Shahed136

Russia is continuing to adapt and evolve its copies of the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, known locally as the Geran, now arming it with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). These are more often referred to as shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles. The development follows a previous version of the drone carrying a single R-60 air-to-air missile, which you can read more about here. It also emerges as Russia makes additional alterations to the drone, including improved line-of-sight control capabilities and self-protection systems.

An example of a MANPADS-equipped Shahed/Geran is seen in recent imagery, including a video, that shows the drone lying in the snow, after it came down intact in Ukraine, reportedly in the Chernihiv region in the north of the country. According to Ukrainian accounts, as well as the rail-mounted missile on the top, the drone is equipped with a camera and a radio-frequency modem.

The missile itself has been widely reportedly as an Igla-S, among the latest models of this widespread MANPADS. Known in Russia as the 9K388, and to NATO as the SA-24 Grinch, the weapon has a maximum range of around 3.7 miles, and improvements over earlier Igla missiles include a more sensitive infrared seeker, a heavier warhead, and an improved fuze.

On the other hand, the inscription on the top of the launch tube appears to read 9K333, which would indicate it is the more modern Verba (SA-29 Gizmo), which was developed as a replacement for the Igla. Its primary advantage is its advanced multispectral seeker, operating in the ultraviolet, near infrared, and mid-infrared bands, for improved discrimination between targets and decoys.

Verba MANPADS

Adapting the MANPADS to the Shahed/Geran appears more straightforward than the R-60, with no need for the launch rail adapter; instead, the MANPADS is simply attached to the drone within its standard launch tube. The complete Igla, for example, is also much lighter: around 40 pounds in its tube, compared to close to 100 pounds for the R-60, minus the launch rail.

Russia started employing Shahed/Geran-type long-range UAVs equipped with air-to-air missiles for combating Ukrainian aviation assets, Ukrainian military radio technology expert Serhii Flash reports.

The remains of a Shahed/Geran-type drone with an R-60 short-range air-to-air… pic.twitter.com/NHBDQQqCK9

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) December 1, 2025

As for the drone, the original Shahed-136 is Iranian in origin. Multiple variants and derivatives of the Shahed-136, including a jet-powered type, are now produced in large numbers in Russian factories, where they are known locally by the name Geran, the Russian word for geranium. Steady improvements have been made to these drones, including a degree of dynamic targeting capability, as you can read about here.

As we have discussed in the past, adding a heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile to the Shahed/Geran in theory provides the drone with a means to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. At the very least, giving the drone the ability to hit back at these threats offers a deterrent capability. Overall, the effectiveness of this combination is questionable. Particular challenges include the need for a high degree of situational awareness, perhaps requiring cameras around the airframe, and the need to maneuver the drone to get it into a boresight location to achieve a lock-on. However, Russia clearly considers that the adaptation is worth exploring, even just as a deterrent strategy to keep drone hunting aircraft at bay.

For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.

Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links. We are also now seeing Russian drones will Starlink terminals, which could provide a vastly superior beyond-line-of-sight capability and could prove to be a big problem for Ukraine if Russia can produce such a configuration in large volumes. These developments are now blurring the classification of the Shahed/Geran from its original long-range one-way attack drone to a loitering munition, with an onboard imaging capability.

Potentially, a Shahed/Geran armed with a MANPADS or an R-60 could use beyond-line-of-sight capabilities to operate the missile. But bearing in mind we know Russia is using the drones closer to the front lines, this would need only a line-of-sight link with operators near the front, or at least by receivers/transmitters placed there. Drone controllers behind the lines could also ‘pick them up’ once in the area, but such an operation is far more complex and fraught with additional risks.

Nevertheless, target acquisition and engagement of a missile-armed drone is still far from straightforward. It’s likely that the modern seeker used by the Igla-S or Verba makes it easier to engage aerial targets, compared to the R-60, with a reduced need to ‘point’ the drone directly at the target. Still, the operator would have to trigger the launch of the missile after receiving the signal indicating a lock-on has been achieved.

At the same time, the Shahed/Geran remains a slow and not particularly agile launch platform, and certainly not one that was designed with air-to-air combat in mind. Adding a top-mounted missile likely also degrades its maneuverability and affects its stability, but less than would be the case with an R-60.

When it comes to finding aerial targets, the most likely scenario involves operating entirely reactively to what is seen visually on cameras around the drone or otherwise searching for targets of opportunity. Another option would involve the drone operator receiving target information from offboard assets, where applicable, but this seems less likely.

Bearing in mind the performance of the Shahed/Geran and the range of the MANPADS, the most likely targets would be the Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip series armed transport helicopters and the Mi-24 Hind series gunships that are routinely tasked with counter-drone missions. We have already seen that lower and slower-flying helicopters face a notable risk from relatively small kamikaze drones that simply fly into them. Ukrainian F-16s, MiG-29s, Su-27s and Mirage 2000s have also been tasked heavily as ‘Shahed hunters,’ but engaging fighters with these weapons would be even tougher. Still their very existence would add a credible threat to fighters approaching them.

