strategic

The Valdai Discussion Club, in partnership with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), will hold the 3rd Russian-African conference titled “Realpolitik in a Divided World: Rethinking Russia-South Africa Ties in a Global and African Context” in late July 2025. The primary goal of the conference is to form and expand communities of African and Russian experts interested in cooperation, the confidential discussion of the most pressing international issues, and the preparation of recommendations for practical foreign policy work.

It is no coincidence that South Africa has been chosen as the venue for the Valdai’s conference. In 2025, South Africa chairs the G20 summit. In preparation for the upcoming late July conference, Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme and the Africa-Russia Project at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), offers an insight into the current Russia-South Africa relations, the United States trade issues with Africa, and Africa’s future prospects in this rapidly changing world. Here are the interview excerpts:

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) will host the 3rd Russian-African conference of the Valdai Discussion Club in South Africa. Within the context of the shifting geopolitics, what would you say, in terms of current Russia-South Africa relations, its status and prospects, as one of the themes for discussion?

Steven Gruzd: SAIIA looks forward to co-hosting the Third Russian-African Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club later in July 2025. We believe that it is important to interact and engage with a variety of actors in a balanced and nuanced way. We do not believe that academic boycotts are constructive.

The event is being held against the backdrop of rapidly shifting global geopolitics and the erosion of the “rules-based international order,” as nationalism is reasserted and conflicts endure in the Great Lakes in East-Central Africa and in the Middle East.

South Africa has maintained good relations with Russia throughout the last decade, although trade remains at a relatively low level and there is much scope to improve it. Diplomatically, relations are warm and constructive, and have been enhanced by regular interaction between the two countries in both BRICS and the G20. South Africa has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s war with Ukraine, but here it has been one voice among many and does not have much concrete to show for these efforts, as the war rages on. Nevertheless, it remains a key driver of the African Peace Initiative. At the UN, most of South Africa’s votes on the Russia-Ukraine war have been abstentions, in line with its declared non-aligned stance.

To what degree are the few points raised above influencing or reshaping Russian-African relations? Do you also think Russia is rivaling and competing with its own BRICS members, for instance, China and India, across the continent?

SG: Russia-Africa relations have been steadily growing, as the two well-attended Russia-Africa Summits in 2019 and 2023 attest to. As Russia has faced sanctions and been shunned by the West, it has sought new markets and to strengthen ties with the Global South, including in Africa. Russia supported the membership of Egypt and Ethiopia to become full BRICS members at the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg. The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, was successful and added Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda as “partner countries.” This was an important occasion for Russia to show that it was not internationally isolated and could still rely on many countries as friends.

The operations of the Wagner Group, especially in the Sahel, have been gradually subsumed under the Africa Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Russia has been strengthening bilateral relations with many African countries and is looking to provide peaceful-use nuclear technology to about 20 African countries. It is heavily involved in the building of a nuclear energy plant in Dabaa, Egypt.

Russia’s BRICS partners—China and India, but also the UAE and Saudi Arabia—are active on the African continent, but at this stage it seems that all are able to achieve their strategic objectives in Africa without coming into conflict with one another.

Do you view South Africa’s G20 presidency as a unique factor for fighting neo-colonialism and Western hegemony and for addressing thorny trade issues with the United States?

SG: South Africa’s G20 presidency is important. It remains the only African member state of the G20, although the African Union has joined as a full member since 2023. This is the first time that the G20 is hosted in Africa. As the president, South Africa has the ability to influence the G20’s agenda. It is the fourth developing country in a row to host the G20—after Indonesia (2022), India (2023), and Brazil (2024). It has continued several of the initiatives of these Global South states in its focus. South Africa’s priorities include strengthening disaster resilience and response, ensuring debt sustainability for low-income countries, mobilizing finance for a just energy transition, and harnessing critical minerals for inclusive growth and sustainable development. The aim is for a more equitable, sustainable, and resilient global economy.

So far, the US has not sent its top leaders to preparatory meetings in South Africa, and there is doubt whether US President Donald Trump will attend the G20 Summit in November. This threatened to damage South Africa’s leadership, but the other G20 members have rallied to support South Africa.

I do not think that the G20 is the venue to “fight neo-colonialism, Western hegemony, and trade issues with the United States,” or at least not in using that language. I think BRICS may be a more appropriate platform to air these issues. South Africa will nevertheless push the concerns of the Global South this year.

Can South Africa’s presidency change perceptions of the G20’s role in global politics and its invaluable contributions to Africa’s development?

SG: I believe South Africa is doing well in its G20 stewardship so far and will hopefully host a successful summit, which has become especially challenging in the current geopolitical environment. If Trump does not attend, it will be damaging to the G20, particularly because the US is the host for 2026. South Africa’s relations with the US have deteriorated, including over Trump’s views on the treatment of white farmers, the expulsion of Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool from Washington, and threatened high tariffs, among many other issues.

The summit will hopefully showcase South Africa and change perceptions about failed or failing African states. South Africa remains a key player in Africa, contributing to the continent’s development through peace efforts, trade, and political interactions.

But I also think South Africa should be and has been modest in its expectations of what the G20 can do during any one-year presidency. The G20 remains one of the few forums where Russia and the West still sit around the same table, and it has been challenging to reach consensus.

South-South cooperation is frequently resonating, as is the United States skipping the G20, Trump, and the new world architecture featuring in bilateral and multilateral discussions. Can African leaders change attitudes and face geopolitical development realities? Can Africa remain non-aligned? What then can we expect as future prospects, especially for Africa?

SG: There is no doubt that South-South cooperation is happening and being talked about more and more, and it is set to continue. The global environment is subject to profound geopolitical tensions, not least due to Trump’s “America First” policies, including high trade tariffs. The entire world of development assistance or foreign aid is likewise undergoing far-reaching changes. Trump has destroyed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), putting at risk or shutting down countless development projects in Africa. European countries—for a long time generous donors to Africa—are diverting billions of euros in development funding to defense and dealing with migration-related issues.

African countries will be under continual pressure to “pick a side” in what some have called the “New Cold War,” and for the most part they will continue to assert their non-aligned stances. How long they can continue on this path is unclear. And many say they are non-aligned but continue to lean closer to either the West or China and Russia in reality. African leaders are having to adjust to a rapidly changing and uncertain world, the contours of which are not entirely clear at this point. African leaders have been forced to deal with a world with less aid. Hopefully this will encourage African states to be more self-reliant, curb corruption, and pursue their national interests.

KEY POINT:

–        The contemporary importance of the aerospace sector stems from its complex technological structure, its diverse applications, and balanced public and private investment, which contribute to security in competitive environments.

–        The 2001 United Nations Convention on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space illustrates the conflict between space militarization and technological security. Modern competition increasingly intertwines military and economic aspects, as demonstrated by advances in electronic warfare and communication systems.

–        As space becomes a battleground for military dominance, it is essential to ensure peaceful development in this race. The challenges lie in managing military interests while promoting civilian innovations, revealing the complexities of international law and the prospects for disarmament in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

–        In contemplating treaties, there is a risk of being seen as naive, as demonstrated by the decline of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This highlights the need to avoid the militarization of space. Alternatives include maintaining secrecy over space defense technologies or promoting strategic alliances for technology sharing.

–        A coalition between the United States, the European Union, and Russia could counterbalance the military advances of China and India. Investment in aerospace technology is key to gaining a competitive advantage, while trade agreements could guide the distribution of dual-use technologies, ultimately influencing global power dynamics and social transformations.

