scrambles

German air force says its ‘quick reaction alert force’ was ordered by NATO to investigate Russian plane in neutral airspace.

Germany’s air force says it has scrambled two Eurofighter jets to track a Russian reconnaissance aircraft after it had entered neutral airspace over the Baltic Sea.

In a statement, the air force said its “quick reaction alert force” was ordered on Sunday by NATO to investigate an unidentified aircraft flying without a plan or radio contact.

“It was a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft. After visual identification, we handed over escort duties for the aircraft to our Swedish NATO partners and returned to Rostock-Laage,” it added.

The operation was conducted as NATO prepares to convene its North Atlantic Council on Tuesday to discuss a separate incident involving Russian jets over Estonia.

According to the Reuters news agency, that meeting is to address what Tallinn called an “unprecedented and brazen” violation of its airspace on Friday when three Russian MiG-31 fighters entered without permission and remained for 12 minutes before leaving.

The claim sparked condemnation from NATO and European governments, who called the incursion a “reckless” and “dangerous provocation”.

Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal requested urgent “NATO Article 4 consultations” on the “totally unacceptable” incursion. Article 4 allows NATO members to hold consultations with the alliance when any state believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is under threat.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence denied the allegation while Estonia summoned Moscow’s charge d’affaires in protest.

Tensions have been heightened in recent weeks by a series of airspace violations along NATO’s eastern flank.

Romania said last week that its radar detected a Russian drone, prompting it to scramble fighter jets. Earlier this month, Poland reported that it had shot down several drones during a Russian aerial attack on Ukraine, marking the first time NATO forces have directly engaged in that conflict.

Ukraine has said the incidents show Moscow is testing the West’s resolve as the war is in its fourth year. Military analysts note that such incursions serve as intelligence-gathering operations, tests of NATO’s responses and pressure tactics designed to unsettle NATO members bordering Russia.

SEOUL, Sept. 1 (UPI) — When President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met for a 50-minute bilateral session at the White House, the tariff number — 15 percent instead of 25 — was already fixed. Korean officials and some outlets described it as a reprieve from a looming trade war.

Yet the domestic headlines told a different story. They highlighted investment pledges, industrial cooperation and reassuring words about the alliance. Tariff relief was part of the package, but not the centerpiece. The balance of benefit, however, leaned unmistakably toward Washington.

Days earlier on CNBC, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick described the framework: A National and Economic Security Fund seeded with $350 billion from South Korea and $550 billion from Japan, directed by the White House “for the benefit of the United States.” He later wrote on X that 90% of the profits would flow to Americans. Korean outlets, including Channel A and the Hankyoreh, relayed those remarks, citing CNBC and X. The message was clear: Allied capital would be put to work for America’s industrial revival.

Seoul has stressed that its cash outlay would be under 5%, with the rest in guarantees, and that only a nonbinding memorandum is on the table. But absent a binding text, Washington’s framing has set expectations. That reality was underscored when the two sides failed to issue a joint communiqué, a delay attributed by Korean media to U.S. insistence on details over governance, agriculture and troop flexibility.

The imbalance was visible before the meeting itself. Reports in Seoul noted that Lutnick warned that failure to accept U.S. terms could put the bilateral agreement at risk. Within days, senior Korean officials — from trade negotiators to cabinet ministers and even national security advisers — were on flights to Washington. The spectacle was less partnership than pressure.

Different allies, different burdens

Japan accepted a similar bargain earlier this summer, pledging $550 billion. That figure equals about 13.8% of GDP and 42% of foreign-exchange reserves. For Korea, the comparison is harsher: $350 billion amounts to nearly 19.6% of GDP and roughly 85% of reserves. By scale, Seoul’s commitment presses closer to its limits.

Europe’s number — $600 billion by 2028 — is aspirational and nonbinding. At 3% of EU GDP, it is large in absolute terms but modest relative to the bloc’s size. The contrast is stark. Tokyo could absorb its pledge. Brussels could dilute its own. Seoul had little room to maneuver.

These ratios explain both Korea’s urgency and the United States’ leverage. They also explain the optics. Japan framed its contribution as prudent policy. Europe cast its figure as a horizon. Korea stressed the distinction between guarantees and cash, but Washington’s simple headline — “$350 billion” — defined the story.

Why Washington pressed Seoul hardest

The pressure on Seoul was not only about money. It was also a signal — to Beijing.

Semiconductors. Washington has steadily tightened controls on advanced equipment bound for China, directly affecting Korean firms with plants on the mainland. The point is blunt: Access to critical tools depends on Washington’s approval. Seoul is expected to follow the United States’ industrial lead, not China’s demand curve.

