perceptions that Washington’s commitment is narrowing rather than expanding.

The implications extend beyond geopolitics. Sumatra contains some of the world’s richest tropical forests, including the Leuser Ecosystem, one of the few places where orangutans, elephants, rhinos and tigers still co-exist in the wild. These forests also rank among the world’s most important carbon sinks, making them central to global biodiversity and climate efforts.

“We should not be closing the U.S. Consulate in Medan,” Robert Blake, a former U.S. ambassador and now senior managing director at McLarty Associates, told UPI. “Despite its relatively small operating cost, the consulate punches well above its weight.

“It enables U.S. diplomats to engage with Sumatra’s 60 million people, promotes American business in a region rich in energy, palm oil and coffee, and supports Indonesia’s efforts to protect Sumatra’s unique biodiversity — a globally significant natural heritage and one of the world’s most important carbon sinks.”

That work has included support for conservation partnerships, scientific cooperation, educational exchanges and civil society initiatives. As climate change increasingly intersects with national security and economic policy, environmental diplomacy has become another arena in which countries build long-term influence.

The Medan consulate has served as a regional presence in North Sumatra, providing U.S. diplomats with direct access to local officials, business leaders, universities, civil society organizations and other institutions outside Indonesia’s capital.

Its location also gives Washington a base for monitoring developments across a strategically important part of the country, including trade, investment, maritime activity and regional ties.

Closing or consolidating that presence would shift more of those functions to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and other regional posts, potentially changing how frequently American officials engage with counterparts in Sumatra.

Supporters of consolidation argue that modern communications and periodic travel can substitute for permanent regional offices, particularly during a period of fiscal restraint. But diplomacy remains fundamentally relational. Trust develops through sustained interaction, familiarity with local institutions and networks that cannot be built through occasional visits.

Whether the closure ultimately proceeds is less important than what it signals. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, Washington contends that strategic competition with China will be won not only through military strength, but also through sustained economic, diplomatic and societal engagement. That strategy depends on people, institutions and local relationships built over decades — not only on high-level summits or defense agreements.

The annual savings from closing a small consulate in Medan are likely to be modest. The strategic cost may be harder to measure.

James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Harvesting the Waves: How Blue Parks Shape Policy, Politics, and Peacebuilding in the South China Sea. Borton is the editor-in-chief of the South China Sea NewsWire. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

Britain’s new Prime Minister Andy Burnham is using social media to reshape Labour’s public image and challenge the growing online influence of populist parties, particularly Reform UK. By combining informal, relatable content with government messaging, Burnham is seeking to connect with younger voters while projecting a more approachable leadership style.

A New Digital Approach

Since taking office, Burnham has rapidly expanded his presence on TikTok, X, and Instagram through light-hearted videos, behind-the-scenes content, and policy announcements packaged in an accessible format.

Unlike traditional political messaging, Burnham’s posts often feature humor and everyday topics, ranging from debating popular pub snacks to joking about his own appearance. Communications experts say this approach presents him as relatable without undermining the seriousness of his office.

Labour Seeks to Close the Digital Gap

Burnham’s strategy reflects Labour’s effort to compete in an online space where Reform UK and its leader Nigel Farage have built significant audiences over several years.

Political analysts argue that while former Prime Minister Keir Starmer struggled to connect through digital platforms, Burnham’s communication style is more natural and engaging. Early polling suggests Labour has narrowed Reform UK’s lead since Burnham became prime minister, although the next general election remains years away.

Positive Messaging Over Polarisation

Communications specialists describe Burnham’s strategy as one focused on inclusion rather than confrontation. Instead of relying on divisive rhetoric, Labour is attempting to broaden its appeal through optimistic messaging and accessible political communication.

Videos highlighting government policies such as tax relief for hospitality businesses have attracted millions of views, demonstrating how policy announcements can gain wider attention when presented through social media trends.

Building a Professional Digital Operation

The government has expanded its investment in digital communications, recruiting specialists in content production, strategy, and social media engagement.

Burnham’s online campaign is being coordinated by experienced digital strategists, reflecting a broader recognition that political influence increasingly depends on platforms where younger audiences consume information.

Analysis: Social Media Is Becoming a Core Political Battleground

Burnham‘s early success illustrates how political communication is evolving beyond traditional speeches and television appearances. Social media has become a central arena where leaders compete not only on policy but also on personality, authenticity, and accessibility. While Burnham’s informal style may help Labour regain ground against populist rivals such as Reform UK, digital popularity alone is unlikely to determine long-term political success. As analysts note, sustained public support will ultimately depend on whether the government delivers tangible improvements on the economy, living standards, and public services. If policy outcomes fail to match the positive online narrative, social media momentum could prove difficult to maintain.

With information from Reuters.

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military think tanks are closely monitoring the movements of the current Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, and tracking the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. PLA websites are officially monitoring the activities and movements of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, particularly the important air event for China: the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), especially as the Egyptian Air Force and Ministry of Defense prepare to launch the second edition of the exhibition (EIAS 2026) at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026.

As an Egyptian expert specializing primarily in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can deconstruct, analyze, and evaluate the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles regarding the role and actions of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and its minister, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, as follows:

– First: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers are closely monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in hosting the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition.

This event is considered regionally significant for China, serving as a platform to connect defense and space organizations in Africa and the Middle East. This edition has garnered considerable international and Chinese interest, particularly from leading figures in the Chinese arms and defense industries, who are showcasing their latest aircraft and drones.  China’s interest in the inaugural El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in 2024 was marked by significant historical participation: the Chinese Air Force performed spectacular air displays, their first official air show outside of China. This first-ever air show featured Chinese aircraft performing unique aerobatic maneuvers in the skies above El Alamein, a first for China. Furthermore, the exhibition served to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian military cooperation. China’s interest in the Egyptian air show reflected the strength of bilateral military relations and the two countries’ desire to bolster their aviation and defense sectors. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers focused on evaluating and analyzing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s activities in hosting the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. The Egyptian Air Force also announced the launch of the second edition of the exhibition, aiming to explore avenues for joint military cooperation and advanced military technologies between Egypt and China.

–             Second: The Role of the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security in Monitoring the Activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to Secure Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Projects and Protect Chinese Strategic Interests

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the Counter-Espionage and Infiltration Bureau) is concerned with the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in securing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects and protecting China’s growing strategic interests in the region from foreign intelligence penetrations. The dimensions of Chinese security and intelligence interest are focused on protecting vital waterways, particularly securing navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which are essential maritime arteries for China’s Maritime and Military Silk Road. Furthermore, the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security seeks to secure major Chinese investments through intelligence oversight of joint Chinese logistical and economic projects, such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the TEDA projects. With close monitoring by Chinese intelligence circles, specifically the role of the Chinese Ninth Bureau in countering external threats, the activities of rival intelligence agencies targeting Chinese military technologies or economic presence in North Africa are being tracked and neutralized.

