Russias

Countries in Central Asia have begun buying oil from Iran as the Russian fuel supplies they have long depended on run dry amid Ukraine’s mounting attacks on Russian energy infrastructure to degrade Moscow’s war effort.

In August, Tajikistan announced it was receiving oil and petroleum products from Iran as Dushanbe faces uncertainty over its fuel supply from Russia. Tehran also agreed to establish a joint refinery in Kyrgyzstan in August, and supply the country with crude oil.

Moscow has been facing fuel shortages due to Ukrainian drone strikes on its refineries as Russia’s war on its neighbour continues to rage.

Can the Russian fuel crisis give Iran a new oil opening in Central Asia?

Here’s what we know:

Which Central Asian countries have been affected by Russia’s fuel crisis?

Ukraine’s offensive against Russian energy infrastructure has caused panic across Central Asian countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are dependent on Moscow for oil and petroleum products.

Tajikistan has traditionally sourced up to 80 percent of its petroleum products from Russia. Kyrgyzstan also relies on petroleum product imports, sourcing more than 90 percent of its petrol from Russia.

“They’ve been hurt the most,” Galiya Ibragimova, a Moldova-based expert on Central Asia with Carnegie Politika, which has its headquarters in Berlin, told Al Jazeera in an interview in August.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the free trade bloc of five former Soviet nations dominated by Russia and the Kremlin’s political decisions.

Tajikistan is not a member of the group, but it bought discounted Russian fuel as “payment for political loyalty, not because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is so kind”, Ibragimova added.

Kazakhstan, meanwhile, boasts three giant, Soviet-era oil refineries. Still, fuel prices in the country have increased by 15.6 percent this year, the UlusMedia website reported on July 10.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is less dependent on Russian energy, with domestic production capable of reaching 100,000 tonnes of petroleum products per month, satisfying most of the country’s needs. But due to the increase in oil demand from its regional neighbours, Uzbekistan has also been forced to diversify its imports and has begun striking deals with countries like Georgia and Iraq.

Why is there a fuel crisis in Russia?

Russia has been facing a severe fuel deficit as Kyiv’s drone strikes – launched in an effort to degrade Moscow’s ability to maintain its ongoing invasion of Ukraine – have knocked out an estimated quarter to half of its total oil refining capacity.

To tackle the problem, Russia has imposed fuel rationing. Sales are often limited to about 20-30 litres (about 5-8 US gallons) per vehicle, and drivers must pump fuel strictly into vehicle tanks. Filling jerry cans is largely prohibited.

Earlier, the government banned petrol and jet fuel exports. Officials are now weighing a ban on diesel exports, too. Authorities have loosened fuel-quality regulations, temporarily allowing lower-grade fuel for the domestic market.

A state of emergency has also been declared in Russian-occupied Crimea, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014. A Russian-owned oil firm in India, Nayara Energy, has reportedly sold petroleum to Russia.

While Russian President Putin acknowledges the crisis, he appears reluctant to end the war on Ukraine and insists the situation is under control.

“These attacks on our facilities certainly create problems – that is obvious. We are currently seeing a certain shortage, though I would say it is not critical,” he said earlier this year.

“First and foremost, we have to rapidly and significantly increase production of air defence systems that are most in demand. We must also continue to improve them… Repairs at refineries must be completed more quickly.”

So, how is Iran helping Central Asia?

Amid Russian fuel shortages, Central Asian countries like Tajikistan have begun striking deals with Iran.

In August, Tajikistan’s Energy and Water Resources Ministry told the Asia-Plus news agency that the country is receiving oil and petroleum products from Iran. The ministry has not disclosed the route used to transport the products, but Tajikistan expects to receive 2.55 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products from Iran.

Besides Tajikistan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian welcomed a proposal from Kyrgyzstan in August to establish a joint refinery in the Central Asian country, according to a report by Iran’s Tasnim news agency,

Under the agreement, Pezeshkian said, “The crude oil needed by the refinery can be supplied by Iran, and the products can be divided between the two sides.”