Security posture. The United States has pressed for greater “strategic flexibility” for its forces in Korea, expanding their role from deterring the North to operating across the Indo-Pacific. For Seoul, that raises the risk of Chinese retaliation, a reminder of the backlash that followed the THAAD deployment. For Washington, binding economic commitments to security posture raises the cost of hedging.

Alliance optics. By securing Japan’s $550 billion and Korea’s $350 billion within weeks, Washington has presented a repeatable model: tariff relief traded for ally-financed U.S. reindustrialization. The choreography is deliberate. It shows Beijing not only that the United States intends to rebuild at home, but that it can marshal allied resources to do so.

At home: A political pivot

For Lee, the meeting carried political weight beyond economic issues. Long portrayed by conservatives as too accommodating to Beijing, he struck a decidedly pro-U.S. tone in Washington.

Conservative commentators welcomed the shift as overdue realism. They noted that Lee had at least avoided the catastrophe of a 25% tariff, and some praised his willingness to pivot away from old rhetoric. Yet they also judged the balance sheet harshly: Korea had yielded vast commitments while gaining little in return. To conservatives, Lee may have changed his posture, but his negotiating capacity remained weak.

Progressive voices were more divided. One camp condemned the outcome as a humiliating concession. They seized on Lutnick’s CNBC claim that 90% of the fund’s profits would accrue to Americans, and criticized the government for failing to publish binding details. For them, tariff relief was a fig leaf that concealed structural subordination.

Another camp within the progressive bloc offered a more defensive reading. Faced with Trump’s tariff threat, they argued, Seoul had little choice but to accept difficult terms. From this perspective, the meeting was not a triumph but a narrow escape — a defensive success in preventing immediate economic damage. Even so, this group acknowledged that Korea’s tangible gains were minimal.

The contrast is telling. Conservatives viewed the shift as the right direction but faulted the weakness of execution. Progressives split between those who saw a surrender of sovereignty and those who accepted it as an unavoidable hedge against disaster. In one way or another, both sides recognized the same truth: The deal left Korea carrying a heavy burden with little new benefit.

The lesson

This was not a balanced bargain. It was leverage at work: punitive tariffs as default, partial relief as inducement, and capital commitments transformed into U.S. industrial policy. By GDP and reserves, Korea’s pledge is the most burdensome among U.S. allies. That is why Seoul faced sharper pressure — and why the outcome doubles as a signal to China.

For South Korea, the question is not whether to lean toward Washington or Beijing. It is whether to shape this new U.S. template with enforceable reciprocity — or subsidize it without return. That starts with transparency: publish the clauses, specify governance and profit sharing, define dispute settlement.

The broader lesson extends beyond Seoul. Tariffs, once a crude tool of protection, have become bargaining chips that compel allied investment. Investment, once a symbol of trust, has become the price of market access. Allies, once accustomed to sharing defense burdens, are now asked to bankroll America’s reindustrialization.

The world is watching. China sees a coalition disciplined by economic leverage. Europe sees an approach it cannot yet match. And South Korea — caught between limited buffers and deep dependence on the U.S. market — is learning what it means when Washington dictates and an ally is forced to scramble in response.

In a sprawling county where transit lines are sometimes miles apart, transit leaders’ plans for the 2028 Olympics and Paralympics rely on a robust fleet of buses to get people to and from venues and avoid a traffic meltdown.

The plan hinges on a $2-billion ask of the Trump administration to lease 2,700 buses to join Metro’s fleet of roughly 2,400, traveling on a network of designated lanes to get from venue to venue. But with roughly three years to go until opening day, the plan faces several challenges over funding and time.

The federal government has yet to respond to the city’s request. And Metro’s commitment to lease clean energy buses could pose supply problems and challenges around charging infrastructure. Operators would also need to be trained under state regulations and provided housing through the Games.

“Three years might seem like a lot of time to many of us, but in municipal time, three years is like the blink of an eye. That’s our greatest challenge.” said Daniel Rodman, a member of the city of L.A.’s office of major events, at a recent UCLA transit forum. “Father Time is coming.”

The Games will be scattered in places across the region including Alamitos Beach in Long Beach, the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, Santa Anita Park in Arcadia, the L.A. Coliseum and Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles and outside the county in Anaheim and all the way to northern San Diego County. Official watch parties and fan gatherings will also occur throughout the metropolis. Since these and many of the venues aren’t directly accessible by rail, the bus system will be key to the city’s push for “transit first” — a motto that city leaders have adopted since Mayor Karen Bass’ previous messaging around a “car-free Olympics.”