Why write about investing in the space sector today? Because it is an area of intervention that has the following structural characteristics: a) it is a complex combination of technologies, as was the case with the cas and , in its early days, the laptop computer; b) it offers a wide range of multiple application to other mature non-space technologies, c) it optimizes the combination of public and private investment, as has been the case with all other investments in technology that have changed the entire production system, and finally d) it guarantees the security of technologies and, therefore, of investments, which are covered in the eyes of competitors for military or security reasons.

For “mature” technologies, this is not possible. [1]

The issue of the militarization of space is essential to understanding the applicability of new aerospace technologies to non-military production.

In 2001, the UN General Assembly approved a Convention on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, signe by all major countries interested in space technologies.

But here too there is a logical contradiction between the non-militarization of space and the security of technologies, which must be covered by international competition in order to produce sufficiently attractive economic returns in a timely manner. [2]

Furthermore, there is a concept that could also be described as economy, albeit in a broad sense: if a State or alliance acquires a competitive edge in a weapons system, it also acquires maximum deterrence at minimum cost.

Competition between weapons system reduces their effectiveness and increases their structural costs, while also limiting their application cycles to civilian production, where global competitors can enter the market.

This is an application of Michael Porter’s thesis on the “global competitive advantage” [3].

It is therefore not surprising that space is the scene of competition that, in addition to being economic and application-based, is increasingly military in nature.

Just think, for example, of laser countermeasures for enemy missile systems and advanced electronic jamming and message distortion techniques that can be directed from space to Earth or, more simply, between space weapons themselves. [4]

The Chinese have already affirmed, in their theoretical and strategic models, the absolute importance of electronic warfare from space and, therefore, of incapacitating the enemy by abolishing its strategic and tactical communication networks. [5]

This is a modern reinterpretation of Sun Tsu’s concept that, in the best tradition of Chinese Zen, victory is achieved by forcing the enemy to move.

The strategic application of the esoteric Buddhist concept of wu wei, “moving without moving.”

Therefore, the more the space economy becomes central to the definition of the next models of globalized development, a technological-productive development in which many non-European and non-Western people will participate for the first time in human history, the more we should expect a “space war” perhaps managed according to the criteria of the Cold War, i.e. a conflict that never reaches the final clash but still makes it credibile and probable.[6]

But let’s see how and what the scientific and technological market of space can become.

According to a British forecast, the return on investment in space is expected to increase in 2007 to USD 140 billion [7], with a differentiation of services as follows: international direct-to-home services, 32%; radio, 6%; fixed satellites, 18%; mobile satellites, 3%; and direct-to-home in the US, 32%.

Total investment is expected to be USD 60 billion. [8]

So, first of all, telecommunications, which is not coincidentally the backbone of current and, above all, future weapons systems.

The ESA, the European Space Agency of which Italy is naturally a member, has drawn up a development plan up to 2010 in which the following are optimized for the communication sector: the size of satellite payloads, the application of military-derived Ku Band technology to civilian networks, and the development of fixed networks for Earth observation for economic, agricultural, and land traffic management purposes [9].

In other words, the aim here is to make investment in aerospace sustainable in order to optimize communication networks, according to the classic model of the “service society” developed in the mid-1980s [10].

But are we sure that the “computerization” and materialization of society and production systems are still a model capable of explaining the world and, above all, of predicting and changing it, according to Karl Marx’s old idea of ideas that “transform” rather than reflect reality?

Today’s aerospace technologies are not so clear-cut in their alignment with the “third wave” model.

Think, for example, of biology and pharmacological and therapeutic experiments or the production of new materials in the absence of gravity.

In the short term, the Great Transformation hypothesized by Karl Polanyi for old industrial capitalism is not only about communication or process innovation but also and above all about old traditional product innovation.

The US NASA has sent two flowers donated by International Flavors & Fragrances into space on the Shuttle Columbia to see whether the absence of gravity would change their scents to produce new essences.

The Russians have signed a contract with US television producer Burnett to organize a “reality show” in space.

In short, the amount of innovative non-communication technologies generated in space is increasing, according to the author’s calculations, by 36% per year for public investment and, as can be seen, private investment. [11]

Therefore, there is nothing to prevent these techologies and new materials from being used in a possible multilateral conflict for space management in the context of future space utilization, including for military purposes.

It is true that, to use a cliché and state the obvious, “space is immense,” but it is the orbits closest to Earth that are most useful both technologically and for telecommunications and, of course, for military purposes. Therefore, military and security control of these orbits will allow for the optimization of public and private investment in aerospace, both civil and military.

Here too, to paraphrase Von Clausewitz, we will be dealing with a cold war by other means.

Meanwhile, defense and security spending allows for the exclusivity of technologies, which cannot be copied or “cloned,” thus guaranteeing the predictability of expected economic returns.

Furthermore, security and defense produce maximum innovation because they are forced to find the competitive or strategic “gap” to exploit for as long as possible against potential enemies.

Finally, space investment in the security-defense area allows for the confidentiality of civilian applications when the time comes.

But when it comes to aerospace, there is more: the possibility of controlling wide areas of the Earth from above allows for an epoch-making strategic transformation: maximum deterrence combined with retaliatory power.

This is a far cry from the atomic strategy, when the aim, from Beaufre to Paul Nitze, was to inflict maximum damage to make it impossible for the enemy to respond and thus force them into classic unconditional surrender.

The development of military space allows for the immediate elimination of defenses and complete blindness to subsequent waves of attack, whether nuclear or conventional.

The new Global Space Strategic allows the fusion of direct and indirect strategy, because the communicative, political, cultural, social, and productive structures are annihilated by the same series of salvos from space that nullify the defenses and response potential of the target state [12].

So the question that arises is this: how can we avoid the strategies that fall out of the “space race” and use aerospace and its innovative technologies only in ways that guarantee peaceful, participatory, and optimal development?

The issue is more difficult than it seems. In fact, much of the public investor’s interest is military, given that the “weaponization” of space allows, with well-planned civilian spin-offs, weapon system such as the atomic weapon of the Cold war, i.e. a high potential for a winning strike, absolute brevity of military actions, and maximum success.

Furthermore, the techniques used in the 1970s to force most countries to abandon nuclear weapons through the Non-Proliferation Treaty have proved ineffective.

On the military front, the so-called “third world” countries now all have the real or short-term possibility of producing atomic weapons.

Weapons “cannot be uninvented,” as General Carlo Jean said years ago.

Furthermore, believing that signing a series of pieces of paper is enough to force a state to change its national strategy or, perhaps, to accept Manzonian proclamations against its neighbors who have instead switched to military nuclear power is a belief of absolute naivety.

There are no treaties that can prevent a state from achieving what it considers to be its national interest. Machiavelli’s saying that words do not govern states also applies to international law.

To believe in the power of treaties is to run the risk of being written, according to Guicciardini’s brutal formula in the Book of Fools.

Finally, the inglorious end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should prevent us from repeating the path towards the militarization of space, as described by Manzoni.

Let us consider the other possibilities: a) absolute secrecy surrounding space defense technologies, leaving the competitors in this new Cold War in doubt as to what technology and doctrine are actually being used. Difficult, but it can be attempted.

Or, within the framework of a clear and strategic alliance, not simply an assembly of Hegelian “beautiful souls,” we could push for effective sharing of space technologies, including those with dual military-civilian use, within the framework of a shared defense doctrine.

Of course, this requires strategic thinking and, above all, serious identification of the enemy, without which there can be no strategy or tactics.

For example, one could think of an alliance between the Russian Federation, Europe, and the US against the strategy and military development of the China-India complex, which would quickly render many technologies obsolete and enjoy a very long “development window” before wages and prices are adjusted to Euro-American standards. [13].

Or a mixture of results that are effective in terms of cost-efficiency (in the sense that it would cost more for any state to wage space war to obtain them on its own) that could stabilize China itself, which could develop its dual-use space technologies also in accordance with a global agreement with Europe and the US to secure Western commercial expansion in Central and South Asia.