Therefore, think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been paying close attention to the Egyptian defense minister’s foreign trips aimed at strengthening Egyptian military partnerships with countries around the world. This is of profound significance and military importance to China and the PLA, given its connection to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the military cover for trade. Beijing relies on developing military coordination with Cairo and advanced arms deals, such as air defense systems, to ensure a stable regional environment that protects its long-term investments. This is achieved through a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, transforming their cooperation from traditional trade to security and defense integration, thus guaranteeing the safe flow of global trade through Egypt. Therefore, the Chinese military has shown keen interest in tracking the movements of Egyptian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher around the world, particularly his important official visit to Turkey in July 2026 and his meeting with the Turkish Defense Minister to sign a letter of intent for defense cooperation and the expansion of joint exercises. This is in addition to his on-site monitoring of the development and training of personnel at the Military Academy and other educational institutions affiliated with the Armed Forces, which intelligence and military circles in Beijing are keen to monitor closely.

– Third: The interest of Chinese military platforms and websites in covering news and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense through official and semi-official military and news portals affiliated with the Chinese government that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs

In this context, several Chinese military platforms and websites specialize exclusively in covering news about the Egyptian Ministry of Defense or Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher individually. However, his strategic movements are also followed through official and semi-official Chinese government military and news outlets that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs. The most prominent of these Chinese websites and platforms include the China People’s Liberation Army Online (cn/China.81 Military Online). This is the official website of the Chinese armed forces, focusing on official meetings and joint cooperation. Also included is the website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, which is known as mod.gov.cn. This covers military diplomacy and protocols between Egypt and China. Additionally, there is (Xinhua Military). This is the official news arm that translates and publishes extensive reports on the restructuring of military leadership and the strategic moves of the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Ashraf Salem Zaher. And the Guancha Platform, which is militarily known as Guancha.cn. This is a leading Chinese analytical website that focuses on international military and geopolitical affairs. It analyzes Egyptian arms deals and military cooperation with regional and international powers, particularly China. Chinese media coverage of news from the Egyptian army and the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in Egypt demonstrates broad strategic interest through Chinese military platforms such as the People’s Liberation Army Online (China Military Online) and the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. This coverage focuses on joint military cooperation, modern Egyptian military technologies, and potential areas of military cooperation between Egypt and China during the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. This is especially significant given the participation of major Chinese military companies in the second edition of the exhibition, companies operating in the fields of defense, armaments, space technology, and commercial aviation. Therefore, specialized Chinese military platforms and agencies highlight displays of modern aircraft and drones, trends in military technological development in Egypt, and areas of mutual military benefit between Egypt and China.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles, represented by the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and all the aforementioned Chinese military sites, are monitoring all Egyptian military and field movements and activities. This includes, most notably, the movements of Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production (who assumed his position in February 2026). His recent intensive activities and initiatives aimed at enhancing combat readiness and strengthening Egyptian-international military cooperation, particularly with China and the People’s Liberation Army, are of particular interest. Among the most prominent movements and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which have been the focus of analysis and evaluation by Chinese military circles, are the Egyptian defense minister’s field and diplomatic activities, including his official visit to Turkey in July 2026 at the head of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to discuss joint defense cooperation with the Turkish side. In addition to the interest, analysis, and evaluation by Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles of the significance of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters and their analysis of its connection to maintaining the security and stability of Chinese investments and opening new footholds and ports, especially in the Horn of Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese logistical interests, relevant circles in Beijing are also monitoring the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss regional conditions and security in Africa, linking this to Chinese interests from a Chinese perspective.

– Fourth: The interest of intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing in the recent Egyptian military activity in Africa and the significance of inviting and receiving African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters, from a precise geopolitical perspective as a strategic pillar serving vital Chinese interests

Intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing view Egypt’s recent military activity in Africa as a strategic pillar directly serving vital Chinese interests. Beijing analyzes the invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense headquarters, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, from a precise geopolitical perspective that links regional security to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This analysis considers the connection between Egyptian activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa and Chinese logistics efforts to secure vital maritime routes for China’s interests. Beijing believes that strengthening Egyptian military influence in the sensitive Horn of Africa region acts as a safeguard for maritime traffic in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, the main artery of China’s Maritime Silk Road, in addition to its importance for protecting China’s ports. Here, Chinese defense circles welcome any efforts to stabilize the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, thus protecting Beijing’s logistics base in Djibouti and opening up prospects for securing new Chinese ports and investments. These investments depend on the stability that Cairo, as a regional power center, can contribute to establishing.

– Fifth: Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt to promote calm and stability in the Great Lakes and Nile Basin region, which is crucial to Chinese logistical interests.

Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt is that relevant circles in Beijing followed with great interest the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guy Kabombo Mwadiyamvita, to discuss regional security conditions. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles analyze this in order to secure Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, given that China has massive investments worth billions of dollars in the minerals and cobalt sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing believes that security and stability in Congo, which Egypt supports through African Union institutions and bilateral cooperation, protects vital supply chains for Chinese technology industries from the risks posed by rebel groups. Furthermore, the Chinese Ninth Bureau and Chinese think tanks and military intelligence affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that strategic coordination in the Nile Basin region is essential for China’s interests and investments. Beijing considers the Egyptian-Congolese consensus to enhance calm and stability in the Great Lakes region and the Nile Basin, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflicts that could threaten construction and infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese companies in those countries.

– Sixth: Chinese military circles are closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to secure the Chinese Maritime and Military Silk Road.

In addition to closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with the leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Chinese military circles are following the security situation and developments in the armed forces’ modernization plans, given the particular importance of these matters to China in safeguarding its interests. Chinese military and strategic circles are keen to follow these meetings due to Egypt’s pivotal role in the stability of the Middle East and its crucial importance to China’s economic interests and investments in the Maritime and Military Silk Road. The dimensions of Chinese interest in President al-Sisi’s role lie in his coordination with the Egyptian military establishment to protect Chinese investments and secure major infrastructure projects and the Chinese economic zone northwest of the Suez Canal. This strengthens the Chinese military partnership with Egypt, paving the way for further defense cooperation agreements, increased military partnership and joint exercises, and the diversification of Chinese arms sources for Cairo. This serves to maintain China’s regional security and to monitor the security situation and its impact on global trade and maritime navigation routes.

– Seventh: Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises and the Badr 2026 tactical project.

Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises. They pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile-firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. Chinese officials also observe the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions. Furthermore, Chinese circles evaluate the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s Badr 2026 tactical project, especially the main phase of the Badr tactical exercise, which involved live ammunition and was conducted by (units of the Egyptian Third Field Army). This evaluation assesses the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital waterways and axes of importance to China. Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises, and they pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. With the Chinese interest in the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions, Chinese circles are also evaluating the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s tactical project (Badr 2026), particularly the main phase of the Badr tactical project, which involved live-fire exercises conducted by units of the Egyptian Third Field Army. This evaluation aims to assess the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital corridors and axes of importance to China. Chinese military circles and analysts are closely following the training and educational activities of the Egyptian Armed Forces, specifically the Badr 2026 tactical project with live ammunition conducted by the Egyptian Third Field Army, night air defense firing exercises, and the scientific activities of the Military Technical College. This is all part of assessing the Egyptian army’s readiness to protect vital axes. Furthermore, relevant circles in Beijing are keen to conduct further monitoring and evaluation of Egyptian military field training activities within the framework of the Badr 2026 tactical project to accurately assess the main phase with live ammunition conducted by units of the Third Field Army in support of the Air Force and to penetrate defenses.  With the interest of Chinese military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army in the (nighttime missile firing) exercises in Egypt, they observed the efficiency and capabilities of the Egyptian air defense forces in operating effectively at night under cover of defense and in the presence of Egyptian military leaders.

With the Chinese military circles monitoring the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Military Academy and the graduation ceremonies of new classes of students from the Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies and understanding and studying the impact of these events on China through the desire of Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles to develop military curricula in Egypt and Africa. This reflects the Chinese interest in Egyptian military education and scientific research and the Egyptian Military Science Day through the monitoring of the activities of the Egyptian Military Technical College’s Science Day and engineering competitions, and following the conclusion of the scientific and engineering competitions and linking them to the technological development of the combat capabilities of Egyptian military academies and institutions, and understanding what is lacking in these activities in order to fill it in the future through military educational partnerships with Egypt and its Ministry of Defense.

With close monitoring by Chinese defense and security circles of the joint Golden Eagle exercises between Egypt and Turkey, given their importance to China’s military and maritime Silk Road and to protecting Chinese interests in maintaining the security of the region and its vital waterways necessary for global supply chains. The focus and attention of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have also been on Egypt. The With You initiative is primarily an Egyptian military initiative concerned with coordinating the Martyrs’ Recognition Fund of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to disburse the first phase of the presidential initiative to care for the children of martyrs and wounded veterans. Chinese circles are interested in this Egyptian presidential initiative to understand its implementation mechanism, in coordination with the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Solidarity, and in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt and Misr Life Insurance Company. China is seeking to understand the Egyptian system and its operational and implementation mechanisms regarding all presidential initiatives.

– Eighth: Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt, understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy, in order to assess Egyptian military and elite human resources and build an accurate Chinese database to understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt.

Furthermore, Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt and understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy in order to share their expertise with the Egyptian military. They are also monitoring announcements of new admissions to the Military Academy and graduates of technological colleges to understand the total number of individuals with military backgrounds in Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to transfer its expertise in military education curricula and leadership and elite training to Egypt and its military academies. An analytical reading of China’s monitoring of the Egyptian military education system reveals profound strategic dimensions that extend beyond mere routine observation for the Chinese. This Chinese interest in the Egyptian military education system can be broken down as Beijing’s focus on monitoring Egyptian military and elite human resources. By monitoring the admission requirements and announcements for the Egyptian Military Academy and Egyptian military technology colleges, Beijing aims to build a precise database and understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt. This contributes to anticipating the future leadership structure of the Egyptian state and helps Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles assess the combat and administrative efficiency of Egyptian military elites. Here, the Chinese side seeks to analyze the preparation and qualification curricula for students in Egyptian military academies to determine the development of Egyptian training doctrine and its adaptation to modern warfare and smart systems. This facilitates the evaluation of the most prominent military partner in the Middle East and Africa region. This can be considered a gateway for transferring Chinese military-diplomatic expertise to Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to introduce its leadership and elite training methodologies. This is part of China’s persistent effort to enhance its strategic influence (soft power) in Egypt and build long-term ideological and tactical alignment between the Egyptian and Chinese militaries through sharing its advanced military doctrine.

    Accordingly, we understand the extent of Beijing’s interest in the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense within its strategy to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This includes securing vital economic interests and maritime routes for China, such as the Suez Canal, and developing mutual military and arms cooperation with Cairo. This stems from China’s keenness to coordinate with Cairo, given its central position in global trade and regional security. This helps diversify Chinese military partnerships with the Egyptian military establishment and its Ministry of Defense, as Beijing presents itself as a reliable strategic military alternative in the Middle East.

WASHINGTON — With Whitewater investigations likely to continue well into next year’s presidential campaign, the White House has decided on a hard-line legal and public relations counterattack that carries serious political risks for President Clinton.

On the legal front, the White House is relying on executive privilege as well as lawyer-client confidentiality to justify withholding notes on a November 1993 meeting at which the president’s lawyers and aides discussed Whitewater.

The notes have been subpoenaed by the Senate Whitewater investigative committee, and White House aides fear that they will be demanded by special counsel Kenneth W. Starr as well. Today the committee will vote to enforce the panel’s subpoena for the notes. Panel Chairman Alfonse M. D’Amato (R-N.Y.) said that the full Senate would vote on the matter before adjourning later this month and that he plans to seek an expedited court review.

Republicans have suggested that the 1993 meeting, which occurred when several federal agencies were investigating the activities of Clinton associates in Arkansas, may have dealt with ways to cover up damaging facts and obstruct justice.

And such charges, whatever their substantive merits, create a politically dangerous problem for an already embattled president going into an election year.

Some sources who have seen the documents insist that they contain no incriminating revelations. They say that the president is invoking executive privilege because waiving it would open the administration to a massive fishing expedition by partisan investigators. Executive privilege is the constitutional principle that a chief executive can maintain the confidentiality of internal communication involving the legal pursuit of his duties.

Yet even if the meeting notes are innocuous and the White House is holding them back only to protect a larger principle, the failure to make full disclosure can raise voters’ suspicions. Already, political opponents and some newspaper editorial writers are using such Watergate-isms as “stonewalling” to describe Clinton’s reaction.

Said a former Clinton White House official knowledgeable about Whitewater: “The problem here is that the courts might ultimately sustain the president but politically it’s a loser.

“In cases like these, the political dimension quickly overwhelms the legal dimension,” said this source. He predicted that Clinton eventually would find a way to release the documents in some form while continuing to assert that they are protected by either attorney-client privilege or executive privilege.

The Senate panel revealed Wednesday that in addition to the notes of the Nov. 5, 1993, meeting, the White House has not turned over four other Whitewater-related documents:

* A draft chronology of the Whitewater saga prepared by the Clintons’ personal lawyer, David E. Kendall. It was drafted five days after the Nov. 5 meeting.

* A letter written Jan. 4, 1994, to the president from Washington attorney James Hamilton, who has represented the family of the late Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster and who worked for the 1992 campaign.

* A New York Times article from Dec. 20, 1993, with notations Clinton wrote in the margin.

* Undated notes of White House aide Joel Klein.