Will exporting oil to Central Asian countries help Iran?

The United States and Israel’s war on Iran has affected Tehran’s oil revenues. Data released by the government-administered Statistical Center of Iran in September showed that gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 10.1 percent year-on-year between March 21 and June 20, the first quarter of the Persian calendar.

Tehran’s ability to sell crude has also been dramatically curtailed by the US naval blockade of Iran’s ports, imposed for most of the war, which began in late February.

Iranian crude and condensate loadings collapsed from about two million barrels per day (bpd) in March to roughly 740,000bpd in July and just 220,000-255,000bpd in August, according to estimates from Kpler and Vortexa.

TankerTrackers.com told the Reuters news agency in September that 29 tankers, carrying 36.11 million barrels of crude, were trapped in the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Vortexa estimated that total Iranian crude afloat had fallen from 135 million barrels at the end of July to 107 million barrels by late August.

Amid these challenges, Iran has been scrambling to find new countries to trade oil with. Russian fuel shortages have opened up new opportunities for Iran in Central Asia, at least in the short term, according to analysts.

How does Iranian oil reach Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Iran does not share a border with either country.

To get to Tajikistan, Iranian “oil and refined products have to cross Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by rail”, said Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

To get to Kyrgyzstan, Iranian oil would also need to pass through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Is trading oil with Iran logistically sustainable for Central Asia?

It is unlikely, Schneider said.

“This opportunity [for Iran] depends on Ukraine continuing to hit Russian refineries, which seems unlikely, both given the waning of Ukraine’s strike capability and the US government’s demand to stop the attacks as they put too much strain on global oil markets,” he told Al Jazeera.

He noted that US President Donald Trump has pressed his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, repeatedly in September for an “energy truce” with Russia, since diesel prices have become a political problem for Trump ahead of the November midterm elections in the US.

“Those truces have so far collapsed within hours, but the direction is clear. Once the strikes stop, or once Russia repairs its plants, Russian fuel will come back to Central Asia duty-free under Eurasian Economic Union arrangements, and Iran will struggle to compete on price,” he said.

Logistics also favour Russia with respect to importing oil to countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, he said.

Unlike Iran, Russia shares a border with both.

“Tajikistan’s own request [for oil] would need around 51,000 rail tank cars, and its main refinery at Dangara has never operated commercially at scale. Russia, by contrast, has decades’ worth of logistics infrastructure, pipelines, rail links, and supply contracts into the region,” Schneider said.

Is Central Asia a big enough market to compensate for Iran’s Hormuz losses?

No, according to Schneider.

Tajikistan’s total demand, Schneider said, was about 50,000bpd.

That is a drop in the ocean compared with the 1.7 million bpd Iran exported by sea a year ago. China reported $9.96bn in two-way trade with Iran in 2025, a figure that does not include some $31.2bn in Iranian oil shipments, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“This suggests that Central Asia can be a useful outlet for Iranian diesel and gasoline, but it cannot replace the Chinese market,” Schneider said.

For Tehran, Central Asia’s importance depends on how the US-Israel war on Iran develops, he said, adding that Tehran also needs to stay on good terms with Russia, with which it has a deep strategic partnership.

“Iran cannot afford to be seen as poaching Russian customers too aggressively, so it will present itself as a stopgap supplier, which, again, limits how much it can earn there,” he said.

What other risks does Central Asia face in buying Iranian oil?

Schneider warned that Central Asian nations could be hit with Washington’s secondary sanctions on Iran.

“Legally, US secondary sanctions apply to any foreign company or bank that conducts a significant transaction in Iranian petroleum, wherever it is based, and the Treasury expanded the list of sanctionable conduct in August. A Treasury official has already warned publicly that anyone in this trade ‘incurs that risk themselves’,” he noted.

But Schneider said that, politically, the US sanctioning Central Asian governments is unlikely.