At this point, it would be a matter of finding a balance between Western and Eastern Technologies, but above all it would be necessary to verify whether our long term development programs envisage an expansion of European trade routes towards Asia, which would make this global strategy entirely reasonable.

If, on the other hand, China and India wanted to manage their “near abroad” on their own, strategy number one, that of an alliance on the militarization of space between the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation, would be more useful.

In short, we need to know and decide where we want to go and then shape our security and space warfare strategies accordingly, without hoping that other areas of the planet will do us the favor of standing still.

On the contrary, as far as we can predict, I suppose that a set of commercial and financial rules, rather than legal ones, could be defined for dual-use space technologies, based on the excellent experience of NATO’s COCOM throughout the Cold War.

From there, we can establish a division of labor in global space technology: there is no point in investing where others have done so before and better; it is better to define sharing rules (with competitive prices) to buy what is unnecessary to develop internally and perhaps resell on the global market those technologies in which a country or technological alliance has proven unbeatable.

Consider, in this case, the technologies for propellant chemistry, which Italy has developed with a high rate of innovation in recent years.

If this global market becomes optimal, then the force of circumstances will prevent the establishment of complete national technologies for the militarization of space. The global economy could become the Machiavellian reality of the situation.

In the meantime, it is absolutely necessary to invest in aerospace in order to acquire that “competitive edge” in cutting-edge technologies, which often have military and space origins, and which will allow us to continue to have: a) a highly differentiated production system, b) a high productivity margin that is competitive with our global competitors.

Reducing labor costs is a limited strategy, and, in any case, it clashes with the cost of living and therefore with a wage bill that is ultimately inelastic. The lower the wage, the worse the productivity per unit of output.

So, we need to invest immediately in advanced aerospace technologies, which will be the source of the next technological clusters that will determine who wins and who loses in the global division of labor.

In conclusion, albeit briefly, I have attempted to outline that we are closely linked to a highly complex set of developments in the technological, military, and economic sectors.

But above all, in that sector where scientific achievements produce deep transformations in the lives of individuals, which in turn change societies. This is the duty of those in science, politics, and business who have the task of questioning the future as a challenge for development and an opportunity for future progress.

Giancarlo Elia Valori

[1] V. Arms Control, Militarization of Outer Space, in www.globalissues.org, accessed on June 12, 2006

[2] V. NBER, Business Cycles Indicators, NBER, University of Chicago, Chicago 2001

[3] V. Michael Porter, Harvard University, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, On Competition, Harvard University Press, 2002

[4] Lt. Col. Bruce M. Deblois, USAF, Space Sanctuary, a Viable National Strategy, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1998.

[5] See defenselink.org, Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., January 2005.

[6] See The National Security Archive, The Master of the Game, Paul Nitze and US Cold War Strategy, from Truman to Reagan, Washington, D.C., October 2004.

[7] UK STRATEGY 2003-2006 AND BEYOND, British Government, 2004

[8] State of the Space Industry, 2004, International Space Business Council, March 2004

[9] BR-256, October 2005, ESA, the Telecommunications Long-Term Plan 2006-2010, Noordwijk, Holland, 2005

[10] Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Bantam Books, 1984

[11] Commercial Alert, NASA shifts strategy for selling outer space, Washington Post, Ariana Eunjung Cha, March 2005

[12] Stephen M. Younger, Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 27 Giugno 2000

[13] See  HEARTHLAND review, Number entitled The atomic Rush, n. 1 2006

Ta’ang National Liberation Army rebels did not acknowledge the loss of Nawnghkio town to the military, saying they moved to ‘safe locations’.

Myanmar’s military government has claimed to have removed rebel fighters and recaptured a town after a yearlong battle near the country’s main army training academy, marking a rare turnaround for the regime in the northeast region of the country.

The country’s ruling military announced on Thursday that it made the advance in Shan State’s town of Nawnghkio, which had been under the control of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

The rebel group, part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, had seized the strategically important town, which sits on a key highway linking central Myanmar to China, in July 2024.

In a statement published in the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar, the military government said it had retaken Nawnghkio after “566 armed engagements within 11 operational months”. A rare one-page spread in the newspaper showed soldiers holding rifles aloft in celebration. It detailed the battle, admitting initial attacks led to officers and enlisted men “sacrificing their lives”.

But “by combining strategic ground and air military tactics”, the military captured “the whole Nawnghkio area” by Wednesday, it said.

Nawnghkio is located about 40km (25 miles) from Pyin Oo Lwin, the town that hosts the country’s main military officer training academy, and some 80km (50 miles) from Myanmar’s second-most populous city, Mandalay.

In a statement, the TNLA did not acknowledge the military government’s claim of victory, saying only that “it has been difficult to continue administrative work in the town due to the heavy offensive”. The TNLA added that it had “moved civil administration services to safe locations”.

While the combined rebel offensive against government forces has inflicted sweeping losses since it was launched in October 2023, analysts say the military government’s control over large population centres is secure as it wields an air force capable of staving off large-scale rebel advances.

Northeastern Lashio city was also captured by the rebels but was handed back to the ruling military in April after a deal brokered by China.

Since a 2021 military coup toppled the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and ignited a civil war in Myanmar, a myriad of pro-democracy armed groups and ethnic rebel armies have joined forces to fight against military rule.

The groups in the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which also include the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Arakan Army, have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from Myanmar’s central government. The alliance is also loosely allied with the People’s Defence Force, a pro-democracy resistance group that has emerged to fight the military regime.

In the international relations structures in Southeast Asia, “strategic trust” acts as a glue between countries that are diverse in terms of institutions, histories, and national interests. Strategic trust can be understood as the extent to which one country believes that another country will not harm its core interests, even in the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms. This is not blind trust but calculated trust, based on consistent behavior, policy transparency, and commitment to complying with common rules of the game. In Southeast Asia, strategic trust is not only the foundation for bilateral cooperation but also a prerequisite for building the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) according to the roadmap by 2025.

The relationship between Thailand and Cambodia is a case in point, reflecting the complex and fragile nature of strategic trust in the region. There have been periods of serious border conflicts, such as the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple area in 2008–2011, and the two countries have repeatedly been embroiled in military tensions. Although bilateral relations have stabilized under Hun Sen and subsequent civilian governments in Bangkok, underlying factors such as anti-Cambodian sentiment in the Thai military and a lack of transparency in the handling of migrant workers and border issues persist. In this context, the ASEAN institution, with its principles of non-interference and consensus, has shown its limits even more clearly. When tensions flare up, ASEAN often lacks effective tools for coordination and mediation, leading to a situation of “every man for himself” and dependence on personal relationships between leaders.

The leak of an audio recording between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen in June 2025 is a typical example of the failure of strategic trust in a loose institutional framework like ASEAN.

What is remarkable about the incident is not only the content of the call but also the nature of the diplomatic form used. The 17-minute exchange was conducted outside official channels and was marked by an excessively intimate tone: Ms. Paetongtarn called Mr. Hun Sen “uncle” and agreed with him to ignore criticism from a Thai military general. This reflects the deeply personal political model in both countries. In Thailand, “Thaksinism” is not just a political phenomenon but also a family-based power structure, where the Shinawatra clan still holds great influence in politics, despite opposition from the military and royalists. In Cambodia, “Hun Senism” is a symbol of decades of personal rule, where Mr. Hun Sen and his family control almost all state power, passing the throne to his son without any real democratic competition.

