strategic

For Trump followers, his offer of a 20 to 40 billion economic assistance to Argentina came as a shock. For a government that emphasizes not spending American tax payers’ money abroad the record high foreign debt defaulter and agrobusiness competitor Argentina is a puzzling choice.

However, there are profound reasons for this outcome. In what follows, I will try to explain them. The first two motives are the most obvious ones, but I promise that the following two are the ones that are not that apparent though interesting to read.

The first reason, and more obvious one, is the ideological congruence between the executives. The Argentine president Milei shares Trump’s anti woke ideology, it has always been a Trump supporter and shares with him a deep-seated rejection for leftist governments and ideologies. However, whereas Trump is an economic nationalist, Milei brands himself as an “anarcho-capitalist” that profoundly believes that the powers of free market should reign without interference in order for economies and societies to succeed.

Secondly, next Sunday Milei will face a crucial midterm election. In a last September legislative vote in the crucial Buenos Aires province (that accounts for 40% of Argentina’s population) he lost against his arch rivals, the Peronist Party. The Peronist coalition, that governed Argentina for the most part of the last 25 years, held a leftist ideology that privileged bilateral relations with China over the US and that is a staunch critic of Trump’s policies. The following Monday, the Argentine peso faced very strong devaluation pressures that ended up drying up the Central Bank’s reserves.

Third, the US grand strategy has been under a deep transformation, at least since Obama`s presidency. It has been progressively withdrawing from the Middle East while focusing more on China. It has also demanded the Europeans (and also its allies in East Asians) to up their defence spending. This relative withdrawal is somewhat compensated by an increase of attention in its own neighbourhood, the Americas. It is under this lens that we can understand the recent US military actions against the Maduro regime in Venezuela, the suspension of economic aid to leftist governed Colombia and the huge tariffs applied to also leftist governed Brazil. Being Mexico also governed by a (somewhat pragmatic) leftist party and having in Chilean President Boric a staunch critic of Trump`s policies, the US is left with very few friends in the region. Right now, the only welcoming ally from a large country in the Americas is Argentina`s Milei.

Fourth, from the Argentine side, a change in the strategic outlook in part of its elites is also paving the way for an alliance with the US. The current Argentine executive, in its quest to achieve macroeconomic stability has as its most coveted goal the dollarization of the economy. This is the endpoint of the pro market economic reforms under way. At the same time, the Milei government supports the US and Israel in a fashion unseen in Argentine history. Worldwide, there are not many countries supporting the Trump agenda as thoroughly as Argentina.

There are strong indications that the deepening of the alliance between the US and Argentina is under way. However, near future events might change this course. Next month there will be presidential elections in Chile, while Colombia and Brazil will have theirs in May and October respectively. A win by the opposition in any of these countries will devalued the strategic relevance that Argentina holds right now. Secondly, will Trump successors double in an alliance with a country that has never been considered strategic for US interests? Finally, there is the question of Milei`s political future in Argentina. Good part of his ambitions and of Argentina’s grand strategy will be risked in next elections.

When Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto stood beside his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi at Al-Ittihadiya Palace in Cairo on Saturday, the joint declaration they signed marked more than a diplomatic formality; it signalled the rebirth of a transcontinental bond, anchored in history, redefined by pragmatism, and sharpened by today’s geopolitical realities.

Indonesia and Egypt have agreed to elevate their long-standing ties to a “strategic partnership”, setting a new tone for bilateral cooperation in sectors as wide-ranging as defence, education, trade, energy and cultural exchange. While this may read like a typical diplomatic communiqué, Prabowo’s visit and the deepening of ties with Cairo reflect a broader and more deliberate shift: Indonesia is seeking to diversify its global alliances, particularly in the Middle East, at a moment when traditional poles of power — Washington and Beijing — are both proving increasingly precarious partners.

Indonesia’s expanding outreach in the Middle East is no coincidence. Cairo is the third stop on Prabowo’s tour through the region, which includes high-level meetings in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. This multi-nation effort is part of Jakarta’s evolving strategy to forge a more independent and dynamic foreign policy, one that not only resists alignment with the world’s dominant powers, but also prioritises partnerships grounded in mutual benefit and shared values.

For Egypt, too, the move makes sense. In a world destabilised by trade wars, multipolar realignments and ongoing regional tensions, Cairo is increasingly looking eastward. Egypt’s active engagement with ASEAN — a bloc wherein Indonesia is the largest economy — underscores its ambitions to tap into the economic dynamism of South-East Asia, particularly in areas like trade, food security and digital infrastructure.