“Central Asia is the arena of a new ‘Great Game’ between Russia, China and the United States, and Washington is courting the region harder than at any point since the 1990s, chiefly for its critical minerals. Kazakhstan alone holds about half of the minerals the US classifies as critical, including uranium and tungsten,” he said.

“Sanctioning a Central Asian government for buying fuel from Iran would push them straight back into closer ties to Russia and China,” he noted.

“What I would expect instead are targeted designations of individual traders, rail and logistics operators and smaller banks, combined with quiet pressure on the region’s correspondent banks. That alone is enough to raise the cost and slow the trade, but will come at the price of these countries redoubling their efforts to decouple economically and financially from the US.”

Putin warned the West he would deploy nuclear weapons if necessary to defend the Russian Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ruled out a ceasefire on long-range strikes with Ukraine as Moscow steps up its campaign of aerial attacks on Kyiv.

“We are told: ‘Let them stop striking your refineries, and you will stop striking their ships.’ It is simply ridiculous,” Putin said on Thursday at the Valdai political forum in Moscow.

The remarks followed a meeting between United States President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in New York on September 22, when Zelenskyy said Kyiv was ready to cease strikes on Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities if Moscow also stopped its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Speaking at the forum of the Moscow-based think tank, Putin said Ukraine had “partially achieved its objectives” with ⁠these strikes, with attacks on Russian ⁠oil refineries having cost the country 1 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), but added that Russia ⁠was now responding in kind.

Russia has ramped up long-range strikes, targeting Ukraine’s steel companies as well as supply chains, notably in the rail sector. Ukraine accuses Moscow of deliberately hitting civilian targets and keeping Kyiv on a near-constant state of alert as it braces for another tough winter.

A Russian drone struck a school in Kyiv on Thursday, according to city officials, as the Ukrainian capital endured relentless aerial attacks. No casualties were reported as children and staff at the school were in shelters when the drone hit.

Putin added that Russia would prefer to end the conflict in Ukraine through talks and wanted it to ⁠be a neutral ⁠country after the end ⁠of hostilities.

The nuclear option

He warned the West not to escalate the standoff over Ukraine by threatening the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is wedged between Poland and Lithuania, and pledged to defend it with nuclear weapons if necessary.

“If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation – in this case, we are referring to Kaliningrad, and perhaps other territories as well – the question of the Russian Federation deploying all the weapons at our country’s disposal will, of course, inevitably and immediately be on the agenda,” he said.

Putin’s comments followed a diplomatic note which NATO said this week it had received from Russia, warning the Western military alliance it would be ready to resort to nuclear weapons if NATO attempted to cut off Russia’s Baltic exclave.

Putin warned that cycles of escalation in international conflict ⁠could quickly lead to dangerous scenarios. “We must realise that the moment when nothing can be changed any longer may come very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. The logic of escalating, increasingly harsh retaliatory measures leads to a fatal point of no return,” ⁠he said.

On the contrary, in the event of a “favourable scenario”, Putin said the assets of Western companies that Moscow had seized could potentially be returned. Putin last month ordered the seizure of businesses and assets of Swiss food giant Nestle, French retailer Auchan, the former Leroy Merlin DIY chain and German wholesaler and food retailer Metro.

Victory of United Russia party strengthens Putin’s hand even as the war with Ukraine grows more unpopular.

President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party has won a record supermajority in tightly orchestrated parliamentary polls that excluded virtually any genuine opposition, near complete official results show.

With over 58 percent of votes secured, United Russia, which has dominated Russian politics for 25 years, is on track to win more than three quarters of the seats in the lower house, the State Duma, according to the results announced on Monday after three days of voting that ended on Sunday.

The polls were the first parliamentary vote since Russian forces invaded Ukraine in 2022 and the first to include residents of four Ukrainian regions that were seized and illegally annexed by Moscow later that year.