The leaked audio recordings reveal a number of statements that have crossed the line on the military and security. Notably, the Thai military’s disdain for Ms. Paetongtarn’s response to her claim that the generals were just “showing off” is a provocative and insulting statement to the military, which has staged coups to overthrow governments led by her family. In addition, the fact that the prime minister of one country made such a clear statement in favor of another country’s leader on a potentially disputed border issue has touched the limits of domestic and international strategic trust. Not surprisingly, shortly afterwards, the Bhumjaithai Party—the second largest partner in the ruling coalition—announced its withdrawal from the government, citing the serious damage to the honor of the nation and the military.

Hun Sen’s role in releasing the recording has further complicated the situation. While Cambodia has said that Hun Sen simply wanted to “clarify the truth” after the first nine minutes of the recording were leaked earlier, observers have said that the release of the entire transcript was politically calculated. On the one hand, it helped Hun Sen demonstrate his status as a “great friend” of Thailand while sending a message to the Thai military that they should not underestimate his influence. On the other hand, he also unintentionally—or intentionally—put the Thai Prime Minister in a difficult position when Ms. Paetongtarn was forced to apologize publicly, undermining her reputation and legitimacy at home.

The impact of the leaked audio recording between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen goes beyond the bilateral level, spreading like a domino effect to many levels of national political structures, international relations, and institutional functioning of ASEAN. At each level, this incident highlights the fragility of strategic trust while exposing the gaps in the ability to control and institutionalize individual power in Southeast Asia.

For Thailand, the political consequences are profound and potentially long-lasting. Internally, Paetongtarn’s government—newly formed with the support of the Shinawatra family—is on the brink of collapse after the Bhumjaithai Party, the second-largest partner in the ruling coalition, announced its withdrawal. This move not only created a parliamentary majority crisis but also cost Paetongtarn her already fragile political legitimacy and credibility as the “political heir” to her father, Thaksin Shinawatra. Polls after the event showed that the government’s approval rating plummeted, while support for the military’s role as a guarantor of national stability increased significantly.

The Thai military—which has traditionally been deeply involved in politics—now has a new justification for acting in the name of “protecting national honor and the face of the military.” The coups of 2006 and 2014 were both carried out in the name of maintaining stability and countering the influence of the Shinawatra family. This time, a civilian leader directly insulting the generals and showing subservience to foreign leaders could be interpreted as a threat to national security. In this context, the possibility of the military intervening, directly or indirectly, is a very real risk. This raises questions about the future of Thailand’s young democratic system, which has been repeatedly disrupted by military coups.

For Cambodia, this event can be seen by Hun Sen as a tactical victory in domestic affairs. The release of the entire recording demonstrates his proactive control of information and public opinion and helps him affirm his role as a powerful regional figure, despite having stepped down from the position of prime minister. In the eyes of the Cambodian public, Hun Sen is praised as someone who maintains his influence in foreign affairs and takes the initiative against a larger country like Thailand. However, on the international level, the release of a private recording between two heads of state may raise doubts about Phnom Penh’s diplomatic credibility. The deliberate release of confidential information will make other partners—both within and outside ASEAN—more cautious in all forms of high-level contact with Cambodian leaders. This, in the long term, may cause Cambodia to be partially isolated in strategic diplomatic channels or at least lose its image as a responsible partner in the region.

In terms of bilateral relations, Hun Sen’s release of the full transcript of the call also puts Thailand in a vulnerable position, forcing the Paetongtarn government to publicly apologize. This is an extremely dangerous diplomatic precedent, especially in the context of the two countries still having unresolved historical disputes. Without a clear and in-depth trust-building strategy from both sides, Thai-Cambodian relations risk taking a major step backward. Any efforts to build trust through defense, border security, and labor cooperation channels could be frozen or shifted to a state of precaution.

Regionally, the impact of this event is systemic for ASEAN. First of all, the incident has seriously undermined strategic trust within the bloc. ASEAN countries, which are already very cautious about sharing information and coordinating security, will now be even more cautious in high-level communications if they are concerned that the content may be leaked or exploited for internal political purposes. The fact that a high-level leader was recorded and then released in full without any official response from ASEAN shows the inability of this organization to handle internal crises. ASEAN does not have any mechanism to investigate, intervene, or mediate in bilateral diplomatic crises, especially when they do not take the form of traditional armed conflicts.

In addition, this incident also sets a dangerous precedent for the entire regional diplomatic culture: when personal relationships can be recorded, edited, disseminated, and exploited for political purposes. This breaks the unwritten norms of ASEAN diplomacy, where friendliness and discretion are considered the foundation. If this trend continues, regional leaders will gradually lose trust in each other, and instead there will be a permanent state of hidden tension. More importantly, strategic rivals outside the region, such as China or the United States, can take advantage of these trust gaps to amplify internal ASEAN conflicts. If any member state feels threatened or betrayed, it can turn to external powers as a strategic counterweight, leading to polarization in regional foreign policy and seriously weakening ASEAN’s neutrality in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.

Recent developments are a wake-up call for Southeast Asia on the need to institutionalize and make transparent strategic diplomatic channels. First, countries need to establish clear standards for high-level contacts between leaders—including confidentiality, recording, and public statements. Calls or personal contacts between leaders should be coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and controlled by an official system to ensure accountability and information security. Second, ASEAN countries need to strengthen the role of professional diplomacy, limiting the use of backroom channels or friendly relationships as tools to resolve crises. In a region where individual leaders can change quickly, betting on personal relationships is a risky strategy.

ASEAN also needs to rethink its operating model. It is necessary to establish an early warning mechanism for intra-bloc diplomatic crises, as well as a code of conduct for senior leaders in bilateral contacts. This is not to control or limit the freedom of leaders but to ensure that individual actions do not undermine the foundation of shared trust. In the long term, a strong ASEAN security community can only be built if member states agree to abandon the mindset of “personal politics” and replace it with institutionalized, accountable, and transparent diplomacy.

The 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, held in late May 2025 in Singapore, continued to clearly reflect the escalating strategic tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Mutual criticism of freedom of navigation, militarization of the South China Sea, and the “rules-based” international order created an atmosphere of near-confrontation.

In that context, Vietnam—a country with a strategic position and close relations with both the United States and China—has once again attracted the attention of international analysts as a potential model of the “soft balancing” strategy. The question is, can Vietnam continue to maintain an independent and autonomous foreign policy while the great powers are increasingly exerting pressure?

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 reaffirmed America’s “unwavering” commitment to the security of its allies and partners in Asia, with a particular emphasis on “freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” and opposition to “unilateral actions that change the status quo.” Hegseth also announced the expansion of defense cooperation with many Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.

In turn, China has criticized the United States for using the Shangri-La Dialogue to “create disputes, sow discord, provoke confrontation, and pursue selfish interests,” after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called China a threat in the Indo-Pacific region.

The war of words between the United States and China at Shangri-La 22 not only reflects the stance of the two powers but also an effort to shape the understanding of regional security, leaving countries like Vietnam facing many difficult choices.

Since 2023, when upgrading relations with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” Vietnam has entered a new phase in its policy of “multilateralization and diversification” of international relations. Bilateral trade turnover between Vietnam and the US has exceeded the 124 billion USD mark in 2024, while the US has also actively promoted cooperation in technology, cybersecurity, and maritime patrol support.

However, China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with total two-way trade reaching a peak of over 230 billion USD in 2023. In addition, China is also an important source of input materials in many manufacturing and processing sectors.

Geostrategically, Vietnam is caught between two increasingly clear poles of influence. Leaning too heavily toward one side not only violates Hanoi’s principle of independent and autonomous diplomacy but also carries the risk of being drawn into conflicts that are not its own.

Vietnam’s “four no’s” defense policy—no participation in military alliances; no alliance with one country against another; no allowing foreign countries to set up military bases; No use of force or threat of use of force—continues to be affirmed after Shangri-La.

