scrutiny

The Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman provided back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran through 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The idea that the Gulf states have a responsibility, a moral one, to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions because of good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.

Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; that host countries relinquished territorial sovereignty by allowing US military bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies the attack on those bases as lawful military objectives. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically wrong. Collectively, they add up to a legal argument that, if accepted, would ensure that the Gulf is permanently destabilised, the basic principles of international law are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very security threats that Iran is reacting to are reinforced.

The self-defence claim does not meet the required legal threshold

The UN Charter, in Article 51, permits the use of force only in self-defence against an “armed attack”, and this term is not defined by reference to the state invoking it. The International Court of Justice, in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter restrictively. The Court distinguished between the most grave forms of the use of force, which qualify as armed attacks triggering the right of self-defence, and less grave uses of force that do not. Accordingly, not every use of force, such as minor incidents or limited military activities, amounts to an armed attack. In this light, the mere presence of foreign military bases in Gulf states, maintained for decades under defence agreements with host governments, would not in itself constitute an armed attack against Iran.

Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, requiring that self-defence be necessary and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated either. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to the policy decisions of the United States is neither necessary, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are still available, nor proportional, since it imposes military consequences on states that are not a party to any conflict with Iran.

Critically, Article 51 also has a mandatory procedural element, in that any state employing self-defence is immediately required to notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently evaded this requirement in each of its escalatory actions. While this may seem to be a minor element, it is in fact the means by which the international community is able to verify and check self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement is not employing Article 51. It is exploiting the language of Article 51.

Iran’s reading of Resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion

The provision of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression includes the “action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Iran could rely on this provision to hold the Gulf states that host United States military bases liable for any act of aggression committed from their territories against Iran. Nevertheless, the mere presence of military bases is not sufficient to hold them to be lawful military objectives; this will depend on their actual contribution to military activities against Iran based on the rules of international humanitarian law.

Thus, such an Iranian reading would be wrong on three distinct legal grounds.

First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. The resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression has taken place, not to confer upon states the unilateral power to punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself, in Article 2, asserts the power of the Security Council to make the determination of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the resolution is therefore bypassed altogether.

Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the active launching of an attack, not the passive hosting of a military base. The legal distinction is fundamental. A state, in signing a defence treaty with another and hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is engaging in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling military strikes against a third party, is engaged in a different matter altogether. Iran has not credibly shown this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and this has not constituted armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.

Third, even if Article 3(f) were applicable, the appropriate course would be to bring the matter to the Security Council, not to launch unilateral military strikes. General Assembly resolutions do not override the Charter. Iran cannot rely upon a non-binding resolution defining terms to override the Chapter VII requirements for the use of force or the clear criteria of Article 51.

Sovereignty cannot be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences

Iran, in invoking the principle of good neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to deny the United States basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way principle, and it does not allow for interference in the internal affairs of other states, certainly not interference in the decisions of other states simply because they are deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent right to conclude defence treaties with whomever they choose, and this is so regardless of the opinion of their neighbours.

The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, finances, trains, and supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Experts reports, as well as other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the activities of the IRGC, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil would be engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran will not accept this principle when it is applied to itself. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the party to whom it would be applied is not a legal principle at all; it is a political tool.

A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests

From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to remove the external balancing architecture of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.

Under balance of threat theory, states react to offensive capability, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the right to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a threat, drives each and every threat variable to maximum levels for each and every state in the region. The obvious consequence, evident in the data, is that the states in the region and external powers are becoming more, rather than less, securely integrated. The Fifth Fleet’s permanent base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s expansion of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.

From the perspective of constructivism, the legitimacy of a legal argument is also partly based on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The record of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations, including the enrichment of uranium to a purity level of 60 percent or more in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removal of monitoring cameras, and the overall violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state significantly. A state that is itself a violator of the legal regime cannot claim the role of a law-abiding state seeking protection under the norms of the legal regime.

Iran’s legal rationale was always theoretically wrong. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not simply target US military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and undeniable. Ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states in the opening days of the conflict. This marked the first time one actor had simultaneously attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its attacks in deliberate stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles were fired against military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles were fired against civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles were fired against the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights throughout the region. Videos from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defence. This is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to avoid the conflict.