The economic logic is compelling.

Bilateral trade between Indonesia and Egypt reached $1.7 billion in 2024, making Egypt Indonesia’s top trading partner in North Africa. Indonesian exports — palm oil, coffee beans and coconut oil — flow steadily into Egyptian markets, while Egyptian companies have invested in nearly 100 projects in Indonesia, including major ventures in energy and infrastructure. Egypt sees Indonesia not just as a partner, but as a regional hub, a gateway to the ASEAN market and a conduit for broader Afro-Asian collaboration.

READ: Over 1,500 Israeli armoured corps troops demand end to Gaza war, return of hostages

But economics alone don’t define this partnership. A key pillar of this Cairo visit was a joint call to address one of the most urgent and morally pressing issues of our time: the war in Gaza.

Both nations are aligned vocally in their support for Palestine. Prabowo, whose administration is bound constitutionally to uphold the end of colonialism in all its forms, made it clear that Indonesia sees the plight of the Palestinian people not just as a regional tragedy, but also as a universal injustice. Al-Sisi, leading a country that shares a border with Gaza and has played a crucial role in mediation efforts, echoed the urgency of halting Israeli aggression and beginning immediate reconstruction.

The joint statement from the summit rejected the forced displacement of Palestinians, condemned illegal Israeli settlements and reaffirmed commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. This alignment is more than rhetorical; it is strategic. As the United States continues to waver in its Middle East posture and China treads cautiously, Indonesia and Egypt see an opening to act, not as neutral observers, but as active proponents of peace grounded in regional legitimacy.

There is another dimension here that deserves attention: defence cooperation. While, traditionally, Indonesia has focused its military relationships on ASEAN allies and Western powers, its partnership with Egypt opens the door to a different kind of military diplomacy, one rooted in shared challenges and experiential learning. Egypt’s unique experience dealing with border tensions in Libya, Sudan and the occupied Palestinian territories offers valuable lessons for Indonesia as it recalibrates its security doctrines in a more unpredictable global landscape.

President Prabowo’s visit to the Egyptian Military Academy and his praise for the country’s training programmes were not just photo opportunities; they were symbolic gestures pointing toward future collaborations in defence education, joint training and possibly co-development of security technologies.

Cultural and educational exchange, too, are seeing renewed investment.

Egypt already hosts more than 15,000 Indonesian students, most notably at Al-Azhar University, a vital bridge in Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. The announcement that Egypt will expand its scholarship programme for Indonesians speaks to a soft power relationship that transcends politics; a commitment to building enduring people-to-people ties.

So why now? The answer lies in the shifting sands of geopolitics. As the world drifts toward a post-American and post-unipolar order, middle powers like Indonesia and Egypt are reasserting themselves, not as followers of global hegemons but as architects of their own regional futures.

For Indonesia, forging deeper ties with Cairo is not about choosing sides in the new Cold War between the US and China. It is about transcending that binary altogether; about carving a space where developing nations, through solidarity and strategic pragmatism, can assert agency on the world stage.

The strategic partnership between Indonesia and Egypt may not dominate global headlines. It could, though, offer a template for how nations of the Global South collaborate, not through dependency, but through dignity. And in a world sorely lacking in moral clarity, Jakarta and Cairo’s unified call for peace in Palestine may well be one of the few voices speaking with both principle and purpose.

Below the radar: Is the Trump-Netanyahu ‘unthinkable’ about to happen?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

When Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto stood beside his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi at Al-Ittihadiya Palace in Cairo on Saturday, the joint declaration they signed marked more than a diplomatic formality; it signalled the rebirth of a transcontinental bond, anchored in history, redefined by pragmatism, and sharpened by today’s geopolitical realities.

Indonesia and Egypt have agreed to elevate their long-standing ties to a “strategic partnership”, setting a new tone for bilateral cooperation in sectors as wide-ranging as defence, education, trade, energy and cultural exchange. While this may read like a typical diplomatic communiqué, Prabowo’s visit and the deepening of ties with Cairo reflect a broader and more deliberate shift: Indonesia is seeking to diversify its global alliances, particularly in the Middle East, at a moment when traditional poles of power — Washington and Beijing — are both proving increasingly precarious partners.