However, the challenge lies in practical implementation in the context of the US increasing its military presence in the East Sea, while China continues to consolidate artificial outposts and increase its maritime law enforcement forces.

Vietnam has been strengthening its defense capabilities, but it is not seeking a rigid alliance. Its defense procurement from multiple sources (Russia, Israel, South Korea, India, etc.) reflects its desire to maintain a flexible neutrality. In addition, Vietnam prioritizes bilateral and multilateral defense dialogues—including the ADMM+ and the ASEAN Maritime Security Capacity Building Initiative—to maintain regional stability.

For many experts, Vietnam is currently one of the few ASEAN countries with the capacity and courage to maintain a “dual pivot ”strategy”—maintaining warm relations with the US while maintaining stability with China. After the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam will continue to play an active role in maintaining the stability of the regional power structure. By raising its voice, it will strengthen ASEAN’s central role, from the East Sea issue to building military-security dialogue mechanisms.

However, it cannot be denied that the increasing strategic pressure from both sides may hurt Vietnam’s independent policy space, especially when some countries in the region have begun to lean heavily towards one side; for example, the Philippines has increased military exercises and signed many extensive military agreements with the US.

Vietnam needs to continue moving in the direction of “not choosing sides, but choosing interests.” This means prioritizing substantive projects: energy transition, green technology, improving maritime security capacity, and responding to climate change.

Equally important is to promote bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels to resolve disagreements, especially the East Sea issue. In the context of the Code of Conduct (COC) still not reaching consensus after nearly two decades of negotiations, Vietnam’s proactive mediating role in ASEAN is extremely necessary.

Finally, Vietnam needs to invest more heavily in its domestic “strategic analytical capacity” and foreign policy advisory apparatus to provide flexible, realistic options and respond promptly to strategic movements in the region.

Thus, after the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, although no solution to regional security conflicts emerged, it was a clear reminder that US-China competition will continue, even more fiercely. In that environment, Vietnam has no other choice but to uphold the principles of independence, self-reliance, and cooperation while strengthening internal strength, expanding partnerships, and firmly maintaining a principled stance.

It is not an easy road. But as history has shown, Vietnam’s sobriety and steadfastness in the midst of major strategic currents is the foundation for long-term stability and development.

Australia is approaching a moment of strategic reckoning in Asia. For years, it has maintained a posture of alliance loyalty to the United States while professing regional engagement. This balancing act is losing credibility.

As Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology and senior fellow at Taihe Institute in Beijing, observes, Australia is increasingly viewed by Southeast Asian nations not as a regional partner but as an actor pursuing extra-regional agendas. The habits of strategic ambiguity are no longer fit for purpose.

The region faces converging challenges: intensifying great power competition, accelerating climate disruption, and growing political fragmentation. Yet the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue revealed little recognition of this reality.

There was no serious discussion of climate as a security issue, and China chose not to attend. These silences at Shangri-La matter. As Admiral Chris Barrie has warned, climate change presents the most immediate threat to Australia’s security and stability. He has called for a new national climate intelligence capability and urgent reorientation of defense strategy.

Keating’s enduring observation remains relevant. Australia will not find its security from Asia, but in it. That vision has been sidelined by a bipartisan consensus around AUKUS, preserved more from inertia than necessity.

With a strong majority in the House and recent Greens defections in the Senate, the Albanese government no longer requires this alignment to govern. It now has the opportunity to reassess and reset.

This is Australia’s ASEAN moment. The choice is between continuing to defer to distant agendas or stepping forward as a credible, sovereign leader in the region. The time for inaction has passed.

Losing the Region—Powell’s Warning

Powell’s recent analysis delivers a pointed diagnosis of Australia’s standing in Southeast Asia. Regional governments increasingly view Canberra not as a constructive partner, but as a proxy advancing external interests.

As Australia strengthens its alignment through frameworks such as AUKUS and deepens its strategic dependence on the United States, it drifts further from the multipolar outlook now shaping the region.

This divergence was clearly visible during the Shangri-La talks in Singapore. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reaffirmed ASEAN’s position of strategic non-alignment, stating, “We won’t choose sides.”

His remarks reflect a growing resolve among Southeast Asian nations to assert agency in the face of great power rivalry. The absence of China from the Dialogue was just as significant. Its decision not to attend signalled a breakdown in regional dialogue and rising mistrust of Western-led security platforms, even as the region confronts converging risks that demand cooperation.

This fragmentation leaves Australia exposed. While countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam are deliberately hedging, engaging the United States, China, and one another without locking into rigid blocs, Australia has placed itself firmly within a binary security framework. That decision undermines its relevance in a region that no longer sees power through Cold War lenses.

Powell’s warning is clear. Australia is at risk of losing the region not through neglect, but through strategic misalignment. Rebuilding trust will require more than reassurance. It will require a visible shift in posture, purpose, and the substance of Australia’s regional engagement.

The Keating Contrast—Abandoned Independence

At a time when Australia’s regional credibility is under strain, it is worth recalling the last prime minister to articulate a confident, independent vision for Asia: Paul Keating.

He recognized that Australia’s future would be shaped not by its proximity to traditional allies, but by its integration with the region. Keating argued that Australia must find its security in Asia, not from it, framing strategic independence as a prerequisite for regional respect.

Unfortunately, that vision has been sidelined. In its place, Australia has adopted a defense posture that prioritizes transoceanic alliance obligations over sovereign strategic design.

Despite ministerial rhetoric about listening to Southeast Asia, the Albanese government has largely maintained the security architecture of its predecessors. The bipartisan unity around AUKUS is being preserved not out of necessity, but out of habit.

The political landscape has shifted. With a firm parliamentary majority and shifting Senate dynamics, the Albanese government now governs from a position of confidence.

This presents an opportunity to chart a course independent of inherited defense orthodoxy, allowing for a recalibration of the nation’s strategic settings, and to realign its security posture to restore regional credibility.

Hugh White has argued that Australia must develop a self-reliant defense capacity. Keating reminds us that sovereignty is the foundation of regional trust. Both point toward the same conclusion. Australia must make choices grounded in its own interests, not inherited reactions, but sovereign priorities.

The Forbidden Threat—Climate Collapse as the Real Security Challenge

While Australia’s defense debate remains fixated on hypothetical conflicts and future weapons platforms, the most immediate and destabilizing threat in the region is already unfolding: climate disruption. Sea-level rise, collapsing food systems, water insecurity, and intensifying weather extremes are straining state capacity, regional cooperation, and economic stability. These risks are not abstract; they are accelerating.

Yet the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue failed to formally address climate security. No multilateral framework was proposed to tackle ecological disruption, and no regional initiative was announced to manage displacement or enhance food system resilience. That China chose not to attend the Dialogue only reinforced the lack of coordinated leadership in the face of shared risks.

This neglect of climate as a strategic issue reveals a deeper problem. Security planning remains anchored to twentieth-century concepts of threat, despite clear evidence that ecological systems now shape the landscape of conflict and cooperation. The regional security architecture is ill-equipped to meet these challenges.

Australia cannot lead in the region while ignoring the risks that matter most to its neighbors. Climate change is not peripheral; it is the context within which all other issues now unfold. Ecological security must be viewed not as an add-on to national strategy, but as its foundation.

Admiral Chris Barrie’s Climate Imperative

Admiral Chris Barrie has emerged as one of Australia’s leading voices on the intersection of climate change and national security. As a former Chief of the Defence Force, his warning is clear: the most immediate threats to Australia will not come from hostile navies but from disrupted ecosystems, broken supply chains, and mass displacement across the region.

Barrie has consistently argued for a broader conception of security. He calls for the establishment of a national climate threat intelligence capability and a strategic reassessment of defense investment allocation.

