Secretive

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Saudi F-15 Eagles Live Missile Firing in Pakistan | Naseem Al-Bahr 13 Exercise

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

An annual award has gone to one of the U.S. Air Force’s most secretive drone squadrons, offering a very rare window into its activities. The 30th Reconnaissance Squadron is one of two units known to operate the stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel, and it is unusual to hear anything about its operational exploits. Much about the RQ-170 itself remains highly classified 17 years after its existence was first officially acknowledged.

The General Atomics Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Squadron of the Year award for 2025 was presented to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference on Tuesday, at which TWZ was in attendance. The AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies works together with General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI) to recognize an Air Force drone unit in this way each year.

“The RPA Trophy is awarded annually at the USAF level for outstanding performance of active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard … squadrons in achieving persistent attack and/or reconnaissance over the preceding calendar year,” the Mitchell Institute told TWZ in a statement. “Squadrons are judged on performance across their specified mission sets, exercise participation, and squadron and individual achievements.”

The institute sent an additional statement regarding this year’s particular award to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron, which is as follows:

“Through relentless combat support, operational agility, and enterprise leadership, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron – known as the Blackbirds – has set the standard for the remotely piloted aircraft community and strengthened the Joint Force’s intelligence advantage. In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted intrusive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across three areas of responsibility, filling critical intelligence gaps and disrupting enemy networks. In the face of urgent deployment requirements, the squadron demonstrated exceptional agility, rapidly pivoting resources to establish forward operating locations and execute critical missions under severely compressed timelines. The Blackbirds’ accomplishments paved the way for future remotely piloted aircraft capability, distinctly identifying them as the Air Force’s most outstanding RPA squadron.“

Larry Stutzriem, the AFA’s Executive Vice President, while presenting the award to representatives of the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron ahead of a panel at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

“In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted 87 ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] missions across three different AORs [areas of responsibility], filled critical intelligence gaps, and disrupted enemy networks,” Stutzriem said. “On the unit mobility side, the Blackbirds executed 7.2 million dollars worth of airlift in six movements across four combatant commands, moving 250 tons of personnel, top secret material, and equipment to provide low-observable RPA support for a critical Secretary of War-directed mission.”

“With their deployments, the Blackbirds demonstrated exceptional agility under extremely compressed timelines,” he added.

Furthermore, during 2025, the squadron “also executed six large force exercises to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; validated joint force tactical objectives in land and maritime environments; and provided combat-relevant training,” according to Stutzriem. “Instructors and evaluators graduated the largest ever combat mission-ready class, 30 percent ahead of schedule, and accelerated mission-ready status 33 percent, while increasing total unit aircrew by 26 percent.”

Though Stutzriem noted that the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron provided “low-observable RPA support,” no explicit mention was made of the RQ-170. Whether or not the squadron may now operate other kinds of low-observable (stealthy) drones is unknown. As mentioned, to date, the Air Force has only confirmed that Sentinels are assigned to two units, the other being the 44th Reconnaissance Squadron. Both the 30th and 44th are assigned to the 432nd Wing at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. Between 20 and 30 RQ-170s, in total, are understood to be in the Air Force’s inventory.

What three specific AORs the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operated in during 2025 is also not known.

However, at least one, and possibly two, RQ-170s took part in the mission to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro in January of this year, as you can read more about here. It’s very likely that the Sentinels were tracking Maduro ahead of the operation. In December 2025, Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) had also made a post on X that included a picture of an individual wearing a name patch with the silhouette of Sentinel and the sleeve insignia of the 432nd Wing, prompting questions about whether the drones were operating in the region. The post was subsequently deleted.

Further in the past, RQ-170s are also known to have been deployed to the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Pacific. The Sentinel first emerged publicly in Afghanistan in the late 2000s, prompting the U.S. military to confirm its existence in 2009. Sentinels are notably understood to have surveilled Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in the lead-up to the raid that led to his death in May 2011.

Later in 2011, one of the drones infamously went down in Iran while presumed to be on a mission to monitor aspects of that country’s nuclear program. With that in mind, it is possible, if not extremely probable, that RQ-170s likely played a role in relation to the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on Iranian nuclear sites last year. Sentinels could have provided direct surveillance over the sites in question, as well as collecting post-mission bomb damage assessments and other intelligence. These are exactly the kinds of missions the drones were designed for and that operators have trained for.

A satellite image available through Apple Maps, seen below, also shows an RQ-170 at Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy, likely in the 2023-2024 timeframe, based on the state of construction visible elsewhere at the base. It is not known how many Sentinels were deployed to Sigonella and for how long. The Apple Maps image does lend some credence to earlier reports that these drones may have flown missions in the Black Sea region, gathering intelligence on Russian forces on the heavily defended, occupied Crimean Peninsula, between 2022 and 2023.

Overall, the RQ-170 does still appear to be a go-to for performing penetrating tactical reconnaissance missions, especially when there is a need to provide persistent surveillance in denied areas, resulting in extremely important intelligence collection.

Again, it is important to reiterate here that we do not know if the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operates any other stealthy drones beyond the RQ-170, or has in the past. A very stealthy high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) surveillance and reconnaissance drone commonly and unofficially referred to as the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, burst into the public eye in March after it was spotted landing in broad daylight at a base in Greece. Much about the drone, including what units are involved in its operation and where the home base of the fleet is, as well as the reasons for its deployment to the region, has yet to emerge. It does seem unlikely that the 30th would have taken on operation of the RQ-180, which is a larger strategic reconnaissance-focused platform compared to the smaller, tactically-minded, and less exquisite RQ-170. This is also just one example of what could still be lurking in the classified realm.

Whether or not the awarding of the 2025 RPA Squadron of the Year trophy to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron might now point to a new willingness to talk about that unit’s activities and/or the RQ-170 remains to be seen. Regardless, the award and its description are yet more reminders of just how important the Sentinel remains nearly two decades after it first appeared.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com