Democrats said that the Clintons have every right to invoke privilege in this matter, and they suggested that the Republicans should try to negotiate a compromise rather than move toward a court battle. D’Amato described the Clintons’ position as “extraordinary and troublesome.” Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland, the committee’s ranking Democrat, accused D’Amato of trying to provoke a confrontation for political reasons.

The White House is more concerned that waiving confidentiality would open the door for Starr to seek notes and testimony from Clinton’s attorneys.

Lawyers, including White House Counsel Jack Quinn, have advised Clinton that he cannot waive the privilege for only one meeting. If he waives it once, he cannot reassert it on another Whitewater issue.

While the White House public relations campaign is aimed at explaining Clinton’s case and marshaling support for it, it also is designed to discredit D’Amato as a political enemy with ethical problems of his own–a ploy guaranteed to stir more controversy and criticism of the president.

Times staff writers John M. Broder and Sara Fritz contributed to this story.

With the ruins of the Gaza Strip lying around him, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz last week renewed his push to set up illegal settlements in the battered territory’s north.

“I intend to establish three Nahal outposts, which is also a military entity, in those places that were in northern Gaza,” Katz told Channel 14, referring to bases that combine farming with an armed presence in a bid to consolidate control over a territory.

The minister said, in his view, establishing these settlements would enhance security – but execution would have to be “in the right way, at the right timing, while coordinating”.

It was not the first time the member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party has made such remarks. In December, Katz said the Israeli military would “never leave all of Gaza” but “in due course” would establish Nahal posts despite a United States-brokered plan stipulating a full Israeli military withdrawal and barring the re-establishment of Israeli settlements.

His comments also echoed a recent statement by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich that “the groundwork to establish three settlements in the North Gaza area” had been completed. Smotrich, who also holds the portfolio of “settlement administration” in the Ministry of Defence, has repeatedly called for the full occupation of the Gaza Strip.

Such a push has been central to the goals of Israel’s settler movement, which in January 2024 organised a conference attended by government ministers to advocate for the re-establishment of settlements in the Strip.

“This is their ideology. They want the Gazans out of Gaza and they want to settle there like they settle in the West Bank,” former Israeli diplomat Alon Liel told Al Jazeera.

All settlements on Palestinian land are illegal under international law, but settlement expansion and annexation have been a core objective of Netanyahu’s hard-right government. In recent years, it has carried out unprecedented settlement expansion, resulting in the forced displacement of dozens of Palestinian communities and the de facto annexation of land in the occupied West Bank.

Issam Younis, a prominent Palestinian human rights defender and director of the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, said he was not surprised by Katz’s latest comments. “It was very clear from day one in the genocide that the main goal was to make life impossible in Gaza by destroying everything,” he told Al Jazeera. “It’s a race for time – take over land, starve Gaza and deny it any chance at life, then expel the population and build settlements.”

Younis said Israel’s conduct during its genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza and the “ceasefire” agreed in October under the US plan clearly showed that expelling the population is the main objective of the Israeli government.

“Dehumanising statements by senior Israeli officials reaffirmed this: calling Palestinians in Gaza ‘human animals’, saying that there are no civilians in Gaza, then saying clearly that the objective was to expel the population and create settlements in the Gaza Strip,” Younis added.

Israel made no secret of that objective. In early 2025, the government announced it was setting up an agency to oversee the “voluntary migration” of Palestinians from Gaza as part of a plan proposed by Katz.

The announcement drew widespread international condemnation. Experts warned that such a move would amount to a war crime. Last month, the Israeli government decided to rebrand the agency and replace talk of “voluntary migration” with the “free movement plan” while using “language deemed more acceptable internationally”, according to Israeli media.

The policy enjoys widespread support in Israel. A 2025 poll commissioned by the University of Pennsylvania found that 82 percent of Jewish Israelis support the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza.

Meanwhile, nine months into a “ceasefire”, during which Israeli attacks have killed at least 1,127 Palestinians, conditions in Gaza remain unbearable.

The United Nations says at least 265 children have been killed during the period while hunger persists and the debilitated healthcare system continues to suffer acute medicine shortages.

“Only 20 percent of what Gaza needs has been allowed to enter – things related to water and health and to life in general,” Younis said, referring to Israeli restrictions on aid entering the Strip. “Gaza is being starved and parched for water.” For him, the aim is clear: expulsion, “even if they call it voluntary migration”.

Liel said Israel is doing the minimum on the humanitarian track to avoid upsetting US President Donald Trump, who has set up what he has named the Board of Peace to oversee the administration and reconstruction of the Strip.

“I don’t think that Israel wants Gaza to be reconstructed like Trump is dreaming,” he said.

Palestinians have been increasingly frustrated with the Board of Peace’s failure to pressure Israel or implement the recovery and construction plans outlined in Trump’s “ceasefire” plan, including the entry of critically needed assistance.

“The Board of Peace is complicit until it moves to rebuild Gaza immediately,” Younis said. “Otherwise, it would not be allowing Israel to create the conditions that make life impossible for Palestinians in Gaza, which will result in expulsion.”

Israeli forces have also expanded the “Yellow Line”, demarcating Israeli-controlled areas within Gaza, to encompass 70 percent of the Strip. “We are not retreating from the ‘Yellow Line’, unequivocally, as long as Hamas does not truly disarm, and even after that, we remain inside Gaza,” Katz told Channel 14 during his tour of northern Gaza, saying the destruction of the territory was “the result of a deliberate policy”.

The settlement push comes as Israel is gearing up for elections, which will be held on October 27.

According to Liel, Katz and other ministers are openly talking about building settlements in Gaza because their calculation is that it would boost their electoral chances amid a shift to the right by the electorate.

Many observers expected the weeks leading up to the polls to be accompanied by a serious escalation in Gaza, the West Bank and other Israeli “war fronts” without changing the political situation in Israel.

“The wish of this Israeli government was that as many [Palestinians from Gaza] will leave. Hopefully voluntarily. If not, Israel will help, and this is the reason you don’t want to rebuild Gaza,” Liel said.

WASHINGTON — Democrats are making a growing effort to adopt a pragmatic focus as they campaign on affordability in the midterms, as some within the party push for moving away from ideological arguments.

Across the country, Democratic candidates are trying to win over voters by talking about real-life scenarios, framing other platform issues in economic terms and, strategists say, aiming to shift a perception that Democrats deal in the abstract.

They see an opening created by voters’ focus on the economy and their ability as the party not in power to leverage affordability as the key midterms issue as Trump’s economic approval remains low. Trump has dismissed the issue, calling affordability a “hoax” by Democrats while also promising economic improvements.

“There has been a learning process in being able to take what Trump and the Republicans are doing and make sure that [candidates] are coming back to the real-world economic implications of whatever that might be,” Democratic strategist Alex Jacquez, who served in the Biden White House. “That’s where maybe [Democrats] haven’t always, in the recent past, made the full connection all the way through.”

Now, “the moment is ripe,” he suggested, for the party to shift its image.