Footage showing the door gunner on a Mil Mi-8 Multirole Helicopter with the Ukrainian Air Force using his M134 Minigun to shoot down a Russian Shahed-136 Attack Drone. pic.twitter.com/UWBd8QUXEf

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) November 12, 2025

While it remains to be seen just how effective the combination of Shahed/Geran with a MANPADS (or R-60) is, these developments reflect a previous precedent for arming drones with air-to-air missiles. The deterrent effect of this can be seen in at least one instance from 2002, when a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Stinger heat-seeking anti-air missile at an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter that was trying to shoot it down, which can be seen in the video below.

Dogfight between MQ-1 Predator drone and Mig-25 Foxbat.mp4

These measures are also indicative of efforts being made by Russia to better defend the Shahed/Geran drones. Another recent development involves the apparent addition of infrared countermeasures to defeat drone interceptors and possible missiles fired by fighters. Attached to the rear of the drone’s stabilizing endplates, these appear to employ electrically heated cylindrical blocks to generate blooming infrared energy, like the Hot Brick system.

Ukrainian military radio technology specialist and consultant Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that Russian Geran-2 drones are now capable of blinding interceptor drones and aircraft.

According to him, the Russians are equipping their strike UAVs with infrared searchlights.… pic.twitter.com/dtpnbKIklE

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) January 3, 2026

For now, we have no evidence of a missile-equipped Shahed/Geran attempting to engage a Ukrainian aircraft, let alone bringing one down. However, having long-range one-way attack drones fitted with air defense missiles provides another complicating factor for Ukraine and illustrates the continued modifications being made to these weapons.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The U.S. Navy personnel in the Middle East have test-launched a Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) long-range kamikaze drone from the Independence class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) USS Santa Barbara. Described as a first-of-its-kind achievement, this comes two weeks after the U.S. military announced it had established Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS) in the region, armed with the LUCAS drones from SpektreWorks. Being able to employ the one-way attack drones from the sea, as well as from sites on land, opens the door to new operational possibilities on top of what was already a major new addition to the U.S. military’s long-range strike arsenal.

TWZ has previously explored in great depth the arguments for arming Navy ships with various types of uncrewed aerial systems to provide additional layers of defense, as well as enhanced strike, electronic warfare, intelligence-gathering, and networking capabilities, which you can find here. Just earlier this year, we also laid out a detailed case for why America’s armed forces should be heavily investing in rapidly-producible long-range kamikaze drones — Shahed-136 clones primarily — just like LUCAS, as you can read here.

Personnel from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s (NAVCENT) Task Force 59 conducted the rocket-assisted launch of the LUCAS drone from the stern flight deck of the USS Santa Barbara on December 16, according to an official release. The ship was operating in the Arabian Gulf, more commonly known as the Persian Gulf, at the time. Established in 2021, Task Force 59 has been leading efforts to expand the Navy’s operational use of uncrewed platforms, as well as new artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, in the Middle East. The LUCAS drone itself had been provided by TFSS, which falls under the auspices of U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), the regional headquarters for special operations activities under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The official release from NAVCENT does not provide specific details about capabilities demonstrated during the test, such as how far the LUCAS drone flew, how it was controlled or directed, and whether it hit a mock target of some kind at sea or on land at the end of its flight.

TWZ reached out to CENTCOM, which declined to provide more granular information. We have also reached out to NAVCENT and SpektreWorks.

General details about the LUCAS drones the U.S. military now has deployed in the Middle East remain limited. It is known that SpektreWorks directly reverse-engineered the design from Iran’s Shahed-136, and initially with an eye toward its use as a threat-representative target for training and test purposes. At some 10 feet long and with a wingspan of around eight feet, LUCAS is slightly smaller than the Iranian drone. SpektreWorks has also publicly provided specifications for the related target drone, called the FLM 136, which has roughly half the range and payload capacity as the Shahed-136. However, it is unclear whether this reflects the capabilities found on operationalized configurations. LUCAS is also said to have a unit cost of around $35,000.

Iran and its regional proxies have employed a growing number of variants and derivatives of the Shahed-136 design in recent years, including in attacks on targets in Israel and on ships sailing in and around the Red Sea. Russia also now produces its own still-expanding array of Shahed-136-based drones domestically, which it regularly employs in attacks on Ukrainian cities, as well as forces around the front lines.

The video below includes a montage of clips from Iranian state media showing Shahed-136s being employed during an exercise.

Баражуючий іранський боєприпас «Shahed 136»

Pictures of the LUCAS drones the U.S. military has released so far show a modular, reconnaissance design that could also be used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as in the decoy role. As TWZ has previously written:

“We see two variants of LUCAS. One is not of particular note, it seems geared to strike the static targets we have become accustomed to for this type of weapon. The other features two very interesting details. It has what appears to be a gimbaled camera system mounted on its nose and, most importantly, a miniature beyond-line-of-sight satellite datalink mounted on its spine. This is a major development that would allow these weapons to not only be controlled dynamically after launch at great distances, but also to hit moving targets and targets of opportunity.”