The rationale provided by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that only targets involved in the preparation or launch of an attack against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. Hotels in Palm Jumeirah are not military command centres. An apartment complex in Manama is not a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s own stated legal rationale, none of these targets was legitimate, yet they were attacked. This was not a legal doctrine at all; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of war revealed this to be the case.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

WASHINGTON — Since a government raid near Waco, Tex., turned into a fiery disaster two years ago, Atty. Gen. Janet Reno has steadfastly defended her decision to storm the besieged compound of the Branch Davidian religious sect and cited a need to rescue the 24 children inside from unsafe and worsening conditions.

But as the episode becomes the focus of renewed attention in the nation’s capital and beyond, fresh questions are centering on certain tactics used by federal agents–specifically the firing of hundreds of rounds of a military-style tear gas into the camp–that may themselves have endangered the children.

At 6:02 a.m. on April 19, 1993, following a 51-day standoff, FBI agents in military tanks advanced from siege lines around the Branch Davidian compound and fired volleys of CS gas inside the buildings to immobilize the heavily armed occupants.

The wooden structures were filled with the gas over the next six hours before the building erupted into flames, leaving more than 80 people dead, including all of the children. Before giving the order to advance, Reno said, she was assured by military experts that CS gas would cause no serious harm or permanent damage to the children of the besieged cult members.

However, it is now clear that medical literature and manufacturers’ warnings available at the time dispute that conclusion.

CS gas is potentially so hazardous when applied in confined spaces that California prison guards are cautioned against using it in the cells of unruly inmates. A Sherman Oaks company suspended sales of CS to the Israeli government in 1988 at the same time Amnesty International linked the gas to the deaths of Palestinians in homes and other buildings in the occupied territories.

Although adults can withstand CS exposure by wearing gas masks, and the Branch Davidian compound was well stocked with military equipment, no masks were available to properly fit children.

“All of those young children who breathed that gas for hours and didn’t have masks would have been in intensive care if they had survived,” said Dr. Alan A. Stone, a Harvard University professor of law and psychiatry who was chosen by the Justice Department to review its performance at Waco and only recently began to speak out. “This seems so clear and apparent that it’s hard for me to imagine how the attorney general, who I have great respect for, could have OKd this.”

The official cause of death for the children, whose bodies were badly burned in the blaze, could not be determined. Smoke inhalation was a leading possibility. However, autopsy records also show that some of the victim’s bodies contained cyanide, a chemical emitted when CS gas–and other substances such as plastic–are heated in a fire. Many of the toddlers and infants may have been overcome by the gas before they died, some experts believe.

In contrast, a government specialist in riot-control agents who requested anonymity said scientific studies indicate that it would be “almost virtually impossible” for large quantities of CS to severely injure any of the Davidians, including the 17 children under age 10. And Justice Department officials say they doubt that many, if any, Davidians breathed significant amounts of CS because of strong winds that whipped through large holes knocked in the building by tank-mounted battering rams to insert the gas.

*

Controversy surrounding the Branch Davidian incident has been fanned by the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, the second anniversary of the Waco blaze. The leading suspect in the fatal attack on the federal building, Timothy J. McVeigh, reportedly considered the Waco siege an example of government’s intention to crush individual liberties, particularly the right to bear arms.

He is not alone. Some conservatives and civil libertarians question whether the full story of the government’s actions at Waco has come to light. At least two congressional committees plan to hold hearings into the Branch Davidian incident this summer.

Officials at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which conducted the initial raid at Waco to serve search warrants related to weapons violations, maintain they have learned painful lessons from their mistakes and adopted changes to ensure they are not repeated.

But the Justice Department has denied being at fault, instead blaming the loss of life solely on Branch Davidian leader David Koresh, who was suspected of stockpiling illegal weapons.

“There is much to be angry about when we talk about Waco, and the government’s conduct is not the reason,” Reno told a gathering of federal law enforcement officers this month. “David Koresh is the reason.”

Henry Ruth, a former federal prosecutor who served on the independent board that reviewed the ATF’s actions, said he found the Justice Department’s review of Waco full of glowing appraisals.

“That is appalling to me when children die in a fire and there is a precedent for it,” said Ruth, citing the five children who burned to death in 1985 when authorities dropped a bomb on the MOVE community building in West Philadelphia. “When they don’t learn their lessons, are children going to die the next time?”