The Democrats’ concentration on affordability and the economy has defined their midterm messaging, playing off elevated inflation, the effects of Trump’s tariffs and high gas prices caused by the war in Iran. The party is attempting to capture enough swing voters to win a House majority in November, and some believe the Senate could also be within reach.

Polling shows pessimism about the economy has increased among all Americans and most believe the country is in an affordability crisis. Americans most frequently mention government leadership and economic issues as the country’s most important problems in Gallup polling.

Voters also increasingly disapprove of Trump’s handling of the economy, including working-class white voters who make up a key part of his base. In an NPR/PBS News/Marist Poll last month, Americans gave the president his lowest-ever approval rating on the economy at 33%.

Speaking in Pennsylvania on Thursday, Trump said of affordability: “That’s a fake word that they use. They caused the affordability problem. It’s called high prices.”

Rep. Adam Gray, a Democrat who represents a purple Central Valley district and is a member of the center-left Blue Dog Coalition in Congress, said he believes voters have grown frustrated by the failure of Washington lawmakers to pay attention to what the people want out from government.

He pointed to Central Valley growers whose business has been affected, he said, by the rising price of fuel and fertilizer, the squeeze on the labor market caused by immigration enforcement and changes to federal programs.

“How regular people experience politics, it’s not the kind of ideological debates we have in Washington,” Gray said. “It’s the experience of doing something, whether that’s shopping for groceries or going to the lake to go boating with your family and realizing the price of gas is through the roof or the road to the lake is in disrepair.”

At a time when Democrats have debated how to embrace a party identity beyond opposing Trump and intra-party fights between progressive and moderate candidates have drawn attention, some believe the “practical” tactic may offer one key to the party’s path forward.

In Texas, Democratic candidates are pointing to the impact of data centers on water supply or the consequences of the state’s abortion ban, said Matt Angle, director of Lone Star Project, a political research organization that works to help get Democrats elected.

“The fact that Corpus Christi is running out of water … [or] you have women who have died because they were denied abortion services,” Angle said. “It’s very important that those things not be talked about in ideological terms but in practical terms. I think Democrats are doing a better job of that than ever before.”

“Real life is happening on the ground,” Angle added. “I think Democrats see that.”

Republicans pursued a similar strategy successfully in 2024, and their attacks on Democrats for focusing on cultural issues may have been successful in pushing Democrats away from that messaging, said Republican strategist Brittany Martinez.

“They have made it clear that’s the direction in which they’re trying to go,” she said of Democrats. “I also think you have outliers of the party that sometimes suck all the oxygen out of the room and maybe derail that message.”

National Republican Congressional Committee spokesperson Christian Martinez said Democrats’ economic record, including in California under Gov. Gavin Newsom, demonstrates a failure to prioritize working families.

“It’s laughable that Democrats are trying to make kitchen-table issues their brand,” he said. “It only proves their political brand is broken, while Californians continue living every day with the receipts from Democrats’ failed agenda.”

Republican National Committee Chair Joe Gruters said Thursday at a summit convened by the Washington-based news outlet the Hill that he was confident the party would retain the House and Senate and projected optimism about the economy.

“He’s going to bat for the American worker every single day,” Gruters said of Trump. “He’s going to continue to do everything he can to get the nose of the economy in this country up and to get prices down.”

But as Trump appears to prioritize other issues, Martinez said, Republicans are facing their own uphill battle to win over swing voters.

“When the president has mocked affordability, said it’s not a crisis, I don’t think that helps [Republicans],” Martinez said. “Democrats have an opportunity to capitalize on that right now.”

Both moderate and progressive Democrats see the moment as a chance to define what the party stands for beyond opposing Trump, and both have seized on real-life arguments, though the approaches differ.

Progressives have long framed a spectrum of issues in economic terms, said Usamah Andrabi, spokesperson for the progressive caucus Justice Democrats.

“That has always been the progressive economic playbook, and I think it’s about time that the other wings of the Democratic Party catch up to us,” Andrabi said.

That also means, he said, not backing away from other issues, such as abortion, foreign wars and healthcare.

“It has always been the right that has sought to divide our communities on these so-called culture war issues,” Andrabi said. “Our vision forward should be one that includes everyone… That does not mean simply ignoring some people’s most urgent crises to focus on something else, because these are interconnected.”

Climate advocates, for instance, are “effectively connecting” climate to top midterm issues, including including gas and utility costs, AI data centers and the Iran war, said Jamie Henn, executive director of nonprofit communications lab Fossil Fuel Media, and have encouraged Democratic candidates to do the same.

“Climate, like many issues, doesn’t win itself on its own merits. It’s in the ways that you talk about it and connect it to kitchen-table issues,” Henn said. “Do it in the right way – it’s not a science lecture on global warming, it’s a story about how clean energy can reduce your bills.”

Still, getting more candidates to pick up those messages can be a steep climb, he said. Advocates in some spaces, including climate, have worried about their issues being sidelined.

“There are Democrats that could be threading this needle who aren’t,” Henn said. “We know the issues that climate needs to be connected to, but [politicians] need… to do a better job to clearly articulate the messages.”

July 13 (UPI) — Yulia Svyrydenko has resigned as prime minister of Ukraine, as President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that she would be assuming a new position amid a shift in the war-torn country’s political strategy.

Svyrydenko stepped down on Sunday, five days short of serving a full year as prime minister. No reason was given.

Her resignation came as Zelensky said in a statement that “Ukraine is changing its political strategy.”

Though he did not detail specifically how or why the change was necessary, he indicated the new strategy would prioritize implementing the agreement with the United States for Ukraine to manufacture Patriot missile systems, advancing Europe’s anti-ballistic missile defense project, progressing Kyiv’s European Union membership, improving relations with Poland and Hungary and creating ties with the Middle East for security and economic cooperation and with China to help Russia’s War.

“Accordingly, personnel changes will begin in Ukraine to ensure the implementation of the updated political strategy,” Zelensky said in a statement.

He said he discussed the details with Svyrydenko and together, “we determined that these changes require a renewal of the Cabinet of Ministers.”

“I am grateful to Yulia for her clear, steady and effective work as prime minister, for her years of productive service on Ukraine’s team, and I have offered her the opportunity to lead a new and important area of relations with a key partner,” he said.

“I expect that, together with MPs, we will make the corresponding changes in the government of Ukraine. There will also be changes among the heads of law enforcement agencies.”

Svyrydenko said in a separate statement that she was grateful to Zelensky and was proud to have led the government as the country defended itself against Russia’s invasion.

“At this moment, it is critically important to unite all our strength and resources to make Ukraine stronger,” she said.

“I remain ready to serve the Ukrainian state and carry out every task aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s position, defending our national interests and bringing a just peace closer.”

The announcement also came about seven months after Zelensky’s administration underwent a major reshuffle after 11 officials quit following a mass corruption scandal that rocked the government.

Zelensky separately said Sunday that he met with Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal and Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov, among other officials.