His emphasis is not on rejecting military preparedness but on adapting it to the realities of a climate-disrupted world. This entails reallocating resources toward civil resilience, logistics, infrastructure hardening, and anticipatory intelligence.

At the Shangri-La talks, United States Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called on Indo-Pacific allies to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP.

Barrie would not dispute the need for greater investment. But he would challenge the logic behind it. More submarines or missile systems will not secure Australia against water insecurity, regional migration crises, or the collapse of vital infrastructure.

A modern defense strategy must be grounded in environmental foresight and regional interdependence. It must prepare for cascading, interconnected disruptions, not simply conventional threats. In this view, spending more is not enough. Australia must spend wisely and in ways that build adaptive, sovereign capacity to meet the challenges already unfolding.

A New Compact with Asia—Reimagining Leadership

In a previous article, I argued that the Coalition’s failure to engage meaningfully with regional climate diplomacy reflected a strategic blind spot that undermined Australia’s credibility. That failure created space for Labor to lead.

With a clear majority in the House and recent defections from the Greens in the Senate, the Albanese government is no longer dependent on inherited defense orthodoxy to govern. It has the mandate and the responsibility to chart a different course.

The unity ticket with the Coalition on AUKUS may have served a political purpose, but it is no longer essential. The region does not need alignment. It needs leadership—anchored in capability and trust. Australia must demonstrate that it understands the security needs of Southeast Asia and the Pacific and is willing to lead in response.

Meeting U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s call to lift spending to 3.5 percent of GDP is achievable. But that spending must serve Australia’s own strategic priorities. It should support Hugh White’s vision for a self-reliant force, and it must advance Admiral Chris Barrie’s call to prepare for the systemic consequences of climate change. Sovereignty now depends not only on defense capability but also on ecological readiness, civil resilience, and regional cooperation.

Ken Henry’s warning against short-termism remains relevant. His leadership of the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper reflected an understanding that long-term security must integrate economic, environmental, and strategic foresight. That insight is more urgent now than ever.

Australia could lead the development of a Climate Resilience Compact with ASEAN, focused on adaptation finance, early warning systems, and joint infrastructure investment. These initiatives would reinforce regional stability, build long-term credibility, and restore Australia’s standing as a partner rather than a proxy.

This approach would also align with French President Emmanuel Macron’s call in Singapore for a third way in regional affairs. His vision of a cooperative Eurasia, shaped by middle powers and not defined by major power rivalry, speaks directly to the moment of geopolitical recalibration Australia must now embrace. The tools are at hand. What is needed now is resolve.

Strategic Spending for a Different Century

Defense spending must increase—not to prepare for someone else’s war, but to build the strategic, ecological, and societal resilience necessary for the century we are already in. Australia needs more capability, but of a different kind.

That means investing in economic sovereignty, with secure supply chains and domestic capacity in critical industries. It means strengthening cyber and digital infrastructure to defend not only borders but also networks and information systems.

It also means preparing for climate-driven displacement and regional instability by building humanitarian logistics and planning for migration and crisis response. Civil defense and national infrastructure resilience must become core security priorities, capable of protecting communities from floods, fires, and system shocks.

Soft power matters too. Australia must rebuild regional trust through strategic communications, education, and long-term relationships, not just treaties and defense platforms.

And it must plan with the future in mind, embedding intergenerational thinking into every major investment, in line with what Henry has called for across national policy.

These are the foundations of a secure, sovereign Australia. More spending is needed, but it must serve the world we are entering, not the one we are leaving behind.

Conclusion—A Sovereign Future Begins in the Region

Australia stands at a point of strategic inflection. The architecture of the old order is fraying. The assumptions that underpinned decades of defense and foreign policy are no longer sufficient.

As Warwick Powell has warned, alignment without purpose risks diminishing Australia’s standing in the region it most depends on. The habits of subordination must give way to a posture of agency.

The region is evolving. Middle powers are asserting independence, ASEAN is upholding non-alignment, and the Indo-Pacific is emerging as a theater not just of competition but of ecological disruption and social upheaval.

The defining threats of this era—ecological disruption, infrastructure risk, and forced migration—are systemic, not hypothetical.

The Albanese government possesses electoral authority, parliamentary confidence, and regional goodwill. It no longer needs to defend inherited positions; it can lead. This leadership must start by redefining national security for the twenty-first century.

Barrie warns of ecological risk, while Henry emphasizes that serious nations plan for the long term. Hugh White reminds us that dependence is not strategy—self-reliance is. Paul Keating’s insight was not rhetorical; it was strategic: security is found in Asia, not from it.

Together, these voices advocate for a different kind of strength. One built on stewardship rather than subservience, cooperation rather than coercion, and the capacity to endure rather than merely to respond.

This is Australia’s ASEAN moment. To remain relevant in the Asian century, Australia must lead as a trusted regional partner, not as a tethered auxiliary. Drift is no longer an option; purpose must now prevail. Sovereignty begins not in reaction to threats, but in the purposeful shaping of what endures.

Since the mid-1960s, Israel has received significant military and diplomatic support from successive administrations in the United States. But never has it enjoyed such unconditional support as it has in the past eight years – under the first and second administrations of President Donald Trump and the administration of President Joe Biden. As a result, Israel has started openly pursuing its greatest Zionist dream: expanding state borders to achieve Greater Israel and accelerating the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people from their homeland.

Although the Israeli state may appear more powerful than ever and overly confident that it will achieve regional dominance, its current position paradoxically reflects a strategic failure.

The reality is that after nearly eight decades of existence, Israel has failed to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the region’s peoples and lasting security for itself. Its present resurgence will secure neither. And that is because its foreign, domestic and military policies are based on a settler-colonial logic which makes them untenable in the long run.

Settler-colonial mentality

Since its founding in 1948, Israel has sought to convince the world and its Jewish citizens that it was created “on a land without a people”. While this narrative has successfully caught on – particularly among the younger generations of Israelis – the forefathers of the Israeli state openly spoke about “colonisation” and settling a land with a hostile native population.

Theodor Herzl, considered the father of modern Zionism, planned to reach out to well-known British colonialist Cecil Rhodes, who led the British colonisation of Southern Africa, for advice on and approval of his plan to colonise Palestine.

Vladimir Jabotinsky, a revisionist Zionist who founded the far-right Zionist group Betar in Latvia, strategised in his writings on ways to address native resistance. In his 1923 essay The Iron Wall, he wrote:

“Every native population in the world resists colonists as long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonised. That is what the Arabs in Palestine are doing.”

This settler-colonial mentality played a central role in shaping the domestic, foreign and military policies of the newly founded Israel. Today, almost 80 years after the creation of the Israeli state, expansionism and aggressive military posturing continue to define the Israeli regional strategy.

Despite official rhetoric about seeking peace and normalisation of relations in the region, the Israeli aspiration to achieve a Greater Israel – one that includes not only occupied Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but also parts of modern-day Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan – persists.

That has been apparent in public discourse and government actions. Settler activists have openly talked about an Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates river. Government advisers have penned articles about “reconquering Sinai”, “dismembering Egypt” and precipitating the “dissolution of Jordan”. Prime ministers have stood in front of the United Nations General Assembly, holding maps of Greater Israel.

The idea of Greater Israel has been widely accepted across the Zionist political spectrum, both on the right and on the left. The primary differences have been in how and when to advance this vision, and whether it requires the expulsion of Palestinians or their segregation.

Expansionist policies have been applied under all Israeli governments – from those led by left-wing Mapai Labor to those led by right-wing Likud. Since the 1949 armistice, Israel has occupied the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sinai (twice), southern Lebanon (twice) and now most recently, more parts of southern Syria.