Reporting from Moscow, Al Jazeera’s Dmitry Medvedenko said the results, along with a high voter turnout of almost 60 percent, “is likely to be seen by Moscow as emboldening, as public support for what it is doing, especially for what it’s doing in Ukraine for the continuation of the war”.

Ella Pamfilova, chair of the Central Electoral Commission, said Yabloko, the only registered anti-war party in Russia, did not win any seats at the national level. It had been removed from the ballot last month by Russia’s Supreme Court and only had a few dozen candidates in single-seat races.

Yabloko did enter the regional parliament in western Russia’s Novgorod region. It said on social media that it received about 12,000 votes – just over six percent of votes and enough to enter the regional legislature.

Yabloko and the Communist Party, which has criticised some aspects of government policy but carefully avoided any criticism of Putin, said many of their observers were turned away from polling stations.

The Communists made it into parliament with 13.8 percent of the vote, securing 40 Duma seats. The nationalist LDPR party won 25 seats and the New People party 20.

Russia did not invite observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which the Foreign Ministry has accused of “double standards” for its criticism of the country. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Pere Joan Pons said the decision to exclude observers violated Russia’s commitments as a member.

‘Surprise to nobody’

Many Russians appeared unsurprised by the poll results.

“In the morning, I saw that ⁠⁠United Russia was winning. It probably comes as a surprise to nobody,” said Moscow resident Tatyana.

Asked what she would like to change, she said: “Well, I guess everyone knows the most acute thing – the conflict in Ukraine. I’d like to see it end sooner, with peaceful methods if possible”.

The continuation of the war risks entrenching policies, which are increasingly affecting average Russians and the parliamentary supermajority may struggle to change the dynamic.

“Putin, of course, will interpret United Russia’s results as confirmation of the (public) support of the war, even though it is not the case: The overall demand for ending the war is growing,” said Tatyana Stanovaya of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in an online commentary.

“The main question is: What now? There are great concerns about mobilisation, new repressions, harsher measures and escalation,” she wrote.

Western criticism

The EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas dismissed Russia’s “so-called” election.

“The Kremlin silenced dissent, barred the only registered party that opposed its war in Ukraine and shut out international election monitors. The veneer of democracy is all that remains in Russia,” Kallas said.

In a joint statement, five countries, including Australia, Britain and Canada, condemned Russia’s “sham” parliamentary elections in areas of occupied Ukraine, branding them “part of a wider system of occupation”.

Russia’s parliamentary elections offer an excellent opportunity for a new round in the information war between the West and Russia. Western politicians, experts and journalists have been given yet another convenient occasion to tell their target audiences that democracy has long ceased to exist in Russia; that the federal parliament, like any other representative body, in practice determines nothing in Russian life; and that all genuinely important decisions for the country are made not even by the government but exclusively in the Kremlin, by an extremely narrow circle of individuals accountable to no one.

Therefore, in the view of many critics of the Russian authorities, elections in Russia need not have been held at all: their outcome was predetermined by Kremlin political strategists and, in any event, will have no significant impact on the country’s future.

And yet even the most biased outside observer could hardly fail to notice the obvious: the Russian authorities made consistent and persistent efforts to ensure that these elections attracted the highest possible participation and were conducted successfully under current electoral law. For at least the past several months, the country had experienced heightened political activity.

Leading politicians and state officials constantly reminded the electorate of the importance of the coming elections. Governors of politically “problematic” regions were urgently allocated additional subsidies. Payments to certain categories of public-sector employees and pensioners were hastily indexed. And inevitable but unpopular or painful decisions for the public – for example, the forthcoming significant nationwide increase in housing and utility tariffs – were postponed until after the elections.

Even possible shifts in Russia’s position on the conflict with Ukraine and future relations with the West were often linked in public and political discussions to the results of the September elections, which were supposedly meant to “untie the hands” of the Russian leadership, although there were very different, sometimes diametrically opposed, views about how exactly the leadership would use these “untied hands”. In any case, it must be acknowledged that the Kremlin did not take the easy path of its opponents in Kyiv, who simply postponed the 2024 Ukrainian presidential election until better, “postwar” times, despite clear discontent and muted grumbling from part of Ukraine’s political class.