Obsidian Entertainment, a subsidiary of Microsoft Corp.’s Xbox, has canceled multiple projects and will begin working on a new game in the popular Fallout franchise as part of the division’s broader restructuring, according to people familiar with the matter.

The video-game studio, based in Irvine, California, also laid off around a quarter of its workforce, said the people, who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to speak to the press.

As part of the shake-up, Obsidian has canceled a planned sequel to the 2025 roleplaying game Avowed along with other unannounced projects.

Under the new plan, studio design director Josh Sawyer will lead a new title in the Fallout universe — a series of roleplaying games that take place in an alternate history in which the U.S. has been ravaged by nuclear war. The emerging strategy is still in flux, the people said, and could still change.

Previously, Sawyer had been directing a roleplaying game that was similar structurally and thematically to Fallout but was not part of the franchise.

An Xbox spokesperson declined to comment.

The shifts take place as Xbox Chief Executive Officer Asha Sharma executes what she has called a “reset” of the organization. On Monday, Sharma announced plans to cut 3,200 jobs and divest five studios. She’s said she’ll invest more in the company’s biggest franchises, including Fallout, which has sold tens of millions of copies and led to a hit show from Amazon.com Inc. that is currently filming its third season.

Despite its critical and commercial success, the Fallout video-game series has not seen a new entry since 2018’s online title Fallout 76 because its primary developer, Xbox’s Bethesda Game Studios, has been focused on other projects. Bethesda has also regularly updated and created new content for Fallout 76, which has reached more than 23 million players.

The only Fallout game in the last two decades to not come from Bethesda was 2010’s Fallout: New Vegas, developed by Obsidian and directed by Sawyer. Although New Vegas has become a fan favorite, Bethesda has maintained control over the franchise. The Rockville, Maryland-based studio will work with Obsidian on the new project, the people said.

Obsidian released three games last year, two of which did not meet sales expectations, including Avowed, the company told Bloomberg Businessweek. The studio had been hoping to build on Avowed by developing a sequel in a shorter timeframe using the world and technology that it had already created.

Progress on the sequel was going well, and it was on track to be announced within the next year. But in the end, it did not fit into Sharma’s overall strategy, according to people familiar with the game’s development.

Some Obsidian employees will continue working on the Avowed sequel as they wait for new projects such as Fallout to be ready, perhaps in hope of one day reviving the game, the people said.

Obsidian will also continue to develop downloadable content for last year’s The Outer Worlds 2, the people said, and will also still work on its live-service multiplayer survival game, Grounded 2.

Schreier writes for Bloomberg.

Published on
02/07/2026 – 15:24 GMT+2

European car suppliers and manufacturers are divided over Brussels’ “Made in Europe” strategy, an effort to shield the EU market from Chinese competition.

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The EU car industry is facing fierce competition from China, threatening hundreds of thousands of jobs across the bloc. To address the issue, the EU is preparing the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act, which is designed to favour electric vehicles constructed mostly with European components in public procurement and public support schemes.

However, EU car suppliers and manufacturers disagree over the proposed law, currently under discussion by EU countries and the European Parliament, which sets a 70 percent local content threshold for electric vehicles.

According to the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA), the Commission’s proposal is a step in the right direction. Based on a study commissioned from management consultancy Roland Berger that Euronews has seen, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery-electric vehicles manufactured in Europe already contain between 80 percent and 90 percent made-in-Europe components.

Consequently, it considers the Commission’s 70 percent threshold to be achievable.

But the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) is pushing for a different methodology, under which regulators would assess finished vehicles instead of the local content in vehicle components.

“A vehicle is far more than the sum of its parts. Its value also lies in the R&D, advanced engineering and highly skilled workforce behind it,” ACEA said in a position paper published on 1 July.

CLEPA responded that under this methodology, a finished vehicle would require only 50 percent EU-made parts and components, with the remaining 20 percent coming from R&D, design and other activities.

This 20 percentage-point dilution of the requirement for EU-made parts “could result in the loss of 350,000 jobs”, CLEPA warned, saying the Commission’s component-level approach would “safeguard the existing manufacturing base”.

“What we are looking at right now is significant competition from best-cost countries, and the dragon in the room is China,” CLEPA Secretary General Benjamin Krieger told Euronews.

“A ‘Made in Europe’ threshold that ignores where the actual parts are built is a label that ignores the European worker,” he said.

In a recent interview with the New York Times, Vice President JD Vance denied that there was an “intense rivalry” between him and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. And yet, reports and speculations about tensions between them continue to emerge, with the Rubio camp allegedly spreading rumours that Vance was thinking about pulling out of the presidential campaign before it even starts

In response, perhaps, during the past two weeks, the vice president has stepped out of his routine public persona that usually avoids controversy to make bold statements critical of Israel. Rubio, on the other hand, has continued to hold the party line of unconditional support for Israel. While Vance has led efforts to negotiate a peace deal with Iran, which have rattled Israel, Rubio has spearheaded efforts to pressure the Lebanese government into an agreement on Israel’s terms.

By becoming the face of Republican scepticism of Israel and clashing with his likely presidential election rival Rubio, Vance appears to be charting his own way to the presidency – one that distances the vice president from what increasingly seem to be unpopular foreign policy positions.

Rubio, until recently, had been on the upswing, assigned ever-more important responsibilities by Trump. He has been a leading voice within the administration for a hawkish approach that has encompassed military action from Venezuela to Iran, outweighing the counsel of the more isolationist Vance.

When it comes to Israel, Rubio has made a point of being as public and proactive as possible in his support for that country and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, supporting his appeal for the US to enter the war with Iran, and even going so far as to put his name on determinations leveraging claims of national security threats to deport foreign students critical of Israel.

While the bulk of his public statements have been directed at the Netanyahu government, it is hard not to read some of Vance’s recent comments as being directly responsive to Rubio’s actions not only abroad, but at home as well.

As Vance put it, “…pro-Israel people in the United States make two critical mistakes. One, on the one hand, is not delineating between America’s interest and Israeli interests because they’re not the same. But the second is always conflating criticism of a particular government with Jew hatred, because if everything is Jew hatred, then nothing is Jew hatred.”

But, if Vance is creating space between himself and Rubio (including, apparently, by eschewing the increasingly weaponised terminology of “antisemitism”), it must also be the case that there is a political case for his doing so. That case has yet to be tested on the Republican side, where the political elites well beyond Rubio continue to move in lockstep with Israel’s Netanyahu.

But Vance, as ever, is reading the base. The same polls that show an absolute collapse of Democratic grassroots support for Israel also show an unmistakable weakening of that support in the Republican base, with one recent survey finding that 57 percent of Republicans under 50 now hold negative views of Israel.

Despite the inability of Republican elected officials to rally support behind their criticism of Israel (neither of the two most visible examples, Representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Thomas Massie will re-enter Congress next year), the demand signal for more frank conversation has propelled right-wing commenters like Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens to ever-greater prominence. Looking into the social media landscape, Republican questioning of the Israel relationship – particularly under the banner question of whether it represents “America First” or “Israel First,” is inescapable.