Indonesia’s expanding outreach in the Middle East is no coincidence. Cairo is the third stop on Prabowo’s tour through the region, which includes high-level meetings in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. This multi-nation effort is part of Jakarta’s evolving strategy to forge a more independent and dynamic foreign policy, one that not only resists alignment with the world’s dominant powers, but also prioritises partnerships grounded in mutual benefit and shared values.

For Egypt, too, the move makes sense. In a world destabilised by trade wars, multipolar realignments and ongoing regional tensions, Cairo is increasingly looking eastward. Egypt’s active engagement with ASEAN — a bloc wherein Indonesia is the largest economy — underscores its ambitions to tap into the economic dynamism of South-East Asia, particularly in areas like trade, food security and digital infrastructure.

The economic logic is compelling.

Bilateral trade between Indonesia and Egypt reached $1.7 billion in 2024, making Egypt Indonesia’s top trading partner in North Africa. Indonesian exports — palm oil, coffee beans and coconut oil — flow steadily into Egyptian markets, while Egyptian companies have invested in nearly 100 projects in Indonesia, including major ventures in energy and infrastructure. Egypt sees Indonesia not just as a partner, but as a regional hub, a gateway to the ASEAN market and a conduit for broader Afro-Asian collaboration.

READ: Over 1,500 Israeli armoured corps troops demand end to Gaza war, return of hostages

But economics alone don’t define this partnership. A key pillar of this Cairo visit was a joint call to address one of the most urgent and morally pressing issues of our time: the war in Gaza.

Both nations are aligned vocally in their support for Palestine. Prabowo, whose administration is bound constitutionally to uphold the end of colonialism in all its forms, made it clear that Indonesia sees the plight of the Palestinian people not just as a regional tragedy, but also as a universal injustice. Al-Sisi, leading a country that shares a border with Gaza and has played a crucial role in mediation efforts, echoed the urgency of halting Israeli aggression and beginning immediate reconstruction.

The joint statement from the summit rejected the forced displacement of Palestinians, condemned illegal Israeli settlements and reaffirmed commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. This alignment is more than rhetorical; it is strategic. As the United States continues to waver in its Middle East posture and China treads cautiously, Indonesia and Egypt see an opening to act, not as neutral observers, but as active proponents of peace grounded in regional legitimacy.

There is another dimension here that deserves attention: defence cooperation. While, traditionally, Indonesia has focused its military relationships on ASEAN allies and Western powers, its partnership with Egypt opens the door to a different kind of military diplomacy, one rooted in shared challenges and experiential learning. Egypt’s unique experience dealing with border tensions in Libya, Sudan and the occupied Palestinian territories offers valuable lessons for Indonesia as it recalibrates its security doctrines in a more unpredictable global landscape.

President Prabowo’s visit to the Egyptian Military Academy and his praise for the country’s training programmes were not just photo opportunities; they were symbolic gestures pointing toward future collaborations in defence education, joint training and possibly co-development of security technologies.

Cultural and educational exchange, too, are seeing renewed investment.

Egypt already hosts more than 15,000 Indonesian students, most notably at Al-Azhar University, a vital bridge in Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. The announcement that Egypt will expand its scholarship programme for Indonesians speaks to a soft power relationship that transcends politics; a commitment to building enduring people-to-people ties.

So why now? The answer lies in the shifting sands of geopolitics. As the world drifts toward a post-American and post-unipolar order, middle powers like Indonesia and Egypt are reasserting themselves, not as followers of global hegemons but as architects of their own regional futures.

For Indonesia, forging deeper ties with Cairo is not about choosing sides in the new Cold War between the US and China. It is about transcending that binary altogether; about carving a space where developing nations, through solidarity and strategic pragmatism, can assert agency on the world stage.

The strategic partnership between Indonesia and Egypt may not dominate global headlines. It could, though, offer a template for how nations of the Global South collaborate, not through dependency, but through dignity. And in a world sorely lacking in moral clarity, Jakarta and Cairo’s unified call for peace in Palestine may well be one of the few voices speaking with both principle and purpose.

Below the radar: Is the Trump-Netanyahu ‘unthinkable’ about to happen?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Sept. 16 (UPI) — Mexico’s government will shift its trade policy next year by raising tariffs on countries without free trade agreements, including China, India and South Korea. The move is aimed at reducing competitive disadvantages in key sectors and strengthening domestic production.

The plan covers 1,463 categories of goods, from vehicles and auto parts to steel, textiles, toys and furniture. Those products currently face import duties of 0% to 35%, but under the proposal they would be subject to rates of 10% to 50%, depending on the category.