Meanwhile, its colonisation of the occupied Palestinian territories has proceeded at an accelerated pace. The number of Jewish colonial settlers in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was approximately 250,000 in 1993; by October 7, 2023, this number had risen to 503,732 in the West Bank and 233,600 in East Jerusalem.

Settlements in Gaza were dismantled in 2005, but plans are being made for recolonisation, as the current Israeli government eyes the full ethnic cleansing of the strip.

Today, there is no major political force in Israel that looks beyond the direct application of naked military power to maintain and protect colonisation activities. This mindset is not limited to politicians but is also a widespread conviction among the Israeli public.

A June 2024 survey found that 70 percent of Jewish Israelis think settlements either help national security or do not interfere with it; a March 2025 poll showed that 82 percent of Jewish Israelis support the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Gaza.

No genuine peace camp

The settler-colonial mindset at the core of the Israeli state has precluded the emergence of a genuine drive for peace. As a result, successive Israeli governments have continued to pursue war, colonisation and expansion, even when seemingly embracing peace talks.

In the 1990s, Israel had the opportunity to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by withdrawing from the territories occupied in 1967 and accepting the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, it used the negotiations as a smokescreen to advance settler-colonial policies.

Even leaders like Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was hailed as a peacemaker and assassinated for it by a Jewish extremist, did not really envision Israelis and Palestinians living side by side. Under his government and during the peace negotiations, the expansion of Jewish settlements continued at a steady pace, while plans for a segregation wall on occupied Palestinian land were pushed forward.

Meanwhile, Rabin and other Israeli leaders involved in the peace negotiations focused primarily on normalising Israel’s existence as it was, without addressing the root causes of the conflict. They sought to pacify Palestinian resistance, rather than establish durable peace.

The absence of a peace camp is not only at the leadership level but also at the societal one. While the Israeli society has active movements for social causes, settlers’ coalitions, and now a movement pushing for continuing the prisoner exchanges with Hamas, it lacks a genuine grassroots peace movement that recognises Palestinian rights.

This is in sharp contrast to other settler-colonial societies, in which there was a push from within to end colonialism. During the French colonisation of Algeria, for example, an anti-colonial movement within France openly supported the Algerian armed resistance. During the apartheid era in South Africa, white activists joined the anti-apartheid struggle and helped sway domestic attitudes.

In Israel, Jewish supporters of Palestinian rights are so few that they are easily ostracised and marginalised, facing death threats and often feeling compelled to leave the country.

The absence of a genuine peace camp reflects the inherent flaw of settler-colonial Israel. It has no coherent political strategy to address broader issues, such as coexistence in the region, which requires acknowledging the interests of others, especially the national rights of the Palestinian people. This makes the settler colony incapable of peace.

Overreliance on Western support

Historically, settler-colonies have always had to rely on outside support to sustain themselves. Israel is no different. For decades, it has enjoyed far-reaching support from Western Europe and the United States, which have provided it with a significant strategic edge.

But this Israeli reliance on Western backing also poses a long-term strategic threat. It makes the country dependent and unable to function like a normal sovereign nation.

Other countries in the region will continue to exist even if they lose support from their Western allies, with only their regimes potentially changing. But that is not the case for Israel.

This unlimited and extravagant support for Israel, aimed at maintaining its dominance as the primary regional power, is likely to backfire.

The growing imbalance of power is generating pressure not only on antagonist countries like Iran, but on other regional players such as Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They increasingly feel that the Western push to defend Israeli interests is infringing on their own.

This situation is likely to push them to increasingly seek alliances beyond the Western bloc to counterbalance this influence. China offers a viable alternative, as it is not a strategic ally of Israel.

A gradual opening to China can shift the political dynamics of the region in the coming years, beyond the capacity of Israel and its allies to control them. That will certainly undermine the Israeli plans to establish regional hegemony.

But Israel faces not only the risk that Western dominance could be challenged from the East, but also that Western societies could pressure their governments to stop backing it.

The Israeli genocidal policies, especially since October 7, 2023, have spurred a profound shift in public opinion across the world, including in Europe and North America.

Israel stands accused of genocide at the International Court of Justice, its prime minister has an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court and Israeli soldiers are facing charges in many countries around the world.

As a result, the Israeli state has notably lost support among those on the left and centre of the political spectrum in the West.

While it still manages to maintain backing in high-level European and American political and military circles, this support is becoming increasingly unreliable in the long term. This uncertainty is further aggravated by the rise of isolationism on the right in the US. If these trends continue, Israel may eventually run out of dependable supporters in the West and lose its financial and military advantage.

The limits of the Israeli settler-colonial state strategy are increasingly becoming clear. The continued use of settler-colonial policies, characterised by excessive violence, along with the pursuit of regional hegemony, is pushing Israel into an untenable position.

The Israeli leadership may be living in a fantasy world, thinking it can pull off a “New World” model on Palestine and exterminate its population to fully colonise it; or to declare itself officially an apartheid state, seeking to make Palestinian subjugation legal.

But in the historical and geopolitical context of the Middle East, neither of these fantasies is viable. Global pressure is coming to bear. The expulsion of the people of Gaza has been outright rejected.

The Palestinian people, like any other nation that has survived brutal colonisation, will not leave their country and disappear, nor will they accept life under a colonial apartheid regime.

Israeli leaders may do well to start imagining the very real possibility of sharing land and accepting equal rights, and start preparing the Israeli society for it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The rail link will connect the Kashmir Valley to the vast Indian plains by train for the first time.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has opened one of the country’s most ambitious railway projects, which will connect the Kashmir Valley to the vast Indian plains by train for the first time.

Dubbed by the government-operated Indian Railways as one of the most challenging tracks in the world, the 272-kilometre (169-mile) line begins in the garrison city of Udhampur in the Jammu region and runs through Indian-administered Kashmir’s main city of Srinagar. The line ends in Baramulla, a town near the highly militarised Line of Control dividing the Himalayan region between India and Pakistan.

The Indian government has pegged the total project cost at about $5bn.

The railway line travels through 36 tunnels and over 943 bridges and will facilitate the movement of people and goods, as well as troops, that was previously possible only via treacherous mountain roads and by air.

One of the project’s highlights is a 1,315-metre-long (4,314-foot) steel and concrete bridge above the Chenab River connecting two mountains with an arch 359 metres (1,177 feet) above the water. Indian Railways has compared its height with the Eiffel Tower in Paris, which stands 330 metres (1,082 feet), and said the bridge is built to last 120 years and endure extreme weather, including wind speeds up to 260 km/h (161mph).

Modi visited the Chenab bridge on Friday with tight security, waving an Indian tri-colour flag before boarding a test train that passed through picturesque mountains and tunnels to reach an inauguration ceremony for another high-elevation bridge named Anji.

The railway “ensures all weather connectivity” and will “boost spiritual tourism and create livelihood opportunities”, Modi said.

The prime minister also helped launch a pair of new trains called “Vande Bharat” that will halve the travel time between Srinagar and the town of Katra in the Jammu region to about three hours from the usual six to seven hours by road.

Modi’s visit to Indian-controlled Kashmir on Friday is his first since a military conflict between India and Pakistan brought the nuclear-armed rivals to the brink of war last month when the countries fired missiles and drones at each other.

The conflict was triggered after a shooting attack in late April that left 26 men, mostly Hindu tourists, dead in Indian-controlled Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan for supporting the attackers, a charge Islamabad denied.

India and Pakistan each administer part of Kashmir, but both claim the territory in its entirety.

Armed groups in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir have been fighting New Delhi’s rule since 1989. Many Muslim Kashmiris support the rebels’ goal of uniting the territory, either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country.

India insists the Kashmir armed groups are backed by Pakistan, a charge Islamabad denies.