Which is not to say it will be an easy path. As sitting vice president, Vance must defer to Trump; while the latter is currently frustrated with Netanyahu, there are no guarantees that the relationship will not warm up between now and 2028 – or that if Israel elects a new leader this autumn, that that person would not be able to rebuild much of Israel’s political capital in Washington.

And similarly, if Vance’s stance on Israel helps him capture the “America First” – which is no easy task given the cohesion within that movement of the Christian Zionist camp that remains strongly pro-Israel – he may then have to contend with a Democratic competitor who seizes the Israel-sceptic mantle more credibly.

Or not. It is still early, but the favoured nominee on the Democratic side appears to be California Governor Gavin Newsom, whose few forays into commentary on Palestine and Israel have quickly been walked back to appease the pro-Israel backers of the party establishment. Indeed, the Democrats will have their own complicated, and likely ugly, battle to fight when it comes to Israel.

What does appear certain, however, is that Israel will be a wedge issue in the upcoming election – and in the wake of the failed Iran war and increasingly unpopular attacks on free speech, both greatly driven by the government of Israel or its aligned lobbies, there is an opening here that Vance, given his competition with Rubio, would have been foolish to ignore.

So is Vance’s public criticism of Israel – and pro-Israel voices within his own party genuine, or calculated? As Vance put it in his book Hillbilly Elegy, “I don’t believe in epiphanies. I don’t believe in transformative moments, as transformation is harder than a moment. I’ve seen far too many people awash in a genuine desire to change only to lose their mettle when they realised just how difficult change actually is.”

Until now, little is harder in Republican politics than to go against the prevailing dogma on Israel. And while Vance has long demonstrated what might be termed isolationist tendencies, there is no reason to think that his recent comments represent an epiphany. Rather, like any politician, he is reading the tea leaves, and sensing an opportunity on the back of a change that is filtering across American public opinion.

Vance may not be committed to driving that change. But he may be smart enough to ride it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Israel’s balancing act that allowed it to reap America’s unconditional and, often, blind support, while slowly benefiting from China’s growing economic influence and political prestige, is already floundering.

Thanks to the heated cold war between the US and Chinese economic superpowers, the Israeli strategy of playing both sides is unlikely to pay dividends in the long run.

Soon enough, Tel Aviv might find itself having to make a stark choice between Washington and Beijing.  When US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Israel on May 13, two items topped his agenda: Israel’s imminent illegal annexation of Palestinian land and the growing Israeli-Chinese economic ties.

Pompeo communicated his country’s stand on both issues, reflecting Washington’s long-standing policies regarding Palestine and China. In the case of Palestine, as with the rest of the Middle East, Washington seems to adhere to Tel Aviv’s agenda, often to the letter.  China is a different story.

READ: China rejects Israel’s planned annexation of West Bank

Two significant historical examples come to mind: one, is Israel’s attempt to sell China Israeli-made Phalcon airborne radar system, which relied heavily on American technology in the 1990s; a similar event transpired in 2005, this time concerning Israel’s Harpy anti-radar missile. On both occasions, Israel succumbed to American pressure and canceled both deals.

For the Chinese, Israel matters for two different reasons. One, Israel is a strategic stop in China’s Belt and Road initiative, China’s most significant economic project to date, ultimately aimed at turning Beijing into a center of global trade and financial activities. Two, China is hoping to fight the US on its own political turf in the Middle East – partly in response to the American ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, which was initiated by the Barack Obama administration.

But the world – in terms of political and economic balances of power – after the coronavirus pandemic is likely to prove a different one when compared with previous years. China’s rise has been in the making for many years and the US political retreat and declining global outreach has been quite evident for some time. The isolationist policies of the Donald Trump Administration, coupled with Washington’s many China-related tantrums in recent years, are all indicators of the vastly changing political realities of a once-unipolar world.

“I will not miss the opportunity to annex the West Bank”- Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

A few years ago, Beijing had the time, patience, and resources to play a long-drawn geopolitical game in order for it to challenge the US’s global influence, whether in South America, Africa, or Israel.

The visit by China’s Vice President, Wang Qishan, to Israel in 2018, to “boost business ties”, was part of this Chinese strategy. That visit followed the signing, one year earlier, of the China-Israel Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. As of 2018, China-Israel trade has jumped to $14 billion and has grown exponentially ever since.

China would have been happy to carry on with that strategy for many years to come. Israel, too, would have played along, considering the lucrative financial returns from its China partnership.

READ: Israel ties to China may risk our ability to work with Tel Aviv

Indeed, despite Washington’s warnings against and, at times, explicit demands on Israel to refrain from giving Chinese companies access to fifth-generation infrastructure (5G) projects in the country, Israel labored to make China feel welcomed.

However, the global response to the coronavirus pandemic is likely to change this, as it has already accelerated the cold war between the US and China, pushing the latter to adopt a more aggressive form of diplomacy and pour massive sums into other countries’ economies to help them in their desperate fight against the COVID-19 disease.

The Chinese strategy is predicated on two main pillars: fortifying existing ties and solidarity with China’s allies or potential allies anywhere in the world, while pushing back against China’s foes, especially those who are participating in Washington’s anti-Beijing campaign.

The latter phenomenon is known as ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’. The ‘wolf warriors’ are Chinese diplomats who have, for months, pushed back with unprecedented ferocity against what they perceive to be US and Western propaganda.

READ: China’s ambassador to Israel found dead in Tel Aviv home

“We never pick a fight or bully others,” China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, told reporters in Beijing on May 24, while explaining China’s novel approach to diplomacy. “We will push back against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honor and dignity, and we will refute all groundless slander with facts,” the top Chinese official said firmly.

China’s new aggressive diplomacy, especially if it continues to define the country’s approach to foreign policy in the coming years, is unlikely to permit Israel to maintain its balancing act for much longer.

China’s ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, who was entrusted with implementing Beijing’s soft-diplomacy with Tel Aviv, died in his home only a few days following Pompeo’s visit to the country. Although Wei’s death was not – at least publicly – perceived to be the result of foul play, his absence, especially in the age of coronavirus and ‘wolf warriors’, might signal a shift in China’s approach to its economic and political interests in Israel.

On May 26, under American pressure, the Israeli Finance Ministry denied China a massive $1.5 billion desalination plant contract, awarding it to an Israeli company, instead.

This is the first time that the US has used its political and economic sway over Israel to curb Chinese influence in the country. China must be anxiously watching events unfold,   to see if US pressure on Israel will continue to undermine Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Deal of the century, embassy relocation, and the Golan Heights – Israel surely can’t believe their luck? – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

The world’s quickly shifting balance of power and the US-Chinese unmistakable fight for dominance is likely to, eventually, force countries like Israel to make a choice, of wholly joining the American or the Chinese sphere of influence. It is all reminiscent of the American-Soviet Cold War, where much of the globe was divided into zones of influence operated by proxy from Washington or Moscow.