The bus system will be key to the city’s push for “transit first.”

(Gabriella Angotti-Jones / Los Angeles Times)

Outside the bus system, several transit projects in the works are expected to ease some of the traffic burden, including the extension for the Metro D Line, also known as the Purple Line, which Metro has slated for completion before the Olympics, and the opening of the automated people mover train at Los Angeles International Airport, which will offer an alternative to driving to the airport. There are also proposals for water taxi use from San Pedro to Long Beach, where multiple events will be held, to offer an alternative to the Vincent Thomas and Long Beach International Gateway bridges.

The big question is whether enough people in a famously auto-bound city will be willing to take public transit. Leaders believe that tourists are likely to take advantage of the system, and hope more Angelenos will too.

“All of our international visitors know how to ride public transportation — it’s second nature for our people coming from other countries,” county Supervisor and Metro board Chair Janice Hahn said at a recent UCLA forum, pointing to the Paris Olympics and the city’s long use of public transit. “It’s the Angelenos that we’re still trying to attract. So I’m thinking the legacy will be a good experience on a bus or a train that could translate after the Olympics to people riding Metro.”

Los Angeles leaders warned of major traffic jams ahead of the 1984 Olympics. Then-Councilmember Pat Russell advised residents to leave the city and take a vacation, and many Angelenos rented out their homes to visitors. Fears loomed that if the city couldn’t nail down a transit plan, the experience would be a disaster and spectators would encounter a fate similar to the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, N.Y., where thousands of people were stranded in below-freezing temperatures after the shuttle bus system became overloaded, according to Times archival reports.

“Of all the problems we’re faced with these Olympics Games, transportation is the surest and most inevitable mess unless we get the cooperation and support of people to adjust their use of their personal vehicles,” Capt. Ken Rude, the head of California Highway Patrol’s Olympic planning unit, told The Times a year before the 1984 Games. Months earlier, he warned that traffic jams could be so bad that people would be forced to abandon their cars on freeways.

Traffic on the 110 Freeway in downtown Los Angeles during the 1984 Summer Olympics.

(Michael Montfort / Michael Ochs Archives via Getty Images)

In the end, catastrophe was avoided. The plan 40 years ago was similar to today’s — build a robust bus system to shuttle Olympics fans, athletes and leaders throughout the county.

Traffic was manageable, whether due to transit plans that relied on an additional 550 buses to assist a fleet of 2,200, temporarily turned some streets one-way and limited deliveries to certain hours, or an exodus of residents as people left the area ahead of the Games, in part due to the dire predictions of complete gridlock.

But fast-forward, Los Angeles’ population has grown from nearly 8 million in 1984 to 9.7 million today, and the region is expecting millions more spectators than it did during the last Games. Estimates for the overall number of expected visitors are still vague, but planners have anticipated as many as 9 million more ticket holders than in the 1984 Olympics.

“There’s a mountain to be moved and if you move it one year, it’s a lot harder than in three years,” said Juane Matute, deputy director of UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies. “The buses are hard enough to get, but all of these policy and regulatory changes may be hard as well.”

Metro has received leasing commitments for roughly 650 buses so far. Vehicles aside, it will take time to get bus operators properly trained, tested and certified to operate public transit in the state, Matute said. An estimated 6,000 additional bus operators would be needed to drive people throughout the Games. Metro has said that those operators are expected to be provided through transit agencies loaning the buses.

In the latest state budget proposal, $17.6 million from the state’s highway fund would go toward Olympics and Paralympics planning, including Metro’s Games Route Network, which would designate a series of roads for travel by athletes, media members, officials, the International Olympics Committee, spectators and workers. But city and Metro leaders have continued to raise concerns over the funding gap, especially since the additional buses and priority lanes network in 2028 won’t be a permanent fixture to Los Angeles, and as the agency grapples with budget challenges as it faces a $2.3-billion deficit by 2030.

A cycle rickshaw driver, of Deke’s Muscled Cabs, transports a passenger, possibly an athlete, during the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.

(Michael Montfort / Michael Ochs Archives via Getty Images)

Olympics planners, on the other hand, are confident that transportation will be successful.

“L.A. has invested unto itself a lot in infrastructure here and transportation infrastructure — far more than it did in ‘84,” LA28 Chair Casey Wasserman said after a three-day visit from the International Olympic Committee.

“We feel very confident that it’ll be a different version of the success we had in ‘84 in terms of ingress and egress and access and experience when it comes to transportation.”

Times staff writer Thuc Nhi Nguyen contributed to this report.