What is going on here? Why should the Kremlin invest so much energy and so many resources in what is often interpreted outside Russia as little more than an unconvincing simulation of genuine political competition? Why launch a new full electoral cycle while a large-scale military conflict has yet to end, when the normal boundaries of peacetime political democracy tend, one way or another, to narrow?

It is difficult to suppose that holding elections in Russia is driven solely by Kremlin strategists’ obsessive desire to impress, at all costs, either their external opponents or their partners abroad. As for the former, they would not change their views about the nature of the Russian political system, even in the hypothetical event that the elections ended in a complete triumph for the radical opposition and a crushing defeat for all pro-Kremlin candidates. Such a scenario would most likely lead to endless speculation about yet another “cunning Putin plan”, intended to mislead a credulous Western public and conceal the consistently authoritarian nature of Russia’s political regime.

As for the latter, it is hard to imagine that the leaders of Iran, North Korea, Belarus or China are seriously concerned about the state or future of Russian democracy. The political systems of their countries, like those of many other foreign friends and partners of Russia, to put it mildly, do not entirely conform to the classical standards of Western liberal democracies. It is doubtful that Kim Jong Un, Alexander Lukashenko or, say, Mohammed bin Salman, or even Donald Trump, would suddenly decide to offer Vladimir Putin wise advice on how to organise polling stations properly and count votes.

It is hardly likely that the Kremlin felt an urgent need to erect elaborate and expensive but not especially durable scenery on the Russian political stage when the reaction of the potential audience to the forthcoming theatrical production was known in advance. It seems more logical to assume that the Russian authorities need elections not as cosmetic decoration for the façade of their political system, designed to attract the indifferent gaze of an outside observer, but as a quite effective and, above all, much-needed mechanism for maintaining dialogue between the authorities and society in the difficult geopolitical and socio-economic conditions of autumn 2026.

First and foremost, the Russian authorities are fighting hard for a high turnout, creating the most comfortable possible conditions for their voters to cast their ballots. This is no accident. A high turnout is convincing evidence of the population’s continued political activity and of the fact that Russian society has not descended into political apathy and wholesale cynicism. The idea of active civic participation is far from an empty phrase for the country’s leadership. In this sense, even a vote against the main “party of power”, United Russia, is clearly preferable to the alternative of a significant part of the electorate conspicuously choosing not to participate in the elections.

No less important, the authorities need the election results as a barometer of current public preferences, something even the most accurate opinion polls or in-depth sociological research cannot replace. Contemporary Russia undoubtedly has its own, albeit relatively narrow, political spectrum of “systemic opposition” parties reflecting the differing interests and expectations of various social, economic, age and regional groups. The constantly changing balance of power between these parties must, one way or another, be taken into account by the authorities when determining the future priorities of their strategy.

For example, relative success for the Communist Party, A Just Russia and candidates from other left-wing parties would be a signal that the authorities should pay more attention to social programmes, the fight against economic inequality and social polarisation, and to countering the many remnants of “wild capitalism” left over from the 1990s. Conversely, a large number of votes cast for the New People party and other right-wing candidates would provide grounds for accelerating structural economic reforms and creating additional opportunities for the private sector, including small and medium-sized businesses. Strong electoral results for the Liberal Democratic Party would indicate growing nationalist tendencies in Russian society. The authorities may respond to such political signals in different ways, but they cannot ignore them and must therefore read shifts in public sentiment correctly.

Moreover, it can be assumed with a considerable degree of confidence that the State Duma elections will, one way or another, lead to substantial changes in the composition of not only the lower house of the Russian parliament but also Russia’s federal government. Following the elections, significant personnel changes are likely to take place in the executive branch – both at the federal level and at other levels. Such personnel changes, in turn, will make room for fresh ideas, innovative programmes, unconventional projects and proposals. There is a clear demand for renewal in Russian society today. Parliamentary elections are one way of responding convincingly to this demand without calling into question the stability of the state’s overall strategy or its senior leadership.