Balancing acts in politics only work if all parties are willing to play or, at least, tolerate the game. While this form of politics suited Israel’s interests in the past and was played, quite successfully for years by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s balancing act is, possibly, over.

Between Washington’s precise demands to Israel to keep Beijing at bay, and the latter’s aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, Israel is facing a stark choice: remaining loyal to a fading superpower or diving into the uncharted waters of an emerging one.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

One of the memorable moments of Venezuela’s crazy January ‘26 was ExxonMobil Chairman Darren Woods sitting across from President Trump, telling him Venezuela was “uninvestable.” His company is owed billions from Chávez-era expropriations, spent years in arbitration tribunals, and had watched its assets nationalised without fair compensation. Four months later, ExxonMobil’s technical teams were on the ground in Venezuela, evaluating assets including the Cerro Negro project. Woods was telling investors he felt positive about the opportunities.

The arc from expropriated creditor to ¿partner? is not happening by accident. In April 2026, the IMF and World Bank resumed dealings with Venezuela for the first time since 2019, opening the path to a formal economic assessment and potentially unlocking $4.9 billion in frozen special drawing rights. In May, the Delcy administration announced a “comprehensive restructuring of its sovereign debt” and PDVSA obligations, appointing Centerview Partners as financial adviser and pledging a macroeconomic framework by June. This did not include a request for a macroeconomic programme established by the Fund, which distanced itself from Venezuela’s announcement shortly after. According to Reuters, Venezuela’s total liabilities could be above $150 billion.

On June 2, Venezuela added Hogan Lovells as legal counsel for the restructuring under a dual mandate that also covers strategic lobbying for the Venezuelan embassy in Washington. The account is led by Norm Coleman, a former Republican senator with deep political connections in the capital. Neither selection has been free of political entanglement. Former Trump official Mauricio Claver-Carone, earmarked by The Washington Post as Venezuela’s unofficial viceroy, has vouched for Centerview. His business partner, Jessica Bedoya, was on the same chartered flight to Caracas as two Centerview executives on February 12, weeks before the firm finalized its contract (Centerview denied Bedoya played any role in their assignment).

Some of the companies that spent a decade winning arbitration awards against Venezuela may now be considering turning those claims into something more useful: an operating agreement, a new oil deal. Whether the game is actually changing, and the extent to which Delcy’s technical cadres can manage the process her government is trying to kickstart, are two of the huge questions for Venezuela’s “transition” observers.

Without the IMF as an anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

The shape of how Venezuela got here is also visible in a Delaware courthouse. In December, a judge signed the order transferring Citgo to Amber Energy, an affiliate of Wall Street hedge fund Elliott Management, for 5.9 billion dollars. The gavel came down, but the sale did not close. CITGO is now in legal and political limbo.

The transaction requires approval from OFAC, which has repeatedly extended the freeze on CITGO-related transactions. The State Department is now the main barrier blocking the sale, while Treasury, Commerce, and Energy favour letting it proceed. Ten days ago, OFAC issued General License 5W, extending the freeze on CITGO share transfers to June 19. A World Bank delegation visited Caracas last month. Everything suggests Delcy Rodríguez now feels compelled to show she can find a way to pay them back. That she has a plan.

In the meantime, Amber Energy is pressing daily for access to CITGO’s financial and operational details even though it is not formally in control, while CITGO itself cannot make major investment decisions or hire key personnel. A company valued at $13 billion is being run in slow motion, waiting for Washington to decide what Venezuela’s most valuable foreign asset is actually worth, to whom, and under what terms.

None of this happened overnight. The process was set in motion by Hugo Chávez when he went on a nationalisation spree that expropriated the assets of ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Crystallex, and dozens of other foreign companies across the oil, mining, and manufacturing sectors. Those companies didn’t go home quietly. They went to arbitration. And they won.

The restructuring announcement tries to change the terms of the conversation. Venezuela is no longer being asked whether it will engage with its creditors. It has begun doing so. Centerview Partners is on the ground. A macroeconomic framework is due soon. The creditor committee, which includes GMO, Greylock Capital, Fidelity, and T. Rowe Price has been ready to negotiate since January.

ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling.

An IMF programme, if it materialises, could signal credibility. It would serve as the anchor for the entire restructuring process. IMF conditionality establishes a debt sustainability framework that defines how much Venezuela can actually pay, which in turn defines what creditors can realistically expect. It also catalyses coordination. Rather than pursuing individual enforcement actions against Venezuelan assets, creditors have an incentive to wait for an orderly process. Without that anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

Delcy Rodríguez announced the restructuring without first securing that anchor. She has stated there are “no plans” to contract an IMF loan. The IMF, for its part, says it is willing to support a programme but requires clarity on economic data and external debt that Caracas has not yet provided. Very soon, we will find out whether Venezuela is building toward an IMF-anchored process or trying to engineer one without it.

Several of the companies owed the largest arbitration awards are well positioned to operate Venezuelan assets: ExxonMobil at Cerro Negro, ConocoPhillips at its former Petrozuata and Hamaca projects. ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling. A negotiated settlement that converts arbitration claims into operational stakes, with revenue streams tied to production, would give creditors a return and Venezuela a rebuilt industry. The OFAC licensing architecture already enables this. Since January 2026, OFAC has issued or updated more than eight general licenses expanding authorised activity in Venezuela’s energy and financial sectors. Washington has built the tools, such as General License 58. The question is whether Venezuela can use them. 

What this push does not resolve is the harder question: whether Venezuela has the institutional capacity to negotiate on its own terms rather than simply accept whatever is offered. Woods’s shift from “uninvestable” to “positive” in four months signals appetite, not commitment. ExxonMobil wants its assets back or a return on its claims. So does ConocoPhillips. So does every creditor in the queue. The question is whether Venezuela can show up to this negotiation as a party with a strategy, not just a debtor with a problem.

The path forward requires exactly what fifteen years of chavismo didn’t build: legal capacity, a coherent negotiating strategy, and the institutional infrastructure to distinguish between claims that should be settled, claims that should be contested, and claims that might be converted into something more useful than a judgment. The latter could amount to an oil agreement like the one Chevron got in the early 2020s. Venezuela’s reformed Hydrocarbons Law allows international arbitration to resolve disputes in the oil and gas sector. So does the new Mining Law for gold and strategic minerals.

The framework now exists in writing. Whether Venezuela can implement it coherently, and whether it can hold up against the inevitable tension between Venezuelan law as established in the new statutes and US jurisdiction as required by OFAC licenses, are the open questions that will determine whether this moment becomes the start of something durable or another lost opportunity.

None of that sounds like glamorous policymaking. It doesn’t play well in a speech. But the alternative, continuing to treat international arbitration as someone else’s problem, has a documented price tag. It is measured in refineries.

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