The FBI was called in on Feb. 28, 1993, to resolve an exceedingly difficult situation at the Branch Davidians’ compound after the ATF raid there went awry. As ATF agents stormed the compound, armed cult members opened fire, killing four officers and five Branch Davidian members. After negotiating a cease-fire with Koresh, the FBI decided that its principal goal was gaining the release of the children inside, according to the Justice Department review of the incident.

Koresh sent out 21 children and 14 adults through March 23. But the releases stopped, and he showed no willingness to surrender.

*

As weeks passed, the uncertainty about the outcome began to mount. The FBI’s longest previous standoff had lasted four days. When the Waco encounter entered its second month, the situation became more “dangerous” because of the difficulty in maintaining security around such a large area and because the FBI’s hostage rescue team was exhausted and in need of retraining, Reno said. The FBI had no backup unit.

On the 22nd day, FBI officials recommended using tear gas to clear the compound. Three weeks later, on April 12, the attorney general was briefed on the FBI’s proposal to use CS gas.

In meetings with military experts, Reno was reassured that the plan to drive out the Branch Davidians with gradual applications of CS gas was safe. They referred to cases of children who had completely recovered within hours of being exposed to CS with no long-term effects.

Reno spent more time weighing the merits of the gassing strategy than any other issue at Waco, said Justice Department spokesman Carl Stern. Among those she consulted was Harry Salem, a toxicologist at the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

Reno was advised that although no laboratory tests measuring the effects of CS gas on children had been performed, “anecdotal evidence was convincing” that there would be no permanent injury, according to the Justice Department report. “The military personnel made Reno feel more confident with the concept of tear gas, as opposed to the original concept in her mind of ‘gassing,’ ” the report said.

Salem declined to be interviewed. In written responses to questions submitted by The Times, Salem wrote that CS can be used indoors as long as safety ratios are not exceeded. Achieving lethal concentrations of CS, Salem wrote, would be “extremely difficult.”

After the Waco standoff’s fiery end, Stone, one of the experts retained by the Justice Department to examine what happened, specifically requested the briefing materials Salem provided to Reno. Stone said he was furnished a copy of a 1971 report by the British government that advocated CS as a crowd-control agent in open-air settings.

“There was nothing the attorney general was given in her material and nothing I was ever given which addressed the problem of CS gas in a closed space,” Stone said.

Stone issued a scathing 33-page report in November, 1993, which the Justice Department declined to make available, that criticized the decision to deploy CS gas. In the Justice Department report, Stone wrote, there is no mention during Reno’s deliberations that young children do not have the lung capacity to use gas masks.

“I find it hard to accept a deliberate plan to insert CS gas . . . in a building with so many children,” Stone wrote. “It certainly makes it more difficult to believe that the health and safety of the children was our primary concern.”

Reno has discounted Stone’s criticism, saying he lacks expertise in the field of toxicology.

The danger of applying CS in enclosed spaces is spelled out in an array of medical literature and manufacturers’ reports, including the Army’s guidelines on civil disturbances. Army Field Manual FM 19-15, published in 1985, warns that CS “is not to be used in buildings, near hospitals or in areas where lingering contamination could cause problems.”

Kelly Donahue, spokeswoman for Federal Laboratories Inc., which produces CS gas, said the chemical is designed for use in a large, open area. “If you were to shoot too much in a building or enclosed area, you could suffocate individuals.”

*

CS takes its name from two scientists, B.B. Corson and R.W. Stoughton, who invented it in 1928. The chemical, ortho-chlorobenzal malononitrile, is considered a “super tear gas” because it works instantly, causing burning eyes, coughing, breathing difficulty, stinging skin and vomiting. Though it is commonly referred to as a tear gas, CS is actually a white crystal that looks like talcum powder. In 1959, the Army adopted CS as its standard riot-control agent, and the chemical was used extensively in the Vietnam War.

The widespread use of CS by South Korea on hundreds of thousands of civilians in 1987 was researched by the Physicians for Human Rights group. After discovering that civilians suffered serious acute illnesses, sometimes with permanent injury, the group called for banning the use of CS on humans.

“Exposure to high concentrations of tear gas in small, enclosed spaces for 10 minutes is potentially lethal, particularly to infants and children. . . ,” the organization concluded.