The Duma elections are the first parliamentary elections held during the special military operation, during which Russian society has changed considerably. In a sense, they can be called a large-scale political experiment whose outcome remains difficult to predict with precision. For example, it is still difficult to determine with confidence which political force will be supported by the majority of people who have participated in the special military operation or who remain on the line of contact. No less uncertainty remains regarding the likely political preferences of many residents of the new Russian regions, for whom the September elections will be their first State Duma election in their new status.

Such an experiment probably carries a degree of risk for the Russian leadership. Nevertheless, the leadership appears prepared to take that risk, not without reason viewing elections not only as an important but as an indispensable mechanism for public confirmation of its continuing political legitimacy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Russians head to the polls from Friday to Sunday to elect members of the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, in the first parliamentary election to be held since the country launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The vote comes as Russians face a slowing economy as well as Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries and warehouses far from the front line.

United Russia, the governing party that backs President Vladimir Putin, is expected to keep its dominant position.

The authorities are presenting the election as a chance for voters to have their say. Critics argue that with no genuine opposition on the ballot, the result is largely settled in advance.

So why are the elections worth watching? Here is what you need to know:

How do Russia’s elections work?

Starting Friday and lasting through Sunday, Russians will elect members of the lower house, the State Duma.

They will also cast ballots in local elections.

Voters in 11 regions will elect their governors, and 39 regions will elect members of regional legislatures.

Voting is spread over three days to boost turnout among the 111 million eligible voters and includes areas Russia occupies in Ukraine. Electronic voting is allowed.

Half of the Duma’s 450 seats are filled by party lists and the other half are contested in single-ballot races.

What is United Russia?

Russia’s governing party, formed in 2001 from a merger of pro-Kremlin parties, has backed Putin and dominated the parliament ever since.

United Russia won more than two-thirds of the Duma’s seats in the 2021 election. It is again poised to dominate the body.

The party’s list is led by political heavyweights: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s top diplomat for 22 years, and Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow’s powerful mayor.

In an apparent bid to add fresh faces to what is widely seen as a party of bureaucrats, its third-highest-ranking official is war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, who was badly wounded by a Ukrainian drone.

Members of United Russia have pledged to back the war effort and Putin’s maximalist goals in what the Kremlin calls the “special military operation” in Ukraine.

Who else is running in Russia’s elections?

Alongside United Russia, other “systemic opposition” parties that vote in sync with the government on key issues are also expected to remain.

The liberal Yabloko Party, the only registered political party that opposes the war, was initially on the ballot, but the Supreme Court ordered it removed in August.

It cited, among other reasons, that the antiwar stance was akin to seeking the violation of Russia’s territorial integrity. Yabloko now runs only single-ballot races.

The Communist Party has been a leading force in the Federal Assembly since the 1990s, led for more than three decades by 82-year-old Gennady Zyuganov, a former Soviet official.

Throughout Putin’s rule of more than a quarter-century, the Communists have criticised some aspects of government policy but carefully avoided any criticism of him. They steadfastly support the war in Ukraine.

Alexander Bratersky, a political analyst and independent journalist, told Al Jazeera that the race for second place is worth watching.

If the Communist Party nab second, it would “suggest voters are angry about economic hardship and falling living standards”.

The Liberal Democratic Party, an ultranationalist force that has been a significant presence in the legislature since the early 1990s, will also likely retain some influence in the Duma.

Like the Communists, it staunchly supports the war and boasts of having multiple veterans as members.

Other smaller parties round out the ballot.

The party known as A Just Russia has been on Russia’s political scene for 20 years. A social-democratic party, it competes with the Communists for older and middle-aged voters nostalgic for the Soviet past, and it supports the war in Ukraine.