“In addition, this capability would help enable swarm tactics, where the drones work to attack targets cooperatively with their progress monitored and altered in real-time by human operators, regardless of whether they have the satellite terminal or not. This is made possible by providing simpler, lighter line-of-sight datalinks on the drones equipped with warheads only, which then connect line-of-sight to the drone carrying the satellite communications terminal, acting as a force-multiplying networking hub. This also means you can have many simple drones paired with a much smaller number of more costly ones equipped with cameras and networking equipment, but achieve the same overall effect as if they all had the more advanced capabilities. This modularity which is ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ is a central tenet of emerging drone warfare TWZ highlighted a decade ago.“

…

“Seeing as swarms can be tailored to various objectives, with mixing and matching BLOS networking enabled units with strikers, and placing them in real time to minimize risk and maximize effect, America’s Shaheds should be significantly more survivable and effective. The ability to work together, reacting to their environment, and leverage real-time intelligence gathered by the full gamut of U.S. and allied assets, are even larger advantages. This is in addition to pairing them with combined arms tactics, from electronic warfare to kinetic strikes, to ensure they get to their target areas. Even if some die to air defenses, that can be viewed as a win, depending on what engages them. Consuming costly and finite effectors is a feature, not a bug, for these relatively cheap weapons, as you can read all about in our larger feature.“

All of this is further magnified by the ability to employ LUCAS drones from any ship with sufficient deck space, as well as launchers on land, which could be semi-fixed or mobile. This is something TWZ highlighted explicitly in our past feature on the prospect of integrating drone swarms onto Navy ships.

Observations for years now of how Iran and its proxies, as well as Russia, have been employing variants and derivatives of the Shahed-136 have underscored their ability to be sent along often circuitous routes to attack targets from unexpected vectors. Even without the addition of more dynamic targeting and fully networked swarming capabilities, this creates immense challenges for defenders. This is only further compounded by the breadth of areas targeted simultaneously and the sheer volume of drones that can be launched in mass barrages, owing in large part to their relatively low cost.

Iran has also notably fielded a number of one-off sea base-like ships with aviation and other capabilities, including the ability to launch long-range kamikaze drones, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles. Iranian forces have also made use of commercial vessels modified as covert motherships to coordinate attacks, including by regional proxies, and to gather intelligence.

U.S. officials have themselves been quick to highlight the new operational capabilities LUCAS offers, especially in light of the newly announced test launch from the USS Santa Barbara.

“A cutting-edge, low-cost attack drone asset, launched from a naval vessel that can sail and operate wherever international law allows, is a tremendous new capability to employ in the region,” Navy Capt. Timothy Hawkins, CENTCOM’s top spokesperson, told TWZ.

“U.S. Navy forces in the Middle East are advancing warfighting capability in new ways, bringing more striking power from the sea and setting conditions for using innovation as a deterrent,” Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of CENTCOM, also said in a statement.

“This first successful launch of LUCAS from a naval vessel marks a significant milestone in rapidly delivering affordable and effective unmanned capabilities to the warfighter,” Vice Adm. Curt Renshaw, commander of NAVCENT and U.S. Fifth Fleet, added in his own statement accompanying the official release. “This achievement demonstrates the power of innovation and joint collaboration in this critical region.”

“This platform will undoubtedly enhance regional maritime security and deterrence,” Renshaw added.

Conducting the test in the Arabian Gulf also underscores previous statements from CENTCOM about how the deployment of LUCAS in the Middle East specifically offers a new way to challenge Iran.

“We are now at a point where not only are we building them in mass, but we have already based them in [the] Middle East for the first time,” a U.S. official told TWZ earlier this month when the establishment of TFSS was announced. “In essence, we are able to flip the script on Iran.”

As we mentioned at the time, the benefits that kamikaze drones like LUCAS offer to U.S. forces also extend well beyond the Middle East. Separate U.S. Marine Corps testing of LUCAS drones at the U.S. Army’s Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) in Arizona points to plans to field long-range kamikaze drones more broadly across America’s armed forces.

As an aside, using an Independence class LCS for the recent maritime LUCAS test launch highlights another potential mission for these ships, as well as the Navy’s Freedom class LCSs. Both types of LCS have chronically underdelivered for the Navy, and the service has spent considerable energy searching for ways to get more operational utility out of the vessels. Last year, then-Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced plans to arm “many” Independence and Freedom class LCSs with new containerized missile launchers as a new way to boost their firepower, as you can read more about here. Giving these ships the ability to launch waves of low-cost, long-range kamikaze drones would be another way to approach this goal.

In general, the market space for Shahed-136-like long-range one-way attack drones is already growing in the United States, with Griffon Aerospace having also been pitching its own design called the MQM-172 Arrowhead to America’s armed forces. This is a trend that has also been emerging elsewhere globally, especially in China, where multiple Shahed-esque designs have appeared in recent years. Russia is also said to be helping North Korea set up its own domestic capacity to produce Shahed-136s, or derivatives thereof, in exchange for Pyongyang’s help in fighting Ukraine.

Whatever plans the rest of the U.S. military may have now for drones like LUCAS, the recent at-sea test launch from the USS Santa Barbara shows that American forces in the Middle East are already working to expand their ability to employ this already important new capability at least in that region.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com