In particular, imported light vehicles — many from China — would see duties rise from the current 15% to 20% to the maximum rate of 50%.

The initiative, part of the government’s Plan Mexico 2026 economic package, drew immediate international reaction, particularly from Beijing, the most affected trading partner.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said his country “firmly opposes any form of economic pressure disguised as trade regulation.”

He said the measure “undermines its legitimate rights” and urged Mexico to act “as a responsible partner in promoting fair and open global trade.”

President Claudia Sheinbaum denied the initiative was aimed specifically at China or prompted by foreign pressure. Seeking to ease tensions, she said she will meet with officials from Beijing and Seoul to explain that the tariff increase is meant “to strengthen domestic production” and is part of the government’s Plan Mexico 2026.

“We do not want any conflict with any country,” Sheinbaum said, emphasizing that the measure is domestic economic policy, not a hostile act.

Mexico’s Economy Ministry said the tariffs would cover about 8.6% of the country’s total imports, valued at roughly $52 billion.

“This is not against any country; it’s per product. In this case, we are applying a package aimed at protecting about 19 sectors of the economy, mainly automobiles and auto parts. These increases are not discriminatory or coercive,” Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard told the Mexican outlet Grupo Fórmula.

“They apply to all countries with which we do not have a trade agreement, and the goal is to strengthen domestic production.”

He added that Mexico’s trade deficit with several Asian countries — particularly China and South Korea — has grown sharply.

“The pace of growth in that deficit worries us. For example, we send one dollar in exports to China and import 11. So when you see prices below cost, any Mexican manufacturer would ask why we are allowing that,” Ebrard said, defending the tariff hike as the maximum permitted under World Trade Organization rules.

The proposal was sent to Congress this week as part of the 2026 budget, and approval is considered certain since the ruling party holds majorities in both chambers. Once approved, it would take effect 30 days after publication in Mexico’s Official Gazette.

The United States and Canada, Mexico’s partners in the USMCA trade agreement, will not be affected by the tariffs because of their existing agreements.

Mexican officials said the measure has multiple goals. The government wants at least 50% of inputs classified as “strategic” to be manufactured in Mexico by 2026, reducing reliance on foreign supply. At the same time, the plan seeks to protect jobs and narrow the trade deficit.

Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard said the priority is to protect domestic jobs, estimating that about 320,000 positions depend directly on the sectors covered by the measure.

The measure would also help reduce Mexico’s large trade deficit with China, which exceeded $57 billion in the first half of 2025.

On the geopolitical front, the initiative comes amid pressure from the United States. Analysts say Mexico is also seeking to “appease” its main USMCA partner over concerns about China’s influence, with the move coming ahead of the next review of the regional trade agreement in 2026.

The 2025 Alaska meeting has served as a wake-up call, prompting Canada to undergo a strategic realignment in its foreign policy with a particular focus on strengthening ties with Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

On Ukraine’s Independence Day, Canada’s Prime Minister did more than just visit Kyiv. His presence sent a message of genuine solidarity and signalled to the world that Canada may be ready to move beyond symbolic gestures into the space of real security commitments.

To address the question, why is Canada recalibrating its global posture?

It is crucial to recognize that Trump’s meeting with Zelensky at the White House served as a stark reminder of the conditional and fragile nature of American support.

If Ukraine, a nation actively resisting military aggression, can be subjected to strategic indifference, then there is little assurance that Canada will be immune to similar treatment. The shifting tenor in Washington, illustrated by former President Trump’s imposition of tariffs and his dismissive rhetoric regarding Canadian sovereignty, signals a deeper recalibration in U.S. foreign policy. For Ottawa, the message is clear: it can no longer rely on the stability of its relationship with Washington. This shift threatens all U.S. allies, including Canada and European countries that have relied on the U.S. security umbrella for decades.

Alongside his visit, Prime Minister Mark Carney expressed support for Ukraine’s call for long-term security guarantees as part of any future peace deal with Russia. That support includes the possibility of deploying Canadian troops to Ukraine. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s words carry the weight of his intent:

“In Canada’s judgment, it is not realistic that the only security guarantee could be the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the medium term,” Carney told reporters. “So that needs to be buttressed. It needs to be reinforced.”

The statement was not simply vague diplomatic language, but it has given a clear message to the hesitant European capitals, and NATO strategists in Brussels now have a concrete framework to build around. Berlin now has political cover to move forward, which has been cautious about postwar commitments. Paris, which has talked about troops but wavered on details, now has an ally willing to share the burden. London, navigating domestic pressure, has now been offered a lifeline.