In the wake of the recent India-Pakistan confrontation, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s timely diplomatic mission to four friendly nations—Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan—has emerged as a significant step towards reinforcing Pakistan’s regional partnerships and showcasing its commitment to peace, cooperation, and brotherhood in a tense geopolitical climate. This carefully planned visit not only strengthened Pakistan’s ties with these brotherly nations but also sent a clear message to the world: Pakistan is not alone. It is backed by sincere, strategic, and spiritual allies who value peace, justice, and shared destiny over narrow national interests or short-term economic gains.

Each stop on this visit carried great symbolic and strategic significance. It reinforced bilateral trust, enhanced political understanding, and laid the groundwork for deeper cooperation in trade, defense, energy, culture, and regional integration. At the same time, it highlighted Pakistan’s diplomatic maturity and moral high ground in contrast to India’s aggressive and isolating approach.

Turkey: Brothers in Arms and Spirit

The first leg of Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s journey began in Ankara. The bond between Pakistan and Turkey is not transactional—it is historical, emotional, and spiritual. During the India-Pakistan crisis, Turkey extended its full and unwavering support to Pakistan. This support was not just political—it was moral, diplomatic, and deeply rooted in a shared sense of justice and historical brotherhood.

Turkey’s role in standing by Pakistan during the confrontation with India was instrumental in boosting Pakistan’s position internationally and deterring further Indian aggression. The people of Turkey, as always, remembered the sacrifices of Muslims in the subcontinent during the Khilafat Movement, and once again, Turkish hearts beat in unison with their Pakistani brothers.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s firm statements and diplomatic engagement during the crisis showed the world that Pakistan is not isolated. During the visit, both leaders reaffirmed their mutual commitment to strengthen cooperation in defense, trade, and strategic coordination. They emphasized joint efforts to combat Islamophobia, promote regional stability, and work for greater unity within the Muslim world.

Key Takeaway: Turkey’s support during the confrontation and the outcome of this visit reaffirmed the deep, unshakable brotherhood between the two nations. New trade and defense initiatives were discussed, and Turkey’s continued role in regional diplomacy was applauded.

Iran: A Neighbor’s Role in Pursuit of Peace

The second stop was Tehran, where Prime Minister Sharif met Iranian leadership in a warm and constructive environment. As neighboring Muslim countries, Pakistan and Iran share a border, a cultural affinity, and a common vision for regional peace. They also share a history of facing similar geopolitical pressures, especially from the Western world.

When India escalated tensions with Pakistan, Iran quickly offered to mediate—a noble and thoughtful gesture that Pakistan welcomed. Tehran’s effort to prevent further bloodshed reflected Iran’s maturity as a responsible regional actor. Unfortunately, India rejected the offer and chose to pursue aggression instead, leading to a dangerous escalation.

Despite India’s hostility, Iran stood firm in advocating peace and dialogue. Prime Minister Sharif’s meeting with Iranian leaders focused on enhancing border security, trade connectivity, and energy cooperation. Discussions also covered regional developments and the role both nations can play in promoting stability in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East.

Key Takeaway: Iran’s sincere efforts for peace were appreciated by Pakistan. The visit reinforced bilateral ties in trade, border management, and energy cooperation, and set a tone for greater regional coordination in times of crisis.

Azerbaijan: Strategic Ally, Loyal Friend

The third destination was Baku, where a deeply significant and emotional welcome awaited the Pakistani delegation. Azerbaijan and Pakistan share an extraordinary relationship grounded in shared religion, culture, and history. Both nations have stood shoulder to shoulder on every major issue—be it the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the Kashmir dispute.

Azerbaijan vocally supported Pakistan during the confrontation with India, dismissing diplomatic pressure and economic blackmail. The visit highlighted the two countries’ strategic convergence, and both leaders committed to expanding ties in defense, energy, and connectivity.

The highlight of this leg of the tour was the trilateral summit between Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. This landmark meeting was a symbol of Islamic unity and mutual support. The three nations discussed deeper integration in areas such as trade, technology, security, and cultural exchange. It was a bold display of a united front of Muslim nations determined to support each other and promote peace and justice globally.

Key Takeaway: Azerbaijan’s rock-solid support for Pakistan and the trilateral summit marked a new era of cooperation. It emphasized the rise of new regional alliances based on trust, respect, and shared values.

Tajikistan: Heart of Central Asia, Partner in Progress

The final stop was Dushanbe, where Prime Minister Sharif met with Tajikistan’s leadership. The visit reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to deepening ties with Central Asian states, particularly with Tajikistan—a country linked to Pakistan by geography, religion, language, and shared challenges.

Pakistan and Tajikistan have long enjoyed warm relations, but the visit added renewed momentum to bilateral cooperation. Both leaders discussed expanding trade routes, especially through Gwadar and Central Asia, improving energy connectivity, and strengthening cultural and educational exchanges.

Tajikistan’s support for regional peace and dialogue aligned closely with Pakistan’s vision. The two countries also explored opportunities in hydropower, climate resilience, and people-to-people contact.

Key Takeaway: The visit to Tajikistan strengthened Pakistan’s vision of regional connectivity. It highlighted the strategic importance of Central Asia and reaffirmed that Pakistan is a gateway for the region’s economic growth and stability.

India’s Punitive Response: A Miscalculation?

India’s reaction to the support extended by Turkey and Azerbaijan to Pakistan was sadly predictable. New Delhi announced punitive measures targeting both nations in trade, tourism, and diplomatic relations. This was an attempt to coerce them into silence and dissuade others from supporting Pakistan.

However, this strategy has already shown signs of failure. Turkey and Azerbaijan, guided by principles, did not succumb to pressure. They chose friendship, morality, and shared destiny over economic convenience. Their leaders made it clear: they stand with Pakistan because it is right, not because it is easy.

This tactic is not new for India. It previously attempted to punish the Maldives for not aligning with its foreign policy goals. It urged Indian tourists and businesses to boycott the island nation. Yet, the Maldivian economy remained stable and even grew stronger with support from new partners. The world is watching and learning that using economic pressure to silence moral voices rarely works.

Will India harm Turkey and Azerbaijan? It may try—but it is unlikely to succeed. Both nations have resilient economies, strong alternative partnerships, and, above all, moral clarity. Their alignment with Pakistan is a principled stance, not a temporary convenience. Their message is clear: friendship cannot be bought or bullied.

A Vision for the Future

Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s visit came at a critical moment in the region’s history. The India-Pakistan confrontation risked igniting a broader crisis. But Pakistan chose dialogue, solidarity, and diplomacy. By visiting these four friendly nations, the Prime Minister demonstrated Pakistan’s peaceful intent and diplomatic strength.

Short-term outcomes include:

Stronger bilateral ties and renewed political trust.

Agreements on trade, defense cooperation, and connectivity.

Unified diplomatic messages against regional aggression.

Long-term impacts may include:

Creation of a new regional bloc focused on Muslim unity and cooperation.

Enhanced regional trade corridors linking South Asia with Central Asia and the Middle East.

A more peaceful and balanced geopolitical landscape where mutual respect prevails.

A Diplomatic Triumph

Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s diplomatic tour was a message of peace, friendship, and regional cooperation. At a time when aggression could have escalated into catastrophe, Pakistan chose the path of solidarity, dialogue, and unity. The visit to Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan was not only a reassurance to Pakistan’s friends—it was a strategic recalibration of regional alliances in favor of cooperation over confrontation.

In this ever-evolving geopolitical landscape, nations that choose principles over pressure, and friendship over fear, will shape the future. Pakistan, with its four loyal partners, has taken a bold and commendable step in that direction.

Let us hope the message of this tour echoes far and wide: peace is possible, unity is powerful, and true friendship cannot be intimidated.