The New People Party was founded shortly before the last parliamentary election in 2021, seeking to position itself as a liberal voice representing younger voters and technocrats. It won just more than 5 percent of the vote, allowing it to form a small faction.

Bratersky described the party as “a liberal-leaning party backed by some Kremlin people who are more technocratic and more pro-peace”.

He said it appeals to the “middle-class audience”, and after the Kremlin banned Yabloko, it has been viewed as its substitute.

“So, if they come third with a good number of votes, this is a sign that those who are antiwar used them as their legal avatar,” he said.

Other parties seeking seats include Communists of Russia, a small rival of the main Communist Party; the Party of Pensioners; the Green Party; the Party of Direct Democracy; and the Motherland Party.

Why do the elections matter to the Kremlin?

While these elections may seem routine, the fact that they are the first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is what makes them important, Bratersky told Al Jazeera.

He said that Putin has linked the elections to support for the war: Endorsing United Russia at its party congress in August, Putin said the party’s duty was “to do everything for victory” in the war in Ukraine.

“This shows that the Kremlin is a bit worried since the elections are the only legal way to show disrespect for the Kremlin,” Bratersky said. “Even Putin’s core fans hate United Russia as a corrupt force.”

How have past elections gone?

Since Putin first came to power in 2000, United Russia has won every Duma election, usually by a wide margin.

The results have repeatedly been disputed.

In 2011, allegations of vote-rigging set off the largest street protests of Putin’s rule.

After the 2021 vote, independent monitors and statisticians said the party’s real support was far lower than the official count.

The authorities have rejected claims of widespread fraud. Opposition parties and critics of the war have increasingly been kept off the ballot.

Warsaw also says it has scrambled military planes in response to a Russian attack in western Ukraine, close to its border.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk says that intelligence information suggests Russia plans to launch drone and missile attacks against countries supporting Ukraine.

Warsaw’s leader outlined the assessment during an address to parliament on Thursday, saying that the attacks will be meant to weaken NATO’s ability to act collectively in response.

“According to intelligence assessments, Russia’s plan … includes hybrid drone and missile strikes against countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland,” Tusk said.

European countries suspect Moscow of being behind a series of acts of sabotage in recent months to put pressure on the allies, especially Germany, helping Kyiv in its bid to resist Russia’s full-scale invasion – something the Kremlin has vigorously denied.

“These potential strikes would be quote-unquote ‘accidental’ in nature, intended to paralyse or at least weaken the resolve of NATO states to invoke the relevant NATO provisions in the event of aggression against a member country,” Tusk added.

He did not elaborate on which intelligence agencies had provided the warning.

He also said such attacks by Russia could coincide with “political changes in certain European countries granting power – or at least a powerful voice – to those who, increasingly invoking noble slogans of peace, pacifism and needless casualties, will call for peace – or rather, the total capitulation of Ukraine”.

Tusk appeared to be referring to the advance of more Russia-friendly parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) and National Rally in France.

Air raid near border with Poland

Earlier on Thursday, Poland said it had scrambled military planes in response to a Russian attack in western Ukraine, close to the Polish border.

Airports in Rzeszow and Lublin were temporarily closed, and residents of two eastern regions of Poland received air raid warnings. Local media reported that sirens had sounded and that pupils in some schools had sought shelter.

“Very close to the Polish border, not far from Dorohusk, a petrol station was most likely attacked again,” Tusk said.

On Sunday, a Russian drone hit a passenger train in Ukraine, just two kilometres (1.6 miles) from the Polish border.

Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said Poland was strengthening airspace protection.

“We have increased F-16 and helicopter activity, and are reinforcing our air defence and rapid response systems,” he wrote on X.

Tusk said he would visit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday to discuss cooperation within the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition, a group of European countries developing an air defence system with Ukraine as a cheaper alternative to the US-built Patriot.

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine make that the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At leats one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it’s size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com