For Moscow, the message is unambiguous: Western resolve will not be undermined by time and political maneuvering. Putin’s calculation has always been that Western resolve would crack, that domestic politics would eventually force Ukraine’s allies to abandon ship. But now the tables have turned, and a peacekeeping force backed by Canada, Britain, and France—with German support—isn’t a negotiating position Putin can simply outlast. It’s a permanent commitment he will be forced to reckon with.

“We are all working to ensure that the end of this war would mean the guarantee

of peace for Ukraine, so that neither war nor the threat of war is left for our

children to inherit,” Zelenskyy told a crowd of dignitaries.

He further added that he wants future security guarantees as part of a potential peace deal to be as close as possible to NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one member state as an attack against all.

The Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, and President Zelensky formalized a

$680 million drone co-production agreement, scheduled to commence imminently. Canada also joined the PURL initiative, a multilateral fund mechanism enhancing Ukraine’s access to advanced weaponry, coordinated by the U.S.

So far, Canada has pledged:

• $680 million for drone co-production.
• $500 million for the PURL initiative
• $680 million for drone co-production
• $320 million for armored vehicles and other resources
• Readiness to join a postwar peacekeeping force

His leadership hasn’t stopped there. As holder of the G7 presidency, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced these measures during the 2025 G7 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada.

“We are working with international partners to strengthen security commitments to Ukraine. While hosting the G7 Summit, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced $2 billion in additional military assistance for Ukraine, as well as the disbursement of a

$2.3 billion loan. We continue to work with our Allies and partners to coordinate and bolster our support through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, including F-16 pilot training under the Air Force Capability Coalition. Canada announced the disbursement of a $200-million contribution through the World Bank at the 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, Italy.

This marks a turning point, with Canada emerging as a key leader in NATO’s collective response, especially at a time when traditional allies have backed off or shown hesitation due to diplomatic pressures. The combination of military aid and

Economic reconstruction funding reflects a mature and comprehensive approach, underscoring Canada’s recognition that lasting peace depends on both strong defense and sustainable development. Moreover, Canada’s strategy aims to reduce reliance on U.S. markets without provoking retaliation—a delicate but necessary balancing act in today’s complex geopolitical landscape.

On August 24th, Carney changed the course. Had he not, Canada would still be making trips to Washington years from now, offering empty platitudes, clinging to diplomacy on thin ice, and watching its future partner in Europe be crushed by imperial aggression. Canada has realized it must help Europe, help Ukraine, and prove it can be counted on.

The arithmetic is brutal for Moscow. With over $20 billion already locked in for 2026 from just three nations, and Europe’s aid machinery now running independently of Washington’s whims, Putin faces a grim calculus. As Europe and Canada lead the charge, the West’s resolve hardens—and for Putin, the future looks increasingly untenable.

In 2012, when President Xi Jinping first coined the term “Chinese Dream”, it was seen as a patriotic call for national revival, a promise was made to restore China’s lost historical pride after a century of humiliation. The narrative of this analogy was powerful and emotionally resonant. Domestically, it stirred unity, strength and pride. Internationally, it was framed as a peaceful vision of shared prosperity in the foreseeable future..

Surprisingly, a decade later, the Chinese Dream has transformed into something far more tangled and complex, and very contradictory. Although Beijing continues to  promote the notion of Chinese Dream as an amiable blueprint for progress and development, nevertheless it also projects a growing assertive foreign policy that raises questions about the true intent of the Dream i-e: Is China’s vision one of joint development, or does it cloak a strategic push for dominance?

China’s ambitions regarding the tensions between peaceful rise and nationalistic assertion are now the heart of global unease. This analogy of Chinese dream might have still inspired many Chinese, but for the world outside China, it is beginning to look more like a dilemma. Moreover these contradictions are no longer just theoretical they are unfolding in real time. For instance, China’s increased military activity off late (2025) near Taiwan and its expanding assertiveness in the South China Sea have clanked the Indo-Pacific. Fears of confrontation are ignited by naval incursions, coast guard problems and air defense drills, while the Philippines and Japan are seeking broadened security ties with the US. Meanwhile, the China–US rivalry ended up intensifying on new fronts, especially in AI, quantum computing, and semiconductor supply chains, signaling that technological dominance has become a new battle ground for China to pursue its strategic vision of rejuvenation, whether it’s the recent American export limitations on advanced chips or Beijing’s retaliatory curtailment on rare earth elements.