High levels of CS exposure have led to heart failure and death in adults, according to a 1989 report in the Journal of the American Medical Assn. The principal author of the study, Dr. Howard Hu of Harvard University Medical School, said he would have strongly recommended against firing CS into the Branch Davidian compound if there was any chance the occupants would remain inside.

*

In the days leading up to the assault, FBI officials told the attorney general they planned to introduce the CS gradually over two or three days. They hoped to force the Davidians out the front door by using gas at opposite ends of the compound.

But the tear-gas raid on April 19 was anything but gradual.

Within minutes of the initial delivery of two bottles of CS, the Davidians fired automatic weapons at the military armored vehicle, according to the Justice Department report. Two M-60 tanks and four Bradley fighting vehicles responded by launching an all-out assault on all areas of the building. Under the plan approved by Reno, the FBI was authorized to escalate the gassing operation if the tanks encountered resistance.

By 6:31 a.m., half an hour after the mission began, the entire building had been filled with CS. The rest of the morning, the FBI continued to deliver gas volleys through all openings of the residential structure to increase the pressure on the occupants.

The attack was so rapid that the tanks quickly exhausted the supply of tear-gas canisters that was to last for several days. At 7:45 a.m., senior FBI officials requested additional rounds of CS from field offices around the country. By the time the final gas volleys were fired at 11:40 a.m., the Bradley tanks had fired at least 300 rounds at the building and the M-60 combat vehicles had made six gas injections.

*

Clive Doyle was inside the chapel when an M-60 tank burst through the front door spraying CS and as additional so-called ferret rounds from the Bradley vehicles landed through the windows. While most Davidians in the chapel had gas masks, Doyle said, they only worked for about half an hour before the filters started to fail. He said there were screams as the gas burned the skin of some people and left others gasping.

“The ferret rounds were almost like rockets,” said Doyle, 54, who lived at the compound off and on for nearly three decades and was acquitted of all charges at the Branch Davidian trial last year.

“They crashed through windows, came whistling past your head and embedded themselves in the wall,” he said. “You could hear them hissing once they broke open. We were praying to God that somehow we would be delivered.”

Doyle said there was “no doubt” the gas poured into an aboveground concrete bunker where the women and children had retreated. The 20-by-21-foot bunker, which had been used as a locked vault and food cooler, was waist-deep in stored ammunition.

“The children had no protection from [the gas] being sprayed because there were no windows or major holes,” Doyle said. “I can imagine it was agonizing for them without gas masks and being in a cul-de-sac part of the building with no wind.”

FBI officials offered a contrasting view. They say that any suggestion that CS could have worked its way through rooms into the bunker is highly improbable.

“They probably would not have had to don gas masks or shed one tear from the CS that would have entered that bunker,” said the government specialist on tear gas.

The charred remains of children, including at least 10 who were younger than 3, were found in the bunker along with 13 women, seven men and a fetus. Coroner’s investigators determined that mothers put wet blankets around the children and held them in their arms before they died.

Given the large quantities of CS pumped into the building, it would have been very difficult for children to have walked out to safety, as envisioned by the FBI plan, some experts say.

“The kids would never have made it,” said George F. Uhlig, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and professor of chemistry at the College of Eastern Utah who has researched the use of CS at Waco. “Eventually you pump in enough gas and you exclude breathing.”

An arson investigation team compiled by the Texas State Rangers found that the ensuing fire that engulfed the compound was deliberately set by one or more people inside the building. The team concluded that the fire was not caused or spread by any chemicals used in the gassing operation.

It is unclear how many Davidians inhaled the CS gas, according to the Justice Department report. The passage of at least an hour between the last gas attacks and the end of the fire would have allowed evidence of the gas to dissipate in the bodies.

“It is impossible to predict what role CS played in this case,” said Dr. Nizam Peerwani, chief medical examiner of Tarrant County, Tex., whose office performed the toxicological tests on the bodies.

While the criticism has mounted, the Justice Department has held firm that the use of the CS was appropriate. Within the past two weeks, Reno went back to Salem to ask him about the safety of CS gas, according to Justice Department spokesman Stern.

“He hasn’t changed his thinking at all,” Stern said.

Times staff writer Ronald J. Ostrow contributed to this story.