In order to completely comprehend the Chinese Dream and its motives, one must trace back to its historical roots. The “century of humiliation” that is identified by colonial invasions, unjust ententes, and foreign assertiveness left a deep imprint on China’s collective consciousness. Communist Party of China (CPC) has marked itself as the soldier that would restore China’s once lost dignity since 1949. But under President Xi, this narrative has been positioned as a  national mission for a longer time: rejuvenation/ rebirth.

However, rejuvenation in this context isn’t just about China’s lost pride and economic growth but it’s more about being on top of the global hierarchy because it’s China’s right to be a global leader. This dream was initially confined to national revival but now it’s propagating beyond its traditional spheres, and this new dimension of this Dream has profound implications for foreign policy. China’s claim of a “Near Arctic State”, it’s leadership role in AIIB and BRICS, investment in Latin America and Africa lately sheds light on it’s global ambitions and the deliberate effort to shape global governance structures and asserting influence internationally. 

The question that arises here is that, whether this Dream actually aligns with global peace as claimed by China or not. Xi has consistently emphasized on “win-win cooperation,” for  a shared and cooperating future of the world system. Global endeavors like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are marked as tools for connectivity, collective progress and development.

Yet behind the literal meaning of this language lies a more complex and calculated strategy. For instance, the BRI has been lagging due to the constant criticism for opaque deals and debt traps etc. This criticism has deeply sharpened recently. In 2024–25, certain countries like Kenya, Malaysia, and Italy either rearranged or withdrawn from the BRI projects, due to obscurity and debt sustainability. There’s a growing discomfort regarding China’s approach to infrastructure diplomacy globally. China’s increasing propagation towards different continents often brings not only infrastructure but also an expanding political influence and economic dependence.

Another worrying aspect of this increasing global dominion by China is it’s actions in the South China Sea, and it’s policies towards ethnic minorities and the brutality in Uyghurs, and the way China has been handling dissent at home is contrary to the harmonious image it seeks to  project in the international arena. The questions is, Is the Chinese Dream of national revival merely a soft power element layered over hard power objectives? Most know the answer.

Neo-realism makes this trajectory of China’s foreign policy seem less ambiguous. It’s the same old tale of survival and power maximization in an anarchic global system.In this sense, the Chinese dream is a strategic doctrine disguised in cultural rhetoric. 

China’s military advancement, tech capabilities, aggressive border posturing and parallel global organizations I-e: AIIB all reflects a far more significant goal: reshaping the global BOP in China’s favor, which is not illegitimate as that’s how all the great powers operate in the international system to gain influence, however, it does challenges China’s notion of a peaceful actor. 

Here the dream becomes a dual use instrument, internationally it justifies China’s strategic expansion and domestically consolidates legitimacy for the CPC.  For instance, the on going AI and semi conductor war with the US, along with the naval brinkmanship near Taiwan sheds light on China enforcing it’s Dream through deterrence rather than diplomacy.

There’s another contradiction i-e: reconciling nationalism at home and claims of cooperation and development abroad. To explain this further, the Dream is a reassembling cry for unity, historical justice and strength. President Xi has positioned himself as the defender of this vision, and in order to do so, has tapped into springing up nationalist sentiments. And any discerned compromise with the international powers would be seen as a weakness- by the Chinese. Nevertheless, China is chanting the melodies of multilateralism and peace, by speaking the language of diplomacy while practicing coercion. This duality of the Chinese dreams inspires citizens at home but at the same time alarms foreign policy makers. Hence the widening credibility gap.

China’s Dream has often been met with caution and skepticism in the international arena. US has openly called this Dream a “strategic competition”. Moreover, EU has always been open to engagement and partnerships but now empathizes “de-risking”, while India, Japan, ASEAN countries and Australia are strengthening their ties and diversifying their supply chains.  Even, from Pakistan, the so called iron brother of China, resistance has risen. The 2025 protests in Baluchistan specially Gwadar over economic segregation and security risks has challenged the entire motto of CPEC as a mutual win. 

Africa and Central Asia has shown growing concerns as well regarding the consequences of long term dependency on Beijing beside the fact that these states are China’s traditional partners. China so far has stood its ground and retained influence through development and diplomacy but its assertive posture is, in the meantime eroding the trust genuine leaderships requires.